Volume 198 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiffs, M Co., O Co. and P Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant R Co., a law firm, for breach of contract for its alleged violation of a confidentiality provision of a settlement agreement executed by the plaintiffs and A Co., to which R Co. was a signatory. The plaintiffs and A Co. had executed a confidential settlement agreement to resolve certain litigation and arbitration proceedings. Thereafter, A Co. brought a related action, Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v. Pursuit Investment Management, LLC, (193 Conn. App. 381) (Alpha Beta), seeking damages for the alleged failure of the defendants, which included the plaintiffs in the present case, to provide A Co. with its proportionate share of the litigation proceeds secured by the settlement agreement. In Alpha Beta, the trial court found that the delayed payment of the proceeds to A Co. constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement by certain defendants in that action, relieving A Co. of its confidentiality obligations thereunder, and this court held that the court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Subsequently, the plaintiffs commenced this action against R Co., alleging that R Co. breached the confidentiality provision of the agreement when it communicated with S Co. in connection with litiga- tion involving the plaintiffs in the present case. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by R Co. on defensive collateral estoppel grounds, concluding that, in Alpha Beta, the defendants were determined to be the culpable parties, excusing further adherence to the confidentiality provisions by A Co., and, once the court had ruled in favor of A Co., it found that R Co.'s obligation pursuant to the confiden- tiality provisions of the agreement also was excused. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly concluded that R Co. was bound by the confidentiality provision of the settlement agreement only to the extent of its client, A Co., which was based on their claim that the language of the agreement, coupled with R Co.'s signature on the agreement, was ambiguous and created a genu- ine issue of material fact regarding the capacity in which R Co. signed the agreement: the agreement was a contract that was entered into among A Co. and the plaintiffs and certain other companies for the principal purpose of settling certain litigation and arbitration proceed- ings; it was undisputed that R Co. was not a named party to the agree- ment, and the language of the agreement repeatedly referred to the parties and their respective counsel, indicating that R Co.'s obligations flowed from its role as A Co.'s counsel and, furthermore, R Co. signed the agreement as counsel for A Co.; viewing the agreement as a whole, this court concluded that any confidentiality obligation that R Co. under- took was limited to the extent of the obligation of A Co., its client; moreover, the trial court properly concluded that a certain affidavit on which the plaintiffs relied in opposition to R Co.'s motion for summary judgment did not create a genuine issue of material fact but, rather, contained conclusory allegations that did not constitute evidence suffi- cient to establish the existence of disputed material facts. 2. The trial court properly concluded that the finding in Alpha Beta that A Co. had been released from its confidentiality obligations under the settlement agreement by virtue of the material breach of the settlement agreement by certain defendants in that action had collateral estoppel effect that extended to R Co., as an agent of A Co.: it was undisputed that A Co. was released from compliance with the confidentiality provi- sions of the settlement agreement as a result of the prior material breach of that agreement by the defendants in Alpha Beta, and, in the absence of an independent contractual obligation on the part of R Co. to comply with the agreement that was untethered to its role as counsel for A Co., this court could conceive of no reason why collateral estoppel principles should not apply under the limited circumstances of this case; moreover, the fact that R Co. was not a party to the related action in Alpha Beta did not militate against its defensive use of collateral estoppel. Argued October 9, 2019—officially released June 9, 2020

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court, which found him in contempt for failing to satisfy various financial obligations relating to the marital home. On appeal, the defendant claimed that there were no motions pending before the court on which it could find him in contempt, as the trial court had denied the defendant's motions because she had failed to appear in court on the date of the scheduled hearing on the motions. Held that the plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that there were no motions pending before the trial court when it found him in contempt: the record demonstrated that the defendant filed three motions for a continuance on the same day and prior to the scheduled hearing on the pending motions for contempt and the trial court thereafter ordered the parties to obtain a hearing date from the family caseflow office to continue the hearing on the defendant's claims and granted in part the defendant's motions for a continuance, which effectively vacated its denial of the defendant's motions for contempt; furthermore, this court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that he did not receive a motion for contempt by service of process, as that claim was not adequately briefed. Argued October 7, 2019—officially released June 16, 2020

The defendant, who had been convicted of the crimes of home invasion, burglary in the first degree and assault in the second degree, appealed to this court, claiming, inter alia, that he was denied his due process right a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety. The defendant had kicked in the door of his former girlfriend's home and physically assaulted her. After the police received a tip that he had been in contact with his then current girlfriend, G, who was incarcerated, the police obtained and examined G's phone records and discovered that she had had several calls with someone who used the same phone number that the victim had given to the police for the defendant. The police thereafter obtained copies of G's recorded phone calls from the Department of Correction, transcripts of which were admitted into evidence. In the transcript of one call, the caller admitted that he had gotten drunk at the home of a friend, J, after which he kicked in the door of the victim's home and began fighting. In the transcript of the second call, the caller told G that he was on the run because the police had gone to his mother's house to ask about G's stolen car. At trial, the victim changed her story and testified that her injuries were not caused by the defendant but occurred when she fell down stairs in her home, and the defendant presented an alibi defense in which J testified that the defendant was with him at J's home on the evening of the assault. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor commit- ted improprieties by using excessive leading questions in his direct examination of the victim, by refreshing the recollection of a witness with a document different from the one he stated that he used for that purpose, and stating in closing argument to the jury, without supporting evidence, that the victim had been threatened or otherwise influenced by the defendant to deny her claim against him and to instead insist that she had been injured when she fell down stairs in her home: a. The sequences of leading questions that the defendant challenged did not constitute acts of prosecutorial impropriety under State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509), as they were not improper in the evidentiary sense under the applicable provision (§ 6-8) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence or in the constitutional sense, in that they did not threaten his due process right to a fair trial: because the defendant objected to only one of the prosecutor's several leading questions, the answer to each subsequent leading question was permitted to stand and be given what- ever weight the jury chose to give to it, and operated as a waiver of any claim by the defendant of evidentiary error on the ground of improper leading of the witness that he might otherwise have raised on appeal, the defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly asked the victim leading questions without obtaining the court's permission to do so or establishing any valid legal basis for so doing was meritless, as the defendant's appellate counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that the victim was hostile to the prosecution throughout her testimony, and, in the absence of any objection by the defendant, the court had no sua sponte right or duty to intervene, and no advance judicial determination as to the propriety of the prosecutor's leading questioning was required; moreover, the defendant's claim that the pros- ecutor used a leading question to identify the victim's injuries before evidence as to those injuries had been introduced was unavailing, as it was not improper for the prosecutor to include facts in those leading questions as to which no other evidence had yet been introduced, as long as he had a good faith basis for doing so, there was no merit to the defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly responded to the victim's assertion about her injuries by asking questions that indicated to the jury that she changed her story from the one she had given to the police and that she changed her story frequently, and, although the defendant claimed that the prosecutor's leading questions improperly suggested to the jury that the victim previously stated that the defendant was the caller on the recordings of G's phone conversations, it was not constitutionally improper for the prosecutor to pose those questions, as the defendant pointed to nothing in the challenged questions that appealed to the jury to accept the prosecutor's statements as true, and it was highly unlikely that the mere asking of the challenged questions would cause the jury to draw that inference, as there was substantial evidence that the defendant was the caller; furthermore, the prosecutor's challenged leading questions about the defendant's alleged threatening phone call to the victim were proper because of the witness' hostility to the prosecution and the defendant's lack of any challenge to the prosecutor's good faith basis for asking the leading questions, and there was nothing about the substance of or manner in which the questions were asked that did any more than ask the witness to admit or to deny the truth of the statements concerning her alleged receipt of a threatening phone call from the defendant and her later report of that phone call to the police. b. The record was inadequate to determine whether, as the defendant claimed, the prosecutor improperly refreshed a witness' recollection by showing the witness a police document different from the one he purported to show the witness for that purpose, as there was no basis to establish that the witness did not in fact prepare the document at issue, and the defendant did not move during the pendency of this appeal to reconstruct the trial court record to identify the document. c. The prosecutor's comments in closing argument to the jury about the victim's inconsistent statements as to how she had suffered her injuries were not improper, as they were based on reasonable inferences that were supported by the evidence: the challenged comments did not refer to or make substantive use of any of the statements of fact in the prosecutor's previous leading questions to the victim, and the prosecutor did not refer to the victim's having received a threatening phone call from the defendant, as was suggested in his prior leading questions to her, but, instead, suggested that the jury should consider the victim's original statements to be more credible than her trial testimony because, unlike her trial testimony, her original statements were made in the immediate aftermath of the incident at issue; moreover, the prosecutor's argument as to the reasons for the victim's change in her story was proper, as it merely pointed out and drew upon the victim's experience with the defendant, the fear it aroused in her and the logical effects it may have had on her desire to testify against him, and the defendant's failure to object to the prosecutor's argument suggested that his counsel did not perceive the argument to be improper. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence recordings of G's phone calls with him, which was based on his claim that the court improperly prevented him from exploring the state's ability to authenticate his voice on the recordings: although the defendant raised the authentication issue during a pretrial hearing, in which the court responded by stating that the recordings would be admitted subject to authentication by the state, the defendant made no objection when the state introduced them during trial, he did not attempt to voir dire any witnesses about them before they were admitted, he never argued that the state failed to lay a proper foundation to authenticate them or move to strike any testimony about them after he realized that the state failed to meet its burden of authentication, and, as there was no basis in the record for the court's ruling striking the testimony of a police officer who identified the defen- dant's voice on the recordings after they had been admitted, this court could not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in striking that testimony; moreover, the defendant's failure to object to the admission of the recordings during trial and to argue that the state failed to prove the identity of the caller appeared to have been a strategic choice, as he did not object to the court's decision to give the jurors during deliberations transcripts of the recordings on which his name was listed as that of the caller, and he told the jury during his closing argument that the state had failed to establish that it was his voice on the recordings. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt: although the defendant's initial objection to the instruction differed from his claim on appeal, which he preserved for appellate review by excepting to the court's instruction after it was approved and delivered, his claim was unavailing, as the record con- tained significant support for the court's instruction in that it was before the jury that he had a prior relationship with the victim, the jury watched the police body camera recordings that showed the bloodied victim identifying the defendant as her attacker, and the jury heard medical testimony about her injuries, read the statement she gave to the police and heard her testify that she was afraid of the defendant and had asked for a protective order against him; moreover, the victim provided the police with a phone number she knew to be that of the defendant, the billing information for that number showed that it was registered in the defendant's name, and the jury heard evidence in the recordings of the defendant's calls to G that the victim had been assaulted. Argued September 12, 2019—officially released June 16, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to recover damages from the defendant guarantor in connection with the alleged default by the borrower, A, on a certain promissory note. The defendant had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff providing that the defendant guaranteed payment of all liabilities owed to the plaintiff by A. A ceased making required payments on October 18, 2011, and the plaintiff subsequently obtained a judgment against A. Thereafter, the members of another entity, P Co., agreed to fund the monthly interest payment due on A's note, and did so until October, 2017, but ceased thereafter. The plaintiff then made a demand on the defendant pursuant to the guarantee agreement, which the defen- dant failed to satisfy, and the plaintiff commenced this action. Following a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly found that the plaintiff's cause of action to recover from the defendant on its guarantee of A's note accrued on October 18, 2011, and, therefore, was barred by the applicable six year statute of limitations (§ 52-576): the court found that, by the terms of the guarantee, A's default on October 18, 2011, immediately implicated the guarantee, and, found that the plaintiff was aware that it had a cause of action on October 18, 2011, as evidenced by its October 18, 2011 letter notifying the defendant it was commencing legal action against A and its filing of an action against A; moreover, the language of the guarantee expressly contravened the plaintiff's argument that its action against the defendant did not accrue on A's initial default but, rather, when partial payments by P Co. ceased; furthermore, this court has explicitly held that an action accrues on the date the note becomes due and payable, not the date of the debtor's last installment payment, and this court concluded that this holding should be extended to apply to actions on third-party guarantee agreements. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that there was an acknowledgment of debt by the defendant, thereby tolling the statute of limitations: although the plaintiff claimed that there was a recognition of the debt, its brief provided no support for what constituted recognition of a debt; moreover, the court found that the reason the members of P Co. promised to pay on A's debt was the plaintiff's threat that it would call all notes owed by the members of P Co., and the plaintiff failed to provide analysis as to how a promise made by members of P Co. for their individual benefits constituted a new promise by the defendant, and, to the extent that the plaintiff presented these arguments as independent bases for establish- ing the defendant's acknowledgment of the debt, they were inadequately briefed and this court declined to review them; furthermore, the partial payments made on the note by P Co. did not constitute an acknowledg- ment of the debt by the defendant, as the plaintiff failed to provide any law or adequate analysis to contest the court's finding that P Co. and the defendant were separate legal entities, and it did not support its contention that payments made by a third party can establish an acknowledgment of debt by the defendant. Argued March 4—officially released June 16, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property of the defendant M, who filed a second amended answer with special defenses and an eight count counterclaim. The counterclaim included claims for, inter alia, violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike M's special defenses and all eight counts of the counterclaim, which the trial court granted on the grounds of legal insufficiency and that seven of the counterclaims did not relate to the making, validity, or enforcement of the note and mortgage, and, therefore, failed the transaction test. Subsequently, the trial court rendered judgment on the counterclaim in favor of the plaintiff, from which M appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed in part. The plaintiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment of this court and remanded the case to this court with direction to reconsider in light of its decision in U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers (332 Conn. 656). Held: 1. This court dismissed M's appeal from the trial court's striking of the second amended special defenses because that portion of his appeal was not taken from a final judgment. 2. The trial court did not err in striking M's second amended counterclaim and rendering judgment thereon in favor of the plaintiff: at oral argument before this court, M abandoned any claim regarding the trial court's rulings as to the counts of his second amended counterclaim sounding in negligent and intentional misrepresentation, fraud and breach of con- tract/breach of the implied contract of good faith and fair dealing; more- over, the court properly determined that the defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate CUTPA violations and did not rely on the making, validity or enforcement test in striking the counts of that counterclaim alleging deceptive acts and practices in violation of CUTPA, wanton and reckless violation of M's rights in misrepresenta- tions and omissions made during loan negotiations, and unfair trade practices, and a claim for punitive damages, thus, Blowers was not germane to the issue of whether the trial court erred; furthermore, M's allegations that the plaintiff violated the uniform foreclosure standing orders, inter alia, by failing to send him notice of the foreclosure judg- ment within ten days following the entry thereof did not sufficiently relate to the enforcement of the note or mortgage because the alleged conduct occurred after the foreclosure judgment had been rendered and thus did not arise out of the same transaction as the plaintiff's foreclosure complaint. Argued January 21—officially released June 16, 2020

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the application for a civil protection order filed pursuant to statute (§ 46b-16a) by the plaintiff, an executive assistant to the first selectman of a Connecticut town. On two occasions in 2018, the defen- dant, a town resident, visited the first selectman's office where the plaintiff worked, and, during the second visit, the police were called and the defendant was arrested for breach of the peace. In her applica- tion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant stalked her and caused her to fear for her safety at work and at her home, and, in an accompanying affidavit, described, how the defendant had threatened and harassed her. Following a hearing at which the parties, the first selectman and V, an employee of the town's tax collector's office testified, the trial court found that the requirements of § 46b-16a had been satisfied, and, therefore, it granted the plaintiff's application and issued a protection order. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of certain audio and videotape recordings that he offered at the hearing on the application for a protec- tion order, that court having properly determined that the recordings were not relevant to its determination of whether to grant the applica- tion: the recording of a conversation between the defendant and the first selectman that purportedly contained audio evidence of the first selectman using coarse language at the town hall and calling the defen- dant inappropriate names would not have aided the court because it would not have made the existence of any fact material to whether the defendant's behavior toward the plaintiff reasonably could have caused her to fear for her physical safety more or less probable than it would have been without the evidence, and, to the extent that the defendant sought to argue that the first selectman's use of such language at his office made it less likely that the defendant's use of similar language would have caused the plaintiff to fear for her safety, the defendant never proffered that the plaintiff was present for the conversation on the recording; moreover, the defendant failed to explain to the court how a recording that purportedly contained evidence of an unidentified employee of the tax collector's office demanding that the defendant pay $20 for his video recording was relevant, as it was not in dispute that the defendant and the town had ongoing issues related to the defendant paying for copies or recordings of public records, and the recording did not purport to involve either V, who had testified at the hearing about her encounters with the defendant, or the plaintiff; furthermore, contrary to the defendant's claim, the court gave the defendant every opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to present his own testimony, and to call any additional witness or to offer relevant evidence in support of his defense. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly issued the protection order despite the fact that he was not arrested for violating any of the statutory provisions set forth in statute (§ 54-1k) governing criminal protective orders was unavailing; that court issued the protection order pursuant to § 46b-16a, which contains no reference to § 54-1k, nor does it limit the court's authority to issue a protection order to individuals arrested under any particular enumerated statute. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly issued the protection order partly on the basis of his having videotaped the plaintiff performing her duties as a public employee, which he claimed did not constitute stalking because he had a legal right to do so; contrary to the defendant's contention, to obtain a civil protection order pursuant to § 46b-16a on the basis of stalking, the plaintiff needed only to allege and prove that on two occasions the defendant harassed, surveilled or monitored her in a manner that reasonably caused her to fear for her physical safety, and the court's findings that the defendant acted on two occasions in 2018, in a manner that would cause a reason- able person to fear for their safety were not clearly erroneous, as the plaintiff testified with respect to the 2018 videotaping incident that the defendant had harassed her by surveilling her and aggressively placing a video camera within one foot of her face while interrogating her about freedom of information requirements, and such actions, when coupled with his threatening behavior during the second 2018 encounter with the plaintiff, were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of stalking neces- sary to support the issuance of a protection order in this case. 4. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly issued the protection order on the basis of actions that implicated his exercise of his rights of free speech and access to public records, the defendant having failed to brief the claimed constitutional issues adequately. 5. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his right to due process by improperly engaging in ex parte communications with the plaintiff, the record having been inadequate to review that claim, as it was not adequate to ascertain whether an ex parte communication happened at all, let alone the nature of any such communication or its harm to the defendant. Argued December 2, 2019—officially released June 16, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, an attorney, for alleged statutory theft arising from the defendant's conduct during prior judicial proceedings involving the foreclosure of the plaintiff's property. The defendant, acting as attorney for B Co., brought an action against the plaintiff to foreclose a municipal lien that B Co. had pur- chased from the city of Bridgeport. The plaintiff thereafter commenced this action alleging that the defendant, in the course of the foreclosure proceeding, made false representations to the court with the intent to default the plaintiff for failure to appear and to render a judgment of strict foreclosure. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant intended to deprive the plaintiff of his property and/or to appropriate the property to B Co., committing theft pursuant to statute (§ 52-564). The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant was protected by absolute immunity pursuant to the litigation privilege, and, from the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, this court having determined, as a matter of first impression, that the defen- dant was protected by absolute immunity from the plaintiff's action for statutory theft under § 52-564: following an evaluation of the competing public policy considerations, including the underlying purpose of judicial proceedings, the similarity between statutory theft and claims of fraud and defamation, which are protected by the privilege, and the availability of other remedies, this court reasoned that the plaintiff's claim of statu- tory theft did not require a consideration of whether the underlying purpose of the foreclosure litigation was improper, rather, the plaintiff's claim raised the issue of whether an attorney's conduct, while represent- ing a client during a judicial proceeding brought for a proper purpose, was entitled to absolute immunity; moreover, a claim of statutory theft under § 52-564 is more analogous to a claim of fraud, as opposed to a claim of vexatious litigation or abuse of process, because the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant obtained the property in the foreclosure action through false representations made to the court in the foreclosure action, and, because the privilege protected the defendant's communica- tions, they were shielded by absolute immunity, regardless of the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action; furthermore, the required elements of statutory theft do not contain inherent safeguards against inappropriate retaliatory litigation, public policy does not support permitting claims of statutory theft against attorneys, as it would inhibit candor in judicial proceedings, and attorneys who engage in serious misconduct, such as that alleged by the plaintiff, are subject to a number of possible sanctions, and the availability of these alternative remedies serves as a deterrent to attorney misconduct. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that, even if the litigation privilege applied to the defendant's conduct during the foreclosure pro- ceeding, the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss where some of the defendant's alleged conduct was perpetrated outside the scope of judicial proceedings: although the plaintiff claimed that the defendant delayed the recording of the certificate of foreclosure, in light of the fact that the litigation privilege applies to documents prepared in connection with a judicial proceeding, the defendant's action was clearly conducted in connection with the foreclosure proceeding and fell within the scope of the litigation privilege; this court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the subsequent sale of the foreclosed property constituted conduct by the defendant outside the scope of the privilege, as the complaint did not contain any allegations of wrongdoing by the defendant with respect to the sale of the property, rather, the complaint alleged that the defendant's misconduct eventually resulted in the sale of the property by B Co., and, as the complaint did not allege that the defendant was involved in wrongdoing with respect to the sale after title had vested in B Co., or that the sale was procured through the services of the defendant, the plaintiff's claim lacked merit; moreover, even construing the allegations of the complaint as alleging a claim for statutory theft on the basis of the defendant's conduct concerning the sale of the property, the sale of the foreclosed property was an integral step in the foreclosure process, and the defendant's conduct in assisting B Co. with that sale was relevant to that proceeding and, thus, fell within the scope of the litigation privilege. Argued January 13—officially released June 16, 2020

The plaintiff attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, his appeal from the decision of the defendant Statewide Grievance Committee, which had denied his request to vacate a prior decision by a reviewing commit- tee of the defendant that imposed a disciplinary sanction against him. The plaintiff, who had represented L in a real estate transaction, intro- duced L to one of the plaintiff's then law partners, O, who was looking to secure a loan for the law firm. In 2001, L loaned the plaintiff's law firm $70,000, and, by 2008, when the law firm had not repaid the loan, the plaintiff and O each executed new notes for repayment of the loan by 2013. In 2011, L filed a grievance complaint against the plaintiff. The reviewing committee concluded in its 2013 decision that the plaintiff violated rule 1.8 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to advise L that he should seek the advice of independent counsel in connection with the loan, and by failing to advise L in writing that he was not acting as his lawyer in connection with the loan and to establish in writing the precise nature of the plaintiff's role in the transaction. The reviewing committee ordered the plaintiff to attend a continuing education course in legal ethics. The defendant thereafter denied the plaintiff's request for review, in which he stated that he accepted the discipline that was imposed and waived any appeal to the Superior Court. Four years later, the defendant declined to act on a motion that the plaintiff filed in 2017, pursuant to Disciplinary Counsel v. Elder (325 Conn. 378), in which he sought to vacate the disciplinary sanction on the ground that the six year time period in the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-32 (a) (2) (E)) for filing a grievance mandated the dismissal of L's grievance. The defendant also declined to act on the plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration. In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss and rendering judgment for the defendant, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal because the plaintiff had waived his right to appeal from the disciplinary decision. The court reasoned that the plaintiff could not circumvent his failure to appeal from the disciplinary decision by fashioning his appeal as one stemming from the defendant's denials of his motions to vacate and for reconsideration. On appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal as nonjusticiable, as it was an improper attempt to relitigate the defen- dant's 2013 decision, and the court therefore could afford the plaintiff no remedy; although the court in Elder stated that the six year limitation period in Practice Book § 2-32 (a) (2) (E) is mandatory and that untimely claims are barred, that limitation period did not deprive the defendant of subject matter jurisdiction over L's 2011 grievance, as the statutes (§ 51-90 et seq.) governing the filing of a grievance contained neither a period of limitation nor an indication that any limitation period set by the rules of practice could affect the defendant's subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff's challenges to the defendant's rejections of his motions to vacate the 2013 disciplinary order and for reconsidera- tion of that rejection were nothing more than an attempted, impermissi- ble end run to avoid the consequences of his waiver of his right to appeal and failure to appeal four years earlier by using a procedure that is not contemplated by the relevant rules of practice or § 51-90 et seq. Submitted on briefs March 17—officially released June 16, 2020

The defendant acquittee, who had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the state's petition filed pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593) to extend his commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, claiming that the court improp- erly found that, at the time of the state's petition, he was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. Following a hearing on the state's petition, the board determined that the acquittee remained an individual with psychiatric disabilities and, if he were discharged from the jurisdic- tion of the board, he would present a danger to himself or others. Thereafter, the court held a hearing and granted the state's petition and extended the acquittee's commitment to the board for an additional four years. From the judgment rendered thereon, the acquittee appealed to this court. Held that the trial court's findings that the acquittee, at the time of the petition to extend his commitment, suffered from a mental illness and that he would present a danger to himself or others as a result of his mental illness if released from the jurisdiction of the board, were not clearly erroneous: the court found both the board's report, which summarized the acquittee's mental health history and set forth his multiple diagnoses, and the testimony of G, the acquittee's treating psychiatrist, to be credible, at the outset of the board's report, the participating board members attested to their presence at the hear- ing, that they had reviewed the record, and that the report issued to the court was based entirely on the record, the law and the board's specialized knowledge and familiarity with the acquittee, and the totality of the evidence supported the court's finding that the acquittee presented a danger to himself or others if released from the jurisdiction of the board, including a review of the acquittee's lengthy struggle with mental illness, his failure to cooperate with treatment and medication recom- mendations and his past violent behaviors and mental health decompens- ations when outside of a maximum security setting. Argued January 7—officially released June 23, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for breach of a commercial lease, and the matter was referred for a hearing to an attorney trial referee, who recommended judgment in favor of the plain- tiff. In her report, the referee noted that the plaintiff had offered itemized exhibits into evidence and testimony that the defendants had failed to make certain rental payments, to pay real estate taxes and hazard insurance premiums. The referee, however, concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence regarding the real estate taxes or insurance premiums. The plaintiff filed an objection to the referee's report, which the trial court denied, and, thereafter, the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the referee's report. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees, in which it sought $27,904.12. The court granted the motion but awarded the plaintiff only $6391.63, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly accepted the attorney trial referee's findings of fact with respect to the unpaid real estate taxes and failed to include in its judgment an amount for unpaid real estate taxes; the record clearly reflected both testimonial and documentary evidence that supported the plaintiff's claim that the defendants owed unpaid real estate taxes. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in determining its award of attorney's fees on the basis of the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff: using the amount in controversy in determining a reasonable award of attorney's fees is improper and the court indicated in its articulation that its award of attorney's fees was linked to the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff, and, accordingly a new hearing to determine such fees was ordered. Argued March 9—officially released June 23, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of assault in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the conditions of his confinement were illegal because he was receiving constitutionally inadequate mental health treatment. The petitioner was an insanity acquittee who had been con- fined to a state psychiatric hospital at the time of his crimes. During the petitioner's sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from a psychologist that the petitioner should be transferred to a specialized behavioral unit in a prison in Maine that provided the treatment program she had recommended for the petitioner. The court did not order that the petitioner be returned to the hospital but remanded him instead to the custody of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction. Subsequent to the filing of his habeas petition, the petitioner filed an emergency motion for an expedited hearing to compel the Department of Correction to follow the psychologist's treatment recommendations. After the respondent filed a motion to consolidate the emergency motion with the habeas trial, the court conducted a status conference on the motion to consolidate but did not grant the motion or specify if, at the next scheduled court date, there would be a hearing on the emergency motion or a consolidated habeas trial. During the proceeding before the habeas court, discussion between counsel and the court indicated that it was the court's intention to conduct the emergency hearing rather than a lengthy trial. After the hearing, the court issued an oral decision in which it rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. The peti- tioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that because the proceeding had been a hearing solely on his emergency motion, his rights to procedural due process were violated on the grounds that he had no notice that his habeas petition also would be decided and that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The court granted the motion for reconsideration and affirmed its denial of the habeas petition. The court thereafter granted the petitioner certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the ambigu- ities in the habeas proceeding should be interpreted in favor of the petitioner, as he reasonably believed that he was proceeding solely on his emergency motion and that his habeas trial would occur at a later date: the court, during the status conference, never formally granted the respondent's motion to consolidate, which resulted in the petitioner's uncertainty regarding the purpose of the subsequent proceeding, the colloquy during the status conference between the court and the respon- dent's counsel compounded the ambiguity, and the court scheduled the subsequent hearing for one-half day, which seemingly suggested that it was bifurcating the adjudication of the emergency motion and the habeas petition; moreover, the petitioner had sought a continuance solely for the hearing on his emergency motion, which the court granted without clarification that it would also schedule the habeas trial for that date, the habeas court thereafter repeatedly indicated that the matter before it was only the emergency motion, although the court appeared con- flicted on the status of the case, as it suggested both that the emergency motion already had been resolved and that the proceeding before it was an expedited habeas trial, and the fact that the pleadings were not closed at the time of the proceeding before the habeas court supported the petitioner's belief that the proceeding scheduled for that date would not be a trial on his habeas petition; accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings because, to hold otherwise, would deprive the petitioner of his procedural due process rights to be duly notified of the nature of the pending proceeding and to present fully his evidence and arguments to the court. Argued February 13—officially released June 23, 2020

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff, and entering certain related financial orders. The trial court determined, referencing the applicable statute (§ 46b-81 (c)), that certain real property constituted marital prop- erty subject to equitable distribution. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly found that certain real property located in New Hampshire was a marital asset and improperly awarded the plaintiff 40 percent of its value; the court explicitly referred to the factors in § 46b-81 (c) in determining that the New Hampshire property was marital property, considering the contributions both parties made in designing, building and maintaining the house, and the time spent there by both parties over the course of the marriage, and the court's award of 40 percent of the New Hampshire property to the plaintiff was not an abuse of discretion because the court found that the plaintiff contributed significantly to the finances of the marriage. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing him to present evidence regarding an alleged prenuptial agreement between the parties: the trial court stated on the record that the defendant, prior to trial, had with- drawn his clam for enforcement of a prenuptial agreement, and, although, in his brief to this court, the defendant argued that he sought to introduce evidence of a prenuptial agreement, and that, in chambers on the morning of trial, the court stated that it would not allow evidence of a prenuptial agreement to be presented because the defendant was unable to provide a signed agreement, there was nothing in the record to allow this court to review the defendant's claim; no objection was made on the record to the court's statement at the opening of trial that it would not consider evidence of the alleged prenuptial agreement, and the defendant neither offered the agreement as an exhibit for identifica- tion purposes nor made any offer of proof. 3. The trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff her share of the New Hampshire property within five months of the dissolution judgment as the court did not properly consider the factors in § 46b-81 in making that order; the court noted that the defen- dant was an accountant but worked only sporadically throughout the marriage, and the court prohibited the defendant from encumbering the property, which prevented him from attempting to obtain a mortgage on the property to pay the judgment; in light of the defendant's lack of employment, assets or other sources of income, the court's order was an abuse of discretion. Argued February 3—officially released June 23, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes, including bribery of a witness, in connection with a traffic incident, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner claimed that counsel, inter alia, improperly failed to challenge the bribery statute (§ 53a-149) as unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because it arguably could encompass legal activity. The petitioner further claimed that his trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on true threats with respect to the petitioner's conviction under the statute (§ 53a-181 (a) (3)) crimi- nalizing breach of the peace in the second degree and that his appellate counsel failed to challenge that decision on direct appeal. The petition- er's conviction stemmed from an incident in which he drove his truck into a vehicle driven by J that was stopped at a traffic signal, causing damage. When J rejected the petitioner's offer to pay him for the damage, the petitioner, who was intoxicated, became agitated and stated to J, ''Why don't we pull over to the side and settle it like men?'' J then observed the petitioner yelling and banging on J's car window while J was calling the police. When the police arrived, an officer found the petitioner lying face down in the boat attached to the rear of the truck. The petitioner's skin was cold and appeared blue or purple, his clothing was wet, and he yelled and cursed at the police and ambulance personnel who attempted to treat him. The police told the emergency medical technician who responded to the scene to take the petitioner to a hospi- tal, where the petitioner was admitted and his blood was drawn and tested. The state issued a subpoena after the petitioner was discharged from the hospital and obtained his blood test results, which were admit- ted into evidence. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition. Held: 1. The petitioner's claim that his trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for having failed to challenge the bribery statute as facially overbroad was without merit: a. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to pursue the novel constitu- tional argument that § 53a-149 was overbroad because it could encom- pass legal activity such as civil settlement negotiations, as that theory was untested in this state's courts and, thus, fatal to the petitioner's ability to establish prejudice; the chances of success in advancing novel legal theories are purely speculative, a petitioner must do more than proffer a speculative outcome to establish prejudice, and a conclusion that counsel rendered ineffective assistance as a result of the manner in which he argued that theory would produce absurd results. b. The trial court properly concluded that appellate counsel did not ren- der deficient performance but employed well reasoned and researched lines of argument, as counsel believed that the case concerned how com- mon people would view § 53a-149 as inapplicable to the petitioner's case, counsel was not obligated to raise every conceivable claim on appeal, counsel pursued the claims he believed were the strongest on the basis of his review of the law and the trial record, and, as a claim that § 53a-149 was overbroad was as novel a theory on appeal as it was at trial, this court did not need to address whether the petitioner was prejudiced. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request at trial and to argue on direct appeal that the trial court should have given the jury an instruction on true threats with respect to the charge of breach of the peace in the second degree: a. Contrary to the assertion by the respondent Commissioner of Correc- tion, the petitioner's claim was properly before this court, the habeas court having concluded that the petitioner's speech amounted to fight- ing words, which may be criminalized under § 53a-181 (a) (3), and the petitioner challenged that determination by arguing that it ignored the state's theory as presented to the jury. b. The habeas court properly determined that the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the lack of a true threats instruction, as the first amendment was not implicated because the petitioner's course of conduct, rather than his speech, was the predicate for the charge under § 53a-181 (a) (3), and, although a defendant is entitled to a true threats instruction only when his statements constitute a true threat, the petitioner failed to establish that it was reasonably probable that, had such an instruction been given, the result of his trial would have been different. c. This court declined to review the petitioner's claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not having asserted that the trial court improperly failed to give the jury an instruction on true threats as to the charge under § 53a-181 (a) (3): the petitioner's claim was not properly before this court, as his habeas petition did not distinctly allege that claim, and that claim was not inextricably linked to the claim in the habeas petition that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for having failed to challenge § 53a-181 (a) as facially overbroad and unconstitutionally vague as applied. 3. The petitioner's claim that his trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for having failed to challenge the admission into evidence of the petitioner's blood test results was unavailing: a. There was no merit to the petitioner's assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to pursue a motion to suppress the blood test results, which was based on the petitioner's claim that the state failed to satisfy the statutory (§ 14-227a (k)) grounds for their admission into evidence; the petitioner's position was contradicted by the record and his own admission that counsel pressed the trial court to preclude the blood test results pursuant to § 14-227a (k) and, although the court rejected counsel's claim that § 14-227a (k) was the exclusive method for the admission of the blood test results in a prosecution under § 14- 227a, counsel's unsuccessful attempt to convince the court did not constitute deficient performance. b. Appellate counsel's decision not to challenge the admission into evidence of the results of the petitioner's blood tests was sound strategy, and the petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by that decision: counsel was not deficient in choosing not to challenge the admission of the blood test results under § 14-227a (k), as he cited case law that a failure to satisfy the requirements of § 14-227a (k) did not foreclose the admission of blood test results under § 14-227a, and case law at the time of the petitioner's direct appeal supported counsel's view that the absence of facts about the hospital's decision to take a blood sample from the petitioner made a fourth amendment claim difficult; moreover, there was an absence of evidence during the habeas trial that the petition- er's claim would have succeeded, as there was little to suggest that the petitioner's transfer to and treatment at the hospital was a pretext to gather evidence against him, there was no evidence that the police requested that the hospital draw the petitioner's blood, and a vast amount of evidence suggested that the request by the police that the petitioner be taken to the hospital was based on a genuine concern for his health. Argued December 4, 2019—officially released June 23, 2020

The plaintiff, a voluntary association of deputized state marshals, sought a declaratory judgment that the actions of the defendant J, the tax collector of the town of Canton, in executing a contract with a law firm, P Co., violated certain provisions of the General Statutes (§§ 12-135 (a), 12- 155, 12-157, and 12-162). J and P Co. entered into a contract stating that P Co. would assist J with the collection of delinquent tax, utility, and similar accounts. The plaintiff alleged that the legislature has outlined only certain classes of persons who were authorized to collect taxes due to a town, and that J lacked statutory authority to delegate or transfer the power to collect municipal taxes to a third party that did not fall within one of those classes. P Co. intervened as a defendant, and then filed a motion to dismiss, which J joined, claiming that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the declaratory action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment dismissing the action, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the declaratory action, as the plaintiff did not establish that its members were classically aggrieved by the challenged conduct: nei- ther the plaintiff's pleadings, nor an affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion to dismiss, provided any basis to conclude that any member of the plaintiff possessed a specific, personal and legal interest with respect to those allegations not shared by the community as a whole, and the plaintiff failed to establish an interest in J's conduct pursuant to §§ 12-155 and 12-157 that was distinguishable from that of the general public; moreover, the plaintiff did not allege specific facts detailing how any of its members were directly injured, nothing in the record indicated that any member of the plaintiff association had ever engaged in the collection of the town's taxes pursuant to §§ 12-135 and 12-162, and the plaintiff furnished no legal authority or factual allegations to substantiate its claim that its members sustained the requisite injury in the form of diminished business opportunities stemming from J's conduct. 2. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to maintain the declaratory action, as the plaintiff did not establish that its members were statutorily aggrieved by the challenged conduct: the plaintiff did not allege that one of its members suffered or was likely to suffer an injury as a result of J's conduct, and the plaintiff could not prevail on its contention that the declaratory judgment procedure embodied by statute (§ 52-29) and our rules of practice (§ 17-55) obviated the need for the plaintiff to allege an injury that it suffered or was likely to suffer as a result of the challenged conduct, as our decisional law was replete with instances in which a party seeking a declaratory judg- ment had been deemed to lack standing due to its failure to allege the requisite injury; moreover, assuming arguendo that our declaratory judgment procedure does not require allegations that the plaintiff was specially and injuriously affected by the challenged conduct, the plain- tiff's allegations still fell short of the general considerations that govern declaratory actions because, even if a court were to declare J's conduct improper, it would have resulted in no practical relief to the plaintiff or its members, as J remained under no obligation to contemplate, let alone secure, the services of the plaintiff's members, and, as a result, the case was nonjusticiable, and the plaintiff was not a proper party to request an adjudication on the legal relationship between J and P Co., as any uncertainty as to the plaintiff's legal relations with the defendants or potential harm to the plaintiff was, on the record, merely theoretical. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for reargument and reconsideration; although the plaintiff alleged that the court failed to address its claim of statutory aggrievement, the court, in its memorandum of decision, relied on Connecticut Supreme Court precedent indicating that, to satisfy the first prong of the associational standing test, a plaintiff must demonstrate how it was harmed in a unique fashion by the challenged conduct and must allege a colorable claim of direct injury, and the court's analysis in this case comported with the standing precepts that our Supreme Court has adhered to in resolving associational standing claims. Argued November 12, 2019—officially released June 30, 2020

The defendant, who had been found to be in violation of probation, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and sentencing him to six years of incarceration. While the defendant had been serving his probationary term, he was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. The defendant was thereafter charged with violation of probation on the basis of this arrest, as well as two incidents in which he failed to report to the Office of Adult Probation. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he violated his probation because there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had constructive possession of the narcotics that formed the basis for his arrest, and the two instances in which he failed to report to the Office of Adult Probation were de minimis: the state presented sufficient evidence to buttress an inference that the defendant constructively possessed narcotics, specifically, evi- dence was presented that the police, while conducting surveillance of an apartment building on the basis of a confidential informant's tip that an individual named J was selling narcotics there, observed S, who had a history of drug related offenses, drive up to the building, and the defendant, the passenger in S's vehicle, went into the building and returned within five minutes, and the police, after conducting a motor vehicle stop, subsequently found a razor blade and narcotics in the front seat of S's vehicle, leading the court reasonably to have inferred that the defendant returned to the vehicle and placed the narcotics on the front seat with the intention that he and S would use or distribute them and, furthermore, sufficient evidence supported the finding of a violation of probation on the basis of two instances in which the defendant failed to report to the Office of Adult Probation. 2. The defendant's unpreserved claim that hearsay testimony was admitted at his probation revocation hearing in violation of his due process rights was not reviewable pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), and the claimed error was not so obvious and egregious that it required reversal under the plain error doctrine; the defendant did not request that the court conduct a balancing test pursuant to State v. Shakir (130 Conn. App. 458), when H, a police officer, testified that K, a detective, had received information from a confidential source, the state had no notice of the defendant's due process claim and, accordingly, did not present evidence regarding its reasons for not producing K at the hearing, and, therefore, the defendant failed to sustain his burden of providing an adequate record to review his claim; moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting K's hearsay statements, as the court was not presented with any evidence that cast doubt on the reliability of K's statements to H, and defense counsel had the opportunity to question H on cross-examination regarding why K had deemed the infor- mation from the confidential informant reliable but did not do so; thus, the court was presented with testimony that contained minimal indicia of reliability. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of six years of incarceration; the court concluded that the defendant's behavior was inimical to his own rehabilitation and the safety of the public and concluded that it did not believe that any further purpose could be served by continuing the defendant's probation, specifically expressing concern that, although the defendant's girlfriend testified that he was providing support for their four month old daughter and assistance to her as she recovered from a car accident, he was engaging in criminal activity while a suspended sentence of eight and one-half years remained outstanding. Argued January 8—officially released June 30, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for employment discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) following the termination of her employment. The plaintiff, who was employed by the defendants as a certified nursing assistant (CNA), alleged that she was approved for unpaid leave by the defendants in order to undergo knee surgery but, while she was recovering from that surgery, she was terminated for failing to report to work and for failing to report her absences on two dates that occurred approximately one week before her surgery. The plaintiff alleged that prior to these absences, she received a phone call from one of the defendants' employees, who told her not to report to work on those two dates, as the defendants were overbooked with CNAs. Since her surgery, the plaintiff has not sought work as a CNA, because she believed she has not yet recovered sufficiently to perform the essential functions required of that position. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and in support thereof, submitted various documents including the defendants' attendance policy, portions of the plaintiff's sworn depo- sition, disciplinary reports warning the plaintiff about her absenteeism and the certified letter sent to the plaintiff, which terminated her employ- ment. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg- ment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to the plaintiff's discrimination claims, as there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the termination of the plaintiff's employment was pretextual and as to whether, at the time her employment was terminated, the plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with a reasonable accommodation of a leave of absence: the record was devoid of any evidence regarding how the defendants treated employees similarly situated to the plaintiff who had sought leave to accommodate a disability, and a jury reasonably could conclude that the defendants told the plaintiff not to report to work on the dates at issue in order to create a pretext so that they would have a ground to terminate her employment independent of her disability and of her request for a leave of absence accommodation; the court's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on the material fact that the plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential functions of her job was incorrect, as it was based on evidence of the plaintiff's ability to perform after her employment was terminated, the determination of whether the defen- dant was qualified, with or without an accommodation, must be made at the time of termination. 2. The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claims, as there was at least a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff could perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation of a leave of absence to have and recover from surgery; the court incorrectly focused on the plaintiff's accommodations after the defendants termi- nated her employment, had the defendants terminated the plaintiff's employment at the end of the three month leave of absence, her inability to perform the essential functions of her job at that time would have been highly relevant, and likely to be dispositive of her claim, however, the defendants terminated her employment shortly after her leave of absence had begun and thus, it was expected, although not certain, that the plaintiff would have been able to return to work following the accommodation of a leave of absence. 3. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claims alleging retaliation, as those claims had been inadequately briefed; the brief was devoid of any discussion of the elements of retaliation, the law governing such, or the court's analysis of the plaintiff's claims. Argued February 5—officially released June 30, 2020

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of murder, robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit, the defendant appealed. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly admitted uncharged misconduct evidence regarding two robberies and three shootings: the defendant failed to preserve his claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged misconduct, the defendant's objections lacked specificity with regard to the two robber- ies and the record did not reveal any objections to the admission of evidence regarding the shootings; moreover, the defendant was not entitled to reversal of his conviction under the plain error doctrine on his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of three uncharged shootings as it was clear from the record that the court balanced the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, and its determination that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial was legally correct; furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence of the uncharged shootings, the defendant could not prove that the abuse of discretion was harmful in light of the trial court's ameliorative steps, which included limiting instructions to the jury regarding its use of uncharged misconduct evidence. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that prosecutorial impropriety deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial; the prosecutor's comments about the defendant's gang affiliation and her misstatement about the location where the defendant confessed to an individual about the murder did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety and, although, the prosecutor's use of the defendant's nickname beyond the purpose of clarifying the responses of the witnesses was arguably improper, the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor's use of his nickname, given the strength of the state's case, the fact that the prosecutor's use of the nickname was infrequent, and the defendant's failure to object to its use during trial. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his right to due process was violated because the state withheld materially favorable evidence; evidence of the state's arrangement to provide a witness with lodging and a stipend for food was immaterial and there was not a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it considered the undisclosed impeachment evidence because the impeachment value of the evidence was low and the state's case did not rest on the testimony of that witness but, rather, there was ample evidence to support the defendant's conviction, including video surveil- lance that captured the shooting and testimony that the defendant twice confessed to shooting the victim. Argued February 10—officially released June 30, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of harassment in the second degree, stalking in the second degree and of having committed offenses while on release, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly determined that he forfeited his right to self-representation. The trial court had granted the defendant's motion to represent himself after it determined that he was competent to do so following a competency evaluation. After finding that the defendant was competent and able to assist in his defense, the court canvassed him as to his waiver of his right to counsel and informed him that a resumption of his prior disruptive courtroom conduct could result in a forfeiture of the right to represent himself. The defendant thereafter engaged in obstructionist behavior in further proceedings despite multiple warnings from the trial court. The court also noted that the defendant's extensive witness list included the names of two deities, and the prosecutor expressed concern about the defendant's competency to represent himself after stating that the discovery the defendant provided to him contained the defendant's origi- nal song lyrics and a short story and photographs of the defendant and his children. The court then ruled that the defendant had forfeited his right to self-representation. Held that the trial court reasonably con- cluded that the defendant would not be competent to discharge the essential functions necessary to conduct his defense without the assis- tance of counsel: the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the defendant had a mental illness or mental incapacity that would interfere with his competency to conduct trial proceedings, which sup- ported the court's conclusion that he forfeited his right to self-representa- tion, as the psychiatrist who conducted the competency evaluation of the defendant diagnosed him with a personality disorder, the court determined after the competency hearing that the defendant exhibited signs of individual functioning problems that included disordered think- ing and impaired expressive ability, and it was reasonable to infer that the defendant's habitual recalcitrant behavior was associated with the diagnosis of a personality disorder with borderline narcissistic and obsessive-compulsive traits, which reflected incompetence to represent himself and would have inhibited his ability to conduct proceedings before a jury; moreover, the court reasonably could have concluded that the defendant's difficulty in grasping legal issues pertaining to the proceedings, his misunderstanding of the distinct roles of the court and the prosecutor, and his difficulty communicating appropriately with the court permitted the inference that he would not be competent to conduct trial proceedings without counsel's assistance; furthermore, the defen- dant's behavior could not be dismissed as malingering, as he character- ized his behavior to the evaluation team as wilful and, despite warnings from the court that he could forfeit the right to self-representation if he did not behave appropriately, he did not sufficiently correct his obstreperous behavior, which permitted the inference that he would be unable to do so as a result of mental illness or incapacity. Argued March 5—officially released June 30, 2020

The defendant, who was convicted of capital felony and murder following the disappearance of the fifteen year old victim, appealed from the judgment of conviction, claiming, inter alia, that certain evidentiary rulings violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense. At trial, the state presented testimony from A, who was serving a ten year sentence for an unrelated crime, that he and the defendant had sexually assaulted the victim, and, that when he met the defendant the following day, the defendant had confessed to killing the victim. In order to impeach A's credibility, the defendant sought to admit a videotape depicting a police officer interviewing A prior to the administration of a polygraph examination. The defendant claimed that the videotape was relevant because it showed that A had been promised favorable treatment in exchange for his cooperation. The trial court, however, excluded the videotape on the ground that it constituted inad- missible polygraph evidence under State v. Porter (241 Conn. 57). A thereafter testified, inter alia, that he hoped to receive some consider- ation from the state in exchange for his testimony. On the defendant's direct appeal, this court agreed with the defendant's evidentiary claim that the trial court had improperly excluded the videotape and found that its exclusion was harmful and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Both the state and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme Court, which affirmed this court's conclusion that the trial court improp- erly excluded the videotape but concluded that any error was harmless and, thus, reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case for a determination of whether the exclusion of the videotape violated the defendant's constitutional rights. Held that the trial court's exclusion of the videotape did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights: although evidence tending to impeach A's trial testimony was central and critical to the defense and the videotape provided support for the defendant's claim that A's testimony was motivated by his own self- interest, the defendant was able to present ample evidence from which the jury could appropriately draw inferences relating to A's motives in testifying, his credibility and his bias, and the defendant was able to impeach A's testimony through other means, specifically through his cross-examination of A; moreover, defense counsel devoted a consider- able portion of his closing argument to A's motives in testifying and his lack of credibility, including highlighting inconsistencies in A's testimony and his statement to the police and A's motives in testifying against the defendant. (One judge concurring separately) Argued February 6—officially released June 30, 2020

The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendant children of N and the defendant spouse of one of the children, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants were liable for conversion, unjust enrichment and tortious interference with contractual relations in connection with N's encumbrance of a condominium that the plaintiffs' deceased father, W, had quitclaimed to N before his death. W had executed a revised will that left his interest in the condominium to N, provided that, if she were to sell the condominium, she was to set aside the proceeds for the plaintiffs, less any funds that N might need for her comfort and support. The same day that W executed his revised will, N executed her will, which provided that, if W predeceased her, her interest in the condomin- ium would pass to the plaintiffs upon her death. W and N then memorial- ized their intentions in a separate agreement that referenced the cross promises in their wills. The agreement provided that, if the property were sold during N's lifetime and after W's death, N would set aside the sale proceeds in a special account for the plaintiffs and that, if the property were not sold, it would be devised to the plaintiffs. The agreement also stated that it was a third-party beneficiary contract for the benefit of the plaintiffs and that nothing in the agreement would limit N's ability to use the funds set aside for her comfort and support, as provided for in W's revised will. N thereafter used the condominium as collateral to obtain a $100,000 line of credit and put the proceeds into an account to which her daughter, the defendant K, had access. After N died, title to the condominium passed to the plaintiffs. K, who had been appointed executrix of N's estate, rejected a claim the plaintiffs filed against the estate in which they sought $76,000 of the line of credit that they believed N had not used for improvements to the condominium. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that N had failed to abide by her promise to W to devise the condominium or the proceeds of its sale to the plaintiffs and sought to recover the outstanding balance of the line of credit. While the action was pending, the defendants' counsel, who had undergone surgery for brain cancer, filed an affidavit with the court and was permitted to withdraw from representation. When the defendants' new counsel thereafter filed a motion for summary judg- ment, the plaintiffs objected to the timing of the motion and to the contention that the defendants' original counsel was incapacitated, and the trial court ordered the defendants to file a motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion for permission and thereafter granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants. The court deter- mined that the written agreement between W and N was void for lack of consideration and that there was no genuine issue of material fact that N had complied with the provisions of the agreement. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the defendants' motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment: the plain- tiffs failed to present any persuasive arguments that the court abused its discretion, including their claim that the court failed to analyze the incompetency of the defendants' original counsel pursuant to statute (§ 45a-650), § 45a-650 having been inapplicable, as it provides analysis for the appointment of a conservator; moreover, the defendants repre- sented to the court that their original counsel had demonstrated clear deficiencies in his representation, the defendants submitted to the court counsel's affidavit, which explained that he was impaired during the pendency of the case, as well as counsel's medical records and a chart of his treatment dates and corresponding trial court dates, and no trial date had been scheduled at the time the defendants filed their motion for permission to file a motion for summary judgment. 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for the defendants, there having been no genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiffs' claims of conversion, unjust enrichment and intentional interference with contractual relations: because N owned the condominium after it was quitclaimed to her, she had the right to borrow against it and, thus, K could not have converted funds that the plaintiffs did not own and could not have been unjustly enriched when N placed funds from the line of credit into an account that passed to K, and, because there was no merit to the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court improperly determined that the agreement between W and N was invalid, the defendants could not have interfered with the agreement; moreover, even if the agreement had been considered, it added only that N had promised not to change her will, the plaintiffs did not argue that N changed her will, the property thereafter was devised to the plaintiffs in accordance with N's will and the agreement, and, as summary judgment for the defendants was proper, the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to them was unavailing. Argued February 11—officially released June 30, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault in the first degree in connection with an altercation during which the defendant shot R, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the state produced sufficient evidence to disprove the defendant's theory of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt; the jury was free to credit R's testimony that the defendant was acting in an aggressive manner and threatening him and that he did not advance toward the defendant, which contradicted the defendant's version of events, and the jury reasonably could have con- cluded that the defendant's fear of death or great bodily harm was unreasonable; moreover, even if the jury determined that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly physical force or great bodily harm was going to be inflicted on him, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant did not subjectively believe that deadly force was necessary to repel R's alleged attack because, although the defendant presented evidence of R's reputation for violence, the jury was free to discredit the defendant's evidence; furthermore, even if the jury con- cluded that the defendant did subjectively believe that deadly force was necessary to repel the perceived attack, the jury reasonably could have concluded that this belief was unreasonable as there was evidence presented that the altercation between the defendant and R inside the defendant's motor vehicle prior to the shooting never escalated beyond a shoving match, and R testified that, on exiting the vehicle, he intended to return to the house and was not charging at the defendant. Argued March 3—officially released June 30, 2020

The plaintiff, as next friend of her minor daughter, M, sought to recover damages from, inter alia, the defendant soccer coach and physical educa- tion teacher, S, for injuries that M suffered when S kicked a soccer ball that struck M in the face during a soccer scrimmage at the school M attended. The plaintiff's complaint alleged claims against S of assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligence, as well as claims of negligence and recklessness against the other defendants, the regional school dis- trict, the superintendent of schools and the school's principal. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff's negligence claims against all of the defendants were barred by governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n (a) (2) (B)) because the plaintiff failed to establish any of the three prongs of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immunity. The court further concluded that the plaintiff's claims of assault and battery and recklessness failed as a matter of law. The court rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment for the defendants, and, because the court's memorandum of decision fully addressed the argu- ments raised in this appeal, this court adopted the trial court's memoran- dum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued March 10—officially released July 7, 2020

The plaintiff, following the defendants' appeal from the trial court's judgment in the plaintiff's favor, sought sanctions from the defendants for their failure to comply with postjudgment discovery orders. The court had previously granted the plaintiff's application for a prejudgment remedy, and, thereafter, granted the plaintiff's postjudgment motions to increase the judgment amount and for disclosure of assets to assist it with secur- ing the additional amount of the judgment. The court ordered the defen- dants to provide the plaintiff with additional documents, stating that if the defendants failed to substantially comply with its order, S and C, the individual defendants who operated the defendant companies, would each be required to appear for an examination of judgment debtor. Thereafter, after failing to produce many of the documents they were required to disclose, S and C were ordered by the court to appear for an examination of judgment debtor and, subsequently, the defendants were ordered to provide the plaintiff with supplemental disclosures. The court thereafter issued an order of sanctions against the defendants for their failure to comply with the court's discovery orders, ordering monetary sanctions comprised of attorney's fees and litigation costs, and the defendants amended their appeal and this court severed this claim from the appeal. Held that the court's order of sanctions met the requirements that a trial court must deem satisfied before imposing sanctions, and, therefore, the court's order did not constitute an abuse of discretion: the court's order was reasonably clear, notwithstanding the defendants' claim that there was neither a clear order nor a violation of any such order, S and C were under oath when testifying during the examination of judgment debtor, and, having sworn to provide truthful testimony, understood that they were required to provide such testimony during the proceeding; moreover, the trial court properly found that the defendants violated the court's discovery order, as there was ample evidence in the record, which purportedly contradicted the testimony that S and C had provided at the examination of judgment debtor, from which the trial court reasonably could have inferred that S and C conducted themselves with obvious dishonesty; furthermore, the court's order of sanctions was proportionate to the defendants' violation of the court's discovery orders that occurred after the examination of judgment debtor, because the court found that the defendants engaged in a continu- ous practice of disobeying the court's discovery orders, the plaintiff suffered harm, including attorney's fees and litigation costs, as a result of the defendants' failure to provide documents that the court had ordered them to disclose that were pertinent to the plaintiff's ability to identify assets that could be used to satisfy the judgment, and the defendants' failure to disclose the documents deprived the plaintiff of information that it needed to collect on the judgment, part of which was not secured by a prejudgment remedy, and the court's order of sanctions was appropriate because it reimbursed the plaintiff for the attorney's fees and other litigation costs that it incurred in order to compel the defendants to provide it with certain documents that the court had ordered they disclose, and that the plaintiff needed, to obtain a remedy to which it was entitled, and, in the absence of the court's order of sanctions, the plaintiff unfairly would have borne this cost. Argued January 13—officially released July 7, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant town for, inter alia, abuse of process and various other intentional torts. The town, after discussion with the plaintiff and without his objection, began mowing overgrown grass, removing shrubbery and cutting and removing certain branches and trees on an area of land located between the plaintiff's property line and the curb of the adjacent street. One month later, however, the plaintiff, after consulting a tree expert, informed town officials that he intended to bring an action against the town because he believed that some of the cut branches and trees had been on his property and that the town had unlawfully cut them. The plaintiff sent a $400,000 invoice to the town manager for ''tree and related damages.'' Thereafter, the town brought an action against the plaintiff to foreclose municipal tax liens on his property. While the foreclosure action was pending, the town notified the plaintiff of an increase in the 2013 assess- ment of his property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the foreclosure action, and, the plaintiff commenced the present action. In a twelve count complaint, the plaintiff alleged, in counts one and four, abuse of process in connection with the foreclosure action and the 2013 assessment, respectively, and, in count eight, abuse of process for the town's alleged misuse of the statute (§ 8-12) that sets forth the procedure to be followed when ordinances are violated. In the other counts of the complaint, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the town committed multiple intentional torts. In response, the town filed an answer and special defenses, including governmental immunity pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n (a) (2) (A)) with respect to ten counts. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the town on all counts, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the town on the plaintiff's intentional tort claims, as that court correctly determined that the doctrine of governmental immunity barred those claims; it was undisputed that the town is a political subdivision of the state, and, therefore, the protection from liability under § 52-557n (a) (2) (A) applied to the intentional tort claims, as the plaintiff failed to identify any statute that abrogated the town's governmental immunity with respect to the relevant intentional torts. 2. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the town on the abuse of process claims in counts four and eight of the plaintiff's complaint; those claims contained no allegations that the town utilized a judicial process or instituted a legal proceeding against the plaintiff, but, rather, they pertained to the municipal property revaluation process and the authority of a zoning enforcement officer to issue orders, in accordance with municipal enactments, regarding the removal of inoper- able vehicles from private property, and, therefore, the conduct alleged, as a matter of law, did not support an abuse of process claim. 3. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the town on the abuse of process claim in count one of the plaintiff's complaint: no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the town com- menced the tax lien foreclosure action for the primary purpose of escap- ing liability for $400,000 in damages that allegedly resulted from the overgrowth remediation activities on the plaintiff's property, as the record was bereft of properly authenticated affidavits, exhibits or other documentation to substantiate the plaintiff's bald assertion that the town had done so; moreover, although a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the primary purpose of the tax lien foreclosure action was the collection of delinquent taxes or the remediation of blight on the plaintiff's property, this court concluded that the protections of § 52- 557n (a) (2) (A), nevertheless, afforded the town governmental immunity against the plaintiff's abuse of process claim, as abuse of process is an intentional tort and, therefore, § 52-557n (a) (2) (A) applied, and the plaintiff failed to identify any statute that abrogated the town's immunity from liability to permit his claim. Argued January 22—officially released July 7, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant M, following M's failure to make any payment on the note for a period of more than eight years. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to liability only and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which M appealed. On appeal, M claimed that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because the action was time barred by statute (§ 42a-3-188) and the court failed to consider his special defense that the plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct. Held: 1. M's claim that the limitation period in § 42a-3-118 barred the foreclosure action was unavailing; the statute, which required that any action to enforce the underlying debt represented by a note must be initiated within six years after the accelerated due date in the note, applies only to the enforcement of a note and did not bar a mortgage foreclosure action on the same debt, and this court declined to overrule precedential case law defining the note and the mortgage as separate instruments and actions for foreclosure of the mortgage and upon the note as distinct causes of action. 2. The trial court properly rejected the viability of M's special defense that the plaintiff engaged in inequitable conduct: M failed to sufficiently allege a valid defense or otherwise meet his burden of proving the facts alleged in his special defense, as his support of his defense consisted only of an affidavit providing merely conclusory statements that did not go to the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage, and the court properly refused to consider M's testimony at the summary judgment hearing; moreover, M's attempted reliance on appeal on findings in the foreclosure mediator's final report was unavailing, as neither party had submitted the report to the trial court for its consideration in the sum- mary judgment context and, thus, this court did not consider that evidence. Submitted on briefs March 2—officially released July 7, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's conviction stemmed from an incident in which she lacerated the victim numerous times with a knife. D, who was dating the victim, and M, who was dating the defendant, engaged in a violent fistfight. As they were fighting, the defendant came out of her house and approached the scene holding a ten inch knife. The victim, upon seeing the defendant, pleaded with the defendant to leave D and M alone. In response, the defendant told the victim to ''shut the fuck up'' and poked her on the forehead with the knife. The victim, fearing that the defendant was going to severely injure D, attempted to grab the knife from the defendant, and a fight for the knife ensued, during which the victim sustained lacerations to her face, thumb and back, which resulted in permanent scarring. At trial, following the close of the state's evidence, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. Held: 1. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim: the jury reasonably could have inferred the defen- dant's intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim from her use of a large, ten inch knife to inflict numerous lacerations on the victim, which resulted in permanent scarring, and from her behavior following the incident, which exhibited a consciousness of guilt; moreover, evi- dence presented at trial of the defendant's interaction with D on the day before the incident, in which D punched the defendant, permitted the jury to infer that, when the defendant came out of her house with a knife, she intended to seriously injure D and that, when the victim requested that she leave D and M alone and foiled her plan to harm D by attempting to grab the knife, the defendant directed her anger toward the victim, and, although the defendant testified that she never intended to harm D or the victim, the jury was free to discredit her version of events on the basis of the evidence before it. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the defense of others, as that court was not obligated to provide a defense of others instruction to the jury. State v. Ortiz (71 Conn. App. 865), clarified. Argued February 11—officially released July 7, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree, risk of injury to a child and unlawful restraint in the first degree in connection with the beating of the victim, who was the mother of his four minor children, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant had dragged the victim by her hair down stairs into the basement of their home, where he kicked, punched and choked her on three consecutive nights while the children, who ranged in age from fifteen months to thirteen years, were alone on the upper floors of the home. After the defendant left the house on the third day, the victim was brought to a medical center, where staff members observed bruising on her scalp, face, chest, back, legs, arms and left side. The victim also was determined to have had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, a broken rib and fluid in her pelvic region. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the state failed to prove that he caused the victim serious physical injury and, thus, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the first degree: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant caused the victim to suffer either serious disfigurement or a serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical injury, as the victim and C, a medical center staff member, testified consistently with one another as to the extensive bruising that covered much of the victim's body, the noticeable injuries to her head and face, and that the victim had lost consciousness during one of the defendant's beatings of her, which the jury was free to credit or disregard; moreover, C testified that the bruising was literally everywhere on the body of the victim, who had a subconjunctival hemorrhage in her left eye, and a police officer who took the victim's statement at the medical center saw that she was missing hair and had a swollen face and a bloodshot eye. 2. The defendant's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of risk of injury to a child was unavailing; the jury reasonably could have inferred that the defendant put the children at risk of impair- ment of their health or morals, as the children had no access to parental care during the three nights when he beat the victim in the basement and did not permit her to leave the basement until the morning, the jury was free to credit a psychologist's testimony that the children may have been traumatized as a result of having observed the extensive physical injuries to the victim, and the state did not have to prove actual harm to the children, as the defendant was charged under the portion of the risk of injury statute (§ 53-21 (a) (1)) that required that he have the general intent to perform an act that created a situation that put the children's health and morals at risk of impairment. 3. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of unlawful restraint in the first degree, as the defendant's intent to unlaw- fully restrain the victim was independent from his intent to assault her: the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant evinced an intent to restrict the victim's liberty to move freely within the house when he seized her by her hair and dragged her into the basement and separately could have reasonably found that he evinced an extreme indifference to human life on the basis of his independent acts of kicking, punching and choking the victim in the basement for three consecutive nights; moreover, the jury reasonably could have found that the defen- dant's act of dragging the victim down a full flight of stairs by her hair subjected her to a substantial risk of injury, as it presented a real or considerable opportunity for her to have suffered an impairment to her physical condition or to have suffered pain. Argued March 10—officially released July 7, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages, including treble damages pursuant to statute (§ 52-568), for vexatious litigation, alleging that the defendants had filed special defenses and brought a counterclaim against him with- out probable cause and with malicious intent. In a prior civil action, the defendants L and his building company, L Co., had retained the plaintiff to defend them in that action. During the course of his represen- tation by the plaintiff, L contacted his insurance company to inquire about providing a defense for L and L Co. in the civil action pursuant to their liability insurance policy. The insurance company then engaged a law firm on L and L Co.'s behalf to defend them. The plaintiff later commenced an action against L and L Co. seeking to collect outstanding legal fees incurred for his services in the prior civil action. L and L Co. retained the services of the defendants S, an attorney, and the law firm in which he was a partner, A Co., to defend them in the collection action and, on the advice of S and A Co., L and L Co. filed an answer, two special defenses and a counterclaim sounding in legal malpractice against the plaintiff, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had neglected to inquire of L's insurance company whether defense coverage was available for the prior civil action and failed to inform L of the insurance carrier's obligation to defend. The plaintiff and L and L Co. reached a settlement in the collection action, and the counterclaim was withdrawn. The trial court thereafter granted the separate motions for summary judgment filed by S and A Co. and L and L Co. in the vexatious litigation action. On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment on the grounds that the defendants had probable cause to assert special defenses and file a counterclaim against the plaintiff in the collection action and L and L Co. relied in good faith on the advice of S and A Co. in asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by L and L Co.: a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether L and L Co. had probable cause to assert the special defenses and to file the counterclaim in the collection action; although L and L Co. submitted a number of exhibits indicating that L was not aware, at the time he hired the plaintiff in the prior civil action, that insurance coverage entitling him to a defense was available to him, the plaintiff submitted several exhibits indicating that L was aware at the time he hired the plaintiff that insurance coverage was available to him but that he did not wish to submit a claim for such coverage because, inter alia, he did not want his insurance premiums to increase; moreover, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether L and L Co. relied in good faith on the advice of S and A Co. in asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim as a factual dispute existed as to whether L conveyed to S all material facts within his knowledge, as the evidence demonstrated that L conveyed to S that he did not know of the availability of insurance defense coverage at the time he hired the plaintiff to defend him in the prior civil action, but there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to whether L knew of the availability of insurance coverage and, thus, whether the advice of S and A Co. was given after a full and fair statement of all facts within L's knowledge. 2. The trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by S and A Co.: the plaintiff's claim that S failed to perform an adequate investigation before asserting the special defenses and filing the counterclaim was unavailing, as S relied on statements and docu- ments provided to him by his clients, consultation with other attorneys, his own experience as a practicing attorney in Connecticut for thirty- six years and legal research, and this information provided S a reasonable basis on which to assert the special defenses and to file the counterclaim; moreover, the plaintiff's claim that S lacked probable cause because he was not an experienced legal malpractice litigator was unavailing, as S acted as a reasonable attorney familiar with Connecticut law in believing that he had probable cause. Argued February 4—officially released July 7, 2020

The plaintiff, who had hired the defendant to perform certain home construc- tion site work in conjunction with the construction of a new home, sought to recover damages for breach of contract and for violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.), alleging that the work the defendant performed was in violation of the Home Improvement Act (§ 20-418 et seq.). The trial court rendered judgment in part in favor of the plaintiff and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages and attorney's fees. The trial court determined that the defendant had breached the contract by failing to complete the project on time and had used improper techniques and methods to fulfill the contract. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court improperly determined that the defendant was liable under CUTPA on the basis of its finding that the defendant violated the Home Improvement Act, as the work performed by the defendant was part of new home construction and, thus, fell within the statutory exception contained in § 20-419 (4), and as such, the defendant's services did not constitute home improvement and there existed no home improvement contract that the defendant violated under the act: contrary to the plain- tiff's claim, interpreting the definition of home improvement to include work performed on land regardless of whether there is an existing building would render the clause providing for an exception to new home construction meaningless; furthermore, as the defendant did not violate CUTPA and without any contractual provision on which properly to base an award of attorney's fees, there was no basis for the plaintiff's recovery of any attorney's fees and costs in connection with the alleged CUTPA violation. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on his breach of contract claim because the trial court's findings were clearly erroneous, the plaintiff never having proved beyond reasonable speculation that the defendant's conduct caused damage to the plaintiff's property; the record provided sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of a breach of contract claim, the trial court was free to credit the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses in concluding that the defendant's conduct caused the damages suffered by the plaintiff, and the defendant's argu- ment that there were other possible causes for the plaintiff's damages was inconsistent with the standard by this court must review the trial court's findings, which is not whether there were other conceivable causes but, rather, whether there was evidence to allow the court to find that the defendant's conduct was the cause. Argued March 3—officially released July 7, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for, inter alia, defamation and tortious interference, in connection with a statement made by the defen- dant W to the plaintiff's employer, Q. The plaintiff, formerly a sergeant with a town police department, retired and took a position as a public safety officer with Q. Prior to the plaintiff's retirement, he was accused of insubordination and neglect of duty. The chief of the police depart- ment, the defendant H, ordered W to conduct an internal affairs investiga- tion into the accusations but the plaintiff retired before the investigation had been completed and a decision could be made whether to discipline him. Q decided to arm certain of its public safety officers, including former police officers, who were able to provide a letter of good standing to Q. K, an investigator for Q, asked W whether the plaintiff would ever be able to receive a letter of good standing from the department, to which W responded ''no.'' The plaintiff's employment was therefore terminated by Q. The trial court denied W's motion for summary judg- ment but thereafter granted W's motion to reargue and, after reconsid- ering its ruling, granted W's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly granted the motion to reargue and the motion for summary judgment. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting W's motion to reargue; W asserted that the court made several errors, including that it overlooked certain evidence or misapprehended facts in denying his motion for summary judgment and, thus, the court was well within its discretion to grant the motion to reargue and reevaluate its decision. 2. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defen- dants on the plaintiff's claims of defamation and tortious interference: there was no genuine issue of material fact that W's statement to K was substantially true, as he submitted evidence, namely, the affidavit of H, who averred that the plaintiff did not leave the department in good standing and that he had declined to provide the plaintiff with a letter of good standing, a decision which the evidence demonstrated was within his sole discretion as chief to make, and, after W met his burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine issue of material fact that his statement was substantially true, the plaintiff failed to proffer any evidence demonstrating the existence of such an issue; moreover, as defamation was the tort underlying the plaintiff's tortious interference claim, the tortious interference claim failed as a matter of law because there was no genuine issue of material fact that the alleged defamatory statement underlying the tortious interference claim was substantially true and, therefore, there was no evidence that W's alleged interference resulted from the commission of a tort. Argued February 13—officially released July 7, 2020

The petitioner appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the citation hearing officer for the respondent city upholding the issuance of a written notice to the petitioner for violation of the city's ordinance concerning abandoned, inoperable, or unregistered motor vehicles. After a de novo hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the city, and directed the city to enforce the judgment. On appeal to this court, the petitioner claimed, among other things, that the court errone- ously concluded that his due process rights had not been violated. Held that the trial court should have dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction rather than addressing any of the petitioner's claims in the petition and directing the city to enforce the judgment: the peti- tioner did not have a statutory right to appeal to the Superior Court from the hearing officer's decision as the statute (§ 14-150a) pursuant to which the city expressly enacted the motor vehicle ordinance did not contain any language providing that an aggrieved individual had a right of appeal to the Superior Court from an adverse decision concern- ing a violation of an ordinance enacted pursuant to the statute; moreover, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that a certain statute (§ 7- 152b) enabled him to appeal as the hearing officer's determination of a violation was based on § 14-150a, a statute that is not listed in § 7- 152b, and the hearing officer's decision was not an assessment for purposes of that statute, which unequivocally provided that the proce- dures set forth therein applied when a city sought to collect fines, penalties, costs, or fees imposed for alleged violations of ordinances enacted pursuant to certain statutes, and an assessment entered under § 7-152b required the payment of a monetary sum, which the hearing officer did not order the petitioner to pay; furthermore, our rule of practice (§ 23-51), which the petitioner also claimed enabled him to appeal, sets forth the procedures for the filing of a petition to reopen and the proceeding to be held on the petition, and does not confer a right to appeal. Argued November 14, 2019—officially released July 7, 2020

The defendant employer and its workers' compensation insurer appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed in part the decision of the Workers' Compensation Com- missioner granting in part the plaintiff employee's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting the compensability of his injuries pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)). The defendants did not file a form 43 to contest liability for the plaintiff's injuries within the twenty-eight day time period mandated by § 31-294c (b) but, rather, filed that form seventy-five days after they received the plaintiff's form 30C notice of claim. The defen- dants' form 43 stated that no medical records supporting the plaintiff's claim and no request for medical or indemnity benefits had been pre- sented to them. The commissioner determined that, because the defen- dants had not timely filed a form 43, they were precluded from contesting the compensability of the plaintiff's claim but that, under the limited exception to the preclusion provision of § 31-294c (b) articulated in Dubrosky v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp. (145 Conn. App. 261), the defendants could contest the extent of the plaintiff's injuries due to their inability to pay indemnity benefits or medical payments within the twenty-eight day time period mandated by § 31-294c (b). The board reversed the commissioner's decision in part, concluding that the com- missioner improperly applied the Dubrosky exception to the preclusion provision of § 31-294c (b) and directed that the defendants were to be precluded from presenting a defense to the plaintiff's claim for benefits. On appeal, the defendants claimed that it had been impossible to comply with the mandate of § 31-294c (b) that they commence payment to the plaintiff on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving written notice of his claim because he failed to furnish them with medical bills or a separate request for payment within that twenty-eight day period. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that the board improperly precluded them from contesting the extent of the plaintiff's injuries: because the plaintiff complied with the notice of claim requirements in § 31-294c (a) and the defendants did not file a responsive answer of any kind within the twenty-eight day period mandated by § 31-294c (b) to indicate their intention to contest liability or to commence payment, the conclusive presumption of compensability in § 31-294c (b) barred them from contesting the extent of the plaintiff's disability or his right to receive compensation, and this court concluded that, although the mechanics of the commence payment predicate in § 31-294c (b) were ambiguous, the initial burden with respect to the commence payment predicate rested with the employer, which was consistent with the legislative policies and purposes embodied in § 31-294c (b), the broad remedial purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) and the statutory (§ 31-294d) requirement of an immediate response from employers with respect to medical expenses, and the placing of the initial burden on the employer comported with a primary purpose of § 31-294c (b), which is to keep the process of initiating a claim for compensation simple and accessible for laypersons, as § 31-294c (b) does not require the claimant to furnish medical bills or a separate request for payment within twenty-eight days after commencing a claim; furthermore, it was entirely consonant with the legislative history and policies embodied in § 31-294c (b) that an employer be required to provide notice to a claimant within the twenty-eight day period when the employer seeks to avail itself of the one year safe harbor provision in § 31-294c (b) that permits an employer to make payments on a claim instead of filing a notice that it is contesting the claim. 2. This court declined to extend the limited exception in Dubrosky to the preclusion provision of § 31-294c (b) in situations in which employers dispute liability and the extent of a claimant's injuries, and fail to make payments for a claimant's medical care; the defendants did not accept liability for the plaintiff's injuries or make any payments for his medical care, and the complex nature of the workers' compensation scheme required that policy determinations and the creation of exceptions to § 31-294c (b) be left to the legislature. Argued January 13—officially released July 14, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. During trial, the defendant's counsel filed a motion for a continuance, on the basis that he was due to appear in this court in another matter on the second day of the trial. The defendant and the defendant's counsel thereafter failed to appear for the scheduled continuation of the foreclosure trial. The court denied the motion and rendered a judgment of foreclosure, from which the defendant appealed. The trial court thereafter vacated the judgment of foreclosure and set a new trial date, after it was discovered that there had been miscommuni- cations among court staff and the defendant's counsel had, in fact, been required to appear at this court. A new foreclosure trial was held and the trial court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which the defendant filed an amended appeal. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly vacated the prior judgment of foreclosure and rendered a new judgment of strict foreclosure in violation of the automatic appellate stay in effect that arose as a result of the defendant's initial appeal. Held that the defendant's claim that the appellate stay of execution arising from the vacated first judgment and initial appeal was violated when the trial court rendered its second judgment of strict foreclosure was unavailing, as the trial court had the authority to vacate a judgment on appeal, even if the effect of such an order was to render any appeal from that judgment moot; although this court agreed that any appellate stay of execution resulting from the filing of the initial appeal technically continued at the time the trial court vacated the first judgment of foreclosure and at the time the trial court rendered the second judgment of strict foreclosure, the court's vacatur of the first judgment could not have violated the appellate stay because it did nothing to enforce or carry out that judgment, but, to the benefit of the defendant, merely returned the parties to the same legal position that the parties occupied prior to the rendering of the initial judgment and, similarly, the new foreclosure judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff did nothing to execute, effectuate, or give legal effect to any judgment in contravention of an appellate stay, the court had continuing jurisdic- tion to act in an ongoing matter despite the initial appeal provided that the court refrained from taking any action that permitted the judgment winner to begin enjoying the fruits of its victory, and, because the second judgment of foreclosure was, itself, an appealable judgment, any new law days set by the court were stayed until the time to appeal had passed and continued to be stayed by virtue of the defendant's amended appeal and, therefore, the automatic stay that may have remained by virtue of the initial appeal was not violated by entry of an entirely new foreclosure judgment. Argued February 6—officially released July 14, 2020