3 Ct. Cust.
Volume 3 — Customs Court Reports
150 opinions
- 3 Ct. Cust. 1Buschoff v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Hides Taken From Cattle Exported Alive.</p> <p>A previous decision in this cause is adhered to (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 336; T. D. 31433). That decision was rested on the proposition that the commodity imported was another and distinct commodity from the one exported. There was no purpose there to hold, nor can the language employed by any fair construction be made to hold, that because an article was named in the dutiable list as subject to duty, the article so named could not in any circumstances be entitled to free entry under paragraph 483, tariff act of 1897. — G. A. 4103 (T. D. 19130).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 5Harris v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. A Valuation, Final and Conclusive.</p> <p>Tlie question is one of valuation, arising out of the appraisement by a board of reappraisement, under tariff act of 1897, of certain Georgian raw autumn wool, white and colors. At the hearing before the board testimony was introduced by the respective parties tending to sustain their several contentions. • The board’s decision, based on the testimony so offered, can not now be reviewed to determine questions that relate only to the proper weight or proper effect of the evidence. — Wolff v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 181: T. D: 31217).</p> <p>2. Examination of 1 in 10.</p> <p>An irregularity in complying with the legal requirements as to the sufficiency of samples of goods before a board of réappraisement will be deemed to have been waived if the importer was present and made no objection to the irregularity. Oelrichs & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 355; T. D. 32091).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 10United States v. National Aniline & Chemical Co. (1912)[RemandedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Incompetent Evidence.</p> <p>The board admitted in evidence a certain certificate “for what it is .worth.” Without determining whether this was equivalent to holding the certificate had probative force of some sort, it is clear that subsection 29 of section 28, tariff act of 1909, relating to the powers of this court does not exempt testimony admitted by the board from the application on its review here of accepted principles governing the competency of evidence; and it is not true that if through error the board has admitted and considered as evidence that which has no tendency to support an issue of fact, such.error, aided by the statute, imparts.a,character,and'forceto that evidence which under no' other circumstances could it possess; the word “competent” in the law, as applied to evidence before this court on appeal, does not clothe testimony improperly admitted below with any new quality or give it a probative force never inherently possessed by it. — Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne (155 Fed. Rep., 144) distinguished.</p> <p>2. Unattested Declaration Abroad.</p> <p>An unsworn ex parte statement made abroad and deposited with a vice consul is .in no sense the equivalent of a deposition under oath and taken where there was an opportunity to cross-examine the witness; and such a statement can not be held to overcome the presumption of correctness in a collector’s classification: especially is this so when such ex parte statement lacks relevancy.</p> <p>3. Motion to Remand.</p> <p>Under the circumstances and upon request therefor, the rule is applied that a cause may be remanded for a new trial when necessary for the purposes of justice.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 19United States v. Weber (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>A “Bushel” of Apples.</p> <p>There is no controversy as to the rate of duty. The controversy is over the legal contents of a bushel of apples. Reviewing the history of the legislation and the decisions affecting weights and measures, it would appear there has never been an authoritative definition of a standard bushel measurement for the United States. The bushel has come, by usage in trade and commerce, to be with us the Winchester bushel of English law prior to 1826, the date of the adoption of the imperial bushel in England. By a statute of Anne, A. D. 1701, recognizing a trade usage already in force, apples and pears were required to be sold by heaping measure; and in the absence of any specific declaration by Congress as to the contents of a bushel of apples or the like, it will be presumed that a bushel of to-day is the bushel of English law and custom in 1776; and a bushel of apples is not a struck Winchester bushel, but that measure heaped.’</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 24United States v. Schwartz (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7187 (T. D. 31401.)</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 52United States v. Byrne (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7189 (T. D. 31403).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 52Shallus v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Maryland, Abstract 17667 (T. D. 28626).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 54Sonneborn's Sons v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Paraffin — Countervailing Duty.</p> <p>A nice precision is not required in formulating a protest, but the ground of it should be fairly stated. The proper rate of the countervailing duty on the paraffin of the importation is the rate assessed by Germany on paraffin, since the paraffin of the importation was manufactured in Germany and exported thence. But the importers asserted no claim on that ground, protesting instead for the Russian rate, because the crude petroleum used was a Russian product. Such a protest is clearly insufficient.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 57United States v. Cochran (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, G. A. 6487 (T. D. 27743).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 62United States v. Stirn (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Wooden Beams Wound With Spun Silk.</p> <p>To be admitted free of duty as a container of merchandise on which a specific duty is imposed, an article should not only be a container, but should be the usual container employed in transporting the goods. The importer failed to overcome by a preponderance of evidence the presumption of the correctness of the collector’s finding that the beams in question were unusual containers, if containers they were, and therefore that presumption must prevail. Further, it is admitted that the beams were designed for some other use than the bona fide transportation of the merchandise to the United States. Under such circumstances additional duty would have been properly assessable on the beams even if they had been within the category of containers described by subsection 18 of section 28, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 67United States v. Stouffer Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25501 (T. D. 31568).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 69American Sugar Refining Co. v. United States (1912)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>An Actual Finding op Tare Departed From.</p> <p>The contention here as to tare is limited to the consignment of sugar on one vessel. In this case the collector in reporting tare departed from his own actual finding. A guess or estimate of a proper allowance for tare may not be substituted for a finding arrived at according to the regulations that control.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 72Manufacturers' Paper Co. v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Dressed Lava Stone — Unenumerated Manufactured Article.</p> <p>These dressed lava stones are used as a part of drums in wood-pulp machines. The words “hewn, dressed, or polished” in paragraph 118, tariff act of 1897, would seem to have reference to the advancement of building stone as such, and the importation is not one of building stone. These stones in fact had been adapted for another and distinct use. They were dutiable as unenumerated manufactured articles at 20 per cent ad valorem, under section 6, tariff act of 1897. Yantine case (159 Fed. Rep., 289). United States v. Tamm (2 Ot. Oust. Appls., 425; T. D. 32173), distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 75United States v. Eckstein (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26216 (T. D. 31788).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 77United States v. Motor Car Equipment Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7272 (T. D. 31864).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 83Collins v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Transferred from United States Circuit Court for District of Massachusetts, G. A. 6857 (T. D. 29947), Abstract 26646 (T. D. 31833).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 87United States v. Buss (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7275 (T. D. 31881).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 91United States v. Pitt & Scott (Ltd.) (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cotton Driving Rope, Belting.</p> <p>The word belting signified originally a flat and not a round article, but the term has taken on a more extended meaning and now covers belts that are round, square, and V-shaped as well as belts that are flat. The merchandise though round and corded in shape has its principal use as belting, and it is dutiable as belting for machinery, made of cotton, under paragraph 330, tariff act of 1909. ■</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 94Marx v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Ikon Drums Containing Glycerin.</p> <p>These articles clearly fall within the letter of paragraph 151, tariff act of 1909. They are “ cylindrical or tubular tanks or vessels, ’ ’ they are made and presently used for “holding gas, liquids, or other material,” and they are “full” when imported. After they have been emptied of their contents, some are used again in the transportation of crude or refined glycerin and some are sold in competition with similar articles in the domestic market. They are dutiable under paragraph 151. — United States v. Marx (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 152; T. D. 31210).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 97Tilge v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>“Hat Sweats” — Finished Manufactures.</p> <p>If it were an original proposition for consideration here there would be some difficulty in holding that by the proviso to paragraph 451, tariff act of 1909, it was the legislative intention to exclude from the operation of that proviso all forms cut from leather which were finished manufactured articles. However, the kindred clause in previous legislation having received a settled construction, the recent enactment must be taken as an enactment in view of that construction; and the importation is accordingly dutiable as manufactures of leather under paragraph 452 of that act.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 102Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7183 (T. D. 31377).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 105Arbuckle Bros. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Pat of Watchmen on Vessels Lightered of Cargoes.</p> <p>The Secretary of the Treasury has plenary power by statute to superintend the collection of duties or imposts and tonnage and to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law to prevent frauds upon the customs revenue. He may authorize his agents, in the discharge of their duties, to insist that all cargoes should be actually landed for inspection, and in permitting the discharge of cargoes upon lighters he is granting a privilege to the importer. In the exercise of this privilege by the importer he suffers no wrong in being required to pay for watchmen’s services.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 110Davies v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Miniatuhb Paper Toys.</p> <p>Cheap, nondurable paper articles, made for the amusement of children, to resemble other and really useful articles, are toys, though they might nominally fall within the provisions of some paragraph other than the toy paragraph of the statute.— United States v. Borgfeldt (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 370; T. D. 31455).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 112Surgical Supply Importing Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Nabeow Strips or Cotton Cloth.</p> <p>Narrow individual strips of cotton cloth about 5 yards in length, wrapped, labeled, and ready for use as bandages are not to be deemed woven fabrics of cotton in the piece or cut in lengths. They are manufactures of cotton not specially provided for and are dutiable under paragraph 332, tariff act of 1909.</p> <p>2. Bandings and Ribbons.</p> <p>The question was not raised by the pleadings as to whether the above goods are or are not the bandings and ribbons of paragraph 349, tariff act of 1909, and the issue may not here be extended to cover that question by a mere suggestion on behalf of the Government. That question was a proper one for appeal.</p> <p>3. Narrow Pieces or Cotton Gauze.</p> <p>The remaining importations are without a commercial designation, but the authorities (the lexicons) seem to make it clear they are bands, and they are dutiable as such under paragraph 349, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 115Bing & Co.'s Successors v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Figured Upholstery Goods.</p> <p>Figured cotton panels of various sizes made on a Jacquard loom and designed to be affixed to screens are not manufactures of cotton clotb, but are more aptly described as Jacquard figured upholstery goods, and they are dutiable as such under paragraph 326, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 117Hensel v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal bom Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7287 (T. D. 31939).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 119United States v. Harper (1912)U.S. Court of International Trade
Motion to dismiss appeal on the ground that more than one year had elapsed since the date of the judgment sought to be reviewed.
- 3 Ct. Cust. 120United States v. Vignier (1912)[ AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>SHORTAGE OP LlQUORS IN BOTTLES OR ÍUGS.</p> <p>From tlie evidence it is concluded the cases containing the liquors were packed at exportation with not less than a dozen bottles each, conforming so to the legal requirements as to packing, and it is further concluded that the shortage appearing was attributable to theft before importation. No allowance may be made for breakage, leakage, or damage in bottle shipments, but this punitive provision of paragraph 296, tariff act of 1897, is not to be enlarged beyond its express terms. Such losses as might be allowed for in bulk shipments would be allowable for in bottle shipments, and a shortage in bottles, as here, that was due to theft, was properly held to be nondutiable. — De Bary v. Arthur (93 TJ. S., 420) distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 124Stern v. United States (1912)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25180 (T. D. 31450).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 128United States v. Godillot (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25655 (T. D. 31624).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 130United States v. Peabody (1912)T AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7238 (T. D. 31717).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 137Gump Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7264 (T. D. 31812).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 142United States v. Thomas (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Evidence Lacking that Goods were Antiques,</p> <p>The question is one of proper compliance with Treasury regulations governing the admission duty free of works of art produced more than 100 years prior to the date of importation. The collector assessed the goods for duty. The character of the affidavits of record, ex parte as these are, and unsupported as they are, does not warrant a reversal of the collector’s action, presumably correct, as this must be considered.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 146United States v. Morris European & American Express Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26570 (T. D. 31866).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 152United States v. Williams (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Affirmed on the authority of United States v. Morris European & American Express Co. (3 Ct. Oust. Appls., 146; T. D. 32386).</p> <p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26570 (T. D. 31866).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 152Horace Day Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstracts 23334 and 23355 (T. D. 30645).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 161United States v. Vandegrift (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25910 (T. D. 31708).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 164United States v. Pastene (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Decayed Macaroni.</p> <p>It is not contended by either party that macaroni is a perishable article within the meaning of the first part of subsection 22 of section 28, tariff act of 1909. The evidence disclosed by the record justifies the conclusion that the macaroni for which allowance was made was, before arrival in port, not merely damaged, but destroyed, and that therefore as to the destroyed portion there was no importation.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 168United States v. Masson (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26550 (T. D. 31866).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 171Vitelli v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>No Take Allowance eor Tops op Garlic.</p> <p>Garlic consists of the bulb and top of the plant. No portion of the natural product as imported can properly be called tare, and particularly is this true since it is shown by the evidence that the tops serve the purpose of preserving the bulbs and are sold as constituting a part of the importation. — Shallus v. United States (1 Ot. Oust. Appls., 316; T. D. 31408); United States v. Baker Castor Oil Co. (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 338; T. D. 32076).</p> <p>Before Montgomery, Smith, Barber, De Vries, and Martin, Judges.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 174King Collar Button Co. v. United States (1912)[Motion deniedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26448 (T. D. 31845).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 176Vandegrift v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>An Excess op 14 Pee Cent op Alcohol in Still Wines.</p> <p>The wine here was tested in accordance with the regulations of the Treasury. It was ascertained to contain absolute alcohol perceptibly in excess of 14 per cent. This finding leaves no room for construction. The wines were dutiable as assessed at 60 cents per gallon under paragraph 307, tariff act of 1909. — United States v. Lueder (154 Fed. Bep., 1; T. D. 27918).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 178Horsfield v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7274 (T. D. 31880).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 180United States v. Strauss (1912)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7305 (T. D. 32069).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 183Knauth v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>ADVERTISING CARDS WITH PICTURES DlE OUT.</p> <p>The proviso to paragraph 415, tariff act of 1909, would appear to have been enacted in view of the decision in Hamilton v. United States (T. D. 29519) and so designed to impose an increased rate of duty over and above the duty on paper, upon paper both printed and die cut with designs.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 184Strouse v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27214 (T. D. 32046).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 187Goldschmidt-Thermit Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Manganese Metal not Ferromanganese.</p> <p>Without meaning to imply that no alloy is entitled to he called ferromanganese in case its manganese content exceeds in any measure 80 per cent of the entire article, yet where the manganese is so considerable and the iron and carbon so slight, as in the present importation, the commodity is not to be deemed ferromanganese as that term appears in the law. The importation was properly assessed as metal un-wrought, not specially provided for, under paragraph 183, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 191United States v. Anderson (1912)[U.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Fabeio Known as Cotton Hollands.</p> <p>Whether the importation is one of articles made from cotton cloth, finished or unfinished, or is one of manufactures with cotton as the component material of chief value, is here, as a question, unimportant. The article is excluded from the other cotton-cloth provisions of the tariff act of 1909 by the terms of paragraph 320 of that act, and being stipulated to be an “article” made from the “fabric known as cotton hollands” and not cotton hollands, the goods necessarily fall within paragraph 332 of the act.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 193Richard v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Enamel” Defined.</p> <p>“Enameled” as employed in paragraph 94, tariff act of 1909, has the limited meaning which it appears always to have borne in ceramics; that is to say, an opaque or colored semivitrified coating applied to the surface of pottery either as a decoration or for a utilitarian purpose.</p> <p>2. Enameled and Printed Spark Plugs.</p> <p>The merchandise of the importation could be classed as enameled only by an expert, for the true-nature of its finish is unápparent to the eye of a layman. However, the contention is made that the merchandise is “printed china.” The testimony to the effect that the word “Rajah,” appearing on the goods, was put there to protect a registered trade-mark, or that the word “ Rajah ” was a trade-mark at all, is too weak, vague, and uncertain to overcome the presumption of correctness attaching to the collector’s decision. The spark plugs were properly held dutiable as “printed china.”</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 198Vandegrift v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Subsection 22, Section 28, Tariff Act of 1909.</p> <p>Subsection 22 of section 28 makes express provision for an allowance in the estimation and liquidation of duties upon fruit, when by reason of decay, destruction, or injury during transportation there is a shortage or in fact a nonimportation thereof, its commercial value being destroyed.</p> <p>2. Proof of Nonimportation, Before Whom.</p> <p>The Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to make regulations relative to shortage or nonimportation of merchandise, but the law itself requires that “proof to ascertain such destruction or nonimportation shall be lodged with the collector of customs * * * within 10 days after the landing of the merchandise.” A regulation intended to exclude from the consideration of a collector proof that had been so duly filed would be invalid.</p> <p>3. Case Here.</p> <p>The importer here duly filed his proof and it will be presumed the collector made his decision in the light of it. The board on review affirmed that decision; it will not now be disturbed.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 204Bloomingdale Bros. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Departmental Practice.</p> <p>Departmental practices and usages, however uniform and long continued they may be, are nothing more than aids to the court in construing a law of doubtful import, and in no case can they be invoked to defeat the legislative will expressed in clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal terms. Here, however, a long-continued and uniform departmental construction is not shown.</p> <p>2. “Not Plated” in Paragraph 188, Tariff Act of 1897.</p> <p>Whether paragraph 188 be considered independently or in its relation to other parts of the law, there is no ground either in its legislative history or its administrative construction for going beyond its express terms in fixing its meaning. No commercial designation is shown, and according to the very terms of the paragraph all the hairpins or safety pins of the importation overlaid or coated with precious or base metals were “plated” within those terms.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 209United States v. Zito (1912)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24556 (T. D. 31207).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 211Bing & Co.'s Successors v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Sufficiency of Protest.</p> <p>The use of “etc.” in the protest is not to be commended, hut a nice precision is not required, and as the collector could ascertain without much difficulty the merchandise to the classification of which objection was made, the protest must be held sufficient. — Carter v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 64; T. D. 31033).</p> <p>2. Value in Chief.</p> <p>To ascertain the material of chief value in any manufacture the value of the materials should be determined as of the time when they have reached such condition that nothing remains to be done by the manufacturer except to put them together. The testimony here is not such as to make it possible fairly to determine the element of value in chief in the merchandise. — United States v. Meadows (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 143; T. D. 31665).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 214United States v. Ceasar (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7217 (T. D. 31565).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 216Frank v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7227 (T. D. 31649).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 219Vandegrift v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Samples Confused.</p> <p>The record witb the samples leaves it uncertain whether or not the merchandise is grasses, and, if grasses, what kind; and whether or not grasses, together with other articles. The confused and confusing character of the samples does not justify the imposition of a penalty on the importer, and accordingly a new trial is ordered</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 220United States v. Embossing Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26362 (T. D. 31832)..</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 224United States v. Metropolitan Aluminum Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Mirrors in Oases — Paragraph 109, Tariff Act of 1909.</p> <p>The merchandise consists of pocket imitation-leather goods holding small mirrors and combs, or pencils and memorandum tablets. The presence of the comb or of the pencil and paper does not remove these articles-fromthe category of mirrors in cases, paragraph 109,. tariff act of 1909, for the provision there is more specific than that of paragraph 17 of the act.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 226United States v. Godwin's Sons (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Bronze Articles Artistically Fashioned.</p> <p>The articles were bronze knockers fashioned after the human figure and bronze busts and statuettes, together with bases made expressly for these. The uncon-tradicted testimony of the maker of the articles is to the effect his work on them was that of an artist rather than as an artisan; that he employed his professional skill in their production. The importations are dutiable under paragraph 454, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 229Plummer v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, G. A. 6491 (T. D. 27761). •</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 230United States v. Reiss (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27240 (T. D. 32046).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 232Oelrichs v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appropriate Provision to be Named in Protest.</p> <p>The protest claimed the importation as “balesbagging,” to be free under paragraph 644, tariff act of 1909, as paper stock, crude, of every description. It is now admitted the merchandise could not be properly classified as “bagging” under that paragraph. But the collector was directed to that paragraph by the protest, and, being accordingly misdirected, the protest was insufficient. — Bliven v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 205; T. D. 31239); United States v. Danker & Marston (2 Ot. Oust. Appls., 462; T. D 32208).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 234Colby v. United States (1912)('AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>•Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28074 (T. D. 32396).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 236United States v. Auffmordt (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26639 (T. D. 31883).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 239Silberstein v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26615 (T. D. 31866).'</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 240Witcombe v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Figured Cotton Cloth Known as Madras Goods.</p> <p>Paragraph 320, tariff act of 1909, makes provision for counting the threads in the fabrics of the importation, and the provision is to the effect that in ascertaining the count of threads per square inch the ordinary as well as the extraordinary threads are to be counted, and counted whether they are clipped or unclipped.</p> <p>2. Texture oe the Fabric.</p> <p>The texture of the fabric is to be'found by counting the threads in one repeat of the pattern and then dividing this result by the number of inches these threads occupy in the cloth. This is to determine the texture not according to the count in the most or the least compact part of the fabric, but according to the average count of the whole.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 245United States v. Conkey (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7294 (T. D. 31986).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 247Meyer v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Crushed Prunes Have no Commercial Designation.</p> <p>The issue of a commercial designation is one of fact, the importer here having the burden of proof. The board found on a consideration of the evidence that crushed prunes were not shown to be commercially known as “jelly.” This finding is correct.</p> <p>2. Crushed Prunes — Fruit Preserved in Own Juice.</p> <p>In the absence of a commercial designation, the merchandise falls aptly within the designation “fruit preserved in own juices” and dutiable as such under paragraph 263, tariff act of 1897, and paragraph 274, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 251United States v. Rothschild (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>The cause was originally docketed in San Francisco. In New York, on December 13,1911, a previous order of August 21 denying a rehearing was vacated and set aside by the board, a rehearing granted, and the board, withoutgiving notice of its proceedings to the parties at interest or a motion therefor, reconsidered the case and gave judgment, duly entered, sustaining the protest.</p> <p>1. Notice.</p> <p>There was error in the failure to give notice to counsel for the Government or to any of the parties of the final hearing and determination of the case.</p> <p>2. Docketing a Cause.</p> <p>Under the rules of the board both the importer and the Government had a right to expect the case would be duly docketed at the port of San Francisco at the next regular hearing. The board was without authority to set the case for a rehearing on a regular trial day, even at the port of New York.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 256United States v. Hobbs (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7309 (T. D. 32107).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 260United States v. Post (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Dried Styba Grass and Avoine in a Natural State.</p> <p>There might be some difficulty in holding that the sun-dried grasses of the importation are textile grasses, or fibers, or other vegetable substances within the meaning of paragraphs 578 and 630, tariff act of 1909, here relied on by the importer; but the rulings of the Board of General Appraisers and those of the courts, acquiesced in, as these apparently have been by Congress, establish a construction that may not now be departed from.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 263Simpson v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27399 (T. D. 32089).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 265Harris v. United States (1912)[Affirmed as to part and reversed as to partU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Grapes in Barrels.</p> <p>Subsection 22 oí section 28, tariff act of 1909, was intended to provide and does provide for an allowance in tbe estimation and liquidation of duties upon fruit wben, by reason of decay, destruction, or injury during transportation, a shortage occurs, resulting ,in fact, in a nonimportation, the commercial value of a designated and reasonably ascertainable quantity of the goods having been destroyed.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 273United States v. Cohn (1912)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Aiiticles Commonly or Commercially Known as Jewelry.</p> <p>The articles are hand-wrought sterling-silver necklets, set with pearls and mar-quisettes. The words “gold or platinum” in paragraph 448, tariff act of 1909, refer to and qualify the immediately preceding classification only, “chain, mesh, and mesh bags and purses,” and not to’all articles commonly or commercially known as jewelry. The goods are duitable at 60 per cent under that paragraph.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 276United States v. Guthman (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7330 (T. D. 32281).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 282United States v. Goldberg's Sons (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27809 (T. D. 32297).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 286Guthman v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7330 (T. D. 32281).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 288Cohn v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Brooches or Brass Set with Stones.</p> <p>The articles of the importation are all commonly and commercially known as jewelry. They might be classified under two different provisions of paragraph 448, tariff act of 1909, but they come more precisely under the clause that relates to “all articles commonly or commercially known as jewelry,” and they are dutiable as such. — United States v. Goldberg’s Sons et al. (3 Ot. Oust. Appls., 282; T. D. 32573); Guthman, Solomons & Co. v. United States (3 Ot. Oust. Appls., 286; T. D. 32572); United States v. Cohn & Rosenberger (3 Ot. Oust. Appls., 273; T. D. 32571).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 291United States v. Cummings (1912)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cross-Appeals from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7270 (T. D. 31850).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 298Consmiller v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25578 (T. D. 31589).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 301United States v. Schumacher (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7248 (T. D. 31756).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 306Richard v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7250 (T. D. 31785).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 309Bowling Green Storage & Van Co. v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Twenty-Year Clause, Paragraph 717, Tariee Act oe 1909.</p> <p>The importer here clearly limited himself in his protest to a claim under the 20-year clause, paragraph 717, tariff act of 1909, and the question now presented is whether that paragraph confers an exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the Secre■’tary of the Treasury to determine a particular importation is or is not a work of art of a described kind. The Secretary has asserted.no such power (Treasury Circular, T. D. 31263), and'properly, for the intention in the statute seems manifestly to have been to confer upon that official authority to prescribe rules and regulations according to which ali questions as to the age of works of art are to be determined by the ordinary tribunals having jurisdiction in customs cases.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 316Koechl v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26810 (T. D. 31912).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 321United States v. Germain (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Gloves Embroidered With More Than Three Single Cords.</p> <p>Reviewing the history of the legislation and of the decisions, and having these in mind, it does not appear affirmatively that the finding of fact as made by the board in this case was either contrary to or clearly against the weight of evidence. The gloves were not subject to a cumulative duty under paragraph 445, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 325United States v. Strauss (1912)[DeniedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Petition for rehearing.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 327Ascher Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26335 (T. D. 31813).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 330Maddaus v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Reappraisement Without Samples.</p> <p>The decision in Oelrichs v. United States (2 Ot. Oust. Appls., 355; T. D. 32091) does not modify the decision in Tilge v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 462; T. D. 31507). In the case here not only was there no sample before the appraising- officer or a legal substitute therefor, but the record discloses thát the- jurisdiction of the appraising officer was protested because of that fact. Until the jurisdictional requirements of the statute have been complied with there can be no ‘ ‘decision, ” as contemplated by the statute to be accepted as final in character.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 333United States v. Ewing (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appear from Board of United States General Appraisers, G.'A. 7303 (T. D. 32045).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 339United States v. Ewing (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Sufficiency of Protest.</p> <p>It is contended the protest makes no claim for reliquidation upon the basis as fixed by the court. Technical precision is not required in protests, but the objections to the assessment must be stated so distinctly and specifically that when fairly construed they will show the claims of the protestant and so notify the collector what these claims are. The protest here is lacking in these respects.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 341United States v. Hagelberg (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Booklets in Chief Value of Pyroxylin.</p> <p>Hand-decorated booklets with pyroxylin covers and paper inserts, value in chief of pyroxylin, are dutiable under paragraph 412, tariff act of 1909, as “booklets, decorated in whole or in part by hand, * * * whether or not lithographed,” and not as manufactures of pyroxylin under paragraph 17 of that act.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 343United States v. Bauer (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Sufficiency of Protest. '</p> <p>A commissionaire’s service is rendered in connection with., on account of, and in consequence of the purchase of goods, is really a part of the transaction of the purchase and shipment of the goods, and the protest here fairly apprised the collector that commissions paid the commissionaire for the purchase of the goods abroad were claimed to be nondutiable.</p> <p>2. Commissions Paid foe the Puechase of Goods Abeoad.</p> <p>Leaving aside technical questions and treating the durability of commissions on its merits, regarding the substance rather than the form, it is clear it was not the intention of Congress to impose a duty upon commissions paid in connection with the purchase of goods abroad. When a payment is a commission proper must depend on the facts in the particular case.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 348Petry v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>An Embossing Machine not a Peinting Peess.</p> <p>Every printing press may be correctly described as a printing machine, but not every printing machine as a printing press. The evidence here was insufficient to prove a trade designation and the bench-lever embossers of the importation, appearing to have been built and to have been generally and chiefly used to emboss and stamp in gold various substances, particularly leather employed in the manufacture of pocketbooks and notebooks, were properly held dutiable under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, as manufactures in part of metal.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 350United States v. Park (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Sufficiency of Protest.</p> <p>The merchandise consisted of short, thick tapers commercially known as night lights, composed of a cotton wick and paraffin, each taper having a metal plate covering the bottom of the wick and incased in a paper cup. These were improperly assessed as tapers and as being dutiable under paragraph 436, tariff act of 1909, and were protested as nonenumerated manufactured articles and as dutiable under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909; but as a case must be tried upon the issues made by the protest and these issues having failed here, the protest can not be sustained.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 353United States v. Ringk (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28410 (T. D. 32488).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 354Maltus v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Rose Plants.</p> <p>Only those briar roses that are three years old or less are entitled to admission at the rate of one dollar per thousand plants (paragraph 264, tariff act of 1909), and the burden of proof was on the importers to show that the plants came within that description. They failed to do this by a preponderance of credible evidence, and the importation must be taken to have been properly assessed under paragraph 264, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 356Spalding v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Grain Leather.</p> <p>It would appear that the proviso to paragragh 451, tariff act of 1909, was intended to he limited in its application to the articles described in that paragraph, and it would be to force the construction to extend it to cover the merchandise here. The leather of the importation, with a natural and an artificial grain, is properly dutiable under paragraph 450, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 358United States v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Tetrapol Soap.</p> <p>The question is not one of commercial designation; it is, simply, whether the presence of 17 per cent in volume of alcohol in the mixture serves to make the classification of the merchandise as a soap improper. “Soap” is not limited in common understanding to solid combinations, but has been broadened in meaning to include substances liquid in form. The merchandise was properly held dutiable not as a chemical mixture, but as “other soaps not specially provided for” under paragraph 69, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 361United States v. American Import Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Night Lights, Partly Metal.</p> <p>Metal forms not only a very considerable part of the merchandise, but is, in fact, a very important, substantial, and material constituent of the goods. Paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909, is clearly applicable.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 363Bartley Bros. v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 25798 (T. D. 31675).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 368Spielmann v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Cotton Gloves, Knitted or Woven.</p> <p>The importation was of cotton gloves with a knitted fabric. The form of the glove was cut from the fabric, and in completing the glove this form was sewed together with thread. “Cotton gloves knitted or woven,” appearing in paragraph 328, tariff act of 1909, is there used in a comprehensive and inclusive sense and embraces gloves manufactured from material either woven or knitted, though not shaped by the weaving process.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 370Stursberg v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Vegetable Parchment Paper with Cotton Mesh Back.</p> <p>The importation is known as parchment cloth; it is made of parchment paper and cotton cloth, the parchment paper being the component of chief value. Its use does not appear by proof, but its apparent characteristics indicate an article differing from either paper or cotton cloth taken alone, and with distinguishing characteristics of its own. It was properly classified by the collector as a manufacture of parchment paper and cotton cloth, dutiable under paragraph 411, tariff act of 1909.— Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne (T. D. 24912).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 373United States v. Crabb (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27835 (T. D. 32302).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 375United States v. Chattanooga Brewing Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Insufficiency of Protest.</p> <p>The merchandise is of a secret composition and is used as a base for the manufacture of nonalcoholic drinks. The evidence showed that the article was not an unenumerated manufacture, but fell for dutiable purposes within one or the other of paragraphs 2 or 3, tariff act of 1909, as an alcoholic compound or as a chemical compound. The protest claimed under neither of these paragraphs, and so could not be allowed. — United States v. Danker & Marston (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 462; T. D. 32208).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 377Sherrard v. United States (1912){AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Leather, Dressed and Finished.</p> <p>The importation, while not entirely finished for its intended use, is nevertheless raised above classification as rough leather, using that term as it appears in the paragraph that controls (paragraph 451, tariff act of 1909). It was properly assessed as dressed leather.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 378United States v. Burlington Venetian Blind Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7360 (T. D. 32503).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 382United States v. White (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28427 (T. D. 32488.)</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 384Martin v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>3. Antique Silverware Part op Personal Baggage.</p> <p>. It is a reasonable Treasury regulation tliat requires an affidavit to be made by the importer of an antique showing why the article is regarded as an antique; and that requires further a described kind of declaration by the foreign seller of the antique as to the character and history of this. That the importation was brought in as personal baggage does not exempt the owner from showing a compliance with this regulation, both as to the affidavit and the declaration.</p> <p>2. When Compliance is to be Shown.</p> <p>The regulation in terms requires the affidavit and the declaration to be produced upon entry, and the fact that no objection was made before the collector that the declaration was wanting will not excuse the importer from showing, on appeal to the Board of General Appraisers, that the requirements had been complied with at the time of entry.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 387Reusche v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27715 (T. D. 32244).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 390United States v. Butler Bros. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Splasii Mats, Curtains, or Screens.</p> <p>Tlie merchandise consists of wood strips, joined or sewed together with cords; figures in imitation of paintings are stenciled on these and they are used as splash mats, placed above washstands. No commercial designation is shown. The definitions of the books make it apparent that these articles may very well be designated as curtains or screens, and their use, too, warrants that classification. They were dutiable as assessed by the collector under paragraph 214, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 392Steinman v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal horn Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28467 (T. D. 32507).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 394United States v. Goldberg (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 26417 (T. D. 31842).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 399Strohmeyer v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Blood Pudding — Sausage.</p> <p>Sausages made of blood pudding, being composed of material closely related to meat in every way, similar in appearance and being prepared for a similar use and being so used, were properly classified for duty, respectively, under paragraph 275, tariff act of 1897, and paragraph 286, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 401Claflin Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7368 (T. D. 32558).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 406Waddell v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>When not Hones or Whetstones, nor Crude Minerals.</p> <p>The stones of the importation do not appear to be in the condition in which they were quarried; rather their shape and size appear as the result of labor and design for a particular use, namely, as polishers. They were properly assessed as marble polishers composed of a mineral substance under paragraph 95, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 408United States v. Borgfeldt (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 29597 (T. D. 32780).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 410United States v. Georgia Pulp & Paper Manufacturing Co. (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Yakking Machines not Machine Tools.</p> <p>The importation is of large, power-driven machines, containing a mechanism for revolving logs while the bark on these is cut away by fixed knives. Are these ■“machine tools,” as that term is used in paragraph 197, tariff act of 1909?</p> <p>By the'testimony it is satisfactorily shown that in the machinery trade, prior to the enactment of the tariff act of 1909 and at that time, “machine tools” had taken on in commerce an established meaning that was general, uniform, and definite, and not partial, local, or personal; and that woodworking machines did not fall within the terms and were not commercially known as “machine tools.” They were not, accordingly, dutiable as such, but as articles wholly or in part of metal not specially provided for under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909.— tledden v. Richard (149 U. S., 346); Pickhardt v. Merritt (132 U. S., 252); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 329; T. D. 32055). — Myers v. United States (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 226; T. D. 31260) distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 419United States v. Knauth (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27728 (T. D. 32244).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 420Masson v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Decorated Earthenware — Rockingham Ware.</p> <p>It is not shown that the importation is definitely, generally, and uniformly known as Rockingham earthenware and so constituting this a commercial designation; rather the contention that it is Rockingham ware is clearly and strongly denied by witnesses whose testimony, though negative in character, must under the circumstances be held to be competent. A witness is qualified to testify as to the commercial meaning of a trade term when he shows he has had experience in the same trade through dealing in a competing article of a similar kind. The goods were properly assessed as decorated earthenware under paragraph 93, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 429Surgical Supply Importing Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28149 (T. D.,3239.6).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 430Rothschild Bros. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7349 (T. D. 32418).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 435Knauth v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28553 (T. D. 32529),</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 436United States v. Hempstead (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28254 (T. D. 32529).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 440Lange Soap Co. v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28935 (T. D. 32655).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 442United States v. Dubied Machinery Co. (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Leather Cut Into Forms.</p> <p>The merchandise consisted oí strips or bands-of chrome leather beveled on the edges and cut into suitable lengths for the manufacture of automobile treads. To adapt these to their special use further labor upon them was necessary. The goods are band or belting leather. They were dutiable as determined by the board under paragraph 451, tariff act of 1909, and were likewise subject to the additional duty imposed by the proviso of that paragraph. — United States v. Richards (1 Ot. Oust. Appls., 537; T. D. 31548).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 444Devoy v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Leathers Cut to Form and Ready por Use.</p> <p>These book backs a.re not mere leather but new articles evolved from leather, bearing a distinctive name, and so processed that they are not only definitely and finally committed to a specific purpose, but they are expressly found to be fitted for no other. They were properly assessed as manufactures of leather under paragraph 452, tariff act of 1909. Tilge & Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Gust. Applá., 97; T. D. 32360). — Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne (T. D. 30085) distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 447Sears v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 27934 (T. D. 32333).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 450Davies v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>COLLECTOR’S CHARGES.</p> <p>Because of the absence of an invoice, the collector on liquidation charged, under section 2926, Revised Statutes, a certain sum for cartage, labor, and storage incidental to the removal and custody of the importation. The cartage was paid for by the Government, while the other services were rendered by Government employees. The entry was confessedly incomplete, an invoice being necessary, and so it was within the authority of the collector under the section cited to cause the merchandise to be removed at the expense of the owners to a warehouse or storehouse, there to remain until due appraisement was had or, at the option of the owners, the original invoice produced; and this is true though there was only one case of merchandise, valued at less than $100. — Kennedy v. Magone (158 U. S., 212).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 456Hawley v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28053 (T. D. 32379).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 459Schloss Co. v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Covered Wire Articles in Chief Value of Silk.</p> <p>The merchandise consists of collar supporters made of a thin steel silk-covered wire bent into a series of open loops, with the ends of the wire bent back and soldered so as to form a closed loop at each end of the article. Paragraph 135, tariff act of 1909, contains no provision fixing a primary rate of duty upon silk-covered wire, though the purpose is clear to fix a minimum rate on covered wire. The commodity falls directly within the provisions of paragraph 403 of that act as manufactures of silk not specially provided for. — Strouse; Adler & Co. v. United States (3 Ct. Oust. Appls , 184; T. D. 32466) distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 461Warren v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>MANUFACTURES OF MARBLE — SCULPTURES.</p> <p>It was not shown that the articles were the production of a sculptor, and though they were carved representations in marble of artistic subjects, they were not dutiable as sculptures. They were properly assessed as manufactures of marble under paragraph 112, tariff act of 1909. — United States v. Baumgarten (2 Ot. Oust. Appls., 321; T. D. 32052) distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 463Dejonge v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, G. A. 7362 (T. D. 32505).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 468United States v. Lun Chong (1912)[RemandedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Record in Another Case as Evidence.</p> <p>The mere citation of a previous decision of the board does not, in the absence of any offer anew of the record in the former case establish that the facts are the same in each. — United States v. Oberle (1 Ct. Oust. Appls., 527; T. D. 31545). Nor can the former case on such bare citation be held stare decisis.</p> <p>2. Presumption as to Collectors’ Finding.</p> <p>The only evidence here going to sustain the board’s finding consists of the samples, unsupported b.y any testimony that the leather, which is the component material of chief value, is leather made from the hides of cattle of the bovine species. This in itself is insufficient. — Shallus v. United States (3 Ct. Oust. Appls., 52; T. D. 32347).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 470Massce v. United States (1912)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Bindings and Trimmings.</p> <p>No commercial designation is shown. The plain surface of the fabric covers more than half of the fabric itself and the area of this plain surface makes it clear the merchandise is designed to be something more than a mere edge for the side that is ornamented. It can not therefore be deemed a trimming, and the evidence moreover shows the use to be chiefly for binding. It was dutiable as binding under paragraph 320, tariff act of 1897.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 473Downing v. United States (1912)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Sculptures.</p> <p>To constitute “sculptures” under tariff act of 1909 the evidence must show the articles were cut, carved, or otherwise wrought by hand from solid blocks or masses of marble and that they were severally the professional productions of a scupltor. The record here establishes neither of these propositions and the merchandise was properly assessed as manufactures of marble under paragraph 112, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 475American Express Co. v. United States (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Gelatin in “Sheets.”</p> <p>To determine what is a “sheet” in a given case, the particular facts of that case are to be considered; and the facts here showing the merchandise to be edible gelatin with irregular edges and uneven surfaces do not make it clear that the article is properly classifiable as sheets of gelatin. The doubt must be resolved in favor of the importer and the goods are dutiable as gelatin under paragraph 23, tariff act of 1909.</p> <p>2. Board’s Finding.</p> <p>The board’s finding of facts will not be disturbed unless clearly contrary to or unsupported by the weight of evidence; but here the finding that the gelatin was in sheets was based on an erroneous construction of the law itself and so does not fall within the rule.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 479Psaki Bros. v. United States (1913)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Ten-Day Limit por Filing Protest.</p> <p>When the ten-day limit fixed by the customs administrative act for filing a protest expires on Sunday, it is not a seasonable compliance with the requirement when the protest is filed on the Monday ensuing. — Shefer v. Magone (47 Fed., 872). Monroe Cattle Co. v. Becter (147 U. S., 47) distinguished.</p> <p>2. Ibid.</p> <p>Nor is it a compliance with the requirement if the protest should be mailed at 4.30 p. m. on Saturday preceding the Sunday of expiration. The office of the collector was closed to public business at that hour, and the protest, having reached the collector’s office at a later horn-, came too late.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 486United States v. Grasselli Chemical Co. (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract28511 (T. D. 32529).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 488Vantine v. United States (1913)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>SCREENS, Value in Chief op Embroidered Silk.</p> <p>The merchandise is screens of embroidered silk panels with wooden frameworks. Silk is concededly the component material of chief value. These screens are not fairly to be considered “screens of wood,” but rather as articles in chief value of silk. They are accordingly dutiable as such under paragraph 402, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 490American Express Co. v. United States (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Medals and Other Metallic Articles.</p> <p>Tlie provision in paragraph 624, tariff act of 1909, for free entry of “other metallic articles usually bestowed as trophies or prizes” is not limited to such as are ejusdem generis with medals, and a shotgun won in a prize shooting tournament is a trophy or prize within the meaning of the law.</p> <p>2. Delivery of the Trophy or Prize.</p> <p>Actual manual delivery abroad of an article awarded as an honorary distinction is not a condition precedent to the free admission of that article.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 495American Manufacturing Co. v. United States (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>The merchandise was classified by the collector as bagging made of jute butts and waste, and was assessed for duty under paragraph 355, tariff act of 1909. The protest claimed alternatively under two paragraphs, to wit, 358 and 480, of that act. On the date set for hearing the Government asked that a consent order sustaining the protest should be entered of record. The protestants objected to this, insisting on a hearing and a decision upon the question of law involved. The board denied this, and, directing a submission of the case without a trial of the issues of fact, sustained the protest. An assessment was ordered under the provisions of paragraph 358. The appeal was taken from the order sustaining the protest.</p> <p>A Consent Order, when Both Parties do not Consent.</p> <p>The order sustaining the protest was not made by the consent of both parties, nor upon the express admission by the Government of any of the facts alleged in the protest. This was not a consent order in the legal acceptation of the term; it was not an order legally following on an express admission of fact by one of the contending litigants. The protestant had the right to show by evidence whether the merchandise belonged to one or the other of the two classes, as alleged in the protest.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 498Taylor v. United States (1913)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Substances Used Only eor Manure.</p> <p>The rape meal of the importation was assessed as.a nonenumerated manufactured article under paragraph 480, tariff act of 1909. It was claimed to be a substance used only for manure and to be dutiable accordingly.</p> <p>The evidence strongly tends to show that rape meal is used in this country as suitable for feeding stock, but it is sufficient to support the collector’s finding that the importers failed to show the merchandise is of a class that has no common, practicable, or profitable use other than use as manure.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 501Raphael Tuck & Sons Co. v. United States (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Views of American Scenery or Objects.</p> <p>Views covered by paragraph 412, tariff act of 1909, are such as present actuái places, buildings, landscapes, or scenes within the United States.</p> <p>2. George Washington Series of Post Cards.</p> <p>Pictures that imaginatively portray events in the life of Washington are not views of American scenery or objects. They do not profess to represent any real localit/ or actual scene or scenery within the United States. They were properly dutiable as cards lithographically printed under paragraph 412, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 503United States v. Bernard (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 28138 (T. D. 32396),</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 504United States v. Reed (1913)[ReversedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Shells, Gut and Bored, Used for Ornamental Purposes.</p> <p>Mussel shells prepared by cutting and boring holes and used for ornamental purposes, having been advanced in value and adapted to a definite use, are not entitled to free entry under paragraph 635, tariff act of 1897, but were dutiable as “shells engraved, cut, ornamented, or otherwise manufactured,” under paragraph 450, of that act. — Hartranft v. Wiegmann (121 U. S., 609) distinguished.</p> <p>Before Montgomery, Smith, Barber, De Vries, and Martin, Judges.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 509United States v. American Bead Co. (1913)[ModifiedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. Imitation Precious Stones, Heart Shaped, with Metal Eing Attached.</p> <p>. Imitation precious stones in the form of hearts, having a hole in the upper extremity in which is inserted a diminutive brass screw ring, are parts of jewelry and are dutiable as such under the last part of paragraph 448, tariff act of 1909. — Coha v, United States (3 Ct. Oust. Appls., 288; T. D. 32575).</p> <p>2. Imitation Precious Stones in Metal Settings.</p> <p>Small imitation diamonds, rubies, and other precious stones set in metal claws that hold the stones in position and that are used as the proof shows chiefly for dress trimming are dutiable as manufactures under paragraph 109 or 199, tariff act of 1909.</p> <p>3. Imitation Precious Stones with Foil Backs.</p> <p>Imitation precious stones with foil backs, either pierced or not pierced, are dutiable not as beads, but as imitation precious stones under paragraph 449, tariff act of 1909.</p> <p>4. Glass Beads, Bars, and Ornaments, Drilled.</p> <p>Glass beads, bars, and ornaments, drilled, and unfit for use in the manufacture of jewelry are dutiable as beads under paragraph 421, tariff act of 1909.</p> <p>5. Imitation Precious Stones, Oval or Heart-Shaped Cameos, etc.</p> <p>Imitation precious stones, oval, heart-shaped, etc., having a small shoulder pierced through in the process of molding, imitation cameos with two holes pierced in the sides, and other articles not in the form of heads, all suitable for use in the manufacture of jewelry, are dutiable as “imitation precious stones” under paragraph 449, tariff act of 1909.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 515McKesson v. United States (1913)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Pbppeemint Crystals, a Medicinal Preparation.</p> <p>The merchandise is not a crude drug, but a manufacture from the peppermint plant and known as menthol. This menthol as imported is sometimes used without the addition of any carrying material for medicinal purposes, while its more common use is in solution or as a salve mixed with inert matter or the like. It was properly classified as a medicinal preparation and was dutiable accordingly under paragraph 65, tariff act of 1909. — Battle & Co. Chemists’ Corporation v. United States (108. Fed., 216), Pink v. United States (170 U. S., 584). — United States v. Sheldon (2 Ct. Oust. .Appls., 485; T. D. 32245) distinguished.</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 520Gallagher v. United States (1913)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Meat-Slicing Machines not Machine Tools.</p> <p>These meat-slicing machines, whether operated by hand power or otherwise, are not used in mechanical work; they are not used upon wood, metal, or stone, and so are not to be regarded as machine tools. They were properly assessed as manufactures of metal not specially provided for under paragraph 199, tariff act of 1909. — Sears, Roebuck & Oo. v. United States (2 Ct. Oust. Appls., 329; T. D. 32055); United States u. Georgia Pulp & Paper Manufacturing Co. ([5 Ct'. Gust. Appls., 410; T. D.. 32998).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 522American Lava Co. v. United States (1913)[Reversed as to part, affirmed as to partU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>Appeal from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstracts 29454 and 29500 (T. D. 32760).</p>
- 3 Ct. Cust. 528United States v. Badische (1913)[AffirmedU.S. Court of International Trade
<p>1. “Individuals” in Paragraph 517, Tariff Act of 1909.</p> <p>It Í3 reasonably clear that the term “individuals,” as employed in paragraph 517, tariff act of 1909, was intended to differentiate between the publications of those other than literary associations or academies and foreign governments and to include under “individuals ” all others.</p> <p>2. Publications for Gratuitous Private Circulation.</p> <p>The publishers of the books imported were dealers in dyes and chemicals; were sellers of the dyestuffs listed in the publication. The testimony showed that these books were intended to be, and were, circulated gratuitously. They were entitled to free entry under paragraph 517, tariff act of 1909. — Schieffelin v. United States (84 Fed., 880).</p>