Volume 19 — Appeals, District of Columbia

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia overruling exceptions to and confirming a report of tbe auditor in a suit in equity against a building association for an accounting, a release of certain mortgages, and tbe cancellation of certain stock.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from a judgment entered upon a verdict for the plaintiffs in an action by husband and wife to recover damages for personal injuries to the wife.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendants from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia granting an injunction restraining tbe defendants from playing tbe game of croquet after nightfall.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>The bill in this case was filed July Í9, 1900, for the purpose of obtaining an injunction to restrain the defendants from playing the game of croquet on a vacant lot near by and opposite the dwelling-house of the complainants, upon the ground, as alleged, that the playing of the game at the time and place constituted a nuisance to the complainants, whereby the enjoyment of their home was seriously impaired.</p> <p>The complainants are husband and wife, and reside on Huntington place, in the city of Washington, opposite an open lot owned by one of the defendants, Mrs. Lacey, and which, with her consent, is used by Mr. Akers, the other defendant, and his family and friends, as a croquet ground. In the bill it is alleged that the game was frequently played from about nightfall until and sometimes later than 11 o’clock, p. m., light being provided from small torchlight lamps, one of which was fastened on each wicket.; that these torches gave a fla33iing light, and e33iitted offensive odor and smoke. The manner in which the complainants were affected by the nuisance is charged to be, that the husband being an architect by profession, his work requires for its proper execution the full composure of his nervous system, which, by the playing of the game, has been disturbed. That the female complainant is of a naturally slight and delicate organization, and is especially sensitive to noises of every description, and she is besides in a delicate condition of health, being far advanced in pregnancy, requiring constant care and attention, and in great danger of serious consequences in the absence of such care and attention, and in the presence of distracting noises or annoyances to her senses of every description. It is alleged that the effect of the light and odor from the torches, and the noises fimn the game upon the female complainant is distracting and annoying, so that she is deprived of sleep and rendered nervous, while the husband, by the constant necessity he is under of giving attention to his wife in her nervous state, is also deprived of sleep, etc.</p> <p>Most of the substantial allegations of the bill in respect of what is alleged as a nuisance by the playing of the game of croquet, are denied by the answer of James 0. Akers, the principal defendant; the answer of the other defendant, Mrs. Lacey, while admitting that the vacant lot belongs to her and that she had given permission for its use as a croquet ground, avers that she was and is ignorant of the manner in which the complainants were affected by the playing of the game of croquet on the lot.</p> <p>IJpon the coming in of the answers, proof was taken in. support of and in refutation of the case as stated in the bill; and, upon final hearing the court below, on the 6th day of June, 1901, decreed that the defendants and each of them and their and each of their several agents, associates, and representatives be perpetually restrained and enjoined from playing the game of croquet at the place and in the manner mentioned and described in the bill of complaint, at any hour or hours which may necessitate the use of lamps or any other form of artificial light to enable the said game to be played; and that the complainants have and recover of the defendants their costs, etc.</p> <p>It is from this decree that the appeal is taken by the defendants.</p> <p>In the opinion of the learned justice below a very full and clear .statement of the allegations and proof is furnished, and also of the contentions of the parties; and as we agree with much of what is said in that opinion, though not with the final conclusion reached, we adopt the statement of the facts that it contains. The opinion states:</p> <p>“ It is alleged that the defendant Akers is a resident on the same street on which the complainants reside; that besides his family he has boarders; that the defendant Lacey is the owner of a vacant lot fifty feet in width, which is directly opposite the residence of the complainants; that the complainants’ residence and this vacant lot are located on Huntington place, just west of Fourteenth street northwest; that the defendant Akers and others have graded ,and equipped this lot for the purpose of games of croquet; that the land has been leveled off and rolled and sanded, and that a number of iron wickets that are essential for the proper playing of that game have been put in the proper place for such purpose upon this lot, and that the lot itself has been inclosed for the purposes of this game by running a wooden curb about it for the purpose of keeping the balls within the boundary; that during the summer of 1899, the female complainant was in a state of bad health; that she had suffered from a physical ailment to which women are subject, and, as a result of that ailment, was suffering from physical weakness and general nervous debility; that during the summer of 1899, it was the habit of Akers, and his family, boarders and others associated with them, to play this game of croquet, not only to some extent in the hours of daylight, but principally after darkness had set in, continuing the game as late as eleven o’clock and sometimes later than eleven o’clock at night; that to enable them to play this game during the hours of darkness, and to afford the requisite light for the purpose, the wickets were each provided with a vertical rod, upon which was hung a lamp supplied either with coal oil, or gasoline, or some inflammable substance which, without a chimney to confine it and keep the light steady, gave a flaring and flickering light, and, for the same reason, inasmuch as the gas or the coal oil was not entirely consumed, emitted fumes and vapors and unconsumed particles, which were offensive, and that this game, played at these unreasonable hour-s, continued through the summer of 1899, notwithstanding the great discomfort to the female complainant. The game, of course, was discontinued during the winter months, as the season was not favorable to such occupation, but it began again in the early summer, and when this bill was filed, somewhere about the middle of July, 1900, the parties were engaged, if not every night, several nights in the week in playing this game. At that time, the female complainant, as alleged and proved, was with child, and the day of her confinement was not remote. She was actually suffering from the inconvenience and the nervous strain which were consequent upon such a condition. It is further alleged that she needed sleep, particularly in the hours that were ordinarily devoted to such purposes, and that the playing of this game at unreasonable hours not only deprived her of sleep at that time, but the consequent effect upon her nervous condition and upon her nerves was such that when the game itself ceased, she had become so wrought up that she was unable, frequently, to get any sleep at all until towards morning, and then, very frequently, only by the use of sedatives.</p> <p>“ In some way it appears that the parties who played this game were aware not only of Mrs. Marsh’s condition, but also of the fact that the game so played was an annoyance to her. I say that because it appears that when Mr. Black-wood was seen he intimated as much. He was seen by the husband of Mrs. Marsh as to the particular subject of this annoyance, and he was asked to speak to Mr. Akers about it. He declined and said that he thought Mr. Marsh should have seen Mr. Akers himself. Bor some reason Mr. Marsh did not care to do so, and declined to do so, and the game continued. Application was made to the chief of police, and also to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, to interpose and stop the annoyance, and the reply given was that it was beyond the power of either or any of these officials; that the only recourse was to the courts. It was then that counsel was called in and a letter was written to Mr. Akers advising him of the situation. Not only did the parties take no notice of it — of the letter, as I understand it, but they continued, notwithstanding the information that owing to this lady’s condition this game was not only a serious annoyance, but operated seriously to impair her health, insisting upon it that they had certain rights in the enjoyment of this property, which had been licensed to them for the purposes of such use, that this was a reasonable use of the property, and it did not matter whether some one else was inconvenienced or not.</p> <p>“ Then this bill was filed. A preliminary restraining order was granted, and ultimately that restraining order was continued until the final hearing. The game was therefore stopped during tire summer of 1900. Proof lias been taken on both sides. It appears by tbe testimony that there are several adjoining bouses adjacent to tbis vacant lot on which tbe game was played on tbe north side of Huntington place occupied by people tbe most of whom are interested in tbe game, and many of whom played, including tbe Akers family, and that on tbe opposite side of tbe street and adjoining tbe complainants, were one or more bouses tbe parties living in which either bad or bad not — I believe one person bas — played occasionally. The other family bas not played at all. The testimony of all of these parties is that they were not annoyed or incommoded by tbe playing of tbis game at night, or by tbe gas or tbe lights that were used for that purpose. They have never noticed any odor from tbe burning gasoline or coal oil. They have not only not been annoyed, but many of them found pleasure in looking out of their windows upon tbe game while it was in progress, and have also enjoyed themselves by walking over to tbe premises and sitting on benches provided for tbe purpose and watching tbe play. There seems to be an entire unanimity on tbe part of tbe neighbors that tbis game is not an annoyance; that it is not a nuisance. There seems to be a common neighborly sentiment between those who have testified in behalf of tbe defendants, easily understood, so far as it can be understood, by tbe fact that many of them engage in tbe game themselves, and those that do not have friends that do. Perhaps also it is explained on tbe ground that it is not tbe custom of these people, although I am not sure that that appears in tbe testimony, to retire earlier than eleven o’clock at night. Probably also on tbe ground that they are persons normally constituted with respect to their nervous system. Tbe only persons who testified to the annoyance and nuisance that is consequent upon such a use of tbe croquet grounds after night, were tbe two complainants, and tbe mother of tbe female complainant, and a fourth witness, who testified that be could bear tbe noise of tbe play from an adjoining street, or he did bear it upon one occasion.</p> <p>“ Now, it is claimed that because this was not an annoyance to these several witnesses who have testified in behalf of the defendants and who are located upon the same street and," to a. certain extent, under the same conditions as to location as those under which the complainants live, it cannot be such a nuisance as would afford to the complainants a legitimate reason for complaint. Such an annoyance, it is claimed, does not afford the complainants or either of them a right to an action at law, for the injury would be so slight as to be unappreciable, and that if not entitled to an action at law they certainly are not entitled to an injunction to restrain the act.</p> <p>“ There can be no question that the game that has been described in the testimony is an innocent pastime, and that the exercise of such game, if it may be called such, is healthful and enjoyable, and parties are to be commended for making use of such outdoor exercise for the purpose of recreation under ordinary conditions. I think the testimony also shows that while this game was accompanied, very naturally, by exclamations of pleasure or disappointment at particular shots, or of laughter or applause perhaps, at the time, over some particular feature of the game, yet it has not been conducted in a boisterous manner. It is, however, claimed that the conduct of the game at these hours of the night, with the noise that necessarily accompanied the knocking of the balls together and striking of the balls by the mallets, and the striking of the balls against the curb, and the conversation and laughter, and the noise that naturally accompanied the playing of such a game, was not only an annoyance to the complainants, but such an annoyance as the court should prevent by injunction.</p> <p>“ Of course, what is a nuisance and what is not a nuisance is a question very largely of locality; a question very largely of the character of the neighborhood in which the nuisance is alleged to have existed, and the purposes for which the neighborhood is used. What would be a nuisance in one locality would not be a nuisance in another locality. There can be no question that the playing of this game in a place that was not so near to a dwelling, or to a number of dwellings in a residence neighborhood, as to interfere with the rest of the denizens of that neighborhood, would not be a nuisance. The question, however, as to what constitutes a nuisance is, as stated, very largely a matter of locality, and the peculiar purposes to which the neighborhood is subjected, and for which it is used, and where the nuisance is located. In a residence neighborhood certain things would be a nuisance that in another neighborhood would be no nuisance. The books are full of such cases, and it would be supererogation and a useless expenditure of time to attempt to give a list of the cases that are dependent upon their peculiar circumstances.</p> <p>“ The question appears to be whether the occupation that is complained of as a nuisance is a reasonable occupation under all the circumstances. The playing of this game of croquet under these conditions during the hours of daylight or in the early hours of the evening, I think, could not be successfully claimed to be a nuisance. I do not think it is contended in the argument of the case that a game so played would be a nuisance, except in so far as the inconvenience afforded by these flickering lamps and by the odors that are claimed to emanate from them might be a nuisance; but the feature of the game which is strenuously objected to is the time in which the game is conducted — that is, in some of the hours ordinarily devoted to sleep, not only because of the noise, but also because of the inconvenience that is suffered by reason of the flickering glare of the lamps and from the smoke that emanates from them.</p> <p>“ The testimony, I think, does not sustain the claim of the complainants that sufficient smoke emanates from those lamps to constitute a nuisance. The most that is claimed for them is that the smoke was perceptible at times on the front steps. Of course that cannot be when the wind is in the opposite direction; it necessarily carries it away from the house, and that would only be occasional, and it would be so slight that it does not appear to me that the court could take any notice of it. It would be such a slight ineonvenience as not to justify any judicial interference or to offer any reasonable claim that the smoke was a nuisance.</p> <p>“ It does appear to me, however, that the glare ■—■ the flickering glare from these lamps located upon this lot directly opposite to the complainants’ house —• must necessarily have some effect upon the comfort of the residents in that house. It is very true that some persons would not mind such lights. The eyes of many people are, however, so constituted that they cannot stand such a peculiar light. Some persons sitting in this courtroom cannot face the window without great suffering; others can.face it and not mind it at all. It is true that the question is not whether an abnormally constituted individual would be inconvenienced, but whether the ordinary person would be subjected to inconvenience by the alleged nuisance. While the question of these lamps would not be a matter of very great moment, disassociated from the other element of nuisance, yet it does not appear to me to be at all unreasonable that it would be a matter of considerable inconvenience; that it can incommode the occupants of that house, and particularly so in the summer time when the windows are all open, the blinds are all open for the purpose of admitting air, and in the time ordinarily devoted to sleep such a light in the room would be a serious inconvenience, and to a great number of people would be a detriment to sleep.</p> <p>“ Now, with reference to the noise from this game of croquet, while, as I have said, those noises are, perhaps, only those that are incident to such a game played in the ordinary way and by ordinarily careful people, yet, played at the hours that are ordinarily devoted to rest, the noise that proceeds from such a game would not only destroy sleep, but throw the persons who are thus deprived of sleep into a nervous condition, which would likely, after the noise ceased, prevent repose for some time after.</p> <p>“ Now, it is said that Mrs. Marsh is an abnormal woman; that she is naturally nervously constituted, and that in her physical condition she was perhaps more nervous than she would have been otherwise; that she was captious and complaining, and that that was her disposition. That was the effect of the testimony taken by the defendants. The testimony of Mrs. Marsh, however, appears to be that of an intelligent woman, showing no rancor or spite towards the people that are thus annoying her, testifying in a very calm and commendable manner of a matter that has evidently been a great source of trouble to her, showing that while she was at the time, the last year, in the summer, under the circumstances, in a nervous condition, yet she says she was not more nervous when she got her rest than people ordinarily are; that when she had a good night’s rest she felt in a cheerful frame of mind the next day, and therefore it seems to me to be clear that the reason that she was annoyed was not merely -because she was of a nervous constitution, but that these noises would actually annoy many other people. * * *</p> <p>“ But there seems to have been, for some reason, an unneighborly feeling on the part of both complainants and defendants, and perhaps the trouble largely arose out of that fact. The defendants, through their witnesses, have testified that the complainants held themselves aloof; that they did not associate with their neighbors. While that complaint might be a reasonable one in a country village, in a city like Washington, where next-door neighbors live by the side of each other for years and never enter each other’s houses, it is not a very reasonable complaint. I think largely this question has arisen out of the fact that there is no social intercourse between the parties, and there is a feeling of soreness consequent upon it.</p> <p>“ The question, it seems to me, is, in the first place, were these noises the ordinary noises that were to be expected by the complainants in that locality, considering its situation, the purposes for which it was used, and the fact that it was a residence locality, and that exclusively. So far as the playing of that game during the day is concerned, I should say that it was such a noise as might be expected. Parties have the right to enjoy themselves by playing a game of croquet, or any other legitimate amusement that they might engage in, but after tbe time tbat is ordinarily devoted to sleep bas commenced, it seems to me tbat sucb noises are not tbe noises tbat may be ordinarily expected. They are not ordinarily sucb noises — tbey are not tbe noises tbat ordinarily emanate from tbe usual and customary use of dwellings.</p> <p>“ Now, was tbis use to wbicb tbis vacant lot was subjected a reasonable or unreasonable use, under all tbe circumstances? I bave no hesitation in saying tbat to me it appears to be entirely unreasonable, considering tbe time tbe game was played and tbe late hour at wbicb it was carried on.”</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the United States from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding an equity court, discharging a rule to show cause why the proceeds of the pension of an insane pensioner, John H. Righter, in the custody of his committee should not be charged with the payment of his board and treatment at the Government Hospital for the Insane.

Hearing on an appeal by tlie defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit in equity against trustees in a deed of trust for an accounting. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: 1. This is a suit in equity against trustees for an account. The bill was filed by Laura I. Olcott against Smith and Kohler, trustees, and others who are formal parties only.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon a verdict in an action against an administrator to recover for personal services alleged to have been rendered his decedent.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows :</p> <p>This action was instituted by a widowed daughter against, the administrator of her deceased father, to recover for services rendered to the father in his lifetime. The action was brought on the 18th day of August, 1901, and the father died on the 6th day of August, 1898. The action is in assumpsit and is founded upon a quantum meruit. The pleas are nonrassumpsit, statute of limitations, and payment, and upon which issues were joined.</p> <p>The deceased father left surviving him three children, two sons, and a daughter, the plaintiff, who attained the age of 18 years in May, 1875, and was married in February, 1888. She had two children, and her husband died "in October, 1892. She lived with her father, rendering service from a time prior to attaining the age of eighteen years, to the ’time of her marriage. Her mother was blind and helpless, and died in 1882, and the plaintiff was the only person to do all the work in and about the home of the family, until she was married.</p> <p>The bill of particulars of the claim for which the plaintiff sues, as stated in the record, is for services, as housekeeper and general servant, rendered to the deceased in his lifetime, from May, 1875, to February, 1888, 12 years and 9 months, and also from March 1 to December 1, 1893, making total time 162 months, at $12 per month, in addition to board, lodging, and partial use of home place during the time, making a total sum of $1,9I4A. From this is deducted the sum of $705, for money paid by tbe deceased in his lifetime, in part support of the two infant children of the plaintiff.</p> <p>It is shown by the proof in the record, that the deceased, Thomas Tuohy, purchased, in 1871, a small parcel of land, consisting of about 26 acres, situated near Cabin John, in Maryland, paying therefor between $500 and $600, and built a small house thereon, at a cost of about $500, which was completed in 1882. That from the time of his purchase of this land he lived thereon with his family, consisting of his invalid wife and his three children. That the occupation of Tuohy, the father, was that of a laborer upon public works, at day’s wages. That the eldest son, Dennis, pursued the same occupation, but sometimes worked at home on the little farm and left home in 1876, when 22 years of age. That soon after the death of the mother, in 1882, the other son, William, then of full age, left his father, and thereafter rendered him no service. That the plaintiff from the time she was able to work until February, 1888, performed all the domestic work about the home, and sometimes having to do the menial outdoor work about the place; that the work performed by her included cooking, washing, milking the cows, making butter, attending to the poultry, etc. That she was permitted to sell the chickens, eggs, and butter, and apply the proceeds to the use of the family, and what was not necessary for that purpose she applied to the supply of clothing for herself. It was shown in proof that her services were worth from $10 to $15 per month.</p> <p>It was also shown in proof that the plaintiff was married to one Trail in February, 1888, and thereupon the intestate leased to his son-in-law the farm from March 1, 1888, for five years, under the term of which lease the intestate was to be boarded and lodged by the tenant in the house on the premises. That said Trail died in October, 1892, and the plaintiff, with her two infant children, continued to live on the place with her father until December 1, 1893, when she left the place. That thereafter, until June, 1891, the intestate continued to live on said premises, at which latter date he sold the same for $6,000, and thereafter lived at the establishment of the “ Little Sisters of the Poor,” a charitable institution in the city of "Washington, until his death in August, 1898.</p> <p>In order to establish the fact of the intention of the intestate to compensate his daughter for her services, there was proof given on the part of the plaintiff, of declarations made by the intestate, at various times and occasions, to the effect, that while he was in his right mind he would not forget his daughter; that, on another occasion before the marriage of his daughter, he tried to borrow $25 to give to her; and on another occasion before her marriage, but when he was drinking, he told one of the witnesses that his daughter would be well cared for when he was gone. And after his daughter had left him, but before he had sold the place, he said to another person that he intended to provide for his daughter after his death, and give her the greater part of his property. After he sold his property, and after the plaintiff had ceased to render service, in various conversations and talks with different people, he said that he would do more for his daughter than for either of his sons; that he would do all he could for her and her children, and would not see them want for anything ; that he would provide for her and no law would break his will; that she and her children would get the best of what he had when he died; and when he was displeased with his daughter, because she would not return and keep house for him, he said, he would break his will; and at another time he said that he would leave his money to his Trail grandchildren, and' not to his sons. These declarations were all of a casual' character, made at different times and to different persons, and under various circumstances, and none of them were made to or in the presence of the plaintiff; and none of them point to or indicate a purpose to pay the daughter for services rendered prior to the time when she attained the age of 21 years, if, by fair and reasonable construction, they can be supposed to furnish evidence of an intention to pay her wages for services rendered after that age. The intestate paid for a considerable time money for the support of his grandchildren, the two infant children of his daughter, but the money was not paid to the daughter as upon account, but was paid by arrangement with and to third parties, and therefore furnishes no evidence of an existing obligation to the daughter.</p> <p>In the course of the trial the plaintiff herself became a witness in her own behalf, to prove the nature and extent of the services rendered, and the value thereof, but not to prove the contract or understanding with her father under which the services were performed. This offer on her part was objected to by the defendant, upon the ground that the plaintiff was incompetent as a witness under the statute. But the objection was overruled by the court, and the plaintiff was allowed to testify, according to the offer made on her behalf. The defendant excepted; and offered no evidence, but rested the case upon the evidence produced by the plaintiff. The defendant, thereupon, among several other prayers for instruction, requested that the jury be directed to find for the defendant, because there was no sufficient evidence to support the. claim of the plaintiff. This request was refused by the court, as were several other prayers offered by the defendant; to which rulings the defendant excepted. The court granted three prayers on the part of the plaintiff, to the granting of which the defendant excepted, and also excepted to certain parts of the general charge of the court to the jury.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia appointing trustees to sell tbe real estate of an unincorporated investment association and to distribute tbe proceeds under tbe direction of tbe court.</p> <p>Tbe Court in its opinion stated tbe case as follows:</p> <p>Tbe Clerks’ Investment Company, named as tbe principal appellant in this case, is an unincorporated association composed of seventy-four persons, among whom are comprised tbe appellee and tbe other appellants. Tbe association is designated as a joint-stock association, in wbicb tbe number of tbe shares of stock is limited to 250, and tbe par value of each share is fixed at $180, required to be paid in monthly instalments of $5 for each and every month for three years, wbicb is tbe time limited in its constitution for tbe continuance of tbe organization. Tbe purpose of tbe association is declared in tbe constitution to be “ to invest tbe funds of its stockholders safely and profitably in real estate within tbe District of Columbia for tbe mutual benefit of its stockholders ” — wbicb we understand from tbe record to mean to buy and sell real estate, and to divide tbe profits among tbe members.</p> <p>Among various other details in tbe constitution with reference to tbe management of tbe affairs of tbe association and tbe election and duties of tbe officers, it is provided that there shall be a president, a vice-president, a secretary, and a 'treasurer, and that these, with five others to be elected by tbe stockholders, and all of whom should be themselves stockholders, should constitute tbe board of directors to have the management of the affairs of the association; that this board of directors, in the language of the constitution, should “ manage the affairs of the company, make all contracts, purchases, sales, incumbrances and lettings, and incur such obligations as may be proper and necessary for the interests of the company, establish, by-laws for their government, and declare dividends out of money in hand and not required to meet obligations.” It is further provided in the same instrument that the board of directors should elect from their own number two trustees, whose duty it should be to “ receive and hold in trust for the company the legal titles of all real estate,” and “ when required by the board of directors execute all conveyances of. property held in trust for the company.”</p> <p>The constitution also contains the following clause: “ The organization of this company shall be for three years. Any member wishing to withdraw within the first year is to receive the full amount paid in less any expense that may accrue pro raía to the number of shares such member may hold; and after one year such member is entitled to receive the full amount paid in less such expense with 4 per cent, per annum interest: Provided that such payments do not interfere with obligations already assumed by the board of directors. All payments of dues to this company shall cease at the expiration of three years from the organization, and the officers elected for the third year 'shall hold office until the affairs of this company are closed up.”</p> <p>The company was organized on March 22, 1892, and consequently its organization was to terminate on March 22, 1895. How many shares of stock were subscribed for or issued during the intervening period of three years, or how many withdrew from the organization during that period, if any, does not appear. But it does appear that at the time when the answer of the defendants to this cause in the court below was filed, that is, on March 7, 1901, there were 171 shares of stock outstanding, on which there had been payments to the amount of $24,184.50. This money was invested in the purchase of ten several lots of ground in. the northeastern section of the city of Washington, which are specified in the record of the cause before us, and which yet remain in the ownership of the association and are held by its trustees, but which, apparently, have depreciated in value to the sum of $12,500 or $15,000. They seem to have been purchased at a time when real estate in the city of Washington was held at a very high figure; and in the period of depreciation and depression following, from 1893 to 1898, and thereafter, it was found impossible to make sale of them at any reasonable price. It would seem that there were no purchasers to be found. In the meantime the taxes and public charges against the property would seem to have been paid by advancements made by some of the members of the association; and all the members of the association, except the appellee, seem to be willing yet to defer a sale of the real éstate for a further and an indefinite time in the hope of increased values.</p> <p>The appellee is the owner of two shares of the stock of the association,, for which she has paid $360, which is their par value. She is not in accord with the other members of the organization on the subject of a further postponement of the settlement of its affairs. During the year before the institution of this suit she seems to have made several demands for withdrawal therefrom and payment to her of the value of her stock, with 4 per cent, interest, which she claimed she was entitled to have, in accordance with the provisions of the constitution of the company, which demands were refused. Thereupon, on October 24, 1900, she filed her bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the District, in which after statement of the organization and purposes of the company and some of the principal facts hereinbefore recited, she alleged that, inasmuch as the term of the organization of the company had been fully ended, she was entitled as one of its stockholders to have a settlement of its affairs and a distribution of its assets; and she prayed for the appointment of receivers to take charge of the affairs of the company, for a sale of the land above mentioned, and for a distribution of the assets among the members of the association, after the payment of its debts, if any there should be found to be.</p> <p>Besides the appellant association, she made eight persons by name defendants to the bill of complaint, and these she alleged to constitute the board of directors of the company. It appeared, however, from the answer to the bill that there were nine directors in all, as provided by the constitution, whose names are there given; that of the eight who are mentioned in the bill of complaint one had resigned and another person had been elected in his place; and that the two directors, who hold the real estate as trustees, and who are specified as such in the answer, are not designated and are not sued as such in the bill.</p> <p>Answer, however, was made to the bill by the seven defendants named, who yet remain directors, and who comprise the two trustees in their number. In this answer objection is taken to the omission of the two directors who are not named, and to the failure of the complainant to join the twTo trustees as such as parties to the suit. And it is averred that the property has been carefully managed; that frequent efforts have been made without success to effect sales of it; that there has been no misconduct or negligence on the part of the officers; that all the taxes previous to those for the year 19001 have been paid, largely by voluntary advancements made by members of the association other than the complainant, who, it is averred, has never taken active interest in the affairs of the association; that the amount of these advancements is the sum of $1,0.95; that the pendency of this suit has prevented contributions for the taxes of the year 1900; that the complainant is the owner only of two shares of stock of the par value of $360, and stands alone against the 13 other stockholders, whose interests represent about $24,000; that, on January 28, 1901, at a general meeting of the stockholders, at which the action was harmonious and unanimous, a plan of settlement was devised and agreed upon whereby the property of the company was to be disposed of by the board of directors at cost price to the members of the association, with the privilege to purchasing members to use their stock at its par value in part payment, or in payment in full, as the case might be, for the property so to be purchased by them; and that it is believed that this plan of settlement can be successfully carried into effect with speedy justice to all and to the general advantage.</p> <p>The cause was set down by agreement for hearing on bill and answer; and thereupon the court adjudged that the complainant as a stockholder in the Clerks’ Investment Company was entitled to have sale of the parcels of land yet held by or for the company, and to have the liabilities of the company determined and the proceeds of sale of the real estate distributed under the direction of the court; and it was., agreed that such sale should be had, and two trustees were appointed, who were the solicitors for the complainant and the defendants respectively, to make the sale and to report their proceedings to the court. Subsequently a motion for a rehearing was filed on behalf of the defendants, which was denied; and thereupon the defendants noted an appeal both from the decree and from the order denying the motion for a. rehearing.</p>

1. The married woman’s act of 1869 (R. S. D. 0., Secs. 727-9), creating a separate legal estate in married women, does not by implication prevent tne creation by deed or will of an equitable separate estate in a married woman.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, overruling exceptions to and ratifying a sale of real estate under a decree in a foreclosure proceeding. Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.

<p>In error to tbe police court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion, stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This cause came up on a writ of error granted by one of the justices of this court to the police court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error, Grant Campbell, was tried upon information and convicted of the violation of the police regulations of the District relating to the removal of dead animals.</p> <p>The case was submitted in the court below upon an agreed statement of facts, which, with the various motions founded thereon and the rulings of the court excepted to, are presented in the bill of exceptions as follows:</p> <p>The defendant is a driver in the employ of Patrick Mann, whose business is the collection of dead animals and the manufacture of them into fertilizers; that the said Mann has been engaged in that business in the District of Columbia for more than twenty years and is fully equipped for the prompt removal of dead animals, having substantially air-tight wagons for the purpose, as required by section 22, article VIII, of the police regulations of the District of Columbia, which regulation, prior to July 5, 1901, was as follows:</p> <p>“ No dead animal of the horse, mule, or jack kind, and no dead cow, goat, calf, sheep, dog, or swine, or any part of the aforesaid dead animals, shall be transported through any street, avenue, alley or public space within the city of Washington, or the more densely populated suburbs of said city, unless the same shall be conveyed in vessels, substantially airtight, constructed either of wood or metal, or both; nor shall any such dead animal, or part thereof, be deposited or left upon any wharf, street, alley, avenue, or public space within said city; and in all cases where such dead animal or part thereof is transported upon the Potomac river or Eastern branch, it shall be unloaded from the aforesaid vehicle directly into the scow provided for the purpose, covered and closed therein, and thereupon immediately conveyed beyond the District of Columbia, or to such place within said District as may be designated by the health officer, and there so disposed of as, in the judgment of the health officer, not to be injurious to health, nor offensive to sight and smell: Provided, that this section shall not apply to the transportation of such animals intended to be used for food.”</p> <p>That on December 1, 1900, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia entered into a five-year contract with the Washington Fertilizer Company for the removal of garbage in this city and its more densely populated suburbs; that, being advised that dead animals were in the same category as garbage, and that they had the right to control the removal of the same, said Commissioners incorporated in their said contract the following clause in regard to the collection of dead animals:</p> <p>“ To collect daily, including Sundays, for a period of five years, beginning December 1st, 19 O'O-, from every part of the District of Columbia all dead animals and remove them to convenient hauling distance as may be approved by the Commissioners of said District.”</p> <p>That the garbage contractor having complained that it was not getting all the dead animals in the District, said Commissioners, with a view of preventing others than the garbage contractor from removing dead animals, on June 4, 1901, amended the foregoing police regulation by adding thereto-the following:</p> <p>“And provided further that no such dead animal, or part thereof, not intended to be used for food, shall be transported as aforesaid without a permit therefor from the Commissioners.”</p> <p>That on August 6, 1001, the aforesaid Patrick Mann, having purchased a dead horse from one Frank H. Hopkins, for which he paid the sum of one dollar, made the following application in writing to said Commissioners for a permit to remove the same:</p> <p>“Washington, D. 0., Aug. 6, 1901.</p> <p>The honorable Commissioners, District of Columbia:</p> <p>Gentlemen: I hereby make application to remove the carcass of a dead horse from New York avenue and Twenty-first street — from stable in rear of premises 'occupied by Prank H. Hopkins — to foot of South Oapitol street.</p> <p>I propose to convey said animal in a vehicle substantially air tight, constructed of wood and metal, in all respects in accordance with section 22, article VIII, of the police regulations ; said carcass to be loaded on a scow at the foot of South Oapitol street and transported down the Potomac river to Giesborough, where my fertilizer works are located. I have purchased from and paid the owner for said carcass, and the same has not yet become a nuisance, nor offensive to the senses of sight and smell.</p> <p>Very respectfully,</p> <p>Patrick Mann.”</p> <p>The Commissioners, after consideration of the above application, refused the same; that, on being notified of the action of said Commissioners, the said Mann directed the defendant to remove the dead horse in question, which he did, and thereupon the defendant was arrested and brought before this court charged with violating the aforesaid police regulation.</p> <p>That the carcass of the animal in question was worth commercially to the said Mann the sum of eight dollars; that the carcass at the time it was removed by the defendant had not become a nuisance injurious to health, and was not offensive to the senses of sight and smell; that the carcass of said horse, except that a permit to remove it was not obtained, was removed by the defendant in all respects as required by the said police regulation.</p> <p>This being all the evidence in the case, thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the court to rule as matter of law that the refusal of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to issue a permit for the removal of the dead animal mentioned in the information in this case was arbitrary and illegal and against the principles of personal liberty and the rights of private property; but the court refused to so rule; to which refusal and ruling the defendant, by his counsel, then and there duly excepted.</p> <p>And thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the court, on the agreed facts of this case, to rule as matter of law that section 22, article VIII, of the police regulations of the District of Columbia, as construed by the Commissioners, is unconstitutional and void, as authorizing the taking of private property without compensation, and as depriving the defendant’s employer of his property without due process of law; but the court refused to so rule; to which refusal and ruling the defendant, by his counsel, then and there duly excepted.</p> <p>And thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the court on the agreed facts of this case, to rule as matter of law that the provision in the contract between the Washington [Fertilizer Company and the District of Columbia (for the removal of garbage in the city of Washington and its more densely populated suburbs, for a period of five years from December 1, 1900) giving to said company the right to remove and convert to its own use all dead animals in the District of Columbia, to the exclusion of their owner’s rights thereto is unconstitutional and void, as authorizing the taking of private property without compensation and without due process of law; but the court refused to so rule, to which refusal and ruling the defendant, by his counsel, then and there duly excepted.</p> <p>And thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the court, on the agreed facts in this case, to rule that the effect of the action of the Commissioners in refusing to issue' a permit for the removal of the dead animal in question was to prohibit and not to regulate the applicant’s business, and that said regulation, as construed by said Commissioners, is unreasonable and void as an unwarranted interference with the rights of private property; but the court refused to so rule; to which refusal and ruling the defendant, by his counsel, then and there duly excepted.</p> <p>And thereupon counsel for the defendant requested the court, on the agreed facts of this case, to rule that the police regulation in qnestion is unreasonable and void and to discharge the defendant; but the court refused to so rule; to which refusal and ruling the defendant, by his counsel, then and there duly excepted.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the petitioner from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissing a petition to intervene in a suit in equity for the sal© of land.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>'The appeal in this case is from an order of the court below passed upon and dismissing the petition of intervention filed by Sarah Loughran, claiming as sole heir-at-law of Joseph F. Loughran, deceased, under alleged limitations in a certain deed of mortgage or trust made to trustees by said Joseph F. Loughran and Frances Marion Loughran, his wife.</p> <p>The question involved depends upon the construction of the terms of certain deeds of conveyance, under which the respective parties claim; those conveyances being a deed to Joseph F. Loughran and Frances Marion Loughran, his wife, and a deed of trust or mortgage of the same property from said Loughran and wife to certain trustees, to secure the payment of a certain promissory note made by Joseph F. Loughran, the husband, to Thomas I. Parker, the grantor in the first-mentioned deed, made to Loughran and wife.</p> <p>The record shows that Joseph F. Loughran originally acquired the lot of ground in question in 1874, and thereafter he erected- a dwelling-house thereon. It also appears that Thomas I. Parker, the brother-in-law of Loughran, advanced the money to build the house; and in December, 1875, the property, by deed of Loughran and wife, was conveyed to said Parker, the brother of Mrs. Loughran. Several years thereafter, that is, on the 22d day of September, 1882, Parker, by deed, conveyed the property, with all the improvements, for the recited consideration of $4,000, to-said Joseph F. Loughran and Frances Marion Loughran, !his wife, “ their heirs and assigns forever,” describing it as all that certain piece or parcel, etc., and all the remainders, reversions, rents, issues and profits thereof, and all the estate, right, title, interest, claim and demand whatsoever, whether at law or in equity, of the party of the first part, etc., “ to have and to hold the said piece or parcel of land and premises, with the appurtenances, unto the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, or the survivor of them, his heirs and assigns, to and'for their sole nse and benefit and behoof forever.”</p> <p>After the lapse of a little more than a month, that is to say, on the 31st day of October, 1882, Joseph F. Longhran, the husband, being or becoming indebted to his brother-in-law, Thomas I. Parker, in the sum of $1,500 on promissory note of that date, payable five years after date, without interest, he and his said wife, Frances Marion, made a deed of trust to F. R. Sparks and S. 0. Hanson, trustees, of the property conveyed by the previous deed of September 22, 1882, made by Parker to them. In this deed of trust it is recited that said Loughran was indebted on the promissory note to Parker, “ and being desirous to secure the punctual payment thereof when and as the same shall become due, with all interest and costs due and accruing thereon, as well as any renewals or extensions, therefore execute these presents. Now, therefore, this indenture witnesseth, that the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the premises aforesaid, and the further sum of one dollar, etc., have granted, bargained,” etc., the property described, and all the estate, right, title, interest and claim whatsoever, whether at law or in equity, of the said parties of the first part, etc. “ In and upon the trusts, nevertheless, hereinafter mentioned and described, that is to say, in trust to permit the said Joseph F. Loughran, his heirs, or assigns, to use and occupy the said described premises, and the rents, issues and profits thereof, until default made in the payment of said promissory note,” etc. And upon full payment of all the said promissory note, etc., “ and all other proper costs, charges, commissions, and expenses incurred by means of said trusts, &e., to release and reconvey the said described premises unto the said Joseph F. Loughran, his heirs or assigns, at his or their cost.” And upon the further trust, if sale should be made upon default, that the proceeds of sale should be applied to the payment of all costs and expenses, and the debt and interest, “ and any balance that should remain, to pay to said Joseph F. Loughran, his heirs or assigns.”</p> <p>Joseph. F. Loughran died March 17, 1897, leaving a will which was duly admitted to probate, and letters testamentary were granted to his widow, Frances Marion Loughran. The testator left no issue surviving him, but he left a sister, Sarah Loughran, as his only heir-at-law.</p> <p>Mrs. Frances Marion Loughran, the widow, died November 9, 1897, leaving a will, but which was a subject of contest. Subsequently, a bill in equity was filed for the sale of the property, and the property was thereafter sold by receivers appointed by the court, for $4,500, and the proceeds of sale are in court for distribution to those entitled. Adverse claims are made to the surplus proceeds of sale, after paying off what remains due of the mortgage debt to the estate of Thomas I. Parker, deceased. It was to assert her right to the fund that the petition of Sarah Loughran was filed, and which has been dismissed; and from the order of dismissal this .appeal has been taken.</p>

Hearing ou an appeal by one of several defendants from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit to enforce a mechanic’s lien, that the complainant should have execution upon a personal decree which had theretofore been rendered in the cause. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: The question raised in this appeal is one of practice, rather than substantive law.

Hearing on au appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a suit- for an injunction to restrain the defendants from further proceeding in an action at law on certain promissory notes.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is a suit in equity to restrain proceedings at' common law.</p> <p>The case was heard in the court below on demurrer to the bill of complaint, and consequently the statements of the bill are accepted as true. The facts, as they appear from these statements, are the following:</p> <p>John H. Glick, now deceased, was the owner of a tract of land on Brightwood avenue, in this District. On November 4, 1892, he entered into a contract with Robert E. L. White and Philip M. Snowden to sell it to them for $34,000, of which the sum of $9,000 was to be in cash, and the sum of $25,000 in deferred payments to be secured by deed of trust on the property. Subsequently, on November 23, 1892, the arrangement was so far modified as that White and Snowden were authorized to form an association, or syndicate, as they . called it, to take the property in their place. Accordingly the Harewood Park Land Syndicate, an incorporated association, was formed for the purpose, and the cash payment of $9,000 required was paid from the contributions of its members. When the necessary deeds and other papers came to he executed, it was first proposed that Glick should convey the property to two persons named as trustees, who should hold for the syndicate, and who, as such trustees, should execute their promissory notes for the deferred payments; and the deeds and notes were so prepared. To this, however, Glick objected, as he had also previously objected to dealing directly with the syndicate, inasmuch as there were women among the members. In order, as he said, to avoid possible future complications, he suggested that the conveyance from himself should be to some one unmarried person, who would thereupon execute the promissory notes for the deferred payments and the deed of trust to secure them, and immediately thereafter convey the property, subject to the deed of trust, to two trustees for the benefit of the syndicate. The suggestion was adopted, and the transaction was completed in accordance therewith.</p> <p>The appellee, George W. White, without any consideration whatever moving to him from any of the parties, and acting merely as a conduit for the title, thereupon consented to act as the intermediary to take and convey the title and to execute the notes, it being done, as stated in the bill of complaint, “ at the request of the said John H. Glick, P. M. Snowden and 11. ,E. L. White, in the presence of all of them, with the understanding, agreement and assurance from the said Glick at the time the same were signed, that the notes were not to take effect as promissory notes of the plaintiff, but were given and accepted as a mere convenience to the said Glick and said syndicate.” And the statement further is that Glick then and there agreed with the appellee that he, Glick, would look to the land, and not to the appellee, for the payment of the money. Upon this assurance the papers were executed, and the promissory notes, five in number for $5,000' each, payable in one, two, three, and four years respectively after date, which was January 4, 1893, to the order of John H. Glick, were delivered to the latter by the appellee, George W. White.</p> <p>John H. Glick died on October 11, 1896; and the promissory notes in question, all of which yet remained unpaid, although there would seem to have been some payments on account of interest, came into the hands of the executors of his will, who are the appellants in this case, Leon Tobriner and John H. F. Glick, and they are now held by them. In the mean time John H. Glick before his death had dealt exclusively with the members of the syndicate, and not at all with the appellee, in regard to the notes and the interest thereon, and had extended one or more of the notes at their request. In fact, it is conceded by every one that the appellee never had any interest in the subject-matter, further than to act as intermediary, as has been stated.</p> <p>On April 21, 1897, the trustees under the deed of trust to secure the notes, of whom Mr. Tobriner was one, after previous advertisement, sold the property under the provisions of the deed, apparently to one Sugenheimer, but in reality to themselves, as representing the estate of John H. Glick, Sugenheimer being interposed, it is alleged, as a fictitious bidder, who, although he paid no money whatever, received the title to the property, but not long after-wards reconveyed it to the trustees, who reported the amount of the proceeds of the alleged sale to Sugenheimer to be $21,000, and the net proceeds after the payment of expenses to be $19,640.19, which they proceeded to credit upon the notes. By this process, three of the notes, with their accrued interest, were reported as paid; and the other two had a balance of the proceeds credited upon them, which, according to the statement of the appellants, furnished to the appellee, left due upon the fourth and fifth notes a sum of $9,191.56, as of the date of the day of sale, April 21, 1897.</p> <p>The deeds from the trustees to Sugenheimer and from Sugenheimer back to the trustees were recorded on the same day, February 25, 1898; ánd on the same day the appellants, in answer to a rule which had been served upon them in the Orphans’ Court at the instance of some person, stated that they had been “ unable to realize upon the said promissory notes, having been unable to sell the real estate conveyed as security for the payment thereof, and the balance of said notes not secured, as aforesaid, are now in litigation.”</p> <p>On May 19, 1898, demand was made by the appellants, as executors of the estate of John H. Glick, upon the appellee for a settlement of the balance claimed by them to be due upon the notes; and such settlement not being forthcoming, they entered suit at common law in the Supreme Court of the District against him for such balance. The appellee appeared and defended the suit, and at the trial sought to show the circumstances of the execution and delivery of the notes and the entire transaction between himself and John H. Glick, as here stated. But this testimony was excluded as inadmissible on the ground that it tended to vary the terms of a written instrument, and the jury were directed to render a verdict for the plaintiffs, which was accordingly done.</p> <p>The appellee forthwith instituted the present suit in equity by filing his bill for an injunction against the appellants to restrain them from further proceedings at law. There was subsequently an amendment to the bill, wherein the circumstances of the alleged sale under the deed of trust and the subsequent proceedings, which were unknown to the appellee at the time of the filing of the original bill, were detailed, as hereinbefore stated. Upon the bill and the amendment thereto there was a restraining order issued, which was subsequently modified so far as to permit the appellants to have judgment entered on the verdict which they had obtained.</p> <p>The appellants interposed a demurrer to the bill and the .amendment thereto; and when the cause came on for hearing, the demurrer was overruled, and the appellants had leave to answer. Of this leave they failed to avail themselves; and ultimately final decree was rendered against them, whereby they were perpetually enjoined from further prosecuting the proceedings at law.</p> <p>From this decree they have' appealed.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court of the United States, dismissing a libel in admiralty for salvage.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appellate Practice; Reversal; Costs.</p> <p>1. Where several appeals are taken from a decree ratifying in its entirety a report of the auditor providing for the distribution of a fund in the hands of receivers among various creditors, giving some priority over others, and it appears that some of the claims were not entitled to the priority given them, while others were, the reversal properly goes to the entire decree appealed from, with directions to state a new account.</p> <p>2. In such a ease, where, on the record as presented in this court, it was difficult to make a proper apportionment of the costs, so as to fix them upon those who were in reality the losing parties on the appeal, it was directed that the costs of the appeal should be paid out of the fund in the receiver’s hands, but not so as to affect the claims held by this court to be entitled to priority, and that the costs below should abide the final decree.</p>

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing or an appeal from a decision of the acting Commissioner of Patents, in an interference case.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe Commissioner of Pensions from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, directing a writ of mandamus to issue against bim.</p> <p>Tbe Court in its opinion stated tbe case as follows:</p> <p>Tbis is an appeal from a judgment ordering a writ of mmdamus to issue to tbe Commissioner of Pensions.</p> <p>Tbe petition was filed by tbe relator. Henry D. Phillips, against both tbe Commissioner and tbe Secretary of tbe Interior. Tbe facts upon wbicb tbe judgment was rendered appear in tbe petition and return of tbe respondents substantially as follows:— Prior to February 5,1900, tbe relator, an attorney tben recognized by tbe Pension bureau, filed an application for a pension, on behalf of Sarah A. Docherty, a widow of a soldier, under the act of Congress of June 27, 1890. Whilst this application was depending, on February 5, 1900, the Secretary of the Interior made an order disbarring the relator from practice before the Department for alleged unprofessional conduct in receiving fees, in excess of those permitted by law, in the case of one Ann Chambers, to whom a pension had been granted. On application to the Secretary of the Interior to review and recall said order, it was by him vacated and revoked on April 26, 1900.</p> <p>After the order disbarring relator, and before its revocation, the Commissioner notified said Sarah A. Docherty that relator had been disbarred, and suggested the employment of some other attorney for the prosecution of her claim. The relator had filed no proof with the application and the same could not be granted without supporting proof.</p> <p>March 15, 1900, the said Docherty filed a written instrument with the Commissioner revoking the authority of the relator, and, thereafter, with the assistance of others, made the necessary proof and obtained the certificate applied for.</p> <p>The money due the pensioner was paid to her without the deduction of a fee for either the relator, or the attorney who succeeded him.</p> <p>Section 4 of the act of June 27, 1890, relating to fees, provides: “ That no agent, attorney, or other person engaged in preparing, presenting or prosecuting any claim under the provisions of this act shall, directly or indirectly, contract for, demand, receive, or retain for such services in preparing, presenting, or prosecuting such claim a greater sum than ten dollars, which sum shall be payable only upon the order of the Commissioner of Pensions, by the pension agent making payment of the pension allowed,” etc.</p> <p>It does not appear from the record that the substituted attorney made an application for the allowance and payment of a fee for his services. After the revocation of the order disbarring him from practice, the relator applied to the Commissioner for an order to the agent to pay him a fee of ten dollars, as attorney for the said Sarah Docherty, out of money coming to her as a pensioner. This was refused by him, and relator appealed to the Secretary of the Interior, who, on January 11, 1901, refused to vacate the said order of refusal.</p> <p>On the grounds, that the relator was the original attorney of the pensioner, and so remained, notwithstanding his temporary disability to prosecute the application that had been filed, and that it became the imperative duty of the Commissioner to order the payment to him of a fee of ten dollars for his services, the petition was filed for a writ of mandamus to compel him to perform that duty. Upon the hearing, the court below rendered a judgment directing the issue of the writ, to the Commissioner of Pensions, commanding him to “ fix and order the payment to the relator, in the manner provided by law, of a fee not greater than ten dollars for his services as agent and attorney for Sarah A. Docherty,” etc., and adjudging costs against him also. The rule was discharged as against the Secretary of the Interior. The relator took no exception to the discharge of the Secretary, and the Commissioner alone has appealed.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the Commissioner of Pensions from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, directing the writ of mandamos to issue against him.

Hearing on a motion by the District of Columbia to dismiss a writ of certiorari to the police court, which had been granted on an ex parte application. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>In error to the Police Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mandamus; Pensions; Attorneys’ Pees.</p> <p>The determination by the Commissioner of Pensions, in the first instance, and by the ¡Secretary of the Interior on appeal from his decision, of the question of whether a pension attorney is entitled to contract for a fee of $25 with a claimant for a dependent father’s pension, or whether he is entitled to a fee of only $10, where it involves the construction and application of several acts of Congress, requires the exercise of discretion, which cannot be controlled by mandamus; following Seymour v. United States, 2 App. D. C. 240; Lochren v. Long, 6 id. 486.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia overruling a demurrer to a writ of scire facias issued by that court to revive a judgment of a justice of the peace docketed in that court under the provisions of section 1022, R. S. D. 0. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia .entered upon a verdict directed by the court in an action of trespass. The Court in. its opinion stated the case as follows: This cause has heretofore been before this court on a question of practice (13 App. D. C. 269). ' It has also on the same question passed through the Supreme Court of the United States (176 U. S. 532).

<p>Hearing on an appeal by a trustee in a partition suit from a decree of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia requiring payment by bim to certain parties to sucb suit of tbeir distributive shares of a fund realized from tbe sale of tbe property involved, as shown by tbe report of tbe auditor, to pay costs, etc. •</p> <p>Tbe Court in its opinion stated tbe case as follows:</p> <p>This case has tbe following history: On April 3, 1896, Eugene F. Arnold, a member of tbe bar of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, residing in said District, filed a bill in said court on behalf of Alice Carter and her husband James Carter, Henrietta Marshall, William H. Marshall and bis wife Julia Marshall, complainants, against Hattie Williams and Benj amin 0. Marshall, to obtain partition of a lot in tbe city of Washington. It was alleged that the property was not susceptible of partition, without loss to the parties interested as tenants in common, and a decree for sale and distribution, was prayed. The bill appears in the record as signed by Alice Carter, William H. Marshal], and Henrietta Marshall and as sworn to by the two first signers.</p> <p>Defendants having been served with process, the cause proceeded to decree on June 19,1897, ordering sale. Eugene E. Arnold was appointed trustee to make the sale, under a bond for $6,000.</p> <p>He was authorized to pay taxes and assessments against the property to the day of sale, for which credit was to be given in his account.</p> <p>June 30, 1899, the property was sold and purchased by William H. Marshall and Benjamin 0. Marshall for the sum of $2,100, with the understanding that it was to be cleared of taxes to said date.</p> <p>The sale was reported July 19, 1899, and a conditional order of ratification passed July 26, 1899. The report was in accordance with the promise of the purchasers to pay all cash before final confirmation.</p> <p>On April 16, 1901, an order was entered by consent of Ben. O. Marshall, William H. Marshall and Hattie Williams, represented by attorneys Bundy and Walker, and by Alice Carter and Henrietta Marshall, represented by attorney L. Cabell Williamson, confirming the report of sale; and reference was made to the auditor to state the trustee’s account and report the proportions of the distributees.</p> <p>The auditor’s report was made May 1, 1901, showing a balance of $1,584.75, distributable among William H. Marshall, Benjamin O. Marshall, Henrietta Marshall, Alice Carter and Hattie Williams, in equal shares-, namely, $316.95 each.</p> <p>This report was confirmed June 13, 1901, on motion of L. Cabell Williamson, Esq., and the trustee, Arnold, was ordered to pay over to him, as solicitor for Alice Carter and Henrietta Marshall the said sums apportioned to them. On July 11, 1901, said parties, through the same counsel, filed a sworn petition setting out the proceedings aforesaid and the refusal of the trustee to pay over the money and praying for a rule against him.</p> <p>In this petition they say, that the reason assigned by said trustee for his refusal is that he claims fees due him by petitioners as their solicitor in said partition suit. And they allege that they never employed said Arnold as their attorney or solicitor, never authorized him to act for them, and never knew that he claimed to act for them until the demand of fees as aforesaid. They further say that they did not sign, or swear to, the said bill, and did not want the property sold.</p> <p>The rule to show cause was entered and the trustee Arnold filed an answer thereto under oath.</p> <p>This answer contains a lengthy history of the proceedings in the cause and is accompanied by many exhibits consisting in part of letters written him by Henrietta Marshall concerning said partition suit during its progress. It alleges substantially —■</p> <p>(1) That the order of ratification of the auditor’s report was entered without notice to him or his knowledge, though he was the only attorney of record for any of the parties; and he did not become aware of the same until July 19, 1901 (at which date he was served with the rule aforesaid). The purchase money was not in fact paid until May 3, 1901.</p> <p>(2) That he has always been ready and willing to pay petitioners the sums coming to them, less their proportions of a few dollars of costs due the clerk and of a certain bill for taxes not included in the auditor’s report. (It appears by an exhibit that said taxes and penalty on redemption were stated May 3, 1901, by the District collector and amounted in all to $13.23, and were paid by the said Arnold.) And that he is now ready to pay the same and has often so notified the attorney for the petitioners, who has refused to receive any less sum than the whole.</p> <p>(3) That the payments due said parties are subject to the deduction of $8.65 each on account of said taxes, as well as the fees aforesaid of $25 each. And that the purchase money had not been paid to him until after the auditor’s report, namely, May 3, 1901, and would not then have been paid without the settlement of said taxes because the party advancing tbe money to tbe purchaser made that condition.</p> <p>(4) That tbe said Alice Carter and Henrietta Marshall did consult respondent and retain bim as their solicitor to bring said suit, did sign tbe bill and were cognizant of all tbe proceedings in tbe case. A lengthy and particular statement is made of tbe circumstances surrounding tbe relations of tbe parties, tbe institution of tbe suit and so forth, with references to letters and memoranda that are set out and then given in full as exhibits. Tbe bill for partition was filed April 3, 1896, and tbe letters of Henrietta Marshall begin with one from her at Wilmington, Del., on March 18, 1896, to her sister, Mrs. Carter, referring to the bouse. Tbe next is from her to Arnold, April 26, 1896, inquiring of tbe business be bad on band for them, and also referring to former business matters.</p> <p>Another exhibit is an agreement signed by all tbe parties, including Henrietta Marshall, who signs first, and Alice Carter, directing said Arnold, as trustee, to pay off a certain tax incumbrance out of tbe purchase money of said lot. This instrument bears date May 1, 1900.</p> <p>No answer was filed to this return to tbe rule to show cause, and on July 22, 1901, a decree was entered “ on consideration of tbe petition and tbe rule to show cause and tbe answer thereto,” directing said Arnold to at once pay to said parties tbe said sums originally apportioned to them, and to pay to said L. Cabell Williamson any costs by bim expended in tbe proceedings, and also the costs of court.</p> <p>From this decree tbe said Arnold has appealed.</p>

<p>Hearing on. an appeal by creditors from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, bolding an Orphans’ Court, allowing counsel fees for defending a will, and also from an order denying a petition of tbe creditors to vacate such previous order, as having been passed to their prejudice and without notice to them.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion"stated the case as follows:</p> <p>On March 7, 1893, Annie E. Northcutt departed this life in the city of "Washington, leaving a last will and testament bearing date on February 26, 1.892, whereby she undertook to bequeath all of her personal estate to a sister, a Mrs. Mira Dugan, and the three children of said sister, and all of her real estate to one Joseph H. McCann; and she appointed Mira Dugan and Joseph H. McCann as the executors of the will. On March 8, 1893, the said Mira Dugan filed the will in the office of the register of wills, and at the same time filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court asking, in view of probable delay in the probate of the will, for the appointment of temporary collectors of the estate. The appellees, Joseph Shillington and Edwin Forrest, were named by her for the purpose, and they were appointed.</p> <p>Thereafter, on March 20, 1893, Mira Dugan filed her petition in the Orphans’ Court, praying for the probate of the will; but at the same time filed written renunciations of the executorship by herself and McCann. She asked for letters of administration on the estate, with the will annexed, to be issued to Shillington and Forrest; and she stated the estimated value of the personal property to be $27,750.</p> <p>Shortly thereafter a caveat to the will was filed by one John McGrane, a brother of the deceased, in which the validity of the will was attacked for fraud, undue influence, want of mental capacity to execute it, and alleged failure of the testatrix to execute it in due form of law. To this caveat Mira Dugan made answer, controverting its statements and defending the validity of the will. No answer was filed on behalf of McCann. Thereupon issues were framed and sent to the Circuit Court for trial; and it was ordered by the court that at the trial the caveator McGrane should hold the position of plaintiff, and that “ Joseph McCann and Mira Dugan, named as executors in the last will and testament of deceased, be named as defendants.” At the trial the issues were all found in favor of the caveatees, and the will was sustained.</p> <p>Subsequently, a second caveat was filed on behalf of one George H. Northcutt, claiming to be a son of the deceased; and upon his behalf further issues, involving the question of his legitimacy, were sent to the 'Circuit Court for trial. At this trial it was ordered that the caveator George H. Northcutt should act as plaintiff, and “ that the caveatees, Mira Dugan and Joseph H. McCann, who are named in the will as executors of said Annie E. Northcutt, should act as defendants.” These issues having been found in favor of George H. Northcutt, further issues were requested and granted, identical with those which had been formulated under the caveat of John McGrane; but upon appeal to this court in the names of Mira Dugan and Joseph H. McCann, we held that the verdict of the jury upon the first issues was conclusive also upon George H. Northcutt. 7 App. D. C. 351.</p> <p>The papers in all these proceedings were signed by the appellees Shillington and Eorrest, as attorneys or proctors- for Mira Dugan and Joseph H. McCann, without specification as to whether it was on behalf of these last as executors under the will or as legatees and devisees. There is one short paper, however, purporting to be a brief, wherein they sign themselves as “ attorneys for executors.” There is no paper signed by Mira Dugan personally after her answer to the caveat of John McGrane, and nothing whatever in the record to show any intervention of Joseph IT. McCann after the paper in which he formally declined the executorship, other than as may be inferred from the appearance of the appellees for him and for Mrs. Mira Dugan.</p> <p>On January 17, 1898, the will of Annie E. Northcutt, bearing date on February 26, 1892, was admitted to probate; and the court, acting upon the renunciations of the executorship filed in 1893 by Mira Dugan and Joseph H. Mc-Cann, issued letters of administration, with the will annexed, to Shillington and Eorrest, who, thereupon as collectors, turned over the personal estate to themselves as administrators.</p> <p>On January 10, 1899, Shillington and Forrest filed a petition in the Orphans’ Court, wherein they alleged that they represented the propounders of the will of the testatrix, and as such representatives had rendered professional services in having the will admitted to probate, to the value of $3,000, which sum they asked to be paid to them out of the estate as compensation for such services. Immediately on the same day the court entered an order making them the allowance for $3,000 which they had prayed. It is not claimed that the creditors of the estate or any other person in interest had notice of the petition or of the allowance made in pursuance of it. On the contrary, it appears that no notice was given to any one. It appears, also, that at this time the personal estate of the deceased had dwindled from $27,750, which was its estimated value at the time of her death, to about $5,000; and that after the deduction from it of this allowance and of other costs and expenses aggregating about $1,000, only the sum of about $1,000 would be left for the creditors of the estate, whose claims, as filed in court, amounted to about $8,500, and nothing whatever for the legatees under the will.</p> <p>Thereupon, as soon as they were advised of the condition of things, the creditors, on October 14, 1899, filed their petition, wherein they prayed to have the order of January 10, 1899, allowing a compensation of $3,000 to counsel, vacated and set aside, on the ground that the petitioners had no notice of it; that the services rendered were not services to the estate or for its benefit, and that the court had no authority in law to make such allowance. It appeared from the petition that the real estate of the deceased had been sold, and had failed to realize even sufficient to pay the liens upon it, in consequence of which nothing was left therefrom for general creditors; and that, as matter of fact, the allowance made to counsel would come out of the only fund available for the payment of debts, and which in itself was wholly insufficient to pay such debts.</p> <p>The appellees answered this petition, and in their answer averred that they had acted, in the services rendered by them, for Mira Dugan and Joseph H. McCann, as executors, and that the allowance to them was proper; and, also, that the petitioners might have known of the order if they had consulted the records of the court.</p> <p>The court [on May 31, 1901] refused to vacate the order; and thereupon the petitioners appealed to this court both from the original order and from the order refusing to vacate the order of allowance; and it is these appeals that are now before us.</p>

The Court in. its opinion stated the ease as follows: The plaintiff in error, Patrick H. Sheedy, was convicted in the police court of the offense of engaging in a gift enterprise in the District of Columbia, and has sued out a writ of error in accordance with the terms of the law.

Hearing ou au appeal by the defeudauts from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, overruling a motion to quash a second or alias writ of fieri facias.

<p>Hearing or aR appeal (specially allowed) by tbe defeudaRt from aR iRterloeutory judgmeut of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, sustaining a demurrer to a plea in abatemeut to au iudictmeut for larceuy.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe respondents from an order of the Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia in a habeas corpus proceeding, awarding tbe custody of two female children to tbeir mother, tbe petitioner.</p> <p>Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.</p>

Hearing ou an appeal by the complainants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing a bill in equity for an injunction. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe relator from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of the Treasury.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the relator from an order of tbe Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of the Interior.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This case was argued in connection with that of The United States ex rel. Willis G. West v. Ethan A. Hitchcock, Secretary of the Interior, just decided [ante, p. 333]; and it seems to be assumed that the facts in both cases are somewhat similar ; and that the questions of law involved are the same.</p> <p>The relator, Emmet Cos, is a white man over 21 years of age, a resident on the reservation of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes of Indians in the Territory of Oklahoma, and who, by intermarriage with an Indian woman of these confederated tribes and by formal adoption therein, became a member of the tribes and entitled as such to participate in the receipt of an allotment of land under the several treaties made between them and the United States,— one known as the Medicine Lodge Treaty, proclaimed on August 25, 1868, and the other made on August 6, 1892, and approved by an act of Congress of June 6, 1900. 31 Stat. 672-679.</p> <p>By the Medicine Lodge Treaty it was provided, among other things, that any individual belonging to said tribes or legally incorporated with them, being the head of a family, who should desire to commence farming, should have the privilege to select, in the presence and with the assistance of the agent then in charge, a tract of land within said reservation, not exceeding 320 acres in extent, for his own exclusive use and possession. In pursuance of it, the relator selected a tract of 320 acres. But it was subsequently ascertained that the 98th meridian, which constituted one of the legal boundaries of the reservation, had been incorrectly located, and that, in consequence of this error, the relator’s tract was not within the limits of the reservation; and he was compelled to surrender it. On application to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he was allowed to select another tract of equal amount, which was confirmed to him and upon the use and occupation of which he entered; and he has now been in possession of it for upwards of three years, and has made valuable improvements upon it of a permanent character.</p> <p>Under the treaty of August 6, 1892,. to which the relator himself was a party on behalf of the Indians, it was provided that every member of the tribe over the age of 18 years should be permitted to select for himself a tract of 160 acres within the reservation, that the tract so selected should be allotted in severalty, and that every member of the tribe should have the undisputed right to make his selection of land so as to include improvements, if any, already made by him. And it was further specifically provided that the relator, who is designated by name 'in the treaty, should be entitled to all the benefits of land and money conferred by the terms of the agreement upon members of the tribe, “ the same as if he were a member by blood of said tribe.” Under this treaty the relator selected a tract of 160 acres of land, which was one-half part of that which he had selected and which had been confirmed to him under the Medicine Lodge ■Treaty. Confirmation of this selection was refused by the agents of the Department of the Interior, and the relator was directed to make another selection, which he did under protest. Subsequently ascertaining that the lands last selected by him were not desirable, he made application to the Commfesioner of Indian Affairs for leave to change his selection, which the Commissioner allowed; and he selected another tract of 160 acres, which was subject to selection by him, and he took possession of it, inclosed it, and moved a house thereon.</p> <p>Subsequently, however, the Secretary -of the Interior disapproved the action of the Commissioner. Thereupon the relator applied to the Commissioner for leave to select 320 acres under the Medicine Lodge Treaty in the place of the tract originally selected by him and which he had surrendered. The Commissioner approved this application so far as to allow the relator to select 160, and hot 320' acres. The relator accordingly selected a tract of 160 acres; but the Secretary of the Interior refused to confirm the selection on the ground that the Territory of Oklahoma had previously selected it for school lands. The relator was directed to make yet another selection, which he did; but the selection, although approved by the Commissioner, was disapproved by the Secretary of the Interior. Finally, the Secretary, of his own motion and without request by the relator, made an allotment to him of the tract of 160 acres, which he had previously selected under protest, and had thereafter surrendered as undesirable.</p> <p>Thereupon the relator filed his petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selections previously made by him, the relator, and to allot to him: (1) Under the Medicine'Lodge Treaty, the tract of 320 acres on which he resided and had made improvements; and (2) under the treaty of 1892 and the act of Congress which ratified the same, the tract of 160 acres which had been assigned to him by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs immediately upon his surrender of the undesirable tract which he had previously taken under protest. A rule was issued to the Secretary of the Interior to show cause; and the Secretary made return to the rule. This return does not appear in the record before us; and we are not definitely advised of the nature of it. But upon the petition, the rule to show cause, and the Secretary’s return to it, the court below discharged the rule, and dismissed the relator’s petition. From its order in that regard the present appeal had been prosecuted.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal (specially allowed) by tbe plaintiff from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, denying a motion for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in an action on a promissory note.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, entered upon a verdict directed by the court in an action against a street railway company to recover damages for personal injuries.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference case, wherein the subject of controversy between the parties is the question of priority of invention of “ a composition consisting of the light cellular substance separated out from the fibers in cornstalk-pith, the same being charged with oil.”</p> <p>This composition the appellant Lazarus Silverman in his preliminary statement, claims to have conceived and explained to others “ during the early part of the year 1897;” and he alleges that he made samples embodying the invention “ during the summer of 1897,” “ and that during the fall of 1897, he used the said invention in the city of Milwaukee, and elsewhere, and has since continued to use the' same in various parts of the Hnited States.” These several dates, which are somewhat indefinite, he seeks in his testimony to make more specific.</p> <p>The appellee' Joseph G. Hendrickson alleges in his preliminary statement that he conceived the invention and disclosed it to others about January 1, 1897; that he made no drawing or model of it, but tested the invention about March 1, 1897; that he filed an application in the Patent Office for the subject-matter of this invention on June 9, 1897; that the application involved in this interference, which he claims to be a substitute for and continuation of the original application, was filed on August 20, 1897; and “ that he personally never reduced the invention to practice, but that he understands it has been reduced to practice by others interested in said invention, but as to the exact date of such reduction to practice he is not advised.”</p> <p>This alleged reduction to practice appears in the testimony to have been made by employees of the Marsden Company of Philadelphia, to which Hendrickson appears to have assigned his rights in the invention.</p> <p>Silverman’s application for a patent bears the date of December 1, 1897, while that of Hendrickson reached the Patent Office on August 20, 1897, and his original application, if it is to be regarded, was filed on June 9, 1897.</p> <p>The examiner of interferences held in favor of the appellant Silverman, the board of examiners-in-chief and the Commissioner of Patents in favor of the appellee Hendrickson. And from the decision of the Commissioner awarding judgment of priority of invention to the latter the present appeal to this court has been prosecuted.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by an applicant for a patent from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting five of six claims of the application.

Hearing on an appeal from a decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. Tbe facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from the Commissioner of Patents in a case of interference between the appellee George Hauser, who holds a patent for the invention in controversy issued to him on June 19, 1900, and the appellant Eugene O. Loomis, who filed an application on July 6, 1900, for a patent for the same invention.</p> <p>The invention in question is an improvement in holders for theater and transportation tickets, which is described in two several counts taken from the two several claims of the appellee Hauser’s patent, as follows:</p> <p>“ 1. A ticket-holder consisting of a blank having a flap at one comer thereof adapted to be folded but once over on to and pasted along merely two of its marginal edges to said blank to form an open-ended pocket and said blank being folded on itself, so as to leave the pocket-opening uncovered, to a rectangular shape corresponding to the pocket.</p> <p>“ 2. A ticket-holder consisting of a blank having a flap at one corner thereof adapted tó be folded bnt once over on to said blank and pasted thereto along merely two of its marginal edges to form an open-ended pocket, and said blank containing spaces for theater diagrams, programs, and advertising matter, and foldable to a rectangular shape corresponding to the pocket.”</p> <p>As already stated, the appellee Hauser holds a patent for the invention, which was issued to him on June 19, 1900, in pursuance of an application filed on April 23, 1900. The appellee Loomis did not file his application until July 6, 1900; and the claims of the patent to Hauser were copied into it for the purpose of procuring the declaration of interference now before us. There is contained in the record a previous application of the appellant Loomis, filed on November 21, 1898, for a patent for a somewhat similar invention, and the proceedings thereon which, on October 12, 1899, resulted in its rejection, in which action the applicant seems to have acquiesced, and to have proceeded no further. In the brief filed in this court on behalf of the appellant it is alleged that, in an amendment to the appellant’s specifications in these previous proceedings, the invention in controversy, or something very much like it, is distinctly disclosed. But in the opinions of the several tribunals of the Patent Office there seems to have been no notice taken of this alleged previous disclosure, or of the proceedings upon the appellant’s first application. Nor was it necessary perhaps to notice them, inasmuch as all the steps of invention claimed in the present case had been taken by Loomis from July to November of 1898, both inclusive.</p> <p>In his preliminary statement filed in the present interference Hauser, the appellee, alleged conception of the invention by him and a drawing illustrative of it in May of' 1897, and a disclosure of it and reduction to practice in September of 1897. The appellant Loomis, in his preliminary statement, alleged conception, disclosure and the making of a model of the invention in July of 1898, and the execution of a drawing and reduction to practice in November of 1898. After testimony taken by botb parties tending to support tbeir respective statements, tbe examiner of interferences rendered judgment of priority in favor of tbe patentee Hauser. This judgment tbe board of examiners-incbief reversed; but tbe assistant Commissioner, wbo acted in tbe place of tbe Commissioner, reversed tbe judgment of tbe board, sustained tbe primary examiner, and awarded judgment of priority of invention to Hauser. From bis decision appeal bas been taken to tbis court by tbe applicant Loomis.</p>

<p>Hearing on three separate appeals (specially allowed) from orders of the Supreme Court to the District of Columbia, overruling demurrers to indictments.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>In these three several cases, involving substantially the same issues, special appeals have been allowed from identical orders entered in each and all the cases by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, wherein the cases were all consolidated. They are all indictments for embezzlement founded’ upon different statutes, but all for the same acts of embezzlement. The indictment in the first case, No. 1067, is based upon section 5488 of the Devised Statutes of the 'United States, whereby it is provided that “ every dis-bursing officer of the United States who * * * converts to his own use in any way whatever * * * any portion of the public money intrusted to him, is in every such act deemed guilty of embezzlement.” The indictment in the second case, No. 1068, was found under the act of Congress of March 3, 1875 (18 Stat. 579), which provides that “ any person who shall embezzle, steal or purloin any money, property, record, voucher, or valuable thing whatever of the moneys, goods, chattels, records, or property of the United States shall be deemed guilty of a felony * * * .” And the indictment in the third case, No. 1086, was found under section 5497 of the Devised Statutes of the United States, as amended by the act of Congress of February 3, 1879 (201 Stat. 280), which provides that “ any officer connected with * * * the internal revenue service, and any assistant of such officer who shall embezzle * * * any money or other property of the United States, and any officer of the United States or any assistant of snch officer who shall embezzle or wrongfully convert to his own use any money or property which may have come into his possession or under his control, in the execution of such office or employment, or under claim or color of authority, as such officer or assistant, whether the same shall be the money of the United States, or of some other person or party, shall, where the offense is not otherwise punishable by some other statute of the United States, be punished by a fine or imprisonment, or both.”</p> <p>The appellant was an employee of the State Department of the United States, wherein he held the position of disbursing clerk, and also that of chief of the bureau of accounts of the Department, and as such he is charged in these indictments with the embezzlement and conversion to his own use of three several sums of money, alleged to be the public money of the United States, the first a sum of $18,229.98, taken on July 2, 1895; the second a sum of $16,837.50, taken on October 22, 1895, and the third a sum of $5,584.92, taken on October 26, 1895. In the first indictment, that in cause No. 1067, there are nine counts, of which the first charges the appellant as a disbursing clerk with the embezzlement of the first-mentioned sum; the second charges him as the chief of the bureau of accounts of the State Department with the embezzlement of the same sum, and the third charges him with the embezzlement of the same sum in his joint capacity as disbursing clerk and as chief of the bureau of accounts. In the fourth, fifth and sixth counts he is similarly charged with the embezzlement of the second sum, that of $16,837.50'; and in the seventh, eighth and ninth counts he is charged in like manner with the embezzlement of the third sum, that of $5,584.92.</p> <p>The second indictment, that of cause No. 1068, contains also nine counts, following closely the lines of the several counts in the previous cause, No. 1067, and substantially the same therewith.</p> <p>The third indictment, that of cause No. 1086, contains five counts, all charging the appellant with embezzlement as tlie chief of the bureau of accounts of the State Department, and of which the first charges him with the taking of $18,229.98; the second with the taking of $16,837.50; the third with ■ the unlawful conversion and appropriation of fifteen United States bonds of the face value of $1,000 each, and the fourth and fifth with similar embezzlement of other bonds.</p> <p>To each and all of these several indictments, and to each and every count thereof, the appellant interposed a demurrer, in which were set forth several grounds of alleged infirmity in the indictments, the principal of which was that no offense against the law was therein stated. The demurrers were all overruled. The accused thereupon filed a motion for a bill of particulars; and the motion was allowed. Bills of particulars in each case were then filed by the prosecution; and in these bills of particulars it appeared that the several embezzlements alleged were of funds in the custody of the State Department from “ moneys paid to the United States on various accounts by foreign governments and collected through the said Department of State.” Thereupon there was filed in each case on behalf of the accused a motion to quash the indictment, on the ground of its indefiniteness and 'insufficiency, and because, as claimed, the bill of particulars stated a different offense from that set up in the indictment. And there was also at the same time filed on behalf of the accused a motion to strike out the bill of particulars and to require the United States to give the accused a better bill of particulars. Both motions were overruled; and it is from the orders overruling them that these special appeals were sought and allowed.</p>

Hearing on a motion by the libellant in a proceeding to condemn certain property captured and claimed as lawful prize of war, to dismiss an appeal by the United States from an order of condemnation of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court of the United States. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe plaintiff from judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, entered upon a verdict directed by the court in an action of ejectment. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, a motion in arrest of judgment having been overruled.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>This is a suit at common law upon a promissory note and various items of account, aggregating the sum of $3,185, which is claimed in the declaration to be due from the appellant, William H. Manogue, who was defendant in the court below, to the appellee, Luke J. Kearney, the plaintiff therein, with interest on the various items thereof at the rate of 6 per centum per annum from various dates specified. After issue joined and trial had there was verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,185.32, being the sum of 3-2 cents in excess of the principal sum claimed in the declaration. Thereupon there was a motion in arrest of judgment, on the ground of alleged excess over the amount claimed; but it was overruled; and judgment having been duly entered upon the verdict, the defendant has appealed to this court.</p>

Hearing on an appeal, by the defendants from an interlocutory decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, appointing a receiver of the rents and profits of certain real estate, pending an action of ejectment, in a suit in¡ equity brought for that purpose. The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows: This is an appeal from an interlocutory decree appointing a receiver for certain improved property pending an action of ejectment for its recovery.

The Court in its opinion stated tbe ease as follows; Tbis case is brought here on a writ of error to tbe police court of tbis District. Tbe question presented by tbe record is as to tbe proper construction of a provision in tbe license law of tbe District, passed by tbe late legislative assembly, and approved on August 23, 1871, in respect to tbe proprietors of backs, cabs, omnibuses, and other vehicles for tbe transporting of passengers for hire.

Hearing on an appeal by tbe defendant from a judgment of conviction of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, upon an indictment for forgery, entered upon tbe verdict of a jury finding bim guilty. Tbe Court in its opinion stated tbe case as follows: Tbe appellant was indicted for forgery of five several promissory notes for $800, $1,000, $2,500, $2,000, and $5,000 respectively, and for uttering sucb forged notes with intent to defraud.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by the complainants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia construing a will, in a suit for that purpose.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>The bill in this case was filed by the appellants, B. Parker Crenshaw, Augustus P. Crenshaw, Susie Crenshaw, Elizabeth O. Thompson, John F. Beed, Nannie P. Beed, Miles K. Crenshaw, Mary E. Crenshaw, M. Millson Crenshaw and Elizabeth J. Crenshaw, to obtain a judicial construction of the last will and testament of Mrs. Mary S. Millson, deceased. It is shown by the allegations of the bill that Mrs. Millson died on the 2d day of March, 1897, seized of certain real estate, and leaving a duly executed last will and testament, and also an unattested codicil insufficient to operate upon and pass real estate, but sufficient to pass personal estate. The duly executed will was made and published on the 19th day of September, 1889, and the codicil was made and published on the 17th day of July, 1895. It is alleged in the bill and also conceded by stipulation of counsel, that the property in controversy, described in the bill, was purchased and acquired by Mrs. Millson, the testatrix, after the execution of her will and before the execution of the codicil thereto. There is no claim or contention that the real estate did or could pass by the codicil.</p> <p>By the will, after bequeathing certain specific legacies to certain of her relations, and certain pecuniary bequests made, the testatrix disposed of the rest and residue of her estate, by the following clause of her will: “All the rest of my estate, and the residue of it, of every description whatever, real, personal and mixed, I give, devise and bequeath to my sister, Mrs. Elizabeth Bicarda Crenshaw, to have and to hold the same absolutely and in fee simple, and hereby constitute and appoint my said sister executrix of this my last will and testament, and request and direct that she shall be allowed to qualify without giving security.”</p> <p>By the unattested codicil, after making certain changes in the bequests in her will, the testatrix concludes the instrument in these terms:</p> <p>“All the rest and residue of my property and estate, of every description whatever, not otherwise bequeathed, having been already devised and bequeathed to my said sister, Mrs. A. P. Crenshaw, I need not say more on the subject.”</p> <p>Mrs. Elizabeth Bicarda Crenshaw, the executrix and residuary devisee and legatee of her sister, died about the 11th day of September, 1899, leaving a last will and testament duly executed, whereby she devised all her estate of evfery description, to' her children, and they are the complainants in this proceeding. The bill is filed against the other heirs-at-law of the testatrix, Mrs. Millson, Bicliard P. McCormick, Margaret P. Stoddert, Millson McCormick, David McCormick, Poxhall P. McCormick, Iábbie McCormick ( and Charlotte 0. McCormick.</p>

<p>Mandamus.</p> <p>Healing on an appeal by the relator from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia denying a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Pensions.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated the ease as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia refusing a writ of mandamus.</p> <p>The petition for the writ was filed by the relator Henry D. Phillips, a pension attorney practicing before the Hnited States Pension Office, against the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Pensions, to require the latter to allow and cause to be paid to the relator a fee of ten dollars in the matter of a certain pension claim prosecuted by him, which the Commissioner first, and subsequently the Secretary on appeal from the Commissioner, had refused to allow.</p> <p>It appears from the petition that one Thomas Irwin had been granted a pension under section 2 of the act of Congress of June 27, 1890, chap. 634 (26 Stat. 182), for physical disability, characterized as “ general disability;” and that subsequently the pension had been increased by the efforts of the relator, as stated in the petition, “ for rheumatism, heart trouble, vertigo, and impaired sight,” from which the pensioner was suffering. The relator for his services claimed a fee of ten dollars; he was allowed only two dollars. He based his claim for the allowance of ten dollars on the provisions of section 4 of the act of Congress of June 27, 1890, already mentioned, which is in the following terms :— “ That no agent, attorney, or other person engaged in preparing, presenting or prosecuting any claim under the provisions of this act, shall directly or indirectly contract for, demand, receive, or retain, for such services in preparing, presenting, or prosecuting such claim, a sum greater than ten dollars, which sum shall be payable only upon the order of the Commissioner of Pensions by the pension agent making payment of the pension allowed.”</p> <p>The rules and regulations made by the Department of the Interior to carry this act into effect provided that, in the absence of a special contract between the pensioner and his solicitor or agent, the maximum fee of ten dollars should be allowed. Here there was no special contract; and the relator claimed the maximum fee under the law and the regulations.</p> <p>On the other hand, the Commissioner, acting nnder a subsequent act of Congress of March 3, 1891 [26 Stat. 1082], held that only a fee of two dollars was allowable. The provision of this act was as follows:—</p> <p>“ Hereafter no agent or attorney shall demand, receive, or be allowed any compensation under existing law exceeding two dollars, in any claim for increase of pension, on account of the increase of the disability for which the pension has been allowed.”</p> <p>The contention of the relator was that the increase of pension in the case was not for increase of the disability for which the pension had first been allowed, but for a new and different disability.</p> <p>As already stated, the Secretary of the Interior sustained the ruling of the Commissioner of Pensions. Thereupon the relator filed his petition for a mandamus. Upon the issue of the rule to show cause, and the coming in of a return thereto, and replication filed by the relator, the court discharged the rule, refused the writ, and dismissed the petition. Prom the order thereupon entered the relator has appealed to this court.</p>

Hearing on an appeal (specially allowed) by tbe caveatee from an order of tbe Supreme Oourt of tbe District of Columbia, bolding a special term for orphans’ court business, framing issues for trial by jury on a caveat to a will.

Hearing or an appeal by tbe exceptants from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia, boldiug a district court of tbe United States, overruling exceptious to aud confirming tbe verdict of a jury in proceedings for tbe condemnation- of land. The facts are sufficiently stated in tbe opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by tbe Commissioners of the District of Columbia from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as a district court of the United .States, vacating assessments for benefits in an award by a jury of condemnation, and declaring them void.</p> <p>The Court in the opinion stated the case as follows:</p> <p>By an act of Congress approved March 3, 1899, entitled “An act to extend S street, in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes” (30 Stat. 1344), it was provided not only that S street should be extended, but also Eleventh street northwest, first in a line due north from Florida avenue to Harvard street, and thence slightly curving to the northwest to Lydecker avenue, with a width throughout of 90 feet; and that, in respect of the land to be acquired therefor by condemnation and the damages to be awarded on account of such land to the owners, at least one-half thereof should be assessed by the jury of condemnation against those parcels of land which abutted on the line of the street so to be opened and extended to a depth of -200 feet from the building lines of the street as extended. It was further provided by the act that the proceedings for condemnation should be under the provisions of chapter 11 of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the District of Columbia; that the sum to be assessed against each lot should be determined and designated by the jury; that, in determining the amount to be assessed against any particular piece of ground, the jury should take into consideration the situation of the lots and the benefits they might receive from the opening of the street; and that the assessments when confirmed by the court should be a lien on the lands assessed, and be collected as special improvement taxes. It was directed by the act that the proceedings of condemnation should be instituted by the Commissioners of the District by filing a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia sitting as a district court.</p> <p>The Commissioners accordingly filed their petition on May 31, 1899; and thereupon, after due notice, a jury of seven persons was impaneled, received instructions from the court as to its duties, proceeded to assess the damages and benefits, and in due time returned its verdict and award into court. In the ascertainment of such damages and benefits, It seems to have taken testimony, although no part of such testimony appears in the record before us. An order of ratification nisi of the verdict and award was passed, and due notice seems to have been given to all the parties in interest. A large number of these appeared and filed exceptions to the award.</p> <p>At this time there was pending in this court the case of Davidson v. Wight, 16 App. D. 0. 3J1, in which, with special reference to the extension of S street, the question of the validity and constitutionality of the act of Congress had been raised. Soon afterwards, on April 25, 1900/we decided that case, and held, in pursuance of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 112 U. S. 269, that the act of Congress was unconstitutional and void, and also that for want of proper notice the proceedings were invalid. Pending an appeal from the decision of this court to the Supreme Court of the United States, a further act of Congress was passed on June 6, 1900, entitled “An act for the extension of Columbia Poad east of Thirteenth Street, and for other purposes ” (31 Stat. 665), by the twelfth section of which it was provided that the Commissioners of the District should make application to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a final ratification and confirmation of the awards of the jury in the matter of the extension of Eleventh street; that the awards, when ratified, should be paid in accordance with the provisions of the act which authorized the extension; and that, if for any reason the assessments for benefits should be declared void, the Commissioners should make application to the court to re-assess them in accordance with the provisions of this act of June 6, 1900, which provided elaborately therefor.</p> <p>The Commissioners accordingly, on June 26, 1900, moved in the Supreme Court of the Distxict to overxuile all the exceptions filed against the verdict of the jux*y, and that the assessments and the awards for damages should both be ratified and confirmed. The coux*t thereupon confirxned the award for damages, but vacated the assessments for benefits and declared them void. It is conceded that this latter part of the decision was based exclusively on the decision of this court in the case of Davidson v. Wight, which held the act of Congress to be unconstitutional in respect to the provisions for the assessment of benefits.</p> <p>Appeal was taken to this court. Within the time allowed for filing the transcript in this court, the time for so doing was extended by an order of the Supreme Court of the District to December 1, 1900'. Again, within the period of the extension.so granted, there was a further extension, by order passed on November 28, 1900, until January 1, 1901. The transcript was filed here during this second peiiod of extension, on December 20, 1900. Thereafter, there were several postponements of the case in this court; and then, on May 6, 1901, a motion to dismiss the appeal was filed, based upon the ground that the court below was without authority to grant the second extension of time, and that therefore the record was not filed in due time in this court. The motion to dismiss the appeal was postponed to the hearing on the merits.</p> <p>It remains to be stated that the Supreme Court of the United States, on April 29, 1901, reversed the decision of this court in the case of Davidson v. Wight, and held the act of Congress in question to be a constitutional and valid enactment. 181 U. S. 371.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal by an intervening party from an order of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia denying his petition and vacating an order staying sale by tbe trustee, in a suit for partition.</p> <p>Tbe Court in tbe opinion stated tbe case as follows:</p> <p>Tbe appellant, John E. Roller, appeals from a decree passed November 6, 1901, dismissing bis bill of intervention in a partition suit depending in tbe Supreme Court of tbe District.</p> <p>It appears from tbe record tbat on or about January 14, 1893, Allen C. Clark and wife began a suit (numbered 14,468) for partition of lots 8, 9, and 10 in square 1028. They claimed title to a portion of tbe same under mesne conveyances from Abraham Young, who'was seized and possessed of tbe whole in tbe year 1800. There were many defendants to tbe bill, including persons claiming in part also under said Young, and tbe heirs at law of one James Ward Scott, in whom title to one-fifth is alleged. John E. Roller was also made a party defendant with tbe allegation tbat be claimed title to tbe whole under a pretended sale for taxes made in 1852. It was alleged tbat tbe tax sale and all proceedings therein were null and void because tbe requirements of tbe law were not complied with; and it was specially charged tbat there was a failure to transmit to tbe clerk of tbe circuit court of tbe District a report in writing, duly certified, etc., of said sale; wherefore said claim of title is a cloud upon tbe true title and ought to be removed, and decree therefor was prayed.</p> <p>John E. Roller demurred to this bill on two grounds: Eirst, tbat tbe bill could not be maintained as against him until title should have first been asserted in a court of law. Second, tbat tbe complainants were barred by laches.</p> <p>This demurrer was sustained on June 17, 1898, and the bill dismissed as to said Roller. Complainants subsequently ordered their hill to be dismissed, having filed a new suit, numbered 15,141.</p> <p>This new bill was filed November 24, 1893, and contained the same allegations substantially as the former, save that John E. Roller was not made a party and no. allegation concerning his tax title was made. On January 25, 1894, Roller obtained leave to intervene, and in accordance therewith, filed an answer on February 13, 1894.</p> <p>In this answer he alleged the tax sale under which he claimed as made in 1850, the payment of all taxes since said date by him and those under whom he claims, and the exercise of rights of ownership and possession for half a century, during which period witnesses have died and records have been lost, so that it would be impossible to establish all the facts thereof with certainty. He further charged unexplained laches on the part of the complainants and those under whom they claim, and finally set up the proceedings in cause No. 14,468, and the decree therein rendered, as a har to complainants’ rights.</p> <p>Complainants filed a supplemental bill repeating practically the allegations of the hill in No. 14,468 concerning the illegality of the said Roller’s tax title. Roller pleaded the aforesaid decree specially in reply to the foregoing.</p> <p>Testimony was then taken upon the issue joined. Roller, on his own behalf, testified to his purchase of the then vacant lots, for. a valuable consideration, in the fall of 1887; the payment of all taxes assessed against the same since his said purchase; that he caused the erection of a fence completely inclosing the premises, shortly after his purchase, and then leased the same to one Myers as a horse-lot in consideration of his promise to keep the fence in repair; that late in 1892, he discovered that some one had broken a part of the fence and dumped quantities of earth upon the lots, which were low; that some one else — supposed to be John H. Walter — had put up a fence whilst the litigation was pending; and that he (Roller) was certainly in actual possession when cause No. 14,468 was instituted.</p> <p>William Myers testified as follows: That the lots were fenced in 1887; that witness obtained the use of them from Boiler for keeping his horses thereon upon condition of keeping the fence in repair, which he did until during the year 1892; that in 1892 some contractors for adjacent excavations broke the fence and dumped some earth upon the lots, and the fencing was then gradually carried away ■and burned; that in the fall of 1892, a man by the name of Davis, who owned or claimed a small lot within the inclosure, fenced it and made some repairs to the general fencing; that but little of the fence remains now, the same having been from time to time taken away by parties unknown. Tax receipts were produced showing payment by Barry and his heirs from and after the alleged tax sale and title issued to him thereunder, in 1850 or 1852. Other evidence was introduced respecting the condition of the lots and their value at an early day, their gradual coming into value with the recent growth of the city, and also touching the existence of certain ancient records of the clerk’s office of the old circuit court of the District; this is of no practical importance in our view of the case.</p> <p>On May 5, 1896, the following decree was passed:</p> <p>“ This cause coming on for final hearing on the pleadings and evidence and having been heard and considered, and the court being of opinion that it has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit, as against the defendant John E. Boiler, that the bill of complaint is multifarious as regards said defendant, and that the complainants are barred by their own laches from any equitable relief against said defendant, it is hereby, this 5th day of May, 1896, ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the bill of complaint be dismissed as against said defendant Boiler; but it further appearing that said Boiler was admitted as a defendant in this cause upon his own application and without the consent of the complainants, it is further decreed that said dismissal be without costs to said defendant.</p> <p>This cause is reserved for further proceedings as between the other parties to the cause.”</p> <p>On May 6, 1896, a decree was passed as between tbe remaining parties granting tbe prayer for partition as prayed.</p> <p>On June 30, 1896, tbe commissioners’ report was confirmed, and Leo Simmons, Esq., was appointed trustee to make sale of certain interests, tbe same being incapable of partition in kind.</p> <p>No action seems to bave been taken under tbis decree until advertisement made in July, 1901, whereupon (July 26), John E. Roller, under leave previously obtained, filed a petition in intervention. Herein be alleged title in fee simple in tbe premises in himself since 1886, and tbe payment of all taxes and tbe exercise of ownership and possession thereafter. He also alleged tbe proceedings and decree in cause No. 14,468, and tbe proceedings and decree thereafter in No. 15,141 — tbe present case — and charged that when tbe decrees of partition and sale aforesaid were made, be was in tbe sole and exclusive possession of tbe property. That tbe orders for partition and sale were passed without jurisdiction and cast a cloud upon bis title, etc. He prayed that tbe sale be stayed until final bearing, and for a decree vacating all proceedings in tbe said cause since tbe decree of May 5, 1896, and for general relief. Tbe complainants replied denying title in Roller, denying bis possession and alleging that actual possession was in Bartow L. Walker — one of tbe defendants — when tbe suit was begun, and is now in Leo Simmons, trustee. Leo Simmons, trustee, made a reply also, which, however, set up nothing new, save that sale bad not been made under tbe decree of June 30, 1896, because of prevailing conditions of tbe market rendering tbe same undesirable, etc.</p> <p>On healing, September 9, 1901, Roller’s petition was denied and tbe same dismissed with costs, and tbe order staying tbe sale by Simmons as trustee was vacated. From tbis decree Roller has appealed.</p>

Hearing on an appeal by the defendants from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia granting the relief sought, in a suit in equity, for the release of a deed of trust. The Court in the opinion stated the case as follows: This is a suit by the heirs-at-law of David Nelligan, deceased, to compel the release of a deed of trust executed by said Nelligan to secure a loan from the Second Working Men’s Building Association of the District of Columbia.

Hearing oil an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Hearing on an appeal by an applicant for a patent from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents denying his application.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference proceeding.</p> <p>The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Hearing on. an appeal by tbe defendants from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court of tbe District of Columbia entered upon a verdict directed by tbe court, in an action upon two promissory notes. Tbe Court in its opinion stated tbe case as follows: Tbis is an appeal from a judgment against appellants as indorsers of two notes of tbe aggregate amount (remaining due) of $3,607.85.

Hearing on an appeal by the petitioner from an order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing a petition to revive a former petition, the object of which was to enforce the payment of a debt alleged to be due the petitioner from the estate of a lunatic.

<p>Hearing on an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents rejecting an application for a patent.</p> <p>The Court in its opinion stated "the case as follows:</p> <p>This is an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents, wherein he refuses to grant a patent to the applicant, Albert Ver ley, of Courbevoie, Erance, for an alleged invention in electrical appliances for the production of the gaseous element known as ozone. The claim of invention is described as follows:—</p> <p>“ In an electrical machine for producing ozone, the combination with the secondary circuit of a transformer, of a condenser connected in and adapted to be charged by said circuit, and an effluvium apparatus, into which said condenser discharges its electricity, one plate of the condenser being metallically continuous with one plate of the effluvium apparatus, and the other plate of the condenser having an interruption or air-space in its connection with the-other plate of the effluvium apparatus.”</p> <p>Ozone, which is found to be useful in the manufacture of perfumes and flavors, is produced by electrical action as the result of exceedingly rapid oscillations, or oscillations of high frequency, as they are called, in an electric circuit; and the volume of ozone developed is in proportion to the frequency of oscillation. To -effect the desired result the applicant uses what is known as the “Herzian exciter,” or airspace, which gives rise to electrical waves of very short duration and very great frequency, amounting to millions and even billions in a second of time; and he locates his condenser, exciter and ozonizer all in the secondary circuit of the transformer. He has received a German patent for this appliance, apparently since the date of his application in the present proceeding. "Whether he has received one from his own country, France, does not appear.</p> <p>The application here has been rejected on the ground of anticipation of the invention in three several patents issued to Nikola Tesla — one, No. 454,622, dated June 23, 1891, purporting to be for a “ system of electric lighting;” a second, No. 46-2,418, issued November 3, 1891, purporting to be for a “method of and apparatus for electrical conversion and distribution;” and the third, No. 568,177, issued September 22, 1896, which is specifically for an “apparatus for producing ozone.” The first and second of these patents show appliances of the same general character as that of the present applicant. The appliance of the third patent is somewhat different; but the specifications of this patent refer to the two previous patents as showing appliances of the same kind that might be used for the same purpose.</p> <p>All the tribunals of the Patent Office held that, in view of these patents to Tesla, there was now no patentable novelty in taking the appliances of the first and second patent and using them for the same purpose as that of the third patent, as Tesla himself had indicated might be done; and this they held was all that the present aqiplicant did.</p> <p>From the decision of the Commissioner of Patents to that effect, the applicant has appealed to this court.</p>