2 Ct. Cust.
Volume 2 — Customs Court Reports
151 opinions
- 2 Ct. Cust. 1Lunham & Moore v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Feat Plates of Steel Made into Various Shapes — Pitchers, Spouts, etc..</p> <p>No commercial designation appearing, a variety of steel shapes ready to be enameled and converted into pitchers, knobs, handles, spouts, etc., is less aptly described as pressed, sheared, or stamped shapes, or as steel in all forms and shapes, than as articles or wares composed of steel, whether wholly or partly manufactured, for to hold otherwise would be to declare the nearly completed articles should have been admitted at the same rate of duty with the original flat sheets of steel; and the importations were dutiable as assessed under paragraph 193, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 4Newman-Andrew Co. v. United States (1911)[Modified and affirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cross-Appeals transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, G. A. 6925 (T. D. 29930).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 9United States v. American Thermo-Ware Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, G. A. 6961 (T. D. 30266).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 11Wolff v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Jewelry and Imitation Jewelry.</p> <p>Where the importation consists of merchandise in a variety of forms, necklaces, chains, hatpins, .etc., made of a variety of materials and some complete, some incomplete, without attempting a comprehensive definition of jewelry or of articles commonly known as jewelry, the appeal here being limited to merchandise represented by enumerated samples, and there being no evidence to controvert the conclusion drawn by the board, the board’s decision must be affirmed; the goods were properly assessed, being commonly known as jewelry, under paragraph 434, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 15Brody v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 23579 (T. D. 30733).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 17Krauss & Co. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 23619 (T. D. 30754), Abstract 23756 (T. D. 30828).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 22Bragg v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Importation op American Products Thereto pore Exported.</p> <p>Certain animals, American products, were exported while the tariff act o£ 1897 permitting the free entry of these on return to the United States was in force; these animals were returned to the United States subsequent to the enactment of the tariff law of 1909, by which free entry was denied an importation of this kind. Held, a ' tariff law creates no vested rights to import free or at any particular rate of duty goods, wares, merchandise, or products of any kind; no contractual obligation had been incurred by the taxing power incapable of being impaired by a subsequent modification or repeal of the provision in question; the law in force at the date reentry was sought applies and the importation of animals was properly held dutiable under paragraphs 225 and 227, tariff act of 1909. — Campbell v. United Stales (107 U. S., 407) distinguished. . -</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 26Breck & Son v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7085 (T. D. 30875).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 30United States v. Garramone (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24821 (T. D. 31300).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 37Thomsen v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 23563 (T. D. 30733).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 39American Express Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Feather Boas under Tariff Act of 1897.</p> <p>Boas made of feathers strung together upon cotton cords differ, of course, from the constituent parts of the boas so made, but avoiding a manifest incongruity if the law were otherwise construed, they must he taken to be like feathers in materials, quality, texture, and the use to which they may be applied, and they were properly held dutiable in similitude as feathers under section 7, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 43Loewenthal v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Naurow Silk Fabrics Showing Original Designs.</p> <p>Trimmings were provided for eo nomine, in paragraph 390, tariff act of 1897. The testimony shows that silt fabrics such as those imported, J to 14 inches in width, with original designs thereon, are known commercially as trimmings; and they fell within the eo nomine description, although the term is a comprehensive one and may include articles that are sometimes designated by a name more restricted in meaning. The importation was dutiable under paragraph 390, tariff act of 1897. — Sidenberg v. Robertson (41 Fed. Rep., 763); Naday v. United States (164 Fed. Rep., 44).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 46Stone v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General-Appraisers, Abstract 24331 (T. D. 31134).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 51Sheldon v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Cotjut or Customs Appeals — Powers to Review.</p> <p>The act creating this court empowers it to review not alone the law, but, when • the findings of the Board of General Appraisers are made an issue, to review the facts presented upon appeal to this court. ,</p> <p>2. A Record Used as a Basis eor Opinion Below Should be Incorporated Here.</p> <p>To enable this court fairly to review a finding of fact by the board, when this finding is made an issue on appeal, it is essential that the court should have before it all the testimony that influenced the board in reaching its conclusion.</p> <p>3. Same.</p> <p>This is not to say the board may not, in the course of its oftentimes necessarily summary determinations, rely in its findings on proof in other like cases, heard on earlier dates by the board.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 55Germania Importing Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. The Making op Paper.</p> <p>To constitute a material paper, it is not necessary that the machine used in its manufacture should be known as a paper-making machine, nor that the material should contain glue, alum, and clay; the product determines its classification.</p> <p>2. Wrapping Paper.</p> <p>Material having the ordinary thickness of wrapping paper, with the appearance of wrapping paper and used as such, must be deemed not wood pulp but wrapping paper, and was dutiable under paragraph 402, tariff act of 1897, as paper not specially provided for.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 57United States v. Braun Chemical Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>-Cylindrical Iron Drums Containing Chemical Salts. *</p> <p>Where the containers are cylindrical iron drums that it is necessary to cut into two parts in order to remove their contents, and- when so cut in two appear to have no value and do not enter into or become a part of the merchandise of this country for any purpose whatever, they are not dutiable under paragraph 151, tariff act of 1909, as cylindrical or tubular tanks or vessels for containing purposes and separately from their contents, but rather as usual containers possessing- no value apart from their contents, and their value should be assessed along with the contained merchandise at ad valorem rates under paragraph 3, pursuant to the provisions of subsection 18, section 28, tariS act of 1909.- — United States v. Marx & Rawolle (T. D. 31210) distinguished.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 59United States v. Lehn (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Completeness op Record Questioned.</p> <p>Where the appraiser in answer to a protest returned that no sample of merchandise had been retained because a sample correctly representing it had been retained in another case before the board, and where the cause had been submitted upon that return of the appraiser, it can not be urged that the testimony, so far as this concerned a sample, had been offered in the first case and not in the second; the return and the submission show it had been so offered.</p> <p>2. Medicinal Preparations Without Alcohol.</p> <p>The merchandise, guaiacol carbonate, having been found by the board to be a medicinal preparation that contained no alcohol and was prepared without the use of it, and the evidence submitted supporting this finding, the finding will not be ' disturbed; the importation was dutiable at 25 per cent under paragraph 68, tariff ■ act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 61Spielman v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Papier-Maché Boxes.</p> <p>Separate provision is made by paragraph 418, tariff act of 1909, for boxes made-wholly or in chief value of paper or papier-máché, if covered with surface-coated paper; but such an eo nomine designation can not be taken to exclude the article so designated from an applicable part of the customs law enacted to simplify administration and to minimize frauds on the revenue.</p> <p>2. Same — Containing Nettings.</p> <p>The provisions of existing law relative to containers impose a duty, for example, on boxes, as boxes alone, when these are imported as merchandise. When they are brought in as usual containers of ad valorem goods they are subject to the specific administrative provision applicable to them when used in that way; and boxes covered with surface-coated paper and composed wholly or in chief value of paper or papier-máché, containing nettings, are dutiable under paragraph 18, section 28, tariff' act of 1909, as usual containers.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 65Dunn v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Apteal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 23665 (T. D. 30768).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 68Wanner v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>. Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7066 (T. D. 30790).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 70Jackson v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Breccia, a Species oe Marble.</p> <p>The provisions of the tariff act of 1909, construed in pari materia show a purpose to classify breccia and marble alike for dutiable purposes; to make them, whenever in similar conditions, dutiable at the same rate. “Marble,” too, and “breccia in blocks” are more specific terms than “minerals crude or not advanced in valúe or condition, ” and moreover, according to the rule,, where there are two provisions applicable, the one carrying the higher rate must be applied, breccia is held to be dutiable by similitude as marble under paragraph 111, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 76United States v. Thomson (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>SpRuce Lumber, How Measured and How Dutiable.</p> <p>It appearing to be the reasonable custom to estimate lumber by the size of the thin end, it is not permissible, for dutiable purposes, to take the average after a measurement of both the thick and the thin ends; and it further appearing, from a preponderance of the evidence, that when lumber delivered as being If inches in thickness, it is actually measured on the basis of 1$ inches and so settled for, the importation of lf-inch spruce lumber was properly held dutiable as lf-inch material.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 78Davison v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “ColoRed” Defined. •</p> <p>The word “colored” is a participial adjective used generally with the meaning of “having a color.” The color’s origin does not enter into the essential meaning ■of the word.</p> <p>2. Á Paper Made of Material with an Inherent Color.</p> <p>A paper manufactured of natural barks or reeds having an inherent color that persists through all processes to which it may be subjected and remains a characteristic of the finished product is a colored paper; and copying paper made of it is colored copying paper, dutiable under paragraph 397, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 80United States v. White (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Gauffre” Defined.</p> <p>‘1 Gauffre ’ ’ is a word of Blench derivation and is variously spelled gauffre, gauffree, gouffre, goffer, gauffer, gaufre, and gauffrer. It accords in meaning with embossed.</p> <p>2. Gauffre Leather under Tariff Act of 1909.</p> <p>The fact that “gauffre” had no fixed uniform trade meaning as applied to leather when the tariff law of 1909 was enacted can not be taken to shift the burden of proof on the Government in determining whether the skins imported were gauffre leather; there is necessary simply an inquiry as to what was intended by the Congress in using “gauffre leather” in that act, and to give effect, if may be, to the actual language employed. The word “cut” there appearing, it would seem was used to impress the customary features of gauffre leather, definite sizes and shapes, but in any view can not be taken to defeat the plain intention as to the dutiable status of the goods. The rate of duty was clearly ascertainable and the importation is dutiable as gauffre leather-under paragraph 451, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 85Frank v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24234 (T. D. 31103).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 89Schiff v. United States (1911)1 AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Plateaux, Plat Round Articles Made of Straw Braids.</p> <p>The importation was of articles circular in form, slightly convex, but nearly flat in shape, with the appearance of plain round mats of braided straw, but without a crown and untrimmed: Held, since the evidence shows the material to be so constructed as to permit of being blocked into hats, without adding any new material, and that it is so blocked, being practically useless for any other purpose, it was dutiable under paragraph 409, tariff act of 1897, as hats composed of straw partly manufactured and untrimmed. ' It was so dutiable, though more than one piece of goods was sometimes employed in the making of one hat.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 92Salomon v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7128 (T. D. 31088).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 95United States v. American Express Co. (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Caviar — “Other Preserved,” Paragraph 270, Tarier Act or 1909.</p> <p>An examination of the legislative record shows that the “situation as it existed” was known when the paragraph making caviar dutiable under tariff act of 1909 was “pressed upon the attention of the legislative body”; and the words “other preserved” employed in that paragraph are not to be taken to defeat a manifest intention of the Congress, and there being no evidence to show what process the caviar of the importation may have-been subjected to, it was dutiable under paragraph 270, tariff act of 1909. — United States v. Cohn (2 Ind. Ter., 474); Hubbard v. City of Taunton (140 Mass., 467); Kelly v. The People (132 Ill., 363). Hansen v. United States (T. D. 30769) distinguished.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 100Rhodes v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Direct Shipment prom the Philippines.</p> <p>The importation, was of sponges, and these, it appears, were dispatched, freight prepaid, from Zamboanga via Hongkong and'Tacoma, Wash., to Chicago. They were delivered by the agents on hoard a vessel lying in or off the port of Hongkong. The evidence to this effect makes a prima facie showing that the goods were shipped direct, and there being no evidence to show there was any delay in the course of the shipment, the consignment was entitled to free entry under section 5, tariff act of 1909, governing articles the growth or product of the Philippine Islands. — United States v. United Cigar Stores Co. .(1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 450; T. D. 31505).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 101United States v. Harper (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Fans Composed of Wood and Silk.</p> <p>'The principle is recognized that, when it clearly appears from the language and context of a proviso it is intended to apply to other subjects than those stated in the paragraph of which it is a part or that it is intended to apply generally to other parts of an act, the proviso must, so far as possible, be given full effect; but this principle will not be applied ex industria to bring an article within the operation of the proviso. Each case must be determined on the facts of that case; and though the question here is not entirely free from doubt, resolving this doubt, as is proper, in the importer’s favor, fans composed of silk and wood and embroidered with silk were dutiable under paragraph 427, tariff act of 1897, which specifically names for duty “fans of all kinds, except common palm leaf fans.” — Lai Ming v. United States (T. D. 30770) distinguished.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 105Carson v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24000 (T.D. 30944).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 109Sheldon v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Shears” Defined.</p> <p>The definition of “shears” in Knight’s American Mechanical Dictionary is accepted as correct: A cutting instrument operating like scissors, but on a larger scale and somewhat differently shaped; the edges of the blades are beveled and the handles adapted for thumb and fingers, respectively, instead of being duplicates.,</p> <p>2. Hair Clippers with Rotary Knives Not Shears.</p> <p>A- tool supplied with rotating or reciprocating knives or cutters arranged for clipping the hair short or close is not to be deemed scissors or shears, but is a manufacture of steel not specially provided for, and the importation- was properly assessed under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 112Goodman v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>. Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7120 (T. D. 31027).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 116United States v. Franklin Sugar Refining Co. (1911)[ AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Abstract 11351 (T. D. 27892).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 123United States v. Saunders (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>“Sides” as Applied to Lumber.</p> <p>There does not appear to be .any definite, uniform, and general trade meaning of the word “sides ” applied to lumber, but the change in the phraseology of paragraph 201, tariff act of 1909, se'ems to show it was intended to include within it all planed or sawed lumber without regard to its actual dimensions, when one, two, three, or four sides had been planed or finished; and so the importation of boards, varying from 1 to 1-i inches in thickness, was dutiable under that paragraph.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 125Shoninger v. United States (1911)LAifirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Vegetable Fiber, Paragraph 349, Tariff Act of 1909.</p> <p>Cotton is a vegetable fiber, and merchandise composed of cotton net, if embroidered with a design in artificial silk, cotton being the component of chief value, falls for dutiable purposes within the last proviso of paragraph 349, tariff act of 1909, namely, that no article or fabric of any description composed of flax or other vegetable fiber, or of which these materials or any of them is the component of chief value, when embroidered shall pay a less duty than the duty there' fixed.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 129Tilge v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.</p> <p>In the ascertainment of the intention of the Congress in giving Anal shape to a paragraph that had been a subject of contention -with them, resort may be had to the current history of the times and of the particular piece of legislation in question. The Congressional Record officially preserves that history. — Aldridge et al'. v. Williams (3 How., 8, 23).</p> <p>2. Skivers not Dutiable as Split Leather.</p> <p>Reviewing the legislative history of the proviso to paragraph 450, tariff act of 1909, it can not be held the Congress meant to extend its provisions to still other paragraphs — to paragraph 451, for example — and so “split leather,” as employed in that proviso, does not include articles such as the skivers of the importation. These were properly held to be dutiable under paragraph 451; and as the duty would be the same it is unnecessary to determine their classification as between either “sheepskins dressed and finished” or as “other leather.”</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 137Stengel v. United States (1911)T AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7145 (T. 1). 31164).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 140United States v. Goldberg (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Statute op Limitations.</p> <p>Where an assessment had been protested and the entry had been retained for reliquidation, and on January 3, 1907, the collector proceeded to reliquidate the invoice in question and then again on December 4, 1908, would reliquidate the same invoice, a second reliquidation was barred. The protest had been satisfied by the reliquidation of January 3,1907, the statute of limitations having begun then to run and more than one year having elapsed. — United States v. Leng (18 Fed. Rep., 15).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 143United States v. Meadows (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7168 (T. D. 31297).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 149Tilge v. United States (1911)[DeniedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Petition on behalf of the Government for rehearing in Tilge & Co. v. United States (T. D. S1507).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 159Benjamin Iron & Steel Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Old Steel Rails Not Scrap.</p> <p>To bring old steel rails within the provisions of paragraph 118, tariff act of 1909, the burden is on the importer to show that the importation is not only of scrap steel, but that it is such scrap steel as to constitute 1 ‘waste or refuse iron or steel fit only to be remanufactured by melting.” The evidence in the record falls short of showing the shipment was of this character; it was properly held dutiable under paragraph 126, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 162Boker v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York. 180 Fed. Rep., 959 (T. D. 30841); G. A. 6613 (T. D. 28230).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 165United States v. Continental Color & Chemical Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7132 IT. D. 31102).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 167United States v. Richter (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. A Manufacture May be Material for Another Manufacture.</p> <p>Ordinarily a manufactured article takes a different form, or at least subserves a purpose different from that of the original materials out of which it is made and usually takes a different name. That does not mean, however, that its usefulness as a material has necessarily ended and that as a manufacture it can not serve the purpose of material for some other manufacture.</p> <p>2. Manufactures of Furs Used as Material.</p> <p>According to the evidence, the importation was of pieces of dressed natural sheepskin sewed into rugs and known to the trade as rugs. It appears they are used as material for making finer rugs or other articles of fur. They are further advanced than dressing and dyeing and were properly dutiable as manufactures of furs further advanced than dressing and dyeing under paragraph 439, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 172Carlowitz v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Plates, Linings, and Crosses.</p> <p>It was the evident purpose of the Congress by paragraph 439, tariff act of 1909, to distinguish between the completed article and the several grades of materials entering into its composition, and to impose on materials prepared for the use of furriers and other manufacturers of fur an intervening rate of duty, higher than the rate upon dressed skins that had theretofore been construed by the board as proper and applicable, and at the same time lower than the rate provided for manufactures made from such materials. The words “plates, linings, and crosses” are employed in that paragraph as words of extension rather than specification and the furriers’ articles of the importation, whether dressed or dyed or not, were properly assessed at 35 per cent ad valorem under that paragraph.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 177United States v. Burkhardt (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>SEALSKIN IN ITS NATURAL SHARE, DRESSED AND REPAIRED.</p> <p>Sealskins.that have been “repaired” can not be taken for dutiable purposes to come within the first clause of paragraph 439, tariff act of 1909, and though “repaired” this -will not constitute them manufactures of furs designated by the second clause of that paragraph; there is no eo nomine provision applicable and the importation is dutiable under paragraph 480 of the act as an unenumerated article,, manufactured in whole or in part.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 181Morimura Bros. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cotton Screens in a Framework or Wood.</p> <p>On a review of the statutes and the decisions founded on the statutes; it is held that screens with panels of cotton, ornamented with embroidered designs or with figures appliquéed thereon, were not dutiable as furniture or as a manufacture of cotton under tariff act of 1897, but were dutiable under paragraph 339 of that act at 60 per cent as “ other articles” embroidered or appliquéed.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 186Woodruff & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, Abstract 22650 (T. D. 30314).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 189United States v. Brown (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, Abstract 21075 (T. D. 29700).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 192Consolidated Color & Chemical Co. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Tetrachloride or Tin — Lac Spirits.</p> <p>Tetrachloride of tin, while admittedly a chemical compound, was not dutiable as such under tariff act of 1897, and being, as appears from a preponderance of the testimony in this case, lac-spirits, it was, as such,'free of duty under that act</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 197United States v. Borgfeldt & Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Decalcomania Transfers — Lithographic Prints.</p> <p>Decalcomanias for ceramic decoration, the decorating to be done by transferring tbe figures and designs from tbe paper to pottery and fixing them on the pottery by burning or baking, are lithographic prints and were dutiable as such within the meaning of paragraph 400, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 203Strauss & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Combs Made on? Gallilith.</p> <p>Since they most nearly resemble combs made of horn, in accordance with the-terms of paragraph 481, tariS act of 1909, combs made of gallilith are dutiable under paragraph 463 of that act.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 206Kahlen v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Suitable” Defined.</p> <p>In the tariff law “suitable” means actually, practically, and commercially fit.</p> <p>2. Onionskin Paper not Printing Paper.</p> <p>The rare and exceptional use of onionskin paper for printing purposes does not constitute it printing paper and it was dutiable as paper not specially provided for under paragraph 402, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 209Revillon Frères v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States' General Appraisers G, A. 7079 (T. D. 30798).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 212Morgenstern & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 23840 (T. D. 30865).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 215Quaintance v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Figured Cotton Cloth Appraised as an Entirety.</p> <p>In appraising the value of figured cotton cloth, the threads added to constitute the figure are not to he omitted in the valuation, but these, together with the foundation threads, are to be taken into account in fixing- ad valorem rates under paragraphs 305 and 306, tariff act of 1897.</p> <p>2. Section 19, Customs Administrative Act op 1890.</p> <p>Section 19, customs administrative act, 1890, providing in effect that imported merchandise subject to an ad valorem duty shall be valued in the condition in which it is imported, requires that the value of the added threads should be computed.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 221Hensel v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24104 (T. D. 31020).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 222Simpson v. United States (1911)[BeversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cotton Waste, not Advanced in Yaltje.</p> <p>Cotton waste recovered from mill sweepings or used cotton waste is not “advanced in value ” by processes of combing, washing, and bleaching in the sense implied by “advanced in value” appearing in section 313, tariff act of 1909. It is entitled to free entry under that act.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 225United States v. Meyerson (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>CARDBOARD EMBOSSED TO IMITATE LEATHER.</p> <p>Plain cardboard that has been embossed to give it an appearance of grain leather by passing it between a smooth and an indented roller remains cardboard; and it is not dutiable as paper, but as cardboard, under paragraph 415, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 227United States v. Bouchsein (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>.Appeal horn Board of .United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7147 (T. D. 31181).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 231American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers G. A. 7148 (T. D. 31201).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 234Hamburger v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Celluloid Imitation Flowers. — Rose Pins.</p> <p>The certainty required in a commercial designation is not here shown, and it appearing that the small imitation flowers of the importation are made of celluloid and attached to metal pins, designed to be worn as boutonniéres, and that they are so worn by adults, they can not be taken to be “toys”; they were dutiable as artificial flowers under paragraph 425, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 236United States v. Mason Bros. & Co. (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26241 (T.D. 31804).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 237American Trading Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Handmade Printing Paper Suitable por Books.</p> <p>The term “handmade” as applied to paper is precise, explicit, specific, and eon--trolling, and since the handmade paper of the importation weighed 10 pounds to the ream, it was dutiable under paragraph 401, tariff act of 1897. — Benneche &Bro. V. United States (153 Fed. Rep., 861).</p> <p>2. Effect op Departmental Practice.</p> <p>Even ifp the evidence showed, as it does not, that the practice of the Treasury Department had been contrary to the ruling now made, the reason for invoking departmental practice as binding is not found here; the provisions of the statute under consideration are not of doubtful construction.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 239United States v. Frank & Lambert (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, Abstract 21027 (T. D. 29690).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 247Pritchard & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Kraet Paper not Printing Paper.</p> <p>The Board of General Appraisers having found the consignment to be wrapping-paper and not printing paper, and an examination of the evidence of record failing to show this decision to have been wholly unsupported or contrary to the weight of the evidence, the decision will be affirmed.</p> <p>2. Commercial Designation.</p> <p>Where there is a question of an article being dutiable and the rate of duty depends on that article’s suitableness for a given use, its commercial designation is a material fact.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 249United States v. Bennett & Loewenthal (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>The entry was made on a pro forma invoice, on or about April 25, 1907. On May 2 the importers filed a consular invoice duly certified, showing the consignment cost less than the amount stated in the pro forma invoice. On May 9 the assistant appraiser made a return on the pro forma invoice showing it to be correct, and apparently on the same day the appraiser’s approval was indorsed thereon. The collector’s notation on the pro forma invoice showed the entered value to be the same as that approved by the appraiser. Later, on May 13, at the request of the appraiser the pro forma invoice was returned to him, and on the next day it was sent to the collector by the assistant appraiser with a notation correcting by diminishing the stated value of the consignment, but no approval of this act by the appraiser is shown, and the collector thereupon indorsed “No reduction in entered value allowed.” The importers took no appeal.</p> <p>1. Duty op an Appraiser.</p> <p>An appraiser, after having once performed the duty of appraisement in respect of any particular merchandise and after having made his return thereof to the collector, has no authority of his own volition to make another appraisement of the same merchandise. — United States v. Drank & Lambert (2 Ot. Oust. Appls., 239; T. D. 31973).</p> <p>2. Proceedings on a Peo Forma Entry.not Simply Tentative.</p> <p>Reviewing at length the history of the legislation, the practice of the Treasury Department and the decisions of the courts as well, no warrant is found.for the statement that an entry upon a pro forma invoice should be held open until the certified invoice is produced or the bond given for its production has been forfeited; nor is any authority found for holding that liquidation is proper on an amount less than the entered value in case an entry is made upon a pro forma invoice, no manifest clerical error or duress appearing.</p> <p>3. The Function of a Pro Forma Invoice.</p> <p>A pro forma invoice is for entry pin-poses a recognized lawful invoice made under oath as a substitute for a regularly certified invoice; a penalty for undervaluation in such an invoice may he inflicted and an entry on a pro forma invoice is such an entry as the language of section 7, customs administrative act of 1890, should and must apply to, namely, “the duty shall not, however, be assessed in any case upon an amount less than the invoice or entered value.”</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 267United States v. Hartwig (1911)T AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Fox Skins, Dressed, Dyed, and Pointed, “Manufactures.”</p> <p>Alaska fox skins that have been dréssed and dyed and pointed by the insertion in the fur at intervals of white hairs from the badger, these white hairs being glued to the skin and making them an Imitation silver-fox skin, since a new article is thereby made, with a new name, character, and use, constitute a manufacture, but not a manufacture of furs prepared for use as material, and the skins were dutiable at 20 per cent ad valorem, whether taken by similitude as furs dressed on the skin or as nonenumerated manufactured articles.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 270Worsdell & Co. v. United States (1911)[Affirmed in part, reversed in partU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Seal Splits or Seal Split Leathers.</p> <p>Paragraph 450, tariff act of 1909, does not cover leathers made from the hides or skins of animals that are not cattle of the bovine species, and as seal splits or seal split leathers are made from animals not of the bovine species, they do not fall within the provisions of that paragraph.</p> <p>2. Grain or Split Leather.</p> <p>It not having been shown that the terms “grain leather” and “split leather, ” as used in paragraph 450 of the tariff act of 1909, are applicable in the trade only to leathers which are unfinished, finished leathers of these kinds made from the hides of cattle of the bovine species are dutiable under said paragraph.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 274Choy Chong Woh & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24686 (T. D. 31236)</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 275Sheldon & Co. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, Abstract 21336 (T. D. 29790).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 278Downing & Co. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, G. A. 6957 (T. D. 30207).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 283United States v. Sheldon & Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Imitation Jet Goods not Manufactures of Glass.</p> <p>•Technically “jet goods” are not, of course, imitation jet, but where the record discloses the importer, the collector, and the Board of General Appraisers all considered the importation an imitation jet it could not be properly assessed as jet, and was rightly held to be dutiable as imitation jet under paragraph 109, tariff .act of 1909. — United States v. Beierle (1 Ot. Oust. Appls., 457; T. D. 31506).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 285Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. A Chemical Compound.</p> <p>A chemical compound is not simply a mingling of components, but a combination of them, resulting in their destruction as distinct entities and in the development by chemical reaction of a new'substance possessing properties radically different from those of its constituent elements.</p> <p>2. “Mixtures.”</p> <p>Mixture implies that the corporeal integrity, the separate chemical nature, and individual properties of the mixed ingredients have be.en preserved.</p> <p>3. Lime Powder, a Mixture, not a Chemical Compound.</p> <p>A combination of lime, carbonate of lime, and manganese oxide, for use in drying and hardening varnish,-is a chemical mixture, and as such is dutiable under paragraph 3, tariff-act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 288Van Treese v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 23890 (T. D. 30879).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 290Goodman & Co. v. United States (1911)[DeniedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Application for a rehearing (T. D. 31658).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 292United States v. Corsi, Zumsteg & Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24896 (T. D. 31335).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 296Irwin & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7165 (T. D. 31294)-</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 299Illfelder & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24807 (T. D. 31300).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 302Kupfer Bros. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7169 (T. D. 31298).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 305Peacock & Co. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24628 (T. D. 31236).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 311Hodgart & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Planit Packing fob Engine Packing and Calking Pueposes.</p> <p>Tin parings and lead shavings obtained by the use of a lathe in the ordinary methods of turning bars of metal to shape and form might, it is true, be deemed waste, but there is no evidence here to negative the idea that these parings and shavings may have been produced for use in the manufacture of a packing. The appearance of the sample is suggestive of an article specially prepared for calking purposes. The importation was properly assessed under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, as articles or wares not specially provided for composed wholly or in part of lead or other metal.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 312American Express Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Bayonets are Side Arms.</p> <p>A bayonet when in use is affixed to a gun, but is not to be considered a part of the gun. The lexicons uniformly define “bayonets” as side arms. As such, they were dutiable under paragraph 154, tariff act of 1897, and are dutiable under paragraph 153, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 314Littauer v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Beads, Strung on Cotton Threads at Fixed and Equal Distances.</p> <p>The phraseology of paragraph 421, tariff act of 1909, relative to beads and spangles, discloses a substantial change from the language in the former law relating to the same subject matter, and it appearing the importation is of beads on strands of a permanent kind designed for use as embroidery just as imported, they will be deemed dutiable conformably to the requirements of that paragraph.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 317Goussios & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. AN ADMINISTRATIVE FOLLOWED BY A STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.</p> <p>■ It is true a more specific designation controls as against a general designation, that a designation eo nomine controls as against a description by class, but where there has been an administrative construction and this has been adopted into law this-construction must control. — Brennan v. United States (136 Fed. Rep., 743).</p> <p>2. Olives Barreled in Brine.</p> <p>To hold this importation to be “fruit in brine” and free of duty as such would be to hold all olives are duty free. The construction given in the administration of the law and the apparent adoption of this construction by subsequent congressional enactment makes black or ripe olives in brine dutiable under paragraph 275, tariff act of 1909.- — Causse Mfg. Co. v. United States, G. A. 5417 (T. D. 24663), distinguished.</p> <p>3. Allowance eor Brine, When not Made.</p> <p>The actual quantity of olives in the importation was, it would seem, ascertained by the gauger and no allowance should accordingly be made for brine.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 321United States v. Baumgarten & Co. (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25440 (T. D. 31543).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 325Tuska, Son & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>,Appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25543 (T. D. 31589), and Abstract 25835 (T. D. 31675).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 327White & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7222 (T. D. 31588).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 329Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States (1911)[ AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of Unitecl States General Appraisers, Abstract 26164 (T. D. 31774).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 332United States v. Shallus (1911)[Modified and affirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. When Duty Attaches.</p> <p>Duty attaches upon imported merchandise at the time the vessel, with the cargo aboard, arrives within the line of the customs district.</p> <p>2. What is a Nonimportation.</p> <p>A cargo, or part thereof, so far destroyed as to be of no commercial value at the time the importation is brought within the customs district is not, as to the destroyed portion, deemed an “importation of merchandise” within the tariff laws of the United States, and therefore no duty accrues or can be collected thereon.</p> <p>3. Importation Despite Loss in Cargo.</p> <p>The destruction or loss of the whole or any part of a cargo of imported merchandise •after this enters the line'of the customs district and before it is unloaded from the vessel or entered or surrendered from the custody of the customs is not thereby exempted from the payment of duties, unless by reason of express statute or regulation and then as provided in that statute or regulation.</p> <p>4. Decay in Cargo a Question op Evidence.</p> <p>The Congress has by remedial statute established a rule of evidence in determining the condition of merchandise at the time this crosses the customs line, and the quantity of the merchandise existing at the precise moment of importation, if made an issue, becomes a fact to be proved, as any other fact in issue, by evidence.</p> <p>5. Present Finding as to Lemons.</p> <p>An examination of all the evidence in this case is persuasive of the correctness of the -board’s finding, except as to one entry, and on modification the finding is affirmed.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 336Cuccio & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Importation and Nonimportation.</p> <p>Whether all, or a portion only, of a cargo of fruit constitutes an importation depends on the facts established by evidence in the particular case. In this particular case the board based its decision on the ground that the ¡evidence offered by the importers was not convincing of error in the return made by the collector and no reason here appears to disturb that finding. — United States i>. Shallus, supra ■ (T. D. 32074).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 338United States v. Baker Castor Oil Co. (1911)[Mollified and affirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Tare, Generally.</p> <p>Impurities ordinarily present in an article of merchandise do not constitute tare; only those impurities not ordinarily present in the merchandise as traded in may be the subject of an allowance for tare.' — Seeberger v. Wright (157 U. S., 183); Shal-lus v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 316: T. D. 31408).</p> <p>2. Tare in Castor Seeds.</p> <p>Without passing on the relevancy, as testimony here, of a certificate showing the results of an analysis made at the place of export, this certificate may be taken as in the nature of an admission against interest, and since it is made apparent that no allowance is commonly made as between seller and buyer of castor seeds, except in cases whore the impurities exceed 3 per cent, and then only for the excess over and above 3 per cent, the allowance here should have been, not for 5, but for the excess above 3 per cent, namely, 2 per cent.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 340Cataldi Aurola v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Allowance eor Breakage, Leakage, Etc.</p> <p>The .proviso to paragraph 307, tariff act of 1909, forbidding allowance to be made for breakage, leakage, etc., of merchandise therein described, must be strictly construed and can not be made to apply to merchandise not within its terms; but the' legality of that provision itself is now stare decisis. The board rightly held the leakage here to be dutiable.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 342Microutsicos v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24628 (T. D. 31236).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 347Stiner & Son v. United States (1911)I'AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7202 (T. D. 31491).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 350United States v. Anderson & Co. (1911)I ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Forgings Advanced in Condition.</p> <p>Comparing paragraph. 127, tariff act ■ of 1897, with paragraph 123, tariff act of 1909, and especially taking into view what would appear to be a manifest legislative intention with respect to paragraph 123, as evidenced by its history, a forging is advanced in condition when the burr on the edge of the rough-forged article is removed by passing it over a grindstone, and a hoe rough forged, but so manipulated, is dutiable under pargaraph 123.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 353United States v. Squibb & Sons (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26002 (T. D. 31727).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 355Oelrichs & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Jurisdiction.</p> <p>The importer himself having invoked a decision by the General Appraiser and later by the reappraisement board, bringing both the subject matter and the parties there; can not be heard to contend the board was without jurisdiction to reappraise the goods.</p> <p>2. Mandatory Provisions of Sections 2901 and 2939, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>Though there may have been a failure on the part of the collector strictly to comply with the provisions of sections 2901 and 2939, Revised Statutes, governing the special designation of merchandise for examination and appraisement, nevertheless the Board of General Appraisers would be in duty bound, the goods in question remaining subject to their control and open to their inspection and examination, to resort, on appeal, to the best means at hand for making an appraisement;, and though it should appear that one package in ten was not in some instances examined by the board, there being sufficient samples of the merchandise before them and these having been examined, there would be accordingly such a substitute process as the law contemplates and permits.</p> <p>3. Questions of Fact Not Retried by Classification Board.</p> <p>It is not the province of a classification board to retry questions of fact determined by a board of reappraisement, and additional testimony offered before the classification board was properly excluded. — Gulbenkian & Co. v. United States (153 Fed. Rep., 858) distinguished.</p> <p>4. Evidence Not Formally Offered and Not Objected to.</p> <p>The Government having tendered evidence, with the promise to support it with additional testimony to make it relevant, but failing in this, and there being no motion to exclude it, the action of the board in taking the testimony originally can not be urged to vitiate the board’s finding in the case.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 361Steinhardt & Bro. v. United States (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7119 (T. D. 31026).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 364Downing & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7156 (T. D. 31235).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 368United States v. Fensterer & Ruhe (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24819 (T. D. 31300).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 371Furuya & Co. v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Leakage op Rice Wine oh Sake.</p> <p>In the past there has been much contention over sake and the leakage of sake, but the tariff act of 1909 would seem, by providing in paragraph 307 for rice wine or sake expressly and forbidding any allowance should be made for breakage, leakage, or damage on wines, to have placed the question beyond doubt. It was properly held, as here, no such allowance should be made on sake.'</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 374Perry, Ryer & Co. v. United States (1911)[Affirmed as to part and reversed as to partU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25204 (T. D. 31450).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 380United States v. John Duncan's Sons (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26197 (T. D. 31788).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 384Dale v. United States (1911)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Leather-Covered Pipe and Cigarette-Holder Cases.</p> <p>Common knowledge and observation serve to convince that the importation is one of smokers’ articles, and these are dutiable not as manufactures of leather but as falling within “ all smokers’ articles whatsoever,” paragraph 475, tariff act of 1909. — Vandiver v. United States (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 194; T. D. 31219); Mark Cross Co. v. United States {Ibid., 377; T. D. 31457); Knauth v. United States (Ibid., 334; T. D. 31432).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 386Carson, Pirie, Scott & Co. v. United States (1911)I ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Teddy-Bear Motes — Toys.</p> <p>, The articles, “Teddybears,” have the shape of dolls with heads representing bears; the testimony shows they are sold to and handled by toy dealers almost exclusively; they are not reasonably fit for any use except to amuse' children; they are toys and are dutiable as such under paragraph 431, tariff act of 1909.— Illfelder v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 109; T. D. 31115).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 388United States v. Shing Shun & Co. (1911)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25572 (T. D. 31589).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 389Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers; G. A. 7157 (T. D. 31253).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 393United States v. Ovington Bros. & Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Emergency Outfit of Tools for an Automobile.</p> <p>Leather cases fitted with ah assortment of tools, consisting of a screw driver, saw, file, and small blades, for which a single handle suffices when used, are not dutiable under section 452, tariff act of 1909, as a “traveling set,” but, adapted and intended for emergencies only, they are dutiable as articles made wholly or in part of metal, under paragraph 199 of that act.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 395United States v. Straus & Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Abtipicial Silk Yarns, Singles, not Trams.</p> <p>The merchandise is the crudest form of artificial silk known- to the throwster’s trade; it corresponds precisely to the natural silk single as this is made up from the cocoon; it was properly held to be in the form of singles and not tram, and th© form being the determining fact for consideration, it was dutiable as singles under paragraph 405, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 397Thomas & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Paper Suitable por Paper Hangings.</p> <p>The evidence does not show that the paper of the importation is either commercially or commonly known as printing paper, distinguishable as such from wall paper; it was not brought in to be used in printing books, and the testimony is conflicting as to whether it is suitable for such a purpose. The case is ruled by Pritchard v. United States (T. D. 31974), and the merchandise was properly held not to be printing paper.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 399Heide v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7199 (T. D. 31475).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 405Stern Bros. v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25070 (T. D. 31405).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 408Godillot & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Pickled Capers.</p> <p>There is no limitation on.the -word “pickles” as used in paragraph 253, tariff act of 1909, and pickled capers are dutiable under it. In the presence of clear and explicit enactment, canons of construction have no application — Microutsicos u. United States (T. D. 32078).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 410Schrader & Ehlers v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Fountain-Pen Barbel Not a Penholder.</p> <p>There is no question of commercial designation, and “penholder” as employed in the statute can not reasonably be held to include the rubber article of the importation. The language of paragraph 187, tariff act of 1909, clearly contemplates that fountain .pens for tariff purposes should be distinguished as they are in fact and in common understanding from the ordinary penholder, and should be subject.to a. different rate of duty. The importations were dutiable as manufactures of hard rubber under paragraphs 450, tariff act of 1897, and 464, tariff act of 1909, respectively.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 411United States v. Wakem & McLaughlin (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7220 (T. D. S1586).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 419United States v. Zinn & Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Baskets of Straw, Willow, Rattan, and Wood, Lined with Silk.</p> <p>“Baskets” is a term, descriptive eo nomine, and the sole requirement needed to bring “baskets” within the provisions of paragraph 214, tariff act of 1909, is that they should in fact be the articles there described, namely, baskets made of bamboo, wood, straw, or compositions of wood. — Thomsen v. United States (T. D. 31590.)</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 422Overton & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Surface-Coated Paper with Lithographically Printed Colored Designs.</p> <p>The merchandise consisted of sheets of paper lithographically printed with colored designs, and not exceeding eight one-thousandths of an inch in thickness. Paragraph 412, tariff act of 1909, contains unmistakable evidence that Congress intended to name the exceptions to its application, and that apart from those exceptions it was meant to cover, as is there expressly declared, articles composed wholly or in chief value of paper lithographically printed, in whole or in part, whether such articles are or are not ejusdem generis with those first designated. The merchandise is dutiable under that paragraph.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 425United States v. Tamm & Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Composed oe.”</p> <p>“Composed,” in paragraph. 95, tariff act of 1909, does not imply that an article to be “composed ” must be made of more than one substance; an article may be composed of a single substance.</p> <p>2. “Mineral Substances.”</p> <p>Nor does the phrase “mineral substances” in the same paragraph mean substances in the plural, to the exclusion of substance in the singular. The solid flint glazing stones of -the importation are dutiable under that paragraph as articles or wares composed wholly or in chief value of earthy or mineral substances. — Salomon v. United States (T. D. 31635).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 427Gage Bros. & Co. v. United States (1912)[Modified as to part, affirmed -is to partU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25774 (T. D. 31575).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 431Salomon Bros. & Co. v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Jute Unmanufactured — -Entry Eree.</p> <p>The merchandise consists of broken fibers of undressed raw jute rejected by the carding machine in’ the first process of manufacture. These broken fibers had been later subjected to a carding process of their own. The product is more accurately described as jute, unmanufactured, than as waste not specially provided for and was entitled to free entry under both tariff acts of 1897 and 1909. — United States v. Hatters’ Em- Exchange (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 198; T. D. 31237).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 434United States v. Vandegrift & Co. (1912)[Motion deniedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Petition eor Rehearing and Time Limitations on Appeals.</p> <p>Where a motion for a new trial has been entered within the time fixed'by law, the limitation of 60 days within which it is permitted to take an appeal begins to run not from the date of the original decision, but from the date the motion for a new trial is disposed of.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 436United States v. Didier-March Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from. Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26371 (T. D. 31832).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 439Sheldon & Co. v. United States (1912)^ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Automatic Lightees to Ignite Acetylene Gas.</p> <p>From the evidence and upon examination of the article itself, it can not well be deemed a smoker’s article. Its use appears to be to light acetylene lamps. It is dutiable as a manufacture of metal, paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909. — Distinguishing Abstract 13785 (T. D. 27785).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 440United States v. Wyman & Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Ikon Cylinder Containing Liquid Sulphurous Acid.</p> <p>The evi.dence shows beyond question that the taut and contents were ordered by the purchasing agent oí the University of Kansas. Whether the tank, though a usual covering, would be free of duty as such under paragraph 151, tariff act of 1909, query; but paragraph 650 of the act applies. In the broader terms employed in paragraph 650, relative to apparatus for the use of institutions of learning, there appears to be a purpose to encourage institutions of the kind, and the paragraph must receive a reasonably liberal interpretation. The cylinder here was indispensable in keeping its contents in the safe and proper way to make these contents available for scientific instruction; it must be deemed scientific apparatus, and as such free of duty.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 444Spencer Importing & Trading Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Olear.”</p> <p>That construction of the word “clear” as applied to shelled almonds will be avoided when to adopt such construction would bring a number of kindred statutory provisions into utter confusion. For a construction here, we have that enforced ■ for many.years by the Treasury Department and acquiesced in by the trade during that time; and</p> <p>2. Clear-Shelled Almonds with Broken Shells and Dust.</p> <p>Clear-almonds, shelled, remain almonds, though they should contain a certain amount of broken kernels, dust, and shells, and they are not to be classified generally with “nuts of all kinds.” They are dutiable as clear almonds, shelled, under-paragraph 280, tariff act of 1909. Paragraph 283 of that act forbids any allowance for the weight of the dust and shells..</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 450Spencer Importing & Trading Co. v. United States (1912)[ AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25946 (T. D. 31720).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 451Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26563 (T. D. 31866).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 454United States v. Wertheimer & Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Board’s Ruling Not to be Disturbed on Defective Proof.</p> <p>The evidence necessary to fix the proper classification of these gloves would include proof of a variety of facts as to manufacture and trade usage. The record here is scanty, too scanty of evidence to warrant the Board’s finding being disturbed.— United States v. Spielmann (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 279; T. D. 31320); United States v. Perkins (ibid., 323; T. D. 31430); and Carson v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., —; T. D. 31656).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 456Shallus v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board.of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24670(T. D. 31236).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 457Habicht, Braun & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7229 (T. D. 31651).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 459American Express Co. v. United States (1912)t AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Papers with Coated Surface or Surfaces, not Specially Provided for. ■</p> <p>By the deliberate change made and appearing in paragraph 411, tariff act of 1909, making it read “paper with coated surface or surfaces, not specially provided for,”' it can not be doubted a change of meaning was intended; and papers like the importation that in fact have a coated surface or surfaces are dutiable under that paragraph. — Kupfer v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., —;.T. D. 32041) distinguished.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 462United States v. Danker & Marston (1912)[BeverseclU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7255 (T. D. 31798).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 465Cassett v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7005 (T. D. 30526).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 471Ahlbrecht & Son v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Statutoey Constbuction.</p> <p>By a familiar rule, a statute that has been reenacted takes the established construction of that statute, but it is always open to the court to determine whether any change that may appear in new phraseology employed was meant to compel a different construction, the prime purpose always being to get at the real intent of the legislature.</p> <p>2. Heeeings in Tins, Smoked oe Pickled.</p> <p>In paragraph 272, tariff act of 1909, Congress has correlated herrings of all kinds, and has included there herrings, pickled or salted, smoked or kippered, with the knowledge, it is to be presumed, that kippered herring can only be imported as fish in tins and has so made of the terms employed a designation more specific;, than “all other fish (except shellfish) in tin packages,” paragraph 270. The impor-. tations are dutiable under paragraph 272. — United States v. Bosenstein (T. D., 31358) distinguished.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 475Jackson Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cast-Iron Linings for Mantels and Fireplaces.</p> <p>The several pieces of the importation, constituting the fireplace and mantel sets, have been so designed, formed, shaped, and fitted together that they have lost their identity as castings and have become parts of a consistent whole; they have passed from the category of materials into one of articles that, through manufacturing processes, have had their ultimate use determined. The fact that the castings are not assembled does not deprive them of their character as entireties. The articles were dutiable as assessed under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 477Gardner & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7237 (T. D. 31707).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 479Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26218 (T. D. 31788).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 481Auffmordt & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7260 (T. D. 31803).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 483Larkin Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Rapeseed or Colza Oil.</p> <p>The contention was made that the importation is not rapeseed oil as assessed, but is a sulphur colza oil, commonly used for soap making. The testimony falls short of maintaining this.</p> <p>2. Remanding for New Trial.</p> <p>A party litigant in an appellate tribunal must stand upon the case as he made it in the lower court; and a case here will not be remanded because the record discloses simply a failure to make proof. — Stegeman v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 208; T. D. 31240).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 485United States v. Sheldon & Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Gum Resin a Crude Drug not Advanced in Condition.</p> <p>The importation is of gum resin or rosin. This is the product of the ordinary treatment that oleoresin or crude turpentine is subjected to in order to separate its two contents. By the application of heat the turpentine is vaporized, passed through a worm, and condensed; the resin content being at the same time run off from the boiler of the still into a vat, but cleansed, in passing through screens, of chips, bark, insects, and dirt, accumulated in taking the turpentine from the tree. These processes have been uniformly held not to advance an articlé from its crude state; not to advance it either in value or condition as those terms are used and uniformly construed in revenue statutes. They merely serve to get the article by itself. The terms “in a crude state” are broad enough to include as “crude” all the grades of resin shown by the record in this case. — Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. United States (94‘Fed. Rep., 822); United States v. Godwin (91 Fed. Rep., 753); Schoenemann p. United States (119 Fed. Rep., 584).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 505Vandiver v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24728 (T. D. 31255).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 508Lazarus, Rosenfeld & Lehmann v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1 Alabaster Pedestals under Tariff Act of 1909.</p> <p>Without determining whether the importations rise to the dignity of “sculptures” in the arts, the character of their production'by wholesale would exclude them from the terms of paragraph 470, tariff act of 1909. Under that paragraph the sculptures designated must be made by hand from solid blocks of alabaster and be, too, the professional production of a sculptor only. The merchandise was dutiable under paragraph 112, tariff act of 1909, as alabaster manufactured into articles.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 512Drakenfeld & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cadmium Sulphide, -a Pigment or Color.</p> <p>The importation may be described as a pigment' or color, or as a chemical compound or salt. Its place in science and commerce, however, has apparently been fixed by its use and by its being chiefly known as a pigment or color. This designation is the more specific and it must prevail as against one more general in kind, and without any limitation as to use or other qualification. It was dutiable as assessed under paragraph 58, tariff act of 1897. — Fink v. United States (170 U^S., 584).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 515United States v. Wertheimer Bros. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Mousselines — Woven Fabrics of Silk — Manufactures of Silk.</p> <p>The goods had been for many years well lrnoyn as articles of commerce and their proper classification had been fixed by judicial construction. It must be presumed that this construction was adopted when the clause in question was brought forward into the new act from the old act, furnishing thus a clear expression of legislative will. The merchandise is dutiable not as woven fabrics in the piece, but as manufactures of silk, under paragraph 403, -tariff act of 1909. — Robinson v. United States (121 Fed. Rep., 204).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 519Stein & Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7232 (T. D. 31672).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 522United States v. Danker & Marston (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “CRUDE” ARTICLE.</p> <p>Though, an article may have been processed, if, as a matter of fact, it must be subjected to some additional process to fit it for its chief or only use, it is, so far ■ as that use is concerned, a crude article. — Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Co. v. United States (94 Fed. Rep., 822).</p> <p>2. Gum Tragasol.</p> <p>Gum tragasol is an article hi a “ crude” state used in dyeing; it is not a vegetable ' extract for dyeing, coloring, staining, or tanning. It was free of duty under paragraph 482, tariff act of 1897, and is free of duty, under paragraph 499, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 526Thayer v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26110 (T. D.'31757).</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 532Comey & Johnson Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Hatters’ Plush, when Assessable as Silk Plush.</p> <p>It is clear that paragraph 477, tariff act of 1909, must be taken to refer specifically to material used exclusively for making men’s hats. The intention was to encourage the domestic production of men’s hats. The proof shows the importation was made for the manufacture of millinery goods or women’s hats, and that it was so used. It was not entitled to the benefit of the paragraph named, and it was properly assessed as a silk plush.</p>
- 2 Ct. Cust. 537United States v. Rettig (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26388 (T. D. 31832).</p>