Volume 19 — Puerto Rico Reports

<p>Deficiency Judgment — 'Third Parties — Record of Judgments — Allegations.— Allegations must be proven by the party wbo makes them. On motion for a deficiency judgment against a third party the mover must prove that the judgment was rendered, that a part thereof remains unsatisfied and that it was recorded in the judgment book of the registry of property.</p> <p>Admissions oe Parties — Transcript oe Record. — Admissions of the parties must appear in the transcript of the record and it is not sufiicient that they appear in the brief alone.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari directed to the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Sanitary Regulations — Rat-Proofing Houses — Information, Insufficient. — The information is defective because it does not allege whether the building ordered to be made rat-proof is a dwelling with a wooden lower floor or a building used as a market, warehouse, storehouse, bakery, pastry factory, canning factory, distillery, confectionery shop, store, grocery, wine cellar, pier, hotel, restaurant, café, eating house or booth. Decided on the grounds of the opinion rendered in Case No. 496, The People v. Planeo, 18 P. R. R., 980.</p> <p>Id. — Information, Insufficient — Defect not Pleaded. — The defect in the information is of such a nature that it may be considered by this court although it was not pleaded by the appellant in this court and it does not appear whether he did so in the trial court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Lis Pendens Attachment — Attachment Without Bond. — In order that an attachment to seeure the effectiveness of a judgment may be ordered without bond, it must appear clearly from an authentic document that the obligation may be legally enforced in accordance with section 4 of the law to secure the effectiveness of judgments, approved March 1, 1902. The documents presented in this case do not show clearly that the obligation is legally enforceable. Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 881, Avalo v. Porrata et at, decided January 22, 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Errors — Appeal.—Fundamental errors may "be pleaded for the first time on appeal.</p> <p>Attorney's Pees — Errors—Appeal.—The plea that a party is not obliged to pay attorney’s fees because he was not expressly adjudged to pay the same may be entered for the first time on appeal although his plea in the trial court was merely that they were excessive.</p> <p>Attorney’s Fees — Costs.—In order that a party may be required to pay attorney’s fees as a part of the costs, it is necessary that .he be expressly ordered by the judgment to pay such fees.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are ■ stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Sanitary Regulations — Rat-Proofing Houses — Information, Insufficient. — -The information is insufficient because it does not state whether the house which is said to be the property of the accused and wherein the repairs were ordered by the Director of Sanitation, is a dwelling with the ground floor of wood- or a building used as a market, warehouse, storehouse, bakery, pastry or canning factory, distillery, confectionery store, grocery, wine cellar, pier, hotel, restaurant, café, eating house or booth; which allegation is necessary in this case in order to show a violation of Sanitary Regulation No. 3. Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 496, The People v. Blanco, 18 P. R. R., 980.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury. — This court cannot consider the instructions of the court to the jury when they are not duly certified by the trial judge.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Bill op Exceptions — Statement op Case. — The transcript of the record not containing a bill of exceptions or a statement of the ease and the instructions of the court to the jury not being duly certified, this court has no means of determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury.</p>

<p>Amendment oe Judgment — Motion to Amend — Clerical , .Errors — Terms oe Court. — The courts of Porto Rico have the power to amend their judgments and decrees in any manner within the term in which the same were rendered, and after the expiration of .the term when the motion to amend is made within the term and remains pending after said term, or when the amendment sought is to correct clerical errors.</p> <p>Ip. — Clerical Errors' — Errors oe Law — Costs.—A district court has no power after the expiration of the term within which it rendered a judgment to amend the same by the addition after the word "costs” the words "disbursements and attorney’s fees.” Such an amendment in the present case, under the circumstances surrounding the same, would constitute the correction of an error of law and not a clerical error.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Disturbing the Peace — Drawing Deadly Weapon. — In order that the drawing or exhibiting of a deadly weapon may constitute a crime under section 370 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that it be done in a rude, angry and threatening manner in the presence of two or more persons. These elements are not present in the case at bar.</p>

<p>Deeided on tie grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 889, Marvin $• Jones, Inc. v. Torres et at, deeided February 4, 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>. Criminal Law — Peremptory Verdict oe Not Guilty — Insufficient Evidence— Contradictory Evidence.' — In a trial by jury where the evidence is contradictory the court has no power to order peremptorily a verdict of not guilty. The court can order the acquittal of the accused only when the evidence is insufficient. . '</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Exceptions—Conflicting Evidence. — In cases where the evidence is conflicting and it does not appear that the appellant noted any exceptions to the rulings of the court below during the trial, and where there is no reason to question the weighing of the evidence by the trial court, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeal — Document Not Presented in Registry. — This court cannot consider on appeal from a decision of the registrar of property documents which are not shown to have been presented in the registry.</p> <p>Curable Defects — Description of Property. — The fact that the principal property from which the lot sought to be recorded was segregated is not described in the document presented for record constitutes a curable defect.</p> <p>Id. — Description of Property. — Failure to set forth in the deed the area of the lot sought to be recorded constitutes a curable defect. It is not enough to-describe it by boundaries giving the length of each boundary.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Decided on the grounds of the opinion delivered in Case No. 514, The People v. Menéndez et al., decided February 7, 1913.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>. Criminal Law — Jurisdiction—Unconstitutional Law. — The unconstitutionality of a statute does not deprive a court of jurisdiction but shows that the offense' charged is not punishable by law.</p> <p>Id. — Escape oe Prisoner — Jurisdiction.—The district court of the district ini which a prisoner escapes has jurisdiction of the crime of escape defined in section 152 of the Penal Code and not the court which sentenced the deserter.</p>

<p>Action for Recovery of Money — Action for Damages. — Quaere..—Section 194 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to actions for the recovery of money arising from a contract or for damages only. Quaere: Can it be applicable also to actions to recover both a sum of money and damages?</p> <p>Judgment by Default — Summons.—In order that a plaintiff may obtain a judgment by default the provisions of the statute must be strictly complied with, and the provisions of section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be followed in the summons.</p> <p>Id. — Damages.—The judgment by default rendered in this case for the amount of the promissory note, without including the damages claimed, is in accordance with the law.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Appeal—Jurisdiction—Transcript op Eecord — Notice op Appeal. — This court is without jurisdiction of an appeal when in the transcript of the record the notice of appeal is omitted. It is not sufficient that in the statement of the case approved by the judge the appellant alleged that he appealed. The People v., Lorenzo, 18 P. E. E., 940.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Judgment in Criminal Case. — A judgment in a criminal ease: should set out the offense of which the defendant was convicted either in terms or by reference to other parts of the record.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Contracts — Deceit.—Tbe trial court did not err in tbe case at bar in deciding that no deceit had been practiced in the execution of the contract in litigation.</p> <p>■Contracts — Fraud—Illiteracy.—If one person enters into a verbal contract with another in the absence of any specially confidential relations between them and the latter reduces the agreement to writing and the former signs it without reading it, or after it is read to him by another person, both parties having the same means of acquainting themselves with the contents of the written contract, said party is bound, by and subject to all the liabilities arising from said contract unless fraud has been practiced, even though the terms thereof differ from the verbal contract entered into, and the fact that the contracting party is illiteiate does not change this rule.</p> <p>Id. — Ratification of Contract — Evidence.—When cine contracting party attacks the contract as null and void the fact that he had offered to sell the house which is the object of the contract is admissible in evidence to show the performance of acts tending to ratify the contract attacked.</p> <p>■Contradictory Evidence — Specific Findings. — "Where the evidence is contradictory and one of the parties desires the court to decide specifically whether the testimony of one of the parties has been considered worthy of belief, he should request this during the trial.</p> <p>Judgments — Basis of Judgment — Error in Reasoning. — If a judgment is in accordance with law, although the reasons on which it is based are erroneous, it will not be reversed on appeal for that reason.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Possessory Title — Dominion Title — House Built on Land Belonging to Another. — When the possessory title to a house is reeorded in favor of its owner by virtue of possessory title proceedings from which it appears that the lot belongs to the municipality, the registrar of property cannot refuse to convert the record of possession into a record of ownership on the ground that it appears from the registry that the house is situated on a lot belonging to the municipality.</p> <p>Becord of Title — Jurisdigtion of Begistry Becords — Administrative Appeal.— When a record is entered in the registry of property it is under the protection of the courts and they alone have the power to determine, in a proper action, the validity or nullity thereof. Such a question cannot be considered in an administrative appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Possessory Title — Dominion Title — House Built on Land Belonging to Another. — If it appears from the registry that a house is situated on a lot i belonging to the municipality, it is clear that the conversion of the record of possession of the house into a record of ownership affects the house only and not the lot of the municipality upon which the petitioner in the possessory title proceedings acknowledged that the house was built.</p>

<p>Third Parties — Record of Title. — Paragraph 1 of article 17 of the Mortgage Law has no other purpose or intent than that of protecting third parties, and if the person in whose favor the record is made is not a third party, it cannot be applied.</p> <p>Record of Title — Deed of Title by Construction — Deed of Sale.' — The record of a house in the registry in favor of its owner by virtue of a deed declaring the construction thereof does not prevent the record of a deed of sale of the same house in favor of the purchaser although the latter was executed prior to the execution of the deed declaring the construction of the house.</p> <p>Id. — Title of Vendor — Title of Vendee. — In accordance with article 20 of the Mortgage Law, in order to record the title of the vendee it is necessary first to record the title of the vendor.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Judgment.—The evidence introduced in this case having been examined, it is found more than sufficient to support the judgment of conviction appealed from.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>(Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 1, refused to record a deed in favor of an agricultural company for the reason that it appeared from the registry that said corporation had recorded already in its favor more than 500 acres of land and that every acquisition of land in excess of that amount was in violation of the Joint Resolution of Congress of May 1, 1900, amending the Foraker Act, and it not appearing that the new acquisition was necessary for the purposes for which the corporation was created, Held:</p> <p>Corporations — Limitation op Bight to I-Iold Lands — Aliens—Escheat—In-quest op Oppice — Office Found. — In tlie United States corporations and foreigners are placed by law in the same class in this respect, and although they are prohibited or limited as to the possession of lands, they have full power of ownership of the lands until the Government or the State intervenes. The proceeding against aliens to secure the escheat of lands is known as "inquest of office'' and ‘ ‘ office found. ’ ’</p> <p>Id. — Titles op Corporations. — Such corporations may sue in ejectment or unlawful detainer and demand specific performance of contracts, for their titles are good as against all the world except the State.</p> <p>Id. — Limitation op Bight to Hold Lands. — The Organic Act does not prohibit the acquisition of lands but limits the ownership and control thereof to 500 acres.</p> <p>Id. — Begistrars op Property — Beoord op Title. — A registrar is bound to record a . conveyance to an agricultural corporation although the law forbids the ownership and control of more than 500 acres. The law only requires the registrar to examine the documents submitted to him and the previous history of the property in question.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney General — Proceedings por Escheat — Ultra Vires. — The Attorney General is the official authorized by the Organic Act in connection with the Bevised Statutes of the United States to initiate proceedings against corporations which perform acts ultra vires. Section 73 of the Political Code is to the same effect.</p> <p>Id. — Construction op Deeds — Limitation op Bight to Hold Lands — Presumption. — The silence of a deed with respect to certain exceptions to the limitation established by the Organic Act does not preclude the possibility of the existence of such exceptions. The same may be said of the supposed violation of the charter of a corporation.</p> <p>Ownership — Becord op Title. — No one is bound to record his property in order to acquire the full, ownership thereof.</p> <p>Registry op Property — Questions op Fact. — The registry is not the place in which to try matters involving disputed questions of fact.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan, Section 2.</p>

<p>Partition op Inheritance — I-Ieirs—Incompatibility—Widow op Testator.— Where there are several heirs the widow of the testator, according to section 1024 of the Revised Civil Code, cannot be appointed partitioner of the estate because the trust is incompatible with her character of heir.</p> <p>Id. — Testamentary Executors. — In accordance with the provisions of section 876 of the Revised Civil Code, the capacity of testamentary executor does not in itself confer competency to partition the estate.</p> <p>Id. — Partitioners—Heirs.—Section 1025 construed in connection with section 885 of the Revised Civil Code does not empower heirs to distribute the estate when any one of the partitioners named by the testator is competent to effect the partition and has accepted the trust.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action for Acknowledgment — Constitutional Law.— Section 199 of the Kevised Civil Code, which has been in force since 1902, is not Unconstitutional because the plaintiff was thereby given two years within which to bring her action for acknowledgment, counting from the date on which that code went into effect, and this period of time is a reasonable one.</p> <p>Actions — Constitutional Law — Prescription.—A statute limiting or reducing the length of time within which to bring an action is not unconstitutional if it allons a reasonable time before prescription begins to run.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Power oe Attorney — Construction.—Powers of attorney should be construed restrictively in order that what the principal authorized for his profit and benefit shall not result in. the reyerse.</p> <p>Id. — Lease—Corporations—Trustees.—According to the fifth clause of its charter the trustees of the Pajardo Sugar Growers’ Association are not empowered to execute a contract of lease, and not possessing that power, they cannot confer it upon their attorney in fact, Jorge Bird Arias.</p> <p>Lease — Trustees—Directors—Corporations.—The trustees of the Pajardo Sugar Growers’ Association not "being empowered as such to execute this contract of lease, it is of no importance so far as the decision of this appeal is concerned that they are at the same time directors of that corporation and may make leases as such.</p>

<p>. Appeal — Assignment of Error. — When in alleging as one of the grounds of the appeal that the court erred in weighing the evidence no specific legal question is'raised'but said question is reserved to be taken up with the other errors in the judgment appealed from, this court cannot consider separately an error alleged in this manner.</p> <p>Simulated Contracts. — It lias not been proved in this ease that the deed whereby Eafael Margari sold to Andrés Crosas his interest in the firm of Margari & Co., in liquidation, was simulated, for it witnesses an act which is in accord with the real facts.</p> <p>Id.- — Conveyance.'—Nor has it been shown that the deeds whereby Eafael Margari sold to the commercial firm of Crosas & Ejnlay, represented by the managing partner, Andrés Crosas, three lots numbered 6, 11, and 12, situated in the barrio Marina of this city, were simulated or null and void, for although said lots appeared in the name of Bafael Margari, they belonged to Margari & Go., and therefore there was no legal obstacle to their conveyance by Eafael Margari directly to Crosas & Finlay, instead of conveying them to Margari Sc Go. so that the firm might in turn convey the same to Crosas & Finlay.</p> <p>Attorney in Fact — Will—Posthumous Child — Guardian.—When one person appoints another his attorney in fact to execute a will in his name in ae- ■ cordance with Law 31 of Toro, or Law 1, title 19, book 10 of the Novísima *’ Recopilación, and at the same time appoints him guardian and curator ad bona of a son, the attorney in fact cannot extend the appointment to include a posthumous daughter of his principal when it does not appear from the power of attorney that he was given that power.</p> <p>Guardian — Partition op Inheritance.' — The nullity of the appointment of a guardian and curator ad bona who does not take part as, such in the partition of the property of the deceased does not affect the validity of the partition.</p> <p>Id. — In a ease where the guardian was not required to give bond and was allowed to use the minor's income for his support, it was unnecessary to comply with the provisions of article 1261 of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure of 1855 .before qualifying</p> <p>Id. — Security por Faithpul Discharge op Duties. — The failure of the guardian to give security for the faithful discharge of his duties is not a material defect such as to render his qualification null and void, nor does it relieve him of the responsibility attaching to the guardianship.</p> <p>Guardian ad Litem — Conplicting Interests — Partition op Inheritance. — In accordance with the provisions of article 1852 of the Code of Civil Procedure which went into effect in Porto Pico on January 1, 1886, when the guardian • ■ cannot represent the minors in a partition of property because of conflicting interests, it was proper to appoint a guardian ad lilem.</p> <p>Id. — Objections—Partition op Inheritance. — It is too late to object to the qualification of a guardian ad lilem after he has discharged the duties thereof and has ceased to act m that capacity after the partition of the estate has been approved; furthermore,- the objection is not legal when made without hearing the interested party.</p> <p>Power op. Attorney — Testamentary Proceedings — Partition op Inheritance. — A power of attorney executed in favor of a person authorizing him to take all the necessary legal steps in testamentary proceedings and generally to perform all acts and proceedings in connection therewith up to the termination of said testamentary proceedings, includes sufficient power to authorize the partition of the estate extrajudicially when the acts of his principal reveal such an intention on his part.</p> <p>Partition op Inheritance — Agreements.—Agreements made in the partition of an estate judicially apqjroved is law for the interested parties duly represented therein.</p> <p>Partnership — Liquidation—Guardian ad Litem — Minors.—When in the liquidation of a commercial partnership the minors interested therein and duly represented by a guardian ad litem are prejudiced by the liquidation, they have the right to proceed against the guardian either before or after reaching their majority, in accordance with the provisions of article 234 of the Code r ■ of • Commerce.</p> <p>'Partition of Inheritance — Negligence of Executor — Eight of Action — Un-collectable Accounts. — Where by reason of the negligence of an executor an account becomes uncollectable, such negligence may constitute grounds for an action against said executor, but does not affect the validity of the partition of the inheritance wherein the account appears.</p> <p>Prescription — Actions—Nullity of Contracts — Eescission of Partition— Minors.' — In accordance with the provisions of section 1268 of the Eevised Civil Code, which is a reproduction of article 1301 of the old Civil Code, actions for the annulment of contracts in the eases referred to in said section lie for four years only, and this period with respect to minors begins to run when they reach their majority. This period of prescription is the same for actions to rescind partitions of inheritance.</p>

<p>Record of Title. — Although the Mortgage Law does not require that houses he recorded, the record of the lots on which they are situated being sufficient, nevertheless, it has been the usual practice to record the buildings, but the owner of a lot who builds two separate houses thereon, each bearing a different street number, is not obliged to record them separately.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Former Jeopardy — Death of Trial Judge. — When a judge sitting in a ease dies before rendering a judgment therein the defendants may be tried by his successor in office, and this does not constitute former jeopardy. The principles which govern this plea in trials by jury are applicable to cases tried by a court without a jury.</p> <p>Id. — Complaint, Sufficiency of. — Although the complaint is loosely framed, as it charges that the defendants were playing “with money,” these words are sufficient to give them notice that money was being exchanged at the game,, and hence that they were playing “for money.”</p> <p>Id. — Statute Taken from Another: State — Construction of Law- — Presumption. — When a statute is taken from another State the presumption is that in adopting it the Legislature accepted the construction put upon it by the courts of the State from which it was adopted.</p> <p>Id. — Prohibited Games — Construction of Law — Noscitur a Sociis. — The word “play” employed in the first part of section 299 of the Penal Code as originally enacted and which is the equivalent of section 330 of the Penal Code of California, includes all persons who deal the cards, conduct or carry on the game, and excludes persons who play or bet on the prohibited games in the sense in which these words are used in the second part of the same section. These words require the same construction in accordance with the principle of noscilur a sochs.</p> <p>Id. — Prohibited G-ames — Construction oe Law. — It is evident from the jurisprudence cited that m section 299 of the Penal Code as originally enacted, the object sought was the suppression of all games mentioned in the statute where some person conducted, opened or managed the game in which he or some other person obtained a profit or gain by the mere fact of such opening, managing or conducting.</p> <p>Id. — Prohibited Games — amendment oe Statute — Construction oe Law. — As section 299 of our Penal Code was amended in 1908 by adding only the word 1 poker' ’ to the list of prohibited games without changing the character of said statute, the principle of noscitur a sociis is likewise applicable to said amended section.</p> <p>Id. — Poker—Prohibited Games. — Although poker may be played without a banker or manager, it may also be played with a banker who obtains a profit or certain percentage, and in such a case it conies within the games prohibited by the amended section.</p> <p>Id. — Construction oe Law — Noscitur a Sociis. — The rule of construction is that where words of particular description are followed by general words that are not so specific and limited, the general words should be construed as applicable to persons or things of like kind as are designated by the particular words, unless there be a clear manifestation of a contrary purpose from the general context.</p> <p>Id. — Prohibited Games — Construction o'e Law — Nosoitur a Sociis. — The addition of the words “or any game of chance” to section 299 of our Penal Code by the amendment of March 10, 1910, could have no other object than to prohibit any other game of a like or similar character to the games enumerated in said section and under the same conditions of dealing, conducting, opening, carrying on, or playing, in the sense in which these words are used in the first part of the section. The principle of noscitur a sociis is equally applicable to this amendment.</p> <p>Id. — Prohibited Games — Construction oe Law. — A person can only be guilty of the crime of playing or betting at a game when some one is conducting, carrying on, dealing or playing the prohibite'd game in the sense in which these words have been interpreted.</p> <p>Id. — Poker in Private House — “Rake-oee.”—Playing a game of poker in a private house is not prohibited by the statute unless there is some one who obtains a ‘ ‘ rake-olf ’ ’ or an advantage by maintaining the game or giving the opportunity for play.</p> <p>Id. — Beneeit oe Doubt. — Any doubt which may arise in the construction of a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the accused.</p> <p>Id. — Criminal Statutes — Construction oe Law — Implication.—Criminal statutes must be strictly construed in those parts which are against the defendant, but liberally construed in those which are in his favor. No person is to be made subject to such statutes by implication.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gruayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Ejectment — Evidence—Ocular Inspection. — An ocular inspection, although not necessary, may be very .important as evidence in cases of this character, since it affords the judge an opportunity to settle on the spot the facts concerning which the witnesses testified.</p> <p>Id. — Plans—Certificate of Survey. — A plan without any signature and a certificate of a survey without the approval of the owners of the adjoining properties can be considered only as acts of one of the parties which are not binding upon the other parties who took no part therein.</p> <p>Id. — Desoeiption op Property — Evidence.—In this case the complaint described: the parcel of land sought to be recovered, but the evidence on the description was so confused and incomplete that it was impossible to render a judgment thereon icuthe clear and definite manner required by law.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of San Jxian, Section 1.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San. Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the 'opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>_ Amendment op Pleadings — Judgment on Appeal. — When a suit has been finally disposed of by virtue of a judgment rendered on appeal, the complaint which was the origin of the suit cannot be amended in the trial court and therefore it is not error for the court to deny such amendment.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Appeal’.—In order that this court may consider the instructions given by the judge to the jury it is necessary that they be signed by the trial'judge, neither the certificate of the stenographer nor the consent of the parties being sufficient to give the same effect thereto.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions to Jury — Appeal.—In order'that this court may consider the-failure of the trial judge to review the testimony of. the witnesses for the-defense, it is necessary that the accused had asked the trial court to amplify its instructions to the ¡jury in that sense.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action por Acknowledgment — Prescription.—The plaintiff having been born on January 12, 1888, and her putative father having died on January 9, 1911, the action for acknowledgment filed by her on May 22, 1911, had prescribed according to the provisions of section 199 of the Revised Civil Code.</p> <p>Construction op Law — Actions—Representatives—Testamentary Executor— Heirs. — The provisions of section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable only to actions prosecuted against the executor or administrator of the property of the deceased and against the estate, and not to an action against the heirs of the deceased, because the word representatives refers to the executor or the administrator, but not to the .heirs.</p>

<p>Appeal — -Transcript op Eecord. — The fact that the secretary of a court certifies to and inserts a document in the transcript of the record does not imply that the document should be considered a part of the record.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Bill op Exceptions. — An appellate court has no means of knowing what documentary or oral evidence has been presented in the court below unless said evidence is incorporated in a bill of exceptions signed by the trial judge and made a part of the record.</p> <p>Id. — Additions to Record — Bill op Exceptions. — The proceedings which according to law must be incorporated in a bill of exceptions cannot be added to the record by a secretary without being so incorporated, and if he does so add them they have no legal effect.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Transcript op Record — Bill op Exceptions — Duty op Trial Judge. — The trial judge is the official whose duty it is to certify to the evidence for the purposes of an appeal or for the transcript of the record, and by force of law he is the custodian of the evidence, it being his duty to see that the bill of exceptions is in accord with the facts.</p> <p>Id. — Minutes op Judge or Clerk — Stenographer’s Notes — Bill op Exceptions. — Neither the minutes of the judge or of the clerk nor the notes of the stenographer can take the place of a bill of exceptions.</p> <p>Id. — Return op Transcript to Trial Court. — In some cases an appellate court will send the transcript of the record back to be reformed by the court below.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Heirs—Record of Title. — A mortgage executed by the heirs upon property recorded in the name of their ancestor cannot be recorded until the encumbered property is recorded in the name of tlie heirs.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Procedure — Pleadings—Change oe Venue — Waiver.—In accordance with the provisions of section 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a motion for change of venue must be filed when the defendant appears and answers or' demurs to the complaint, and if he fails so to do he will be deemed to have waived his right. According to this rule, a motion for a change of venue filed at the time the defendant moves for an extension of time within which to answer the complaint and asks that the two causes of action alleged in the complaint be separated, without answering or demurring to the complaint, must be overruled.</p> <p>Change of Venue — boNSTRUOTiON op Law. — Section 82 of the Code of Civil Pro-’ cedure should be construed in connection with section 75 of the same code,' and both refer to cases in which the defendants or. the cause of action are properly in another district.</p> <p>Id. — Question op Bight — Discretion.—A change of venue under the foregoing conditions is a question of right and not of discretion.</p> <p>Id. — Submission to Jurisdiction. — In accordance with .section .77 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when the defendant appears and moves for a change of venue and at the same time asks that the plaintiff be required to separate the causes of actions alleged in the complaint and that he be granted an extension of time in which to answer the epmplaint after the ruling on the motion for a change of venue, he submits to the jurisdiction of the court.</p>

<p>Costs — Attorney's Fees — Procedure.—Questions relating to costs, disbursements and attorney's fees are governed by tie special statute upon the sub-jeet, and in deciding such questions the special provisions of the statute must be followed and not the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, except such as are applicable to supply deficiencies in the special statute.</p> <p>Id. — Objection to Memorandum op Costs — Evidence.—The Act of March 12, 3 908, concerning costs does not provide imperatively that the party entitled to costs, disbursements and attorney’s fees is always bound to introduce evidence upon each and all of the items of the memorandum when there is objection thereto.</p> <p>Id. — Sworn Memorandum op Costs — Presumption.—A memorandum of costs which has been sworn to has in its favor the presumption that it is a true statement, and this court will not interfere with the action of the court below in approving a memorandum of costs unless it be shown that error has been committed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a decision of the Registrar of Property of Agnadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judgment affirmed for the reasons set forth in the opinion delivered in ease No. 876, Torres v. Irizarry, ante p. 341.</p>

<p>Amended Complaint — Forwarding Pleadings by Mail — Computation op Time.— The period of twenty days granted the appellant within which to file his amended complaint should be computed from the day after the order granting the same, and the said complaint must be deemed to have been filed on the day it was received by the secretary and not on the day it was deposited in the mail.</p> <p>Id. — Piling Pleadings. — Sections 321 and 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to the filing of an amended complaint.</p> <p>Id. — Piling Pleadings After Expiration of Time Granted — Discretion.—Allowing the filing of an amended pleading after the expiration of the time granted therefor lies within the discretion of the court.</p> <p>Judgment of Dismissal — abuse of Discretion — Piling Pleadings After Expiration of Time Granted. — A judgment dismissing a complaint for failure to file in time will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is shown.</p> <p>Id. — Piling Amended Complaint — Abuse of Discretion. — Held that the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in rendering judgment dismissing the complaint because it was filed two days after the expiration of the period of twenty days granted the plaintiff for that purpose, especially as no satisfactory excuse was given for not filing the complaint in time.</p>

<p>Guardian — Consolidation cp Properties — Property op 'Incapacitated Persons — Judicial Authorization. — Neither the letter nor the spirit of subdivision 5 of section 282 of the Revised Civil Code as amended by Act No. 33 of March 9, 1911, requires judicial authorization for the guardian of an incapacitated person to consolidate under one title two properties recorded in the registry and to record the same as one property in accordance with the provisions of article 60 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Criminal Law — Electors—Besidence.—A rural teacher who lives in a town in a rented house in which his mother and sisters also live and where he ' keeps his trunk and clothes, does not lose his residence merely because ho goes to teach five days in the week in a rural school situated in another district, returning to his house Friday nights and remaining there until Monday, but continues to be an elector in the district in which he lives.</p> <p>Id. — Election Law. — The provisions of section 16 of the Election Law approved March 8, 1906, are not applicable to this case.</p>

<p>Appeal from'the District Court of: San Juan, Section 2:</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of one of the Justices of this Court rendered in Habeas Corpus Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of .San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss appeal.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Jurobs — "-Challenge oe Juro-rs. — Subdivision 4 of section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable only to a juror - who has served as such-in another trial for the same crime charged.</p>

<p>Complaint filed by Juan Mollfulleda.</p> <p>Tlie facts aie stated in the decision.</p>

<p>Possessory Title Proceedings — Evidence—Opposition.—In possessory title proceedings the evidence of the petitioner must lie limited to the fact of the possession by him in his own name and no opposing interested party will be heard except upon the specific fact of the possession in his own name alleged by the petitioner. Such opposition to possession by the petitioner in his own name should be made in the possessory title proceeding and either be sustained or overruled therein.</p> <p>Id. — Opposition—'Question oe Law — Declaratory Action — Interested Party.— Any opposition in possessory title proceedings involving a question of law should be raised and determined in the proper declaratory action, and it cannot be raised by any person whomsoever but only by the party having an interest or right in the real property the possession of which is in question.</p> <p>Id. — Opposition—Declaratory Action — Ownership by Prescription —Possession as Owner. — In a declaratory action brought to oppose possessory title proceedings based upon the fact that the opposing party has acquired the ownership of the property by prescription, it must be alleged that the possession has been as owner because such possession is the only possession which may serve as’ a title- to acquire ownership.</p> <p>Id. — Opposition—Declaratory Action. — Even when in a declaratory action to oppose possessory title proceedings it is not proven that the defendant and petitioner in the possessory proceedings is the owner of the real property involved, this fact is not sufficient to warrant a decree that the property belongs to the plaintiff and opposer.</p>

<p>Trespass — Lessee.—The lessee oi a property who is in possession thereof may bring the action for trespass provided for in section 279 of the Code of Civil' Procedure. ■ ' . •</p> <p>Evidence — Objection—Waiver.—Any evidence may be considered by the court in the absence of an objection to the admission thereof, and the right to object will be deemed to have been' waived where it is not made use, of.</p> <p>Id. — Contract oe Lease — Appeal.—When a party consents to the introduction of the testimony of witnesses to prove the existence of a written contract of lease he cannot allege on appeal that sufficient evidence of the contract was not presented, the maxim consensus tojlit ■ errorem being applicable.</p>

<p>Crimiual Law — Assault with Intent to Commit Murder — Information— Premeditated Intent. — To constitute tlie crime of assault witli intent to commit murder as defined in section 218 of the Penal Code, the assault must "be committed with premeditated intent to kill and that fact must he alleged in the information.</p> <p>Id. — Errors not Prejudicial to Accused — Aggravated Assault and Battery.— It is not an error prejudicial to the accused such as to require the reversal of the judgment for the trial court to overrule a demurrer to the information based on the ground that it was insufficient because it did not expressly allege a premeditated intent to kill where, as in this case, the accused was found guilty of aggravated assault and battery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Proceedings — Presumption.—'Regularity in the proceedings of courts of justice is always presumed until the contrary is shown.</p> <p>Appeal — Divorce—Alimony—Pleadings—Transcript op Record. — In order that this court may consider on appeal the plea that the appellant had not been given an opportunity to appear in his own defense and that the plaintiff had not been required to submit evidence in- support of the allegations of her petition for alimony in an action for divorce, the facts on which such plea is based must be included in the transcript of the record.</p>

<p>Pleadings — Amendments—Striking Out Parties — Amended Complaint. — When the plaintiff strikes out the names of a number of defendants from the complaint he should file a new complaint in the amended form.</p> <p>Corporations — Copartnership—Liability oe Partners — Merger oe Copartnership into Corporation — Exoussion.—In order that the individual partners may be held liable for debts of a copartnership all remedies must first be exhausted against the property of the copartnership and the fact that a judgment against the corporation which acquired the property of the co-partnership and into which the latter was merged by agreement of the partners remains unsatisfied on a nulla bona return, does not constitute sueh exhaustion of remedies unless the charter of said corporation provides that the corporation shall assume all the liabilities of the original copartnership.</p> <p>Id. — Res Judicata — Copartnership—Merger oe Copartnership into Corporation. — When a copartnership is merged into a corporation by agreement of its members and sells its properties to the latter, this fact alone does not imply that the latter is the continuator of the personality of the former, and a judgment rendered against the corporation cannot be pleaded as res judicata in another similar action against the members of the defunct co-partnership because the required identity of parties defendant is lacking.</p>

<p>Settlement — Consent—Error of Fact — Deceit.—When a party consents to a settlement belióving that the property forming the subjeet-matter of said settlement was encumbered by only two mortgages and it results that there was a third mortgage of which the consenting party had no knowledge, such settlement is null because the consent was given under an error regarding a condition affecting the essence of the contract and it is not necessary to said nullity that deceit was practiced by the other party.</p> <p>Costs — Attorney’s Pees — Judgment.—A judgment decreeing the payment of costs and attorney’s fees cannot fix the amount of the latter. Such fees must be set out in a bill of costs which is subject to objection in accordance with the provisions of sections 327 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure a3 amended by the Act of March 12, 1903.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama.</p> <p>The facts ,are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Procedure — Summons—Service oe Summons — Return oe Service. — When an action is brought in a district court, according to section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure the marshal who should serve the summons is the district marshal and not the municipal marshal. If the service is made by the official authorized by law, his certified return is sufficient. If made by any other person, whether an official -or a private person, it must be returned with an affidavit of said person made according to the statute.</p> <p>Id. — Summons—Jurisdiction—Service op Summons — Return op Service. — In order to bring a defendant under the jurisdiction of 'the court he must be summoned in the manner prescribed by law and a return made to the court" showing that the summons was so served, all without prejudice to the provisions of section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Id. — Summons—Minors—Service op Summons. — In order that a minor may be brought within the jurisdiction of a court he must be summoned personally. Service of a summons upon the guardian of a minor is insufficient.</p>

<p>Physicians — Practice of Medicine — Sale of Oxydonor Apparatus. — The mere advertising and selling of the Oxydonor apparatus by a person who is not a physician does not in itself constitute a violation of the Act of March 12, 1903, regulating the practice of medicine.</p> <p>Id. — Practice of Medicine — Sale of Oxydonor Apparatus. — In order that the advertising and sale of the Oxydonor apparatus by a person who is not a physician may constitute an infraction of the Act of March 12, 1903, regulating the practice of medicine, it is necessary to prove the following elements: That the accused recommended, prescribed or directed for the use of some person the Oxydonor apparatus for the cure, relief or palliation of some ailment or disease of the mind or body, and further that he did so after having received, or with the intent of receiving, either directly or indirectly, some bonus, gift or compensation.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of A recibo,.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action of Filiation — Act of Acknowledgment. — An action of filiation is necessary when the status of a natural child has not been established by an act of acknowledgment made in a solemn and authentic manner, enabling it to show its status as such the same as if it were a legitimate child.</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer—Conclusion of Law. — As a demurrer admits only such facts as are well pleaded in the complaint, the allegation therein that a person possesses the status of a natural child is insufficient to produce that.effect because said allegation is a conclusion of law.</p> <p>Nature of Cause of Action- — Title of Action — -Prayer of Complaint. — Neither the wording of the prayer of the complaint nor the title of the action necessarily determines the nature' of the cause of action, but this must be inferred from the facts originating the same.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement of Case.' — A statement of the ease which lacks the approval of the trial judge has no legal value.</p> <p>Id. — Brief of Appellant — Assignment of Errors. — When the brief of the appellant do'es' not contain the assignment of errors required by rules 42 and 43 of this court, the court may. pass over any errors which are not of a fundamental nature apparent from the transcript of the record.</p> <p>Divorce — Cruel Treatment. — In determining generally what conduct on the part of one of the spouses constitutes cruel treatment, the statutory provisions, the circumstances of each case, the. physical and mental condition and the social status of the parties should be considered.</p> <p>Id. — Cohabitation—Marital Duties. — The' mere withdrawal from the marital bed unaccompanied by the abandonment of other marital duties is not a ground for divorce.</p>

<p>Execution — Limitation op Time for Execution — Stay oe Execution. — In accordance with sections 239 and 243 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the legal period within which execution may issue on a judgment is five years, and the time during which execution is stayed by order of a court cannot be excluded in the computation of said period. Millin v. Aldrey, District Judge, 16 P. R. R., 373.</p> <p>Id. — Notice—Waiver—Record.—When it appears from the -record that notice of a motion for the execution of a judgment which had become prescribed had already been served on the adverse party and there is nothing to show that the said party agreed to the issuance of the execution, the statement by the court in its decision that it sustained the motion with the approval of the attorney for said party is not sustained by the record and is not sufficient to effect the waiver of a right of the prejudiced party.</p> <p>Id. — Recording Judgment — Limitation of Time.- — It is not necessary to enter in the judgment record created by the revised Code of Civil Procedure all judgments previously rendered in order that they may be executed, and the five years allowed by section 239 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be computed from the date of the rendition and proclamation of such judgments according to the former Code of Civil Procedure.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie District Court of Gnayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petty Larceny — Double Sentence. — A judgment of conviction of the crime of petty larceny under which the petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of $200 with costs and to imprisonment for six months at hard labor, is not a double sentence and is neither void nor contrary to law, for under sections 431 of the Penal Code and 324 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as amended by the Acts of March 8, 1906, and March 9, 1911, relating to the imposition of costs in criminal cases, the court is authorized to pass such sentence.</p> <p>Id. — Habeas Corpus — Appeal—Malicious Mischief. — The question of whether . the facts proven at the trial constitute malicious mischief rather than petty larceny cannot be considered in habeas corpus proceedings, for that is a question for consideration in an appeal from the judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal 'from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Possessory Title Proceedings — Contest—Jurisdiction.—In accordance -with subdivision 2 of section 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act of March 9, 1905, an appeal taken from a judgment of a district court in a ease of contest of possessory title proceedings brought and decided in a municipal court and affirmed on appeal in a district court should be dismissed when the value of the property is less than $300 or when the appeal ivas not taken within the period of 15 days.</p>

<p>Evidence — Proof op Death op Victim — Civil Begistry — Testimony op Physicians. — According to section 206 of tlie Penal Code, the testimony of the physicians who saw the corpse of the victim, identified the same and made the autopsy thereon is better evidence to prove the death than a certificate of death from the Civil Begistry, section 320 of the Civil Code not being applicable to the present ease.</p> <p>Id. — Impertinent Evidence — Objection to Evidence — Striking Out Evidence.— Without prejudice to the discretional power of courts to strike out impertinent evidence introduced without objection, a court commits no error in overruling a motion to strike out such evidence when the motion is based on reasons that could have been alleged in opposition at the time the evidence was offered.</p> <p>Id. — Charge to the Jury. — Immaterial Errors. — An inadvertent statement made by the trial judge in his charge to the jury that ‘ ‘ some witnesses ’ ’ had seen the accused commit the crime in reality, when only one witness was present at the commission of the crime,'cannot be regarded as an error prejudicial to the rights of the- accused because such statement could not have influenced the minds of the jurors who heard the testimony of all the witnesses..</p>

<p>AMENDMENT oe Pleadings — Discretion oe Court. — The courts of Porto Rico have the inherent authority to permit amendments of allegations in the pleadings, and such authority is conceded by the Code of Civil Procedure and is purely discretionary.</p> <p>Id. — Discretion oe Court. — The discretionary power of courts to grant leave to amend the pleadings should be exercised in accordance with the circumstances surrounding each ease in order to further the ends of justice.</p> <p>Id. — Abuse oe Discretion — Appeal.—Rulings of trial courts allowing the amendment of pleadings will be reversed on appeal only when it is clearly shown that the trial court abused such discretion or exceeded its discretionary powers.'</p> <p>Id. — Ruling on Motion to Amend. — When leave to amend the complaint is asked at the beginning of a trial the court should decide the question either negatively or affirmatively and should not order the party to withdraw the amendment and present the same later if necessary.</p> <p>I'd. — Fundamental Error — Refusal oe Leave to Amend. — In the light of the circumstances of this case the tidal court committed a fundamental error in refusing leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint during the trial by adding thereto the allegation that Tomás Dávila & Co. had taken charge of the assets and liabilities of the former firm of Tomás Dávila.</p>

<p>Parties to Actions — Death of Pasty — Joint Debtors — Proceedings in Municipal Courts — Appeal.—When in an action brought in a municipal court against two joint debtors one of them dies and an appeal is taken to the district court where the case is tried de novo and judgment is rendered in accordance with the pleadings and evidence, this court cannot inquire into the correctness of the proceedings had in the municipal court by reason of the death of one of the parties in an appeal from said judgment when, as in the present case, the heirs of the deceased are not parties to the appeal and the judgment of the district court is against the surviving debtor only.</p> <p>Promissory Note — Joint Debtor — Ignorance.—When one of the joint drawers of a promissory note acknowledges his signature to be authentic, but says that he affixed the same in ignorance of the liability he was assuming, such statement alone is not sufficient to destroy the validity of the instrument.</p>

<p>Municipal Ordinance — Injunction—Jurisdiction.—District courts have jurisdiction in cases involving the validity or nullity of municipal ordinances and may grant injunctions enjoining their enforcement. This doctrine is sustained by the opinion of this court in the case of Property Owners’ League v. City of San Juan, 14 P. R R, 85.</p> <p>Id. — Regulating Sale op Meats — Powers op Municipal Council. — A municipal council has.no authority to pass an ordinance imposing on purveyors of meat for public consumption the obligation to accept and pay as their employes persons designated by the mayor and whom said employers cannot discharge when their interests are not protected.</p> <p>Id. — Action to Annul Ordinance — Injunction—Prescription.—When an injunction is applied for as an ancillary remedy in a -suit brought to annul a municipal ordinance, the plea of prescription should be entered in opposition to the original complaint and not to the granting of the injunction.</p> <p>Id.- — -Prescription—Action to Annul Ordinance. — The period of prescription of 30 days fixed in the second part of section 93 of the Municipal Act of March 8, 1906, is not applicable to an action to annul a municipal ordinance brought by a private individual who may deem himself injured thereby.</p> <p>Id. — Injunction—Action to Annul Ordinance. — The bringing of an action to annul a municipal ordinance does not prevent the plaintiff from applying for a temporary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of said ordinance.</p> <p>Id. — Injunction—Action to Annul Ordinance. — An injunction may issue against a municipal council enjoining the enforcement of a municipal ordinance sought to be annulled in the action.</p> <p>Id. — Action to Annul Ordinance — Injunction—Municipal Council — Mayor.-— The issuing of a temporary injunction against a mayor in an action to annul a municipal ordinance brought against a municipal council when the petition for the injunction, is directed against said council is not error, as the mayor is the executive who enforces the resolutions of the municipal corporations and is its representative m judicial actions.</p>

<p>Procedure —• Nonsuit — Abandonment — Appeal. — Motions for nonsuit are addressed to the consideration of the court and when a defendant wishes to demur to the plaintiff’s evidence he should stand on this point and not introduce his evidence, for this will be understood as. an abandonment of said motion and the same will not be reviewable on appeal if the defendant’s evidence supplies the defects whieh the plaintiff’s evidence may have contained.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Rulings.—All questions concerning the admissibility of evidence should be ruled on during the trial and before judgment is rendered, but this is not of great importance when the ease is tried without a jury, because, if the evidence is really impertinent, the court is in a position to remove the impressions caused thereby.</p> <p>Natural Children — Action ojp Acknowledgment — Evidence — Striking Out Evidence — Eundamental Error. — In actions for acknowledgment of natural children testimony that tne plaintiff had carnal intercourse with other men during the period when the child could have been begotten is pertinent if offered to show sexual connections with such men during said period and the striking out of said testimony by the court is a fundamental error.</p>

<p>Cancellation op Annuity. — A general statement that an annuity recorded in the registry of property in favor of the Insular Treasury has been transferred to tlie Roman Catholic Church of Porto Rico is not sufficient in the absence of direct proof thereof to justify the cancellation of said annuity at the instance of the church.</p>

<p>Inheritance Tax — Proceedings to Contest Appraisal and Assessment. — The-proceeding in force for contesting the appraisal of property and assessment of inheritance taxes thereon is that established by section 374 of the Political'. Code, which was not repealed either expressly or impliedly by Act No. 35 of: March 9, 1911.</p> <p>Id. — Appeal—Proceedings to Contest Appraisal and Assessment. — The appeal allowed by section 374 of the Political Code to any person or beneficiary affected by the appraisal, and assessment of inheritance taxes should be taken within 30 days from the date of the completion of said appraisal and assessment. After the lapse of said period the right to appeal granted by law shall be deemed forfeited.</p> <p>Taxes — Payment oe Taxes Under Protest. — In order to exercise the recourse allowed by Act No. 35 of March 9, 1911, it is necessary that the preliminary steps for the collection of the taxes shall have been taken by the proper official, that the taxes shall have been paid under protest and that the proceeding be taken on the ground that the collection of the taxes so paid under protest is unjust, unlawfj.il or in violation of some statutory provision.</p> <p>Id. — Excessive Appraisal — Payment oe Taxes Under Protest. — The remedy provided for by Act No. 35 of March 9, 1911, is not applicable to eases where the payment of taxes'is objected to on the ground that the appraisal of the property is excessive, but to eases where the collection is unlawful.</p> <p>Id. — Construction oe Law — Board oe Review and Equalization — Injunction. — The effect of Act No. 35 of March 9, 1911, was not to substitute and repeal the provisions of sections 308 and 374 of the Political Code relative respectively to the Board of Review and Equalization and to appeals to the proper district court from the appraisal of the estate of inheritance and the assessment of taxes to be paid by the heirs, but to substitute and repeal expressly, as it did, the recourse allowed by the Injunction Acts of 1902 and 1906 against the illegal collection of taxes.</p>

<p>Power of Attorney — Sale in Double Character oe Agent eor Vendor and Vendee — Katification of Acts of Attorney in Pact. — In the year 1892 Silvestre Iglesias as attorney in. fact of Salvador Ledesma, the ancestor of the plaintiffs, and as attorney in fact of his own wife, executed a deed of sale conveying to his wife his principal’s interest in a certain house. The whole of said house had been acquired by the wife of Iglesias, but one-third thereof was' transferred to Ledesma according to agreement because he contributed one-third of the purchase price. After the sale Ledesma wrote to Iglesias approving the transaction and expressing his satisfaction at the acquisition of the property by the latter's wife. Iglesias represented Ledesma in other matters as well and their personal and business relations were intimate. The sale was attacked as void, because, in accordance with section 1362 of the Eevised Civil Code, which is the same as section 1459 of the Spanish Civil Code in force when the sale was made, an agent could not acquire property from his principal. The court held:</p> <p>.1. The fact itself that in executing the deed of sale Iglesias appeared as the agent of both the vendor and the vendee is a subsidiary matter, the important question being whether he, as agent of the vendee, purchased for himself.</p> <p>2. Even granting that it was proven that the money with which the wife oi Iglesias acquired the said interest was not her private money, but was earned by the husband during the marriage, which is not alleged in the complaint, said fact would show that the property was acquired in the name of the wife for the conjugal partnership and not for the husband individually. A failure by Iglesias to disclose to his principal the origin of the purchase money doesi not constitute a material concealment which would vitiate the ratification of the contract by the principal.</p> <p>3. The principal ratified' said sale with a full knowledge of all the essential . elements of the contract and by virtue of said ratification the sale was confirmed, the contract being one capable of ratification.</p> <p>4. In order to determine whether any of the contracts forbidden by section 1362 of the Eevised Civil Code are capable of ratification the special nature of each case should be considered, for they are not all governed by the same principle, the modern tendency being to put such a construction upon these contracts as favors the liberty of alienation.</p> <p>5. The Civil Code makes no distinction between 'void and voidable contracts, therefore, if a contract has all the elements required by section 1228, according to section 1277 it may be ratified unless it partakes of one of the vices mentioned in section 1242.</p> <p>6. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 11, 1894, is not applicable to the present case, because the true basis of that opinion was that prescription had run and the question of voidable vel non was not raised.</p> <p>7. Sales between joint owners are encouraged by law and the fact that the wife of Iglesias was a joint owner of the house with Ledesma is a .circumstance in favor of the possibility of the ratification.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Original Jurisdiction. — Id. order that -this court may consider originally a petition for a writ of certiorari to a municipal court, the petitioner must allege the reasons therefor in accordance with' rule 69 of this court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p>

<p>Appeal — Immaterial Errors. — Errors which do not influence the decision of the case or are favorable to the appellant will not justify a reversal of the judgment rendered.</p> <p>Id. — Findings and Conclusions op Trial Court — Unimportant Errors. — The findings and conclusions of the trial court cannot be considered on appeal as insufficient by reason of slight and inadvertent errors such as the mention of an erroneous date.</p> <p>Id. — Findings op Fact — Conflicting Evidence. — Where the evidence is conflict- > ing the findings of fact of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal except where partiality, passion, prejudice or manifest error is shown.</p> <p>Id. — Findings op Fact — Evidence.—It is essential to the sufficiency of findings of fact that they be sustained.by the evidence, but where there is any competent evidence to support them they will not be reversed on the ground of insufficiency, nor even where they are totally insufficient when the error is not prejudicial.</p> <p>Evidence — Records—Prima Facie Evidence — Certificate of Birth — Date of Birth.- — -A certificate of brith issued by the official in charge of the civil registry is prima facie evidence of the date of the birth of the person referred to, but, in accordance with section 11 of the Law of Evidence, it may be contradicted when it is shown by oral evidence establishing the correct date of the birth that the date in the certificate is erroneous.</p> <p>Id. — Leading Questions — Discretion of Court. — It is permissible at the discretion of the court to propound leading questions t'o witnesses, and when the case is being tried before a court without a jury the admission of such questions could not well be deemed prejudicial.</p> <p>Id. — Ante-Mortem Admissions. — The mere fact of the death of a person is not sufficient alone to lay a predicate for allowing the testimony of witnesses regarding anle-morlem admissions made by the deceased.</p> <p>Id. — Natural Children. — When, as in the present case, the natural child who brings the action was born in 1908, the refusal to admit in evidence a certificate of birth showing that another child was bom to the mother of the plaintiff in 1904 does not constitute an error prejudicial to the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Expert Witnesses — Hypothetical Questions. — Great discretion is allowed the trial judge in the examination of expert witnesses and while as a general rule hypothetical questions must be founded upon facts established during the trial, it is not necessary that all the facts should be clearly proven or that the exaet language of witnesses should be followed.</p> <p>Id. — Deputation of Witness. — In order to attack the reputation of a witness it is sufficient to give evidence in general terms and it is improper to prove specific acts reflecting on the character of the ■witness.</p> <p>'d. — Expert Testimony — Exclusion of Testimony — Discretion of Court. — • The court in the exercise of its discretionary power may exclude the testimony of an expert witness and such ruling will not ,be reversed unless it is shown ffiat the court abused its discretion.</p> <p>Id. — Reputation op Witness — Impeachment op Witness. — When it is sought to impeach the integrity and veracity of a witness it is not permissible to introduce evidence tending to show specific acts of her prostitution or immorality, but the evidence shall be confined in general terms to her reputation for truth and veracity in the neighborhood in whieh she lives.</p> <p>Id. — Considering the circumstances of this case it was held to be immaterial to its decision to determine the color of the mother.</p> <p>Opinion of the Trial Court. — Section 227 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Act of March 9, 1911, provides that the trial judge shall prepare and file a brief statement containing the findings of fact and the reasons for his decision, an elaborate opinion being optional and not necessary.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — New Trial — Transcript op Record. — In an appeal from an order refusing a new trial the transcript of the record should contain a copy of the order appealed from and its omission is a defect which affects the jurisdiction of ' this court and said defect cannot be cured by the insertion in the record of the notice of said decision given by the secretary of the lower court to the parties.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p>

<p>Costs — Attorney’s Pees — Objections—Deficiency oe Record — Presumption.— When the recovery of attorney’s tees as costs is objected to in the lower court on the sole ground that such fees are excessive, the objecting party and respondent cannot plead for the first time in the appellate court that the record does not show that the subject-matter exceeded $500 or that the party claiming costs obtained judgment for costs, disbursements and attorney’s fees, for the nature of the proceedings in the court below gives rise to the presumption that both of these questions were admitted by the parties.</p> <p>Id. — Objections to Cost BIill — Attorney Appearing Pro Se. — A district court lacks jurisdiction to consider and decide in a proceeding objecting to a cost bill whether an attorney appearing in his own behalf is entitled to recover his fees from the adverse party as said question should be decided in rendering the final judgment.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney’s Pees — Appeal.-—The amount of attorney’s fees claimed as costs cannot be determined on appeal when the lower court fixed no amount but only held thát an attorney is not entitled to fees when he appears in his own defense.</p>

<p>Appeal from ’the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion. •</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from, the District Court of Guayama in Certiorari Proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>BvidbNce — Contradictory Testimony of a Deceased Witness. — After the preliminary investigation by the municipal judge of the death of the plaintiff’s father the only eyewitness to the accident died. His testimony before the said judge was admitted in evidence without objection to show the negligence of the defendant company in this case. The defendant presented two witnesses who testified almost identically that the deceased eyewitness had made statements to them contrary to his testimony before the municipal judge and the plaintiff took an exception as to only one of these witnesses on the only ground that his testimony was hearsay evidence. It was held:</p> <p>1. That perhaps the exception on the ground of hearsay might have been taken successfully by the appellant if it had included both witnesses and if the object had not been to impugn the veracity of the witness.</p> <p>2. That in accordance with the doctrine laid down in the ease of The People v. Tims, 7 P. R. R., 129, hearsay evidence' is admissible to show that a de-deceased witness had made contradictory statements.</p> <p>3. Objections to the admission of evidence should be made on specific grounds and if said grounds are without legal force the admission of said evidence cannot be assailed on appeal on grounds different from those set •up in the court below.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Natural Children —Concubinage—Acknowledgment—■ Presumption. — Since Law 11 of Toro went into effect the presumption which existed under the Eoman Law that the children born of a concubine living in the house of the paramour were the natural children of the latter, is not recognized and it is an indispensable requirement under said Law of Toro that before a child can be considered a natural child it must be acknowledged by the father either expressly or impliedly. The mere fact that the child was born in the house of the father at the time the mother lived with him therein in concubinage, is not sufficient to confer upon it the status of natural child.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Action for Acknowledgment — Prescription.—When an action is brought to recover an interest in an inheritance on the ground that the plaintiff was acknowledged tacitly by the father as his natural child, according to Law 11 of Toro such facts tend to show a tacit acknowledgment by acts and words of the putative father and the action has the scope of an action for acknowledgment subject .to the prescription applicable to said action.</p> <p>Id. — Action for Acknowledgment — Prescription.—As the plaintiff had reached her majority in 1907, according to section 199 of the Eevised Civil.Code her right of action had prescribed when the action was brought in 1911.</p> <p>ID. — Action eor Acknowledgment — Prescription.—Aetions for acknowledgment are subject to prescription and the provisions of the subsequent civil codes governing prescription are applicable likewise to actions for acknowledgment arising under the Laws of Toro.</p>

<p>Demurrer — Verbal Demurrer — Reconsideration.—When a party whose demurrer to a complaint has been overruled wishes to raise the same question again he should file a motion to reconsider the ruling on the demurrer .and not wait until the trial to enter said demurrer again verbally, for such practice has no authority in law.</p> <p>Verbal Demurrer — Certiorari—Amendment oe Complaint — Annulment of Trial — Presumption.—When after .the introduction of all the evidence the court sustains a demurrer pleaded verbally at the opening of the trial and grants the appellant leave to amend his complaint and the prejudiced party thereupon in a petition for certiorari assails said ruling as implying an annulment of the trial, the presumption, in case of doubt, is that it was not the intention of the trial court to annul the trial but to allow an amendment so that the complaint would conform to the evidence.</p> <p>Amendment of Complaint — Variance—Defect—Discretion.—When after a trial there is a variance between the complaint and the evidence or when the complaint defectively states a cause of action, the court has the discretion to permit an amendment so that the complaint may conform to the evidence and such ruling will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown.</p> <p>Id. — Discretion.—After a case has been submitted to the court for final decision an amendment is still within the discretion of the court in the interest of justice and only an abuse of said discretion will cause a reversal.</p> <p>Id. — New Trial — Discretion.—It is not an abuse of discretion to allow an amendment to the complaint even after the evidence is all in and although such ruling may be equivalent to the granting of a new trial.</p> <p>Id. — Costs—Reopening of Trial. — The only penalty which the courts inflict upon a party moving for a-n amendment is the imposition of costs or the reopening of the trial. y</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer—Verbal Demurrer. — When the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint is overruled and later at the beginning of the trial he pleads the demurrer orally and the court is satisfied that the cause of action was not well pleaded, it would be unfair to the plaintiff to refuse leave to amend the complaint after the introduction of the evidence especially when there are elements of evidence which sustain said amendment.</p> <p>Certiorari — Amendments—Appeal.—Generally questions of amendment of pleadings should not be raised by certiorari proceedings when they may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, .Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Adultery — Circumstantial Evidence. — Although in nearly all cases of adultery the carnal intercourse between the parties must be inferred from the attending circumstances, the mere faet that two persons of different sexes are alone in a room, although at night, is not sufficient in the absence of other corroborating circumstances to justify the conclusion that the offense was committed.</p>

<p>Foreclosure Proceedings — Jurisdiction.—The municipal courts- of Porto Rico have no jurisdiction in the summary foreclosure proceedings established by the Mortgage Law and its Regulations although the amount involved does not exceed $500.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction—Mortgage.—According to the Mortgage Law and its Regulations in connection with the old Code of Civil Procedure, the Courts of Primera Instancia had exclusive original jurisdiction of summary foreclosure proceedings regardless of the amount of the mortgage.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction—Mortgage.—General Order No. 118 of August 15, 1899, gave exclusive jurisdiction to th’e district courts in summary foreclosure proceedings.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction—Mortgage.—Section 4 of tlie Act of March 10, 1904, reorganizing the judiciary of this Island did not confer jurisdiction upon the municipal courts in summary foreclosure proceedings when the amount involved did not exceed $500. Said jurisdiction remained exclusively in the district courts even though the mortgage were less than $500.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts — Civil Action — Special Proceedings. — The amount of $500 fixed by section 4 of the Act of March 10, 1904, reorganizing the judiciary of this Island determines the jurisdiction of municipal courts in the ordinary civil proceedings provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure, but is not applicable to the proceedings governed by special laws which continue in force in accordance with the act of special legal proceedings of March 9, 1905.</p>

<p>Lottery — Contracts Arising prom Lotteries. — Lotteries are prohibited in Porto Bieo and it is a well-established rule that in transactions arising from lotteries the courts will leave the parties where it found them and will not lend.their aid either to enforce or rescind sueh contracts, but in criminal actions arising from such transactions the rule is different, as the judicial power is not employed to aid an individual in securing the proceeds of an unlawful transaction but to prosecute a wrongdoer.</p> <p>Id. — Embezzlement.—A person who wilfully, maliciously and unlawfully appropriates a prize drawn by a lottery ticket confided to him for safe-keeping is guilty of embezzlement.</p>

<p>Ganancial Property — Gift from Parent ■ — • Loan — Cestui que Trust. — A executed a document acknowledging the receipt of 5,000 pesos from B, to be delivered in equal shares to the latter's two daughters two years after the death of B and his wife, A to pay annual interest thereon while the money remained in his possession. It was held that said document does not show a loan from the daughters but a purely voluntary gift from B to his daughters in trust to take'effect after his death, that said sum was the exclusive property of the daughters and did not partake of the character of ganancial property and that each of said daughters was entitled to dispose freely of her share without the consent or authorization of her husband.</p> <p>Id. — Paraphernal Property — Marital Consent — Construction of Law. — The marital consent exacted by the laws in force prior to the Revised Civil Code so that the wife could dispose of her own separate property was suppressed by said Revised Civil Code without prejudicing the right acquired by the husband under the laws in force at the time the marriage was contracted.</p> <p>Id. — Vested Rights — Construction of Law. — The fundamental element in the law governing conjugal partnerships is the right' of each of the spouses to receive one-half of the property acquired during the marriage at the dissolution of the same and this is a vested right which cannot be modified by the Legislature without working a hardship upon the spouses who contracted the marriage under that law.</p> <p>Evidence — Conditional Admission of Evidence — Practice.—Although it is a better practice to rule upon the admissibility of evidence at the time it is offered and objected to, it is not a fundamental error when the case is tried without a jury to strike out subsequently evidence which was admitted con- ’ ditionally, because the court is in a position, to free itself from the impression caused thereby.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Acknowledgment — Action for Annulment of Designation of Heirs — Evidence.—In an action brought by a natural child to annul a designation of heirs on the ground that she had been duly acknowledged by her father, which allegation was denied by the defendant, the only evidence competent to prove the. fundamental allegation of acknowledgment is the authentic public document in which it was made or the judgment of the . court so decreeing.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Action for Annulment of Designation of Heirs— Evidence. — In an action brought by a natural child to annul a designation of heirs on the ground that she had been duly acknowledged by her father,' a document containing the statement of a sister of the putative father to the effect that the latter’s succession, composed of herself, her sister and his daughter, the plaintiff, had been in possession of a certain property, is inadmissible as evidence to prove said acknowledgment.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Evidence—Certificate of Marriage'. — The ' fact that the putative father of a natural daughter attended her marriage and signed the certificate in which it was stated that the bride was his acknowledged daughter, when there is nothing to show that he had made any express declaration as to sueh acknowledgment or even that he gave his daughter permission to marry, does not constitute an authentic and genuine acknowledgment.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment.—When a father has failed or refuses to make a formal acknowledgment, an action for acknowledgment is indispensable and" it can be dispensed with only when there exists an authentic and formal document witnessing sueh acknowledgment or when the same has been decreed by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Certificates op Baptism and Marriage — Evidence.— The mere mention of the acknowledgment of a person as a natural child in a certificate of baptism is not presumptive evidence that such acknowledgment was made, for certificates of baptism and certificates of marriage certify only to the administration of the baptism and the celebration of the marriage on the dates stated therein.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the. Begistrar of Property of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Record oe Title — Ambiguous Application to Registrar. — When it is desired that the registrar of property make any entry in the hooks of the registry the applieaion should he made in a specific and definite manner and not in a vague form creating doubt as to the kind of entry desired.</p> <p>Liens — Freedom oe Property — Presumption.—The presumption is always in favor of "the freedom of the property and in order that property may be considered encumbered the lien must be constituted in clear and fixed terms which do not give place to the least doubt.</p> <p>Id. — Modification of Contract — Third Party: — When a property is recorded in the name of a third party a modification of the original contract amounting to a lien to which said third party Jias not consented cannot be recorded in the registry later.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tire opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>Tile facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal' from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Liability of -Employer for Acts of Employe — Internal Revenue Law — Judgment Against Partnership on Information Against Individual Partners — Trial De Novo — Jurisdiction—Irregularity in Lower Court. — An information having been filed in the Municipal Court of Ponce against Nar-ciso and Juan Barquet, and their attorney having entered a plea of not guilty in the name of Barquet Hermanos, the trial was held and said court rendered a judgment of conviction against the firm. The case having been tried de novo in the district court and the judgment appealed from affirmed, said judgment was reversed by this court on appeal and a new trial was ordered. At the beginning of the new trial the defendants demurred on the ground that the district court was without jurisdiction of the ease on appeal because the judgment rendered by the municipal court was not against the accused but against the partnership, and the district court found the individual defendants guilt-y. It was held:</p> <p>L That the District Court of Ponce had jurisdiction of a new trial of the accused on the charges made against them and also of their persons, any irregularities which ma.y have been committed in the municipal court not being material to said trial.</p> <p>2. That the accused, as members of the firm of Barquet Hermanos, are liable for a violation of the internal revenue law committed by a,n employe of the firm in their store, and the fact that there may have been other members of the firm who were not included in the information does not exempt the accused from said liability.</p>

<p>Divorce — Grave Injury — Amorous Delations, with Third Person — Evidence.— The fundamental cause of action for divorce in this case is that the defendant had gravely injured the plaintiff by maintaining amorous relations with a third person. In proof of this allegation -the plaintiff offered in evidence a love-letter addressed to “Lola” by “Bosa,” which the plaintiff alleges he took from his wife, the defendant, when she was about to post it under cover addressed to her lover, and two other undated and unsigned letters which the plaintiff avers -were written by his wife; and the plaintiff himself testified. "It was decided that even admitting the genuineness of the said three letters, as they wero made a part of the complaint and not denied by the defendant, they do not prove that the defendant was the person who, over the signature of “Bosa,” addressed the letter which her husband took from her to her lover under the name of “Lola,” therefore the amorous relations on which the allegation of grave injuries was based were not proven.</p> <p>Id. — Grave Injury — Cruelty.—In order to obtain a divorce on the ground of grave injury such injury must reach the point of cruelty.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement of the Case — Transcript op Record. — In accordance -with rule 40 of the Supreme Court the period of 30 days allowed for the filing in said court of the transcript of the record in an appeal should be counted, when no statement of the case has been filed, from the day on which the notice of appeal was filed in the lower court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Action eor Acknowledgment — Personal Action. — An action for acknowledgment brought by a natural child is of a personal character and should be governed by the laws of the country of the natural child.</p> <p>Id. — Action eor Acknowledgment — Non-Besident Defendants — Jurisdiction. — The general rule that a court acquires no jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in personal actions unless they have been summoned personally within the State or possess property therein which has been attached is not applicable to an action for acknowledgment brought by a natural child. The district courts of Porto Eico acquire jurisdiction in such cases over non • resident defendants although they have not been summoned personally within the State or possess property therein.</p> <p>Id. — Action ' for Acknowledgment — Complaint—Allegations.—In accordance with section 189 of the Eevised Civil Code, which was in force in 1903 when the plaintiffs were born, the allegation, of the complaint that their parents lived in concubinage both at the time of their birth and conception is a pertinent allegation.</p> <p>Id. — Action for Acknowledgment — Complaint—Allegations.—The allegation of a complaint that the father of the plaintiffs had acknowledged them on various occasions relates to the acts of acknowledgment performed by the father and is not inconsistent with - the other allegation that he had never acknowledged them legally as his natural children. The signification of the second allegation is that the plaintiffs had not been acknowledged in such a solemn and authentic manner as to obviate the necessity of their bringing this action.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Certificates of Birth — Discrepancies.—The trial court did' not err in admitting certified copies’ of the birth certificates of Ana Luisa and Ana Teresa Mérida on the condition that it be proven (as was done later) that the said certificates referred to the plaintiffs, Ana Luisa and Ana Teresa Orama.</p> <p>Id. — Amending Complaint — Evidence.—The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that their father had deposited money for their account in the Banco Territorial y Agrícola on June 18, 1910, and August 7, 1911, and to prove this they offered in evidence the bank passbook, which was admitted without objection, according to which the last entry was made on May 23, 1911. The court granted said parties leave' to amend the complaint by substituting the latter date for that of August 7th. It was held that the court did not err in allowing such amendment and that no prejudice was caused thereby to the adverse party, who neither referred thereto at the trial nor asked for a reasonable time within which to present evidence to rebut the amendment.</p> <p>In. — Res Judicata — Action fob. Acknowledgment — Final Judgment. — A final judgment rendered in an action of filiation is no bar to the institution of another similar action between the same parties when the latter is based on acts of acknowledgment performed by the father subsequent to the rendition of the judgment in the original action.</p> <p>Id. — Res Judicata — Final Judgment. — A judgment rendered in E¡,n action is conclusive as regards the issues joined, but is not res juclieaia in another suit of the same nature between the same parties based on different facts which did not exist when the first action was brought.</p> <p>Id. — Action for Acknowledgment — Education and Support — Evidence.—According to the provisions of paragraph 2 of section 189 of the Revised Civil Code, the evidence introduced in an action of filiation cannot be deemed insufficient merely because although evidence was introduced to show that the father supported the children none was submitted to prove that he educated them, when the proof of the acts of acknowledgment on the part of the father is sufficient to establish the acknowledgment.</p>

<p>Bape — Action por Damages — Sufficiency op Complaint — Conviction op De-pendant. — In order to maintain an action for damages for rape it is not necessary that the defendant shall have heen found criminally guilty of said crime. Therefore a complaint which alleges the commission of the crime; without stating that the defendant had heen tried and convicted is sufficient.</p> <p>Id. — Action job Damages — Civil and. Criminal Actions Separate. — A civil action for damages for rape is not subordinate to the criminal action, hut they are entirely independent and may be maintained separately.</p> <p>Civil Liability Arising prom Crimes — Construction op Law. — Since the amendment of section 1059 of the Revised Civil Code by the Act of March 10, 1904, civil liabilities arising from crimes or misdemeanors are governed, by analogy, by the provisions of section 1803 of said Civil Code.</p> <p>Prescription — Action for Damages. — A civil action for damages for rape comes under the provisions of section 1869 of the Revised Civil Code; hence the right of action prescribes in one year.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Pleadings — amended Pleadings — Demurrer—Plea of Prescription — View of Premises — Witnesses—Assignment of Error. — Por the reason that demurrers to that part of the answer which set up a plea of prescription were sustained, the answer was amended three times. At the beginning of the trial the defendant made a motion for leave to reinsert in the answer the plea of prescription which had been eliminated from the issue by the sustaining of the demurrers, which motion was overruled. It was held:</p> <p>1. That the amending of an answer aftfer a demurrer thereto had been sustained constitutes a waiver of the exception which might be tafeen to the ruling of the court in sustaining the demurrer.</p> <p>2. That the-court committed no error in permitting the plaintiff to amend his complaint during the trial to make it conform to the evidence and that, then was the proper time for the defendant to ask leave to reamend his. answer by the addition of the plea of prescription and to request a suspension of the trial to enable him to introduce evidence in support of his plea. .</p> <p>3. That both parties consented to the view ordered by the court and n« exception was taken by the defendant to the action of the court or to the manner of its execution.</p> <p>4. That apart from the fact that the defendant did" not object to the absence of the stenographer and secretary of the. court from the view, it was not necessary that these officials should accompany the court and even if it were error not to have them present it was not one of such a nature as to affect the defendant’s rights.</p> <p>5. That as the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff the court committed no error in allowing him'to indicate first at the view' the property in litigation.</p> <p>6. That the record shows that all the witnesses had been sworn at the trial, hence the objection that the witnesses present at the view had not been sworn is without foundation.</p> <p>7. That m order that this court may notice any particular errors alleged to have been committed by the lower court they should be specifically assigned in the brief according to the requirements of rules 42 and 43 of this court.</p>

<p>New Tbial — Stjkpbise—Diligence—Eatjlt ob Negligence. — The appellant moved for a new trial in this ease on the ground that he was surprised at the view to find that the property identified by the witnesses was within the district of Sabana Grande instead of being in Yauco, alleging that if he had known this, he would have been enabled to admit his possession of the same and claim title by prescription. It was held:</p> <p>1. That the amended description of property showed the defendant the district where the same was situated and he had an opportunity at the trial to see a plan thereof, but notwithstanding this he did not allege surprise before the judgment was rendered.</p> <p>2. That in order to secure a new trial on the ground of surprise it must be shown that the surprise did not result from the party’s own fault or negligence.</p> <p>3. That great diligence is required of a person moving for a new trial on the ground of surprise unless the surprise is self-evident, which is not the case here.</p>

<p>Perjury- — Contempt—Rule to Show Cause — Jurisdiction—Action Pending— Presumption. — The fact that the rule to show cause why a party should not he punished for contempt hy perjury did not contain the necessary allegation that the civil action in which the perjury had been committed was still pending, so as to confer jurisdiction on tlie lower court, cannot be successfully-pleaded for the first time on appeal, for unless the contrary is proven the presumption is that the lower court acted according to law and that the civil case was still pending.</p> <p>Id. — Bule to Show Cause — Oath oe Witness. — The appellant contends that the recital in the rule to show cause that the accused made a solemn oath before the court to tell the truth is not sufficient to show that his testimony was given under oath. It was held that objections to such errors should be made in the court below and that the error would be cured by the evidence submitted at the trial.</p> <p>Id. — Contempt—Evidence—Materiality oe False Testimony. — In a summary proceeding for the punishment of perjury as contempt, in order to prove the materiality of the false testimony given by the accused in the civil action it is sufficient to present that part of the record of the civil case which tends to show such materiality and it is not necessary to offer the whole record in evidence.</p> <p>Nonsuit — Waiver.—When a defendant introduces his evidence after his motion for a nonsuit has been overruled he is understood to have waived this question.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1</p> <p>■Tbe facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Action oe Ejectment Against the People op Porto Rico — Consent op People to be Shed — Jurisdiction.—The present is an action of ejectment brought against The People' of Porto Eico and Wenceslao Borda as lessee of the Caño de Tiburones lands without the consent of The People to be sued. During the pendency of this appeal the Supreme Court of the United States held in the case of Eosaly v. The People of Porto Eico, 227 U, S., 270, that The People of Porto Eico cannot be sued without its consent. It was held that in accordance with said doctrine neither the trial court nor this court on appeal has jurisdiction of the case and that therefore the proceedings are • null and void and that the case cannot be decided on its merits as against the defendant Borda because The People of Porto Rico is the party really interested in the suit and any decision which might be rendered against Borda would affect necessarily The People of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>Ejectment — IIeirs—Right of Action. — The heirs who compose the succession of a person have a prima facie right of action in the name of the succession to recover the property which belonged to their ancestor and Which was not alienated lawfully.</p> <p>Id. — Yerbal Sale of Property — Documentary Evidence — Oipu. Testimony..— After a careful review of the evidence introduced by the defendant in support of her allegation that she had bought the property from the ancestor of the plaintiff succession it was held to be insufficient. In cases of this kind it is usual that there exists some foundation of documentary evidence and in the absence of this, oral testimony to establish the fact of the sale must be strong and conclusive.</p> <p>Id. — Ownership of Building on Land of Another Person. — It having been shown that one of the defendants built a house in good faith on land which he believed to be his own but which afterwards, proved to belong to another person, the ownership of s'aid house should be governed by the provisions of section 370 of the Revised Civil Code.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Contradictory Evidence. — When the evidence is contradictory neither the verdict of the jury nor the judgment of the court should be reversed unless it be shown that they were influenced by partiality, prejudice or passion or that manifest error was committed.</p> <p>Motion to Quash — Delay in Piling Information — Discretion of Court. — Although the ruling on the defendant’s motion to quash the information because the period of 60 days had expired before the fiscal filed said information, is within the discretion of the trial court, said discretion is dependent upon whether the reasons alleged by the fiscal or brought to the cognizance of the court in some other manner are sufficient to justify the delay, for the provisions of section 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are mandatory.</p> <p>Id. — Construction of Law — DeLxVY in Piling Information — Reason for Delay. — The provisions of section 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure require that in cases of both felony and misdemeanor the information should be filed within 60 days after the commission of the crime, and it is the duty of the court to order that the information be quashed when there are no good and sufficient reasons to justify the delay in filing it.</p> <p>Id. — Delay in Piling Information — Good Reasons for Delay — Awaiting Result of Wounds. — The victim in this case died on October 21, 1912, as a result of the wounds received on September 10, 1912. The accused was arrested on October 24, 1912, and from said date to February 10, 1913, when the information was filed, more than the 60 days prescribed by law, had elapsed. It was held that the reasons given by the fiscal to justify the delay in filing •the information, said reasons being based on the necessity of awaiting the result of the wounds received by the victim, were insufficient and that the district court erred in overruling the motion of the accused to quash the information.</p> <p>Id. — Time to Make Motion to Quash — Waiver.—Although it is the general rule that the proper time to make a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was filed after the expiration of the 60 days prescribed by law is at the time of the arraignment or immediately after the expiration of the 60 days, the failure of the accused to follow this rule does not destroy his right ' to make said motion at any time before the trial, but if said motion is made, after the trial dr after the jury is empaneled, said right of the accused may be considered as waived.</p>

<p>Petition for writ of certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated iu the opinion.</p>

<p>Administrative Appeal — Documents Not' Presented in Registry. — In the decision of an administrative appeal this court cannot consider documents which are not shown to have been presented in the registry of property and considered by the registrar in rendering the decision appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Second Appeal. — An administrative appeal having been decided by this court, the same question cannot be raised later by means of a second appeal based on the same documents which served as grounds for the first appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Tacit Mortgage — Paraphernal Property — Delivery oe Wipe’s Property to Husband. — According to Law 17, Title XI, Partida IV, the mere existence of paraphernal property does not imply ispso faoto that the husband’s property is subject to a tacit mortgage for the value of the paraphernal property, but it is necessary that an express delivery of the paraphernal property shall have been made to the husband in order that said tacit mortgage may exist.</p> <p>Delivery op Paraphernal Property to Husband — Insufficiency op Complaint — Conclusion op Law. — The allegation in a complaint that the husband expressly received the paraphernal property of his wife constitutes a conclusion of law, it being necessary to allege the date of the delivery and the form and manner in which the husband received the property, a public instrument executed by the -husband acknowledging the receipt by him of said property not being equivalent to this special and express delivery.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal -from a Decision of the Begistrár of Property of G-uayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in-the opinion.</p>

<p>Sale Subject to Right op Redemption — Lease—Assignment op Right op Redemption — Record op Consummation op Sale. — The appellant purchased certain properties subject to a right of redemption and then leased them to the vendor under an agreement, among other things, that if three consecutive monthly payments should become due and not be paid punctually, it would be considered that the total obligation was due and the purchaser would have the right to apply for an entry in the'registry of a consummation of sale. The registry shows that subsequently the right of .redemption was assigned to another. The record of the ease does not show the manner in which the application for the entry of the consummation of sale was made. It was held that in view of the circumstances of the case and it not appearing that the appellant proved that the assignee of the original vendor and lessee failed to comply with the condition, the decision appealed from should be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Preferred Creditor — Collection of Mortgage in Instalments— Instalments of Mortgage Not Due. — Article 125 of the Mortgage Law refers to eases of the sale of property mortgaged in favor of several creditors to satisfy the claim of a first preferred creditor and article 331 of the same law supposes that the property sold is of sufficient value to cover both the due instalment whose collection is sought and those pending. Neither of said articles is applicable to a ease in which proceedings are taken to recover an instalment of a mortgage credit which is due when there are other instalments of the same credit not due and the proceeds of the property sold are not sufficient to cover the due instalment.</p> <p>Id. — First Mortgage Creditor — Eecord of Lien. — Recording to section 3828 of the Revised Civil Code, it should not be understood that the first mortgage creditor is the one whose credit first falls due, but the one in whose favor the mortgage obligation was first recorded in the registry of. property.</p> <p>Id. — Instalments of Mortgage — Preference.—Instalments of the same mortgage are not credits distinct from each other but parts of the same mortgage right and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, being equal in right, theie is no preference among them, although they fall due at different times.</p> <p>Id. — Instalments of Mortgage — Sale of Property to Satisfy Instalment of Mortgage When There Are Other Instalments Not Yet Due — Distribution of Proceeds of Sale. — When property affected by a mortgage payable ■ in instalments falling due at different times, each instalment being represented by a promissory note, is sold and the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the amount of the note or instalment due and for the payment of which the property was sold, wherefore the notes or instalments not yet due cannot be satisfied, the net proceeds of the sale should be divided pro rata among all the creditors, the holder of the due instalment who brought the proceedings receiving the proportional part corresponding to him and the portions corresponding to the other instalments being deposited until their cancellation. According to article 176 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law, article 1575 of the old Law of Civil Procedure is applicable to the case, whereas neither the Mortgage Law, the Code of Civil Procedure of 1904 nor the Act of March 9, 1905, relative to the manner of satisfying judgments, contain any provision on this point.</p> <p>Id. — Cancellation of Mortgage Payable in Instalments — Essential Allegation of Complaint. — In an action for the cancellation of a mortgage securing several instalments'of an obligation when the mortgaged property has been adjudicated to the holder of a due instalment in part payment thereof and there are other instalments not due, in order to secure the cancellation of the entire mortgage it is necessary to allege in the complaint that of the proceeds ■of the sale of the property so adjudicated the pro rata shares corresponding to the owners of the other instalments have been deposited.</p>

<p>Summary Foreclosure Proceedings — Action for Annulment of Proceedings— Jurisdiction. — According to article 175 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law, an action may be maintained for the annulment of summary foreclosure proceedings and under section 76 of the Code of Oivil Procedure any district court, in accordance with its jurisdiction, shall have cognizance of said action when the parties may have agreed expressly or impliedly to submit the suit to the decision of the same.</p> <p>Id. — Action for Annulment of Proceedings — Mortgage Payable in Instal-ments — Promissory Notes Payable to Order — Partial Payment of Mortgage — Concurrent Promissory Notes. — In this ease a mortgage was created on several rural properties payable in ten instalments and a promissory note payable to the order of the creditor was made for each instalment. The plaintiff, being the holder of note No. 3, which was due and not paid, brought thereon the summary foreclosure proceedings provided for by the Mortgage Law and six of the mortgaged properties were adjudicated to it, but the general,lien on said properties was not canceled in the registry. Matters standing thus, the defendant, alleging that he was the holder of note No. 5, instituted the same proceedings as had been followed by the plaintiff and directed the same against the properties adjudicated to the plaintiff, basing his claim on the fact that the mortgage created on said properties was not canceled. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this action for the annulment of the summary proceedings prosecuted by the defendant. It was held:</p> <p>1. That the debt acknowledged in promissory note No. 3 being due and unpaid, the plaintiff could recover the amount in an action against the mortgaged properties, but taking into account the fact that said properties secured other like credits as well as that of the plaintiff because they all emanated from one single mortgage, the plaintiff, in having said properties adjudicated to it in part payment of its credit, acquired only the'proportional part of the proceeds of the sale which said credit represented, the properties remaining encumbered to secure the proportional parts corresponding to the other creditors.</p> <p>2. That applying this principle to the defendant also, the conclusion is reached that he has no right to recover his entire credit out of the properties acquired by the plaintiff, but only his proportional share of the proceeds of the sale.</p>

<p>■Foreclosure Proceedings — Mortgage—Promissory Notes — Auction Sale — Distribution of Proceeds of Sale — Mutual Eights of Holders of Notes.— The plaintiff company, being the owner of promissory note No. 3 of a series of promissory notes secured by a single mortgage,’ instituted summary fore-, closure proceedings to recover on said note, and as no bidders appeared at the auction sale all the remaining properties covered by the mortgage were adjudicated to said company in part payment of said note. When proinissory note No. 9 became due the defendant who was the owner thereof brought summary foreclosure proceedings for its collection against the American Trading Company. During the pendency of said proceedings the said company began an action to annul said foreclosure proceedings and to cancel in the registry the mortgage which' secured the notes following note No. 3. Ii was held:</p> <p>1. That the American Trading Company had no right to ask for the cancellation of the mortgage in question, because in acquiring the mortgaged property it had not followed the law and had not regarded the mutual rights of the owners of the other notes.</p> <p>2. That Inocencia Quevedo Castellano mistook her right of action in bringing the summary foreclosure proceedings, for her cause of action was against the American Trading Company for a proportional distribution of the proceeds of the sale.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of San Juan. Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the decision of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>Motion to Dismiss Appeal.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion.</p>

<p>Consent oe People to be Sued — Jurisdiction.—The People of Porto Rico cannot be sued without its consent and a judgment rendered against it without this requisite is null and void for lack" of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Appeal — New Trial — Verdict Contrary to Evidence — Transcript of Record — ■ Statement op the Case. — As a statement of the case has not been included in the transcript of the record, this court cannot inquire into the contention of the accused that the lower court erred in denying the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence.</p>

<p>Certiorari — Appeal—Jurisdiction.—A writ of certiorari does not lie when the only question raised in the petition is reduced to whether the judge of the lower court acted within his jurisdiction in refusing to issue a writ of cer-tiorari, from which decision the prejudiced party had a remedy by appeal to this court.</p>

<p>Appeal — Transcript op Record —■ Extension op Time — Jurisdiction. — The power to extend the time for filing in this court a transcript of the record on appeal lies in this court and district courts are without jurisdiction to do so.</p> <p>Id. — Statement op ti-ie Case — Extension óf Time — Premature Motion. — A motion for an extension of time for the filing of a statement of the case or of a bill of exceptions macle before noting the appeal is premature and an order sustaining the same has no legal force or effect.</p> <p>Findings op Fact — Discretion of Court — Incidental Orders After Judgment. — In accordance with the provisions of section 227 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911, a district judge is not compelled to make out and file findings of fact in support of an order approving a bill of costs. It is left to the discretion of the court to make such findings or not in connection with incidental subsequent orders either in regard to costs, attorney’s fees or execution of judgment or other orders of an incidental nature made after judgment.</p> <p>Appeal — Dismissal op Appeal. — The order appealed from having been entered on June 20, 193 3, since which date there is no showing that the appellants have perfected their appeal, it should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Récord oe Title — Registrars oe Property — Limit to Review oe Judicial. ■ Documents. — Although article 18 of the Mortgage Law grants to the registrars the power to pass on, under their responsibility, all documents issued by judicial authorities for the sole purpose of admitting, suspending, or refusing their admission to record or entry, said power does not authorise' them to examine the grounds of judicial decisions or to base the denial of any record or entry upon their estimation of the legality of such grounds, albeit they are allowed to consider whether the decisions were rendered by a. court of competent jurisdiction in a proper action.</p> <p>Id. — Dominion Title Proceedings — Depositions—Affidavits.—A decision of a district court approving dominion title proceedings should not be refused admission to record because the witnesses testified by means of depositions' taken before a justice of the peace of' said district commissioned for that purpose by the said court, for the doctrine laid down in the case of Meléndes' v. The Registrar, 17 P. R. R., 575, is applicable only to affidavits and not to. depositions of witnesses.</p>

<p>Property oh Minors — Execution Against Minors — Judicial Sale — Record of Title. — The sale of property belonging to minors made by a marshal at public auction in compliance with a writ of execution of a judgment rendered against the said minors.is valid and therefore recordable in the registry.</p> <p>Id. — Execution Against Minors — Judicial Sale. — Act No. 33 of March 9, 1911,. refers only to sales of property of minors voluntarily made by the representatives of the minors and not to sales ordered by judicial authority for the execution of a judgment against the minors.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Ban Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Amendment to Complaint — Joining New Parties Defendant — Unpre judicial Errors. — The allowance of an amendment to a complaint joining new parties defendant does not constitute an error prejudicial to the interests of' the defendant when the court in rendering judgment fails to make any pronouncement ini regard to the said new parties. The injured party, if any, would be the plaintiff, and as he has not appealed it would be idle, to discuss this error alleged by the defendant.</p> <p>Sureties — Principal Debtor — Bond in Solidum. — The promissory notes in litigation were guaranteed by the sureties in the following manner: “We constitute ourselves sureties and principal debtors for the amount of this note, with the same liability as the direct debtor.” It was held that although the phrase “principal debtor” has the same signification as “surety in solidum,” as in this case the sureties did not state that each one of them individually guaranteed the amount of the obligation, each surety cannot be held liable for the total amount of the obligation, but both are liable conjointly without ties in solidum, therefore the liability is divided between them.</p>

<p>Certiorabi — Allegations Not Proven — Bad Practice. — It is bad practice to make allegations of fact in a petition for a writ of certiorari which the petitioner is not prepared to prove subsequently in the proper manner, and this is a sufficient ground for quashing the writ of certiorari and dismissing the petition without considering the hypothetical questions raised therein.</p>

<p>Quasi Contract — Management of Another’s Business — Liquidation of Partnership — Continuation of Partnership After Death of Partners — Liability of Heirs. — Wien, as in tie case at bar, the members ol a partnership die and an employe laving an interest in the business continues the same in the name of the partnership without liquidating the same and there is no intervention of the heirs of the deceased partners or any ratification by them of the acts of the employe, such acts of said employe do not constitute a quasi contract for the management of another’s business or make the said heirs liable for the debts contracted by the said employe in the name of the partnership, especially when, as in the jnesent case, it is not shown that the said heirs received any benefit whatever or that? the assets of the partnership at the time of1 the death of -the partners were insufficient to meet their obligations then outstanding. As a matter .of fact, said obligations were paid by the said employe who obtained further credit and contracted new debts.</p> <p>.Id. — Ratification — Management of Another’s Business — Liquidation of Partnership. — The failure of the heirs of the deceased members of the defendant partnership to intervene and attempt a liquidation of the partnership does not amount to a ratification of' the continuance of the business after the death of all of said members, by an employe having an interest, therein, nor is the mere fact that one of the, heirs of the_ said members was an employe of the person who continued the business of said partnership an act of such intervention or ratification.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The 'facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Plumacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1.</p> <p>The facts are stated in t(ie opinion.</p>

<p>Lottery Tickets — Selling Lottery . Tickets — Accomplice—Evidence—Testimony ■ of Purchaser of Lottery Tickets. — As section 293 of the Penal Code makes only the selling of lottery tickets a crime and' not the buying of them, the purchaser cannot be considered as an accomplice of the seller; therefore' his testimony in an action against the seller does not require the corroboration required by section 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the testimony of accomplices in general.</p>

<p>Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Judge of the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Notaries — Inspection of Notarial Protocols by Internal Revenue Agent.— The office of a notary • public not falling within the classification of buildings made in section 24 of the Internal Revenue Law of March 9, 1905, an internal revenue agent has no right thereunder to enter said office against the wish of the notary to inspect the notarial protocols in order to ascertain whether the internal revenue stamps required by law have been attached. Section 381 of the Political Code is not applicable to the case at bar, for it refers to cases of taxes on inheritances.</p> <p>Constitutional Right — Unwarranted Seizure and Search — Tnsuíction of Notarial Protocols by Internal Revenue Agent. — The mere fact that the government may be deprived of its revenue does not justify the inspection of a notarial office by an internal revenue agent without authority of law. The guaranties afforded by Amendments 4 and 5 of the Constitution of the United States against unwarranted searches and seizures are closely allied to the privilege of a person of not being compelled to give testimony against himself in a criminal action and are more important considerations.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Costs — Costs in Municipal Courts — Appeals to District Courts. — Section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that the party adjudged by a district court to pay the costs in a ease appealed from a municipal court must also pay the costs incurred in the lower court, was not repealed expressly of by implication by the Act of March 11, 1908, regulating appeals from judgments of municipal courts in civil actions.</p> <p>Repeal by Implication. — In order that a law may be considered as repealed impliedly by a subsequent law, the new law must contain provisions either conti ary to or irreconcilable with the former law.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gruayama.</p> <p>Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the Untied States.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the decision of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal — Administrative Appeal — Record of Title — Classification of Document — Duties of Registrar. — When a document is presented in the registry for record it is the duty of the registrar, in accordance with the Act of March 1, 1902, relating to administrative appeals, to pass on the document and to record the same or refuse to admit it to record, making the entries required by sections 4 and 7 of the said Act of March 1, 1902, as the ease may be; and the registrar who returns a document with the stamps without taking any action because, it does not appear that the internal revenue stamp of one dollar required by law was canceled on the original document, acts in open violation of the said sections.</p> <p>.Id. — Administrative Appeal. — rHio Supreme Court cannot review in an admims-trative appeal the decision of a registrar returning the instrument with the stamps to the interested party without taking any action thereon because it does not appear that an internal revenue stamp, of one dollar was canceled on the original document. In order that an appeal may be taken, the registrar must refuse absolutely to reeord the instrument or admit the same to record with curable defects.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, .Section 2.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal oe Appeal — 1Transcript oe Record — Omission oe Copy of> Judgment. — When the transcript of the record in an appeal from a judgment does not contain a copy of the judgment appealed from, the appeal .should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction-in this court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District. Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Supplementary Brief — Discretion of Court. — The briefs of, both parties should be filed before the hearing on the appeal, as required by sections 42 and 45 of the Buies of this court, and only in cases where the circumstances justify it can a supplementary brief be allowed to be filed after the hearing. In the present ease the court in its discretion admitted the supplementary. brief because notice had been given to the adverse party who offered no objection, and for the further reason that no new questions were raised in said supplementary brief.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Begistrar of Property of San Germán.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Hnmacao.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of G-uayama.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

Stipulation that the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States he considered withdrawn by appellants. The facts are- stated in the decision.

<p>Contract — Sale witi-i Bigi-it of Bedemption — Lease—Consummation of Sale— Proof of Nonfulfilment of Condition. — Although as a general rule only the failure of the registry to show that the condition of a contract of sale with right of. redemption has not been, complied with is necessary to justify the registrar in entering a consummation of the sale at the instance of the interested party; still, in cases like the present relating to a contract of sale with right of redemption and at the same time to a lease in which the consummation of sale is made to depend upon the payment of the rent, which payment, as a general rule, is not noted in the registry every time it is made, it is advisable that the failure to comply with the condition should not only appear in the registry, but should be proved in seme other way, e. g., by an affidavit of the petitioner.</p>

<p>Natural Children — Acknowledgment—Record of Acknowledgment. — In order that the acknowledgment of a natural child may be considered as having been made according to law, it must have been made by a solemn act of the father with the firm intention of doing so, of which act there must be an authentic and genuine record.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Acts of Father Tending to Acknowledge — Action of Filiation. — When the father has performed acts tending to establish his paternity, which acts of themselves alone did not constitute a solemn acknowledgment and of which no authentic and genuine record remained, as required by the Law of Toro, and in the cases specified in section 137 of the old Civil Code and section 189 of the Revised Civil Code, an action of filiation must be brought and the acknowledgment be decreed by the solemn act of a court of competent jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id. — Certificates of Baptism and Marriage — Evidence.—Certificates of baptism and of marriage prove the administration of the baptism and the celebration of the marriage on the dates stated, but they do not prove the truth of the. statements contained in them with respect to the filiation or civil status of the person baptized or married.</p> <p>Id. — Acknowledgment—Baptismal Certificate — Private Document. — A footnote entered by a parish priest to a baptismal certificate after the change of sovereignty and the separation of Church and State, to the effect that ' the putative father of the baptized child personally appeared before him and expressed his wish to recognize the child as his own, has only the character of a private document and cannot bo considered as an authentic and genuine record of the acknowledgment. Such an acknowledgment is not of itself sufficient to give the acknowledged child the right to bring an action for the annulment of the institution of heirs of his putative father because he was not included therein.</p>

<p>Partnership — Action oe Debt. — A partner of a mercantile firm has no legal capacity to recover in his own name and as a private individual a debt due to the firm of which he is a member.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petition for approval of statement of the case by this court.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Guayama.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Gaming — Monte—Dealee oe Bankee — Complaint.—A complaint alleging that the accused played monte for percentage and for money, one of them acting as dealer and banker and the others betting, states facts sufficient to constitute the offense defined in section 299 of the Penal Code as amended by the Act of March 12, 1908, and Act No. 36 of March 10, 1910.</p> <p>Id. — Poker—Erroneous Translation. — Poker was not one of the games expressly prohibited by section 299 of the Penal Code, which section was erroneously translated into Spanish by placing a comma after the word “stud-horse” and before the word “poker” as though referring to two distinct games instead of one single game called stud-horse poker. The game of poker was added to the list of prohibited games enumerated in section 299 of our Penal Code by the Act of March 12, 1908, amending the said section.</p> <p>Id. — Monte—Banking or Percentage Game. — The game of monte, to which the present ease relates, is one of the games specifically enumerated in section 299 of the Penal Code as a banking or percentage game.</p> <p>Id. — Pokee—Banking or Percentage Game. — The game of poker is included in the statutory prohibition of section 299 of the Penal Code, amended by Act of March 12, 1908, when conducted under the same conditions as any banking or percentage game.</p> <p>Id. — Poker—Construction of Law. — Prom the amendment of section' 299 of the Penal Code by the Act of March 12, 1908, it is. deduced that it was the intention of the Legislature to penalize, in addition to the games mentioned in said section, any banking or percentage game conducted under the same conditions as those expressly enumerated therein, and included the game of poker among those expressly prohibited, but only when played under the conditions of a banking or percentage game.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Discretion of Court. — The trial court, in the exercise of its discretional power, may admit in evidence the cards and money seized after the case for the prosecution has been rested, but the introduction in evidence of these incriminating articles is not necessary, for the offense of playing a prohibited game does not depend upon the seizure of the cards or money used in the game, but upon the fact that the person was playing a prohibited game.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Gfuayama in a case of gaming.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Complaint — Objections in Trial Court — Defects Supplied by Evidence. — As the complaint in this case was not objected to in the trial court, any defects which the complaint may have contained are presumed to have been supplied by the evidence.</p> <p>Id. — Gaming—Monte.—A complaint charging the accused with playing monte for money and percentage, one of them acting as banker or dealer and the rest betting, states facts sufficient to constitute the offense defined in section 299 of the Penal Code as amended by the Acts of March 12, 1908, and March 10, 1910, the game of monte being specifically prohibited in said section.</p> <p>Gaming — Monte—Poker.—The opinion delivered in the ease of The People v. Benitez et al. on March 6, 1913, is not applicable to the present case because that case related to the game of poker, while this relates to the game of monte which was expressly prohibited as a banking game by section 299 of the Penal Code before it was amended. See the opinion in the case of The People v. Ortiz et al., decided today.</p>

<p>Appeal — Correction op Record — Record op Different Case. — A certificate issued by the secretary of the lower court referring to parts of the record of a case different from the one which is the object of the appeal and which are not shown to have formed part of the record of the lower court, cannot be added to the transcript of the record on appeal by means of a motion to correct the record.</p> <p>Id.' — Correction of Record. — Rule 55 of this court' is applicable to cases where it is sought to correct an error or to supply an omission in the transcript of the record, but cannot serve as authority for the review by this court, on a motion to' correct the record of the approval by the lower court of the statement of the ease.</p>

<p>Embezzlement. — Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it had been confided or who was in lawful possession thereof.</p> <p>Id. — Unlawful Sale of Property — Appropriation of Proceeds of Sale. — In an information charging the accused with having unlawfully sold a heifer which he had received to raise for a share of the profits derived therefrom and appropriated the proceeds to his own use, the property embezzled is the heifer and not the proceeds of the sale, hence it is not necessary to allege in the information the amount of the proceeds of the sale. The doctrine laid down in the case of The People v. Alomar, 10 P. E. B., 282, is not applicable to this ease, because in that case the property embezzled was the proceeds of the sale of the horse and not the horse itself.</p> <p>Id>. — Fraudulent Sale of Heifer — Felony.—The fraudulent sale of a heifer received to raise for a share of the profits, appropriating the proceeds of the sale, constitutes a felony whatever may be the amount of the proceeds of the sale, according to sections 455 and 428 of the Penal Code.</p> <p>Id. — Verdict—Felony.—When an accused is charged with embezzlement consisting in having sold unlawfully a hei-fer received to raise for a share of the profits and appropriated the proceeds of the sale and the jury finds him guilty of embezzlement, such verdict is sufficient and a sentence of one year in the penitentiary, which can be imposed only in cases of felony, is not erroneous because the crime of embezzlement is not graded and the fraudulent appropriation of a heifer is always a felony.</p>

<p>Appeal — Costs—Ruling on Bill of Costs while Appeal is Pending — Jurisdiction. — In accordance with the Costs Act of March 12, 1908, when a judgment has been appealed from the trial court retains jurisdiction to rulo on the objections in proceedings for the taxation of costs, but it cannot issue execution thereon until the appeal from the judgment is decided.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney’s Fees — Subject-Matter of Litigation. — In an appeal from a ruling approving a bill of costs, the question of whether attorney’s fees may or may not be imposed in injunction proceedings in which it is impossible to determine whether or not the subject-matter of the litigation exceeds $500 in value, cannot be considered, this being a question which should bo raised on appeal from the judgment imposing the attorney’s fees.</p> <p>Costs — Disbursements—Traveling Expenses. — The traveling expenses of one of the parties to an action do not form part of the costs, properly speahing, but said expenses may be allowed lawfully as disbursements; therefore, said expenses cannot be included in the bill of costs when the judgment is for costs only and not for disbursements. Yeve v. Municipality of Fajardo, 18 P. R. R., 738.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 2, in . injunction proceedings.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Seduction—Evidence—Credibility and Chastity oe Pboseoutrix.— Two letters having been stricken from the record on motion of the fiscal because not properly identified in the statement of the case, this court cannot, take them into consideration in deciding the appeal; but even if it could,, their only object being to impeach the credibility and chastity of the prosecuting witness and the jury having found a verdict against the accused, this-court would not interfere with that verdict on account of what might be deduced from those letters, for the testimony' of the prosecutrix was corroborated by two witnesses.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Eegistrar of Property of Caguas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal-op Appeal — Amount in Litigation. — When, as in tbe case at bar, it is only alleged in tbe complaint that tbe value of tbe bouse in litigation is less than $500 and from tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff-respondent it is shown that tbe house is worth more than $400, a motion to dismiss tbe appeal on tbe ground that tbe 'amount in litigation does not exceed $300 should be overruled.</p> <p>Ib. — Intervention—Service oe Notice of Appeal — Attachment—Default— Adverse Party. — When in an action, of intervention in ownership of real! property brought against the owner of the attached property and the creditors who attached it judgment is rendered against the defendants, a co-defendant owner of the attached property having been adjudged in default for non-appearance either in the municipal court or the district court, said co-defendant is not an adverse party because he would not be prejudiced by a reversal of the judgment appealed from, and therefore it is not necessary to serve him with the notice of appeal, nor will the appeal be dismissed on that ground.</p> <p>Id. — Notice of Appeal — Omission Supplied. — In accordance with section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the notice of appeal is an essential part of the transcript of the record in an appeal. A simple reference thereto is not sufficient. Its omission in this case was supplied by the respondent's filing a certified copy of the notice of appeal.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Cause oe Action — Complaint—Old Registry of Mortgages — Transfer to New Registry — Third Parties. — In order that a complaint against a third person to recover on a mortgage recorded in the old registry of mortgages may state a cause of action, it is necessary to allege therein that the entry in the old registry was transferred to the books of the modern registry within the year following the promulgation of the Mortgage Law which went into effect in this Island on October 25, 1893, or within the year of extension granted by Royal Order of November 28, 1894, in accordance with article 449 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law in connection with article 397 of said law.</p> <p>Id. — Third Parties — Knowledge of Existence of Mortgage — Allegations— Complaint — Conclusion of Law. — The allegation in the amended complaint that the defendant bank “had knowledge of the existence and validity or effectiveness of the mortgage “ is a conclusion of law, for it does not allege the facts necessary to enable the court to reach the conclusion that the defendant had such knowledge.</p> <p>on motion for reconsideration.</p> <p>Demurrer — Cause of Action — Complaint.—A demurrer on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient.to constitute a cause of action goes to the whole complaint ■ and it is not necessary to specify the particulars wherein the complaint is insufficient, and in deciding on appeal a demurrer of that character this court may consider motu propio any ground of the insufficiency of the complaint, although it were not alleged by the demurrant either in the court below or in this court.</p> <p>Amendment of Complaint — Deprival of Day in Court. — The judgment, rendered by this court in this ease does not prevent the plaintiff from moving the trial court for leave to amend the complaint, and the fact that this court in its said judgment did not grant express authorization to so amend does not imply that the plaintiff has been deprived of his day in court.</p>

<p>Appeal from a Decision of the Registrar of Property of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Conjugal Partnership Property — Presumption.—The evidence introduced by the appellants tending to show that the property attached was acquired by the wife in her own name and that she had paid taxes thereon is not sufficient to destroy the presumption that the said property is conjugal partnership property.</p> <p>INTERVENTION-BECORD OB’ TITLE-ATTACHMENT-EVIDENCE —• PRIVATE DOCUMENT — -Third Parties. — A private document which has never been recorded in a public registry and is introduced in evidence in an action of intervention for real property three months after the attachment and on the very day of the trial, cannot prejudice the creditor who attached the property, nor is it sufficient to establish the title of the intervenor and to justify the dissolution of the attachment.</p>

<p>Aggravated Assault and Battery — Cruelty—Light Punishment.- — Although the sentence in this case of $100 fine or imprisonment for one clay for each $2 which the accused failed to pay, is light in view of the cruelty of the offense charged, consisting in the punishment of a child by hanging his body from a rope, the judgment appealed from is affirmed because, no statement of the case having been filed, it is not possible to determine whether there were extenuating circumstances which influenced the sentence.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal of Appeal — Notice of Appeal — Service of Notice oy Mail — Construction.—A motion for the dismissal of an ajipeal for the reason that service of the notice of appeal was made by mail when the' attorney for the adverse party had an office open in the same city where the attorney for the appellant resides, should be sustained, because in such circumstances the service should be made personally or in some of the other ways prescribed by section 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure which should be construed strictly.</p> <p>Id. — Notice oe Appeal — Service oe Notice by Mail. — Notwithstanding the doctrine laid down in the preceding paragraph, if the appellants' attorney in this ease had shown that although he erred in serving the notice of appeal by mail the defendant's attorney had actually been given notice in due time of the filing of the appeal, or if the defendant's attorney himself had acknowledged the service of the notice, perhaps this court might overrule the motion to dismiss the appeal.</p>

Motion of respondent to dismiss the appeal and motion of appellant for leave to file transcript of record. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>Statement of Case — Construction of Law. — The provisions of section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, amended by Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911, clearly prescribe the time within which the statement of the ease should be filed and when the law is clear the letter thereof should not be undervalued under the pretext of complying with its spirit.</p> <p>Id. — Construction of Law. — The provisions of section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not authorize the trial court to admit a statement of the ease presented after the expiration- of the time allowed by law. See Pardo v. Pardo, decided today.</p>

<p>Appeal — Dismissal op Appeal — Transcript op Becord — Extensions op Time.— The respondent asked the trial court for an extension of time of 30 days-in which to file the statement of the case. The appellant agreed that he be granted 15 days and, according to the journal, the court granted him 10 days. Subsequently, within the 15 days agreed to by the 'appellant, but after the expiration of the 10 days granted by the court, a new extension of 15 days for the same object was asked for and granted, after which several more extensions of time were granted without any objection from the appellant. • While the statement of the case was still under the jurisdiction of the district court, the respondent appeared before this court and moved for the dismissal of the appeal because the second extension of time was granted after the expiration of the first. It was held that in view of all the circumstances and considering the present status of the case the dismissal of the appeal should not be granted.</p>

<p>Appeal — Statement op Case — Final Approval — Transcript op Record. — The final approval of the statement of the case which must serve as a basis for the computation of the time for filing the transcript of the record in the Supreme Court, in accordance with section 299 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 70 of March 9, 1911, and former jurisprudence of this court, is the approval by the judge after all the corrections and amendments admitted by the court had been entered and the certificate of approval of the trial judge attached, and not the allowance by the court of the amendments proposed by one of the parties.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan, Section 1, in an action of ejectment.</p> <p>Motion of respondent for the dismissal of the appeal.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.'</p>

Section 1, in an action for redemption. Motions of respondents to dismiss the appeal and motion.of appellant to correct the transcript of the record. The facts are stated in the opinion.