¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion holding that the State produced sufficient evidence to survive defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because I believe that the evidence was insufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that defendant was guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon, I would hold that the trial court erred by not allowing defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and would order a new trial for defendant.
¶3“The State concede [s] that defendant herself did not commit the robbery at the Zingo Mart,” and instead argues that she acted in concert with Lanier. At issue is whether the State presented substantial evidence showing that defendant was acting in concert with Lanier to rob the Zingo Mart. I would hold that the State failed to carry this burden.
¶4Under the doctrine of acting in concert,
[I]f two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose ... or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.
¶5State v. Herring, 176 N.C. App. 395, 399, 626 S.E.2d 742, 745 (2006) (quoting State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 233, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (1997)) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
¶6The State must show that defendant was present, that she had joined in purpose with Lanier to commit a crime, and that the crime for which she was being tried, robbery with a dangerous weapon, was either “in pursuance of [that] common purpose ... or [was] a natural or probable consequence thereof.” Id,.; see also State v. Sloan, 180 N.C. App. 527, 638 S.E.2d 36 (2006) (Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Defendant argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish her presence. “For purposes of the doctrine, ‘[a] person is constructively present during the commission *380of a crime if he or she is close enough to be able to render assistance if needed and to encourage the actual perpetration of the crime.’ ” State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 306, 560 S.E.2d 776, 784 (2002) (quoting State v. Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 175, 420 S.E.2d 158, 169 (1992)).
¶7I do not think that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish defendant’s constructive presence. The majority holds that defendant was constructively present during the Zingo Mart crime “because she was actually present and participated in the crimes at K-Mart and the Perfect Nail Salon.” In my opinion, such reasoning is inadequate to support a finding of constructive presence. Although by her own admission defendant was seated in the vehicle outside the Zingo Mart, it appears that she was sitting in the passenger seat, rather than positioned as a getaway driver. This inference is supported by both defendant’s statement that “Hank pulled behind a store” and Detective Murphy’s testimony that Lanier was driving the vehicle at the time defendant and Lanier were arrested. The store clerk testified that he did not see a vehicle at the time of the robbery, and defendant stated that they were parked behind the Zingo Mart. Again, both statements support the inference that defendant was not in a position to render assistance or encourage the actual perpetration of the crime. Although the use of circumstantial evidence is permissible to establish sufficient evidence, “that evidence must be real and substantial and not merely speculative. Substantial evidence is evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the fact to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Berry, 143 N.C. App. 187, 207, 546 S.E.2d 145, 159 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, the State’s evidence does not rise to the level of sufficiency. Accordingly, I would find that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support defendant’s constructive presence during the Zingo Mart robbery.
¶8Because I would find that it was error for the trial court to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶9. Although I need not address whether defendant shared a common purpose with Lanier in order to find error with the trial court’s ruling, defendant’s admission to the events at K-Mart and the Perfect Nail Salon, as well as her voluntary plea of guilty to the common law robbery of the nail salon, indicate that the Zingo Mart robbery occurred outside the scope of any common purpose that defendant had with Lanier.