Volume 194 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff trustee of a trust brought this action to recover damages from the defendant beneficiaries of the trust, B and J, for common-law and statutory (§ 52-568) vexatious litigation in connection with a prior action that J and other beneficiaries had commenced against the trustee and in which B had filed a cross complaint against the trustee. In that prior action, B and J had claimed that the trustee improperly failed to provide them with certain accountings of the trust before the death of the settlor, R. Judgment was rendered in favor of the trustee on the operative complaint of J and cross complaint of B after the partial granting of a motion for summary judgment and a jury verdict. Thereafter, the trustee brought this action, claiming that all of the counts against him in the prior action were terminated by way of summary judgment or resolved by the jury in his favor. The trial court found that the trustee had conceded that his action would fail if he did not to prove one of his vexatious litigation claims as to one of the claims by B and J in the prior action. The court rendered judgment in favor of B and J after it determined that the trustee had failed to prove that they lacked probable cause, as required under the common law and under § 52-568 (1), to sue him for failure to provide them with accountings, and had failed to prove that B and J had acted with malice, as required under § 52-568 (2). The trustee thereafter filed a motion for reargument and reconsidera- tion in which he claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had stated mistakenly in its memorandum of decision that he had conceded that his action would fail if he could not prove that B and J lacked probable cause to bring all of the counts in the prior action. The trial court granted the motion for reargument and reconsideration and rendered judgment for the trustee on his claim under § 52-568 (1), and rendered judgment for B and J as to the trustee's claims under the common law and § 52- 568 (2). B and J then appealed and the trustee cross appealed to this court. B and J claimed, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the trustee's causes of action and improperly failed to consider whether R had been subjected to undue influence in connection with the creation of the trust. The trustee, on cross appeal, claimed, inter alia, that the trial court should have concluded that all of the claims at issue were vexatious in nature and, thus, rendered judgment in his favor with respect to those claims. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied B's motion to dismiss the trustee's action, in which B claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the trustee's lack of standing at the time he commenced the action: although the trust document did not specifically authorize the trustee to commence a vexatious litigation action, the trustee had a specific interest in the claims he brought against B and J in his capacity as trustee, and a common-law duty to take reasonable steps to recoup assets of the trust, including attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of the prior action, within a reasonable time frame during the winding up of the trust after R's death, as the trustee' actions were a reasonably necessary part of the winding up process, and no provision of the trust specifically abrogated the trustee's fundamental duty to pursue claims and recoup assets on behalf of the trust, including claims against beneficiaries; moreover, B and J provided no support for their claim that the trustee lacked authority to pursue his claims because the trust's beneficiaries had standing to pursue a claim against their fellow beneficiaries for damages related to the prior action, as the trustee had a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the trust and not to defer to decisions made by beneficiaries, and B and J provided no authority to support the proposition that the trustee lacked the authority to carry out his duties as trustee during the winding up period without first seeking the approval of one or more beneficiaries of the trust. 2. B and J could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly failed to consider whether R was subjected to undue influence in connec- tion with the creation of the trust; there was no indication that the court ignored or failed to consider evidence of undue influence, although the court did not expressly address the issue of undue influence in its factual findings, it plainly found that R was advised of and satisfied with the contents of the trust, and the court was not obligated to resolve the issue of undue influence because the question before it was whether J had probable cause in the prior action to claim that the trust should be modified on the ground of undue influence, and whether B and J, in relying on their claim of undue influence, had probable cause to bring their claims against the trustee. 3. This court found unavailing the claim by B and J that the trial court misinterpreted relevant law in its analysis of whether they had probable cause in the prior action to claim that the trustee had failed to diversify the trust's assets in violation of statute (§ 45a-541c); the claim by B and J rested on the faulty premise, which this court rejected, that the trial court failed to consider whether R was subjected to undue influence in connection with the creation of the trust, as the trial court plainly found that R had been advised of the contents of the trust and was satisfied with them. 4. B and J could not prevail on their claim that the trial court misinterpreted relevant law in its analysis of whether the trustee could prevail merely by demonstrating that B and J lacked probable cause to bring one of the several claims against him in the prior action; contrary to the assertion by B and J that the trustee's claims merely presented different theories of recovery that arose from his conduct in the prior action in failing to diversify the trust's assets, the court properly applied the law and concluded that the claim of failure to diversify trust assets was logically severable from the remaining claims for which probable cause existed, as the failure to diversify claim was not based on the identical factual allegations as the remaining claims, the allegations in each claim related to facts that differed in terms of times, occurrences and actions, and each of the claims at issue amounted to separate and distinct charges to which the trustee was required to respond. 5. The trial court did not properly analyze whether B and J had probable cause to bring certain of their claims against the trustee in the prior action, as the court essentially disallowed any reliance by the trustee on the trust's exculpatory clause to demonstrate that B and J lacked probable cause: although the exculpatory clause did not cloak the trustee with immunity from suit, the clause was highly relevant to an analysis of whether probable cause existed to bring the claims at issue against the trustee in that it represented a significant hurdle for B and J to overcome in order to demonstrate that the trustee was liable for the damages that they sought in the prior action, and, therefore, the trial could should have considered whether B and J reasonably believed that they could overcome the exculpatory clause and whether they reasonably believed that they were able to prove that R had been sub- jected to undue influence; moreover, because B was an attorney at the time he filed his cross complaint, the court had to resolve the issue of whether a reasonable attorney would have believed that B had probable cause to bring the claims in the cross complaint, and with respect to J, the court had to determine whether the facts known to J at the time he brought the claims against the trustee in the prior action were sufficient to give rise to a bona fide belief that he should entertain the action against the trustee; accordingly, the judgment could not stand with respect to the trustee's claims under § 52-568 (1) that alleged that B and J lacked probable cause in the prior action to bring certain claims in various counts of the complaint and cross complaint. Argued December 3, 2018—officially released October 29, 2019

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her postdissolution motion for contempt, in which she claimed that the defendant had violated a certain alimony obligation contained in the parties' separation agreement. The separation agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, required the plaintiff to pay the defendant alimony based on his annual income from employ- ment, which was defined as line 1 on the plaintiff's annual schedule K- 1 from his then employer, the law firm M. Co., and included a requirement that the plaintiff pay the defendant true up alimony based on his gross income over a certain amount. Subsequently, the plaintiff sold his inter- est in M. Co., where he had been a partner, and became a partner in a new law firm, G. Co. That year, the plaintiff received two schedule K- 1s, one from M. Co. and one from G. Co., each of which listed income amounts on lines 1 and 4. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's true up alimony obligation for that year must be based on the total of all of those lines and filed a motion for contempt based on the plaintiff's nonpayment of any true up alimony for that year. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's motion and requested statutory attorney's fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for contempt and did not award attorney's fees to either party. On the defendant's appeal and the plain- tiff's cross appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for contempt: pursuant to the specific and plain language of the settlement agreement, which the parties freely agreed to use when they drafted the agreement, only income reported on line 1 of the schedule K-1 could be used in calculating the plaintiff's true up alimony obligation, and because the plaintiff's combined line 1 income from both K-1s was less than a certain amount, the defendant was not entitled to any true up alimony for that year; moreover, the defendant's claim that certain language in the parties' agreement required that the reference to line 1 income was meant merely to be an example of one type of employment income that could be considered with other types of alleged income in calculating the plain- tiff's true up alimony obligation was belied by the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim on cross appeal that the trial court improperly denied his request for attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully opposing the defendant's motion for contempt; following a review of the briefs of the parties and the record of the hearing on the motion for contempt, this court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to award attorney's fees to the plaintiff. (One judge concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued April 15—officially released October 29, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of robbery in the first degree and threatening in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he displayed a semiauto- matic pistol to the victims and stole marijuana from them, dropping his wallet as he fled. Upon receiving a text message from one of the victims, the defendant replied with a text message demanding his wallet and threatening to shoot the victims. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a photograph of guns that had been forensically extracted from his cell phone by the police. Held: 1. Even if it was improper for the trial court to admit the photograph into evidence and not give the jury a limiting instruction, the defendant failed to demonstrate that he was harmed thereby, as the alleged error did not substantially affect the verdict; the state's case against the defendant was supported by additional strong evidence, including identifications of the defendant by victims who knew him, and the state presented evidence of text messages that corroborated the victims' version of events, as well as evidence that the police had seized the defendant's wallet from the crime scene. 2. The defendant could not prevail, pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), on his unpreserved claim that the state violated his due process right to a fair trial by eliciting testimony during a witness examination and making a remark during closing arguments about his postarrest and post-Miranda silence; even if a constitutional violation existed, the state established that the alleged constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the prosecutor did not focus on the defendant's post-Miranda silence or engage in repetitive references to the defen- dant's silence, the challenged testimony related to the efforts made by the police to locate the firearm, evidence introduced by the state that was unrelated to the defendant's silence, including the identification of the defendant by two witnesses who knew him, which corroborated text messages between the defendant and a victim, and the seizure of the defendant's wallet from the crime scene, proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and defense counsel failed to object to the testimony and prosecutor's remark during closing arguments. Argued January 9—officially released November 5, 2019

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of the victim, who died of asphyxia by manual strangulation and had been found in the basement of an apartment building, filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance from the counsel who had represented him with respect to his criminal trial. Specifically, he claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and call R as a witness at the criminal trial, and to present a defense predicated on R's testimony and a written statement R had provided to the police, in which R stated that S had confessed to killing the victim. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his claims of ineffec- tive assistance of counsel were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could have resolved the issues in a different manner, or that the questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further: the habeas court's findings that S's confession to R, which trial counsel did not present to the jury at the petitioner's criminal trial, did not exclude the presence of others in the basement at the time of the victim's murder and that R assumed that the petitioner was not with S when S murdered the victim were not clearly erroneous, as the evidence in the record did not indicate that S told R that the petitioner was not present when S murdered the victim, R's testimony and statement indicated only that S killed the victim, and the evidence supported the court's findings that S's confession did not exclude the presence of others at the crime scene when S murdered the victim and that R merely presumed that the petitioner was absent; moreover, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged deficient performance because, even if S's confession to R had been presented to the jury at the petitioner's criminal trial, there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been dif- ferent. Argued September 9—officially released November 5, 2019

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and criminal possession of a firearm, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to set aside the judgment of conviction. The court dismissed the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment, filed in 2017, on the ground of collateral estoppel in that the defendant's claim of ''after-discovered fraud'' on the court had already been considered and rejected multiple times before, includ- ing, most recently, when the trial court denied a motion to open and set aside the judgment he had filed in 2010, which alleged, inter alia, fraud concerning ballistics evidence. Alternatively, the court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 2017 motion to set aside the judgment and that, even if the defendant could make out a cognizable fraud claim, no fraud exception exists to the finality of crimi- nal judgments. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in dismissing his 2017 motion to set aside the judgment of conviction, as the defendant's appeal was rendered moot because he failed to challenge all independent grounds for the court's adverse ruling: although the defendant claimed that it was error for the trial court to find that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 2017 motion to set aside the judgment, he failed to challenge the court's independent ground for dismissing the 2017 motion to set aside the judgment, namely, that the defendant's claim was substantively the same as others he had made multiple times before, most recently in 2010, and, thus, was collaterally estopped, and, therefore, even if this court agreed with the defendant on the merits of his subject matter jurisdiction claim, there was no practical relief that could be afforded to him in light of the unchallenged collateral estoppel basis for the trial court's dismissal; accordingly, the defendant's claims were moot and this court was without subject matter jurisdiction over his appeal. Argued September 11—officially released November 5, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, attempt to commit assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and criminal possession of a firearm, filed a petition for a new trial, alleging that he had been convicted due to fraud by the prosecutor. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the respondent, the state of Connecticut, on the ground that the petitioner had filed the petition for a new trial past the applicable three year statute of limitations ([Rev. to 2001] § 52-582). The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration in August, 2017, which the court denied in September, 2017, and the petitioner appealed to this court. In February, 2018, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the denial of the petition for a new trial and a request for leave to file a late petition for certification, which the trial court denied. Subsequently, the peti- tioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. On appeal, the petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his late petition for certification to appeal. Held that the trial court properly denied the petitioner's request for permission to file a late petition for certification, as the petitioner failed to demon- strate how the court's ruling, based on the court's finding of a lack of good cause for the petitioner's delay, satisfied any of the criteria that constitutes an abuse of discretion; the record revealed that there was a delay of over four months from when the August, 2017 motion for reconsideration was denied and when the petitioner filed the petition for certification and the request for leave to file a late petition for certification, which was far beyond the statutory (§ 54-95 [a]) ten day time frame, and although the petitioner attributed the filing delay to errors by the office of the clerk, which incorrectly returned the petition to him, the trial court's order demonstrated that it properly considered the reasons for the petitioner's delay in filing the petition, and the petitioner did not explain how the alleged clerical error by the clerk's office led to an over four month delay in filing the petition. Argued September 11—officially released November 5, 2019

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of felony murder, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that due process required that the state prove that he breached his initial plea agreement before it could enter into a second plea agreement with him. The defendant had agreed to plead guilty in exchange for his truthful testimony at the trial of his codefendant, or where, as here, the codefen- dant pleaded guilty without going to trial, the state would recommend a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. After the trial court permitted the defendant to withdraw a motion he had filed to withdraw his initial guilty plea, the court vacated the defendant's initial plea. The defendant then pleaded guilty to felony murder, after which the court accepted the state's recommendation that it impose a sentence of thirty years of incarceration. Held that the judgment of the trial court denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was affirmed; the trial court having fully addressed the arguments raised in this appeal, this court adopted the trial court's well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued September 19—officially released November 5, 2019

The plaintiffs brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment and to quiet title relating to the scope of an ingress and egress easement in favor of the defendants, which was located on a shared driveway on the plaintiffs' property. Following a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the declaratory judgment rendered by the trial court did not provide the plaintiffs with any practical relief and, thus, did not solve a justiciable controversy, which was based on their claim that because the parties agreed that the easement was limited to ingress and egress, the plaintiffs were in the same position they were in prior to the commencement of the action; the plaintiffs' action alleged the overburdening of an easement, specifically, that the scope of permissible uses of the easement by the dominant estate was limited to ingress and egress and that any other use would overburden the easement, the defendants claimed that there was no cause of action for minor, infrequent use of the easement unre- lated to ingress and egress, and the court's judgment, which adjudicated the rights of the parties with respect to the scope of the easement, effectively adopted the plaintiffs' position, and, consequently, the plain- tiffs were not in the same position as they were prior to the commence- ment of the action, and the claimed controversy was justiciable. 2. The defendants' claim that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining that they had overburdened the easement was unavailing; although the defendants claimed that the court improperly proscribed, contrary to a reasonableness standard, trivial and infrequent conduct, such as the defendants' children writing with chalk on the easement area, given the clear and unequivocal language of the easement, the defendants' rights thereunder were expressly limited to ingress and egress, the defendants acknowledged that their rights under the ease- ment were limited to ingress and egress, and because the record sup- ported the court's finding that the defendants' children engaged in activi- ties on the driveway unrelated to ingress and egress, the trial court properly evaluated the scope of the easement. Argued September 10—officially released November 5, 2019

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted on a guilty plea of two counts of murder and one count of assault in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. During the trial of the present case, the petitioner and A, the petitioner's grandmother, both testified that they met with the petitioner's trial counsel, who threatened the petitioner that A and the petitioner's cousin would go to prison if he did not plead guilty. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the amended habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal; the petitioner's claims essentially challenged the determination of the credibility of witnesses by the habeas court, which is the sole arbiter of witness credibility and expressly found that the testimony of the petitioner and A, alleging that the petitioner had been coerced into pleading guilty, was not credible, that was the only evidence offered to support the petitioner's claims that his plea had been coerced and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and the credibility of trial testimony is not debatable among jurists of reason. Argued September 13—officially released November 5, 2019

The defendant, who had been convicted, on guilty pleas, of the crimes of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree and sale of narcotics, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct a judgment mittimus. He claimed that the court improperly denied his motion on the ground that he was not entitled to the presentence confine- ment credit he claimed. Held that because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the Commissioner of Correction's applica- tion of presentence confinement credit, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant's motion and, therefore, should have dismissed it rather than denied it. Argued October 7—officially released November 5, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of criminal possession of a firearm, criminal posses- sion of ammunition, carrying a pistol without a permit, illegal receipt of a firearm, possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle and interfering with an officer, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that there was insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of illegal receipt of a firearm; the state did not prove that the defendant was disqualified from receiving a firearm at the time that he received the firearm in question, nor did it establish when the defendant came into possession of the firearm. Argued September 18—officially released November 12, 2019

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child in connection with his sexual abuse of the minor victim, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence expert testimony from M, an expert in forensic interviewing, regarding how child victims of sexual abuse behave and how they disclose their abuse, which he claimed was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and constituted impermissible vouching for the victim's credibility: a. The trial court did not commit plain error in admitting M's expert testimony; although M testified generally about the nature and purpose of forensic interviews, the general characteristics of sexually abused children, the different types of disclosures and several factors that may trigger those types of disclosures, M did not opine that the victim exhib- ited any of the characteristics she discussed but, rather, acknowledged the limitations of her testimony on cross-examination, noting that she did not know anything about the victim or her forensic interview, and stated that she was not offering any opinion about the victim's disclosure process or the truthfulness of any of her disclosures, and, therefore, M's testimony was consistent with testimony that our Supreme Court, in State v. Taylor G. (315 Conn. 734) and State v. Spigarolo (210 Conn. 359), previously has determined to be admissible. b. This court declined to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of justice to preclude, as a matter of law, the admission of expert testimony on the characteristics of children who report sexual abuse, as our Supreme Court has clearly held that such testimony is admissible, and this court could not use its supervisory authority to overrule binding Supreme Court precedent. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion during a pretrial hearing by refusing to permit him to ask the victim leading questions on direct examination was unavailing; there was nothing in the record to suggest that the victim's testimony would have been differ- ent had defense counsel been permitted to ask her leading questions, and, therefore, as the defendant conceded during oral argument before this court, he could not establish that the trial court's alleged error caused him harm. Argued September 5—officially released November 12, 2019

The plaintiff brought this action seeking, inter alia, the partition of certain real property that she owned as a joint tenant with the defendant. In count one of her complaint, the plaintiff sought a partition of the prop- erty, and in count two she sought an accounting and damages. After the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the first count of the complaint only, the plaintiff filed a motion for an order of partition by sale and the appointment of a committee. Thereafter, the court entered a notice of judgment of partition by sale and set a sale date, and the defendant appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. Subsequently, the defendant filed another appeal to this court from the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court, claiming that he brought the appeal to overturn summary judgment in order to stop the sale of the property. Held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defen- dant's appeal, the defendant having failed to appeal from a final judg- ment; a judgment that disposes of only part of a complaint is not a final judgment unless the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties, and it was undisputed that the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court did not dispose of all causes of action against the defendant, as the second count of the plaintiff's complaint remained pending and the record did not contain a withdrawal or an unconditional abandonment of that count of the plaintiff's complaint. Argued September 20—officially released November 12, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, attempt to commit murder, criminal possession of a firearm and illegal possession of a weapon in a motor vehicle in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel and his prior habeas counsel had provided ineffective assistance. Following the shooting, M overheard a conversation between the petitioner and two men regarding certain details of the shooting. Prior to the petitioner's criminal trial, trial counsel advised the petitioner that any testimony from M with respect to that conversation would not be admitted into evidence because it constituted hearsay. Thereafter, the petitioner rejected the state's plea offer of a sentence of thirty-five years of imprisonment and, instead, requested a twenty year sentence. During the criminal trial, the trial court admitted M's testimony pertaining to the postshooting conversation as an adoptive admission. Following the trial, the jury found the petitioner guilty of all the charges against him, and he was sentenced to a total effective term of sixty years of imprisonment. In his amended habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assis- tance by providing him with inaccurate legal advice as to the admissibil- ity of M's testimony concerning the postshooting conversation and that, but for that deficient legal advice, he would have accepted the thirty- five year plea deal rather than proceeding to trial. The petitioner also claimed that his prior habeas counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise that claim in his first habeas petition. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, concluding, inter alia, that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that it was reasonably probable that, in the absence of his trial counsel's alleged deficient advice, he would have accepted the thirty-five year plea deal, and, therefore, he failed to establish prejudice. In reaching its decision, the court discredited the petitioner's testimony that he would have accepted the plea offer had he received accurate legal advice from trial counsel, specifically stating that although the petitioner was sincere, his testimony on that issue was unreliable. Thereafter, on the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly denied the petitioner's amended habeas petition, that court having correctly concluded that the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proving that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged deficient performance: contrary to the petitioner's claim that the habeas court's finding that he would have rejected the thirty-five year plea deal even if he had received accurate advice from trial counsel concerning the admissibility of M's testimony was clearly erroneous because it was undermined by the court's statement regarding his sincerity, the court plainly distinguished the petitioner's sincerity from the unreliability of his testimony regarding whether he would have accepted the thirty-five year plea deal, finding that although the petitioner, in hindsight, sincerely believed that he would have accepted the plea deal after having been convicted and sentenced to sixty years of imprisonment, his testimony was unreliable as to whether he would have accepted it at the time it was offered to him; moreover, the habeas court's finding that the petitioner would have rejected the plea deal even if he had received accurate advice from trial counsel was supported by other evidence in the record that tended to demonstrate that the petitioner would not have accepted a plea deal of more than twenty years, and because the habeas court properly concluded that the peti- tioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that it was reasonably probable that he would have accepted the plea but for trial counsel's alleged deficient performance, this court declined to address the peti- tioner's claim that his prior habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, as that claim failed as a matter of law. Argued September 5—officially released November 12, 2019

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court affirming in part an order of a family support magistrate with respect to his motion for modification of his child support obligation and remanding the case for further proceedings. Held that the plaintiff's appeal from the order of the family support magistrate was not taken from a final judgment, which is a threshold requirement to appeal the order to the Superior Court, and, therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than resolving it on the merits; the family support magistrate did not fully dispose of the plaintiff's motion for modification, as he addressed only the first claim set forth in the motion and remanded the second claim pertaining to a certain stipulation between the parties to the family support magistrate for further proceedings, and, as evinced by certain additional proceedings before another family support magistrate and a resulting appeal to the Superior Court, the magistrate's order neither terminated a separate and distinct proceeding nor concluded the rights of the parties so that further proceedings could not affect them. Argued May 16—officially released November 19, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for, inter alia, fraud, in connection with false representations made during the defendants' sale of certain real property to the plaintiff. After the defen- dants were defaulted for failure to plead, a hearing in damages was held, after which the trial court awarded the plaintiff damages that included $4000 in attorney's fees. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict as to damages and for additur, which the court denied. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed that the court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for additur as to her attorney's fees. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for additur as to attorney's fees; our rules of practice provide for a motion for additur in connection with a jury trial, not with respect to a hearing in damages to the court, and having construed the requested additur as a motion for reconsideration, this court concluded that the trial court could have reasonably decided as it did and did not abuse its discretion. Argued September 18—officially released November 19, 2019

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate the viability of an intoxication defense. The petitioner had pleaded guilty, under the Alford doctrine, to various charges in connection with the stabbing deaths of two children. The plea agreement allowed the peti- tioner to avoid the death penalty, and he received a total effective sentence of life in prison with no possibility of release. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the record having supported that court's conclusion that trial counsel's strategy in not presenting an intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assis- tance: the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of overcoming the presumption that trial counsel's decision not to raise an intoxication defense was a reasonable trial strategy, the petitioner's claim that had trial counsel properly investi- gated and informed him of a possible intoxication defense, there was a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty was unavailing, as trial counsel adequately investigated and informed the petitioner of the availability and effectiveness of an intoxication defense, and properly advised him that an intoxication defense would likely have failed and that if he had gone to trial he would have faced a possible death sentence, and although the petitioner claimed that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the murders in support of his intoxication claim, no evidence of the drug he purportedly ingested was recovered, the petitioner denied being under the influence of drugs to the police immediately following the murders, and the results of psychological tests obtained by the petitioner's trial counsel suggested that any ingestion of drugs immediately prior to the murders may have been voluntary and did not support a potential defense of intoxication; accordingly, the petitioner failed to establish that the issues he raised were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court reasonably could have resolved them differently, or that they raised questions deserving further appellate scrutiny. Argued September 11—officially released November 19, 2019

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. At trial, the defendant testified, inter alia, that he and the victim were smoking phencyclidine in his bedroom while the victim exchanged a series of phone calls with her mother to arrange for a ride to work. The defendant further testified that a heated conversation ensued between the victim and her mother, that the victim subsequently took a gun from the defen- dant's closet and put the gun to her head, and that the gun went off when the defendant tried to take it from the victim. On appeal, the defendant claimed that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial because of certain prosecutorial improprieties in closing argument. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor improp- erly opined on how someone should act during a police interview because there was no evidence as to how a grieving person typically would respond when questioned by the police hours after witnessing his friend's death, nor about how the defendant's ingestion of phencyclidine could have affected his behavior during the police interview; the prosecu- tor, who merely asked the jurors to consider the defendant's demeanor during the police interview and argued the inference that he was calm during that interview, properly prompted the jurors to employ their common sense in considering the evidence, and he simply observed that the defendant was calm and calculating at the time of the police interview, which the jurors reasonably could have inferred from the video of the police interview that was entered into evidence. 2. The defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly interjected his own experience by stating what he would have done if he had found himself in the defendant's circumstances was unavailing; the challenged com- ment of the prosecutor was not an improper personal anecdote and was based squarely on the evidence that was heard by the jury, including the defendant's testimony that he failed to answer the victim's cell phone when her mother called after the shooting, as well as his testimony regarding the victim's heated conversation with her mother that led to her supposedly picking up the gun and holding it to her head to attempt suicide, and the prosecutor's statement about what he would have done did not indicate that the statement was based on the prosecutor's own experience and was the rough equivalent of asking the jurors what they would have done in the defendant's shoes after the shooting. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor improp- erly appealed to the jurors' emotions when the prosecutor speculated that the defendant went through the victim's purse after her death and found letters regarding child custody issues; the prosecutor's comment was a proper response to an inference raised by defense counsel that a letter from the victim's child custody attorney in the victim's purse corroborated the defendant's story that the victim was suicidal and trying to kill herself because of child custody issues, and there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the inference that the defen- dant went through the victim's purse, including the defendant's affirma- tive efforts to portray the victim's death as a suicide, as well as the time and opportunity he had to do so after the shooting and before the police arrived. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor's state- ment that the defendant's version of the events, namely, that the gun was in both his and the victim's hands at the time of discharge, contra- dicted the gunshot residue evidence was improper because it was not properly derived from the evidence presented; although the gunshot residue expert did not state with absolute certainty that the victim's hands could not have been on the gun at the time of discharge, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that the victim did not have her hands on the gun at the time of discharge due to the lack of gunshot residue on her hands, and, thus, the prosecutor properly argued a fair inference from the evidence to the jury. 5. The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's use of the words ''kill shot'' improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathies and emotions because those words implied more than mere murder was unavailing, as the words used were factually accurate and supported by the evidence that the victim was in fact killed by a gunshot to her forehead, and the evidence presented supported the inference that the victim's death was intentionally caused by the defendant. 6. Although the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' sympathies by using the word ''executed'' and improperly expressed his personal opinion by making the statement that ''[i]t's shameful'' that the defendant went through the victim's purse after her death, those improprieties did not deprive the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial; the prosecutorial improprieties were not so serious as to amount to a denial of due process, as defense counsel invited the prosecutor's use of the words ''[i]t's shameful,'' the improprieties were not severe because defense counsel did not object and the use of the words ''executed'' and ''[i]t's shameful'' was not blatantly egregious in light of the facts before the jury, the improprieties were infrequent because they consisted of a few words following three full days of evidence, the statement ''[i]t's shameful'' was not central to a critical issue in the case, the curative measures employed by the court, including instructions to the jury on multiple occasions throughout both the trial and closing argu- ment that closing argument was not to be considered as evidence, were adequate, and the state's case was strong enough so that it was not reasonably likely that the jury's verdict would have been different if the prosecutor had not used the word ''executed'' and the phrase ''[i]t's shameful.'' Argued September 5—officially released November 19, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with its representation of the defendant in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. After the trial court granted the defendant's motion to implead three third-party defendants, F, W and M Co., F filed a cross complaint against the plaintiff, W and M. Co., alleging, inter alia, that they had committed legal malpractice in connection with the defendant's dissolution of marriage proceeding. The trial court thereafter granted motions to preclude expert testimony filed by the plaintiff and W and M Co., and subsequently granted their motions for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon. Follow- ing the trial court's denial of his motion for reconsideration, F appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that F's cross complaint set forth a claim of legal malpractice against the plaintiff, W and M Co.; the operative complaint was F's answers, defenses and cross claim, not his amended motion to implead response, which was filed before F became a party to the action, and the only claim in the operative complaint, when construed liberally, sounded in legal malpractice. 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the cross claim defendants on the legal malpractice claim; despite having ample opportunity to do so, F, the cross claim plaintiff, failed to properly disclose expert witnesses in accordance with the requirements of our rules of practice, and in the absence of such testimony, F could not establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice because he could not prove either a breach of the applicable standard of care or the element of causation. Argued September 10—officially released November 19, 2019

The plaintiff, B Co., sought to foreclose certain municipal property tax liens on property then owned by the defendant, G Co. The trial court granted G Co.'s motion to cite in the city of Bridgeport as a defendant, and G. Co. filed cross claims against the city and a codefendant, M. G Co. claimed, inter alia, that M tortiously interfered with its intended sale of the property to the city and that the city interfered with a proposed zoning change that would have increased the value of the property. Thereafter, the city was substituted as the plaintiff and M Co. was substituted as the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the city and M against M Co. on the cross claims and denied M Co.'s motion to reargue. On M Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court did not err in finding that M Co. failed to establish any tortious action by M; the trial court did not credit any evidence offered by M Co. in support of its allegation that M had acted to interfere with negotiations between the city and G Co., which never reached an agreement with the city for a purchase price for the property, and M Co. failed to allege on appeal any legal error or an erroneous factual basis for the trial court's decision. 2. M Co.'s claim that the trial court erred in finding that the city did not tortiously interfere with the business relationship that existed between G Co. and M failed as a matter of law; M Co.'s claim consisted of nothing more than a request for this court to substitute its own evaluation of the evidence for that of the trier of fact, which this court would not do, and M Co. failed to demonstrate that the trial court either misapplied the law or relied on clearly erroneous factual findings in reaching its decision. 3. The trial court did not err in finding that the city did not act improperly to devalue the property; M Co. presented no evidence that any member of the planning and zoning commission acted improperly in deciding not to change the zoning designation of the property, the trial court was free to reject an inference that members of the commission acted improperly and to conclude that the commission may have decided against a zone change for the subject property, despite initial support for a change, for a reason other than improper interference by the city, and M Co. conceded at oral argument before this court that tortious interference was not the only reasonable inference the trial court could have drawn based on the evidence presented. Argued September 13—officially released November 19, 2019

Convicted of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, the defendant appealed. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he entered an apartment building and shot the victim. Shortly thereafter, the defendant encountered his neighbor, L, who bought a gun from the defendant. After learning of the victim's murder, L broke the gun into pieces and threw it into a river, but subsequently informed the police of what he had done. The trial court denied the defendant's motion in limine to preclude the state from introducing into evidence a handgun magazine recovered during an underwater search of the river. At trial, the state presented written and video recorded statements that two witnesses, C and D, had made to police inculpating the defendant in the victim's murder. C and D testified that their state- ments were false and the result of police coercion. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the trial court erroneously admitted the video recorded statements into evidence under State v. Whelan (200 Conn. 743) was not reviewable, the defendant having failed to brief the claim adequately; although the defendant labeled his claim in his brief as evidentiary in nature, he predominantly analyzed it as instructional in nature, as he did not challenge the admissibility of the statements under Whelan, and his only contention was an undeveloped claim of instruc- tional error, namely, that the court had the obligation to instruct the jury as to which portions of the video recorded statements could be used for impeachment purposes and which portions could be used substantively, the defendant's brief did not comply with the applicable rule of practice (§ 67-4 [e] [3]) concerning claimed evidentiary errors, and it was not the proper role for this court to guess at the nature of the defendant's claim and the legal analysis to apply thereto. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court errone- ously admitted into evidence the handgun magazine, which he claimed was irrelevant, prejudicial and misleading: the recovered magazine tended to show that the defendant had access to a firearm shortly after the victim's murder, supported the conclusion that the magazine belonged to the firearm used to kill the victim, and corroborated the state's theory of the case, as it corroborated L's testimony that the defendant sold him a handgun on the morning of the victim's murder and that he had thrown the disassembled handgun into the river, and the handgun magazine was relevant because a firearms examiner testi- fied that the recovered magazine was consistent with a magazine that would fit the type of handgun used to kill the victim; moreover, even though the defendant claimed that the magazine was not reliable evi- dence because it had physically degraded, the state presented evidence that the condition of the magazine at the time it was recovered from the river was different from its condition at the time the crime was committed, but that the change was due to natural causes, not human activity, and it was relevant and probative because it aided the trier of fact in determining a material fact or in corroborating other direct evidence in the case. Argued September 11—officially released November 19, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his rights to due process were violated because he was tried while he was incompetent and a competency examination had not been requested for him during the criminal proceedings by the trial court or by the state, in violation of statute (§ 54-56d). In his first habeas petition, the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance. The habeas court denied that petition, and this court dismissed the petitioner's appeal from that denial. In his two count second habeas petition, the petitioner alleged in the first count that he suffered from severe intellectual disabilities that included an inability to read and write, and that he had been diagnosed at a young age as suffering from mental retardation with brain functioning equivalent to that of a ten year old. He alleged that as a result of those purported deficiencies, he could not comprehend the nature of the criminal pro- ceedings against him, other than the general nature of the charges and that he faced incarceration if he were convicted. In the second count, the petitioner alleged that he had significant physiological and mental health afflictions that rendered him incompetent to be prosecuted and to stand trial. The respondent Commissioner of Correction filed a return, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-30), asserting that the petitioner had procedurally defaulted as to both counts of his petition because his due process claims were not raised during his criminal trial or on direct appeal. The respondent further alleged that the petitioner could not establish sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse the proce- dural defaults. The petitioner thereafter filed a reply to the respondent's return, pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-31 [c]), in which he asserted, inter alia, that he could demonstrate cause to excuse the procedural defaults on the basis of the allegations in his habeas petition. The habeas court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the second habeas petition, concluding that the petitioner's due process claims were procedurally defaulted and that he had failed to allege legally cognizable cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural defaults. The court thereafter granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner's claim that the procedural default rule did not apply to his due process claims, raised for the first time by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, that he was incompetent to stand trial and that the state and the trial court failed to comply with § 54-56d was unavailing: a. The petitioner's due process claims, although not distinctly raised before or adjudicated by the habeas court, were reviewable, as the petitioner's reply to the respondent's return contested the assertion of procedural default, and whether the procedural default rule was applicable to the petitioner's claims was a question of law that required no factual findings by the habeas court. b. The petitioner's procedural and substantive competency claims were subject to procedural default: although principles of federalism and comity do not apply in state habeas proceedings, federal and state habeas proceedings share a principal prudential interest in the application of the procedural default rule, which is vindicating the finality of judgments, and applying the procedural default rule to a procedural and substantive competency claim accords weight to the finality of judgments by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the court is focused on his case, and the rule promotes the systemic interests of conservation of judicial resources and the accuracy and efficiency of judicial deci- sions; moreover, the risk of an incompetent person being convicted and sentenced without any requested examination of, or other challenge to, his or her competency during the criminal trial proceedings or on direct appeal is so minimal that the systemic interests of finality, accuracy of judicial decisions and conservation of judicial resources vastly out- weighed such risk, which is not enhanced by requiring a habeas peti- tioner to allege legally cognizable cause to overcome the procedural default, and that conclusion struck the right balance in according appro- priate weight to those systemic interests; furthermore, this court declined to treat the petitioner's claims of incompetence to stand trial in the same manner as substantial claims of actual innocence, which are not subject to procedural default, as state habeas review jurispru- dence has developed in tandem with federal habeas review jurispru- dence, which limits the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to actual innocence claims, and our appellate courts have consistently and broadly applied the cause and prejudice standard to all trial level and appellate level procedural defaults, with certain limited exceptions. 2. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner's claims were procedurally defaulted because his reply was deficient and he failed to demonstrate cause to excuse his procedural defaults; the petitioner's reply did not satisfy the requirements of Practice Book § 23-31 (c), as the petitioner did not articulate with specificity any facts that demonstrated cause to overcome his procedural defaults but, rather, baldly alleged that he could demonstrate cause to excuse the procedural defaults solely on the basis of the allegations in his habeas petition, and even if the petitioner were permitted to rely on the allegations in his habeas petition to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural defaults, the allegations that he was incompetent to stand trial were not sufficient to overcome the procedural defaults, as his alleged incompetence was an internal, rather than an external, impediment to his defense and, thus, could not serve as cause to overcome a procedural default. Argued May 23—officially released November 26, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant in connection with the alleged wrongful termination of her employment by the defen- dant, alleging claims for wrongful discharge in violation of an implied contract, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). After the trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike all three counts, the plaintiff filed a substitute complaint, recasting the first count as one sounding in racial discrimination in her discharge from employ- ment. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended substitute complaint, amending the allegations in the second and third counts. The defendant filed another motion to strike all three counts, and a motion to dismiss the first count. The trial court granted the motion to strike and rendered a judgment of dismissal as to the entire complaint, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, which affirmed the dismissal of count one but reversed the judgment of dismissal as to counts two and three because the defendant did not seek a dismissal of those counts. On remand, the plaintiff filed another substitute complaint setting forth four counts, which alleged claims for wrongful discharge in breach of an implied employment contract, defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a violation of CUTPA. After the trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike each count, the plaintiff filed another substitute complaint incorporating counts one, two, and four from her previously stricken complaint and repleading count three. The trial court, again, granted the defendant's motion to strike the complaint and also granted a motion for judgment filed by the defendant. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly struck each count of her operative complaint. Held: 1. The trial court properly struck the first count of the plaintiff's operative complaint; the factual allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint for wrongful termination in breach of an implied contract neither set forth the facts essential to the establishment of an implied contract nor specified any particular public policy that was alleged to have been implicated by her discharge from the defendant's employ. 2. The trial court properly struck the second count of the plaintiff's operative complaint alleging defamation, in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had made false statements regarding the reason for the plain- tiff's termination when it contested the plaintiff's claim for unemploy- ment benefits; there was nothing in the record that indicated that the plaintiff sought the permission of the court or the agreement of the defendant to amend her complaint by adding a new cause of action after the case was remanded to the trial court by this court, and it was clear that any statements made by representatives of the defendant before the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor when contesting the plaintiff's eligibility for unemployment benefits were absolutely privileged because such proceedings were quasi-judicial in nature. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly struck the third count of the operative complaint, in which she alleged a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on the defen- dant's conduct in improperly withholding from her three personal folders that contained various certificates and personal records when it dis- charged her from employment, and in making false allegations of wrong- doing when it contested her eligibility for unemployment benefits; state- ments made by representatives of the defendant before the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor when contesting the plain- tiff's eligibility for unemployment benefits were absolutely privileged because such proceedings were quasi-judicial in nature, and with respect to the plaintiff's claim that the defendant improperly withheld from her the three personal folders, the plaintiff made no allegation that the documents in those folders were irreplaceable or of such value that it was patently unreasonable for the defendant to withhold them. 4. The trial court properly struck the fourth count of the plaintiff's operative complaint alleging a violation of CUTPA; the plaintiff did not allege any acts committed by the defendant in the conduct of any trade or com- merce, the allegations she did make clearly fell outside of CUTPA, and the only posttermination conduct relied on by the plaintiff were statements made by the defendant to the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor, which were protected by an absolute privi- lege, and could not be used as a basis for the CUTPA claim. Argued September 11—officially released November 26, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, negligence in connection with the defendant's construction of a bulkhead at a marina operated by M Co. on property owned by the plaintiff. Pursuant to a lease agreement between the plaintiff and M Co., M Co. was obligated to maintain the structural improvements at the marina. When the bulkhead began to deteriorate soon after its construction, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, who then filed a motion to stay the action for arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the construction contract between the defendant and M Co., of which the plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary. The trial court granted the motion and stayed the plaintiff's action pending arbitration. Thereafter, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement with an arbitrator to arbitrate their dispute. The arbitration agreement provided, inter alia, that the arbitration would proceed on an ad hoc basis, without an administering organization. In her award, the arbitrator found that the bulkhead was a total loss, that the defendant was negligent in constructing it and that his negligence proximately caused its failure. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiff $275,607 in damages. Thereafter, the defendant filed a demand for a trial de novo with the trial court, and the plaintiff filed an objection to that demand and an application to confirm the arbitration award. Following a hearing, the court denied the defendant's demand for a trial de novo and granted the plaintiff's application to confirm the award. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. This court declined to review the defendant's claims that the trial court should have vacated the arbitration award because the arbitrator failed to comply with the mandatory oath requirement of the applicable statute (§ 52-414 [d]) and the plaintiff failed to comply with the statute (§ 52- 421 [a]) that requires certain documents to be filed with the court clerk in conjunction with an application to confirm an arbitration award; the defendant failed to preserve his claims of noncompliance with §§ 52- 414 (d) and 52-421 (a) for appellate review, as he failed to raise them in his demand for a trial de novo or during the hearing before the trial court. 2. The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's application to confirm the arbitration award, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that the arbitrator exceeded or imperfectly executed her powers in issuing the award in violation of the applicable statute (§ 52-418 [a] [4]): contrary to the defendant's claim, the arbitrator did not exceed her authority when she did not apply the construction industry rules of the American Arbitration Association when arbitrating the dispute between the parties, as the arbitration agreement lacked any reference to those rules and, instead, provided that the arbitration would proceed on an ad hoc basis, without an administering organization; moreover, the record did not support the defendant's claim that the arbitrator exceeded her authority and manifestly disregarded the law in failing to consider the parties' obligations under the construction contract, as the arbitrator indicated in her decision that she considered the duties and obligations created by the contract, and her award discussed the obligations of the defendant in building the bulkhead and the plaintiff's obligations in acquiring the materials for its construction. Argued September 19—officially released November 26, 2019

The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant seeking the specific performance of a contract for the sale of certain of the defendant's real property to the plaintiff. In 2010, T, the chief executive officer of the plaintiff, and the defendant created and signed a handwritten document reflecting their intention for the defendant to sell a parcel of certain real property to T for development into residential homes. The plaintiff hired L, an engineer, to develop plans and to obtain permits from the town and other governmental agencies. Thereafter, the defendant informed L that he was concerned with the drainage system in L's plans, which extended the drainage system into a portion of the defendant's property that he was not selling. A revised drainage plan required addi- tional governmental approvals, and without fully approved plans the plaintiff refused to close. The plaintiff subsequently instituted this action seeking specific performance and alleged claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel as a result of the defendant's failure to transfer the property to it. The trial court found in favor of the defendant on all counts of the complaint and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in determining that the document executed by the parties violated the statute of frauds: that court found that the document did not identify the buyer or seller, describe the property with definiteness, or define boundaries for the property or the size of the parcel, nor did it reference maps or other documentation that would define and describe the prop- erty, and it found that a phrase indicating a ''right to back out'' was so lacking in context that it was itself evidence that the document did not satisfy the statute of frauds, and because the document lacked essential terms required to satisfy the statute of frauds, the court did not err in declining to utilize extrinsic evidence where, as here, such evidence was not introduced to aid in the interpretation of a valid contract, but was advanced to provide essential missing terms; moreover, the plaintiff's claim that the court improperly failed to consider its claim that part performance removed the agreement from the statute of frauds was unavailing, as the court, in finding for the defendant on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim on the ground that the document violated the statute of frauds, necessarily rejected that claim, and the court found that the plaintiff's actions could have been attributed to the risk it took in investing in L's services and, thus, did not unmistakably point to the formation of an enforceable contract, which precluded a conclusion that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements of part performance to defeat the statute of frauds. 2. The trial court did not err in rendering judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim, and its finding that the plaintiff did not confer any benefit on the defendant was not clearly erroneous; that court found that the defendant was not unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's decisions, including its decision to invest in L's preparation of plans containing a drainage system that the defendant opposed, and that there was no credible evidence to support the claim that the defen- dant received the benefit of L's plans, and those findings were supported by the record. 3. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for the defendant on its promissory estoppel claim was unavailing: the court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff did not suffer substantial financial injury even though it had incurred expenses, as the court found that it had incurred expenses not in reliance on a clear and definite promise that the defendant reasonably could have expected to induce reliance, but in furtherance of its choice to invest in L's services, and although the plaintiff claimed that the court erred, in its promissory estoppel analysis, in considering the ambiguity of the document exe- cuted by the parties, the court did not invoke the provisions of the document to bar the plaintiff's claim but, rather, considered the docu- ment in the context of whether a promise, which a promisor reasonably could have expected would have induced reliance, was made. Argued September 17—officially released November 26, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of, inter alia, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm and assault in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that his sentence of ninety-five years of imprisonment violated his state and federal constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The petitioner had been charged with murder and assault in the first degree in connection with a shooting incident when he was seventeen years old. In a second case, he was charged with assault in the first degree in connection with a different shooting incident. The petitioner opted to go to trial after rejecting a plea offer of thirty-eight years of incarceration to resolve both cases. Prior to trial, he pleaded guilty in the second case, and the jury thereafter found him guilty in the murder case. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and dismissing without prejudice his cruel and unusual punishment claim, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly advise him about the plea offer; the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's allegedly deficient performance, as the habeas court, after choosing not to credit the petitioner's testimony, concluded that he would not have accepted the plea offer if his lawyer had performed competently and, given this court's well established deference to the habeas court's credibility determinations, the petitioner failed to sustain his burden of persuasion. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his sentence violated his state and federal constitutional rights to remain free from cruel and unusual punishment and, thus, that he was entitled to a new sentencing proceeding in which the court must consider the mitigating factors of youth and impose a proportionate sentence: a. Contrary to the assertion by the respondent Commissioner of Correc- tion that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's cruel and unusual punishment claim because he was not aggrieved by the habeas court's dismissal of the claim without prejudice, the petitioner was aggrieved by the dismissal and, thus, this court had subject matter jurisdiction; although the habeas court's disposition of the petitioner's claim would have allowed him to file a new habeas petition, he was nonetheless aggrieved, as the dismissal deprived him of his right to have his claim adjudicated on a timely basis because he would have been forced to file a new habeas petition that would have led to a significant delay in his ability to resolve his claim. b. The petitioner was not entitled to resentencing, as there was no violation of his constitutional rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; subsequent to the petitioner's conviction the legislature enacted No. 15-84, § 1, of the 2015 Public Acts, which was later codified (§ 54-125a [f]) and provided parole eligibility for juvenile offenders serv- ing a sentence of greater than ten years of incarceration, our Supreme Court determined in State v. Williams-Bey (333 Conn. 468), which had been pending during the petitioner's habeas trial, that parole eligibility adequately remedied any violation of the requirement in Miller v. Ala- bama (567 U.S. 460) that the mitigating factors of youth be considered before a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, or its functional equivalent, could be imposed on a juvenile offender, and the petitioner's appellate counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that the outcome of Williams-Bey would be dispositive of this issue on appeal. Argued September 9—officially released November 26, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of possession of narcotics with the intent to sell by a person who is not drug-dependent, sought a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress cocaine that the police found during a search of his bedroom in the residence of the home in which he had been staying. The petitioner also claimed, inter alia, that his habeas counsel in a prior habeas action rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise that claim of ineffective assis- tance of trial counsel. The police had found the cocaine after they obtained the written consent of the owner of the home to search the petitioner's bedroom. The habeas court dismissed the petitioner's claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, concluding that they were barred by the successive petition doctrine codified in the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 [3]). The court also determined that the petitioner failed to prove deficient performance by his prior habeas counsel or prejudice that resulted therefrom. The court thereafter granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal, and the peti- tioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pursuant to the successive petition doctrine in § 23-29 (3); the petitioner's claims were predicated on the same ground that was raised in his prior habeas action, the petitioner did not allege that his claims were based on newly discovered facts or evidence, and he sought the very same relief that he had requested in the first habeas action. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his assertion that the habeas court improperly denied his claim of ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel; trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the drugs that were found in the petitioner's bedroom predicated on a theory that the petitioner exclusively possessed the bedroom and, by extension, the cocaine discovered therein, was not objectively unreasonable, as trial counsel necessarily had to weigh the motion's limited probability of success against its potential impact on a contrary theory of defense that was based on the petitioner's nonexclusive use of the bedroom, counsel had to be mindful that any suppression hearing testimony by the petitioner regarding his exclusive possession of the bedroom could be used against him at trial, which made the pursuit of a motion to suppress fraught with risk, and because the petitioner did not demon- strate deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel, his claim of ineffective assistance of prior habeas counsel necessarily failed. Argued September 16—officially released November 26, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant attorney for, inter alia, legal malpractice in connection with the defendant's represen- tation of the plaintiff in a divorce proceeding. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to advise him of the rights that he was giving up by entering into a separation agreement that was incorporated into the dissolution judgment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that an issue of material fact did not exist. From the judgment rendered thereon in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim; this court, applying the well established principles that govern the review of a decision to render summary judgment, adopted the trial court's concise and well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued October 16—officially released November 26, 2019

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion to correct, the defendant sought to have the court vacate the judgment of conviction on the ground that he was not the defendant named in the charging instrument and, thus, that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. The trial court denied the motion to correct on the ground that the claim raised therein did not challenge the legality of the sentence imposed. Held that although the trial court correctly determined that the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence was not the proper procedural vehicle to raise his claim concerning the legality of his conviction, the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion to correct, as it raised claims that did not challenge the legality of the sentence imposed or the disposition made during the sentencing proceeding, and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over the motion. Argued October 23—officially released November 26, 2019

Convicted, after a jury trial, of five counts of the crime of risk of injury to a child, two counts of the crime of unlawful restraint in the first degree, and of the crimes of assault in the first degree, criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree, and assault in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant lived in an apartment with N, his girlfriend, and her five daughters, including the victims, J and D. The defendant, after an argument with N, began to yell at the victims for disobeying a rule about hanging out of their bedroom window. The defendant then grabbed J, lifted her off the ground and carried her to the stove in the kitchen, where he ignited the gas burner and placed J's right hand over the flame. The defendant dropped J, but he then picked up D and carried her to the stove, where he placed both of her hands on top of the flame for up to one minute. Subsequently, D received medical treatment at a hospital for her severe burns and underwent several surgical procedures, including the amputation of several finger- tips. Forensic interviews of the victims were recorded and, in those recordings, the victims identified the defendant as the individual who had burned their hands on the open flame from the stove burner. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the state from entering video recordings of the forensic interviews into evidence, which the trial court denied on the first day of trial. At the close of the state's case, and again at the close of the defendant's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two counts that charged him with risk of injury to a child, and the court denied those motions. Following the jury's verdicts, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the admission into evidence of the forensic interviews necessitated a new trial, which the court denied prior to sentencing. Held: 1. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the forensic interviews into evidence because they failed to satisfy the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment excep- tion to the rule against hearsay, as established in State v. Griswold (160 Conn. App. 528), was not reviewable; the defendant's appellate argument differed from what was presented to the trial court, defense counsel having claimed before the court that Griswold, a case where the defen- dant sexually abused the victims, was inapplicable to the present case and that the admission of a forensic interview pursuant to the medical treatment and diagnosis exception required evidence of a sexual assault. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the forensic interviews of the victims were not relevant: the relevancy argument raised by defense counsel to the trial court, which focused on the connection between forensic interviews, cases involving sexual assault and the constancy of accusation doctrine, contradicted existing precedent and was wholly without merit because the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against hearsay has no direct connection to the constancy of accusation doctrine and is not limited to sexual assault cases; moreover, the defendant's claim on appeal that the recordings of the forensic interviews failed to meet the standard of the applicable provision (§ 4-1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence in that they did not tend to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable than it would be without such evidence, was unavailing, as, during the forensic interviews, the victims identified the defendant as the person who had burned their hands and discussed the extent of the injuries they suffered, which satisfied the low hurdle of relevance and had obvious value to the state's case. 3. The defendant's claim that the prejudicial impact of the forensic interviews of the victims outweighed their probative value and that those interviews were cumulative and, therefore, should not have been admitted into evidence, was not reviewable; the defendant failed to brief that claim adequately, as he addressed the claim in a single sentence and failed to cite any authority or to present any reasoning to support his claim regarding the prejudicial impact or cumulative nature of the forensic interviews. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two counts of risk of injury to a child, which was based on his claim that neither J nor D were placed at risk of injury to their physical or mental health because neither victim actually witnessed the burning of the other; it was undisputed that D was present in the apartment when the defendant burned J and that J was in the apartment when he burned D, the jury reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of N's testi- mony and the photographs admitted into evidence that depicted the layout of the apartment, that the defendant created a situation that was likely to result in injury to D's mental health as a result of her witnessing the burning of J, and although there was conflicting evidence as to whether J directly observed the burning of D, evidence is not insufficient because it is conflicting or inconsistent, as it is the jury's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibil- ity of witnesses, and the jury can decide what part of a witness' testimony to accept or reject. 5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court made a constitutional and evidentiary error when it improperly precluded him from presenting evidence of third-party culpability by not allowing him to testify about N's prior statement to him that she had burned the victims, which was based on his claim that the court improperly deter- mined that the statement against penal interest exception to the rule against hearsay did not apply to N's alleged admission to the defendant that she had burned the victims: the defendant had to establish the unavailability of N to use the statement against penal interest hearsay exception, and although the defendant claimed that N was unavailable because she was reluctant at trial to make a statement against her penal interest, there were pauses in her testimony, her version of the events was opposite to that of the defendant, her testimony would not be favorable to the defendant, and she had demonstrated a willingness to lie to protect herself, those contentions, unsupported by case law or other legal authority, failed to acknowledge that N testified during the defendant's criminal trial and were not encompassed within the five situations of unavailability previously set forth by our Supreme Court; accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the statement against penal interest exception to the rule against hearsay did not apply, and, therefore, the defendant could not prevail on his evidentiary or constitutional claims. Argued September 9—officially released December 3, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress from the defendants E and T, who filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction due to improper service of process as a result of the plaintiff's failure to serve them at their last known addresses, and neither of whom was a resident of this state. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in part thereon, concluding that where, as here, there was a challenge to personal jurisdiction of nonresident individuals, it was the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence adequate to establish such jurisdiction, and that the plaintiff had failed to use diligent and persistent efforts to properly serve E and T at their last known addresses. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss filed by E and T: because there was a dispute as to the location of the last known addresses of E and T, once their affidavits raised a factual question challenging the court's jurisdiction for insuffi- cient service of process, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove the court's jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants, the plaintiff did not cite to any counter authority to disclaim his burden to prove jurisdic- tion, nor did he provide evidence of his diligent and persistent efforts to locate the last known addresses of E and T within a reasonable time of his attempt to serve process on them, as mere notice of the action is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a party who has not been properly served, and the plaintiff failed to account for his efforts to remain current on the whereabouts of E and T before attempting service of process to commence this action; accordingly, because the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden that he properly served E and T at their respective last known addresses and that he made a reasonably diligent search to find out their last known addresses, within a reasonable time, before attempting service of process, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over E and T. Argued September 24—officially released December 3, 2019

The defendant, who had been convicted of one count of assault of an employee of the Department of Correction, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion because the sentencing court substantially relied on the state's materially inaccurate information at sentencing. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence: the defendant could not establish that the sentencing court relied on certain claimed inaccurate informa- tion in the state's sentencing memorandum and an attached affidavit from a police detective that the defendant was a leader of a gang and that he was the subject of an active investigation by North Carolina law enforcement for ongoing criminal activity, as the police detective's sworn testimony far exceeded the minimum indicia of reliability required of information relied on by a court in sentencing and the defendant offered no evidence refuting the state's claims regarding his affiliation with the gang or that undermined the state's claim that he was a leader of the gang at the time he was sentenced; moreover, the record confirmed the trial court's finding that the sentencing court did not specifically refer to any information from a North Carolina police detective in its sentencing remarks, and the trial court discussed and applied correctly the appropriate standard of actual reliance in that it determined appropri- ately that there was nothing in the record that indicated that the sentenc- ing court relied on information regarding the defendant's activities in North Carolina to fashion the defendant's sentence; furthermore, because the defendant failed to establish that the sentencing court relied on inaccurate or unreliable information, his other claims on appeal necessarily failed. Argued September 17—officially released December 3, 2019

Convicted of the crime of assault of public safety personnel arising out of an incident in which the defendant struck a correction officer, the defendant appealed to this court. During the trial, the defendant asserted an affirmative defense of mental disease or defect. Both the state and the defendant offered testimony from expert witnesses who conducted separate competency evaluations of the defendant. The defendant's expert witness presented testimony that the defendant lacked the capac- ity to control his behavior in accordance with the law, while the state's expert witness testified that the defendant was capable of controlling his behavior. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the jury's rejection of the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect was not reasonably supported by the evidence and that the jury improperly disregarded his expert witness' conclusion that he lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct within the law. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense of mental disease or defect was not reasonably supported by the evi- dence, as the jury was entitled to accept or reject the expert testimony presented at trial; the defendant's claim that the jury was obligated to accept his expert witness' testimony and that its failure to do so consti- tuted reversible error was unavailing because the jury, as the finder of fact, was the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any basis on which to overturn the jury's determination of the credibility of the expert witnesses. Argued October 7—officially released December 3, 2019

The plaintiff R Co. sought to recover damages from the defendant J, a minority shareholder of R. Co., for alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Since 1984, R Co., which was founded by R, the late father of the individual parties, who are all siblings, has operated as a specialty freight trucking business. When R died, C assumed R's shares of R Co., and the siblings managed R Co.'s operations until they had a falling out in 2011, and J resigned from his positions as an officer and director of R Co. After the plaintiffs commenced the underlying action, J filed a counterclaim seeking dissolution of R Co. on the ground that the individ- ual plaintiffs had engaged in illegal, oppressive and fraudulent conduct to J's detriment. In lieu of dissolution, R Co. elected to purchase J's shares in it at fair value, and the plaintiffs withdrew their complaint. J thereafter filed a second amended counterclaim alleging that R Co. had engaged in oppressive conduct because for many years it provided shareholders with funds to pay federal income tax liabilities incurred as a result of the pass-through of R Co.'s profits to them, but J had not received any such payments for the years of 2012, 2013, and 2014, even though he remained a shareholder. Because the parties could not agree as to the fair value of J's shares or to the terms of R Co.'s purchase of them, those issues were presented to the court, which, after a trial, determined the value of R Co. and the fair value of J's shares, and concluded that because R Co., through its majority shareholders, engaged in oppressive conduct toward J, J's interest in R Co. would not be subject to a minority discount. The court held further evidentiary hearings and determined that J's shares would not be reduced by a marketability discount and that J was entitled to attorney's fees and expert witness fees, and the court ordered R Co. to pay J certain sums. R Co. appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court determin- ing the fair value of J's shares, establishing the terms of payment for the purchase of those shares, and awarding attorney's fees and expert witness fees. J, on cross appeal, claimed that the trial court erred in not awarding attorney's fees in the amount of one third of the value of his interest in R Co. pursuant to a contingency fee agreement that he had signed with his counsel. Held: 1. R Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred by not tax affecting its earnings in analyzing its valuation; the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to tax affect R's future cash flow, as the court, in the absence of binding authority, carefully considered cases from other jurisdictions, which provided considerable support for its approach, the court was tasked with determining fair value, as opposed to fair market value, and the present case was ill-suited to tax affecting earnings in light of R Co.'s practice of extending loans to shareholders to cover their tax liabilities and then retiring those loans through the payment of bonuses, and it was entirely foreseeable that such a practice would continue after R Co. purchased J's shares. 2. The trial court did not err in declining to apply a minority discount to the value of J's shares, or in awarding attorney's fees and expert witness fees on the ground that J suffered oppression at the hands of R Co.'s majority shareholders: there was no basis in the record to support R Co.'s claim that J did not have a reasonable expectation of assistance from R Co. to cover his tax liabilities, and even though R Co. claimed that the decision of whether to assist J in covering his tax liabilities was made by its financial advisory board, not by the majority sharehold- ers, that claim rested on the testimony of M, a financial advisor, who the court expressly found not credible; moreover, although R Co. claimed that J failed to establish his tax obligations for the years in question, the record supported the court's finding that R Co. provided tax adjust- ments to shareholders who had a potential tax liability, not only to those who proved an actual tax liability, and the court properly rejected R Co.'s claim that any oppression occurred only after J petitioned for dissolution, as the court's finding of oppression was not limited to the 2014 tax year, but began in 2011, when J resigned as an officer and director, and, therefore, the court's finding of minority oppression was not clearly erroneous, it did not abuse its discretion by not applying a minority discount to the value of J's shares in R Co., and R Co.'s challenge to the court's award of attorney's fees and expert witness fees failed. 3. R. Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in declining to apply a marketability discount to the value of J's shares, which was based on its claim that the court's failure to do so caused an undue financial burden: the court examined R Co.'s finances and the value of J's shares, and determined that there were no extraordinary circum- stances that warranted a marketability discount, and even though J's one-third share of R Co. was substantial, that did not mean that R Co. should not be required to pay fair value for J's shares; moreover, the court focused on the financial burden of its judgment on R Co., as well as on R Co.'s financial viability, when it fashioned the ten year payment plan afforded to R Co. to satisfy the judgment, and, therefore, R Co. could not prevail on a claim of unfair financial burden simply because it might experience difficulty satisfying the court's judgment. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in accounting for a certain loan due to R Co. from J and in ordering that certain sums be paid to J within thirty days of the date of judgment; given the irregular bookkeep- ing employed by R Co., the court's treatment of those sums was reason- able and equitable, as the court included J's loan balance as an asset of R Co., adding it, along with the loan balances of other shareholders, to the capitalized cash flow in arriving at R Co.'s total value, and it essentially credited J for the bonus provided to the two other sharehold- ers in 2014 and reduced the value of J's share in R Co., and the court's decision to add the loan balance to the overall value of R Co. while reducing the value of J's shares by the credit was an imperfect, but justifiable treatment of those sums. 5. J could not prevail on his claim on cross appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to award attorney's fees in the amount of one third of the value of J's shares in R Co. in accordance with a contingency fee agreement that he had signed with his counsel; although J claimed that the court did not first analyze the terms of the fee agree- ment before departing from its terms to prevent substantial unfairness to R Co., because the court reached the issue of substantial unfairness, the court necessarily first analyzed the terms of the contingency fee agreement and found that its terms were reasonable, and the court did not err in finding that adherence to the agreement would be substantially unfair to R Co., as the court did not hold that the agreement was unreasonable but, rather, found that the resulting award was unreason- able because it was over $100,000 more than an award based upon the actual services rendered by J's attorneys, and that finding was sufficient to sustain the court's determination that adhering to the agreement would be substantially unfair. Argued September 9—officially released December 10, 2019

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying an application for relief from abuse that he had filed, pursuant to statute (§ 46b-15), and issuing sanctions against him. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court, in making certain findings, failed to consider certain facts in evidence. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's application for relief from abuse from the defendant; the record showed that the court did, in fact, consider the evidence that the plaintiff claimed it ignored, the factual findings made by the court were supported by testimony that the court alone had the discretion to credit or to disregard, and the fact that the plaintiff disagreed with the outcome did not render the court's factual findings clearly erroneous. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing sanctions against the plaintiff and ordering him to pay attorney's fees to the defendant pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 1-25) for filing a frivolous application; that court made it clear that it considered the plaintiff's actions throughout the course of the parties' litigation and, in the context of § 1-25, found the plaintiff's argument that he had a good faith basis for filing the application at issue to be unpersuasive. Argued October 10—officially released December 10, 2019

The plaintiff, who previously had filed an application for joint custody of his minor child with the defendant, to whom he was never married, appealed to this court from orders of the trial court granting certain postjudgment motions for contempt filed by the defendant and awarding her attorney's fees. After the trial court awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties' minor child to the defendant and ordered the plaintiff to pay child support to the defendant, the plaintiff filed a separate appeal from that judgment. While that appeal was pending, the trial court granted multiple postjudgment motions for contempt filed by the defendant for the plaintiff's failure to make, inter alia, child support payments, and ordered the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in litigating her motions for contempt. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in finding him in contempt for nonpayment of support orders while those orders were on appeal, prioritizing the resolution of motions for contempt over a pending motion pertaining to visitation, failing to consider his financial affidavits, awarding attorney's fees to the defendant and accepting the defendant's affidavits of fees with incorrect docket numbers. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's postjudgment motions for contempt against the plaintiff for his failure to make timely support payments; the plaintiff having failed to file a motion for a stay of the support orders during the pendency of the appeal, his weekly support payments were still due as scheduled. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in scheduling and adjudicating the defendant's postjudgment motions for contempt before resolving the defendant's motion for modification of visitation; that court had broad discretion to manage its docket and resolve cases as it saw fit, and the record did not reveal, nor did the plaintiff point to, any evidence establishing that the court's decision was unreasonable, as it was reason- able for the court to dispose of motions in the manner it considered to be most efficient, especially given the number of motions filed by both parties throughout this case. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in not considering his financial affidavits in ruling on the defendant's motions for contempt; it was plain from the record that the court did consider the evidence the plaintiff presented but found his affidavits and testimony to be not credible, and that he had the ability to pay his portion of ordered child care expenses, and because the court had the sole discretion to assign weight to the evidence, it was free to make that credibility determination, and it did not abuse its discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt for failing to make support payments. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the plaintiff to pay attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in connection with her postjudgment contempt motions; although the plaintiff claimed that a ruling of the court regarding arrearages had the effect of vacating the contempt orders underlying the arrearages, the court's order vacating any findings of arrearages, which was made in accordance with this court's decision in the plaintiff's separate appeal, did not trigger a retro- active vacation of the underlying contempt orders or the related sanc- tions, and, thus, the contempt orders stayed intact. 5. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting certain financial affidavits that had been filed by the defendant under incorrect docket numbers; a scrivener's error such as an incorrect docket number consti- tutes a circumstantial defect and does not deprive the trial court of juris- diction. Argued October 10—officially released December 10, 2019

The plaintiff, a retired police officer, appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner denying his motion to open a certain stipulation that he and the defendants, the city of New Haven and its workers' compensation administrator, had executed to settle several pending workers' compensation claims related to his employ- ment with the city. The plaintiff had agreed to accept a settlement of his claims for $22,500. On the morning of the stipulation approval hearing before the commissioner, the defendants' counsel presented the plaintiff with the stipulation and a settlement agreement, neither of which the plaintiff had seen before and both of which he signed. The stipulation did not reference the settlement agreement, which required the plaintiff to waive, inter alia, causes of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). At the stipulation approval hearing, the commissioner canvassed the plaintiff with regard to the stipulation, and approved it after determining that the plaintiff had executed it knowingly and voluntarily. None of the parties asked the commissioner to review or to sign the settlement agreement, and the commissioner did not examine or sign the settlement agreement. After the plaintiff received a $22,500 settlement check, he returned it and sought to open the stipulation pursuant to statute (§ 31-315). He claimed, inter alia, that the stipulation was nugatory on the ground that his execution of the settlement agreement was not knowing and voluntary because the parties had agreed to settle only the workers' compensation claims. The commissioner concluded that opening the stipulation was not warranted because, inter alia, the plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, accident or mistake. The board thereafter affirmed the commissioner's denial of the motion to open, determining that the parties had agreed that the plaintiff would receive $22,500 for the withdrawal of the workers' compensation claims, that he was canvassed with respect to the stipulation by the commis- sioner who presided at the stipulation approval hearing, and that no mistake was made that warranted the opening of the stipulation. The board further concluded that the plaintiff would need to seek redress in a forum that has jurisdiction to consider issues relative to the settlement agreement. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the board did not err in affirming the commissioner's denial of the plaintiff's motion to open the stipulation, as the board and the commissioner correctly concluded that the Workers' Compensation Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain issues that related to the settlement agreement: the plaintiff presented no claims that challenged the integrity of the settlement of his workers' compensation claims, as he had agreed to be paid $22,500 in exchange for the settlement, he was canvassed, adequately by his own admission, with respect to the stipulation, and the $22,500 sum was remitted to him, and the issues he raised as to the waiver of any rights he may have had were beyond the commission's jurisdiction, which is limited by statute to claims arising out of the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.); moreover, this court declined to review the merits of the various claims the plaintiff raised in his appellate briefs, as those claims were not presented to the commis- sioner during the underlying proceedings. Argued September 19—officially released December 10, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of, inter alia, felony murder and robbery in the first degree as an accessory, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his prior habeas counsel, D, and his original appellate counsel, F, had provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. There- after, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. On appeal, he claimed that the habeas court improperly concluded that he was not denied the effective assis- tance of counsel by D with respect to D's efforts to establish that F was ineffective. Although F, in a petition for certification to appeal to our Supreme Court, claimed that it was improper for this court in the petition- er's direct appeal to order that the trial court modify the petitioner's conviction of robbery in the first degree as an accessory to a conviction of accessory to attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, he failed to include a citation to State v. Sanseverino (287 Conn. 608) (Sansever- ino I), in which our Supreme Court, after reversing the defendant's kidnapping conviction, noted the possibility that the state could ask the court to modify the defendant's conviction to the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint in the second degree. The petitioner also claimed that F was ineffective in failing, while the petition was pending in our Supreme Court, to file a motion for reconsideration in this court regard- ing the modification issue after our Supreme Court officially released its decision in Sanseverino I. He further claimed that D was deficient in the petitioner's first habeas trial because he failed to point out suffi- ciently F's errors, and because he failed to advance the legal analyses set forth in the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Rogers in State v. Sanseverino (291 Conn. 574) (Sanseverino II), which questioned the wisdom of allowing the modification of a defendant's conviction to a lesser included offense, where a jury instruction on the lesser included offense was not provided by the court, in future cases that do not share the unique circumstances of that case. Finally, he claimed that F was ineffective for failing to make the argument against modification of the petitioner's judgment based on his acquittal due to insufficient evidence and the lack of a jury instruction on the lesser included offense, similar to the way in which the appellate attorney had successfully raised a similar claim in State v. LaFleur (307 Conn. 115), which concluded that the facts and procedural history of that defendant's case were sufficiently different than those in Sanseverino II to preclude modification of the defendant's conviction of assault in the first degree to the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal: in the petitioner's first habeas case, D did claim that F should have filed a motion for reconsideration with this court in the petitioner's direct appeal, the possible relevance of the Sanseverino I, Sanseverino II, and LaFleur cases was raised by D and considered by the habeas court, the petitioner's expert witness in the first habeas case testified concerning Sanseverino II and why he believed that it was relevant to the petitioner's case, and on appeal from the habeas court's decision in the first habeas case, the petitioner, in support of his claim that F was ineffective by not filing a motion for reconsideration with this court in the petitioner's direct appeal, fully addressed all three cases in his appellate brief to this court, which rejected the claim, and, thus, the petitioner could not establish prejudice with respect to that claim; moreover, the petitioner could not establish prejudice with respect to his claim that D provided ineffective assistance by failing to claim that F was ineffective on direct appeal when he did not rely on Sanseverino I in his petition for certifica- tion to appeal to our Supreme Court, as the petitioner could not establish that there was a reasonable probability that, if F had cited to Sanseverino I in his petition for certification to appeal to our Supreme Court, certifica- tion would have been granted and the outcome of his appeal would have been different, the petitioner having failed to establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that our Supreme Court was unaware or unmindful of its then very recent decision in Sanseverino I when it denied the petition for certification to appeal. Argued October 9—officially released December 10, 2019

The petitioner, who had been convicted of, inter alia, the crimes of attempt to commit kidnapping in the first degree and attempt to commit sexual assault in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that under current case law interpreting the kidnapping statutes, including State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509), his due process rights under the federal and state constitutions were violated due to the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury. The petitioner's conviction stemmed from his conduct in bursting through the door of the victim's apartment, choking her and engaging in a physical struggle with her, after which he dragged her out of the apartment and into a nearby hallway. Eventu- ally the struggle moved outdoors, where a bystander heard the victim's screams and restrained the petitioner until the police arrived. While at the police station, the petitioner admitted that he intended to bring the victim back to his apartment to rape and torture her. Although the trial court did not instruct the jury that in order to find the petitioner guilty of attempted kidnapping, it had to find that he intended to restrain the victim to a greater degree than was necessary to commit sexual assault, the habeas court concluded that the trial court was not required to give a Salamon instruction and that even if it had been required to do so, the absence of a Salamon instruction was completely harmless because there was no reasonable possibility that a jury instructed pursuant to Salamon would have reached a different result than it did. Accordingly, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the amended petition, and, thereafter, granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The petitioner's claim that the habeas court's failure to give the jury a Salamon instruction was not harmless error was unavailing, that court having properly concluded, on the basis of the evidence, that the peti- tioner was not entitled to a Salamon instruction because he intended to abduct and restrain the victim for a longer period of time and to a greater degree than would have been necessary to commit the other charged offenses and was only thwarted by the victim's own efforts to escape and the timely intercession of a third party: the evidence demonstrated that the petitioner intended to render the victim uncon- scious, bind her and take her to his apartment where he would rape and torture her, and that he engaged in conduct designed to carry out his plan when he burst into her apartment, choked her and chased her when she attempted to get away, and his attempt to bind and move the victim from her apartment to his apartment where he intended to rape and torture her increased the risk of harm, prevented her from seeking help and would have prevented the crime from being detected, which showed that he prevented the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which would have been necessary to commit the other crime; moreover, the state was not required to establish any minimum period of confinement or degree of movement, the petitioner, who was convicted of attempt to commit kidnapping in the first degree, failed to address the law pertaining to the crime of attempt as it related to the facts of this case, and because the trial court was not required to give the jury a Salamon instruction, it was not necessary for this court to determine whether the absence of such an instruction was harmless error. 2. The petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in conceding his guilt to a burglary charge during closing argument was unavailing; the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of overcoming the presumption that trial counsel's remarks reflected a reasonable trial strategy, as the petitioner had pursued an affirmative defense that he should be found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, which entails an acknowledgment that he committed the offenses, counsel explained to him that such an affirma- tive defense constituted an admission of guilt, and although the peti- tioner was equivocal as to whether he recalled counsel's advice to him about presenting a mental disease or defect defense involving a concession of guilt and claimed that he misunderstood that he would have to concede his factual guilt to all charges, there was no evidence in the record that the petitioner ever objected to counsel's concession strategy and the habeas court made no such finding, and counsel's presentation of that defense was predicated on the evidence in the record, including testimony from two experts that the petitioner was suffering from a mental disease or defect when he committed the charged crimes. Argued September 17—officially released December 17, 2019

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, thereafter, denied the petition for certifi- cation to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. The petitioner subsequently filed an application for a fee waiver and attached thereto an affidavit requesting certification of additional issues on appeal. Although the waiver application was granted, the court did not initially rule on the petitioner's request for certification of additional issues on appeal, and the petitioner subsequently filed a motion for articulation requesting that the court rule on his request, which the court treated as a motion to amend the petition for certification and granted. On appeal, the respondent Commissioner of Correction claimed that the habeas court, having previously denied the petition for certification to appeal, lacked jurisdiction to allow the petitioner to amend his petition for certification to appeal. Held: 1. The respondent's claim that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction to allow the petitioner to amend his petition for certification to appeal was unavailing: that court's ruling did not implicate the four month jurisdic- tional limit of the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-4) because courts have continuing jurisdiction to fashion appropriate remedies pursuant to their inherent powers, and its ruling allowing the petitioner to amend his petition for certification to appeal was merely a clarification of an ambiguity in the record concerning which claims the petitioner had preserved for appeal, and although the petitioner timely raised claims in his petition for certification to appeal and his waiver application, the court had ruled on only the former, and the issues raised in his applica- tion went unaddressed by the court, through no fault of the petitioner, until he filed a motion for articulation; accordingly, the court did not open a twenty-two month old judgment but, rather, addressed an overlooked petition for certification to appeal that previously had been filed. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the habeas petition and concluding that trial counsel's performance was not deficient: a. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court erred by not analyzing whether the cumulative effect of his trial counsel's alleged errors constituted prejudice under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668); the court considered and rejected multiple claims of ineffective assistance that the petitioner alleged against his trial counsel, noting that the state presented a strong case against the petitioner, our Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to adopt a cumulative error analysis, and it was not within the province of this court to reevaluate the decisions of our Supreme Court. b. The petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to ensure that he was competent to stand trial was unavailing; although the petitioner claimed the court did not consider evidence that he suf- fered from amnesia when the crimes were committed and throughout his criminal trial, the petitioner's trial counsel testified at the habeas trial that he had reviewed three competency evaluations, all of which indicated that the petitioner was competent to stand trial and capable of assisting his attorney, the court found that trial counsel's testimony was credible and that the petitioner was intelligent and able to under- stand the proceeding, and that the petitioner presented no evidence to corroborate his amnesia claim or indicating what an additional investiga- tion would have uncovered had counsel undertaken such steps, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that that finding of the habeas court was clearly erroneous. 3. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for a writ of mandamus to obtain legal assistance in preparing his appellate brief and oral argument: a. Contrary to the claim of the respondent, the petitioner's claim was not moot because it fell within the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine; the petitioner's claim related to an inherently limited action that would likely be moot in a substantial majority of cases, the petitioner alleged an ongoing constitutional viola- tion in which our correctional facilities systematically deny inmates meaningful access to the courts and, thus, this issue would be likely to arise any time that an inmate proceeds self-represented, and the peti- tioner raised a question of public importance because he alleged a serious constitutional violation. b. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for a writ of mandamus; the appointment of counsel for habeas petitioners satisfies the requirements of our state constitution and Bounds v. Smith (430 U.S. 828), which provides that inmates have a constitutional right to access to the courts, the petitioner was not deprived of his rights because he had the option of appointed counsel at his habeas trial and on appeal but elected to proceed self-represented, Bounds, which affords the states discretion to determine how to provide access to the courts, and its progeny provide no specific requirement that the states provide law libraries or other means of legal research to inmates, and, therefore, the remedy sought was not a mandatory duty of the state and the petitioner had no clear right to have the duty performed. Argued September 23—officially released December 17, 2019

The acquittee, who had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his application for discharge from the jurisdic- tion of the Psychiatric Security Review Board. He claimed that the diagnoses attributed to him—cannabis induced psychotic episode, an acute intoxication now in full remission, cannabis use disorder in remis- sion in a controlled environment, and alcohol use disorder in remission in a controlled environment—are not considered mental illnesses and, thus, do not constitute psychiatric disabilities pursuant to the statutes (§§ 17a-580 through 17a-602) concerning the psychiatric security review board. Held that the trial court did not err in denying the acquittee's application for discharge from the jurisdiction of the board and determin- ing that the acquittee's diagnoses constituted psychiatric disabilities under §§ 17a-580 through 17a-602; that court's finding that the acquittee was mentally ill, suffered from a substance induced psychotic disorder and, thus, suffered from more than mere substance abuse was not clearly erroneous, as the court, in making that finding, considered testimony from a treating forensic psychiatrist, as well as the acquittee's history under the supervision of the board, his anxious and impulsive behavior over the past eight years, the nature of and circumstances surrounding his criminal conduct in assaulting and attempting to assault individuals, his need for continued therapy and supervision, his refusal to consider medication as recommended and his lack of compliance and honesty with staff members and treaters, and on the basis of the totality of the evidence, the court determined that if the acquittee were to be released from the board's supervision entirely, he would under those circum- stances present a danger to himself or others. Argued September 24—officially released December 17, 2019

The plaintiff, C Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant, S, who was defaulted for failure to plead. Thereafter, the trial court granted the motion filed by the substitute plaintiff, A Co., for a judgment of strict foreclosure and rendered judg- ment thereon, from which S appealed to this court, which reversed in part the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. Following the remand, A Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only on count one of its operative, six count amended complaint. Subsequently, S filed a motion for an exten- sion of time to respond to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, which the court denied as untimely. The parties appeared before the court at short calendar on A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, which had been marked ready. The court granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, absent opposition. S's counsel then stated that, pursuant to statute (§ 51-183c), the court was required to recuse itself. The court responded by asking whether S's counsel had filed a motion to recuse, to which he indicated that he had not, and the short calendar proceeding concluded. Subsequently, A Co. filed a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, which the trial court granted and rendered judgment thereon, from which S appealed to this court. Held: 1. S could not prevail on his claim that, pursuant to § 51-183c, the trial court judge should have recused herself from ruling on material issues following this court's reversal of the judgment of strict foreclosure, as § 51-183c did not apply because there was no trial within the meaning of the statute; our appellate courts have repeatedly concluded that § 51- 183c does not require recusal where the adversarial proceeding at issue did not constitute a trial, and, thus, § 51-183c did not apply in the present case so as to require the recusal of the trial judge following the reversal of the judgment of strict foreclosure because that judge had not presided over any trial, as the judgment of strict foreclosure was rendered in the context of a short calendar proceeding, to which § 51-183c does not apply. 2. The trial court erred by granting A Co.'s motion for summary judgment without hearing oral argument on that motion pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 11-18): the opportunity for oral argument required by § 11-18 (a) was not provided during the short calendar proceeding, as the trial court, upon confirming that S had not filed a written response to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, did not inquire as to whether S's counsel wanted to be heard to argue whether A Co. had met its initial burden, but, instead, the court immediately granted the motion absent opposition; moreover, although A Co. claimed that S did not comply with the procedural requirements of § 11-18 (a) (2) because he failed to file a written notice seeking oral argument, the two conditions for oral argument being a matter of right for motions for summary judgment contained in § 11-18 (a) are disjunctive, and S satisfied the condition contained in § 11-18 (a) (1), as A Co.'s motion for summary judgment had been marked ready; furthermore, although A Co. claimed that S waived oral argument as to its motion for summary judgment under § 11-18 (d), which provides that the ''[f]ailure to appear and present argument on the date set by the judicial authority shall constitute a waiver of the right to argue unless the judicial authority orders other- wise,'' that claim failed because not only did S's counsel appear for oral argument, but the trial court ruled on the motion before either party could argue the merits of the motion, and because S had a right to oral argument, which was not waived, with respect to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, the court improperly adjudicated that motion with- out permitting oral argument on the merits. 3. S's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying on timeliness grounds his motion for an extension of time to respond to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment was unavailing: the forty-five day period set forth in the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-45 [b]) for the filing of a response to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment passed without S filing a response or a motion for an extension of time, and although S claimed that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for an extension of time as untimely because the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-47), which allows the court to grant a continuance for discovery purposes on the basis of reasons stated in the affidavits of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment, contains no timing require- ment, Practice Book § 17-47 imports the forty-five day filing deadline set forth in Practice Book § 17-45 (b); moreover, this court rejected S's claim that an alleged undocumented agreement between counsel, specifically, that A Co. would not claim its motion for summary judgment until S had taken a deposition of A Co.'s corporate designee, can usurp the requirements of the rules of practice, including the need to seek extensions of time in a timely manner. Argued September 24—officially released December 17, 2019

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of unlawful discharge of a firearm, carrying a pistol without a permit, risk of injury to a child and reckless endangerment in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he fired a shot from a pistol into B's home after having purchased marijuana from B and fighting with him outside of the home. B's girlfriend and her five year old daughter were in the home at the time of the shooting. At trial, the state called B to testify regarding his account of the incident, including that the defendant had pulled a pistol from his waistband and fired a shot into a first floor window of his home. The defendant's friend M, who was with the defendant when he purchased the marijuana from B and witnessed the incident, also provided testimony for the state, the majority of which corroborated B's account of the incident. In addition, M testified that the defendant handed him the pistol as they fled the scene together following the shooting. The police recovered the pistol from M when they subsequently apprehended him and the defendant. The state also presented testimony from forensic examiners who testi- fied that a bullet and shell casing found at B's home was fired by the pistol that was recovered from M and that a buccal swab of the defen- dant's DNA linked the defendant to that pistol. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find him guilty because the state presented insufficient evi- dence to prove that he was the shooter: on the basis of compelling circumstantial evidence elicited from B, M's eyewitness testimony and the DNA evidence linking the defendant to the pistol that was used to fire the bullet into B's home, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant was the individual who committed the shooting, and although the defendant challenged the competency of M as a witness and noted the self-serving interest of both M and B in testifying on the state's behalf, those contentions were based on credibility considera- tions that were the exclusive province of the jury, which could have discounted M's and B's testimonies if it had found those witnesses to be unreliable. Argued October 16—officially released December 17, 2019

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant property owners for injuries she sustained when she tripped on a public sidewalk that abutted the defendants' property. The plaintiff alleged that an approxi- mately one and one-half inch lip between two segments of the sidewalk constituted a defective condition in the sidewalk. Under the common law, a landowner whose property abuts a public sidewalk is under no duty to keep the sidewalk in front of the property in a reasonably safe condition, except when a municipality confers liability on the abutting landowner through a statute or ordinance, or where the defect was created by a positive act of the landowner. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming, inter alia, that under the facts alleged by the plaintiff, they owed no duty to the plaintiff to maintain the sidewalk. The defendants claimed that the applicable city ordinance (§ 21-37) shifted only the duty of repairing an abutting sidewalk from the municipality to an abutting landowner but did not shift liability for injuries resulting from an unsafe condition on the sidewalk. The defendants further asserted that the positive act exception to the general rule absolving landowners of liability for defective sidewalks did not apply because they did not create the unsafe condition on the public sidewalk. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendants as to counts one and two of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that the defendants violated § 21-37, the plaintiff's appellate counsel having conceded to this court that § 21-37 did not shift liability to the defendants and did not play any role in her appeal. 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to counts four and five of the complaint, which alleged that the defect in the sidewalk developed as a result of the settling of one adjacent segment of the sidewalk: there was no allegation in those counts that any positive act on the part of the defendants caused the settling of the sidewalk segment, as the allegation suggested that the alleged settling resulted from nature and the passage of time, which was insufficient as a matter of law to impose a duty on an abutting landowner, and, thus, the allegations of counts four and five were insuffi- cient as a matter of law to hold the defendants liable for the plaintiff's injuries; moreover, the plaintiff's claim that the defendants owed a duty of care on the theory that a business owner that invites the public to enter and exit its property at a particular location owes a duty to ensure that the location is reasonably safe was unavailing, as the case law relied on by the plaintiff in support of that claim was inapposite in that it did not involve a public sidewalk and, therefore, did not create an additional exception to the general common-law rule. 3. The trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts three, six and seven of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged that the defendants had constructed a sidewalk on their property with a resulting approximately one and one-half inch lip between the sidewalk segments and the sidewalk on the adjoining prop- erty, as those counts alleged a legally cognizable basis for liability in that they alleged that the defendants constructed the sidewalk with the alleged defect: to prevail on their motion for summary judgment, the defendants bore the initial burden to negate the factual claims as framed by the complaint, and, thus, with respect to counts three, six and seven, it was incumbent on those defendants to whom such counts were directed to proffer evidence that either they did not construct the side- walk or that they constructed the sidewalk without the alleged defect, and because the defendants did not submit any supporting affidavits or documentary evidence, they failed to satisfy their initial burden as movants for summary judgment with respect to those counts; moreover, the fact that the defendants submitted evidentiary materials with their reply brief did not cure their failure to proffer evidence with their initial motion because the reply materials did not establish the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. Argued April 11—officially released December 17, 2019 Proceedings Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen- dants' alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Shapiro, J., granted the plaintiff's motion to cite in Vernon W. Belanger et al. as defen- dants; thereafter, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Frank C. Bartlett, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff). Christopher P. Kriesen, with whom was Ronald J. Houde, Jr., for the appellees (defendants). Opinion MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Cynthia Cyr, appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, VKB, LLC (VKB), Shady Oaks Assisted Living, LLC (Shady Oaks Assisted Living), Shady Oaks Rest Home, Inc. (Shady Oaks Rest Home), Vernon W. Belanger, and Kay F. Belanger. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts of her amended complaint when it (1) failed to require the defendants, as the movants for summary judgment, first to establish that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) determined that the defendants' alleged affirmative acts did not create the defect in the sidewalk, and (3) purportedly determined, as a matter of law, that a business owner that invites individuals to enter and exit its property at a particular location owes no duty to ensure that such location is reasonably safe. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court. The following procedural history is relevant to our analysis of the plaintiff's claims. On November 29, 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action, sounding in negli- gence and negligence per se, against the original defen- dants, VKB, Shady Oaks Assisted Living, and Shady Oaks Rest Home. On February 2, 2017, the original defendants filed an answer and special defenses in response to the plaintiff's original complaint. On Febru- ary 6, 2017, the original defendants filed a request for leave to amend their answer and special defenses and appended the proposed amendment, which was deemed to have been filed by consent, absent objection. On February 10, 2017, the plaintiff filed a reply.1 On December 29, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite in additional defendants, Vernon W. Belanger and Kay F. Belanger, and to amend the complaint, which was granted by the court on January 17, 2018. On January 31, 2018, the plaintiff filed her amended complaint and alleged, inter alia, the following. At all relevant times, the defendants owned, and/or were in the possession and control of, real property located at 344 Stevens Street in Bristol (property). On May 28, 2015, at approximately 10:15 a.m., the plaintiff was walking on the sidewalk abutting the property, when she tripped on an approximately one and one-half inch lip between two sidewalk segments (defect) and fell, sustaining physical injuries, principally to her left hand, which necessitated medical treatment and interfered with her employment and enjoyment of life's activities. The parties do not dispute that the sidewalk at issue is a public sidewalk. On the basis of the foregoing factual allegations, the plaintiff asserted the following claims: (1) negligence as to VKB (count one); (2) negligence per se as to VKB (count two); (3) nuisance as to VKB (count three); (4) negligence as to Shady Oaks Assisted Living (count four); (5) negligence as to Shady Oaks Rest Home (count five); (6) nuisance as to Vernon W. Belanger (count six); and (7) nuisance as to Kay F. Belanger (count seven). The plaintiff alleged alternative theories as to how the alleged defect in the sidewalk was created. On the one hand, in counts one and two (directed to VKB), count four (directed to Shady Oaks Assisted Liv- ing), and count five (directed to Shady Oaks Rest Home), the plaintiff alleged that the defect ''developed as a result of the settling of one adjacent segment.'' On the other hand, in count three (directed to VKB), count six (directed to Vernon W. Belanger), and count seven (directed to Kay F. Belanger), the plaintiff alleged, respectively, that VKB, or its predecessor(s) in interest, Vernon W. Belanger, and/or Kay F. Belanger, through one or more of their agents, servants, and/or employees, constructed the sidewalk with the resulting defect. In each of the respective counts, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were responsible for keeping the abut- ting sidewalk in a safe condition for the use of the public. The defendants did not move to strike any of the plaintiff's claims. On March 12, 2018, however, the defendants filed an amended motion for summary judg- ment (motion), and a supporting memorandum of law, as to all counts of the plaintiff's amended complaint. The motion was not accompanied by any supporting affidavits or documentary evidence. The defendants argued that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Bristol Code of Ordinances § 21-372 (city ordinance) shifts only the duty of repairing an abutting sidewalk from the municipality to an abutting landowner and does not shift liability for injuries resulting from an unsafe condition of the sidewalk, (2) there is no common-law duty owed by abutting land- owners to the public for sidewalk defects, and (3) there is no evidence, and the plaintiff cannot prove, that the defendants created the alleged defect so as to fall within an exception to the general rule that liability remains with the municipality in cases involving public side- walk defects. On April 19, 2018, the plaintiff filed an objection and a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, as well as the affidavit of Frank C. Bartlett, Jr., Esq., and several exhibits. On May 7, 2018, the defendants filed a reply memorandum of law, as well as the affidavit of Ronald J. Houde, Jr., Esq., and several exhibits. That same day, the court held a hearing on the motion. On June 15, 2018, the court granted the defendants' motion, rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts. The trial court's memorandum of decision reflects the following analysis. Having reviewed the general principles regarding the liability of abutting landowners for injuries sustained on a defective public sidewalk, the court first concluded that, although the city ordinance imposes a duty on the defendants to maintain the side- walk, it does not shift liability from the municipality to the defendants for the plaintiff's fall. The court then addressed the plaintiff's argument that there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defen- dants caused the sidewalk defect by performing a posi- tive act. Specifically, the court stated that ''[t]he plaintiff does not allege, and has not presented evidence to show, that the sidewalk was constructed or repaired deficiently . . . .'' The court went on to reject the plain- tiff's additional arguments, namely, that the defendants owed her a duty of care by (1) voluntarily undertaking to inspect the sidewalks and (2) incurring a higher duty of care to the plaintiff as a business invitee. Thereupon, the court entered judgment in favor of the defendants as to all counts. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be provided as necessary. Before we turn to the plaintiff's claims on appeal, we briefly discuss the standard of review and applicable legal principles. The standard governing our review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is well established. ''Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A party moving for sum- mary judgment is held to a strict standard. . . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When documents sub- mitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met its burden, how- ever, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . . Our review of the trial court's decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.'' (Emphasis omitted; internal quo- tation marks omitted.) Capasso v. Christmann, 163 Conn. App. 248, 257, 135 A.3d 733 (2016). We next review the substantive law governing liability for injuries resulting from a defective condition on a public sidewalk. ''It has long been established that municipalities have the primary duty to maintain public sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. Robinson v. Cianfarani, [314 Conn. 521, 525, 107 A.3d 375 (2014)]. General Statutes § 13a-99 further provides in relevant part that '[t]owns shall, within their respective limits, build and repair all necessary highways and bridges . . . except when such duty belongs to some particular person. . . .' When a sidewalk 'along a public street in a city [has] been constructed and thrown open for pub- lic use, and used in connection with the rest of the street, [it] must, as a part of the street,' be maintained by the city, and kept in such repair 'as to be reasonably safe and convenient for . . . travelers . . . .' Man- the city the public and individuals have a right to look for security against accidents, as well as for indemnity for injury occasioned by its neglect.' Id. ''This primary duty cannot ordinarily be delegated to or imposed upon a third party by contract or ordinance. 'An abutting landowner, in the absence of statute or ordinance, ordinarily is under no duty to keep the public sidewalk in front of his property in a reasonably safe condition for travel.' Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 280, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). Abutting landowners, therefore, are generally not liable for injuries caused by defects on public sidewalks adjacent to their prop- erty. See Robinson v. Cianfarani, supra, 314 Conn. 529. The common-law rule is that the abutting landowner is under no duty to keep a public sidewalk in front of his property in a reasonably safe condition for travel. Id. Moreover, shifting liability cannot be accomplished by inference or by alleging alternative theories of com- mon-law negligence. Id., 528. There are two exceptions. First, municipalities, in limited circumstances, can con- fer liability onto the abutting landowner through a char- ter provision, statute, or ordinance. Id. Second, land- owners may be liable for injuries caused by defects they created by their own actions. Id. . . . ''Therefore, without a statute that confers liability or the creation by the abutting landowner of the cause of the injury to the plaintiff, the landowner owes no duty to members of the public traversing the public sidewalk. See Wilson v. New Haven, supra, 213 Conn. 280–81.'' (Citations omitted; footnotes omitted.) McFarline v. Mickens, 177 Conn. App. 83, 93–95, 173 A.3d 417 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 997, 176 A.3d 557 (2018). I We first consider the foregoing principles with respect to counts one and two of the amended com- plaint (i.e., the plaintiff's claims of negligence and negli- gence per se as to VKB). In the allegations made in support of such claims, the plaintiff exclusively relied on the city ordinance as creating a duty on the part of VKB to inspect, maintain, and/or repair the abutting sidewalk, and to warn individuals, including the plain- tiff, of the allegedly defective condition of the sidewalk. During oral argument before this court, and having stated in the plaintiff's principal appellate brief that ''the plaintiff is not claiming that [the city ordinance], in and of itself, shifts liability to an abutting landowner,'' the plaintiff's counsel expressly acknowledged that the city ordinance does not play any role in the plaintiff's appeal and conceded that summary judgment properly entered in favor of VKB on count two. Count one neces- sarily suffers the same fate, however, as the plaintiff's theory of negligence alleged therein also is based exclu- sively on VKB's alleged violation of the city ordinance.3 See Robinson v. Cianfarani, supra, 314 Conn. 528 (holding that town ordinance that imposed duty on abutting landowner to remediate hazardous conditions created by accumulation of snow and ice on public sidewalk but did not shift civil liability to that landowner for failure to do so could not be used to support alterna- tive negligence theories). Accordingly, the plaintiff's challenge to the trial court's rendering of summary judg- ment in favor of VKB as to counts one and two is deemed abandoned, and the judgment as to counts one and two is affirmed on that basis. II We turn next, in the context of the remaining counts, which do not rely on the city ordinance, to the applica- bility of the second exception to the general rule. ''[O]ur courts have long recognized '[the second] exception to the general rule, in that abutting property owners can be held liable in negligence or public nuisance for injuries resulting from an unsafe condition of a public sidewalk caused by positive acts of the defendant.' Gambardella v. Kaoud, 38 Conn. App. 355, 358, 660 A.2d 877 (1995). Examples of this exception include a landowner who maintained a gasoline pump inches away from a side- walk which would spill gasoline onto the sidewalk, ren- dering it unsafe for travel; Hanlon v. Waterbury, 108 Conn. 197, 198–99, 142 A. 681 (1928); and a defendant who allowed grease from his restaurant to seep from the front of his building onto the public walk. Perkins v. Weibel, 132 Conn. 50, 51, 42 A.2d 360 (1945).'' (Emphasis added.) McFarline v. Mickens, supra, 177 Conn. App. 94–95. Other examples include a landowner and its lessee that allowed ice to form on a public sidewalk as a result of the melting of snow that had accumulated on projections from the defendants' building; Calway v. William Schaal & Son, Inc., 113 Conn. 586, 588–90, 155 A. 813 (1931); and landowners and their lessee that allegedly caused sand, sticks, and debris to accumulate on a public sidewalk; Gambardella v. Kaoud, supra, 38 Conn. App. 359; accord Wilson v. New Haven, supra, 213 Conn. 280–81 (abutting landowner not liable for injuries sustained as result of fall caused by raised, broken, and uneven section of public sidewalk where plaintiff did not claim that statute or ordinance created duty owed to plaintiff by abutting landowner and where abutting landowner did not create hazardous condi- tion); Abramczyk v. Abbey, 64 Conn. App. 442, 446–47, 780 A.2d 957 (analogizing case, which involved public right-of-way located on defendant's property, to public sidewalk cases and concluding that, in absence of any evidence that defendant's positive acts caused city's water pipe to be tripping hazard, defendant was not liable for injuries caused by exposed pipe), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 933, 785 A.2d 229 (2001). Moreover, an abutting landowner owes no duty to the public to take affirmative steps to remediate a defect on a public sidewalk resulting entirely from the opera- tion of nature. See Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 525, 534 (1881) (there is not imposed ''upon the individual any liability at common law for injuries resulting from obstructions in [a public sidewalk] wholly the effects of natural causes''); McFarline v. Mickens, supra, 177 Conn. App. 97–98 (landowner owed no duty to public in connection with naturally growing grass on public sidewalk). Mindful of the foregoing principles, we address sepa- rately (1) those counts in which the plaintiff alleged that the defect in the sidewalk ''developed as a result of the settling of one adjacent segment'' and (2) those counts in which the plaintiff alleged that the relevant defendant ''constructed a sidewalk on the property with a resulting approximately 1 1/2'' lip between the side- walk segments it installed and the sidewalk on the adjoining property.'' A We begin with counts four and five, directed to Shady Oaks Assisted Living and Shady Oaks Rest Home, respectively, in which the plaintiff alleged that the defect in the sidewalk ''developed as a result of the settling of one adjacent segment.'' As stated previously in this opinion, in construing the plaintiff's claims, the court concluded in part that ''[t]he plaintiff [did] not allege . . . that the sidewalk was constructed or repaired deficiently . . . .'' Insofar as counts four and five are concerned, we agree. There is no allegation in counts four and five that any positive act on the part of these defendants caused the settling of the sidewalk segment. Rather, the allegation that the defect in the sidewalk ''developed as a result of the settling of one adjacent segment'' suggests only that the alleged set- tling resulted from nature and the passage of time, which is insufficient as a matter of law to impose a duty on an abutting landowner. See Hartford v. Talcott, supra, 48 Conn. 534; McFarline v. Mickens, supra, 177 Conn. App. 97–98. In short, it is clear on the face of these counts that they are legally insufficient.4 They fail to state a legally cognizable basis on which to hold Shady Oaks Assisted Living and/or Shady Oaks Rest Home liable for injuries on the abutting public sidewalk. Thus, in the absence of (1) a charter provision, statute, or ordinance that confers liability, or (2) any allegations in counts four and five, that Shady Oaks Assisted Living and Shady Oaks Rest Home, respectively, created a defective con- dition on the public sidewalk, the settled common-law rule governs. See Robinson v. Cianfarani, supra, 314 Conn. 528–29, 528 n.7. Notwithstanding the well settled principles explained previously in this opinion, the plaintiff claims that the defendants owed her a duty of care on the theory that a business owner that invites the public to enter and exit its property at a particular location owes a duty to ensure that the location is reasonably safe. In support of this claim, the plaintiff largely relies on Ford v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, 155 Conn. 24, 32–36, 229 A.2d 346 (1967), in which our Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court holding the defendant lessor liable in negligence for injuries sustained by a business invitee as he exited the lessor's premises. The trial court in the present case concluded, and we agree, that Ford is inapposite because, at a minimum, it did not involve a public sidewalk and, therefore, did not create an additional exception to the general common-law rule discussed previously in this opinion. On the basis of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's rendering of summary judgment in favor of Shady Oaks Assisted Living and Shady Oaks Rest Home as to counts four and five, respectively. B We continue our analysis with counts three, six, and seven, in which the plaintiff alleged that VKB, Vernon W. Belanger, and Kay F. Belanger, respectively, ''con- structed a sidewalk on the property with a resulting approximately 1 1/2'' lip between the sidewalk segments it installed and the sidewalk on the adjoining property.'' With respect to these allegations, we disagree with the trial court's statement that ''[t]he plaintiff [did] not allege . . . that the sidewalk was constructed or repaired deficiently . . . .'' These allegations were suf- ficient to bring the plaintiff's claims in counts three, six, and seven within the second exception to the com- mon-law rule, namely, that an abutting landowner can be liable in negligence or public nuisance for injuries resulting from an unsafe condition of a public sidewalk caused by a positive act of the defendant. That is, the allegations of these counts may be reasonably viewed as alleging that VKB, Vernon W. Belanger, and Kay F. Belanger, respectively, constructed the sidewalk with the alleged defect (i.e., that the alleged defect resulted from the construction of the sidewalk). In light of our conclusion that counts three, six, and seven sufficiently allege a legally cognizable basis for liability, we proceed to address the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in failing to require the defendants to satisfy their initial burden, as the movants for sum- mary judgment, to establish the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. As stated previously in this opinion, in support of their amended motion for summary judgment, the defendants did not submit any supporting affidavits or documentary evidence. The plaintiff argues that, in light of this failure, the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof to her when it concluded that ''[t]he plaintiff . . . has not pre- sented evidence to show . . . that the sidewalk was constructed or repaired deficiently . . . .'' We agree. Practice Book § 17-45 (a) provides: ''A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by appropriate documents, including but not limited to affidavits, certi- fied transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written admissions and other supporting documents.'' (Emphasis added.) ''On a motion by [the] defendant for summary judgment the burden is on [the] defendant to negate each claim as framed by the complaint . . . . It necessarily follows that it is only [o]nce [the] defen- dant's burden in establishing his entitlement to sum- mary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial. . . . Accordingly, [w]hen documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 139 Conn. App. 618, 626–27, 57 A.3d 391 (2012); see also Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 320–21, 77 A.3d 726 (2013); Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Frimel, 192 Conn. App. 786, 795, A.3d (2019); Magee Avenue, LLC v. Lima Ceramic Tile, LLC, 183 Conn. App. 575, 583–85, 193 A.3d 700 (2018). To prevail on their motion for summary judgment, the defendants bore the initial burden to negate the factual claims as framed by the complaint. Thus, in response to the allegations in counts three, six, and seven, that VKB, Vernon W. Belanger, and Kay F. Belanger, respectively, ''constructed a sidewalk on the property with a resulting approximately 1 1/2'' lip between the sidewalk segments it installed and the side- walk on the adjoining property,'' it was incumbent on those defendants to whom such counts were directed to proffer evidence that either they did not construct the sidewalk or that they constructed the sidewalk with- out the alleged defect. In the absence of any evidentiary submission, such defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden as movants for summary judgment with respect to counts three, six, and seven, and the trial court erred in granting their motion for summary judgment as to those counts. The fact that the defendants submitted evidentiary materials with their reply brief (reply materials) in sup- port of their summary judgment motion does nothing to cure the failure to proffer evidence with their initial motion because the reply materials do not establish the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact.5 That is, the reply materials do not contain any affidavits or other supporting documents that demonstrate that the defendants either did not construct the sidewalk or constructed the sidewalk without the alleged defect. Moreover, the reply brief states in part: ''[I]t is not clear that the defendant[s] actually constructed the sidewalk in question,'' which effectively concedes that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether any of the defendants constructed the sidewalk. The judgment is reversed in part only as to the grant- ing of the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to counts three, six, and seven of the plaintiff's amended complaint and the case is remanded with direction to deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to those counts and for further proceedings according to law; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects. In this opinion the other judges concurred. 1 On December 19, 2017, the original defendants filed a motion for sum- mary judgment as to all counts of the plaintiff's original complaint. The defendants later filed an amended motion for summary judgment, the grant- ing of which is the subject of this appeal. 2 Section 21-37 of the Bristol Code of Ordinances, entitled ''Maintenance— Abutting owner's duty generally,'' provides: ''(a) All public sidewalks, when- ever installed, shall be maintained, repaired, replaced and kept clear by the abutting property owner and not at the expense of the general city taxpayers whether such public walks are described as school walks or otherwise. ''(b) Every person owning land within the city, upon or adjacent to which is a sidewalk, whether constructed by him or not, shall at all times keep such sidewalk in safe condition for the use of the public, and shall have repaired all defects which may occur in such sidewalk and at all times remove therefrom all obstructions or any substance which would in any way impede or imperil public travel upon such sidewalk.'' 3 Specifically, in count one, the plaintiff alleged in relevant part: ''4. At all times relevant, [VKB] was responsible for keeping the abutting sidewalk in safe condition for the use of [the] public, pursuant to the ordinances of the [city of] Bristol. . . . 15. [VKB] has direct liability to the plaintiff for the injuries she sustained via operation of Bristol [Code of] Ordinance[s] § 21-37.'' 4 ''The existence of a duty is a question of law . . . .'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Cochran, 332 Conn. 325, 338, 210 A.3d 469 (2019). ''[T]he use of a motion for summary judgment to challenge the legal suffi- ciency of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint fails to set forth a cause of action and the defendant can establish that the defect could not be cured by repleading.'' Larobina v. McDonald, 274 Conn. 394, 401, 876 A.2d 522 (2005). 5 The reply materials, which were filed on the same day as the summary judgment hearing, include certificates of use and occupancy, two photo- graphs of the sidewalk, excerpts from the plaintiff's deposition transcript, and the affidavit of Ronald J. Houde, Jr., Esq. attesting that the submitted documents are true and accurate copies. Because the plaintiff's counsel stated to the trial court during the summary judgment hearing that he had no objection to the court considering the defendants' reply, the plaintiff is deemed to have waived any objection to the reply on timeliness grounds. Cf. Magee Avenue, LLC v. Lima Ceramic Tile, LLC, supra, 183 Conn. App. 583–85 (holding that, in adjudicating defendants' motion for summary judg- ment, trial court should not have considered defendants' initial affidavit, filed one day before summary judgment hearing, to which plaintiff objected on, inter alia, timeliness grounds).