Volume 193 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The petitioner, a citizen of Bolivia, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him adequately as to the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty to certain offenses that subjected him to deportation. The petitioner initially was charged with offenses that exposed him to twelve years of imprisonment. After the petitioner received a plea offer from the state, the trial court indicated that it would allow the petitioner to enter an open guilty plea with no agreed upon sentence to two charges and offered to vacate the plea and grant the petitioner's application for accelerated rehabilitation if the petitioner paid a $10,000 fine. The petitioner then entered a guilty plea. It was subsequently determined that the petitioner was ineligible for accelerated rehabilitation, and the state and the petitioner agreed on a sentence of five years of imprison- ment, execution suspended, with three years of probation. The petitioner did not ask to withdraw his guilty plea. After the petitioner was sen- tenced, deportation proceedings against him were initiated. At the habeas trial, the petitioner testified that, at the time he entered his plea, he understood that if it was determined that he was ineligible for accelerated rehabilitation, he could be deported. He also testified that he did not think he would be deported after he accepted a plea agreement that did not require him to serve any time in prison. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly rejected the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and denied the habeas petition, that court having properly determined that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's allegedly deficient perfor- mance: the habeas court credited the testimony of the petitioner's trial counsel that avoiding double digit incarceration was the petitioner's primary concern, that, on several occasions, he discussed with the peti- tioner the immigration issues associated with the case and that it was his understanding that the petitioner knew of the immigration conse- quences, the petitioner stated on the record during the plea canvass that he understood that his guilty plea may lead to his deportation and his claim that he would have proceeded to trial had he known of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea was belied by the testimony adduced at the habeas trial; accordingly, the habeas court's conclusion was legally and logically correct, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known that it would lead to certain deportation and that he, instead, would have proceeded to trial. Argued May 13—officially released September 24, 2019

The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of East Haven, denying their application for approval of an affordable housing development. The plaintiffs, owners of undeveloped real property in East Haven, submitted, pursuant to statute (§ 8-30g), an affordable housing applica- tion that sought to amend the zoning regulations to create a new mixed income housing zone and to construct 105 detached single-family homes. The defendant initially denied the plaintiffs' application on several grounds, including, inter alia, that it had insufficient drainage, and the plaintiffs subsequently revised their application to address those con- cerns. At a hearing on the revised application, the defendant presented the findings of an engineer, who had prepared a report on the plaintiffs' revised application that had not been made available to the plaintiffs until the day of the hearing and which raised concerns regarding the revised application's storm water drainage system. Despite the plaintiffs' requests to continue the hearing so they could review the engineer's report, the defendant concluded the hearing that night and denied the revised application on essentially the same grounds as the initial applica- tion. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which sustained the appeal in part and remanded the case to the defendant with respect to five issues related to storm water drainage. To comply with the court's remand order, the plaintiffs hired an engineer to assist them in addressing the storm water drainage issues and resubmitted their application to the defendant with a revised storm drainage plan. Subsequently, the defendant denied the plaintiffs' resubmitted applica- tion on several grounds, including, inter alia, that the resubmission failed to address the concerns of the defendant's engineer and that the resubmitted application varied so much from the revised application that it was actually an entirely new application. Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court, which rendered judgment sustaining the appeal, from which the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Superior Court did not err in concluding that the affordable housing application resubmitted in response to the court's remand order was not a new application; that court properly reviewed the differences between the remand site plan and the modified site plan and determined that the changes made to the remand application were done in order to comply with concerns regarding storm drainage, as the layout of the plan was fundamentally unchanged, changes were made in order to address the storm water drainage issues raised by the report of the defendant's engineer, and, thus, because the site plan submitted with the remand application was an updated plan consistent with the Superior Court's remand order, it did not constitute a new plan. 2. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the plaintiffs' remand application, which included a new storm water drainage system, was beyond the scope of the remand order; the essential purpose of the remand order, which required the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with an opportunity to respond to the concerns of the defendant's engineer regarding storm drainage issues, was fulfilled when the plaintiffs' engi- neer worked with the defendant's engineer to resolve the storm water management issues and reached a consensus on the technical elements of the drainage system, the record demonstrated how the remand appli- cation satisfied the reservations of the defendant's engineer about the storm water drainage and, therefore, the remand application was well within the scope of the remand order. 3. The defendant could not prevail on its claim that the Superior Court improperly concluded that evidence that the application failed to comply with town zoning regulations and that the storm water drainage system posed significant dangers to human health and safety did not support the defendant's denial of the applications: noncompliance with a zoning regulation alone was not sufficient to support the defendant's denial under § 8-30g (g), as the principal aim of the statute is to prevent a pretextual denial of an affordable housing application and § 8-30g (g) required the defendant to affirmatively prove that its decision to deny an affordable housing development was necessary to protect substantial public interests in health, safety, or other matters, that such public interests clearly outweighed the need for affordable housing, and that such public interests could not be protected by reasonable changes to the affordable housing development, and the defendant's listing of rea- sons why the affordable housing application was denied did not meet the standard required by § 8-30g (g); moreover, the defendant, in denying the different versions of the plaintiffs' applications, failed to demonstrate that there was any, much less sufficient, evidence in the record to showed that denying the affordable housing development was necessary to protect a substantial interest in health and safety, and the record indicated that the plaintiffs satisfactorily complied with the concerns of the defendant's engineer regarding the storm water management system. Argued April 11—officially released September 24, 2019

The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Planning and Zoning Commission of the Town of Greenwich approving the applications of the defendant N Co. for a special permit and a site plan to construct a new building on property owned by C and leased to N Co., which abuts the plaintiffs' properties. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs, on granting of certification, appealed to this court. They claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly agreed with the commission's interpretation of a certain building zone regulation (§ 6-94 [b] [1]) to allow the commission to permit a building closer than 100 feet from the plaintiffs' property lines if, after considering the proposed use and its specific location, the commission found that the closer distance would not produce any adverse impacts on the abutting properties. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that § 6-94 (b) (1) allows the commission to locate a building closer than 100 feet from their property lines only if that closer location affirmatively will protect the plaintiffs from whatever adverse impacts they would endure if the building were located 100 feet or more from their property lines. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that the commission's construction of § 6-94 (b) (1) of the regulations was proper; the plain language of the regulation requires the commission to consider the particular use and specific location of charitable institutions applying for a permit to construct a building less than 100 feet from a neighboring property line, the requirement in the regulation that the permit may not be issued unless the lesser distance would protect the property owners from adverse impacts requires the commission to find by substantial evidence that there will be no adverse impacts on adjacent properties due to the building being closer than 100 feet, and the plaintiffs' construction implied a decision-making process not set forth in the regulation. 2. There was substantial evidence in the record from which the commission could have concluded that the proposed facility was in compliance with certain building zone regulations (§§ 6-15 and 6-17), which required the commission to take into account whether N Co.'s proposed facility was in conformity with the plan of conservation and development; the evidence demonstrated that N Co. has operated on C's property for approximately forty years, that it has been part of the residential neigh- borhood during that time, that it currently operates out of facilities that are not adequate to meet the needs of the community, and that it serves an important function in the community, the proposed building, which will be located on C's property adjacent to where N Co. currently oper- ates, is closer to the plaintiffs' properties to protect natural resources, including mature trees, and under N Co.'s proposal, exiting drainage would be improved, new trees and vegetation will be planted, and the proposed facility would complement existing buildings on the site and have no adverse impact on the historical nature of the area. 3. The trial court and commission properly concluded the provision (§ 6- 95) of the building zone regulations governing accessory uses does not apply to N Co.'s special permit application; the proposed building meets a permitted use definition for special exceptions under a separate regula- tion (§ 6-94), which addresses nonresidential uses, and it was illogical to apply § 6-95 to § 6-94 uses such as N Co.'s proposed building. Argued May 20—officially released September 24, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of two counts of the crime of assault in the first degree in violation of statute (§ 53a-59 [a] [1] and [3]) in connection with an incident in which he stabbed the victim multiple times with a knife, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court rendered judgment denying in part and dismissing in part the habeas petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly concluded that he failed to establish that he had received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel: a. The petitioner's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assis- tance by not objecting to the trial court's jury instructions or requesting an additional jury instruction regarding the difference between the intent elements of the two assault charges of which he was convicted, and that he was prejudiced thereby was unavailing; the habeas court reasonably concluded that the petitioner failed to establish both deficient perfor- mance and prejudice, as the petitioner, at the habeas trial, presented no proposed charge for which trial counsel could have advocated, the instructions were correct as given and, therefore, further elucidation was not required to satisfy the standard of reasonably competent repre- sentation, and there was nothing to suggest that instructions providing some unspecified greater detail would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by declining to object to the admission of a police detective's written summary of the petitioner's oral account of the incident; trial counsel's strategic decision to allow the written summary into evidence to present an alternative narrative, namely, that the petitioner had acted in self-defense, without the petitioner having to testify and subject himself to cross-examination about his criminal history, was not unreasonable, and there was not a reasonable probabil- ity that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the written summary had been excluded. c. The habeas court reasonably concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to request the trial court to place its rejection of his plea agreement with the state on the record, as there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the criminal proceedings would have been different if trial counsel had made the request; even if trial counsel had requested the trial court to place its rejection of the plea agreement on the record, the court may or may not have done so, and either way, the plea agreement would have remained rejected, and any suggestion that the court would have reconsidered its rejection if it had been prompted to put the matter on the record was pure speculation. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly dismissed his claim that the trial court violated his right to due process by not stating on the record its reasons for refusing to accept the plea agreement, which he claimed prevented him from pursuing an appeal on that issue; there was nothing in the record to suggest that the petitioner had been harmed by the absence of a record of the rejection of the plea agreement, as the petitioner did not show that there would have been the slightest difference in the outcome of the trial if the rejection had been placed on the record. Argued January 2—officially released September 24, 2019

Convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree in connection with his conduct in hitting the victim in the head with a bottle, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant and another individual, M, had been fighting in a bar as a result of offensive remarks that M made to the defendant's girlfriend. After security guards separated the defendant and M, the victim asked M why he was fighting, and the defendant struck the victim with the bottle. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court deprived him of his right to present a defense of investigative inadequacy when it omitted from its instructions to the jury certain language in his written request to charge that pertained to the police investigation into the incident as it might relate to weaknesses in the state's case. The defendant claimed that without the inclusion of the language he requested, the jury would not have understood how to use the evidence he elicited at trial about the inadequacies of the police investigation. Held that the trial court did not mislead the jury or violate the defendant's right to present a defense by omitting the requested language from its instructions: that court's jury charge was identical to the model jury instruction provided on the Judicial Branch website and was in keeping with long-standing Connecticut law, nearly identical instructions have been upheld by our Supreme Court, the defendant presented his evidence to the jury and cross-examined the state's wit- nesses regarding the alleged inadequacy of the police investigation, and the court did not direct the jury to disregard that evidence or argument, and specifically instructed the jury to consider all of the evidence before it; moreover, the court, in its charge on investigative inadequacy, repeated to the jury its responsibility to determine whether the state, in light of all the evidence, had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the count with which he was charged. Argued March 5—officially released September 24, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of criminal possession of a firearm, criminal posses- sion of ammunition and possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain evidence and improperly granted the state's motion to join two separate cases against him for trial. The defendant had been charged, in one of the cases, with kidnapping and assault in connection with his alleged conduct with two women, D and P, at his home. The jury found him not guilty of all charges in that case. The police had conducted surveillance of the defendant's home and wanted to speak to him outside of the home because it was reported that he had a firearm when the kidnappings and assaults were alleged to have occurred. While one officer was speaking with the defendant on a phone, the defendant went outside of his home several times and walked near one of his cars that was parked in the driveway before reentering the home. The police saw the car's lights flash and heard its engine run. The defendant told the officer on the phone that he had the keys to the car but had not started it remotely. After several hours of no contact with the police, the defendant came outside of his home again and walked toward a fence that bordered his property where he was arrested. The police then conducted a protec- tive sweep of the home. The next day, pursuant to search warrants, the police seized various items from the defendant's home and car that included weapons, ammunition, marijuana and other drug related mate- rials. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court errone- ously denied his motion to suppress the evidence that the police seized from his home and car: a. The warrantless search of the defendant's home after he was arrested and in police custody constituted a justifiable, protective sweep of the home in light of specific, articulable facts that supported a reasonable belief by the police that a third party who posed a danger to those on the arrest scene was inside the home where firearms were believed to be present; the police reported that they saw movement within the home and that there were multiple cars on the defendant's property, there had been a report of a serious assault of D and P that allegedly occurred in the home within the prior twenty-four to thirty-six hours, D and P had reported that the defendant had guns in the house and had people watch the house, and, in light of the defendant's behavior, the police were entitled to discredit his statements that no one was in the home and that he did not possess weapons or start the car in his driveway. b. This court found unavailing the defendant's unpreserved claims that he was constructively seized by the police and that they lacked probable cause to search his car: there was no way to know whether a violation of constitutional magnitude in fact had occurred, as the record was insufficient to determine whether the police ordered the defendant to exit his home when they first attempted to make contact with him or how many officers surrounded the home at the time that the constructive entry into the home allegedly occurred; moreover, the information that the police affiants provided in their search warrant application supported a determination that probable cause existed to search the defendant's vehicle, as the affiants' averments that they observed the defendant walk back and forth to the vehicle and heard it being locked or unlocked supported reasonable inferences that he had access to the vehicle when the police observed his movements or prior to their arrival, and that the defendant may have moved evidence from the home to the vehicle, and the defendant's reliance on trial testimony to support his assertion that the police lacked probable cause to search the car because no officer saw him open it or any of its hatches was unavailing, as only information that was before the issuing judge at the time the warrant was signed could be considered in determining whether the warrant was based on probable cause. 2. The trial court did not commit plain error when it granted the state's motion for joinder, as the defendant, personally and through counsel, expressly stated that he had no objection to joinder; even if the defen- dant's waiver of his claim concerning joinder did not preclude him from prevailing under the plain error doctrine, he could not demonstrate that the claimed error was so clear and harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice, because even though the defendant claimed that joinder prevented him from testifying concerning the firearms charges but that he had reason not to testify with respect to the assault and kidnapping counts, he did not move to sever the informations or indicate that he wanted to testify concerning some counts of the informations but not others, even when the court canvassed him regarding his decision not to testify. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim of judicial bias, which was based on his assertion that the trial court, in its pretrial memorandum of decision on his motion to suppress, had found him guilty of the kidnapping and assault charges prior to any evidence when it referred to D and P as victims and then considered those charges in sentencing him, the record not having supported the defendant's contention that the court considered the kidnapping and assault charges when it sentenced him; although the court mentioned the kidnapping and assault charges when it summarized the events that led to the discovery of the firearms, ammunition and marijuana, it had referred to those charges as the ''original allegations'' and thereafter focused on the events that occurred on the day of the defendant's arrest, its refer- ence to the defendant as violent was done in the context of reviewing his criminal history, not with respect to the kidnapping and assault charges, and, therefore, because the record did not provide a basis for the defendant's claim of judicial bias, there was no manifest injustice that warranted reversal of the judgment pursuant to the plain error doctrine. Argued April 10—officially released September 24, 2019

The plaintiff landlords, D, C, and B Co., sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of certain premises leased to the defendant tenants, N, S, and S Co. Since 1970, the plaintiffs' property was used as an automobile repair facility, and the plaintiffs had installed underground gasoline and waste oil storage tanks on the property but failed to follow proper protocols for their removal, which resulted in environmental contamination. Subsequently, in July, 2014, seven months after the par- ties entered into a lease of the property, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection issued an enforcement order directed to B Co. and commenced a civil action that resulted in a stipulated judgment. During trial in the present case, the defendants asserted the special defense of equitable nonforfeiture and argued in their posttrial brief that they withheld rent payments because of their counsel's advice to hold the rent in escrow, because they were unaware of the contamina- tion, and because they were concerned that one of their two businesses would not be permitted to open due to the plaintiffs' failure to extend their rent abatement period, despite the delay of the plaintiffs' property manager and leasing agent in obtaining certificates of occupancy for retail or food service uses. The trial court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail in their claim that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that they failed to prove their special defense of equitable nonforfeiture: that court properly applied the doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture to the facts of this case, as it determined that the defendants, who had admitted that they deliberately stopped paying rent upon advice of their counsel because they were upset about the contamination, failed to prove the first element of the equitable nonforfeiture test, namely, that the nonpayment of rent was not wilful or grossly negligent, and the court, having made that determi- nation, was not required to address the other elements; moreover, the court determined that the defendants failed to prove they made a good faith effort to comply with the lease or had a good faith dispute as to its meaning, and it reasonably could have reached the conclusions it did on the basis of certain testimony presented, which it was free to credit. 2. The defendants' claim that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs were unaware of contamination until after July 1, 2014, was unavailing, as there was evidence in the record to support that finding; D testified that he believed any contamination detected in 2011 was within accept- able limits and that he told the defendants that there was some contami- nation, but if there was any problem, he would take care of it, and even if the existence of contamination on the property requiring action prior to July 1, 2014, was concealed from the defendants, the court also found that the plaintiffs had complied with their obligation under the lease and had taken care of the problem, and that the remediation had no effect on the progress of the defendants' renovations or their ability to open both of their businesses on the property, and, therefore, even if the court's finding that the plaintiffs were unaware that the tank graves contained gasoline type contaminants above action levels was errone- ous, any error was harmless. 3. The defendants' claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that they failed to prove their special defenses of unjust enrichment and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not reviewable, the defendants having failed to brief the claim adequately; the defendants' analysis appeared in a single paragraph of their brief, they did not distinguish between their third or fifth special defenses, both of which alleged a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, there were no legal authorities cited or an analysis of whether the special defenses were legally viable, and the defendants did not cite any standard of review governing this court's review and inaccurately asserted that the court failed to make any factual findings as to the fourth and fifth special defenses, and that the court failed to refer to the special defenses alleging a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' request for a continuance so that T, an enforcement officer employed by the department, could testify: the defendants failed to make an adequate showing as to why T, who purportedly was under subpoena, was not available to testify as scheduled, or why T's deposition was not taken beforehand and offered into evidence in lieu of live testimony, they made no proffer to the court as to the necessity of T's testimony or why the denial of a continuance would impair their defense, nor did they request a capias to compel T's presence, and the court appropriately considered that counsel for the defendants moved for a continuance on the day of trial; moreover, even if the court abused its discretion, any error was harmless, because even though the defendants argued before this court that denying their request effectively kept out of evi- dence department documentation concerning the history of contamina- tion on the property, the trial court considered the contamination issue to be ''pretextual'' and found that the defendants suffered no detriment as a result of the contamination and remediation, and that they did not offer any evidence that they complained about the issue until they filed their answer in this case, and, thus, the defendants did not demonstrate that they were harmed by the court's purported error. Argued February 11—officially released October 1, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant police detective, K, and the defendant city of Hartford for personal injuries he sustained when he was ejected from his motorcycle after it was struck by K's unmarked vehicle, which was not equipped with flashing or revolving lights or a siren, while K was surveilling the plaintiff and traveling above the speed limit in the wrong lane of traffic. The plaintiff sought to recover damages on the basis of K's alleged reckless and negligent conduct, claiming that K's conduct violated a ministerial duty imposed on him by certain motor vehicle statutes. After the case was tried to a jury, the trial court granted K's motion for a directed verdict on the plaintiff's recklessness claim. The jury thereafter returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on his negligence claim. Subsequently, the trial court set aside the verdict on the negligence count, concluding that the plaintiff's allegations related to discretionary acts for which the defendants were immune from liability pursuant to the statute (§ 52- 557n) concerning governmental immunity. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly directed a verdict in favor of K as to the plaintiff's recklessness claim, as the evidence, viewed in a light most favorably to the plaintiff, was sufficient for the jury reasonably to con- clude that K acted recklessly: on the basis of the evidence presented, the jury reasonably could have concluded that K consciously disregarded state laws relating to speed limits, reckless driving, following too closely and traveling in the correct lane of traffic in a situation in which a high degree of danger was present, and that he was aware of the risks and dangers his conduct imposed on others, yet showed little regard for the consequences of his actions; accordingly, the plaintiff was entitled to have his recklessness claim submitted to the jury. 2. The trial court properly set aside the verdict in favor of the plaintiff on his negligence claim; the circumstances surrounding K's conduct demonstrated that he was engaged in discretionary activity, as he was engaged in the discretionary police activity of surveilling the plaintiff and, thus, did not have a ministerial duty to follow every motor vehicle statute, even if those statutes in other circumstances would impose ministerial duties, and in the absence of a directive that clearly compelled K's conduct, he was entitled to governmental immunity for his discretion- ary acts. Argued May 13—officially released October 1, 2019

The defendant filed a motion to modify an award of child support that had been issued in connection with a foreign judgment of dissolution. He sought a downward modification of his child support obligations, claim- ing that there had been a substantial change in his and the plaintiff's financial circumstances. In support of his motion, the defendant cited statutes from Connecticut (§ 46b-86) and New York (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 [B] [9] [b] [2] [i]), both of which permit modification of a child support order upon demonstration by the moving party of a substantial change in the financial circumstances of either party. Following the dissolution, the plaintiff moved from New York to Connecticut with the parties' four children, and the defendant moved to New Jersey. In response to the motion to modify, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order requesting the trial court to find that the New York child support guidelines applied to the defendant's motion. Prior to the dissolution of their marriage, the parties had entered a detailed separation agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, provided that it was to be construed pursuant to New York law and required that the defendant pay the plaintiff basic child support and add-on child support. The agreement also contained a default provision, which provided, inter alia, that if a party failed to perform his or her obligations under the agreement, the aggrieved party could bring an action to enforce his or her rights, and if that action was successful, the defaulting party was liable for the aggrieved party's reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for order, concluding that the substantive law of New York applied to the defendant's motion to modify. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt regarding the children's add-on expenses, a motion for attorney's fees and costs, and a motion for contempt regarding the defendant's alleged failure to pay his basic child support obligation. Following a hearing, the trial court, applying New York law, denied the defendant's motion to modify and the plaintiff's motions for contempt and for attorney's fees and costs. In denying the motion for contempt regarding child support, the court found that the precise amount of basic child support that the defendant owed the plaintiff was not entirely clear and unambiguous, and, therefore, it issued an order directing the parties to follow the procedure set forth in their agreement for resolving child support dis- putes, whereby they are to have their accountants discuss and try to reconcile any discrepancies before the parties resort to judicial interven- tion. Specifically, it ordered that the parties direct their accountants to utilize the New York child support guidelines formula, as well as the precise illustrations contained in relevant paragraphs of the agreement, including the use of adjusted gross income as shown on the parties' income tax returns, when making their child support calculations. On the plaintiff's appeal and the defendant's cross appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly rewrote the parties' agreement by issuing its order with respect to the manner in which the parties were to proceed to resolve their dispute regarding basic child support, including how to calculate the amount of basic child support the defendant owed her: the trial court, by issuing its order, did not rewrite the agreement but, instead, sought to facilitate its enforcement by providing the parties with a timeline for exchanging information as required by the agreement, and the order was necessary to narrow the issues in dispute at any future hearing, as the court ordered the parties, who appeared unable or unwilling to abide by the clear requirements of their agreement, to do what they should have done before the plaintiff filed her motion for contempt, and the court's inclu- sion of the term adjusted gross income in its order did not rewrite the agreement because that term was incorporated, by way of example as to how the defendant's basic child support obligation was to be calcu- lated, in the agreement that became part of the New York judgment of dissolution; furthermore, the plaintiff did not demonstrate that she was harmed by the court's order, as the objective of the order was to have the parties and their accountants reach an agreement regarding the defendant's basic child support obligation, and, if they could agree, there would be no need for the parties to seek judicial intervention. 2. The record was inadequate to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred by failing to award her attorney's fees and costs to defend against the defendant's attempt to invalidate the agreement with respect to the law applicable to his motion to modify his child support obliga- tions, as that court did not provide a factual or legal analysis of its denial of the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs, and this court would not speculate as to the reasons for the trial court's determi- nation or what conduct of the parties it considered. 3. The trial court did not err by failing to award the plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to the default provision of the parties' agreement: contrary to the plaintiff's claim, her motion for contempt regarding the children's add-on expenses was not successful, as she failed to obtain all of the add-on expenses she was seeking, and the court found that there was a good faith dispute between the parties regarding the amount the defendant owed the plaintiff, who failed to prove all of the allegations in her motion; moreover, the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant was in wilful and intentional violation of the agreement was a legal conclusion, neither party was in full compliance with the agreement, there was no evidence that the defendant was unwilling to pay what he owed and, in fact, he proposed a settlement and had a good faith reason not to pay some of the claimed expenses upon request, and the fact that the defendant offered to pay what he owed, not what was demanded of him during the litigation, should not result in his having to pay the plaintiff attorney's fees to have a court resolve disputes that the parties should have been able to resolve given that the add-on expenses and conditions were clearly spelled out in the agreement. 4. The defendant's claim on cross appeal that because he had registered the New York dissolution judgment in Connecticut pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-71), the trial court improperly concluded that New York law, rather than Connecticut law, applied to the motion to modify was dismissed as moot; because the standard for modification of a child support order under both New York and Connecticut law is a substantial change in circumstances, the result would have been the same whether the court had applied New York or Connecticut law, and, therefore, there was no practical relief that could be afforded to the parties. Argued January 17—officially released October 1, 2019

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court resolving a postjudgment motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff. The parties' separation agreement included payment of alimony to the plaintiff calculated from the defendant's gross income of base pay and performance based bonuses, and a provision stating that income shall not include stock that may be awarded to either party. In 2011, the defendant was hired by a company that was acquired by V Co., and he accepted a position with V Co. that included a retention plan, which included short-term incentives, long-term incentives, including both restricted stock units that would be payable in the form of stock and performance stock units that would be payable in the form of cash, and a severance package. In August, 2015, the defendant's employment with V Co. was terminated, and he received a severance payment, after which he found higher paying employment and adjusted his alimony payment accordingly. In July, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant failed to amend support based on the total reported for his income. There were three court rulings as to this motion, the last of which declined to find the defendant in contempt but ordered, inter alia, the defendant to include all past long- term incentive payments and the severance payment from V Co. in the calculation of gross income and to recalculate past alimony owed to the plaintiff. From that decision, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court improperly interpreted a provision in the parties' separation agreement governing alimony to require that restricted stock units and performance stock units received from the defendant's employer be included within the alimony calculation. Held: 1. The trial court erred in ordering the defendant to include all past and future restricted stock unit payments in the calculation of gross income under the alimony provision, as the separation agreement unambigu- ously excluded stock from the alimony calculation: the separation agree- ment required an annual exchange of income tax returns for purposes of establishing the actual gross income for the previous calendar year, which the parties understood included any additional bonus income received and, thus, the annual alimony calculation was performed using the income the parties received during the previous calendar year, and during the calendar years at issue, the evidence showed that the distribu- tions received by the defendant pursuant to the restricted stock unit program consisted of shares of V Co.'s common stock, which is unambig- uously excluded from the alimony calculation; moreover, the plaintiff's claim that the alimony exclusion for stock excludes only nonperform- ance based awards of stock was unavailing, as the parties could have included language to that effect if they had intended for the alimony exclusion for stock to be so limited, and to define the stock exclusion to be limited to nonperformance based stock awards would render the stock exclusion wholly unnecessary. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in finding that performance stock units are not stock, as the defendant's vested performance stock units were designed to be distributed in cash, all distributions of the defendant's performance stock units were made in cash, and, thus, the defendant did not receive stock pursuant to the performance stock unit component of the long-term incentives program; moreover, the record did not support the defendant's claim that perform- ance stock units were neither base pay nor performance based bonuses and, therefore, did not fall within gross income for purposes of the calculation of alimony under the separation agreement, and although the defendant presented testimony that the long-term incentives pro- grams are golden handcuffs designed to keep an individual with the company, not to give them a bonus for performance, the court was not required to credit that testimony or to find that a golden handcuff is not normally a form of bonus. 3. The trial court improperly interpreted gross income, which included only base pay and performance based bonuses, to include the defendant's severance payment; although the amount of the defendant's severance payment was determined by his base pay and eligibility for the short- term incentives plan, the severance payment was distinct from both base pay and performance based bonuses and, therefore, did not fall within the definition of gross income pursuant to the separation agreement. Argued May 15—officially released October 1, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for defamation from the defendant, who filed a counterclaim for breach of the parties' separation agreement, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff was in arrears on his obligation to pay unallocated alimony and child support. Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his complaint, the parties stipulated to the amount due on the counterclaim, and the trial court rendered judgment on the counter- claim in accordance with the parties' stipulation. The defendant subse- quently applied for, and was granted, a property execution on the con- tents of a storage unit rented in the name of the plaintiff's father, and filed a claim for a determination of interests in the disputed property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the plaintiff owned the contents of the storage unit but that a variety of items in the storage unit were exempt from property execution pursuant to statute (§ 52-352b). On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in determining, sua sponte, that certain property was statutorily exempt from execution; pursuant to the plain language of the applicable statute (§ 52-361b [d]), a judgment debtor may claim an exemption by returning a signed exemption claim form indicating the property claimed to be exempt, and because § 51-361b (d) makes clear that if a judgment debtor chooses to claim an exemption, the judgment debtor must return the exemption claim form, which the plaintiff here failed to do, the statutory procedures provided for in § 52- 361b (d), which provide for notice, a stay of the property execution and a hearing to determine the rights to the disputed property, were not triggered. 2. Even if the plaintiff could assert a claim of exemption over the levied property without filing the necessary form, the plaintiff failed to seek a determination that the property was exempt, and, thus, the trial court should not have exempted any of the items from execution because it was never asked to do so; the sole claim of the plaintiff at the hearing was that the items in the storage unit did not belong to him, he failed to assert in any way that even if the property belong to him it should be deemed exempt as necessary to him, and, thus, the court improperly determined that certain items were necessary to the plaintiff despite the lack of any such claim being made and without supporting evidence. Argued May 15—officially released October 1, 2019

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted on a guilty plea of home invasion and kidnapping in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his mental health and to retain a forensic psychol- ogist to aid in mitigating his sentence. The petitioner had gone to the home of a family for whom he had previously worked, took cash from the homeowner, tied the hands of the homeowner and her minor son with rope and forced the homeowner to write several checks and to sign a contract to make it look as if she owed him money, after which he bound their mouths with duct tape and confined them in the home. The homeowner was able to convince the petitioner that she should accompany him to the bank, where she withdrew cash and wrote another check to the petitioner, who then asked the homeowner to drive him to Vernon, where she dropped him off before returning home and calling the police. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica- tion to appeal; the petitioner's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in not investigating his mental health and retaining a forensic psychologist were, as the habeas court recognized, a close issue, and, thus, the petitioner's appeal was not frivolous, and the ques- tion he raised was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to investigate his mental health and to retain a forensic psychologist to aid in mitigating his sentence: the petitioner could not overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assis- tance, as the habeas court credited counsel's assessment of the petitioner as an intelligent adult who coherently and cogently discussed his case with trial counsel, displayed wide understanding of the legal process and showed no discernable signs of mental problems; moreover, counsel had inquired of the petitioner as to whether he ever had issues with mental illness or received mental health care, which the petitioner denied and counsel confirmed with the petitioner's family, counsel addressed certain disagreements he had with the petitioner's presentence investiga- tion report and presented a detailed and articulate sentencing memoran- dum, as well as a letter from the petitioner's sister, in an attempt to explicate why the petitioner would conceive of and execute a plot to extort money from the victims, and counsel's mitigation strategy was crafted and executed on the basis of the petitioner's history of repeated setbacks in his life that culminated in the home invasion incident, as the petitioner and his family members denied that he had mental health issues and, instead, gave counsel information to prepare a mitigation defense. Argued April 16—officially released October 1, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of murder and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, who was pregnant with his child, the defendant appealed. The defendant had plotted with a friend, H, to kill the victim after she refused the defendant's requests to have an abortion. The victim and the defendant had driven to a location where the defendant purportedly intended to collect money from someone. H, who had driven the defendant's car to the area and parked nearby, thereafter approached the victim's parked car, in which she and the defendant were sitting, and fatally shot the victim. The defendant later told a police detective, E, that an unknown individual had attempted to rob them and shot the victim as she tried to drive away. H thereafter told a friend, M, that he had killed the victim at the defendant's behest, after which H and M robbed a store using the gun that H had used to shoot the victim, which they then hid in a park. The defendant subsequently told E that H and M had robbed the store, after which M turned himself in to the police and helped them retrieve the gun. At trial, after H invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and declined to testify, M testified about the gun and what H had told him concerning the victim's murder. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence H's statements to M as dual inculpatory statements pursuant to the applicable provision (§ 8-6 [4]) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting H's statements to M about the victim's murder as dual inculpatory statements under § 8-6 (4), as H's statements were sufficiently trustworthy and against his penal interest: a. The defendant's claim that H's statements to M were inadmissible as dual inculpatory statements because they sought to shift the blame for the victim's murder to the defendant was unavailing, as the statements were squarely against H's penal interest; H had unequivocally admitted to killing the victim as part of a scheme he and the defendant concocted, the statements implicated H and the defendant equally, and even if H's statements suggested that he was trying to minimize his involvement in the scheme or to explain his reasons for killing the victim, they exposed him to potential liability for the same crimes with which the defendant was charged, for which H was convicted in a separate trial. b. The trial court correctly concluded that H's statements to M were sufficiently trustworthy, as H, who sometimes stayed at M's home, made the statements less than two weeks after the victim's murder, and H and M, who robbed the store together, trusted one another, shared a friendship and had known each other for about ten years at the time H made the statements; moreover, the truthfulness of H's statements was corroborated by evidence that included an attempt by H and M to repair the gun before the victim's murder, and testimony from W that, less than two hours before the murder, the defendant, who was accompa- nied by H, told W that he wanted to kill the victim and asked W to act as a lookout and to provide a false statement to the police. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the state failed to disclose to him certain police internal affairs records, in viola- tion of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83), that concerned allegations of prior misconduct by E, as those records were not material to the outcome of the defendant's trial; moreover, even if the records could have been used to impeach E's credibility, there was overwhelming evidence to support the defendant's conviction, the impeachment of E with the records would not have raised doubts about the reliability of the testi- mony of W and M, as M's testimony directly implicated the defendant in the victim's murder, and the impeachment of E with the records in order to call into question W's credibility would have been cumulative, as the defendant argued to the jury, concerning the circumstances sur- rounding a written statement that W had given to the police, that the evidence suggested that W had been coerced by the police, and there was no indication that W's testimony was tainted as a result of his interactions with the police. Argued April 16—officially released October 1, 2019

The plaintiffs, trustees of a certain trust, sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, breach of contract. The plaintiff F had purchased an undeveloped lot from the defendant in the town of Milford with views of Long Island Sound, Charles Island, and Milford Harbor. At closing, the parties entered into an agreement pursuant to which the defendant was to maintain certain height restrictions on his property, regrade certain topsoil and trim certain tree limbs. After attempts to resolve disputes related to the topsoil and tree limbs had failed, the plaintiffs commenced this action. Following a trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs with respect to their breach of contract claims and awarded them $4100 in damages, but it denied their request for injunctive and equitable relief with respect to their claim of private nuisance, and determined that the plaintiffs' two principal claims for injunctive relief regarding the tree limbs and the pile of topsoil had become moot because the defendant trimmed the relevant limbs and leveled the topsoil so that it no longer obstructed F's view. Subsequently, the court held an evidentiary hearing concerning a motion for attorney's fees filed by the plaintiffs in accordance with a provision of the parties' contract, which provided that the prevailing party in litigation enforcing the agreement would be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. The trial court awarded the plaintiffs $93,405 in attor- ney's fees and costs and determined that the plaintiffs were the prevailing party under the contract. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not discounting the award of attorney's fees on account of the small sum awarded to the plaintiffs for the breach of contract claim; although the defendant claimed that a proper analysis of the factors listed in rule 1.5 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct would compel a significant downward departure from the plaintiffs' initial lodestar calculation, which is the initial esti- mate of a reasonable attorney's fee calculated by multiplying the number of hours expended on litigation times a reasonable hourly rate, because the damages awarded were insignificant in relation to the court's award of attorney's fees, the plaintiffs had a legitimate claim for attorney's fees pursuant to the contract, and the fact that the defendant rendered the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief under the breach of contract claims moot by performing as required under the contract well into the trial did not obviate the plaintiffs' legitimate claim for attorney's fees pursuant to the contract. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees with respect to the plaintiff's private nuisance claim on which the plaintiffs did not prevail; although a party may recover attorney's fees for unsuccessful claims that are inextricably intertwined and involve a common basis in fact or legal theory with the successful claims, the private nuisance and breach of contract claims in the present case were factually and legally distinct, and were not inextricably intertwined or based on a common legal theory. Argued April 15—officially released October 1, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for negligence for injuries she sustained while admitted to the defendant hospital. On February 10, 2015, while she was placed on fall prevention protocol, which required that she have assistance to leave her hospital bed, the plaintiff fell while using a restroom and sustained certain injuries. There- after, on April 6, 2015, the plaintiff was informed that a nurse or nurse's aide should have been responsible for her safety while at the defendant hospital. In November, 2016, the plaintiff received an automatic ninety day extension of the statute of limitations and delivered the action to the state marshal for service of process on May 22, 2017. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants and found that because the plaintiff suffered actionable harm on February 10, 2015, she should have brought the action, with the ninety day exten- sion, on or before May 10, 2017, and that the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 52-584). On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly determined that her action was barred by § 52-584. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous course of treatment doctrine; the continu- ous course of treatment doctrine applies only to the repose portion of § 52-584 and not to the discovery portion, which addresses the plaintiff's knowledge of the injury and not the defendant's act or omission, and because the plaintiff commenced her action within three years of the act or omission complained of, her action was not barred by the repose portion, and the continuing course of treatment doctrine was not applica- ble under the circumstances of this case. 2. The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff's action was time barred, as the evidence before the court, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the nonmoving party, demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered her injury as contem- plated by § 52-584; the plaintiff adequately countered the defendants' motion for summary judgement with admissible evidence demonstrating that it was not until April 6, 2015, that she was informed that a nurse or nurse's aide should have been responsible for her safety and, thus, there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff discovered the alleged breach of a duty by the defendants and a causal relationship between the defendants' alleged breach of duty and the resulting harm to her, and the plaintiff did not sustain an injury for purposes of § 52-584 until she had knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have had knowledge of sufficient facts to bring a cause of action against the defendants. Argued March 5—officially released October 1, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of interfering with an officer and disorderly conduct, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that the evi- dence was insufficient to support his conviction. Police officers, who had been providing security at an event for Jewish athletes, were alerted that the defendant was driving across the country to various synagogues, and had posted a video on the Internet in which he stated that he was in the process of desecrating Jewish temples and was on a mission to rid the planet of Jewish people. When the police observed the defendant's parked car across the street from a Jewish temple, they approached and asked him for his driver's license and vehicle registration, which the defendant refused to provide. The police observed metal devices with wire attached to them inside the car, which the defendant told them he used to desecrate the temples. After the defendant refused the officers' requests to step out of his car, the police extricated him from the car and attempted to place him in a police vehicle. The defendant resisted the officers' efforts to place him in the police vehicle and screamed anti-Semitic comments loud enough to be heard by a crowd of bystanders nearby. Police officers who had watched the defendant's Internet video testified at trial about its contents. The trial court also declined, for lack of relevance, the defendant's request to issue a sub- poena to a rabbi from out of state whom the defendant claimed would testify that he had a cordial visit with the defendant and that the defen- dant was doing no harm while traveling around the country. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that his arrest and seizure by the police were illegal was unavailing; even if the defendant's arrest were illegal, it could not serve as the basis for overturning his conviction, as the defendant did not argue that evidence was obtained or used against him at trial as a result of his purported illegal arrest, and his claim that certain evidence that the police seized from his car was invalid could not be reviewed, as it was raised for the first time in his reply brief, the defendant never moved to suppress the evidence, and the trial court did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions regarding whether any evidence was illegally seized. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the police officers' testi- mony was fabricated; the jury was free to credit or discredit the testi- mony of the officers, it heard testimony from the defendant that the police officers' testimony was false, and it was free to weigh the conflict- ing testimony and to assess the credibility of the various witnesses, and there was a reasonable view of the evidence that supported the jury's guilty verdict. 3. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from police officers about statements the defendant had made in an Internet video that he had posted; the trial court made clear to the parties that it was not going to make any ruling in advance of the officers' testimony and that it would, instead, consider any objections as they were raised during the presentation of the evidence, the defendant did not object to any of the state's questions or move to strike any testimony, he did not argue that the officers' testimony should be excluded or stricken but, rather, claimed that other videos should have been admitted to mitigate the prejudicial effects of the officers' testimony, and, therefore, the defen- dant failed to secure from the court a finalized, specific ruling as to any of the testimony elicited at trial. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's request to excuse a prospective juror for cause during voir dire; the prospective juror repeatedly stated that she was able to serve as an impartial juror, and nowhere in the record was there an indication that she could not judge the defendant impartially, nor was there any indication in the record that her demeanor, which the court was able to observe, suggested that she could not be a fair and impartial juror. 5. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his state constitutional right to compulsory process when it denied his request to issue a subpoena to a rabbi from out of state; it was apparent that the testimony the defendant sought to illicit from the rabbi was irrelevant and inadmissible, as testimony regarding one peaceful interaction that the rabbi had with the defendant or that the defendant was not doing any harm on his spiritual journey was not relevant to the charges for which the defendant was on trial. 6. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly found him incompe- tent to stand trial before it later determined that he was competent to stand trial was not reviewable, the defendant having failed to brief the claim adequately; the defendant's brief contained no analysis as to how the court made the initial determination that he was incompetent to stand trial, and the defendant did not analyze the evidence of competency or attempt to undermine the court's finding by reference to relevant law. 7. The defendant's claim that the trial court violated his constitutional right to travel when it imposed as a term of his conditional discharge a special condition that he stay out of Connecticut was dismissed as moot, as that condition had expired prior to the resolution of the defendant's appeal; moreover, the defendant's assertion that his claim was not moot because it fell within the collateral consequences exception to the moot- ness doctrine was unavailing, as he only generally asserted that his sentencing would have lasting consequences and did not demonstrate how an expired restriction on his ability to enter the state would create a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur, and the defendant's claim that the condition banning him from the state has led to adverse employment consequences because he has been denied employment after failing background checks was mere conjecture, as he failed to allege or to demonstrate that the condition led to his adverse employment consequences. Argued April 10—officially released October 1, 2019

The plaintiffs, R Co. and U Co., sought to recover damages from the defen- dant insurance company for breach of contract. R Co. had leased certain property to U Co., which operated a business in a building on the property that was damaged by an overload of snow and ice on its roof. At that time, the defendant provided a policy of casualty insurance to the plaintiffs, who filed an insurance claim for the damage to the building. The defendant accepted that the roof had been damaged by an event covered by the policy and agreed that replacing the roof and its support- ing structures was necessary. After the parties had engaged in an adjust- ment process, the defendant remitted a payment to the plaintiffs in the amount of $167,006.03, upon which the parties had settled, and a portion of which was allocated to the cost of demolishing the existing roof. As part of the rebuilding process, a company retained by the plaintiffs found that asbestos containing material was present in at least two small areas of the roofing membrane and that lead based paint was detected on a ceiling located in the building. The cost of demolishing and removing all of the old roofing material in a safe and safety compliant manner was $90,139.26. The defendant refused to pay the additional demolition costs, and this action followed. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on the breach of contract count, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. They claimed that the trial court erroneously concluded that the defendant did not breach the policy by declining to cover the increased demolition costs resulting from the presence of asbestos and lead in the building. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the trial court improperly found that the increased demo- lition costs constituted replacement costs, rather than being a compo- nent of the actual cash value of the plaintiffs' loss, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide reasonable notice to the defendant of their claim seek- ing recovery for the increased demolition costs. Held that the plaintiffs having failed to provide this court with an adequate record, this court declined to address the merits of their claim on appeal: although the trial occurred over two days, the plaintiffs provided this court with only a partial transcript consisting of the testimony of a single witness on the second day of trial, and in the absence of transcripts of the entire trial, this court could not evaluate the plaintiff's arguments in support of their appellate claim without resorting to speculation; accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. Argued March 14—officially released October 1, 2019

The plaintiff company sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, breach of contract for their failure to remit to the plaintiff its proportionate share of certain proceeds secured by a settlement agreement. The defendants S and C are individuals who, together, formed, operated, and controlled the defendant companies, O Co., F Co., C Co., M Co., P Co., I Co. and N Co. In approximately 2007, the plaintiff invested in both O Co. and C Co. and, as a result, acquired limited partnership interests in those companies. In 2007, F Co. and M Co. had purchased certain securities known as collateralized debt obligations from U Co. and, in 2008, after the value of the collateralized debt obligations precipitously dropped, P Co. and I Co. commenced a civil action alleging fraud against U Co. In April, 2009, the plaintiff executed a limited partnership agreement for C Co., which contained certain provisions for withdrawals by and distributions to limited part- ners. In September, 2009, the plaintiff redeemed its investment in O Co., which extinguished its interest in that company except for certain holdbacks to indemnify potential future expenses of O Co. In 2010, the plaintiff commenced a civil action in the Supreme Court of the state of New York against I Co., S, and C, and filed a separate arbitration proceed- ing against O Co. and C Co. In April, 2011, the plaintiff, I Co., S, C, O Co., C Co., and A Co., the former general partner of C Co., executed a confidential settlement agreement to resolve the 2010 New York action and the arbitration proceeding. As consideration for the plaintiff's with- drawal and release, § 3 of the settlement agreement required I Co. to pay the plaintiff a settlement payment, as well as a redemption payment, which represented the plaintiff's pro rata share, approximately 32.083612 percent, of the net asset value in C Co. as of February 28, 2011, minus a holdback of $250,000 for the purpose of funding costs associated with the ongoing 2008 action against U Co., and minus an additional holdback of $200,000 to pay legal fees and expenses. In addition, § 4 of the settle- ment agreement secured the plaintiff's interest in two of C Co.'s contin- gent assets by providing that nothing in the settlement agreement shall affect the plaintiff's pro rata share in C Co.'s proportionate interest in the U Co. litigation proceeds or in C Co.'s interest in a claim against L Co. Shortly after the settlement agreement was signed, the L Co. claim was sold for $9,334,141.55, but no portion of the L Co. claim proceeds were remitted to the plaintiff until October, 2011, when the plaintiff received $1,022,022.36. In 2013, the plaintiff commenced a civil action in the Supreme Court of the state of New York against I Co., C Co., O Co., and A Co., alleging that those defendants had breached the settlement agreement by, inter alia, failing to pay the plaintiff its pro rata portion of the L Co. claim proceeds. Soon after the commencement of the 2013 New York action, certain of the defendants transferred to the plaintiff approximately $700,000 in additional proceeds from the L Co. claim, for a total distribution of $1,722,022.36. In 2015, P Co. settled the U Co. litigation for a total of $36 million, but the defendants have not provided the plaintiff with any portion of the settlement proceeds. The plaintiff then brought the present action against the defendants seeking damages for their failure to remit to the plaintiff its proportionate share of the U Co. litigation proceeds as secured by § 4 of the settlement agreement. The plaintiff filed an application for a prejudgment remedy, and the plaintiff's operative amended substitute complaint alleged, inter alia, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, statutory theft (§ 52-564), and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, which the court granted only as to the claims of statutory theft and a CUTPA violation. The court also granted the plaintiff's appli- cation for a prejudgment remedy, and the plaintiff thereafter secured the full attachment amount. In October, 2016, the court rendered judgment partially in favor of the plaintiff as to certain defendants on its complaint and in favor of the plaintiff on a counterclaim filed by the defendants. In particular, the court concluded that the defendants that were parties to the settlement agreement, namely, C Co., O Co., I Co., S, and C, as well as N Co., the general partner of C Co. at the time the U Co. litigation proceeds were realized, were liable for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for their intentional failure to remit to the plaintiff its proportionate share of the U Co. litigation proceeds as secured by the settlement agreement. The defen- dants appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. During the pendency of this appeal, the plaintiff, pursuant to statute (§ 52-278k), filed a motion with the trial court seeking modification of the previously secured prejudgment remedy attachment amount to secure from C Co., O Co., I Co., S, C, and N Co., an additional $947,731 that it anticipated would accrue during the pendency of this appeal. The plaintiff also filed a motion with the court seeking supplemental asset disclosure from those defendants to assist with the securing of the additional attachment pursued by the motion to modify. Subsequently, the trial court granted those two motions, and the defendants filed an amended appeal with this court. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improp- erly interpreted the agreements between the parties when it concluded that the plaintiff prevailed on its breach of contract claim, which alleged that the defendants had failed to pay the plaintiff its proportionate share of the proceeds from the U Co. litigation, as the court properly held that the plaintiff proved a breach of contract because the defendants settled the U Co. litigation for $36 million, and the plaintiff has not received its portion of those proceeds in contravention of the settlement agreement and the limited partnership agreement: the defendants' claim that they could not be held liable for breach of the settlement agreement because, pursuant to § 4 of that agreement, the distribution of the pro- ceeds from the contingent assets was governed by all of provisions of the limited partnership agreement, which afforded the general partner discretion to withhold or reduce payment of the contingent interests, was unavailing, as the trial court correctly determined that the execution of the settlement agreement constituted a withdrawal of the plaintiff as a limited partner from C Co. and properly concluded, in light of that withdrawal, that the payment of the contingent assets was to be governed by the specific withdrawal provision of the limited partnership agree- ment, and the court's interpretation of both the settlement agreement and the limited partnership agreement together was further bolstered by the relevant portion of the withdrawal provision of the limited partner- ship agreement, which provides that a withdrawal was subject to certain restrictions and reserves for contingent or undetermined liabilities of C Co., as the parties specifically identified those restrictions and reserves in the settlement agreement's holdback provisions, and it was logical for the court to conclude that, following C Co.'s receipt of proceeds from the realization of a contingent asset, the plaintiff, pursuant to § 4 of the settlement agreement and § 5.01 of the limited partnership agreement, was entitled to its pro rata share of those proceeds in cash as soon as practicable following the effective date of the withdrawal; accordingly, the trial court properly considered the language of § 4 of the settlement agreement in conjunction with the other provisions of the settlement agreement, the limited partnership agreement, the relation of the parties, and the circumstances under which it was executed. 2. The defendants' claim that the trial court improperly rejected their breach of contract counterclaim, which alleged that they were relieved of their obligation to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds because the plaintiff had breached the settlement agreement, was unavailing: a. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erroneously found that the plaintiff had not materially breached the settlement agreement by violating § 7 when it requested that R Co., the plaintiff's law firm, contact the United States Securities and Exchange Commission regarding an ongoing investigation, by commencing the 2013 New York action seeking an injunction to prevent C Co. from utilizing the U Co. litigation holdback, and by colluding with S Co.; that court's finding that the plaintiff's actions did not constitute a material breach of the settlement agreement, the essential purpose of which was to resolve the then existing disputes among the parties, was not clearly erroneous and was supported by the evidence that § 7 was not central to the settlement agreement, that the plaintiff sought information from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission regarding an ongoing investigation in which the plaintiff's interests were potentially involved, that the plaintiff filed an action in New York alleging that the defendants had breached the settlement agreement, and that the plaintiff had communicated with S Co. after it already had been advised of the settlement agreement, as those actions were taken by the plaintiff to enforce its rights that were at the core of the settlement agreement. b. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erroneously found that their prior partial delayed payment of the L Co. claim to the plaintiff relieved the plaintiff from its obligations under the confidentiality provision, as the court's finding that any claimed breach by the plaintiff was excused by the defendant's prior breach of the settlement agreement was not clearly erroneous; the evidence demon- strated that the settlement agreement, read in conjunction with the limited partnership agreement, obligated the payment of the contingent assets, including the pro rata share of the proceeds of the L Co. claim, approximately $2,994,729.76, to the plaintiff in cash as soon as practica- ble following the effective date of the withdrawal on June 1, 2011, and that no portion of the L Co. claim proceeds were remitted to the plaintiff until October, 2011, when the plaintiff received $1,022,022.36, and, even if the defendants' calculation as to the plaintiff's proportionate share of the L Co. claim was correct, the evidence that, prior to any of the contested communications, the plaintiff received less than one half of what the defendants had calculated was the plaintiff's entitlement, more than four months after the funds had been received by C Co. without sufficient justification, supported the court's finding that the defendants had materially breached the settlement agreement. 3. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff prevailed on its breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim; that court found that the signatory defendants, I Co., O Co., C Co., S, and C, deprived the plaintiff of its right to receive the benefits under the settle- ment agreement, under which they had a clear obligation to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds to the plaintiff, and the trial court's conclusion that at least some of the defendants breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was supported by its findings that the defen- dants failed to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds to the plaintiff, wilfully attempted to thwart the plaintiff's ability to receive those proceeds, raised unsupported claims and counterclaims that alleged misconduct by the plaintiff, maintained control over the proceeds so as to retain them for as long as possible for their own benefit, continued to prolong the litigation and cause excessive expenses, and failed, until ordered by the court, to provide information to the plaintiff that could have resolved some of the issues in advance of this litigation. 4. The plaintiff's claim on cross appeal that the trial court improperly con- cluded that the plaintiff could not prevail on its conversion claim was unavailing, as the court properly concluded that the plaintiff could not prevail on its conversion claim because it merely was a recasting of its breach of contract claim; the plaintiff's conversion claim sought the same damages as its breach of contract claim, namely, its proportionate share of the U Co. litigation proceeds, the plaintiff's conversion claim alleged the same breach of duty, namely, the defendants' obligation pursuant to the settlement agreement and the limited partnership agree- ment to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's conversion claim was based on the exact same allegations as its breach of contract claim because the plaintiff's complaint entirely incorporated the breach of contract allegations into its count alleging conversion. 5. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to strike its Connecticut statutory causes of action for statutory theft and a violation of CUTPA on the ground that those claims were barred by § 12 of the settlement agreement, which provides in relevant part that any disputes or litigation arising out of that agreement ''shall be governed by New York law''; the relevant language in § 12 of the settlement agreement is broad and does not apply only to breach of contract causes of action, and the plaintiff's statutory causes of action arose out of the settlement agreement because the basis for both claims stemmed from the settlement agreement, as the statutory theft claim alleged that the defendants withheld and utilized for themselves the U Co. litigation proceeds, and the CUTPA claim alleged that the defendants breached the settlement agreement and failed to provide the plaintiff its share of the U Co. litigation proceeds. 6. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that all of the defendants should be held liable for the plaintiff's claims of breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing pursuant to a piercing the corporate veil or alter ego theory, and that the trial court improperly declined to consider those theories despite the fact that they had been pleaded and briefed; when construing the trial court's judgment as a whole, it was apparent that although the court recognized that the plaintiff had not separately pleaded its piercing the corporate veil and alter ego theories, and although the court did not engage in a discussion of each and every element of the plaintiff's theories, it consid- ered and rejected those theories. 7. The trial court improperly interpreted the settlement agreement to con- clude that all of the defendants who were signatories to the settlement agreement, I Co., O Co., C Co., S, and C, as well as N Co. as successor general partner of C Co., were liable for nonpayment of the U Co. litigation proceeds, as only I Co., C Co., and N Co. were liable: although that court correctly concluded that there was no express limitation in § 4 of the settlement agreement as to which defendants had the obligation to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds, the court erred in literally interpreting certain language in the settlement agreement to hold all of the signatory defendants liable for each and every obligation in the settlement agree- ment, and it improperly failed to consider the limited partnership agree- ment or the circumstances under which the settlement agreement was executed, as O Co. could not be held liable pursuant to § 4 of the settlement agreement because it was unable to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds to the plaintiff, and S and C could not be held individually liable in the absence of an express agreement by them to undertake an individual obligation in either the settlement agreement or the limited partnership agreement to remit the U Co. litigation proceeds as soon as practicable; moreover, the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the proper interpretation of the limited partnership agreement and the settlement agreement required that only N Co. be held liable for nonpayment of the U Co. litigation proceeds, as the defendants that are liable for nonpayment are those that both undertook an obligation and had the ability to pay the U Co. litigation proceeds, namely, C Co., as owner of the interest in the U Co. litigation proceeds at issue, N Co., as general partner of C Co., and I Co., which had remitted both the settlement payment and redemption payment on behalf of the defen- dants, including C Co., pursuant to the settlement agreement. 8. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court errone- ously awarded damages because it failed to reduce C Co.'s share of the U Co. litigation proceeds by 10 percent to account for M Co.'s other investor, H Co., which is another entity controlled by S and C: the trial court's finding that C Co. was the sole investor in M Co. and, thus, that C Co. was entitled to all of M Co.'s share of the proceeds from the settlement of the U Co. litigation, was supported by the court's findings regarding the lack of credibility of the defendants' position regarding $1.1 million that S and C had deposited into an account of M Co., the defendants' failure to comply fully with discovery, and the lack of credibility of the testimony of S, and that the investment was withdrawn prior to the execution of the settlement agreement, as well as evidence that S and C, through H Co., made their investment in M Co. after the collateralized debt obligations had been purchased, after the collateral- ized debt obligations had lost value, and after the U Co. litigation had been commenced; moreover, the defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court erroneously awarded damages because it failed to account for a performance fee reduction from the U Co. litigation proceeds, which was based on their claim that the limited partnership agreement provides that the general partner of C Co., N Co. at the time, was entitled to a 20 percent performance fee for net economic profit, as the limited partnership agreement definitively provides that losses incurred by a limited partner prior to the execution of the limited partner- ship agreement are to be taken into account when determining cumula- tive fiscal period net economic profit and, thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the U Co. litigation proceeds did not constitute a net profit because those proceeds only partially recouped prior substantial losses incurred in connection with the collateralized debt obligations. 9. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erroneously awarded damages because it improperly permitted the defendants to retain the remainder of the U Co. litigation holdback, which was based on the plaintiff's claim that the court, having found that the $250,000 holdback designated by the settlement agreement to cover expenses incurred in connection with the U Co. litigation had not been exhausted, erroneously failed to award damages for the remainder of the unused U Co. litigation holdback: that court definitively concluded that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the U Co. litigation holdback had been exhausted, and did not conclude, as claimed by the plaintiff, that the evidence demonstrated that the holdback had not been exhausted, and the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erroneously found the division of the U Co. litigation proceeds to be 52.8 percent to M Co. and 47.2 percent to F Co., and that the court should have drawn an adverse inference against the defendants for their failure to comply fully with discovery was unavailing, as the trial court specifically rejected the plaintiff's credibility challenge to the position taken by the defen- dants, this court could not second-guess that credibility assessment, and the testimony and evidence cited by the court were sufficient to support its conclusion; accordingly, the court's finding as to the division of the net proceeds of the U Co. litigation was not clearly erroneous, and the court properly determined the amount of damages. 10. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion to increase the amount of the prejudgment remedy, which was based on their claim that the filing of an appeal, without more, did not constitute a sufficient basis for the court to modify, pursuant to § 52-278k, the existing prejudgment remedy; it was not clear error for the trial court to have increased the amount of the prejudgment remedy, as the court made its probable cause deter- mination on the basis of the amount of the judgment rendered against the defendants, the court's award of postjudgment interest, the fact that the defendants took an amended appeal, and the average pendency of similar civil cases before this court. This court declined to review the defendants' unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for postjudgment discovery in connection with the court's upward modification of the prejudgment remedy amount, the defendants having failed to preserve properly their claim that the trial court lacked authority to grant the plaintiff's supplemental motion for disclosure of assets. Argued November 27, 2018—officially released October 8, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree, sexual assault in the first degree, and risk of injury to a child in connection with his alleged sexual abuse of the minor victim, the defendant appealed. Although the defendant's conviction related to two incidents involving the minor victim, during his trial there was testimony relating to two other alleged incidents of sexual abuse, one of which occurred while the defendant and the victim were hiking alone at a state park. After the defendant testified at trial that, during the hike, there were other people around, the prosecutor asked him a series of questions that focused on whether he previously had told the police during an interview that there were other people around during the hike, and remarked that this was the first time that they were hearing about that information. On appeal, the defendant claimed, for the first time, that the questions referring to the trial as being the first time that the defendant mentioned that other people were in the same area during the hike violated his constitutional right to remain silent pursuant to Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610) by introducing evidence of his post-Miranda silence. Specifically, he claimed that the questions focused on his silence after he was arrested and received his Miranda warnings and, therefore, that his post- Miranda silence was used as evidence of guilt. Held: 1. The defendant's unpreserved claim that his constitutional right to remain silent pursuant to Doyle was violated was unavailing; it was clear from the record that the questions referring to the trial as the first time that the other hikers were mentioned pertained to the defendant's pre- Miranda interview that occurred on March 31, 2014, and, therefore, the defendant having failed to demonstrate that an alleged constitutional violation existed, his unpreserved claim failed under the third prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn 233). 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that because the prosecutor's questions sought to elicit evidence of his post-Miranda silence, they amounted to prosecutorial impropriety that violated his due process rights: this court has determined that certain of the questions did not violate Doyle and the defendant did not argue how those questions would otherwise amount to prosecutorial impropriety, and with respect to the prosecutor's question of whether the defendant told anyone about the presence of the other hikers in the time period between a pre- Miranda interview and his arrests in September and November, 2014, even if that question was improper, it did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial, as the claimed impropriety was not pervasive throughout the trial and was confined to a single question that related to uncharged misconduct, it was not central to a critical issue in the case or the defendant's theory of defense, defense counsel objected to the question before it was answered and the objection was sustained, the court's general instructions were sufficiently curative, and the state's case was not particularly strong. Argued March 4—officially released October 8, 2019

The plaintiff sought a temporary and permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from, inter alia, maintaining a parking lot within an easement granting the plaintiff a right-of-way over certain property owned by the defendant. The defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking, inter alia, a judgment declaring that it had the right to relocate the right-of-way at its own expense provided that it would be similar in size to the existing right-of-way and that it would not impose any additional burden on the plaintiff, as well as a permanent injunction directing the plaintiff to release the right-of-way upon its relocation by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's complaint, concluding that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief because it had failed to establish that the defendant's actions were interfering with the plaintiff's use of the right-of-way. The court also rejected the defendant's counterclaim insofar as the defendant sought a right to relocate the existing right-of-way and an order directing the plaintiff to release the right-of-way upon its relocation. Thereafter, the defendant appealed, and the plaintiff filed a cross appeal with this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the counts of the defendant's counterclaim relating to the defendant's request to relocate the right-of-way and for an order directing the plaintiff to release the right-of-way; notwithstanding the defendant's claim to the contrary, there was no meaningful difference between the unilateral modification of an easement that this court in Alligood v. LaSaracina (122 Conn. App. 473) found to be improper and the unilateral relocation of an easement that the defendant sought in the present case, as either change is improper without the mutual consent of the landowner and the ease- ment owner, and this court rejected the defendant's claim that Alligood was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and declined to over- rule Alligood. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in the defendant's favor on the plaintiff's complaint and denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief: in concluding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that its inability to use the right- of-way would necessarily result but for the issuance of the requested injunction, and, thus, was not entitled to its requested injunctive relief, the trial court applied the correct standard of law set forth in Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp. (179 Conn. 390), which requires a party seeking injunctive relief to show that there a substantial probability that but for the issuance of the injunction, the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm; moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief under the circumstances of the case and in light of the extraordinary nature of injunctive relief, as the court fully acknowledged that parking in the right-of-way would interfere with the plaintiff's access to the right-of-way but that this harm was not likely to befall the plaintiff but for the issuance of the requested injunction. Argued January 22—officially released October 15, 2019

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of possession of a narcotic sub- stance, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which two police officers, C and R, while patrolling an area known for drug use, located the defendant and two other individuals, Y and M, inside of a van that was parked behind bushes. After C observed two bundles of heroin on the center console next to the defendant's left leg, the police conducted a search of the van, which revealed the presence of heroin. Heroin was also found on the person of M. In prosecuting the case, the state pursued the theory that although the defendant did not physically possess narcotic sub- stances on his person at the time of the arrest, he constructively pos- sessed at least some of the narcotics found in the van. Held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant constructively possessed at least some of the narcotics to support the defendant's conviction, as the jury reasonably could have inferred, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, that the defendant knew of the presence of the narcotics in the van and exercised dominion and control over the narcotics: C testified that the van was parked in the rear of an otherwise vacant parking lot in broad daylight and was concealed by a cluster of bushes so that it was not visible from the street, the area was known for traffic in narcotics, the location of the van raised C's suspicions, the defendant quickly reached behind the driver's seat as C approached the van, and a subsequent search of the vehicle revealed that a large bag containing small rubber bands and a white powder that later tested positive for heroin was present where the defendant had reached, which supported the inference that the defendant hastily attempted to conceal the substance he knew was illegal and exercised dominion and control over it; moreover, other evidence found at the scene, as well as the wealth of evidence seized by the officers at the time of the arrest and the testimony of the witnesses, further provided a sufficient basis for the jury reasonably to find that the defendant knew that heroin was in the van and that he exercised dominion and control over at least a portion of it. Argued March 7—officially released October 15, 2019

The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant state officials, officers and employees, claiming that telephone calls he had made to them were unlawfully recorded because they failed to obtain his consent or to provide him with notice in violation of statute (§ 52-570d [a]) before recording the calls. The plaintiff sought, inter alia, to permanently enjoin the defendants and all state officials and employees from unlawfully recording telephonic communications in the conduct of state business. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that § 52-570d did not waive sovereign immunity by force of necessary implication, and that the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief failed because he did not make substantial allega- tions of wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants to promote an illegal purpose in excess of their statutory authority. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the defendants were immune from suit pursuant to the doctrine of sovereign immunity: a. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that because § 52-570d authorizes an aggrieved person to bring an action in the Superior Court, as does similar language in the statute (§ 17a-550) that provides remedies for violations of the patients' bill of rights, the only possible interpreta- tion of § 52-570d is that it impliedly waives sovereign immunity: unlike § 17a-550, which makes no distinction between patients of private and public mental health facilities, § 52-570d does not implicate a compelling public policy reason to provide those who have their telephonic commu- nications recorded in an illegal fashion by the government the same civil remedy as those who are recorded illegally by private parties and, thus, no language in § 52-570d required an interpretation that it impliedly waives sovereign immunity; moreover, related statutes that evidenced the remedial nature of § 17a-550 illuminated the breadth of the legislative concern for the fair treatment of mental patients, and a statute's instruc- tion as to what an aggrieved person must file and where to file it did not compel the conclusion that such a statute waives sovereign immunity. b. There was no merit to the plaintiff's assertion that because § 52-570d (b) exempts from liability certain state officials, it waives sovereign immunity from suit by necessary implication for those state officials not so designated, such as the defendants: the implicit waiver of sovereign immunity from liability in § 52-570d (a) and (b) did not implicitly waive sovereign immunity from suit, and the exemption of certain state officials in § 52-570d (b) from the provisions of § 52-570d (a) did not require the conclusion that the legislature intended to waive sovereign immunity from suit with respect to those claims, as a statute logically can be interpreted as waiving sovereign immunity from liability with respect to certain state officials but not waiving sovereign immunity from suit with respect to claims against those officials; moreover, where the state waives sovereign immunity from liability but not its immunity from suit, an aggrieved person in such circumstances is not without recourse and may seek recovery against the state by filing a claim with the Claims Commissioner pursuant to statute (§ 4-141 et seq.). 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that because he sought declara- tory and injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of an officer's statutory authority, the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint by failing to apply the exception to sovereign immunity for claims of declaratory and injunctive relief, as the plaintiff failed to alleged a cogni- zable claim under that exception to sovereign immunity; the trial court properly determined that the complaint did not set forth substantial allegations of wrongful conduct by the defendants to promote an illegal purpose in excess of their statutory authority, as the plaintiff's interpreta- tion of § 52-570d would impose civil liability on state officials for conduct as innocuous as having an answering system that records voice mails, and the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendants recorded his tele- phonic communications to promote an illegal purpose and did not allege any purpose behind the recording of his telephonic communications in a manner proscribed by § 52-570d (a). Argued May 22—officially released October 15, 2019

The plaintiff, M. Co., which had obtained a default judgment in California against the defendants, J and G, brought this action seeking to enforce that judgment in Connecticut, alleging claims for breach of contract and quantum meruit. Following a trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of M Co., from which the defendants jointly appealed to this court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the defendants, on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which reversed this court's judgment, concluding that it did not have jurisdic- tion over the appeal due to a lack of a final judgment as to G, and remanded the case to this court with direction to dismiss the appeal. M Co. subsequently filed in the trial court a withdrawal of the action as to the breach of contract and quantum meruit counts against G, and the defendants jointly filed the present appeal to this court. M Co. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that it was untimely and, thus, subject to dismissal. The defendants subsequently filed a motion for permission to file a late appeal, which this court granted nunc pro tunc. Held that M Co.'s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied; contrary to M Co.'s claim that this court should dismiss the appeal because its untimeliness constituted a jurisdictional defect, the twenty day time limit for filing an appeal pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 63-1) is not subject matter jurisdictional and this court may, in its discretion, allow a party to file an untimely appeal, and although the general rule against hearing untimely appeals is necessary, in the present case good cause existed for allowing the defendants' appeal to proceed, as the policy considerations that ordinarily weigh against granting untimely appeals either were not present or were overborne by compet- ing considerations, the defendants did not strategically employ delay tactics for their own benefit, and allowing the defendants to file a late appeal would not prejudice M Co., whereas, if this court were to decline to allow the appeal to go forward, the defendants would be unduly deprived of their appellate rights. Considered June 26—officially released October 15, 2019

The plaintiff pedestrian sought to recover damages from the defendant for negligence for injuries she sustained when she was struck by a motor vehicle operated by the defendant. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance with it, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail in her claim that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, which was based on her claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of contributory negligence, the record having contained ample evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence was a substantial factor in causing her injuries: there was evidence that the plaintiff was not in a designated crosswalk at the time of the collision, although there was a crosswalk approximately 750 feet down the road- way that would have been visible to the plaintiff and which she previously had used, that it was dark at the time of the collision and the plaintiff was wearing dark clothing, which the jury reasonably could have concluded would have made it difficult for the defendant to see her, that the plaintiff had ''popped out'' in front of the defendant's vehicle, that the area of the collision was flat and straight and that the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the collision, from which the jury could have inferred that the plaintiff walked or ran into the path of the defendant's vehicle and failed to yield the right-of-way to the defendant, that had the plaintiff been paying attention or keeping a proper lookout, she would have seen the defendant's vehicle in sufficient time to avoid the collision, and that the plaintiff was not exercising reasonable care to avoid harm to herself; moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff's negli- gence far exceeded the defendant's negligence, as there was evidence that the plaintiff had consumed approximately nine alcoholic drinks shortly before the collision and that she was captured on camera having difficulty standing and walking, whereas there was evidence that the defendant had consumed one alcoholic drink one and one-half hours before the collision and did not appear inebriated, and the defendant testified that she was not speeding and was paying attention to the roadway. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on contributory negligence when such a charge was not supported by the evidence was unavailing; the record contained sufficient evidence of the plaintiff's contributory negligence to support the court's instruction, including evidence that the plaintiff was intoxicated, did not cross at a designated crosswalk and was wearing dark clothing when she suddenly appeared in the roadway. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on the relevant statutes governing the parties' respective duties, which was based on her claim that once the court instructed the jury on a pedestrian's duties pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 14-300b [a] and 14-300c [b]), its refusal to charge the jury on the duties that a driver owes to pedestrians pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 14-300d and 14-300i) constituted error: the court incorpo- rated the duties of pedestrians identified in §§ 14-300b (a) and 14-200c (b) in its charge on contributory negligence, and the duties of drivers in relation to pedestrians identified in §§ 14-300d and 14-300i in its charge on negligence, the fact that the jury found the defendant 10 percent negligent indicated that the jury understood that the defendant owed a duty of care notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence, and, therefore, the court adequately instructed the jury regarding the defendant's duty to exercise reasonable care; moreover, although the instructions were not a model of clarity, jury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury, and there was not a reasonable possibility the court's charge misled the jury. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motions for a mistrial and to set aside the verdict, in which she claimed that she was prejudiced by the admission into evidence of certain improper hearsay evidence during the videotaped deposition testimony of the defendant's expert toxicologist, M, who commented in the video that the plaintiff had stated that she recalled walking across the roadway, even though the parties did not dispute that the plaintiff did not recall the accident and had agreed that M's comment would be excluded from the recording shown to the jury; immediately after the recording containing M's comment was played for the jury, the plaintiff's counsel corrected M, explaining that his statement was based on a police officer's mistaken interpretation of a comment by the plaintiff's mother, M admit- ted that he was mistaken, and the court gave the jury an instruction, which it was presumed to have followed, to ignore any comments indicat- ing that the plaintiff remembered the collision shortly after the jury viewed the recording. Argued February 5—officially released October 22, 2019

The defendant, who had been convicted on guilty pleas under multiple informations of three counts operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of statute (§ 14-227a), two counts of failure to appear in the second degree and of criminal trespass in the first degree, appealed to this court challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. At sentencing, the defendant made an oral motion to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that he was under the influence of psychotropic medication at the time he entered the plea agreement and because the plea canvass was deficient. Defense counsel also claimed that he was ineffective. The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas and sentenced the defendant in accordance with his pleas. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an eviden- tiary hearing with respect to the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; the defendant never requested an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court afforded him an opportunity to be heard on his various claims, including his motion to withdraw his pleas at the sentencing hearing itself, and the defendant failed to provide an adequate factual basis to support a further hearing, as the defendant told the court during the plea canvass that he was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol or medications, he did not provide the names of any medications or claim that they rendered his guilty pleas involuntary, defense counsel's assertion that the plea canvass was deficient for failing to specify that the defendant's driver's license could be revoked perma- nently was not a reason among the grounds enumerated in the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-27) for the withdrawal of a plea, and neither defense counsel nor the defendant provided a factual basis for the assertion that defense counsel had been ineffective. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 39-27), on the ground that his counsel was ineffective, as the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of providing that the guilty pleas resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel; although the defendant claimed that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to investigate his case in several ways, defense counsel presented only bare assertions of those claims, and the defendant, thus, presented an inadequate factual and legal basis to support his assertion, and neither the defendant nor his counsel articu- lated or proved that but for counsel's alleged errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to terminating the defendant's participation in an alcohol education program, the purpose of which is to allow first time offenders of § 14-227a an opportunity to rehabilitate so as to avoid further involvement with the criminal justice system while protecting the public from persons who operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; the defendant had been admitted to the program following his second operating a motor vehicle while under the influence charge, after which he was arrested for a third such charge and entered into a global plea agreement that included guilty pleas to three counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence as a first offender, and it was apparent from the record that the trial court recognized that, by pleading guilty to those three counts, the defendant effectively conceded that, despite participating in the program, he was not entitled to a dismissal of the charge, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's pleas, the court properly made an indepen- dent determination that the termination of the defendant's participation in the program was warranted. Argued April 22—officially released October 22, 2019

The defendant mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff father sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties' minor child and issuing certain orders. The plain- tiff had filed an application seeking sole custody of the child, who had been living with the defendant since his birth. The plaintiff also filed motions for pendente lite orders to establish a parenting plan, to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child and for child support. Thereafter, the trial court issued a pendente lite order appointing H as guardian ad litem for the child and accepted the parties' stipulation regarding pendente lite financial orders. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion seeking to hold the plaintiff in contempt for violating the pendente lite financial orders, and the plaintiff filed a motion to modify his support obligations under the financial orders, claiming a substantial change in circum- stances. Following a hearing on the plaintiff's application for custody, the trial court found that the plaintiff had rebutted the presumption of joint legal custody and ordered that the plaintiff have sole legal and primary physical custody of the child, with parenting time for the defen- dant, and that the defendant pay the plaintiff $241 in weekly child support in accordance with the Connecticut child support guidelines. The court also issued a protective order pending any potential appeal to secure the custody award in order to provide a smooth as possible transition for the child. In addition, the court issued orders related to, inter alia, the child's education and associated costs, and ordered that H continue to serve as the child's guardian ad litem and issued various orders related thereto. The court also granted the plaintiff's motion to modify and ordered that the plaintiff's child support obligation would terminate on the date when the defendant's child support obligation began. The court, however, did not rule on the defendant's motion for contempt. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly delegated its decision-making authority to a nonjudicial entity when it defined the duties and responsibilities of the guardian ad litem: none of the challenged duties amounted to an improper delegation of the court's authority, as the breadth of tasks assigned to the guardian ad litem reflected the court's confidence in the commitment and talent of the guardian ad litem, and the court's desire to minimize the effect of the parties' toxic parenting relationship on the child and to discourage them from heedless and incessant litigation over matters that should not require judicial intervention; moreover, contrary to the defendant's claim, requiring that the guardian ad litem hold the child's passport, monitor the parties' communications, review the child's telephone bill, investigate facts, make recommendations, mediate disputes and testify in court in no way empowered the guardian ad litem to issue orders that affect the parties or the child, and although the court did authorize the guardian ad litem to select a coparenting counselor/coordinator in the absence of an agreement between the parties, any dispute regarding the selection of a coparenting counselor/coordinator reflected little more than a difference of opinion or preference between the parties and did not so implicate the best interests of the child as to require judicial resolution of the matter. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering that the prevailing party in any postjudgment dispute between the parties adjudicated by the court after unsuccessful mediation with the guardian ad litem be reim- bursed by the other party for his or her share of the guardian ad litem's fees; the amount of any future fees and the parties' respective financial capacities to pay such fees were purely speculative, and there was nothing in the record to guarantee that if any such guardian ad litem fees became due, the respective financial situations of the parties would have remained unchanged. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly appointed the guard- ian ad litem without having complied with certain statutory requirements was moot, that court's relevant order having been superseded by subse- quent orders of the court that addressed the same issues, and, therefore, there was no practical relief that this court could afford the defendant. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in, sua sponte, issuing its protective order: the language of the order clearly indicated that that court intended it to function as a protective order issued pursuant to Yontef v. Yontef (185 Conn. 275) that was meant to ensure an orderly transition that protected the primary interests of the child in a continu- ous, stable custodial placement, and the court had the inherent authority to issue such an order sua sponte to preserve the parties' rights during the immediate postjudgment period pending an appeal; moreover, the need for such an order was amply supported by the record, as the court found that there was an extraordinarily high level of conflict and mistrust between the parties, that the parties had been wholly incapable of resolving such conflict, that the parties demonstrated a willingness to disregard court orders and to engage in self-help, and that their behavior had the potential to do irreparable harm to the child. 5. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the parties to enroll the child in private school through high school and to divide the payments for that schooling: although that court did not abuse its discretion in determining that it was appropriate for the child to continue to attend the private school that he had been enrolled in through eighth grade, there was no evidence of the cost of a private high school or that the parties had ever agreed on the child attending a private high school, as the parties' financial affidavits listed only the cost of the child's current attendance at the private school, and the court's determination that it lacked sufficient evidence to issue an educational support order for higher education or private occupational school, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56c [c]), supported the notion that the court also lacked sufficient evidence to issue an order for private high school. 6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the child support guidelines worksheet in issuing its child support orders; contrary to the defendant's claim, the net income figures contained in the child support guidelines worksheet and relied on by the court were supported in the record. 7. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court, by failing to order the plaintiff to reimburse her for certain expenses he allegedly should have paid in accordance with a prior stipulation between the parties, in effect, granted the plaintiff a retroactive modifica- tion of pendente lite orders to pay those expenses; because the trial court did not rule on the defendant's motion for contempt, and it made no findings or orders in regard to what the defendant alleged the plaintiff owed, there was no retroactive modification from which to appeal, and, therefore, in the absence of a decision on the defendant's motion from the trial court or an explanation for its failure to rule on the motion, this court had no basis for reviewing the trial court's silence. Argued May 16—officially released October 22, 2019

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of arson in the first degree and murder, filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his right to a fair trial under the state and federal constitutions had been violated. Specifically, he claimed that because A, an attorney with the Office of the State's Attorney, initially had prosecuted his criminal case before the trial court declared a mistrial on the ground that A had become a potential witness in the case, the Office of the Chief State's Attorney, which prosecuted the petitioner's criminal case in the second trial, should have disqualified itself from the case under the Rules of Professional Conduct. The habeas court granted the motion to dismiss filed by the respondent Commissioner of Correction and rendered judgment thereon, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's third habeas petition, as the petition failed to state a claim upon which habeas relief could be granted; the petitioner could not assert, on the facts alleged, a claim for relief under the applicable rules (1.10 and 3.7) of the Rules of Profes- sional Conduct, as neither rule 1.10 nor 3.7 required disqualification of the attorneys in all of the state's attorney's offices and the Office of the Chief State's Attorney, the petitioner provided no basis for any conclu- sion that certain statements he had made to A during plea discussions while the petitioner was self-represented were privileged, as an attorney- client relationship did not exist between the petitioner and A, and although the petitioner claimed that A's potential testimony regarding the petitioner's statements to A would have been inadmissible and that the threat of A's testimony effectively prevented him from testifying in his own defense, that claim was entirely speculative, especially given that the petitioner did not file a motion in limine to obtain a ruling regarding the admissibility of A's potential testimony. Argued May 20—officially released October 22, 2019

The plaintiff brought this action seeking joint custody of the parties' minor child. After the trial court rendered judgment granting joint legal custody to the parties and primary physical custody to the defendant, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of custody. During the pendency of the custody modification proceedings, the plaintiff also filed two motions seeking a declaratory judgment that certain fundamental rights guaran- teed by the federal and state constitutions deprived the court of the authority to adjudicate parental custody conflicts under the best inter- ests of the child standard. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying in part the plaintiff's motion for modification of custody, dis- missing her motions for a declaratory judgment and awarding attorney's fees to the defendant. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that the court violated her fourteenth amendment rights by terminating a portion of certain rights provided to her under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (act) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) without conducting a fitness hearing was not reviewable, the plaintiff having failed to brief the claim adequately; moreover, even if the issue of federal preemption had been adequately briefed, it would not have any applicability to the precise claim as framed by the plaintiff, as the plaintiff stated in her brief that she was not appealing from the trial court's decision declining to modify the existing order that she has no authority to change the location of the child's schooling, which was the sole basis for her claim under the act. 2. The trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's motions for a declaratory judgment that the court had no authority under the federal and state constitutions to intervene in her long-standing custody disputes with her child's father; the plaintiff's constitutional claims were mer- itless, as she fundamentally misunderstood when declaratory relief judg- ment is statutorily available and failed to recognized the difference between unwarranted governmental or third-party actions intruding upon the lives of intact families, as opposed to the obligation of family courts to hear and decide cases brought before them by one parent against the other. 3. The trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for modification of custody; the court carefully considered and applied the criteria set forth in the applicable statute (§ 46b-56), the court's factual determina- tion that there had not been a change in circumstances warranting an increase in the plaintiff's parental access during the school year or any change in how decisions affecting the child are made was supported by the evidence, and the plaintiff did not explain how she derived her mathematical computations to support her claim that the court miscalculated the number of home to home transitions the child would experience under her proposed orders. 4. The trial court did not err in awarding the defendant $3500 for a portion of his attorney's fees; that court, which considered all of the relevant statutory (§ 46b-62) criteria, as well as the parties' testimony, evidence and an affidavit of legal fees filed by the defendant's counsel, found the amount and hourly rate set forth in the affidavit to be reasonable, and concluded from all the credible evidence that the plaintiff was in a financial position to contribute to a portion of fees incurred by the defendant for the third course of litigation on the same topic concerning the plaintiff's access to the minor child, and the trial court's failure to address the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's request for attorney's fees was harmless error, as the objection failed to address the criteria in § 46b-62. Argued April 9—officially released October 29, 2019

The plaintiff appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Water Pollution Control Authority of the Town of Westport denying the plaintiff's application for a sewer extension. After the matter was tried to the court, the court remanded the application for a new hearing, at which the plaintiff could produce new evidence germane to the equitable disposition of its application. Following a new hearing, the defendant again denied the plaintiff's application, and the plaintiff appealed to the trial court, which rendered judgment sustaining the second appeal, reversing the defendant's denial of the application, and remanding the application for conditional approval subject to the completion of ongoing improvements and upgrades to the sanitary sewer system. Thereafter, the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly rendered judgment sustaining the plaintiff's appeal and remanding the matter to the defendant with direc- tion to grant the sewer extension application, as the decision of whether to grant a conditional approval of a sewer extension application was properly left to the discretion of the defendant, and the court impermissi- bly substituted its own discretion and judgment for that of the defendant by overriding its decision and ordering a conditional approval of the application: the fact that a conditional approval of an application would be a viable option available to an agency in considering an application does not mean that the agency must exercise that option whenever possible and in all situations, the defendant here chose to reject the rationale relied on by the trial court in favor of a more cautious approach that required the plaintiff to file a new application once it could demon- strate that sufficient sewer capacity existed for the planned develop- ment, and the record did not support a conclusion that the defendant's decision was illegal, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion; moreover, the defendant was entitled to a presumption of regularity in its decision- making process, as it had provided the additional rationale that it was a settled policy of the defendant not to grant conditional approval of applications, there was unrebutted testimony that the defendant had not granted a conditional approval in more than thirty years, which was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant had a practice to refrain from granting conditional approvals, and, by choosing not to do so in the present case, it was acting in accordance with its usual practices and procedures. Argued April 22—officially released October 29, 2019

The plaintiffs, V and O, appealed to this court from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant town of Colchester. The plaintiffs owned an undeveloped parcel of real property located in Colchester in an area that is designated as a flood zone on a map prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A survey indicated that the map incorrectly located a portion of a brook on the property, which the plaintiffs claimed caused the property to be improperly designated as being in a flood zone. V submitted to FEMA an application for a Letter of Map Amendment to correct the map, and FEMA requested additional information. The plaintiffs thereafter demanded that the defendant file an application for a Letter of Map Revision (LOMR) with FEMA on their behalf, and when the defendant declined, the plaintiffs commenced this action seeking a writ of manda- mus to compel the defendant to do so. The plaintiffs contended that the applicable federal regulations (44 C.F.R. §§ 65.3 and 65.7) impose a ministerial duty on the defendant to file a LOMR application on their behalf to rectify the incorrect depiction of their property on the map. After the plaintiffs appealed to this court from the summary judgment rendered in the defendant's favor, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that the appeal had been rendered moot by certain recent developments. Specifically, in 2016, FEMA officials informed the defendant of a new program that was intended to help communities reduce their flood risk. The defendant's town engineer asked FEMA to review the flood zone mapping in the area of the subject brook for potential conflicts between the flood limits shown on the map and the actual flood limit elevations based on topography. In 2018, FEMA notified the defendant that it had completed the discovery portion of the new program and had selected the brook for an upcoming study. This court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal without preju- dice. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the appeal was moot was unavailing, as FEMA's pending study of the brook did not render the appeal moot; correspon- dence from FEMA to the defendant indicated that the new program was being implemented for the first time, and the record did not indicate when the program would conclude or when any final determination regarding the brook would transpire, and, guided by the fundamental precept that this court must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of jurisdiction in resolving the issue of mootness, this court could not conclude on the limited record before it that the pending review of the brook under the program necessarily deprived this court of the ability to provide the plaintiffs with any meaningful relief. 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to file a LOMR application on their behalf: a. Despite the plaintiffs' contention that the defendant owed a duty to initiate a LOMR application pursuant to § 65.3, by its plain language § 65.3 concerns physical changes to property, it was undisputed that no physical change affecting flooding conditions had occurred with respect to the plaintiffs' property, as the plaintiffs' claim was that the brook was improperly depicted on a portion of their property since the map was promulgated, and, therefore, in the absence of any allegation that the plaintiffs' property underwent any physical change or that it was affected by a physical change to another property, the plaintiffs' claim was untenable; moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs attempted to inject new factual allegations into the case for the first time on appeal, such allegations were improper, having never been raised before the trial court, and this court declined to consider them. b. The plaintiffs could not prevail in their claim that § 65.7 imposed a ministerial duty on the defendant to file a LOMR application to correct the inaccurate description of the brook on their behalf: a prerequisite to the extraordinary relief afforded by a writ of mandamus is the exis- tence of a ministerial duty, and a community's determination pursuant to § 65.7, as to whether any ''practicable alternatives exist'' to revising the boundaries of a previously adopted floodway is a quintessentially discretionary function, as opposed to a ministerial function, as that determination requires a community to exercise its judgment as to whether alternatives to revising such boundaries are practical; moreover, the applicable federal regulation (44 C.F.R. § 72.1) expressly indicates that LOMR applications are predicated on proposed or actual manmade alterations within the floodplain, § 65.7 plainly and unambiguously con- cerns changes to floodways, and because the plaintiffs did not allege any manmade alterations or physical changes affecting their property or the designation thereof, § 65.7 was inapposite to the present case. c. The plaintiffs did not demonstrate that they had no adequate remedy at law: the plaintiffs neither alleged in their complaint nor provided any evidence that property owners are precluded from filing LOMR applications, and a review of the regulatory scheme indicated that prop- erty owners were not precluded from filing LOMR applications, as the National Flood Insurance Program plainly envisions the filing of LOMR applications by parties other than local communities such as the defen- dant; moreover, the instructions provided by FEMA for completing LOMR applications require the submission of a concurrence form with signatures of the requester, community official and engineer, the purpose of which is to ensure that the community is aware of the impacts of the LOMR application and which was further evidence that the program envisions applicants other than local communities, and the plaintiffs presented no basis on which this court reasonably could conclude that a property owner is prohibited, as a matter of federal administrative law, from filing a LOMR application, and the availability of that legal remedy, which would provide the plaintiffs the relief that they sought, was fatal to their mandamus action. Argued April 9—officially released October 29, 2019