Volume 18 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari.</p>

<p>Appeal — Assignment op Errors. — According to rules 42 and 43 of this court it is incumbent upon the appellant to assign the particular errors alleged to have been committed by the court below. ■</p> <p>Judgment — Opinion op Trial • Judge — Time Within Which It Should be Delivered. — According to the provisions of 'section 227 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by an Act approved March 1, 1911, the judge shall make out and file a brief statement of the case setting out the facts as found by him and giving the reasons for his decision. But this provision does not direct that the statement should be made previously, simultaneously, or subsequently to the judgment and, therefore, the fact that the statement was made after the judgment was rendered does not render the judgment null and void.</p> <p>Qbligations — Lack op Evidence — Burden op Proop. — The burden of proof to show the existence of an obligation is upon the party demanding the enforcement thereof, according to section 1182 of the Civil Code and section 108 of ithe Law of Evidence, and when such proof is lacking the legal maxim actore non probante reus est absolvendus is applicable.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal, from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Possessory Title Proceedings — Irremediable Defects — Nature of Right Sought to ibe Recorded. — In order that a property he admitted to record in the registry on the strength of possessory title proceedings instituted by a husband in the name of his wife it is necessary to show whether said property is considered as property of the conjugal partnership or as the private property of the wife, and proceedings failing to set forth this contain an irremediable defect which prevents its admission to record.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence op Civil Status op Party Instituting the Proceedings. — It is ■ not an indispensable requisite to possessory title proceedings that the civil status of the party commencing the proceedings at the time of making the purchase of the property therein mentioned be shown, as that is a fact which can be established by any admissible evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Remediable Defects — Witnesses in Possessory Title Proceedings — Evidence That They Are Property Owners — Powers op Registrars. — It ap- ■ pearing from the record that the witnesses testified under oath and in the presence of the judge as to their residence and as to whether or not thejy owned property, and that the judge held that such requirements of the law had been duly proven, such finding of the judge should be accepted by the registrar.</p>

<p>Cancellation of Record — Award of Rural Property at Public Sale. — A record of the award of a rural property at a public sale having been made in the registry the cancellation thereof cannot be made without the consent of the person in whose name the record has been entered and unless the legal ground authorizing the cancellation has been duly alleged and proven.</p>

<p>Demubber — Decision on Demurrer not Shown in Recobd. — When a demurrer and an answer to the complaint raising questions of law and of fact are filed at the same time the questions of law should he decided first; and when the record does not show what disposition was made of the demurrer and it appears that a judgment was rendered upon the questions of fact it must he presumed that the demurrer was overruled.</p> <p>Water Rights — Declatory Action Relating to Ownership — Ambiguous and Doubtful . Complaint — Pacts Insufficient to Constitute a Cause of Action. — On examining the complaint in the case at haT hy which a declaratory action relating to the ownership of waters used for irrigation is brought the Supreme Court on appeal decided that the demurrer to the complaint filed hy the defendant on the ground that no cause of action was shown and that the complaint was ’ambiguous and uncertain, should have been sustained because the allegations made in the complaint with reference to the concession and prescription administratively recognized upon which the plaintiff: rests his case are too unintelligible sand doubtful.</p>

<p>Divorce — Cruel Treatment — Serious Injuries — Sufficiency of Complaint— Time, Place, and Manner of Cruel Treatment. — A petition for divorce is sufficient when founded upon the cruel treatment and serious injuries mentioned in section 164 of the Revised Civil Code and when it makes the allegation that "repeated cruelty by words and acts practiced by the defendant toward the complainant beating and injuring her to such an extent as to compel her to abandon the conjugal domicile and seek refuge with her-parents,” it being unnecessary to set forth in the complaint the time, place, and manner in which such cruel treatment was practiced as they may be withheld to be brought up during the trial.</p> <p>"Weighing Evidence — Partiality, Passion, or Prejudice. — It not having been shown to this court that the trial judge acted with partiality, passion, or prejudice, or committed manifest error, his findings will not be disturbed on appeal.</p> <p>Divorce — Reconciliation—Defense not Pleaded in Answer. — Inasmuch as the reconciliation of- the spouses was not alleged in the answer it cannot be taken into consideration for the first time on appeal.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Perjury—Depositions and Affidavits. — The provisions of section 121 of the Penal Code relating to perjury committed in depositions axe applicable also to affidavits. o</p> <p>Id. — Publication of Affidavit — Allegations Essential in. Charge of Perjury. — In pursuance of the foregoing doctrine it is an essential -requisite in an information for perjury committed in an affidavit to allege the fact tliat the aeeused parted with the false affidavit or deposition by delivering it to some other person with the intent that it he reported or published as true, hence an information failing in such allegation is fatally defective.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Receiver of Estate — Heirs—Misjoinder of Parties Defendant — Powers of Receivers. — A demurrer on the ground of misjoinder of parties defendant to a complaint formulated directly and exclusively against the receiver of an estate without including the heirs who compose the succession should be sustained where no allegation is made in the complaint as to the powers given to said receiver for, as a general rule, authority to sell property without an order of the court is not included among the powers conferred upon receivers and, therefore, the service of a summons upon the receiver only is insufficient to enable a court to make any disposition whatever of the property of the heirs in the possession of the receiver.</p> <p>Joinder of Actions — Actions Derived from Express Contracts — Loan Negotiated by Receiver — Expenses, Costs, and Attorney’s Fees. — Claims to collect loans made to a receiver for disbursements made by him in payment of expenses incurred in operating the properties in his charge may be joined with claims against him for expenses, costs, and the fees of counsel in the suit in which he was appointed receiver, because the first is derived from an express contract and the seeond from an implied contract.</p> <p>Id. — Prayer of Complaint — Demurrer.—Where a suit is brought against a receiver in the capacity of representative of several heirs a demurrer on the ground that the language of the complaint is ambiguous because it is prayed therein that a decree issue against the receiver personally cannot be sustained, because aside from the fact that the objections should be made to the facts alleged and not to the prayer the object herein is for a judgment against the defendant in his representative capacity.</p>

<p>Actiok fob Damages — Damages Caused — Construction oe the Word ‘ Caused. ’ ’ — For the same reason that the judgment in an action to recover a sum of money calls for the payment of interest until the judgment shall have been fully satisfied including the interest accruing after the rendering of the judgment, so also in an action for damages for the defective construction of a dwelling house an order may be made directing the payment of rentals lost until the defects shall have been corrected without violating the provisions of section 1068 of the Civil Code, because the word “caused” used in said section should not be construed so narrowly as to.bar.such provision from the judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Noncomplianoe with Obligation — Fraud, Negligence, or Delay. — Where the finding of the court below supported by the evidence is that the defendant has violated the terms of the contract it is unnecessary to ascertain whether the court took into consideration the existence of fraud, negligence, or delay, for the purpose of reaching the conclusion that the defendant should pay for the damages actually caused by his failure to comply with the contract within the provisions of section 1068 of the Revised Civil Code. Id.- — Latent Defects in Construction oe a House — ‘Acceptance oe Work. — The acceptance of the work by the owner of a house does not impair his right to claim and to obtain such damages as he is found to be entitled to on account of latent defects in its construction.</p> <p>Id. — Ocular Inspection — Coneormty oe Both Parties — Result oe Inspection. — An ocular inspection of the work having been made by the consent of both parties, one of them cannot afterwards object to the introduction of evidence upon the result thereof nor to a consideration of the same by the court in rendering judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Slight Coneliot. — Where the difference observed is rather casual than essential it cannot be held that there is a real conflict between the allegations and the evidence.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Plea op Former Jeopardy. — Habeas corpus is perhaps the proper proceeding for reviewing the decision of a court in a case in which a person accused of a crime pleads former jeopardy as a defense if the court rejected the plea and refused to hear him on it, but in a case in which the court heard the evidence offered by the accused in support of said plea and overruled it a question of fact was raised which can be reviewed only by appeal:</p> <p>Id. — Appeal and Error. — It is a well-known principle of law that habeas corpus cannot be substituted for appeal and error.</p> <p>Id. — Nature op Plea op Former Jeopardy. — The question raised by the.plea of former jeopardy is a question of fact.</p> <p>Id. — Fifth Amendment to Constitution — Constitutional Question — Review by Habeas Corpus. — When a person accused of a crime pleads former jeopardy and the trial court rules that the fact is not proven the accused has no right to a review of the decision of the lower court in habeas corpus proceedings on the mere allegation that the Constitution has been violated.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Construction oe Law — Divorce—Death oe One oe Spouses After Action Was Commenced — Continuance oe Action by Executor. — Pursuant to the law governing the matter, the death of one of the spouses after a suit for divorce has been commenced terminates the suit, and the executor of the deceased spouse cannot continue the action for the sole purpose of determining the share of the surviving spouse and his usufructuary interest in the estate of the deceased. *</p> <p>Id. — In considering ambiguous statutes courts should take into consideration the history of the times when they were enacted.</p> <p>Id. — Divorce—Death oe One oe Spouses. — ¡The history of the Act of March 9, 1905, relative to heirs-at-law is given in the opinion. Inasmuch as the purpose of that act was to reestablish the provisions with respeet to natural children which had theretofore existed, and as a completely new divorce system has been established in Porto Eieo the provisions of section 8 of that act with respect to the continuance of divorce suits after the d'eath of one of the spouses should be construed as having been copied inadvertently from the former laws:</p> <p>Id. — All Provisions oe a Statute Must Be Given Eeeect — Absurd Results.— While it is a principle of law that all the provisions of a statute must be given effect, the courts have also declared that the principle should not be followed when said construction would lead to absurd results.</p> <p>Id. — Useless Things. — A law should not be so construed so as to make possible the doing of vain and useless 'things under cover of that law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The -facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Nullity oe Designation oe Heirs — Natural Grandchildren — Acts oe Acknowledgment. — An action for the nullity of a designation of heirs brought by an acknowledged natural child of one of the children of the ancestor of the defendant succession in which no specific allegation is made of the act of acknowledgment of said plaintiff is insufficient, for it is not enough, as has been done in the case at bar, to insert a clause of the will of said ancestor relating to the legacy left to the plaintiff, for the acknowledgment is a personal act which devolves upon the father or mother as the case may be or upon both jointly or by virtue of a judgment rendered in a corresponding action.</p> <p>Natural Children — Right oe Succession — Law Governing. — It is a well-established principle that the laws in force at the time of the death of the ancestor should govern the rights of the heirs.</p> <p>Id. — Right oe Representation — Father oe Putative Father. — According to the laws in force on August 13, 1879, an acknowledged natural child was not entitled to inherit as the representative of his putative father from his paternal grandfather and, therefore, the father of the plaintiffs in this action was not an heir-at-law of the ancestor of the defendant succession and plaintiffs have no cause of action entitling them to ask for the nullity of the will attacked in the complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Right oe Succession — Bights oe Representation — Givil Code. — Under the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code which was in force in Porto Rico in 1890, an acknowledged natural child had no right to inherit as representative of his putative father from his paternal grandfather.</p> <p>Legacy- — Legatee—Rights oe Legatee. — A complaint claiming a legacy but failing to state the date of the death of the testator is insufficient, for it is necessary to state said date in order to ascertain whether the legatee survived the testator so as to know whether or not he acquired the legacy and transmitted it to his heirs, the burden of proof to show that the legatee survived the testator falling upon those who claimed the legacy as survivors to the rights of the legatee.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Property of Member of Religious Communities — Transfer Thereof to Community. — All members of a religious community by the mere fact of making their solemn vow transfer to the community to which they belong not only their present but their future possessions. Qwidquid monacims adqwirit, monasleriwm adquirit.</p> <p>Ecclesiastical Law — Personality of The Roman Catholic Church. — When the question involved is the determination of the rights appertaining to and the relations existing between a nun, a convent, and the prelate of the diocese, as is the ease here, the rules adopted by the Roman Catholic Church in the exercise of its powers to govern its own institutions are applicable and the personality of said church has been recognized fully by the Supreme Court of the United States and by the Supreme Court of Porto Bieo, but, of course, within the constitutional limitations and principles of international law.</p> <p>Annuities — Effect op Registration in Pavor op a Nun — Cancellation.—The annuity in question being recorded in the name of a Carmelite nun and the Catholic bishop having authorized the cancellation thereof on behalf of the convent of Carmelite nuns, the cancellation is properly made because by the application of the principle of eccleciastical law above mentioned the annuity in question being recorded in the name of the nun is ipso jure recorded in the name of her convent, and it cannot be said that the interest is recorded in favor of a person other than the one disposing of it.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinión.</p>

<p>Cancellation of Mortgages — Remediable Defects — Liquidating Firm — Powers and Obligations oe Liquidating Firm. — The Begistrar- of Property of Caguas recorded the cancellation of the mortgage which is the object of this suit with the remediable defect that the articles of copartnership of the firm of Müllenhoff & Korber not having been presented to him. to enable him to ascertain what were the powers and obligations of Korber & Company as liquidators who canceled the mortgage created by the former firm. Held: That it appearing from the deed of cancellation that Korber & Company are the liquidators of Müllenhoff & Korber and that the liquidating partnership has all the powers and obligations mentioned in articles 227 to 233 and 235 to 237 of the Code of Commerce, among which is the power to discharge obligations previously contracted, it was unnecessary for the registrar to have before him the deed referred to by him, wherefore no remediable defect existed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Heirs — Responsibility op Succession — Property op Ancestor.- — In this suit the date of the death of the ancestor of the defendant succession against whose inherited estate this suit was brought was not proven; neither was it proven that on the date of his death he left any property constituting his estate capable of division among the persons who appeared to be his heirs. It was held that the action was not well founded inasmuch as it was not • shown that the property actually possessed by any of the heirs of the defendant succession descended from the estate of the ancestor, by which circumstance only could said property be affected by a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and on which alone he based his action Neither has it been shown that in the acquisition of the property or in the judicial elaim made by the defendant, Francisco Hernández Barreto, there existed fraud or collusion.</p> <p>'Consideration por Contract — False Consideration. — The consideration in a contract although not expressed therein is presumed to be lawful and valid until the contrary is proven, and proof of false consideration being lacking in this case the nullity sought cannot be granted.</p>

<p>Nullity of Will — Disinheritance — ■Usufructuary Rights of Surviving Spouse. — This was a suit to annul a clause oí a will whereby a wife attempted to disinherit her husband and deprive him of any right to the usufruct of her property to which he might be entitled by law. A demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it did not state sufficient facts was sustained on the theory that the action was premature because there was a divorce suit pending continued by the executor of the deceased spouse. Held: That as the question is one which has been decided by this court in the ease of Celis Alguier v. Méndez, deeided March 7, 1912, to the effect that the death of one of the spouses puts an end to the divorce suit the present action was not premature inasmuch as the time to attack a will is promptly after its publication. Failure to allege that the testatrix left any property is not in the circumstances of this ease a material omission.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appear from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Dismissal of Appeal — Jurisdiction of Supreme Court — New Trial — Value of Thing Claimed — Municipal Courts. — This court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order of a district court overruling a motion for a new trial in a ease appealed thereto from a municipal court where the value of the thing claimed exclusive of profits and interest does not exceed $300.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Grand Larceny — Jurisdiction.—According to the laws in force in Porto Rico the district court of the district where the defendant is found in possession of the stolen property has jurisdiction to try a ease of grand larceny without regard to the district where the property belonged.</p> <p>Habeas Corpus — Grand Larceny — Location oe Stolen Property. — In a habeas corpus proceeding the legality of a judgment cannot be attacked because the crime of grand larceny was committed in a district different from that in which the case was tried, for this is a question that should be determined-at the trial of the case and if error is committed it may be reviewed 'on appeal from the judgment.</p>

<p>Third Parties — Knowledge oe Liens Existing on Property. — According to the Mortgage Law persons who have not participated in the contract re- ; corded are considered as third parties. No one ean be considered as a third ■ ; person who although not having taken part in the instrument recorded had ; knowledge of the encumbrances and liens existing upon the property at the time of the acquisition of the same.</p> <p>Id. — Nullity op Dominion Title Proceedings. — Persons who have taken part in the prosecution of dominion title proceedings cannot contest the nullity of said proceedings as third parties.</p> <p>Prescription — Dominion—Good Paith and Just Title. — A person acquiring-property by purchase from the executor of the deceased owner by a deed of bargain and sale executed in part by minors without the necessary formalities of law cannot invoke the ordinary term of prescription of good faith and just title for the period of 10 years as a foundation for his dominion title.</p> <p>Third Parties — Proceedings to Establish Dominion Title — Cancellation op Record, — The nullity of dominion title proceedings cannot affect third parties who acquired their rights from persons who appear of record to have the right to execute the contracts referred to in the deeds whose nullity and consequent cancellation are the objects of the suit.</p> <p>Id; — Dominion Title Proceedings. — The nullity of dominion title proceedings for reasons -which appear neither in the registry nor in the proceedings cannot affect a person who acquired under said proceedings previously approved, his purchase having been recorded in the registry after said proceedings had' already been recorded, even though said proceedings were not on record at the time the deed of purchase was executed.</p> <p>Recorded Title — -Recorded Subsequent Title. — In order that a recorded title may invalidate to the prejudice of an innocent third party another subsequent title also recorded it is necessary that the record of the former should be prior to that of the latter inasmuch as it would be an absurdity to hold that an older title unrecorded at the time of recording a later title could annul or prejudice the later title when the existence of the older title does not appear nor could be established from the registry.</p>

<p>Costs — "Sentencia Píeme” — Pinal Judgment. — The words "final judgment” used in the English text of section 339 of the Codie of Civil Procedure as amended by the Act of Mareh 12, 1908, means the judgment rendered by the trial court and not sentencia firme which is the expression erroneously used by the translator in the Spanish text.</p> <p>Id. — Taxation oe Costs — Jurisdiction oe Triad Cotjet. — In accordance with the Costs Act of Mareh 12, 1908, the trial court has jurisdiction in proceedings for the taxation of costs as far as deciding the objections raised without excepting cases where an appeal has been taken from the judgment allowing the costs, but has no jurisdiction to enforce its decisions and order the collection of said costs while an appeal from the judgment is pending.</p> <p>Id.' — Time eoe Payment cot Costs. — According to section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Act of March 12, 1908, where no appeal has been taken from the judgment or where the judgment has been affirmed on appeal, the party against whom the costs have been adjudged shall deposit the amount thereof with the secretary of the court within five days after notice duly served upon him, and should he fail to do so a writ of execution shall issue. When the judgment taxing the costs has been appealed from, as in the ease at bar, and the decision on such appeal is pending, the result of the same shall be awaited before proceeding to collect the costs in the manner aforesaid.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Areeibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>DEMUBKEKf-^PAETiTiON oe Inhebitance — Fraud.—The plaintiff claims damages suffered by alterations made in a partition of property in the substitution of one person for another in the adjudication of a property. A demurrer on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was sustained by the eourt. It was decided on appeal that the demurrer was well founded because the complaint did not allege facts constituting fraud to counteract the presumption of regularity in the partition proceedings which had received judicial sanction, for the mere fact that the name of one person has been erased and that of another substituted is not sufficient to show fraud.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Cancellation oe Mortgage — Record oe Title in Favor oe Person Other Than Grantee. — By virtue oí a judgment rendered in proceedings for foreclosure of mortgage the marshal of the District Court of Mayagiiez executed ai deed of conveyance by judicial sale in favor of A, who consented to have said mortgage canceled by reason of the confusion of rights, but upon presentation of said deed in the registry it was refused admission to record. Subsequently the appellant presented in the registry a copy of the deed of conveyance for the sole purpose of canceling the mortgage in favor of A. The registrar refused to admit same to record because the application for admission to record of the deed to the mortgaged property to the creditor having been previously denied there was no confusion of rights or merger of estates in the same person. Held: That the refusal to record the cancellation on the grounds set forth by the registrar in his decision was well founded.</p>

<p>Complaint — Answer—Allegations of Complaint not Denied in Answer.— Although according to section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure every material allegation of the complaint not denied in the answer is taken as true for the purpose of the suit, there is no provision of law requiring the trial court to designate prior to the trial what facts alleged in the complaint have not. been denied in the answer.</p> <p>Answer to Complaint — Irrelevant Allegations — Defective Answer. — Where the answer is defective and does not constitute a good defense the plaintiff may move for a judgment on the pleadings. If any part of the answer is irrelevant or redundant a motion to strike out should he made. Where any of the material allegations of the complaint have not been denied in the answer the plaintiff may decline to present proof as to them and consider them as having been admitted by the defendant.</p> <p>Contrary Evidence — Findings of Trial Court — Partiality, Passion, or Prejudice. — Where the evidence is contrary the findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it be shown that it acted with partiality, passion, or prejudice, or had committed manifest error of law or of fact.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Vacant Inheritance. — An inheritance remaining unclaimed is considered vacant.</p> <p>Id. — Prior Record in Pavor of Heirs. — In the ease at bar the instruments' presented to the registry for record show that there are heirs designated' by the court at the instance of one of them and that the marshal’s deed in favor of the appellant is the final result of a suit brought against the heirs and not against the inheritance in which the heirs were summoned as such, and it is not shown that the repudiation by them of the inheritance was alleged as a defense. The court held that it is not possible to presume that a vacant inheritance is treated of and that a previous record in the name of the heirs can be dispensed with.</p> <p>Inheritance Tax. — In view of the circumstances of the case and of the fact that the heirs were brothers of the deceased the court held that the decision of the registrar refusing to record the sale on the ground that the payment or exemption from payment of the inheritance tax had not been proven was well founded.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Injunction — Stay of Foreclosure Proceedings. — Both, before and since the enactment of the Injunction Act of 1906 this court has held' that mortgage foreclosure proceedings should not he stayed except for the reasons expressly set forth in section 175 of the Mortgage Law Regulations.</p> <p>Id. — Multiplicity op Proceedings. — The real meaning of the expression "to prevent a multiplicity of proceedings ’' in the Injunction Act of 1906 is to prevent one or several parties from bringing different actions concerning the-same subject-matter, but not to place a debtor in a position to prevent his creditors from suing him. It would not be just or lawful to grant an injunction only to prevent several claimants from prosecuting claims which are prima faoie valid against the same property.</p> <p>Id. — Debtor—Stay op Summary Proceedings — Intention op Legislature.— We cannot believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to permit a debtor to obtain by means of an injunction what he eould not obtain in any other way, namely, the stay of an executory proceeding against him. His remedy is by way of an ordinary suit with a cautionary notice thereof entered in the registry of property.</p> <p>Id. — ’Construction op Law — Mortgage Law — Injunction Act — Implied Repeals. — It is a general principle of construction of statutes that implied repeals do not as a rule merit the sanction of the courts. The Injunction Act of March 8, 1906, did not repeal section 175 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law.</p>

<p>Criminal Law- — Appeal—When Order Denting New Trial Mat Eeviewed.— In order that this’ court may consider whether a district court erred in overruling a motion for a new trial in a criminal ease it is necessary that the order denying the new trial he appealed from directly or excepted to- ■ in due form and' included in the appeal from the judgment rendered in the same ease.</p> <p>Id. — Nature oe Appeal — Duty oe Appellant. — An appeal is not a thing of rights hut a statutory privilege, and whoever exercises the privilege must do so in the form specified hy law, and it is incumbent upon him to do directly everything that will advance his own interests.</p> <p>Id. — Presumption oe Regularity oe Proceedings oe Court oe Record. — The regularity of the proceedings of a court of record is presumed until the contrary affirmatively appears.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Damages — -Witnesses—Veracity.—The fact that a -witness has had a serious disagreement with an official of a railway company is not sufficient of itself to deprive the testimony of this witness of due credit in a suit against said company, especially when upon weighing said testimony the court became convinced that it was perfectly logical and had been corroborated in its essential parts.</p> <p>Id. — Physical Pains — Loss oe Time’ — Necessary Expenses. — In the ease at-bar it was decided on appeal that it had been alleged and proven that the plaintiff suffered real and positive damage in his person causing physical pain, loss of work, actual expenses, and an evident imperfection in his sense of hearing, not by.his own carelessness, -but through the negligence of the. defendant, a judgment against the defendant for the sum of- $700 and costs conforms to law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Statement op Case — Excessive Extension op Time — Abuse op Discretion. — The approval of a statement of the case 4 months and 24 days after the judgment was rendered cannot he held to he an abuse of discretion in view of the faet that it was done with the consent of the fiscal for the district and that the extension although too long has not caused any injustice. It is possible that the trial court may have known of potent reasons for delaying so long the approval of the statement of the ease. No objection having been made in the court below to such approval and no motion having been made in this court to strike the. same from the reeord, said document has full legal effect.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Motion to strike out.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for a writ of certiorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal La-w — Confession of Accused — Evidence.—The testimony oí witnesses concerning a confession voluntarily and freely made to them by the accused is not hearsay hut direct evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Confession of Accused — Proof That It Was Made Voluntarily and Freely. — The testimony of witnesses relating to a confession made by the accused does not lose its value on, account of the fact that the fiscal did not offer evidence to show that the confession was made freely and voluntarily, because when the accused does not object to the testimony concerning the confession it is presumed that the confession was made freely and voluntarily unless the contrary appears from the testimony itself.</p> <p>Id. — Confession of Accused Obtained by Deceit — Police—Detective.—The fact that a policeman, a detective, or any other person obtained a confession by deceit is not of itself sufficient to render the testimony inadmissible.</p> <p>Id. — Classes of Murder in First Degree. — According to our code there are three classes of murder in the first degree, namely, that which is perpetrated by means of lying in wait, poison, or torture; that which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem; that which is committed by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.</p> <p>Id. — Murder in First Degree — Lying in Wait — Deliberation and Premeditation. — When murder in the first degree is perpetrated by lying in wait and this fact is proven it is not neeessary to show any other acts of deliberation or premeditation in order that the crime may be classified as murder in the first degree.</p> <p>Id. — INSTRUCTIONS to Jury — Crime of Less Degree. — In a ease of murder in tie first degree tie court did not commit an error in failing to instruct tie jury concerning tie crime of lomicide wlen there was nothing in the evidence tending to slow tlat tie crime could le reduced to tlat grade.</p> <p>Id. — List op Witnesses por Prosecution — Information.—There is no provision in our criminal laws requiring tie fiscal to endorse on tie information tie names of all tie witnesses for tie prosecution whom le may intend to examine. It is sufficient tlat le name those whom he examined for tie purpose of filing tie inf ormation.</p> <p>Id. — Veracity op Witnesses — Presumptions—Impeachment op Witness. — The law does not require tlat tie presumption of tie veracity of a witness le attacked ly proofs of specific reproaelalle acts lut only tlat it le proven that lis general reputation for veracity, honesty, and integrity is lad or tlat le has been convicted of an infamous crime.</p> <p>Id. — Impeachment op Witness — Specific Reprehensible Acts. — Evidence tending to prove specific reprehensible acts and a certain quarrel between two persons to whom, according to the witness, tie accused attributed some participation in tie crime, is not admissible for tie impeachment of a witness.</p>

<p>Recovery of Money — Demurrer—Waiver of Demurrer on Ground of no Cause of Action. — -A demurrer on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is never considered as waived, hut on the contrary may he pleaded at any time, even for the first time on appeal, and although it is not pleaded the court may consider and decide it moto propio in all cases. WTien a demurrer on this ground is filed and withdrawn hy the pleader before the court has passed it, it may he repleaded later without being considered as having been waived hy its withdrawal.</p> <p>Id. — Satisfaction Pleaded — Liberal Interpretation of Pleadings. — The third: allegation of the complaint in the case at bar reads as follows: ‘ ‘ The creditor having tried to collect this obligation in a friendly way, it has been impossible to do so.” It was decided on appeal that such an allegation is sufficiently explicit for it to be understood that the breaking of the contract had been alleged. According to section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, allegations in pleadings should be construed liberally.</p> <p>Presumptions — Principle and Agent — Pause Document. — Although it is true that according to paragraph 2 of section 101 of the Law of Evidence a principal cannot impeach the recital in a document signed by his agent if it is within the powers conferred upon him, this precept does not govern when it is alleged that the document was executed by collusion between the plaintiff and the agent for the purpose of defrauding the principal.</p> <p>Evidence — Weight Given It By 'Trial Court — Passion, Prejudice, or Partiality- — Grave Error. — When the evidence is contradictory the weight given to it by the trial court will not be questioned unless it is shown that the judge was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiality, or that grave error is manifest.</p> <p>Intervention — Decision on Complaint in Intervention. — When a complaint in intervention is filed with the prayer that in case the defendant should be decreed to pay the plaintiff the intervenor’s claim should have preference, the court does not commit error in not passing upon the conditional prayer of the complaint in intervention when the deeree was not so against the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Embezzlement—Bvidenoe—Sale oe Mare. — A person having-been accused of appropriating to his own use the proceeds of the sale of a mare and it not having been proven that the accused sold said animal or ever had it in his possession the offense charged is not proven. The mere fact that the accused promised to pay $25 and actually paid it to the com-complainant after the information had been filed against him does not show of itself and in the absence of other proofs that the accused had sold the mare and appropriated the proceeds.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Unappealable Orders — Appointment op Receiver. — An order of a district court refusing to appoint a receiver is not appealable.</p> <p>Appointment op Receiver — Verified Petition — Lack op Verified Objection.— The mere fact that no verified objection was made to a verified petition for the appointment of a receiver is no reason why the receiver should he appointed necessarily when the petition itself is insufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Possession oe Property by Plaintiee — Waste.—la the ease at bar it was held that the petition for the appointment of a receiver on the ground that the defendants were not taking eare of the property properly and were squandering its produets was insufficient, because from the petition itself it was shown that on the date on which the petition- was filed the defendants did not have possession of the property but that it was in the possession of the plaintiff who only feared that the defendants would take possession of it.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of P.once.</p> <p>MotioN for reconsideration of judgment.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Bill of Lading — Construction op Contracts — Discharging Merchandise-Shippers. — This case turns upon the construction placed upon clause 5 of the bills of lading which shippers sign when shipping merchandise by The New York and Porto Bieo Steamship Company. . It was held that according to said clause said steamship company has no right to employ lighters for discharging merchandise for account of the consignee when said consignee offers to receive the merchandise at the ship’s side at the commencement of discharging in lighters furnished by said consignee.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Contract — Single Clause op Contract. — In construing a contract the significance of one part or single clause thereof should not be relied upon exclusively, but the document should be considered as a whole in order to ascertain the intention of the parties thereto when the contract was made.</p> <p>Id. — Discharging Merchandise — Bights op Shippers and Carriers. — According to the doctrine expressed in the foregoing paragraph and construing as a whole the bills of lading signed by shippers of merchandise by The New York and Porto Bieo Steamship Company it results that the consignee has the right to receive the merchandise at the ship’s side as soon as it is discharged and that the company or its agents have the right to employ lighters to receive the merchandise when the consignee does not receive it at .the ship’s side as soon as it is ready to be discharged.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Contract — Object op Construction — Intention op Parties. — The real purpose of all the rules of construction is to' ascertain and apply the intention of the parties to the contract' to be construed.</p> <p>Id. — Discharging Merchandise' — Obligations op Consignee. — The consignee of merchandise has no right to delay the discharging of the ship but must be prepared to receive his goods at the ship’s side and at the place where she is discharging as soon as they are ready to be discharged, and in these circumstances the steamship company has no right to deliver the goods to another person to be landed for account of the owner.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Injunction — Suspension op General Business oe a Corporation — Notice op Application. — The present action for an injunction has for its object the enjoining of the defendant company from continuing to use the railroad tracks which it has constructed upon lands of the plaintiff municipality. Held: That this case does not fall entirely within the provisions of section 9 of the Injunction Act of March 8, 1906, because the restraining order of the eourt does not operate as a suspension of the general and ordinary business of the defendant corporation but only affects the same in part. This error does not annul the subsequent proceedings in this case because the prejudiced party accepted the ruling of the court and fled a new application for an injunction, giving notice thereof to the defendant.</p> <p>Id.' — Application por Injunction' — Proceedings—Determination op Rights op Parties. — When an application for an injunction is presented whose principal and only objeet is to obtain a perpetual injunction, as was done in this case, the defendants should be duly notified thereof and they may demur or answer as they see fit. If the ease is not decided on the pleadings the parties introduce their testimony and later a judgment is rendered on the merits of the case. Meanwhile a temporary injunction may be solicited and, in many cases, the fact that the temporary injunction is granted or denied does not necessarily affect the granting or denial of the perpetual injunction. When the law lays down no exact rules for the prosecution of a suit for injunction, as is the case in Porto Bico, the court should direct the progress of the same, applying as far as possible the rules for the prosecution of an ordinary suit and reducing or extending the time to plead according to the nature of each ease.</p> <p>Id. — Denial op -Application por Injunction — Discretion op Court. — Considering the special nature of the injunction and that its temporary or final granting, particularly the former, rests upon the sound discretion of the eourt, the eourt has authority to deny the application offhand or to dismiss it finally after the hearing for a temporary injunction within the suit for a final injunction if the court is convinced that the petitioner has absolutely no grounds for the same, and in such cases the decision of the court disposes of the suit finally.</p> <p>Id. — Denial op Application por Injunction — Amended Application. — When by a mere reading of the application for an injunction it cannot be decided whether it is entirely lacking in grounds or whether it can be amended, the eourt commits error if in passing on the petition for a temporary injunction it dismisses the suit finally.</p>

<p>Unappealable Orders — Decision Concerning Reconsideration oe Another Order. — A decision of a court overruling a motion for a reconsideration of an order in which a district court orders the registry of a judgment of dismissal of a complaint is not appealable.</p> <p>Motion eor Judgment — Notice to Adverse Party. — A petition or motion for judgment need not be served upon the adverse party according to the provisions of the last paragraph of section 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Vega et al. v. Rodríguez et al., 17 P. B. R., 237.</p> <p>Id.- — Reconsideration oe an Order Entered With Intervention oe Adverse Party. — The respondent in this case having given notice to the adverse party of his motion for a judgment he should also have given notice of the motion presented later for a reconsideration by the court of its decision on the first motion, but his not having done so is not a fatal error carrying with it a reversal of the judgment. It is not an abuse of discretion on the part of the court not to have required the notice to be given to the adverse party because the registering of the judgment in this ease is so clearly according to law .that the judge himself could and should have ordered it without motion by either of the parties.</p> <p>Costs — Approval oe Memorandum — Pinal Judgment. — The reversal by this court of an order approving a memorandum of costs on the ground that the district court had hot rendered final judgment should not be interpreted in the sense of obstructing the due registration of the judgment and the collection of the costs and fees allowed by law.</p> <p>Id. — Approval oe Memorandum — Discretion oe Court. — The fact that upon presenting a fiiemorandum of costs to a district court the second time for its approval for the reason that its first approval had been revoked on the ground that final judgment had not been rendered when the first approval was made, the lower court approved the same the second time for a larger amount does not constitute an abuse of discretion considering the circumstances of the ease.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Confession of Accused — Eequisites of Confession. — A free and voluntary confession made by an accused person is the best kind of evidence and therefore admissible to prove the commission of the crime.</p> <p>Id. — Confession of Accused. — Upon examining the confession of the accused in this case it was considered to contain the necessary requisites for its validity and admission as proof.</p> <p>Id. — Confession of Accused — Presence of Third Parties. — The fact that an accused person confessed the crime before the fiscal and in the presence of a detective and a reporter does not by reason of this mere fact remove from the act the necessary spontaneousness to give it legal effect.</p> <p>Id. — Confession of Accused — Eequest to Make It — Oath and Signature of Accused. — It is not necessary to show that the accused asked permission to make the confession in order to give it validity. Nor is it a requisite that the confession be signed and sworn to by the accused. A verbal confession is valid.</p> <p>Id. — Confession of Accused — Imprisonment of Accused. — A confession made by an accused person who is serving a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary as the result of a charge of capital crime is admissible as evidence against himself if the confession appears to have been made voluntarily* and not on account of threats or promises.</p> <p>Id.' — Instructions to Jury — Construction.—It is a general principle of law that the instructions to the jury should be construed as a whole and not in single and independent paragraphs, and that in their construction the evidence introduced at the trial which served as a basis for the instructions should be taken into consideration.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Premeditation—Deliberation.—When the judge does not define particularly the terms premeditation and deliberation in his instructions to the jury, but expresses himself in general terms which include such definitions, the instructions are sufficient and conform to the law.</p> <p>Id.- — Premeditation and Deliberation. — Both of these expressions are referred to and explained in the opinion.</p> <p>Id. — Deliberation—Murder in First Degree. — -Premeditation and deliberation are essential elements of the crime of murder in the first, degree, but deliberation is not an essential element of the crime of murder in the second degree.</p> <p>Id. — Erroneous Instructions Favorable to Accused — Unimportant Errors.— Such an error in the instructions to the jury as explaining the provisions of law in a sense more favorable to the accused than the evidence taken at the trial warrants is an unimportant error and will not work a reversal of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Instruction to Jury — Proof of Murder in First Degree. — In failing to instruct the jury on the law governing the crime of murder in the second degree when the evidence shows only the commission of the crime of murder in the first degree the court does not commit error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of G-uayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>New Trial — Appeals prom: Municipal Courts — Jurisdiction op Supreme Court. — According to section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act of March 9, 1905, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain appeals from judgments of district courts rendered on appeal from municipal courts only when the amount in litigation exceeds $300, therefore it lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order denying the reversal of a judgment and the granting of a new trial in a case originating in a municipal court where the amount in litigation was less than this sum.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contrary Evidence — Findings op 'Trial Court — Passion, Prejudice, or Partiality. — In case of contradictory evidence, as in the 'case at bar, the weight placed thereon by the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that said court was influenced by passion, prejudice, or partiajity, or that said court greatly abused its discretion, none of which have been alleged or proven in this case.</p> <p>Appeal — Grounds op Judgment. — One of the errors alleged by the appellant consists in a statement made by the lower court in the grounds for the judgment. It was held that the appeal lies against the judgment and not against the grounds therefor, but in spite of this fact we have examined the grounds for the judgment appealed from and find no basis for the error alleged.</p>

<p>Costs — Amendment op Oath to Bill op Costs — Discretion op Court — Appeal. — Permission to amend tlie oath to a hill of costs rests exclusively in the discretion of the tiial court and unless an abuse of this discretion is shown, resulting in an injustice to the injured party, the ruling of tlie court below will not be reversed on appeal..</p> <p>Id. — Notice op Amendment — Injury to Adverse Party. — In the case at bar the trial court allowed the amendment of the oath to the memorandum of costs to the effect, that the notary who administered the oath was personally acquainted with the person sworn. Notice of said amendment was not served upon the adverse party. It ivas held that the requirement to give notice to he adverse party depends upon the nature and circumstances of each case, and in order that tlie failure to give notice may be ground for the reversal of the order appealed from it is neeossary that the party complaining of the failure to give notice show that he has suffered injury thereby, a fact which has not been proven in this case, nor has it been proven that such notice was' necessary.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Accounting — Construction—Execution of Judgment.' — In this case it is sought to enforce compliance with the judgment rendered by this court on June 24, 1909, in an action instituted by Margarita Cintrón et al. v. The Banco Territorial, in which judgment the Banco Territorial was required "to render to the plaintiffs an itemized account, supported by vouchers, of the administration of the ‘Laura' etsate.” It was held that the terms ‘‘rendition of an itemized account, supported by vouchers, of the administration of the ‘Laura’ estate include besides the production of said account in the manner directed, its examination with the intervention of the parties concerned and its approval or final modification during the proceedings for the execution of the judgment of June 24, 1909, so as to determine the true credit or debit balance, because these three acts have a perfect relation to each other and are absolutely necessary to a formal and effective compliance with the judgment. Such procedure is not in conflict with the Code of Civil Procedure now in force and is in accord with the procedure followed in the courts of the United States.</p> <p>Id. — Objections to Accounts — Execution of Judgment — Actions.—In accordance with the doctrine, established in the preceding paragraph, the objections made by the plaintiffs to the accounts presented by the Banco Territorial should be discussed and decided after hearing the allegations of the parties and taking the evidence in support of their respective rights, but it would not be proper, as requested by tlie petitioner, that the proceedings for the execution of the judgment be declared terminated because the bank had rendered accounts and that recourse be had to an ordinary action for the purpose of objecting to the accounts and proving the objections.</p>

<p>Appbal — Brief—Extension of Time. — In an action of ejectment in which the plaintiff and appellant failed to introduce any evidence at the trial, but the defendant introduced some tending to prove his ownership of the property in litigation, the appellant filed in this court a transcript of the record on April 9 and on May 18 following, when the appellant had not yet filed his brief within the period fixed by rule 42 of this court, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because said brief had not been filed, nor was said brief filed when said motion was heard. Seld: That in view of all the circumstances attending this case the appeal should be dismissed, and the extension of time asked for by the appellant at the hearing of the motion for' filing his brief after the time fixed therefor had expired, be denied.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Application for Writ of Gertorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Contempt—Perjury—Rule to Show Cause. — Under the Act of March 9, 1931, providing a summary punishment for perjury as contempt, the trial judge is not required to examine all or any of the evidence before issuing the rule against the perjuror to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or to incorporate in said order a statement of such evidence, it being sufficient that the judge shall be satisfied that the perjury has been committed in order that he may proceed on Ms own motion alone with the inquiry for contempt.</p> <p>Id. — Constitutional Law — Contempt—Perjury—Summary Punishment for. Perjury. — In The People v. Fourquot, 17 P. R. R., 1037, it was held that the Act of March 9, 1911, summarily punishing perjury as contempt is not unconstitutional.</p> <p>Td. — Perjury as Double Offense — Contempt—Dormer Jeopardy. — It is premature to enter the plea of former jeopardy when, as in the case at bar, the-appellant, who was eliargod with contempt for having committed perjury, has not been prosecuted for perjury in accordance with the ord.inary proceedings provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. There are many crimes which at the same time are contempts of court, and the fact that punishment has' teen imposed for the contempt does not prohibit punishment for the crime by which the contempt was committed.</p> <p>Id. — Perjury—Contempt—Meaning of "Case Pending” — Jurisdiction.—Examining the Act of March 9, 3931, punishing as contempt the crime of perjury, it appears that the words "during the trial of any case pending” limit the-institution of proceedings for perjury as contempt to the time during the trial of a ease pending. It is said that a civil case is "pending” before a court from the time the complaint is filed until the judgment is rendered disposing of the matter litigated. When the ease ceases to be "pending” the jurisdiction to punish for contempt by means of perjury ceases, and the delinquent is; liable to prosecution for the perjury in the usual manner only.</p> <p>Id. — Perjury—Evidence—Contempt—Manifest Ealsity of Testimony. — The words "manifest falsity of the testimony” mean that the judge presiding at the -trial of a case should be satisfied that the perjury has been committed, and this fact becomes manifest to the judge like any other fact by observation, by perception, by reasoning, and other means not detailed in the statute.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Time Allowed por Administrative Appeal — Computation op Time.— In accordance with section 3 of the Act of March 1, 1902, governing administrative appeals, said appeals must be taken within 20 days from the notice of the decision of the registrar. In the case at bar notice of the decision .appealed from was served on May 4 and the notice of appeal was not filed in the office of the secretary of this court until after the 24th of the same month. ILeld: That the appeal should be dismissed because it was not taken • within the time fixed by law. The time within which an appeal may be taken is computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, in which case it is also excluded.</p>

<p>Construction of Will — Legacy—Hospital.—The question involved in this ease is as to which of the hospitals of Ponce is entitled to a legacy of 5,000 provincial pesos bequeathed by the ancestor of the plaintiff succession in favor of the “Hospital de Caridad", (charity hospital) of Ponce. The trial court held that according to the evidence the “Asilo de Pobres de Nuestra Señora de la Guadalupe" (asylum for the poor of our Lady of Guadalupe), publicly known. by the name of “Hospital de Mendigos" (beggars’ hospital), “Hospital de Pobres" (hospital for poor people), and “Hospital de Mendigos y Ancianos" (hospital for beggars and old people), being the only hospital ■devoted exclusively to sheltering’ the poor and the only one maintained exclusively by charity, it should receive said legacy. It was decided on appeal that from the evidence introduced the conclusion is reached that the intention ■of the testator was to bequeath said legacy to this hospital, and that the word hospital is applied indiscriminately to institutions devoted to sheltering and receiving wanderers and poor persons, to raising and educating homeless ■children, and to curing indigent sick people, wherefore the said word “hos- . pital" has no such limited significance as the appellant desires to give it.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Evidence — Objection to Evidence. — Any probatory evidence may be considered by tlie trial court if no objection is raised to the admission thereof. This is an application of the maxim concensus tollit errorem.</p> <p>Appeal — Agreement as to Material Pacts. — When the parties with the consent of the court, agree to try a case on the theory that a certain question is material to the issue, said theory cannot be rejected when the case is on appeal' for review.</p> <p>Id. — Allegation Which Has Been Stricken Out — Objection.—In accordance with the doctrine expressed in the preceding paragraph, when the facts stated in an allegation which has been stricken out are proven without objection by the adverse party and submitted as facts essential to the consideration and decision of the ease by the trial court, the> judgment appealed from will not be reversed for that reason.</p> <p>Third Parties — Becord op Title — Mortgage Law. — In the case at bar the title of ownership of the subject matter of the suit was not recorded in the registry of property. Held: That the character of third party alleged by the defendant should not be governed by the special provisions of the Mortgage Law, but by the general provisions of the Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — “A” sells certain property to “B” under a-private instrument. Later “A”' simulates a debt in favor of “ G” who sues “A” and obtains an attachment to secure the effectiveness of the judgment on the same property sold by “A” to “’B.” During the prosecution of the action “C” sells his credit to “D,” who has knowledge of the history of the ease. ' B ’ ’ brings an action in intervention against “A,” “G” and “D.” In said action “D” alleged that he was a third party. Held: That the trial court having decided that the simulation of the debt of “A” to “B” and the knowledge of that fact by “D” -were proven, “D” cannot be considered as a third party.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appear from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Sufficiency oe Complaint. — An examination oí the complaint, as a whole shows that the offense was committed in the municipal district of Guayama. The fact that the word “public” was not inserted in defining the offense committed against the peace constitutes no defect, because the facts alleged in the complaint show how the peace was disturbed and it is such facts that determine the nature of the offense charged; not the name given thereto by the prosecutor.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence.—Some of the acts with which the defendant is charged having been committed in the street and others in the municipal jail, the trial court committed no error in refusing to strike out the testimony of a witness with respect to those which took place in the jail, especially when taking into account that the evidence was admitted without objection by the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Corroboration of Testimony. — In a case of this nature the testimony of one witness is sufficient to prove the facts alleged in the complaint and needs no corroboration.</p>

<p>Execution of Judgment. — The provisions of section 1068 of the Civil Code and of article 923 of the old Law of Civil Procedure are applicable only to eases where the execution of a judgment becomes impossible by reason of some act done by the defendant himself, but not where the impossibility of complying therewith is due to acts of the plaintiff, as occurs in this case.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment—Beturn oe Payment Unduly Beoeived. — When in a judgment rendered in an action to recover an undue payment the court directs that both litigant parties return what each had received, the plaintiff, under pretext that it is impossible for him to return what he had received, cannot ask the court after judgment has been rendered and during the proceedings for the execution thereof to oblige the defendant to pay to him the amount which said defendant had unduly received.</p> <p>Appeal — Unappealable Orders. — The decision rendered by the trial court in the ease at bar overruling a motion of the plaintiff praying that the defendant be obliged to pay him what said defendant had unduly received is unappealable because it has not the character of a special order entered after final judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Complaint—Oath—Deputy Secretary — Appeal—Procedure.— The question as to whether the oath to a complaint is insufficient beeause it was administered by a deputy secretary of a municipal court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, beeause should a defect exist fox such reason the same would not be fundamental from the moment when testimony in support of the complaint was taken at the trial.</p>

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Ownership Title — Pleadings—Actions—Procedure.— The aetion of unlawful detainer is a special proceeding the sole purpose of which is to recover possession of real property and eject therefrom whomsoever may detain the same without title thereto, and no question as to the right of ownership can he decided in said aetion. When the answer alleges some title to the property and such allegation is supported by any evidence the ejectment should not be ordered, but the parties should settle the question of the legal title to the property in an ordinary aetion before the aetion of unlawful detainer is brought.</p> <p>Amendment of Pleadings — Verification of Answer — Discretion of Court— Appeal. — The granting of permission to a defendant to verify his answer which had been filed not verified and the verification of which was necessary because the complaint was verified lies in the discretional power of the court, and this court will not review the granting of such permission unless it is shown that the trial court abused its discretional power.</p> <p>Complaint — General Denial — Pleadings'—Appeal.—The objection that an answer to a verified complaint is defective because it contains a general and not a specific denial of the allegations of the complaint cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but should be pleaded in the trial court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Rape—Age op Victim op Rape — Evidence—Objection—Waiver op Evidence. — A defendant who allows the introduction of parol evidence to establish the age of the victim without objection waives the introduction of any better evidence that may exist and it is therefore unnecessary for this court to decide in this case whether the certificate of birth from the civil register is the best evidence to establish said age.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Objection.—A court may consider any kind of evidence which may be introduced without objection on the part of the adverse party.</p> <p>Id. — Testimony op Victim op Rape — Corroboration op Evidence. — In accordance with section 250 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as amended by an Act of March 11, 1909, it is a requisite in cases of rape that the testimony of the victim be corroborated.</p> <p>Id. — Corroboration op Testimony. — In order that testimony may be deemed corroborated it is unnecessary to corroborate all of its points, but it is sufficient to corroborate some of the details thereof tending to connect the defendant with the crime charged against him.</p> <p>Id. — Confession op Dependant — Corroboration op Testimony — -Evidence.—The confession of the defendant of the crime of rape charged against him is not only a corroboration of the testimony of the victim, but constitutes in itself sufficient evidence of the crime.</p>

<p>Tiburones Lagoon or Channel — Caño de Tiburones — Swamp Lands. — The fact that all the lauds whieh formed part of the original Tiburones lagoon or channel (Caño de Tiburones) belong to the People of Porto Rico does not signify that it must follow that because said lagoon or channel formerly covered a large tract of land lying between Arecibo and Bareeloneta or because the waters have receded or because • a considerable portion of the swampy lands of said locality were formerly covered by the waters of the lagoon or channel all the boggy or swampy lands now in said locality necessarily belong to the People of Porto Bico as a part of the lands which formed said lagoon.</p> <p>Id. — Construction.—The word “channel” (oaño) as applied to the Tiburones channel of Areeibo must not be construed to mean that it only embraces the present width of the channel or stream of water which is approximately seven or eight meters.</p> <p>Id. — Identification of Property — Title.—After examining the evidence in the ease at bar the court held that the titles submitted by the plaintiffs for the purpose of establishing their ownership of the properties which they claim do not show clearly nor has it been proved by means of other evidence that said titles refer to the lands in litigation.</p> <p>Ejectment — Area of Lands Claimed in Ejectment. — In an action of ejectment it is an indispensable requisite that the plaintiff specify in a precise manner the superficial area of the property which he seeks to recover. In the ease at bar the court held that the defendants had not complied with such requisite inasmuch as they had not specified with exactness the precise dimensions of the lands which they seek to recover and which form part of a larger estate of which they are in possession.</p> <p>Id.' — -Identification of Property — Boundaries.—Upon examining the evidence introduced in this case this court held that the southern, eastern, and western boundaries of the property in litigation have not been alleged or proved in a definite, clear, and precise manner. The Tiburones channel is given as the southern boundary, but no specific length or distance determining the part of the channel to which the estate extends has been alleged because the width or length of the channel has not been clearly and definitely proven. The eastern boundary has not been shown in such manner as to permit the determination of the length of the estate on the east. The western boundary alleged by the plaintiffs was contradicted by the owner of the contiguous-estate who testified that his property does not wholly bound the estate in litigation on the west, but bounds on the west the estate of which the-plaintiffs have possession.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Automobiles — Common Carrier. — In order that an automobile may be considered as devoted to the business of a common carrier it is necessary that the owner thereof employ the same regularly in the business of transporting passengers, conveying any one who pays the corresponding priee. The fact that the owner of a private automobile hires it to certain friends, but not to everybody, does not indicate that his automobile is devoted to the business of a common carrier.</p> <p>Damages Between Private Persons. — There existing no Federal Statute regulating the matter of damages between private persons and there being no provision in the Consititution of the United States in regard to this subject there is no doubt that in accordance with sections 8 and 32 of the Foraker Act the Legislative Assembly has power to legislate on the subject. Therefore, the provisions of the Eevised Civil Code governing this question are the only provisions to be considered in deciding this case.</p> <p>American Jurisprudence — Fault or Negligence. — American doctrine and jurisprudence are only applicable to obligations arising from the fault or negligence in so far as they are based on the provisions of the Civil Code of Porto Eieo or are derived from general legal principles not in conflict with said code.</p> <p>Liability eor Acts oe Others — Fault or Negligence. — In accordance with- the provisions of sections 1803 and 1804 of the Eevised Civil Code, the general rule is that a person is liable for his own acts of omissions and if he should be called up to answer for the acts or omissions of others, this would be an exception to the general rule.</p> <p>Id. — Due Care and Diligence — Presumption—Subordinates.—The provisions of section 1804 of the Eevised Civil Code attaching liability for the acts and omissions of another are based on the juris tantwin presumption of fault arising from the fact that due care and vigilance to prevent the injury were not exercised over the acts of subordinates and, therefore, the last paragraph of section 1804 frees from liability persons who are bound for the acts of others when it is shown that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family.</p> <p>Id. — Exception to Rule as to liability — Civil Punishment. — Liability for the acts or omissions of another can be enforced only when the exception to the general rule that a person shall answer only for his own acts or omissions is clearly specified in the law, because as said liability has to a certain extent the nature of a punishment, though a eivil one, the principle should be applied that no person can be punished, even civilly, except when the law has so provided specifically.</p> <p>Id. — Drivers op Private Conveyances — Common Carrier. — There is no provision whatever in section 1804 of the Civil Code nor in the other sections on this subject which makes the owner of an automobile or vehicle not devoted to the business of a common carrier liable for the negligent acts of the chauffeur of the automobile or driver of the vehicle.</p> <p>Id.- — -Specific Law —Construction op Law. — The wording of section 1804 of the - Revised Civil Code prohibits courts of justice from fixing liability in eases not comprised in said section, for when a law specifies and determines the cases to which it is applicable, it cannot be applied to other eases not included therein according to the legal principle expressio unius est exelusio alterius.</p> <p>The scope of the opinion delivered in the ease of Marrero v. López, 15 P. E. R., 746, is discussed and explained in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>Id. — Common Carrier — Driver of Private Conveyance. — The owner of a private automobile or vehicle not being liable for the acts of fault or negligence of the person employed by him as chauffeur if said automobile is not a part of the business of a common carrier, and it not having been proven in this ease that the defendant's automobile is such, the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant for the damages suffered by reason of the negligent acts of the defendant’s chauffeur.</p> <p>New Trial — Discovery of New Evidence — Proof of Activity. — In order that a motion for a new trial based on the discovery of new evidence may be sustained it is necessary to show in the affidavits that the party exercised reason- ' able activity to discover and introduce said evidence at the first trial, the mere allegation of activity being insufficient.</p>

<p>Evidence — Additional Evidence After Trial — Contracts—Intention of Parties. — Construing liberally the provisions of sections 25 and 28 of the Law of Evidence, the judge who, after the trial, sets a date for the introduction of additional evidence for the purpose of amplifying and explaining the evidence already introduced relative to the intention of the parties when making the agreement in litigation commits no error, but such additional evidence must treat only of the circumstances relating to the agreement, and if- evidence beyond the limit authorized by law is introduced that part of the evidence which exceeds said limit should not be considered by the trial judge nor by this court on appeal.</p> <p>Servitude of Bight of Wat — Bight of Personal Use — Construction of Contract. — The clause of the contract whose construction is the fundamental question in this suit reads as follows: "(c) It is a condition of this contract that the purchaser is entitled to use the alley specified in the second para- ■ graph, but neither he nor subsequent purchasers may construct sheds (ran-chones]) nor tenement houses but only private residences.” After examining the evidence introduced in this ease and especially the contents of the deed of sale executed by the defendant to the first purchaser of the lot in litigation, the court held that the clause above transcribed constitutes a servitude of right of way and not a right of personal use of the alley in question in favor of- certain persons only.</p> <p>Bights Acquired bt Purchaser — Transmission of Bights — Personal Bights— Limitation of Conveyance. — Bights conveyed by the vendor to the purchaser of a property may be conveyed in turn by the latter to another person and by the last to another, and so on in succession, unless it is a case of rights of an exclusively personal nature or a limitation is clearly expressed in the deed as the real and positive intention of the contracting parties.</p> <p>Id. — Meaning of Word "Purchaser” — Transmission of Bights — Personal Bights — Limitation of Conveyance. — In accordance with the doctrine laid down in the preceding paragraph the court held that the word "purchaser” used in clause c of the contract, which is the subject of this suit, also includes subsequent purchasers, because the right established in said clause is not of an exclusively personal nature, nor was a limitation clearly specified-in the deed as the real and positive intention of the contracting parties.</p> <p>Id. — Construction or Contracts — Intention or Parties — Creation or Servi-tudes. — The doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of Spain on November 4, 1897, to the effect that “in contracts creating servitudes or establishing encumbrances affecting the liberty of property, the intention of the parties-upon these points 'must be clearly expressed, a broad construction thereof not being permissible," is accepted by this court; but applying it to this ease is does not produce the effect of obliging this court to hold that in the clause in litigation a servitude of right of way was not created instead-of only a right of use of a personal character.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>Tile facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Undue Payment — Construction of Law — Error in Payment Alleged Must be Proven.- — Section 1801 of the Civil Code should he construed in connection with section 1796 of the same code and, in accordance with the former section, the plaintiff in an action to recover what he had paid unduly is relieved of the necessity of proving the error under which he made the undue payment only when the defendant in his answer denies that he had received any amount, hut when the answer to the complaint does not deny the receipt of any sum, as in the case at bar, hut alleges that any amount which the defendant may have received was a due and just debt, the plaintiff is not relieved of the duty of proving the error under which he made the payment.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence of Fraud — Presumption of Just Debt — Receipt Acknowledged in Deed. — The evidence in the case at bar having been examined this court held that as it was not proven that there was fraud in the execution of the deed introduced by the plaintiff wherein it is stated that the plaintiff's ancestor acknowledged receipt from the ancestor of the defendant succession of the sum of money which is the subject matter of this suit, it is necessary .to conclude that said deed shows that the sum claimed in this action was really due to the ancestor of the defendant succession.</p> <p>RECONSIDERATION.</p> <p>Keoonsideration — Delay in Asking Beoonsideration. — This case was decided on June 26, 1912. On November 27, 1912, the appellant moved this court to reconsider its judgment rendered on the former date. It was held that about five months having elapsed between the date of the judgment and the motion to reconsider without good reason having been shown for such delay, this fact alone is not sufficient ground for overruling the motion to reconsider. However, having examined the allegations of the motion to reconsider it is decided that they do not affect the grounds of the judgment rendered June 26, 1912.</p>

<p>Condemnation of Private Property — Indemnity for Damages. — The evidence in the case at bar having been examined, this court held that the court below committed manifest error in weighing the evidence when it held that the plaintiff suffered no damages whatever by reason of the expropriation of the land for the defendant company, and that in not granting him indemnity for the damages caused him by depriving him of his property it violated section 355 of the Civil Code and the Act on condemnation of private property, approved March 12, 1908.</p> <p>Id. — Compensation for Damages — Benefits Resulting from Construction of Railroad. — The owner of land of which a strip is expropriated cannot be considered as compensated for the damages caused in depriving him of the property by the benefits which may result to him from the increase in the value of his lands caused by the laying of railroad tracks through the same, for such benefits never accrue exclusively to him but are common to all the land-owners of the district where the estate is located.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action to Claim Filiation — Essential Allegation |ot Complaint to Claim Filiation. — In accordance with Law 11 of Toro, in order that a person may he acknowledged as a natural child it is necessary that the parents should have been able to marry lawfully and without dispensation at the time of the conception or birth of the child. This is, therefore, an essential requisite which must be alleged in all complaints to claim filiation filed in accordance with said law. The complaint filed in this ease not containing such allegation the judgment appealed from dismissing the complaint should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Aggravated Assault and Battery — Simple Assault — Defective Complaint. — A complaint for aggravated assault and battery wherein it is not alleged that the assailant was an adult male and the assailed a woman is defective and cannot support a judgment of conviction for aggravated assault and battery; but said complaint is sufficient to charge the crime of simple assault.</p> <p>Id. — Qualification of Crime — Complaint.-—That which determines the nature of the crime charged in a complaint is not the name given thereto in such complaint but the facts alleged therein.</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer to Complaint — Superfluous Allegations — Aggravated ■ Assault and Battery — Simple Assault. — When the facts constituting the crime of aggravated assault and battery have not been properly alleged in the complaint and said complaint for such reason has been demurred to, the court may overrule the demurrer and hold the facts improperly alleged to be superfluous and the complaint sufficient for a simple assault and battery.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Striking Out Part oe Evidence. — A motion to strike out a part of the testimony of a witness without specifying the part objected to should be overruled in that ground.</p> <p>Id. — Striking Out Part oe Evidence — Objection to Testimony. — A motion to strike out a part of the testimony of a witness made after said testimony had been admitted without objection should be overruled on the ground that it was not made at the proper time.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Evidence—Unimportant Errors. — The admission or exclusion of evidence which will not affect the result of a trial constitutes an unimportant error and should not be considered by this court on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Costs — Attorney’s Fees. — Section 327 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act of March 12, 1908, contains the mandatory provision that in all cases where in an action or proceeding costs are allowed to one party if the matter in litigation exceeds $500 in value said party shall be entitled to receive from the defeated party the amount due the former’s attorney for his services.</p> <p>Id.- — Value oe Property in Litigation — Attorney’s Fees. — In order that the successful party may be entitled to collect attorney’s fees from the defeated party it is necessary that the subject matter of the action be certain, specific, or assessable and that the value thereof may be fixed, and attorney’s fees cannot be collected as part of the costs when the value of the subject matter is undetermined or unassessable.</p> <p>Id. — Injunction—Value oe Property in Litigation — -Attorney’s Fees. — In accordance with the doctrine laid down in the preceding paragraph, when, as in the case at bar, it is impossible to estimate whether or not the value of the property in litigation exceeds $500, attorney’s fees cannot be collected as part of the costs even though the value of the lands to which the injunction refers is $2,000, because that fact does not mean necessarily that the right claimed in the complaint in which the injunction is prayed for exceeds $500.</p> <p>Id. — Construction oe Law. — Laws governing costs should not be construed liberally or beyond their literal sense but should be construed strictly.</p> <p>Id. — Disbursements in Suit — Attorney’s Fees — Construction.—Sections 327 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by the Act of March 12, 1908, refer to costs, disbursements, and attorney’s fees, therefore such distinction should be borne in mind and disbursements and attorney’s fees cannot be considered as included in costs.</p> <p>Id. — Meaning op Word “Costs.” — In costs are included fees and indemnities, consisting of sums fixed and unalterable previously specified by law, rule or tariff.</p> <p>Id. — Disbursements in Suit. — Disbursements are understood to be the expenses of a suit which are not included in costs as defined in the preceding paragraph, or, in other words, the indemnities and fees not consisting of fixed and unalterable sums previously specified by law, rule, or tariff.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney’s Fees. — Under the designation attorney’s fees remuneration for the professional services of a lawyer is understood.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Judgment and Laws Relative to Costs. — A judgment which provides for the payment of costs only refers to the costs alone and not to disbursements and attorney’s fees, because judgments carrying costs as well as laws relative to costs should be construed strictly.</p> <p>Id. — Judgment Which Sentences to Payment op Costs — Attorney’s Fees.— Attorney’s fees as well as disbursements are demandable only when the judgment which sentences a party to the payment of costs expressly includes the payment of disbursements and attorney’s fees. When a judgment sentences a party to the payment of costs only, attorney’s fees and disbursements cannot be claimed as part of the costs.</p> <p>Id. — Who May Adjudge the Payment op Attorney’s Fees and Disbursements — Substitute Judge. — The judge who presides at the trial of an action or proceeding is the only one empowered to sentence a party to the payment of attorney’s fees and disbursements, a judge who substitutes the one rendering judgment not having such power.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Objection to Memorandum op Costs — Excessive Costs. — The right to collect costs, disbursements, and attorney’s fees can be contested only on appeal from the judgment and not in an objection to the memorandum of costs, disbursements, or attorney’s fees, in which proceeding only the amount thereof can be objected to because of its being undue or excessive.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Striking out Testimony op Witness — Objection.—A court commits no error in refusing to strike out the testimony of a witness on motion therefor after the witness had been allowed to testify without objection.</p> <p>Id. — Striking Out 'Testimony op Witness — When Motion to Strike Out Testimony Should Be Made. — Ordinarily a motion to strike out the testimony of a witness should be made at the time of his testifying if the objection to such testimony is manifest. If the objection is not manifest at the time, the motion should be made immediately after the objection becomes manifest. If the objection is to the competency of the witness, it is too late to move to strike out his testimony after he has finished testifying.</p>

<p>Inheritance — Alienation oe Hereditary Rights. — The right of an heir to inherit from his father accrues at the moment of the death of the father and from that moment the heir may alienate validly all his hereditary rights to the inheritance from his father.</p> <p>Id.- — Alienation op Hereditary Rights — Depect in Deed — Record op Title — - Partition and Adjudication op Inheritance. — In accordance with the doctrine laid down in the preceding paragraph, the fact that a deed transferring hereditary rights is executed on the same day as that on which the partition of the inheritance is made and prior to the judicial approval of said partition and the recording thereof in a notarial office is not an incurable defect which bars the recording of the deed transferring the hereditary rights nor is it in conflict with the provisions of article 17 of the Mortgage Law, because in such a ease it is not sought to record a previous title or one of the same date executed by a person other than the one who appears in the registry to have title, but to record a deed executed by the very person who appears in the registry to possess title.</p> <p>Id. — Partition op Inheritance — Alienation op Hereditary Rights — Third Parties. — An heir who conveys all of his hereditary rights to the inheritance from his father, which title the grantee afterwards recorded as specified in certain property by virtue of the partition of the inheritance, has not the character of a third party with regard to the grantee of said rights.</p> <p>Id. — Record op Title — Alienation op Hereditary Rights — Record op Property Adjudicated to Heir in Partition. — A purchaser of title and rights in an inheritance who presents in the registry for record the deed granting him the hereditary rights to the property adjudicated to his vendor is entitled to have said deed entered on the records of the property adjudicated to the heir who conveyed to him his hereditary title.</p> <p>Id. — Description op Property — Amendable Depect — Partition Proceedings.— When a party who acquires by purchase the hereditary rights of an heir presents the deed of sale of said hereditary rights in the registry for record accompanied by a writing wherein the description of the estate adjudicated to the heir who sold him his title is given, if the description given in said writing agrees with the one appearing in the registry in favor of the record of the partition, said writing is sufficient and it cannot be said that such deed contains the amendable defeet of not giving a description of the property.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Notice oe Appeal — Presumption.—It is the established practice of this court to consider the date borne by a notice of appeal as the date of its filing in the office of the secretary of the trial court unless the contrary is shown clearly. Therefore, when in a criminal case it is shown prima facie that the appeal,.was taken in time this court will not dismiss the appeal because the notice thereof does not show the date of its filing in the office of the secretary unless the fiscal shows that this court is without jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id.' — Appeal—Notice oe Appeal — Presumption.—When the fiscal appears in this court after the transcript of the record has been remitted by the court below and makes any motion the object of which is not the dismissal of the appeal, it will be presumed that the notice of appeal was served in due form.</p>

<p>CANCELLATION OF RECORDS-IMPLIED CONSENT TO CANCELLATION.-Although the provisions of article 82 of the Mortgage Law require that in order to eaneel an entry or a cautionary notice by virtue of a deed the consent of the person in whose favor the record or entry was made must be shown, said article does not require that such consent shall be stated expressly in the document in a specific form, implied consent being sufficient if from the wording of the document it can be deduced in sueh manner as to leave no doubt that the consent was given.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Murder—Sufficiency of Information — Omission of Words “Human Being.” — It being necessary to constitute the crime of murder, that the being killed was a ‘ ‘ human being, ’ there is no doubt that this element is an essential allegation in all informations for murder; but when, as in the case at bar, the information begins by charging the defendant with the crime of murder in having killed José Beyes Lucian, which name signifies it was a human being and not an animal, and also employs the words “assault and battery,” etc., which can refer logically only to a person and not to an animal, the omission of the words “human being” does not make the information fatally defective for it is evident that the defendant is charged with the crime of murder for having killed a human being and not an animal.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Amendment op Judsment Appealed Prom — Pine and Imprisonment — Alternative Imprisonment. — In accordance with section 322 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alternative imprisonment may be imposed at the rate of one day for each two dollars of the fine which the party sentenced fails to pay, for although the minimum rate of alternative imprisonment should be one day for each dollar the maximum rate is left to the wise and sound discretion of the court. There existing no legal reason in the case at bar to justfy the modification of the sentence appealed from as asked for by the fiscal, the judgment should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeals — Doduments Sent by Mail — Piling Appeal in Supreme Court. — Within the 20 days after the service of notice of the decision of a registrar of property the documents establishing an appeal therefrom must be filed in the Supreme Court, and even supposing that such documents were deposited in the post office within the legal period, according to rule 2 of this court in connection with section 3 of the act governing administrative appeals, until said documents are received in the office of the secretary of the Supreme Court, whether forwarded by mail or otherwise, they will not be considered as filed in said office of the secretary.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeal — Period for Taking Administrative Appeal. — In accordance with section 3 of an Act governing appeals from decisions of registrars of property, approved March 1, 1902, all administrative appeals should be taken within a period of 20 days after the notice of the decision and, therefore, the present appeal is dismissed because it was taken after said period.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Habeas Corpus — Murder in First Degree — Premeditation and' Deliberation. — In accordance with our statutes, in order that the crime of murder in the first degree may exist it is sufficient that, among other things, an unlawful death shall have been caused wilfully, deliberately,, and premeditatedly, and all these elements appear from the. evidence taken in the case at bar. Deliberation 'and premeditation depend upon the circumstances of the case and the act of aiming and discharging a firearm at a person and thereby killing him is sufficient to constitute premeditation and deliberation notwithstanding the rapidity with which the act may have been committed.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Perjury—Contempt—Summary Proceedings for Contempt — ■ Commencement of Proceedings for Contempt. — A judgment of eonvietion for contempt rendered in summary proceedings initiated in accordance with Act No. 41 of March 9, 1911, is valid even when said judgment is rendered after the judgment in the main case in which the witness charged with contempt testified falsely, provided that the proceedings were commenced before the rendition of judgment in the main case, for the court retains jurisdiction to decide the summary proceedings for contempt even after the rendition of judgment in the case in which the perjury was committed.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Original Jurisdiction oe Supreme Court — Period Granted por Commencement op Actions by the Boman Catholic Apostolic Church.— In accordance with the Act of March 10, 1904, conferring original jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of Porto Eico for the trial and adjudication of certain Maims of the Eoman Catholic Apostolic Church in Porto Eico, this court lacks original jurisdiction in actions instituted by said church after the lapse of three months from the approval of said act, and therefore the complaint filed in this case will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Action of ejectment instituted in the Supreme Court as a court of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Power of Attorney — Express Power of Attorney in Pact — Dissolution and Liquidation of Mercantile Partnership — Adjudication of Property of Partnership. — An. attorney-in-fact having express power from the only heir of one of the members of a mercantile partnership to dissolve and liquidate the same lacks the power to adjudicate one of the estates of said partnership to another member in payment of his corresponding interest in the dissolved partnership.</p> <p>Powers of Liquidators. — In accordance with article 228 of the Code of Commerce, the powers of the liquidators of a mercantile partnership are limited to receiving the credits of the partnership, extinguishing its obligations previously contracted as they fall due, and executing pending transactions.</p> <p>Attorney in Pact — Express Power of Attorney in Pact — Adjudication of Property of Partnership — Alienation.—The act of adjudicating the property of a partnership in liquidation to one of the members in payment of his share of the assets in the dissolved partnership constitutes a real aet of alienation, which, according to section 1605 of the Revised Civil Code, cannot be performed by an attorney-in-fact without express power therefor.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>Motion to strike out the statement of .the case and to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Application for Writ of Certiorari.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Procedure—Notice—Judgments by District Courts in Appeals prom Municipal Courts. — Rule 34 of tlie District Courts should be construed in harmony with Act of March 11, 1908, which is the law in force on the subject'. In accordance with said law a judgment rendered by a district court before the expiration of the ten days specified in said Rule 34 by virtue of a trial held in the absence of one of the parties is not absolutely null especially when it appears, as in the case at bar, that the ease was entered on the calendar, that a date was set for its trial, that the plaintiff had counsel since the trial in the municipal court and that said attorney was served with notice of the appeal.</p> <p>Judgments — Setting Aside Judgments — Conditional Orders — Discretion op CoOrt. — An order setting aside or refusing to set aside a judgment under the powers conferred on courts by section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, lies in the discretion of the court and the judge may impose conditions such as the payment of the costs incurred in setting aside a judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Conditional Orders — Non-Compliance with Conditional Order — Revocation op Conditional Order. — When a condition imposed by a court in setting aside its own judgment is not complied with by the party on whom it was imposed, the court has the power to revoke the order thus reestablishing the former status of the case.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Natural Child — Action eor Acknowledgment — Prescription.—The plaintiff herein having been born on November 30, 1864, his putative lather having died on April 15, 1911, and the complaint not having been filed until April 30, 1912, there can be no question that the action for acknowledgment brought by the plaintiff had beeome extinguished by the lapse of the term fixed by section 199 of the Revised Civil Code. Jesús v. Succession of Pérez, decided May 2-2, 1912.</p> <p>Id. — Duration oe Action eor Acknowledgment — Law Which Governs — Action eor Acknowledgment. — According to rule 4 of the temporary provisions of the Revised Civil Code, the duration of the action for acknowledgment brought by the plaintiff herein must be governed by the provisions of section 199 of the Revised Civil Code which is the law applicable to this ease and not by article 137 of the Spanish Civil Code formerly in force.</p> <p>Id. — Prescription oe Actions eor Acknowledgment — Revival oe Right. — Act No. 73, enacted March 9, 1911, is not applicable to the ease at bar, because when said act took effect the action claiming filiation brought by the plaintiff had already prescribed and her right had beeome extinguished, and the said act cannot revive a right which had lapsed. The ease of Jesús v. Succession of Perez, 18 P. R. R., 392, is referred to and followed here.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action for Acknowledgment — Prescription.—The plaintiff having been born in 1861, the putative father having died on April 15, 1911, and the complaint having been filed on April 13, 1912, Held: That this aetion had prescribed, Jesús v. Succession of Pérez, 18 P. E. B., 392; Poblé v. Succession of Pérez, 18 P. E. E., 894.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Disturbing Public Peace — Malice or Wilfulness — Assault— Self-Defense. — Upon examining the evidence in the case at bar it was hold that the appellant did not act maliciously or wilfully and that the acts which he committed were in self-defense to repel the unlawful assault made upon him by the other accused. ' ■</p> <p>Id. — Assault—Sele-Deeense.—According to sections 52 and 54 of the Penal Code a person about to be.injured may employ the necessary resistance to prevent the offense attempted against his person, his family, or any member thereof, and a person who is attacked is not required to flee or hide himself or turn aside from the publie streets to avoid his assailant.</p>

<p>Property of Conjugal Partnership — Mortgage Recorded in Name of Wife— Source of Funds of Wife — Presumption.—It appearing from the records of the registry of property that a mortgage credit was acquired by the wife during her marriage and the records of said registry not showing the source of the money given on the mortgage, it must be presumed that said mortgage credit has the character of property of the conjugal partnership according to sections 1316 and 1322 of the Revised Civil Code.</p> <p>Id. — Mortgage Recorded in Name of Wife — Presumption—Source of Funds of Wife. — As a mortgage acquired by the wife during marriage, with no showing in the registry as to the source of the funds with which she acquired it, is presumed to be community property, the record of said mortgage in the registry in the name of the wife should be considered as in favor of the conjugal partnership and not in favor of the wife alone, for the record does not show that said mortgage is her private property, nor is she the exclusive owner of half of tho eredit' until the conjugal partnership with her husband is dissolved and liquidated.</p> <p>Id.- — Debts Contracted During Marriage- — Attachment — Community Property — Mortgage Recorded in Name of Wife. — According to paragraph 1 of section 1323 of the Revised Civil Code the property of the conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by the husband during the marriage and also for debts contracted by the wife in the cases in which she can legally bind the partnership; therefore an attachment granted in an action against the husband to recover debts and obligations contracted by him during the marriage may be entered in the registry on a mortgage credit recorded in the name of the wife alone and considered as community property because the source of the money given on the mortgage is not shown, for the record of said mortgage credit in the name of the wife cannot be considered as a reeord in favor of a person distinct from the husband but as in favor of the conjugal partnership.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Conspiracy—Circumstantial Evidence. — Considering the secret character of conspiracies, it is necessary as a general rule to prove them by means of circumstantial evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Conspiracy—Evidence—Discretion oe Court — Concession oe One oe Conspirators. — In the exercise of the discretional poner which it has to regulate the order of the introduction of evidence, a court may allow a fiscal to introduce as evidence the confession of one of the conspirators made in testifying as a witness at the investigation of the crime by the fiscal, especially when it has not been shown that said confession was not made freely and spontaneously by the conspirator and even though at that stage of the trial the existence of the conspiracy had not been proven.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence oe Conspiracy — Testimony oe Conspirators — Discretion oe Court — Appeal.—Although the general rule is that no testimony of the conspirators shall be admitted until the conspiracy shall have been established, the court has discretional power to vary the order of evidence on this point and its ruling in this regard will not be reversed provided the circumstances of the case warrant such action.</p> <p>Id. — Information—Investigation by Fis«al — Testimony oe Witnesses. — The law in force in Porto Rico does not require a fiscal to take down in writing the testimony of witnesses called to testify before him in the investigation of a crime. Neither does the law require that an information filed by a fiscal shall be accompanied by the written testimony of the witnesses.</p> <p>Id. — Information—Preliminary Investigation in Municipal Court — Jurisdiction. — When a case originates through the sworn information of the fiscal the law in force in Porto Rico does not require that a preliminary investigation be made in a municipal court in order that the district court may take jurisdiction thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Subpoena Duces Teoum' — Preliminary Investigation in Municipal Court — Testimony oe Witnesses.' — In the case at bar it was held that the trial court committed no error in refusing to require the fiscal to introduce the testimony given by the witnesses in the preliminary investigation made in a municipal court, for, supposing them to be admissible, the defendants could have obtained such testimony by means of a subpoena duces tecum.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The “facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Crime Against Public Safety — Collision—Acts of Negligence. — The evidence in the case at bar having been examined, it was held that the acts of negligence of the defendant had been proven, consisting in his being intoxicated and in driving on the left-hand side instead of on the right-hand side of the road when the collision in question took place..</p> <p>Id. — Drivers of Vehicles — Alcoholic Drinks — Negligence.—Although nothing is provided in the road law nor in the automobile regulations relative to the use of alcoholic drinks by drivers of vehicles, considering the effects of sueh drinks on the senses and on the mental and moral faculties of man, it may be concluded that a driver who drinks such liquors in excess is negligent in the faithful discharge of the duties of his position.</p> <p>Id.- — Speed of Automobile — Use of Horn on Automobile. — The speed at which an automobile is driven and the nonuse of the horn are circumstances which may be considered in cases of this nature.</p> <p>Id. — Driving Automobile on Public Boads. — Section 12 of Act No. 41 of March 10, 1910, requires drivers of vehicles meeting on public roads to approach and pass each other on their respective right-hand sides, and in the case at bar if the defendant had complied with this provision he would have - prevented the collision for which he is responsible.</p>

<p>Pleading — Demurrer—Pacts Insufficient to Constitute Cause of Action— Appeal — Plea Baised by Initiative oe Court. — A demurrer on the ground that the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action may be pleaded for the first time on appeal to this court and may be passed upon by the trial court and the appellate eourt on their own initiative even though it has not been pleaded by the parties. Ramírez v. Schroder et al., 16 P. B. B., 589.</p> <p>Natural Children — -Acknowledgment of Natural Child — Action for Acknowledgment — Law Which Governs. — -The acknowledgment of the minor plaintiff in this case having been made on October 29, 1906, when the Bevised Civil Code was already in force, this action is governed by the provisions of said code and not by those of the Spanish Civil Code in force prior to 1902, or the action should be founded upon a right the existence of which is independent of our statutory laws.</p> <p>Id. — -Objection to Acknowledgment — Statutory Bight — Natural Bight. — The right of the plaintiff herein to oppose his acknowledgment as a natural child is not founded upon our statutory laws, but is a natural right independent thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment of Natural Child — Objection to Acknowledgment— Bemedy for False Acknowledgment. — In the case at bar it is clear that the acknowledgment of the plaintiff as a natural child by a person who is not his real' father is damaging to him, and as there is no wrong without a remedy the plaintiff may bring such action as may be proper for the purpose of opposing such acknowledgment.</p> <p>Id. — Objection to Acknowledgment — Action to Oppose Acknowledgment — • Construction of Law.- — The fact that article 133 of the Spanish Civil Code has been repealed and that section 193 of the Bevised Civil Code of 1902 and Act No. 73 of March 9, 1905, have been enacted without including the provisions of said article 133 of the Spanish Civil Code which expressly limited the right of a minor to oppose his acknowledgment to the four years following his majority does not imply that a minor can not bring an action to attack his acknowledgment made while the Bevised Civil Code was in force.</p> <p>Id. — Construction of 'Law — Acknowledgment of Natural Child — Action to Oppose Acknowledgment — Prescription.—The fact that when the Legislative Assembly of Porto Bico by the enactment of Act No. 73 of March 9, 1905, reenacted the provisions of article 133 of the Spanish Civil Code in force in Porto Bico prior to 1902 it failed to include the last paragraph of said article 133 by virtue of which a minor may contest his acknowledgment within the four years following his majority, does not imply that it was the intention of the Legislative Assembly to deprive the minor of the right to contest his acknowledgment by a person who is not his father. The only significance which may be given to such an omission is that the Legislative Assembly desired that the prescription of an action to contest acknowledgment shall be governed by the general provisions of the statutes of limitation.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Sureties in Criminal Cases — Liability for Costs in Criminal Cases — Erroneous Translation into Spanish of Section 49 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. — In accordance with the English text of section 49 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the judgment against the defendant is affirmed on appeal or the appeal is dismissed, at the expiration of the five days following the district court shall render judgment against the sureties for the amount of the fine and costs if not already paid. In the Spanish text of the same section the word "costs” has been omitted erroneously.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Liability of Sureties — -Object of Surety — Costs.—In accordance with section 48 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by an Act of March 12, 1908, in case of an appeal from a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace in a criminal case the surety is for the purpose of securing the payment of the costs which rhay be imposed on the defendant by said district court, including those previously incurred in the inferior court, and to guarantee the appearance of the defendant in the district court on such date-or dates as his presence may be required.</p> <p>Id. — Costs in Criminal Cases — Nonpayment of Costs by Defendants — -Liability of Sureties — Construction of Law. — Although according to section 271 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act of March 9, 1911, the costs should be taxed against the defendants, said provisions of law do not prohibit the taxation of costs against their sureties who are liable for the payment of the same should the defendants fail to pay them.</p> <p>Id. — Costs in Criminal Cases — Collection of Costs from Sureties — Execution of Judgment.- — Proceedings against sureties to collect costs in criminal cases is not a civil action but should be considered as an incident to the execution of the judgment in a criminal case, and the fiscal should endeavor to collect the costs by filing a separate motion for eaeh surety instead of instituting one single proceeding including all the sureties in several criminal cases.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Transcript op Eecord — Notice op Appeal — Omissions — Jurisdiction op Supreme Court.- — In order that the Supreme Court may have jurisdiction to decide an appeal it is necessary that the same shall have been taken in the eases in which the law allows an appeal and that the requisites necessary to consider it as perfected shall have been complied with. Therefore it is indispensable that the transcript of the record include a certificate of the notice of appeal which was filed, and this omission is not corrected although it is recited in the statement of the ease that the same is filed by virtue of an appeal, or the taking of the appeal is shown in any other incidental manner in the transcript of the record.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal —■ Transcript op Eecord —■ Errors or Omissions — Diligence op Appellant. — Although in accordance with section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended March 7, 1908, it is the duty of the secretary of the district court to prepare the transcript of the record in criminal eases, the appellant who is interested in the success of his appeal should by all means be diligent in seeing that before the hearing of the appeal the transcript of the record contains all the documents necessary to make it valid and that any error or omission whieh the secretary may have committed is corrected.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Apppeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law- — Arrest at Night — Pelony—Misdemeanor—-Warrant of Arrest — Endorsement by Magistrate — Powers of Police — Crime Committed in Presence of Police — Construction of Law. — Paragraph 1 of section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers a policeman to arrest a person who has committed a public crime in his presence, whether it be a felony or a misdemeanor, at any hour of the day or night, without a warrant of arrest bearing the endorsement of a magistrate authorizing the arrest at night, and said power is not limited in any manner by the provisions of section 120 of the same code.</p> <p>Id. — Arrest at Night — Warrant op Arrest — Construction op Law.. — The limitation with respect to arrests at night provided for by section 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers only to the arrest of a person by virtue of- a warrant of arrest issued by competent authority before whom charges have been-made against said person.</p> <p>Id.- — -Interpretation op ‘ ‘ Charged ’ ’ — Criminal Complaint. — The word “charged” as used in section 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not equivalent to the word “imputed,” but means that there exists a complaint made by some person in whose presence, perhaps, the crime was committed, which complaint was made to the proper official for the purpose of having him issue the corresponding warrant of arrest.</p> <p>Id.- — Construction—Interpretation op “Charged” — Preliminary Investigation on Accusation. — In legal phraseology a “person charged” with a crime is a person against whom a complaint has been made before the proper authority in the form ordinarily followed in judicial proceedings.- In the eyes of the law a person is ‘ ‘ charged with a crime ’ ’ only when he is called upon in a legal proceeding to appear and answer to such charge. Investigations made by fiscals, examining magistrates and even grand juries do not in themselves determine the existence of a “ criminal charge. ’ ’</p> <p>Id. — Statutes Adopted prom Other States — Construction by Courts op States Prom Which Statutes Adopted. — The rule requiring the acceptance of the construction given to a statute by the courts of the State from which the same has been adopted is not of universal application, but is subject to many exceptions and limitations.</p> <p>Id. — Expressio Unius Est Exolusio Alterius. — It is hold in the case at bar that this maxim is not applicable. Very often the exclusio is the result of inad-vertanee or omission on the part of the legislator, and in such cases as well as in those where the application of said maxim leads to inconsistency or injustice the maxim should not be applied.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Statutes — Construction Should Harmonize All Provisions op Title. — Sections of a code should be construed with their object in mind as it appears from the title of the chapter and in a manner to harmonize all the provisions of the title.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Statutes — Intention op Legislator. — The fundamental rule for the construction of a statute, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that the statute should be construed in accordance with the intention of the legislators.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Law — Ordinary Meaning op Words — Absurdity or Inconsistency — Intention op Legislator. — The “golden rule” in determining the intention of the legislature in enacting a law is to adhere to the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words used in the law unless such meaning would lead to an absurdity or produce some inconsistency between different parts of the law, in which ease the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity or inconsistency in the law.</p> <p>Id. — Arrest at Night Without Warrant — Construction oe Law.' — In the ease at bar it was held that the construction given by the trial court to sections 116 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the effect that a policeman cannot arrest at night a person who has violated the law in his iiresence without a warrant of arrest bearing the endorsement of a competent authority expressly authorizing the arrest at night would annul the statutes intended to preserve the public peace and good order and protect honest persons, and a condition of affairs closely resembling anarchy would follow.</p>

<p>Conjugal Partnership — Debts Contracted Before Marriage. — In accordance with section 1325 of the Revised Code, the payment of debts contracted by' either spouse before the marriage is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.</p> <p>Id. — Conjugal Partnership — Community Property — Private Property — Presumption. — In accordance with section 1322 of the Revised Civil Code, all property acquired during the marriage is considered as property of the conjugal partnership, but this presumption may be destroyed by proving that the property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses.</p> <p>Id. — Execution Against Wife’s Property to Satisfy Husband’s Debts Contracted Before Marriage.- — -In accordance with the'doctrine laid down in the preceding paragraph, it was held in the case at bar that it having been proved that the houses in litigation were acquired by the plaintiff during her marriage but with the proceeds of the sale of property owned by her before the marriage, said houses could not be levied on or sold under execution to satisfy debts contracted by the husband of the plaintiff prior to the marriage.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Approval op Statement op Case — Duty op Trial Judge — Appeal — Bill op Exceptions. — In certifying to a statement of the case the judge should state that he approves it because the facts set forth therein conform to those-which transpired in the course of the trial and because it contains all the evidence introduced at the trial as well as the exceptions noted, if it is to be filed by the appellant both as a statement of the case and bill of exceptions.</p> <p>Id. — -Appeal—Contradictory Evidence. — When the evidence is contradictory the findings of the trial court will be respected by this court unless it is shown that the trial court was influenced by passion or prejudice or committed manifest error.</p> <p>Id. — Begistrars op Property — Office Hours op Eegistrars op Property. — A registrar of property who wilfully fails to attend punctually at his office on the days on which the law requires him to do so violates the act assigning salaries to registrars of property of March 10, 1904, as amended March 8, 1906.</p> <p>Id. — Superfluous Allegation. — Superfluous allegations are considered as not having been alleged and need not be prpven.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Law of the Case — Appeal.—The opinion delivered by this court on June 26, 1912, in certiorari proceedings, No. 94, Peres et al. v. Lopes, District Judge, cannot be considered as the law of the case nor can it bind the appellants in the present ease so as to deprive them of a hearing in this appeal for the reason that they did not appear and were not heard in the aforesaid eerliorari proceedings. Therefore, this case must be considered as if it had not been decided previously by virtue of certiorari proceedings.</p> <p>Appeal — Transcript of Eecord — Bill of Exceptions — Statement of Case— Errors of Law. — When a transcript of the record does not contain a statement of the case or a bill of exceptions, the Supreme Court ean examine and consider only the errors of law which appear on the face of the record.</p> <p>Id. — Law of the Case — Transcript of Eecord — Bill of Exceptions — Statement of Case — Certiorari—Errors of Law. — In accordance with the doctrine laid down in the preceding paragraph, there existing no bill of exceptions or statement of the case in the transcript filed and the questions of law that may be examined being the same as those decided by this court on June 26, 1912, in the certiorari proceedings, the opinion then delivered is the law of the case and must govern necessarily the decision of this case.</p> <p>Id. — Second Appeal — Law of the Case. — When by virtue of a second appeal the same case is twice brought to an appellate court the opinion delivered in deciding the first appeal constitutes the law of the ease, and in considering the second appeal the court can decide only whether the proceedings in the lower court after the decision of the first appeal are in harmony with the opinion delivered in deciding the same, which opinion, so far as relates to the questions considered and decided therein, constitutes the law of the case which must govern the second appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Motion of fiscal to dismiss appeal.</p> <p>Appeal dismissed on motion of fiscal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Motion of fiscal to dismiss appeal.</p> <p>Appeal dismissed on motion of fiscal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Motion of fiscal to dismiss appeal.</p> <p>Appeal dismissed on motion of fiscal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>Motion of fiscal to.dismiss appeal.</p> <p>Appeal dismissed on motion of fiscal.</p>

<p>Appeal-t-Findincs ojt Lower Court — Simulated Payment — Fraud—Conspiracy — Evidence.—After weighing the evidence introduced in this case the trial court held that the existence of a fraudulent conspiracy between the defendants for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff or that the payment made by one defendant to his codefendant was. false and simulated had not been proven. It was held on appeal that the appellant not having alleged or shown that the lower court committed error in weighing the evidence or that it was actuated by passion, prejudice, or partiality, no reason existed for not accepting said findings.</p> <p>Private Documents — Third Parties. — A receipt in the form of a private document and acknowledged by the parties thereto has the same value as to said parties as a public instrument and according to section 1193 of the Civil Oode is effective from its date, but in regard to third parties section 1195 of said code is applicable.</p> <p>Judgment Lien — Payment to Judgment Debtor — Fraudulent Intention— Common Credits — Beal Property. — The Act of March 8, 1906, providing for the manner of creating judgment liens on real property does not create, as is indicated by its title, liens on common credits, therefore a judgment creditor who has recorded his judgment in the judgment registry cannot plead the existence of a lien on a common credit which the debtor had in his favor. Even in the supposition that a person pays his debt to a judgment debtor knowing that said judgment is recorded in the registry, if he does not know of the fraudulent intention which said debtor may have in regard to the judgment creditor, the payment is properly made and extinguishes the obligation.</p> <p>Payment — Rescission op Payment — Obligations not Due. — The payment of a debt before it is due will not be rescinded for the reasons stated in section 1259 of the Revised Civil Code unless it is shown that the person who made the payment was insolvent at the time.</p> <p>Costs — -Appeal—Notice op Appeal. — When the transcript of the record does not contain the notice of appeal taken from the decision of the trial court approving a memorandum of eosts, this court lacks jurisdiction to decide the appeal although it may have been really taken.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p>