Volume 197 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of A, sought, by way of summary process, to regain possession of certain premises occupied by the defen- dant. The defendant previously held a life estate in the premises but had his life estate terminated by the Probate Court. Thereafter, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit and, when the defen- dant failed to vacate the premises, the plaintiff initiated a summary process action. The defendant was defaulted for failure to plead and the court rendered a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion to open and an application for a stay of execution. The court denied the motion to open but granted a limited, final stay of execution for thirty days. The defendant subsequently filed a claim of exemption from eviction on behalf of C Co., as occupant of the property, which the court dismissed, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to open the judgment of default; the defendant failed to articulate a good defense and had not met the standard for opening a judgment pursuant to statute (§ 52-212) because he failed to demonstrate that he had been prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause from making his defense and from timely filing his answer. 2. This court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's chal- lenge to the trial court's order granting him a limited stay because the claim was moot; subsequent to the commencement of this appeal, an automatic stay arose pursuant to statute (§ 47a-35), which was then vacated by the trial court following the plaintiff's motion to vacate because the defendant failed to provide security as set forth in § 47- 35a, and this court denied the defendant's motion to stay eviction and, thus, there was no practical relief that this court could afford the defen- dant by reviewing his claim regarding the propriety of the limited stay granted in December, 2018; moreover, the defendant's challenge to the court's ruling granting a limited stay was procedurally improper as issues regarding a stay of execution cannot be raised on direct appeal. 3. This court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly dismissed the claim of exemption for eviction that he filed on behalf of C Co. because the defendant lacked standing; the defendant was not an attorney licensed to practice law in this state and, therefore, he lacked standing to maintain any claim on behalf of C Co. Argued November 20, 2019—officially released April 14, 2020

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant M. The property was transferred several times via quitclaim deed and was eventually deeded to the defendants W Co. and P. Following the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for judgment of strict foreclosure and the setting of law days, W Co. twice filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.), and both petitions were dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion, to which W Co. and P did not object, for an order of no bankruptcy stay, alleging that, pursuant to statute (11 U.S.C. § 362), because W Co. had filed two bankruptcy proceedings within the previous year, which had both been dismissed, a stay would not automatically be imposed if W Co. filed a third petition for bankruptcy. After the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to reset the law days following W Co.'s second bankruptcy filing, W Co. filed a third petition for bankruptcy four days before the law days were set to commence. The plaintiff then filed a second motion for order, to which W Co. and P did not object, seeking to establish that the law days had commenced and title to the subject property had vested in the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, pursuant to state statute (§ 49-15) and federal statute, 11 U.S.C. § 362, there was no automatic stay provision in effect following the filing of W Co.'s third petition for bankruptcy. The court granted both of the plaintiff's motions for order. Thereafter, the court granted the motion to intervene filed by the purchasers of the property, A and M, and A and M filed an application for an execution of ejectment to remove W Co. and P from the property. Thereafter, W Co. and P filed motions to reargue the court's granting of the plaintiff's motions for order, which the court denied as untimely, and W Co. and P appealed to this court. Held that there was no practical relief the trial court could have afforded W Co. and P, as title to the property had vested absolutely in the plaintiff after the passing of the law days: W Co. and P failed to redeem before the passing of the law days and they were not deprived of the right to appeal concerning the law days, as the twenty day period pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 11-12) to appeal from the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motions for order expired before the law days commenced; moreover, W Co. and P's motions to reargue were filed approximately eight months after title in the property had vested in the plaintiff; accordingly, the trial court should have rendered judgment dismissing W Co. and P's motions to reargue as moot rather than denying those motions. Argued January 14—officially released April 21, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant police officer, C, and the defendant city of New Haven for, inter alia, negligence in connection with injuries he sustained when he collided with C's police cruiser while riding his dirt bike on a municipal street. In response to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants alleged a number of special defenses, including that the plaintiff's claims were barred by governmen- tal immunity because C was engaged in discretionary acts at the time of the accident. Prior to trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine to preclude the admission of any impeachment evidence relating to prior alleged misconduct by C. The plaintiff filed an objection to which he attached copies of three internal affairs reports authored by the New Haven Police Department, which described three instances in which C had engaged in misconduct and dishonesty during interactions with the public and then had misrepresented the nature of those interactions in official police reports or in response to internal affairs investigations. The trial court granted the defendants' motion in limine with respect to the internal affairs reports and the information contained therein. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. On the verdict form, the jury indicated that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that C or the city was negligent. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. Contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the trial court properly precluded the admission of the findings and conclusions by the police department in the internal affairs reports that C had engaged in misconduct and was dishonest; those findings and conclusions constituted extrinsic evidence of alleged prior misconduct because they reflected the opinions of the police department that C had acted untruthfully, and, therefore, pursuant to our Supreme Court's decision in Weaver v. McKnight, (313 Conn. 393), they were inadmissible and properly excluded. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly submitted the issue of governmental immunity to the jury, which was based on his contention that the question of whether C's actions were ministerial or discretionary was not a factual question for the jury but, rather, was a legal issue to be decided by the court; it was unnecessary for this court to reach that question, as the plaintiff could not demon- strate that he suffered any harm by the submission of the issue of governmental immunity to the jury because the jury found that C was not negligent and, therefore, it was not necessary for the jury to reach that issue. Argued December 4, 2019—officially released April 21, 2020

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her motions to open and to modify the court's previous judgment modifying an educational support order. The parties' separation agree- ment, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, included a section pertaining to the division of costs for educational support for their daughter. That section did not contain terms setting forth a specific allocation of responsibility between the parties with regard to the educa- tional expenses but provided that the court would retain jurisdiction over the issue and that the judgment would remain modifiable. The defendant filed a postjudgment motion to modify the educational support order, seeking to establish each party's responsibility regarding their daughter's college costs and expenses, which the court granted, ordering that the plaintiff was responsible for 45 percent of the college costs and expenses for the 2017-2018 school year. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment and a motion to modify the educational support order, alleging fraudulent nondisclosure on the part of the defen- dant with regard to his income. The court denied the plaintiff's motions, concluding that the plaintiff had the defendant's accurate financial infor- mation, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not fail to determine whether the plaintiff had met her burden of proof to establish the existence of probable cause that the defendant committed fraud by nondisclosure; the trial court's memo- randum of decision explicitly set forth the definition of fraud and the legal standard for opening a judgment when fraud is alleged before it ultimately denied the plaintiff's motions and it was implicit in the court's rejection of the plaintiff's claim that the court considered the facts as applied to the appropriate legal framework and made a determination on that basis. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motions to open and to modify the judgment on the basis of fraud; in light of the evidence before the court in ruling on the plaintiff's motion to open, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of probable cause that the defendant had fraudulently concealed certain financial information dur- ing the proceedings on his motion to modify the educational support order, the stock option sale proceeds were reflected in the defendant's 2016 W-2, and, although listed in a separate section of his financial affidavit, were on the affidavit, not omitted or concealed, and the defen- dant testified that his financial affidavit was truthful and honest, testi- mony which the court could have credited, and, in concluding that the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of fraudulent nondisclosure, the court had no basis on which to modify, on the basis of fraud, its judgment on the educational support order. 3. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claims attacking the court's understanding, interpretation and application of the defendant's finan- cial affidavits and tax documents; the plaintiff's claims regarding whether the trial court properly understood the defendant's financial information were not properly before this court because this question was unrelated to the question of whether the defendant fraudulently concealed information from the court and the plaintiff, which was the sole basis for the plaintiff's motions open and to modify. Argued January 14—officially released April 21, 2020

The defendant, who had been convicted, on guilty pleas, of the crimes of larceny in the first degree, burglary in the third degree, and criminal violation of a restraining order, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his second motion for presentence confinement credit. The court had granted the defendant's first motion for presen- tence confinement credit and, thereafter, issued a revised mittimus. Subsequently, the defendant filed a second motion for presentence con- finement credit and, at the hearing on that motion, defense counsel informed the court that the Department of Correction had found the revised mittimus problematic and would not credit the defendant's sen- tence. The court denied the defendant's second motion, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the court abused its discretion in denying his second motion for presentence confinement credit, that his sentence was illegal because it breached his plea agree- ment with the state, and that the failure of the department to implement the revised mittimus resulted in structural error and fundamental unfairness in the sentencing process. Held that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the defendant's second motion for presentence confinement credit: a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a motion directed at the sentencing court, is the proper method to challenge the application of presentence confinement credit; the defendant never argued that there was an illegal sentence, illegal disposition, or that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, and he did not argue or present evidence demonstrating that his second motion fell within the narrow grant of jurisdiction provided by the applicable rule of practice (§ 43-22). Argued January 6—officially released April 21, 2020

The plaintiff inmate sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants, current and former employees of the Department of Correc- tion, alleging that they had wrongly withheld religious literature and cards that had been mailed to him in violation of his rights to religious freedom under the state and federal constitutions, and the applicable state statute (§ 52-571b) and federal statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.). The plaintiff also alleged that the applicable department administrative directives that justified the defendants' actions were not promulgated in accordance with the applicable statute (§ 4-166 et seq.) governing administrative procedures. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly rendered judgment for the defendants, and, because that court's memorandum of decision thoroughly addressed the arguments raised in this appeal, this court adopted the trial court's well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued January 22—officially released April 28, 2020

The defendant appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the second substitute plaintiff, W Co. The defendant initially executed the mortgage in favor of M Co.; J Co. then assigned the mortgage to itself, commenced this action, and thereafter filed a motion to substitute C Co. as the plaintiff. C Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability, and the defendant opposed the motion, claiming that the note, which was endorsed in blank by M Co., was endorsed falsely by R, a former employee of the relevant department of M Co., who did not actually sign the note but, rather, someone else signed R's name or used a signature stamp bearing R's signature on the endorsement. The trial court granted C Co.'s motion for summary judgment as to liability and subsequently rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment as to liability, which was based on her claim that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether J Co. was the holder of the note at the time it commenced this action due to an invalid endorsement of the note by M Co.: the defendant's claim that, because the purported signature was not R's signature it was not an endorsement at all, was inconsistent with the broad definition of signature under the applicable statute (§ 42a-3-401 (b)), and the defen- dant did not dispute that the endorsement stamp was placed on the note by someone affiliated with M Co., the name of a former employee fell within the definition of § 42a-3-401 (b), and the fact that M Co. chose to use a stamp bearing the signature of a former employee was of no import to the analysis under § 42a-3-401 (b), which pertains to a bank's rights and obligations related to the note, rather than to one of the bank's former employees; accordingly, the stamped signature met the signature requirements for negotiable instruments and, because the endorsement did not identify a person to whom it made the instrument payable, the note was endorsed in blank, making it payable to the bearer and, thus, J Co., which was in possession of the original note, was entitled to the presumption that it was the owner of the debt with the right to enforce it. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly rejected her first and third special defenses when granting summary judgment as to liabil- ity was unavailing: by the defendant's own characterization, the first and third special defenses pertained to the issue of damages and not to liability, and the court's determination that the special defenses failed to defeat summary judgment was isolated to the issue of liability, as there was no indication that the court disposed of the special defenses for purposes of challenging the amount of debt before it rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure; moreover, at the hearing on the motion for judgment of strict foreclosure, the defendant failed to raise these special defenses or challenges to the amount of debt owed, and, there- fore, the defendant could not attempt to use her challenge to the court's decision granting summary judgment as to liability as a vehicle to resur- rect the special defenses she failed to raise during the hearing on the motion for judgment of strict foreclosure. 3. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly struck the fourth count of her amended counterclaim when granting summary judgment as to liability, which was based on her claim that the court incorrectly determined that the count of her counterclaim seeking attorney's fees pursuant to statute (§ 42-150bb), did not meet the transaction test set forth in the applicable rule of practice (§ 10-10): the defendant's claim mischaracterized the record, because the court was not asked to strike the fourth count of her counterclaim, and the court's memorandum of decision contained no indication that it did so; the court highlighted the bizarre nature of the fourth count, in which the defendant claimed she was entitled to attorney's fees, and the court held that, even if such a right existed, the count had no reasonable nexus to the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage note and, accordingly, the court concluded that it was not precluded from granting summary judgment on that basis; thus, the court did not strike the count but, instead, analyzed the merits of the count and its potential effects on C Co.'s prima facie case of liability, and concluded that the count was insufficient to preclude the granting of summary judgment as to liability. Argued January 9—officially released April 28, 2020

The plaintiffs, H, a minor, through his next friend, A, his mother, sought to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants' negligence. Following certain noncompliance with discovery, the plain- tiffs' attorney sought and was granted a withdrawal from the case. Thereafter, A withdrew her claims. When H did not appear in court on the date trial was set to begin, the trial court rendered a judgment of dismissal. Subsequently, counsel appeared for H and filed a motion to open the judgment, which the trial court denied. H appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to open. Held that the trial court did not properly exercise its discretion in denying H's motion to open the judgment, as H satisfied his burden of demonstrating that he was prevented by reasonable cause from prosecuting the action; the trial court's finding that H's negligence prevented him from prosecuting the action was clearly erroneous, and, to the contrary, the unique challenges H faced in the months leading up to the dismissal of his action, including that he, as a minor, lacked consistent familial support to enable him to prosecute his action and his relationship with A had broken down and was undisputedly plagued by conflict, established reasonable cause that prevented him, a minor allegedly suffering from a major neurocognitive disorder as a result of a traumatic brain injury, from prosecuting his action. Argued January 22—officially released April 28, 2020

The defendant, who had been convicted, on a plea of nolo contendere, of four counts of the crime of criminal possession of a firearm appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his motion, the defendant claimed that, because the four firearms were found in a single event, his possession of them constituted only one offense, and, therefore, the imposition by the sentencing court of consecutive sentences violated the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. In concluding that the consecutive sentences did not violate double jeopardy, the trial court analyzed the controlling statute ((Rev. to 2013) § 53a-217 (a) (1)), which provided in relevant part that a person is guilty of criminal posses- sion of a firearm when such person possesses a firearm and has been convicted of a felony. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that the defendant's consecutive senten- ces did not violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence: that court properly construed § 53a-217 (a) (1) as criminalizing the posses- sion of a single firearm, and, therefore, the plain and unambiguous words of the statute demonstrated the legislature's intent to punish the possession of each individual firearm; moreover the defendant's reliance on State v. Rawls (198 Conn. 111) and State v. Ruscoe (212 Conn. 223) in support of his contention that § 53a-217 (a) (1) was ambiguous was unavailing, as those cases were factually distinguishable from the pres- ent case because § 53a-217 (a) (1) criminalized the possession of ''a'' firearm, not ''any'' firearm, as was the case in Rawls, and the word firearm is not a word that can be both singular and plural, as was the case with the word at issue in Ruscoe. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly failed to apply the rule of lenity when a reasonable doubt persisted as to whether the legislature intended to authorize punishments for the simultaneous possession of more than one firearm under § 53a-217 (a) (1); because this court rejected the defendant's contention that § 53a- 217 (a) (1) was ambiguous, the rule of lenity was not applicable. Argued January 15—officially released April 28, 2020

The petitioner, who previously had pleaded guilty to larceny in the fifth degree and larceny in the sixth degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to accurately advise him about the consequences of pleading guilty under federal immigration law. The petitioner was ordered removed from the United States on the basis of the two larceny convictions as well as a prior conviction of robbery. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the habeas petition as moot, concluding that it could provide no practical relief because the petitioner did not challenge the robbery conviction in his amended habeas petition and that conviction was a separate basis for the petitioner's ordered removal. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court did not improperly dismiss the amended habeas petition as moot because no practical relief from his ordered removal could be afforded to the petitioner; a decision on the merits challenging the larceny convictions could not provide the petitioner relief from his ordered removal because the petitioner's robbery conviction, not chal- lenged in the amended habeas petition, serves as an independent basis for the petitioner's ordered removal. 2. The trial court improperly dismissed the amended habeas petition as moot because the larceny convictions give rise to a reasonable possibility of prejudicial collateral consequences as a matter of law; the petitioner has not yet been removed from the United States and additional sources of prejudicial consequences apart from removal and barred reentry are a reasonable possibility in connection with the petitioner's potential future involvement with the criminal justice system, and, accordingly, the judgment was reversed and a new habeas trial was ordered. 3. This court declined to review the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim; the habeas court did not rule on the merits and there were existing factual disputes that could not be resolved on appeal. Argued October 16, 2019—officially released April 28, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of home invasion, burglary in the first degree and sexual assault in the third degree in connection with an incident in which the defendant forced the victim into her apartment at knifepoint, forced her to undress and sexually assaulted her, the defendant appealed. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction of the charges of home invasion and burglary in the first degree: a. There was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction of home invasion; contrary to the defendant's claim that the state failed to prove that he entered a dwelling while the victim was present in that dwelling, as required by the home invasion statute (§ 53a-100aa (a) (1)), because the victim was not actually present in her apartment when he entered it, the jury was entitled to credit the victim's testimony that she entered her apartment before the defendant and, therefore, was present in it when the defendant entered. b. The defendant's claim that the evidence underlying his conviction of burglary in the first degree was insufficient because the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he entered the victim's apartment with the intent to commit a crime was unavailing; the jury reasonably could have inferred the defendant's intent to commit a sexual assault from the fact that he was in possession of a syringe and injectable erectile dysfunction medication when he unlawfully entered the victim's apartment, and there was no merit to the defendant's challenge to the permissibility of such an inference on the ground that he told a police detective that those items were intended to be used with his former girlfriend, as the jury was not required to credit the defendant's statement. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly allowed the state to introduce the testimony of a police detective regard- ing statements made by the defendant pertaining to a gift bag containing a syringe and injectable erectile dysfunction medication that he had with him in the victim's apartment, as the probative value of the gift bag evidence outweighed any undue prejudice caused to the defendant by its admission. Argued February 4—officially released April 28, 2020

The plaintiff sought to foreclose liens for unpaid common charges pursuant to statute (§ 47-258 (m)) against two medical office units owned by the defendant G in a common interest community. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment as to liability and rendered judgments of foreclosure by sale, from which G appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff: although § 47-258 (m) (1) (C) required that the plaintiff's executive board either adopt a standard foreclosure policy or specifically vote to authorize foreclosure, the plaintiff had no standard foreclosure policy and the plaintiff's executive board merely authorized sending the matters to collection; moreover, because the foreclosure actions were not commenced in compliance with § 47-258 (m), the court lacked juris- diction over the actions. Argued January 23—officially released May 5, 2020

The plaintiffs appealed to this court from the judgment of the Superior Court, which affirmed the order of the Probate Court awarding the defendant L, the nominated executor of the estate of the decedent, A, legal fees incurred in the defense of A's will, pursuant to statute (§ 45a- 294). The plaintiffs, who are the son and grandson, respectively, of A, objected to L's petition to admit A's will to probate. On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claimed that the Superior Court erred in finding that a nominated executor in a will not yet admitted to probate has standing to seek reimbursement of legal fees prior to being appointed executor by the Probate Court and abused its discretion in awarding legal fees prior to a hearing on the merits of an objection to the will submitted to probate. Held: 1. The Superior Court properly found that L had standing as the nominated executor to request legal fees prior to the admission to probate of A's will: pursuant to § 45a-294, the Probate Court had jurisdiction to award an executor expenses incurred in defending a will, even if that will was not admitted to probate; moreover, the plaintiffs failed to identify precedential authority supporting their contention that an executor must be appointed by the Probate Court in order to have standing to seek reimbursement of legal fees, and the plaintiffs' suggestion that a nonap- pointment would strip the nominated executor of the right to seek reimbursement of fees would render the critical language of § 45a-294 meaningless; furthermore, L had fiduciary duties both to file the will with the Probate Court and to endeavor to procure its admission and, thus, L's duties were not inferior to those of an executor appointed by the Probate Court. 2. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal expenses to L in the amount awarded by the Probate Court; the plaintiffs failed to provide notice to the Superior Court, either in their stipulated facts or their reasons for the appeal, that they were challenging the amount of fees the Probate Court had issued, nor was the Superior Court apprised that the plaintiffs sought a de novo hearing on the reasonable- ness of such fees. Argued January 8—officially released May 5, 2020

The defendant, who had been convicted of assault in the first degree, appealed to this court. Following the defendant's conviction, the trial court scheduled sentencing and granted a motion filed by the state to increase the defendant's bond, reasoning that the defendant faced a substantial prison sentence and had a strong incentive not to appear at sentencing. Thereafter, the defendant posted his bond and the court granted his request for a thirty day continuance of his sentencing. The defendant subsequently failed to appear for sentencing on the date that he had requested, and the court sentenced the defendant in his absence. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the prosecution when it sentenced him in abstentia: the defen- dant was unable to demonstrate that a constitutional violation existed because he waived his constitutional right to be present at sentencing by deliberately absenting himself from the proceedings, and, while the defendant's failure to appear for sentencing alone satisfied waiver, addi- tional evidence demonstrated that the defendant knew that he was required to be present at sentencing and knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his right to be present; the defendant specifically requested a continuance of sentencing, and at no point asserted that he was unaware that he needed to be present for sentencing or that he did not know when sentencing was scheduled, and, as the court articulated, the defendant demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the sentencing process, leaving the court unclear as to whether the defendant would appear, and, accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's later request, made on the day of sentencing through defense counsel, to move sentencing back to later that day; moreover, the court did not improperly fail to make an express finding that the defendant had waived his right to be present, as the defendant did not cite to any case law requiring the court to make an express finding of waiver, and the court's statement that the defendant demonstrated a cavalier attitude was the functional equivalent of a finding of an implied waiver; furthermore, the defendant did not cite any case law that demon- strated that the court was constitutionally required to advise him, prior to sentencing, that sentencing would proceed in his absence if he did not appear, the court was not required to notify the defendant preemp- tively that his case would proceed in his absence without any indication that the defendant would not appear in court at some later time, as such a requirement would give the defendant the power to control the court by unilaterally preventing his case from proceeding. Argued January 6—officially released May 5, 2020

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant and to collect payment of the debt from the defendant S, who had executed a continuing guarantee for payment and performance obligations due under the note. Following the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motion to substitute W Co. as the plaintiff, the court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure in favor of W Co., from which S appealed to this court. Held: 1. S lacked standing to challenge the foreclosure judgment on appeal: as a guarantor, she was not a party to the mortgage or the note and she had neither a legal interest in the property securing the note nor an equitable or statutory right of redemption in the property and, thus, this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine her appeal. 2. The trial court did not render final judgment with respect to the count of the complaint seeking to enforce the guarantee against S and, thus, the appeal was dismissed with regard to that count for lack of a final judgment. Argued February 4—officially released May 5, 2020

The defendant, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of man- slaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that his conviction did not violate the constitu- tional guarantee against double jeopardy because the defendant failed to demonstrate that both offenses occurred during the same transaction and the crime of risk of injury to a child was not a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree as charged. Held that the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence because his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated, the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child arose from the same act or transaction, the long form information having alleged that both crimes occurred on the same day, at the same location, and were perpetrated on the same victim, all of the victim's wounds were recent, were inflicted in the same short period of time, and occurred not long before the victim's death, including the fatal laceration to the victim's liver, and the state's theory of the case, pre- sented during trial and its closing argument, was that the defendant inflicted multiple blows to the head, chest and abdomen of the victim over a short period of time, in a single, continuous attack; moreover, the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child constituted the same offense, as risk of injury to a child was a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree as charged because it was not possible for the defendant to have committed man- slaughter in the first degree as charged by causing the death of the victim by blunt trauma to the abdomen without also impairing the health of the victim by inflicting trauma to his abdomen, as charged in the risk of injury to a child offense; furthermore, there was no authority that would support a conclusion that the legislature intended to specifically authorize multiple punishments under the statutes in question. Argued December 3, 2019—officially released May 12, 2020

The plaintiffs, residents of the town of Madison, brought an action seeking, inter alia, a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant H Co., a hotel in Madison, and the defendant hotel property owner from hosting public outdoor summer concerts. H Co. has been in operation since before the adoption of the Madison zoning regulations in 1953 and, therefore, its operation as a hotel and a restaurant was grandfathered as a nonconforming preexisting use in a residential zone. In 2012, H Co. began sponsoring a free public summer concert series on a strip of land located immediately adjacent to the hotel property. This strip of land is part of a town park, which has existed since 1896, and was also grandfathered as a preexisting nonconforming use in a residential zone. The concert series consists of one concert per week and was scheduled, organized, and funded by H Co., which obtained the requisite permits from the town to host the concerts. During the concerts, H Co. sold food and beverages from its property to both hotel guests and concert attendees. Since 2012, there have been numerous complaints by nearby residents regarding the noise and traffic created by the concert series. The plaintiffs thereafter brought the present action, claiming that the defendants violated Madison zoning regulations by hosting the summer concert series on the town park, thereby illegally extending and expanding nonpreexisting, nonconforming uses of the hotel property. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that the zoning restrictions applicable to H Co., which would prohibit it from hosting such concerts on its own property, also applied to H Co.'s ability to host a concert series on town park property. Held: 1. The trial court erred in concluding that H Co.'s use of the town park to host a public concert series violated the permissible uses of the park under the Madison zoning regulations because the court improperly considered the restrictions applicable to the hotel property in evaluating the legality of H Co.'s use of the town park; H Co.'s permitted use of the town park did not grant H Co. a possessory interest in the park, and H Co.'s use of its own resources to support and sponsor a free concert series, despite the commercial nature of such use, did not trans- form the park into part of H Co.'s property or expand H Co.'s use of the town park impermissibly, and there was no prohibition on commercial events on town property in the Madison zoning regulations. 2. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the only permissible uses of the town park are those that can be shown to have historically occurred prior to the adoption of the zoning regulations in 1953 and, therefore, because there was no evidence of concerts having occurred in the park, their occurrence improperly expanded the nonconforming use status applicable to the park; the property's classification as a park as a whole, and not merely the actual prior uses of the park, was what was grandfathered into the zoning scheme and, therefore, permissible uses of the park included all passive and recreational activities permitted in any park in Madison, the use of the park to host a free public concert series was within the bounds of the park's nonconforming use, as the town's definition of a park has no enumerated list of permissible activi- ties, and the park has been used continuously as a park since 1896. Argued November 21, 2019—officially released May 12, 2020

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance for failing to hire or to consult with a defense expert in arson investigation before trial. The petitioner had been convicted of various offenses in connection with his role in planning and recruiting two brothers, J and F, to burn the shed of the victim, G, with whom he quarreled over used car transactions. After G had removed two cars from the petitioner's used car lot, the petitioner took various actions that G interpreted as threats to his safety and his wife's safety. G testified that the petitioner left two sealed envelopes with ''funny money'' inside on G's lawn, indicating to G an intent to retaliate. When he thereafter observed two men near his shed just before it burst into flames, he fired a gun at the men as they fled, striking one man in the arm. J sought treatment that evening in a Massachusetts hospital for a gunshot wound to his arm; DNA from his blood was recovered outside G's home. At the criminal trial, J testified that the petitioner had hired him and F to burn the shed, had given them the gas can containing gasoline to use, and had telephoned him twice the evening of the fire. The state presented evidence that the DNA recovered from the saliva on the envelopes left on G's lawn had come from the petitioner. The state also presented the testimony of an expert, a state chemist, that the accelerant used to start the fire was not gasoline, but a compound often found in various substances used in the car repair business. Defense counsel, who had not hired an arson investigation expert, learned for the first time at trial, through the state's expert, that the accelerant was not gasoline, after he had cross-examined G. Defense counsel, because he had not known that the accelerant was a compound that G may have used to repair autos in his shed, had not questioned G regarding his access to such an accelerant to start the fire. The habeas court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On the petitioner's certified appeal to this court, held that the habeas court properly denied the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of his failure to establish that his counsel's failure to hire or to consult with a defense expert in arson investigation before trial prejudiced his defense; the petitioner failed to prove that, if counsel had known before trial that an organic compound other than gasoline, particularly a com- pound used in auto repair, had been used to set fire to G's shed, his cross- examination of G would have elicited sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable probability that the result of the criminal trial would have been different, the petitioner having failed to call G to testify at the habeas trial to establish what G would or could have testified to on cross-examination at the criminal trial had he been questioned about the compound, and the state's other evidence establishing the petition- er's guilt as the person who planned and recruited others to commit the intentional burning of G's shed was overwhelming, including eyewitness testimony from G and J and DNA evidence connecting J to the scene on the night of the fire and the petitioner to the envelopes left on G's lawn. Argued March 4—officially released May 12, 2020

The defendant, who had been previously convicted of the crimes of murder and assault in the first degree and whose sentence was enhanced pursu- ant to statute (§ 53-202k) for the commission of class A and B felonies with a firearm, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion because there was evidence that, in the course of the underlying shootings, he had used a weapon that was specifically exempted from the ambit of § 53-202k, and, there- fore, his sentence enhancement pursuant to that statute was illegal. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence; for that court to have jurisdiction over that motion after the sentence had been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the proceedings leading to the conviction, had to be the subject of the attack, and the defendant's claim here, in essence, that the state did not present sufficient evidence to prove that § 53-202k was applica- ble, did not challenge the legality of his sentence or the sentence proceed- ing but, rather, the evidence that underpinned his conviction, and, there- fore, a motion to correct an illegal sentence was not the proper procedural path for the defendant to raise such a claim, as it challenged his underlying conviction. Argued January 21—officially released May 19, 2020

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and issuing certain orders. Prior to the parties' marriage, the defendant and his brother, M, purchased two pieces of real property together, property L and property B. The defendant owned 99 percent of property L and one percent of property B, whereas M owned 1 percent of property L and 99 percent of property B. Property L was the marital home of the defendant and the plaintiff. M died in April, 2014 and, in his will, M devised his interest in both pieces of real property to the defendant. During the dissolution proceedings, the trial court ordered the defendant to transfer his rights, title, and interest in property L to the plaintiff and to retain ownership of property B, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant raised several claims regarding the trial court's orders concerning certain real property and its financial orders. Held: 1. The trial court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the real property awarded as part of the parties' marital estate; the trial court has plenary and general subject matter jurisdiction over legal disputes in family relations matter pursuant to statute (§ 46b-1 (c)) and has authority to transfer property germane to a dissolution proceeding pursu- ant to statute (§ 46b-81), including title to real property; moreover, to the extent that the defendant's argument is construed as a challenge to the trial court's authority to order the defendant to transfer his rights, title, and interest in property L to the plaintiff, the court did not lack the authority to do so; the court is required by § 46b-81 to divide the marital assets of the parties at the time of dissolution and, therefore, properly ordered the defendant to transfer his rights, title, and interest in property L, which was listed on his financial affidavit, indicating it was part of the marital property to be divided. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's orders regarding the distribution of real property were predicated on a mistake and are impossible to execute; M devised his interest in property B to the defendant in his will and, on his death, the defendant became the sole owner of property B and it was irrelevant that M's estate had not been settled at the time of dissolution and that the defendant was not in possession of the property, as the defendant conflated ownership and possession, and, therefore, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find that the defendant was the sole owner of property B. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant to pay 53 percent of the cost of the child's extracurricular activities; although the court set no upper limit as to that cost, at the time of the dissolution, the cost of extracurricular activities as listed on the plain- tiff's financial affidavit was de minimus and the defendant failed to establish that the court's order constituted an abuse of discretion; more- over, if there is a substantial change in circumstances, the defendant has a remedy pursuant to statute (§ 46b-56) to seek a modification of the court's order. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the real property between the parties without determining the value of that property; the defendant failed to provide evidence as to the value of property B, listing the estimating value of property B as ''unknown'' on one financial affidavit and, in a second financial affidavit, providing the value of property B as of the date of M's death, whereas the relevant value in a dissolution action is the value as of the date of dissolution. 5. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to divide the parties' personal property listed on their financial affidavits and ordering them to divide the property to their mutual satisfaction; nevertheless, this court con- cluded that reconsideration of the court's order as to the division of the parties' personal property did not merit reconsideration of all of the court's financial orders as the few items of personal property are clearly severable from the overall mosaic that was the court's financial orders. 6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant to pay the mortgage and other costs for property L until he transferred his rights, title, and interest to the plaintiff; the court's order required the defendant to pay the mortgage and costs for less than one month and, if he could not afford to do so, he could have transferred his interest in property L to the plaintiff immediately following the dissolution rather than wait until the end date set by the court. Argued December 10, 2019—officially released May 26, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for breach of contract in connection with the purchase of certain real property owned by the defendants. Following a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff made numerous claims, including that the trial court's findings throughout the trial were based on fraudulent misrepresentations that the defendants presented as fac- tual trial exhibits and were further supported by false testimony. Held that the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate record that would enable this court to review her claims on appeal; the plaintiff filed a form pursuant to the rules of practice (§§ 63-4 (a) and 63-8 (a)) in which she noted that she would not be ordering transcripts from the trial and, in the absence of the transcripts, this court could not evaluate the plaintiff's arguments in support of her appellate claims without resorting to specu- lation. Argued February 10—officially released May 26, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages allegedly sustained as a result of the defendants' negligence and recklessness, arising out of an incident in which the defendant's motor vehicle struck the front of the plaintiff's neighboring home. Prior to trial, the court denied the defendant's motion in limine seeking to preclude the plaintiff from offering evidence regard- ing her home repair costs, which he asserted were paid for by the plaintiff's homeowners insurer. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and the court thereafter denied the defendant's motion for remittitur and rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Subsequently, the court denied the defendant's motion to open the judgment, in which he argued that a payment made by his automobile liability insurer to the plaintiff's homeowners insurer constituted a payment by him, such that requiring him to pay the economic damages awarded by the jury would result in a double payment and that the plaintiff's insurer was equitably subro- gated to the plaintiff's rights to seek recovery from the defendant. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion in limine; although there was no dispute that the plaintiff's insurer paid the plaintiff on an insurance claim submitted by her in relation to the incident, the court observed that there may have been a discrepancy between the amount the plaintiff paid for the repairs and the amount she was reimbursed by her insurer, and the court addressed the defendant's double recovery claim when it adjudicated his motion for remittitur, as to which the parties had created an evidentiary record. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motions for remittitur and to open the judgment, because the court's denial of these motions resulted in a double recovery by the plaintiff, and a double payment by the defendant with respect to property damage expenses the plaintiff had incurred: the court properly declined to consider the defendant's double payment and equitable subrogation claims in deciding his motion for remittitur, as this court's review of the defendant's pleadings and prejudgment motions revealed no mention of the issues of double payment and equitable subrogation, the defendant did not assert payment as a special defense or plead a right of setoff, and, although the defendant asserted in his motion for remittitur that he was seeking to prevent a double recovery, the defendant did not refer to his automobile liability insurer or present his claims of double payment and equitable subrogation therein; rather, the record revealed that the defendant raised his double payment claim for the first time during argument on his motion for collateral source reduction, which immediately preceded argument on his motion for remittitur, the defen- dant's trial counsel did not cite any legal authority in presenting that particular argument, counsel made no perceivable reference to his related equitable subrogation claim during argument on his postverdict motions, and the defendant failed to raise his equitable subrogation claim to the court in any manner during the prejudgment proceedings; moreover, the court did not err by declining to consider the defendant's double payment and equitable subrogation claims in deciding the defen- dant's motion to open, when he failed to raise them, either adequately or at all, to the court prior to it rendering judgment in the plaintiff's favor; furthermore, even if this court were to agree with the defendant that he properly raised his double payment and equitable subrogation claims, the defendant could not prevail on the merits because, even though the defendant claimed that his automobile liability insurer reim- bursed the plaintiff's homeowners insurer for the property damage expenses incurred by the plaintiff that constituted the majority of the economic damages awarded by the jury, the evidence in the record demonstrated only that the defendant's insurer made a payment to the plaintiff's insurer in relation to the plaintiff's insurance claim, it did not include a dollar for dollar breakdown of the payment, which did not match the sum remitted by the plaintiff's insurer to the plaintiff, and, therefore, it was unknown what portion, if any, of the defendant's insur- er's payment was intended to recompense the plaintiff's insurer for the property damage expenses incurred by the plaintiff, and without evidence detailing the precise nature of the payment by the defendant's insurer, the defendant's double payment and equitable subrogation claims failed. Argued November 18, 2019—officially released May 26, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant law firm R Co. for statutory (§ 52-568) vexatious litigation in connection with its representation of K and N in a prior action they had brought against her. In the prior action, K and N had filed a multicount complaint alleging various claims, including prescriptive easement, and the plaintiff filed a counterclaim alleging misuse of an easement and trespass. Following a trial in the prior action, the court found in favor of the plaintiff on all counts of the complaint and in favor of K and N on the counterclaim. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced the present action for vexatious litigation as to each count alleged in the complaint in the prior action. The court found in favor of R Co. on all of the counts except the count alleging vexatious litigation in the pursuit of K and N's prescriptive easement claim. The court found that R Co. had lost probable cause to pursue that claim in October, 2008, following its receipt of certain disclosures that made the claim untenable and that continuing to pursue it violated § 52-568. The court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to an award of double damages under § 52-568 for litigation of that claim after October, 2008; however, because the only damages that the plaintiff sought were the attorney's fees incurred in defending the underlying action, the court declined to award damages because the plaintiff had not provided the required apportionment between the attorney's fees related to the defense of the prescriptive easement claim after October, 2008, and those related to the defense of the other claims. Thereafter, the plaintiff, at the court's direction, submitted an affidavit from her attorney, with accompanying exhibits, and claimed damages in the amount of $460,878.08 for attorney's fees. Following a hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of R Co., concluding that the plaintiff had relied on the wrong legal standard and that she again had failed to meet her burden of proving, as close as possible, the actual portion of attorney's fees that were attributable directly to the litigation of the prescriptive easement claim. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed and R Co. cross appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly concluded that she failed to present evidence that would allow it reason- ably to calculate her damages and that the court erred when it failed to apply the common nucleus test for apportionment to her claim for attorney's fees: that court properly determined that the common nucleus test was inappropriate in this case because in a vexatious litigation case such as this case, in which the plaintiff has prevailed on only one of several claims and there is no additional costs borne in defending against a vexatious claim, as those costs were necessary to the defense of viable claims or to the prosecution of a counterclaim, the plaintiff has not suffered any damages; moreover, the trial court's finding that the plaintiff failed to prove the amount of her damages was not clearly erroneous, as the court properly found that, although the defense of the prescriptive easement claim was significant in the underlying trial, the plaintiff's trespass counterclaim was basically the reciprocal of the prescriptive easement claim and would have necessitated the resolution of most of the same elements of prescriptive easement even if the prescriptive easement claim had not been pursued, and, consequently, it determined that the plaintiff had not proven the amount of her attorney's fees solely attributable to her defense of the prescriptive easement claim. 2. R Co.'s cross appeal challenging the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff had established one of her causes of action was dismissed, R Co. having lacked standing because judgment had been rendered in its favor, and, therefore, it was not aggrieved by the judgment. Argued January 14—officially released May 26, 2020

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff and A Co., a nonparty entity, entered into a factoring and security agreement under which the plaintiff received the option to purchase any of A Co.'s accounts receivable that it deemed to be eligible accounts, and, additionally, received a security interest in all of A Co.'s accounts receivable. There- after, the plaintiff sent a notice to the defendant asserting that A Co. had assigned to it an invoice due to A Co. from the defendant. The defendant remitted payment directly to A Co. The plaintiff commenced this action, claiming that payment should have been made to it pursuant to statute (§ 42a-9-406), and not to A Co. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, that court having properly held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a direct payment of a receivable due to A Co. from an account not purchased through its agreement with A Co., but in which the plaintiff had a security interest; the factoring agreement did not constitute an outright sale of A Co.'s accounts but, rather, it gave to the plaintiff the sole discretion to purchase certain of A Co.'s accounts, the agreement did not indicate that either party to that agreement intended for the unpurchased accounts to be subject to collection upon the notice and demand of the plaintiff in the absence of a breach by A Co., and the agreement's security interest provision had no direct relationship to its separate provisions authorizing the plaintiff to purchase and collect on certain accounts; moreover, although the plaintiff was assigned a secu- rity interest in all of A Co.'s accounts receivable, including that of the defendant, there was no assignment of the amount due or to become due such as to trigger the payment provision of § 42a-9-406, and, thus, because the plaintiff had not been assigned that particular receivable it had no right to the proceeds from that account and the plaintiff incorrectly imported its status as an assignee of a security interest in A Co.'s accounts receivable into the term ''assignee,'' as used in § 42a- 9-406. 2. The trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judg- ment; the court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff had never been assigned a specific legal right to recover on the specific invoice related to the payment and, this court having determined that an actual assignment of the amount due or to become due is a precondition to collecting on an invoice pursuant to § 42a-9-406, agreed with the trial court that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the requisite assignment of the defendant's invoice never occurred. Argued January 16—officially released May 26, 2020

The plaintiff mother sought to recover damages for personal injuries that her minor child, T, sustained when she was assaulted by other students during a lunchtime recess at her public elementary school. After a trial to the court, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. The municipal defendants appealed to this court, claiming, among other things, that the trial court improperly determined, in the absence of expert testimony, that one student intern and three or four staff members were insufficient to control as many as 400 students on the playground. This court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that expert testimony was required to prove the standard of care necessary to determine how many adults were required to control as many as 400 students on the playground. The plaintiffs, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to our Supreme Court, which reversed this court's judg- ment and concluded that the fact finder did not need to apply scientific or specialized knowledge to determine whether the defendants adequately supervised the children in the present case, and remanded the case to this court with direction to consider the defendants' other claims on appeal. Held that the trial court's finding that there were as many as 400 students on the playground at the time T sustained her injuries was clearly erroneous and inextricably entwined with the court's conclusion that the defendants were negligent, constituting harmful error that required a new trial; such finding was in direct contrast to the evidence presented by school personnel, it was not supported by any other evi- dence and was premised on an additional clearly erroneous finding that the entire student body was released for recess simultaneously, rather than in waves. (One judge dissenting) Submitted on briefs January 6—officially released May 26, 2020

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the defendant, claiming that the trial court inequitably distributed the parties' marital property, improperly declined to admit many of his exhibits into evidence, and failed to address several of his pretrial motions in a timely manner. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the marital property, this court having concluded that, based on a consideration of the plaintiff's arguments and an independent review of the overall distribution and the record, that the court's distribution of the property was not improper; the trial court could have concluded from the defen- dant's testimony and other evidence that the defendant did not withdraw funds from the parties' joint bank accounts in violation of the automatic court orders, and, based on that conclusion and the relevant statutory criteria, decided that it was appropriate to allow each party to retain his or her respective bank accounts as part of the overall distribution of marital property; moreover, because the plaintiff agreed with the trial court that it did not have jurisdiction to distribute property not owned by either party, he waived that part of his claim concerning the distribu- tion of real property owned by the defendant's father, and, taking into account the financial standing of the parties at the time of trial, the trial court's order to sell one of the parties' homes was not improper; furthermore, in light of this court's decision in Picton v. Picton (111 Conn. App. 143), and having reviewed the trial court's overall distribution of marital property and the record, the trial court did not improperly order that the plaintiff either return the defendant's jewelry to her or forfeit $50,000 of his share of the proceeds from the sale of one of their homes. 2. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to admit his exhibits into evidence due to an inadequate record; the plaintiff never requested that any of the excluded exhibits be marked for identification, and he did not point to an adequate substitute in the record that would allow this court to analyze the contents of his excluded evidence. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not adjudicating the plaintiff's outstanding pretrial motions until after the trial concluded, the plaintiff having failed to demonstrate that he was harmed by either the timing or substance of the trial court's decisions; at a pretrial status conference the plaintiff indicated, after the trial court had addressed various discov- ery issues, that he had everything he needed to try the case thereby conceding that he was not harmed by the timing of the court's adjudica- tion of his discovery related pretrial motions; moreover, the plaintiff did not assert that the court incorrectly denied any of his pretrial motions and could not demonstrate that he was harmed by the substance of the court's decisions. Argued December 9, 2019—officially released June 2, 2020

Pursuant to statute (§ 53a-98 (a) (3)), a person is guilty of custodial interfer- ence in the second degree when, knowing that she has no right to do so, she ''holds, keeps or otherwise refuses to return a child . . . to such child's lawful custodian after a request by such custodian for the return of such child.'' Convicted, after a jury trial, of three counts of the crime of custodial interfer- ence in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant's children were at her home in Glastonbury for purposes of visitation over a holiday weekend. The defendant's former husband, F, who is the children's father, had sole physical and legal custody of the children, but they wanted to live with the defendant and not with F. When F arrived to pick up the children in accordance with the visitation schedule, the defendant told F that she was not sending the children out to him because they did not want to come out and that she was going to do what the children wanted to do. F contacted N, a Norwalk police officer and the children's school resource officer, and told him about the children's refusal to return to his home in Norwalk. A few days later, N contacted the defendant by telephone and asked her why the children were not returned to F, and she told N that they did not want to come out to F and that she would not make them go with him. N then warned the defendant that she could be in trouble if she did not return the children to school. When the children were still not in school approximately one week later, N followed up with the defendant, who said that she would not return the children to school. Thereafter, N sought an arrest warrant for the defendant. On appeal, the defendant claimed that § 53a-98 (a) (3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to her and that there was insufficient evidence to support her convic- tion. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on her unpreserved claim that § 53a-98 (a) (3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to her, the defendant having failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation, and, therefore, her claim failed under the third prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233): a. The defendant's claim that § 53a-98 (a) (3) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to her because the phrase ''refuses to return'' was not defined in the statute and its meaning was not otherwise sufficiently clear or definite to provide notice that her inaction of not forcing the children to go with F could expose her to criminal liability was unavail- ing; the language of the statute provided clear notice to the defendant that the core meaning of the phrase ''refuses to return,'' which could be ascertained from common dictionary definitions, encompassed the behavior of a person who either affirmatively declines to return a child to his lawful custodian or declines to take any affirmative steps to do so upon the lawful custodian's request, and a person of ordinary intelligence in the defendant's circumstances would have understood that her abdication of any parental responsibility to return the children to F violated the core meaning of the statute. b. The defendant failed to demonstrate that she fell victim to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of § 53a-98 (a) (3); although the defen- dant claimed that the statute is subject to arbitrary enforcement due to its vagueness and that it, therefore, impermissibly delegates the resolu- tion of the definition of the phrase ''refuses to return'' to police officers, judges and juries on an ad hoc basis, it was unnecessary to address the particular enforcement of the statute in this case, this court having concluded that § 53a-98 (a) (3) provided sufficient guidance as to what conduct is prohibited and that it has a clear core meaning within which the defendant's conduct fell. 2. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction of three counts of custodial interference in the second degree; the jury reasonably could have inferred from the evidence presented at trial that the defen- dant had the ability to take some action to return the children to F but that she refused to do so, F and N having testified that the defendant stated that she would not make the children go with F and that she was going to do what the children wanted, and the defendant having testified that she was going to support the children's decision not to go with F and that she was not going to make the decision for them, even though, as their mother, she had a certain amount of power do so. Argued September 13, 2019—officially released June 2, 2020

The plaintiff, P Co., a real estate development company, sought damages from the defendant A, a property owner, and the defendant H Co., a real estate holding company, for vexatious litigation in connection with P Co.'s plans to construct a mixed use development project in Stamford. P Co. alleged that the defendants sought to impede its development project through A's opposition to three of P Co.'s zoning applications. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, determining that A's zoning appeals were protected activity pursuant to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which shields individuals from liabil- ity for petitioning a government entity for redress in order to advocate their causes regarding business and economic interests. On appeal, P Co. claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in concluding that A's appeals were not objectively baseless and, therefore, that the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which does not protect activity brought with no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable ruling, was not applicable. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that A's legal actions in contesting various changes to P Co.'s zoning applications did not qualify for the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine; contrary to the plaintiff's claim, A's appeals were not objectively baseless and did not become baseless merely because they failed; a reasonable litigant in A's position could have concluded that P. Co.'s failure to comply with the Stamford zoning regulations resulted in an incomplete application, and that the zoning board's failure to post notice of a hearing continuation could have been grounds for an appeal, and, once the trial court determined that at least one claim in an action had objective merit, it was not required to determine whether additional claims in the same action were not objectively baseless. 2. P Co. could not prevail on its claim that the trial court misinterpreted the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in applying the two part analysis in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (508 U.S. 60), in which a trial court may exam- ine a litigant's subjective motivations only if the challenged litigation was objectively meritless; although P Co. claimed that A's petitioning activity consisted of several legal proceedings rather than a single pro- ceeding, and that the trial court should have applied the holistic analysis in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (404 U.S. 508), in which a court may analyze a litigant's subjective motivations in determining whether A's appeals were not baseless, the two part analysis was appropriate in the present case because there were only three actions alleged to have been baseless, and the holistic analysis argued by P Co. has only been applied in cases concerning proceedings that far outnumbered those in the present case. Argued November 14, 2019—officially released June 2, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from certain postjudgment orders of the trial court granting in part the plaintiff's motions for contempt. The plaintiff cross appealed to this court from certain postjudgment orders of the trial court denying in part her motions for contempt and granting the defendant's motion for contempt. The motions for contempt were all predicated on a postjudgment order of the court incorporating a stipulation by the parties. In her motions for contempt, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had wilfully violated the parties' stipulation when he was late in returning the parties' minor son to her house after school on four occasions and by refusing to work with the guardian ad litem in mediation to resolve a parenting access schedule issue. In his motion for contempt, the defendant alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff had wilfully violated an order of the court when she removed the parties' minor daughter from private physical therapy sessions, which had been prescribed by the daughter's physician. Held: 1. The trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt regarding the parties' parenting access schedule: the language in the stipulation underlying the motion, that the parties ''shall work with the guardian ad litem'' to adjust the schedule, was not clear and unambigu- ous, and the testimony of the guardian ad litem as to her interpretation of the relevant language was extrinsic evidence, which could only be considered when the order was found not to be clear and unambiguous and, thus, could not support a finding of contempt, and the defendant's conduct in engaging in a forty-five minute telephone conversation with the guardian ad litem constituted a reasonable interpretation of the relevant language; moreover, the additional qualifying phrase ''if neces- sary'' in the stipulation provision in question was ambiguous as it was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation; furthermore, the relevant section of the stipulation contained no clear and unambiguous language that instructed the parties how to proceed when they disagreed as to the necessity of adjusting the parenting access schedule. 2. The trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt regard- ing the defendant's actions in returning the parties' minor son to her at the end of the school day; the stipulation language in question, that ''the defendant shall be responsible for coordinating [their son's] timely return to the plaintiff's care'' after school was not clear and unambiguous, as the parties did not specify an exact time the son must be returned to the plaintiff, and, on each of the four days at issue in the motion for contempt, the parties' son stayed after school to meet with his teachers and tutors or to practice the drums, which was a reasonable interpreta- tion of the relevant stipulation language. 3. The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for contempt regarding physical therapy for the parties' minor daughter, as its judg- ment finding that the plaintiff wilfully failed to comply with a court order that she engage in a good faith consultation with the defendant prior to making a decision about the children's health did not conform to the defendant's pleadings; in his motion, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had wilfully failed to comply with a court order when she unreasonably withheld her consent for timely medical treatment for their daughter, failed to insure their daughter's medical needs were timely and appropriately met and failed to place their daughter's needs and interests above the plaintiff's personal preferences, thus, the basis on which the court found the plaintiff in contempt was not one of the bases pleaded by the defendant in his motion for contempt, and the defendant's contention that the court's order requiring good faith consul- tation and prohibiting the unreasonable withholding of consent must be read together was unavailing, as those obligations are two separate components of the court's order. Argued January 16—officially released June 2, 2020

Convicted, following a bench trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction and that the trial court improperly admitted certain testimony of a police officer. The defendant had been involved in an accident in which the investigating police officers determined that he had been the operator of the motor vehicle that collided with two other vehicles. At trial, during the state's direct examination of D, a police officer who responded to the scene of the accident, D testified that he smelled the odor of marijuana in the defendant's car but he did not smell the odor of marijuana on the defendant's person. Following D's testimony, defense counsel, claiming that the state committed a discovery violation because it had not disclosed that D would testify about the odor of marijuana, moved for a mistrial and a dismissal of the charge. The trial court denied defense counsel's motions and found the defendant guilty. Held: 1. This court concluded, on the basis of the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of operating a motor vehicle while under the influ- ence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, specifically, marijuana or Gabapen- tin, or both: the defendant did not dispute that he was operating a motor vehicle on a public road at the time of the accident, and the state elicited testimony from the investigating police officers that the defendant failed three field sobriety tests, that he was stumbling around and slow to respond to questions and directions, appeared dazed and confused, appeared unaware that he had been in a car accident, refused to provide a urine sample following his arrest, and admitted to the officers that he had smoked marijuana approximately one hour before the accident and that he also had consumed regular prescription medication, Gaba- pentin, which he had admitted to a medical professional one month earlier caused him to feel drowsy and unable to function, and a forensic toxicologist testified that Gabapentin should not be taken prior to operating heavy machinery, such as a motor vehicle, and that the side effects of that drug included negative cognitive effects, dizziness and lack of coordination. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike D's testimony with respect to the marijuana odor coming from the defendant's vehicle: in its oral decision, the court identified the evidence that it relied on to conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and nowhere in that recitation did it rely on any reference to D's testi- mony about the odor of marijuana, and, even if the court did abuse its discretion in allowing that testimony, given the remaining evidence before the court with respect to the defendant's guilt beyond a reason- able doubt, any error was harmless. Argued February 3—officially released June 2, 2020

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of five counts of threat- ening in the second degree in connection with posts he made on Face- book that contained several threatening statements directed toward Superior Court judges and court employees, the defendant appealed. The defendant had been convicted of similar charges in 2014 in connec- tion with sending a threatening e-mail to a Superior Court judge during his contentious divorce proceedings. In 2017, while on house arrest and while his appeal from his prior conviction was pending in our Supreme Court, the defendant posted several statements on Facebook that threat- ened the Cromwell Police Department and called for the killing of judges and court employees and the arson of courthouses. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that a jury reasonably could find that the defendant's statements, in light of the context in which they were made, were not protected by the first amendment because they were advocacy directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and were likely to do so and because the statements constituted true threats. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because the statements were not true threats and, thus, were constitutionally protected free speech. Held that the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, as there was probable cause to support continuing a constitutional prosecution against the defendant under each count for threatening to commit a crime of violence in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror; the uncontested facts in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, would allow a person of reasonable caution to believe that at least five of the defen- dant's statements were highly likely to be perceived by a reasonable person as serious threats of physical harm, the defendant's history of having a contentious relationship with certain judges and judicial employees, his prior conviction for similar threats, the details contained in the defendant's statements that illustrated how seriously he consid- ered exacting revenge against those affiliated with the court system, the reactions to the defendant's statements, especially that of a court employee identified in one of the statements, who immediately reported the post to the authorities on the same day he discovered the posts, and the defendant's failure to express contrition for his statements thereafter and his additional statements of hostility toward Superior Court judges and court employees supported a determination that the statements reasonably could be interpreted as serious expressions of intent to inflict harm against judges and court employees. Argued October 15, 2019—officially released June 9, 2020

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for sum- mary judgment as to liability and rendered judgment of strict foreclosure. The trial court then granted the plaintiff's motion to strike a counterclaim filed by the defendant and denied the defendant's motion to open the judgment, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure as the court acted well within its discretion in determining that the defendant had not established good cause for opening the judgment: although the defendant pleaded that he informed the court through a colleague at the earliest opportunity that he could not attend the hearing on the motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure due to medical reasons, he acknowledged that the transcript of the hearing in question did not reflect that any such information had been received by the court; moreover, the court did not receive any information about why or how the defendant's failure to attend court that day had prevented him from making any material input to the court's decision whether to grant the plaintiff's motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure. 2. This court did not address the defendant's claim challenging, on due process grounds, the manner in which his motion to open was adjudi- cated, as that claim was not preserved for appellate review because it was not been presented to and decided by the trial court. 3. This court did not review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in adjudicating the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the defendant having failed to timely appeal from the rendering of the underlying judgment of strict foreclosure, which was based on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 4. This court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to strike his counterclaim, the defendant having failed to replead the counterclaim after it was stricken, or move the court to render judgment against him on that claim, resulting in a lack of a final judgment on the counterclaim. Argued March 9—officially released June 9, 2020

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of man- slaughter in the first degree with a firearm and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, D, provided ineffective assistance. He claimed, inter alia, that D was deficient in failing to adequately investigate and present available witnesses in support of his claim of self-defense and by failing to raise the defense of third-party culpability. D died prior to the petition- er's habeas trial and, thus, the habeas trial did not hear testimony regard- ing D's investigative efforts, trial strategy, or other tactical decisions. The habeas court rendered judgment granting the habeas petition, from which the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court improperly concluded that D provided constitutionally deficient representation with regard to the petitioner's self-defense claim: the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that D's investigation or decision not to call certain witnesses constituted deficient performance as he failed to present testimony regarding D's investigative efforts and, thus, failed to overcome the strong presumption that D engaged in an objectively reasonable investigation, and he failed to present any evidence regarding D's trial strategy and, thus, failed to overcome the presumption that any decision not to call certain witnesses was sound trial strategy; furthermore, the habeas court's conclusion that the witnesses who testified at the habeas trial were credible and could have lent additional support to the petitioner's claim of self- defense was premature in the absence of a determination that D's perfor- mance was deficient. 2. The habeas court improperly determined that D provided ineffective assistance because she failed to pursue a third-party culpability defense: the court failed to consider whether D's decision might be viewed as a reasonable strategic decision and the petitioner failed to present evi- dence that this decision constituted deficient performance; the record was clear that, although D did not request a third-party culpability instruction, she did argue to the jury that the victim was killed by a bullet fired by someone other than the petitioner, and there were a number of reasons why D may have chosen to present the third-party culpability defense in this manner. Argued November 12, 2019—officially released June 9, 2020

The plaintiff administrator of the estate of the decedent, D, sought to recover damages from the defendants, four members of the tactical unit of the State Police, for the wrongful death of D following his suicide after a standoff with law enforcement on certain public property in Groton. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that, in response to a Groton police captain's request for the assistance of the tactical unit, the defendants arrived at the scene of the standoff, and, after several hours of unsuccess- ful negotiations with D, who was suicidal and armed with a handgun, they used less than lethal ammunition on him. D then shot himself in the head and died as a result of the gunshot. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In reaching its decision, the court determined that the wrongful death action, as alleged in the complaint, satisfied the four criteria of the test set forth in Spring v. Constantino (168 Conn. 563), and, therefore, it was brought against the defendants in their official, rather than individual, capacities. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the ground of sovereign immunity: contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the four criteria of the Spring test were satisfied, and, therefore, the defendants were sued in their official, rather than their individual, capacities, as the defendants were state officials, the action against them concerned a matter in which they were representing the state and acting in the scope of their official police duties, the state was the real party in interest because the damages sought by the plaintiff were premised entirely on injuries alleged to have been caused by the official acts of the defendants, and a judgment against the defendants would impact how the State Police, and especially members of the tactical unit, respond to subsequent situations in which an armed individual occupies public property and is noncompliant with attempts to negotiate, as they may be hesitant to use less than lethal ammunition or similar tactics because of the risk of being sued in their individual capacities; moreover, notwithstanding the plaintiff's claim to the contrary, the trial court did not improperly consider a certain State Police manual in granting the motion to dismiss. Argued January 14—officially released June 9, 2020