Volume 181 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series

R.C. 163.21(A) – R.C. 163.62(A) – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – EMINENT DOMAIN: The trial court did not err in holding that employee-retention bonuses paid by appellant business after appellee Ohio Department of Transportation abandoned its proposed appropriation of appellant's property were not recoverable as "other actual expenses" under R.C. 163.21(A)(2) because the bonuses related to the conduct of the business and not the presentation of appellant's case in the appropriation proceeding. [But see CONCURRENCE: Statutory interpretation of R.C. 163.21(A)(2) is unnecessary because a trial court has broad discretion in determining a "just" amount of expenses to be charged an appropriating agency after abandonment, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it would be unjust to require appellee to repay appellant for expenses it incurred as a result of a business decision to retain employees.] The trial court did not err in holding that employee-retention bonuses paid by appellant were not recoverable under R.C. 163.62(A) because the bonuses related to the conduct of the business and not the presentation of appellant's case in the appropriation proceeding.

MUNICIPAL – TAXATION – DUE PROCESS – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL: The assessments set forth in the city's ordinances regulating alarm businesses and alarm users constitute taxes rather than fees under the factors set forth in State ex rel. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd. v. Withrow, 62 Ohio St.3d 111, 579 N.E.2d 705 (1991), and Am. Landfill, Inc. v. Stark/Tuscarawas/Wayne Joint Solid Waste Mgt. Dist., 166 F.3d 835 (6th Cir.1999), because the funds from the assessments are placed in the general fund, not in a specifically-dedicated fund, no services are provided directly to the payers of the assessments that are not provided to all city residents, there is no provision providing that excess funds from the assessments must be used for purposes related to false alarms, the assessments are imposed by city council, which is a legislative body, and the assessments can be expended for general public purposes. The assessments set forth in the city's ordinance regulating alarm business and alarm users violate the Due Process Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions because they do not bear a reasonable relationship to protections, benefits or opportunities provided by the city to those paying the assessments. [See CONCURRENCE: If the city chooses to amend the current ordinance or pass another ordinance regulating alarm systems and false alarms, the ordinance must not interfere with private rights beyond the necessities of the situation, must bear a real and substantial relation to public health, safety and welfare, and must not be unreasonable or arbitrary.]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT – FOREIGN LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES – REGISTRATION – R.C. 1705.58 – STANDING: The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant Ohio company against plaintiff Pennsylvania company where, pursuant to R.C. 1705.58, plaintiff's business activities within the state required it to register with the Ohio Secretary of State before it could maintain a lawsuit in Ohio, which plaintiff did not do, and therefore, plaintiff lacked standing to file the lawsuit.

Magistrate's decision objection de novo R.C. 2929.41(B)(1) R.C. 2929.24 R.C. 2929.25 R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a) R.C. 2929.25(D) misdemeanor sentence aggregate term modify suspend maximum jail term community control violation matter of law. Trial court's order modifying the defendant's misdemeanor sentence was modified to delete language indicating additional jail time remained available for sentencing, which was erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court sentenced the defendant pursuant to R.C. 2929.24(A) and 2929.25(A)(1)(a) to a jail term of 30 days for each misdemeanor count in combination with the direct imposition of five years of community control. Because the defendant was credited with the total jail time on the sentence that was imposed, he was not subject to any further jail time. R.C. 2929.25(D) could not be read to permit the trial court to modify the sentence beyond the maximum jail term initially imposed.