Volume 2 — Maryland Chancery

<p>[EVIDENCE — ELECTION.]</p> <p>The rule of evidence, that husband and wife cannot be witnesses for or against each other, is firmly established, and is founded partly on identity of interest, and partly on that principle of public. policy which seeks to prevent discord in families, — a policy of which no invasion will be permitted, even after divorce.</p> <p>No case has been found in which a husband has been so far regarded as agent for his wife, as that his declarations as agent can be received in evidence against her.</p> <p>The rule which admits as evidence the admissions and declarations of an agent, like other rules, is subject to limitations. Such declarations must be made in the course of, and accompanying the transaction which is the subject of inquiry, — but when so made, they constitute a part of the res gesta, and are binding on the principal.</p> <p>Declarations of an agent, made after the transaction, though in relation to it, are no part of the res gesta, and are not binding on the principal, but come within the rule that excludes hearsay evidence.</p> <p>The entries in the books of an agent, running over a long lapse of time, cannot be used against a principal, without showing that they were made under circumstances which constitute them a part of the res gesta.</p> <p>A plaintiff suing at law and in equity at the same time and for the same matter, will be compelled to elect in which court he will proceed. The reason and object of -this rule is to relieve a defendant from the “double vexation” of defending himself in two courts against the same demand, — and to avoid the clashing of jurisdiction, which would result from a jury finding a verdict one way and the Chancellor deciding another.</p> <p>The party put to his election will he allowed a reasonable time to determine. This reasonable time seems now to be eight days.</p> <p>The rule as to electing cannot be evaded by mingling other grounds of complaint in the action at law with that which is comprehended in the bill in equity, where the real, substantial ground of complaint is the same in both courts.</p> <p>'If plaintiff refuses to elect, his bill will be dismissed with costs.</p> <p>Any decisive act of the party, with knowledge of his rights and of the facts, such as, asking to have a commission remanded upon any ground, determines his election.</p> <p>One of several defendants, without the concurrence of the rest, has the right to compel an election.</p>

<p>An infant female between sixteen and twenty-one years of age, is competent to give a valid receipt for her property, but not an acknowledgment for the payment of an equivalent. The auditor may be ordered to proceed immediately to the adjustment of an account — a settlement in the Orphans Court by a guardian is not conclusive; but when relied on by him here, he should produce the vouchers on which it was founded. A party may be arrested under an attachment any where, out of, as well as in the county of his residence. A plaintiff, after a decree in his favour for the delivery of certain negroes, may, by a new bill, recover their increase and profits subsequent to the auditor’s report, and not included in that decree. A decree of the Court of Appeals, sent to the Court of Chancery to be executed, cannot be there revised or modified in any material particular. Personal property, of which a partition cannot be made, may be sold, and the proceeds of sale divided.</p>

<p>[PARTNERSHIP — INJUNCTION—RECEIVER.]</p> <p>A Partnership is entered into for a special purpose, to wit, the delivery of 40,000 feet of plank stocks at a certain place. Subsequently, the partnership was dissolved, the defendant agreeing to pay the plaintiff for his interest in the timber at certain rates specified in the contract of dissolution. A bill was then filed to set aside this contract of dissolution on the ground of fraud, and praying for an injunction and the appointment of a Receiver. Upon the motion to dissolve the injunction, it was held, — ■</p> <p>That in case where a partnership still subsists, to authorize either party to apply for an injunction and the appointment of a Receiver, he must be prepared to show a case of great abuse or strong misconduct. Query— Should not the bill likewise ask for a dissolution of partnership ?</p> <p>After dissolution, the objection to an injunction and the appointment of a Receiver, is not so strong. But to induce the court to exert this strong authority, some urgent and pressing necessity must be shown.</p> <p>Upon the motion to dissolve, the court cannot decide that the contract of dissolution is void. This contract transferred the legal title to the defendant, and this court is always reluctant to interfere in opposition to the legal title, and will only do so in case of fraud clearly proved, and of imminent danger.</p>

<p>[acts op 1785, chap. 72, sec. 12, and 1831, chap. 311, sec. 7 — allegation — DEMURRER—DESCRIPTION OP LAND.]</p> <p>Bill for a sale of lands held in common by Plaintiffs and Defendants. Demurrer on the ground that the bill was for a partition under the Act to direct descents — or was addressed to the general power of court to make partition, — and that the bill was not in proper form under the Act of Descents, and was otherwise defective. Also, that the name of the land to be sold was not given. Held, that—</p> <p>It is a proceeding under the Act of 1831, chap. 311, sec. 7. By the Act of 1785, chap. 72, sec. 12, the court is empowered to sell lands in which infants are interested. That provision is extended by the Act of 1831 to cases where the parties are of full age. To give the court jurisdiction under these Acts, the bill should allege that a sale would he for the advantage of the parties, — and the allegation must be established by admission, if the parties are of age, or by evidence, if not of age, — and if so established, the court has power to decree a sale.</p> <p>Though parties have a right to resort to demurrer, this mode of defence is viewed with suspicion and disfavour. The claim of the plaintiff must be stated with clearness. But if the case is so stated as to apprise the opposite party of the claim, he would not be permitted to object on the ground of uncertainty, though every particular circumstance is not stated. General certainty is sufficient.</p>

<p>[The facts necessary to an understanding of this case are fully set forth in the Chancellor’s opinion.]</p>

<p>[parol PROOF — CANCELLING OP BOND.]</p> <p>Upon a bill filéd by an obligor, in a sealed note against tlie executor of the obligee, the note was decreed to be cancelled upon proof that the testator did not intend to exact payment of the money due upon it, but originally intended it as a gift, or afterwards treated it as such, and abandoned it as a debt, — although this proof consisted entirely of the parol declarations of the testator, unaccompanied bv any other statements, or papers of any description.</p> <p>Authorities on this subject reviewed and considered.</p> <p>Cases of this description distinguished from gifts inter vivos, and donationes mortis causa, to perfect which, there must he an actual delivery according to the manner in' which the particular thing, the subject of the gift, is capable of being delivered, and without which delivery, the gift is invalid, both at law and in equity.</p> <p>This decree, being against an executor, who is acting simply in the proper discharge of his office, will he without costs.</p>

<p>[MORTGAGE — EFFECT OF PRIOR REGISTRATION — ASSIGNMENT—NOTICE.]</p> <p>H. &M., to secure an indebtedness they were about to contract with the firm of D. & N., by means of promissory notes and bills of exchange, to be made, accepted or indorsed by H. & M., and by them passed to D. & N., to an amount not to exceed §50,000 at any one time, on the 31st July, 1845, executed to the latter a mortgage of certain real and personal property, which was not recorded until 6| o’clock, P. M., of the 16th of June, 1846. On the 11th of April, 1846, the same parties executed a second mortgage of thesame.property to the same mortgagees, to secure a like indebtedness, not to exceed §75,000, which was recorded at 5 o’clock, P. M., of the 16th of June, 1846. This also not having been recorded in time, with respect to the personalty, a third mortgage, embracing the same and some additional personal property, was executed to the same parties on the 16th, and recorded on the 17th of June, 1846, as a further security, and confirming the preceding one of the 11th of April. Notes to a large amount, drawn and indorsed according to the provisions of these mortgages, were discounted by various parties, and both drawers and indorsers became insolvent. Upon a bill to subject the property to the payment of the debts secured by these mortgages, according to the rights of the respective parties — the contest being, between the plaintiffs, who had discounted the acceptances of H. & M., made subsequent to the second, and in ignorance of the existence of the prior unrecorded mortgage, and the defendants, Winn and Ross, trustees of Samuel Jones, Jr., an insolvent, who had taken these notes, dated both before and after the date of the recorded, but with knowledge of the existence of the prior, mortgage, in exchange for his own notes, which were negotiated for account of H. & M. It was helh—</p> <p>That three bills of exchange, dated the 2d, 7th and 14th of May, 1846, drawn by L. S. N., one of the firm of D. & N., on H. & M., payable to the order of D. & N., and accepted by H. & M., having been previously indorsed by said L. S. N., in the name of the firm of D. & N., and which were discounted by the plaintiffs, were within the tenor of these deeds of mortgage, and secured by them.</p> <p>That the unrecorded mortgage of the 31st of July, 1845, is invalid against the plaintiffs and others holding acceptances secured by the recorded mortgage of the 11th of April, 1846, and that the notes held by Winn and Ross, dated prior to the date of this mortgage, are not entitled to the benefit of the security, and must be excluded from any participation in the fund raised by the sale of the mortgaged property.</p> <p>Where a fund is to be applied to one of two sets of creditors, a party liable to both, and who has been released from the costs of the suit, is a competent witness in the case.</p> <p>Where a party who has trusted a mortgagor, knowing of the existence of a prior unrecorded mortgage, claims to stand upon a stronger equity than a party subsequently trusting the mortgagor, because the former knew of the unregistered mortgage, and the latter did not — such a pretension is in conflict with the act of 1785, ch. 72, sec. 11.</p> <p>The assignment of a debt secured by a mortgage, carries the latter with it, whether the mortgage is mentioned in the assignment or not; and the plaintiffs in this case are to be regarded as assignees of the mortgage executed to protect the acceptances held by them, though they did not know of its existence when the acceptances were taken.</p> <p>A subsequent purchaser, who has actual notice, at the time of his purchase, of a prior unregistered mortgage, cannot avail himself of his purchase against the prior conveyance. This doctrine rests upon the ground of fraud, and is subject to the qualification that the prior unrecorded conveyance shall be available only in cases, where the notice is so clearly proved as to make it fraudulent in a subsequent purchaser to take and record a conveyance in prejudice to the known title of the other.</p> <p>A bona fide assignee without notice will not be affected with notice to his assignor, but will be as much protected as if no notice had ever existed.</p> <p>The assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to the equities which existed against it in the hands of the assignor ; but these equities are the equities of the debtor himself, and not equities residing in some third person, against thejassignor.</p> <p>The defendants, Winn and Ross, will be allowed a dividend on the notes held by them, dated after the mortgage of April, 1846, only to the extent of the amount which their insolvent, Jones, has paid, or his estate will -pay, upon the cross notes given by him in exchange for these of H. & M.</p>

This bill was filed on the 26th of February, 1820, by John Kipp and Amos Brown, against Alexander B. Hanna and Sarah, his wife, William Warner, Sarah Hanna, Jr. Mary Hanna, Andrew Hanna, John Hanna, Robert Hanna, Paul Jacquin, Andrew Hall, Thomas Tyson, and Frederick G. L. Burhing.

This bill was filed on the 2d of August, 1827, by Robert Welch, of Ben. and others, as creditors of David Stewart, deceased, against Henry H. Stewart and others, the administrator, heirs and legal representatives of the late David Stewart.

[On the 14th of September, 1846, Johns Hopkins and others, creditors of Samuel Jones, filed in this court their bill of complaint against Jones, Albert and wife, and one Michael S. Norman, in which it is alleged that Jones, being hopelessly insolvent, and knowing himself to be so, and being in fact under expectation of applying for the benefit of the insolvent laws, and designing and threatening to prefer certain of his creditors, his near relations, was about to convey a…

<p>This bill was filed on the 17th of August, 1826, by Perry Townshend and Anna Maria, his wife, against William J. B. Duncan, Caroline Duncan, who are infants, Joseph Robinson and Thomas Iglehart. The bill states, that William Duncan being seized and possessed of a considerable real and personal estate, on the 26th of December, 1818, made his last will, which, so far as concerns the matter in controversy, is as follows:</p> <p>CI give and devise unto my daughter Caroline Duncan, and my son William Joseph Bend Duncan, the plantation whereon I now dwell, consisting of several tracts, or parts of tracts of land, one of which is called and known by the name of Burgess’s Right, and part of a tract in two parcels, called Puddington’s Harbour, otherwise called Puddington’s Gift, being contiguous to each other, and containing, in the whole, two hundred twenty-nine and one-half acres, more or less, to them and their heirs forever, to be equally divided between them, share and share alike as joint tenants, and not as tenants in common. I give and bequeath to my daughter Anna Maria Duncan,- the sum of sixty dollars, current money, as an annuity, to be paid to her out of the profits of my real estate above mentioned, annually for and during the term of her natural life, withholding from her, however, the power of selling or transferring the above mentioned annual allowance to any person or persons whatever, under penalty of forfeiture. I do hereby constitute and appoint my dear wife Deborah Duncan, sole executrix of this my last will.’</p> <p>The bill further states, that the testator, William Duncan, died, on or about the 25th of March, 1819, leaving those children, the plaintiff Anna Maria, by a first marriage, and the defendants William and Caroline, both of whom were then and still are infants, by his wife Deborah, the legatees and devisees mentioned in his will; that the said Deborah administered and died; and that Thomas Iglehart took out letters, and was then the administrator de bonis non of the deceased; that the said Deborah, before her death, paid the plaintiff Anna Maria, one year’s allowance after her father’s death; and that Joseph Robinson, who had been appointed, and then was the guardian of the said infants, had also paid the plaintiff Anna Maria, one year’s allowance under the will of her father. But that the defendants had failed and refused to pay any more of the annuity to her, either before or since her intermarriage with the plaintiff Perry Townshend.</p> <p>After which the bill concludes thus; to the end that justice may be done them, that an account may be had, that the said land may be sold; and under the direction of this court, the proceeds thereof applied to the payment of their annuity, with costs of suit; and the balance so invested as to stand an answerable fund to meet future instalments of said annuity; or that such other relief may be given to them as to the court may seem meet; and to the end that answers may be filed to all and singular the premises, to grant subpoenas, &c.</p>

<p>[INSOLVENT DEBTOR — UNDUE PREFERENCE.]</p> <p>John & William Hammond, partners, being indebted to the Union Bank in the sum of $5000, on the 21st of February, 1832, gave their note for the same at sixty days, in the partnership name, payable to the Bank in its corporate name, which was secured by the pledge of sixty-four shares of the stock of the bank, standing in the name of James McCormick. This not being paid at maturity, and the partnership in the meantime being dissolved, on the 24th of April following, they gave a new note, in their individual names, payable to the cashier of the bank at twenty-eight days, which became due on the 25th of May, and on the 25th of June, 1832, was paid by said McCormick with money which he admits, in his answer, he received from the Hammonds two days before, but, as he avers, with no knowledge of their business or indebtedness. The Hammonds petitioned for the benefit of the insolvent laws in September and October, 1832. The complainant seeks the repayment of this $5000, on the ground that it was paid to the bank in fraud of these laws. John L. Hammond, one of the partners, and the only witness in the case, proved that, about the 21st of May, 1832, when they had not available means to pay their debts, an arrangement was made by witness, his brother and clerk, and said McCormick, to pay the bank the note in question out of bills due the firm. That witness objected to this arrangement, because they expected to compound with their creditors, and he did not wish to give a preference to one over another, but to make an equal distribution of assets among their creditors. It was held—</p> <p>That this proof was not sufficient to establish that this preference was given with a view, and under any expectation, on the part of the Hammonds, of taking the benefit of the insolvent laws, and was not, therefore, void under the insolvent system of this state.</p> <p>This transaction, occurring prior to the act of 1834, chap. 293, must be shown to be void, if void at all, under the act of 1812, chap. 77, sec. 1, or the act of 1816, chap. 221, sec. 6.</p> <p>At common law, a debtor in failing circumstances has an unquestionable right to secure one creditor to the exclusion of others, either by payment or a bona fide transfer of his property. The onus probandi is therefore upon the party who seek to disturb such preference to show that it is prohibited by our insolvent system.</p> <p>The vitiating intent may be established by circumstantial proof: but such proof is entitled to less influence when it is manifest that direct evidence upon the question was within reach.</p>

[The bill alleges that the complainant, having a common interest with the defendants, Robert H. Ayres, and Alethea, his wife, in certain lands, subject to dower of Mrs. Mary Ayres therein, at the request of said Robert and wife, assumed the payment to said Mary of $240 annually, as a consideration for the relinquishment of her said dower interest; and that said Robert, in consideration thereof, bound himself to pay to complainant, annually, during the life of said Mary, the…

<p>[The facts of this case are fully set forth in the Chancellor’s opinion.]</p>

<p>[jurisdiction.]</p> <p>Upon a bill to enjoin the defendants from collecting a tax imposed by the street commissioner of the city of Baltimore, upon the property of the complainants, for widening a street — the acts of Assembly and ordinances of the City having given the right of appeal to all persons considering themselves thereby aggrieved, from the decisions of the commissioners to Baltimore City Court, which remedy the complainants failed to take — held—</p> <p>That this court has no jurisdiction, and the injunction was dissolved.</p>

[The bill in this ease was filed on the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 19th of September, 1834; for a sale of certain real estate. A decree was passed for a sale at September term, 1838, and the trustee filed his report of sales.

John Manning and Mary Ann, his wife, by their petition stated, that Mary Ann was one of the presumptive heirs at law of Cornelius Boarman, then a resident of Prince George’s county, who was seized in fee simple of a valuable real estate in Charles county; and possessed of a large personal estate, more than adequate to his maintenance; that he had, by the visitation of God, been deprived of his undei'standing; and, for several years past, had not enjoyed any, or but very few…

<p>[The facts upon which the decree in this case is founded, are sufficiently set forth.in the Chancellor’s opinion.]</p>

<p>[EXECUTOR — ASSIGNMENT BY — RULES 03? EVIDENCE.]</p> <p>A party who was executor and devisee, acting in those capacities, assigned a mortgage debt, part of the assets of his testatrix, to certain assignees, to secure the payment of his own debt, due to the latter — held—</p> <p>That the assignees, by taking such an assignment, were aiding the executor in committing a devastavit, and acquired no title thereby.</p> <p>In order to defeat the title of the alienee of an executor, in a court of law, it is necessary to show actual collusion between the executor and the purchaser or creditor.</p> <p>But in equity, an executor or administrator can make no valid sale or pledge of the assets, as a security for, or in payment of, his own debts; because the transaction itself gives the purchaser or mortgagee notice of the misapplication, and necessarily involves his participation in the breach of duty.</p> <p>Though the courts are less disposed to disturb the title of an assignee, when the assignment is made for money advanced at the time, than when made for an antecedent debt, yet if it appears in the transaction itself, that the executor is about to misapply the money raised upon the assets of his testator, the mere circumstance that the advance of the money was cotemporaneous with the assignment, will not protect the lender.</p> <p>When a person, dealing with an executor, must, from the very nature of the transaction, necessarily know that the executor was applying the assets to objects in conflict with his duty, he deals with him at his peril; and a transfer, or an assignment, made under such-circumstances, will, in equity, be set aside at the suit of a creditor, a specific, residuary, or general legatee.</p> <p>Quere, is not such a disposition of the assets prohibited by the act of 1843, eh. 304?</p> <p>A parly dealing with an executor, as such, has notice of the existence of the will, and of its contents: the will, in this State, being open to inspection upon the public records.</p> <p>The court may very properly refuse to interfere actively in behalf of a party holding a security, and asking to have it made effectual, when the circumstances may not be strong enough to warrant a decree to compel him to surrender it.</p> <p>The rule of evidence, that neither the husband or wife can be witnesses for or against each other, applies to a case in which the husband is offered to testify in favor of the wife, in reference to her separate estate.</p> <p>This rule is founded, not on the ground of interest, but of policy, and extends to cases where the wife was afterwards divorced from the husband.</p> <p>The only exception to this rule which was formerly recognized, was, where the husband commits an offence against the person of his wife, when, ex necessitate, the wife may make an affidavit against her husband.</p> <p>The parol declarations of the husband, that he had obtained a receipt from his wife, who was one of the legatees in the will, as a matter of form, to enable him to settle an account as executor in the Orphans Court, and not upon actual payment, made at the time of settling, were held to constitute a part of the res gesta, and, as such, admissible, to contradict and overthrow the receipt, though they might operate in favor of the wife.</p>

On the 22d of June, 1829, Amos Binney, of Boston, in Massachusetts, filed this bill against The President and Directors of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company and Isaac McCord, praying for an injunction to .prohibit the doing of certain acts, which, he alleged, would be greatly and irreparably injurious to his rights and property — and, on the same day, an injunction was granted as prayed; with leave to the defendants to move for its dissolution, at any time after filing…

<p>[RULES OF TRACTICE — GUARDIAN AND WARD — INFANTS—VACATING FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.]</p> <p>The trustee of an insolvent debtor is a necessary party to a bill filed by creditors to vacate a fraudulent conveyance, made by the insolvent before hig application.</p> <p>An answer to a supplemental bill must be restricted to the matters stated in it, and a defendant has no right, under pretext of answering the supplemental, to add to, or amend his answer to, the original bill.</p> <p>Exceptions to an answer on these grounds will be sustained.</p> <p>Where the relation of guardian and ward has been terminated by the removal of the former, the infant has the same right to call him to an account, as he would have, to call his representatives to an account in case of his death : and in the latter case it has been decided that an infant may sue as if he were of age.</p> <p>Though an infant himself cannot call his guardian to an account, whilst the relation subsists, but must wait until he attains age, yet a third person may do so, during the minority, for the benefit of the infant, of whose interest the law is especially careful.</p> <p>The office of guardian is that of a trustee, and the general power of the Chancery Court to superintend trusts, is expressly preserved .by the act of 1798, ch. 101, sub. ch. 12, sec. 16.</p> <p>Prior to the act of 1835, ch. 380, the general rule was, that a creditor, before he could in equity pursue property fraudulently conveyed, must have first obtained a judgment with respect to realty, and a judgment and fieri facias where personal property was to be reached ; yet there are some exceptions to the rule.</p> <p>The case of a guardian suing in behalf of his wards, who is the surety on the bond given by the former guardian, and, therefore, cannot himself maintain an action at law on the bond, might possibly be regarded as constituting such an exception to the general rule.</p> <p>But the act of 1835, ch. 380, sec. 2, expressly exempts creditors from the obligation to obtain judgments, before they can proceed in equity to vacate fraudulent conveyances.</p> <p>The conveyances in this case were vacated upon proof, that they embraced all the grantor’s property, real and personal; that they were made to his daughter, who never did and never could have paid the consideration expressed in them; that at the time of executing them he was greatly in debt, and shortly after-wards applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws, returning no property in his schedule; and that the whole transaction was a scheme to defraud his creditors.</p>

[The history of the various proceedings in this case, as well as the facts upon which the decree is founded, are so clearly set forth in the opinion of the Chancellor, as to require no further statement.]

[This case originated in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, and was removed to the Court of Chancery under the act of assembly. The facts upon which the relief prayed is refused are fully set forth in the Chancellor’s opinion.]

[The chief object of the bills in these cases was to obtain a specific execution of an agreement, entered into on the 13th of December, 1837, between William Crawford, Jr. and the defendant, Purnell, the terms of which are fully set forth in the Chancellor’s opinion.

<p>[CHURCH CORPORATIONS — CHANCERY PRACTICE — ACTS OP ATTORNEY.]</p> <p>Under the act of 1802, ch. Ill, authorizing the incorporation of churches, the persons elected according to the provisions of the 2d section of that act and not the congregation, constitute the corporation of the church.</p> <p>Nine persons were elected trustees of a church, in accordance with the above act. A bill was filed in the name of the corporation against five of these trustees in their individual capacities. Before answering this bill the defendants filed a petition contesting the authority of the solicitor who filed it, upon the ground that a minority only of the board of trustees of the corporation authorized it to be filed, and for this reason prayed that the bill might be dismissed. Held—</p> <p>That notwithstanding the apparent anomaly of a corporation in its artificial capacity suing a majority of the individuals composing it in their natural capacity, such a state of things may very properly occur. In this case the three members authorizing the suit, would, by the charter, constitute a majority of a quorum for the transaction of business, and at a meeting thus held, the present proceedings might have been ordered.</p> <p>The bill might have been filed in conformity with the charter, and it would therefore, be improper to dismiss it, upon this summary proceeding, before answer, without evidence, and merely upon allegations proceeding from the defendants themselves.</p> <p>Where the appearance of an attorney is entered on the record, it is considered as done by the authority of the party, and whatever is done in the progress of the cause, is regarded as done by, and binding on the party himself — the fidelity of the attorney in the discharge of his trust being a question between him and the party for whom he undertakes to act.</p>

[The bill in this case was filed on the 22d of September, 1847, by the complainant, who is the administratrix of her deceased husband, George T. Forrest, against the defendant seeking the enforcement of the trusts of a certain deed, bearing date the 17th of July, 1845, by which a lot of ground in the city of Baltimore was conveyed to the defendant by one William Hanson and wife, “in trust for the use and benefit of the said George T. Forrest, during his life, and after his…

<p>[The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion.]</p>

[The bill in this case was filed on the 4th of April, 1848, alleging that the complainant entered into copartnership with the defendant, under the name and firm of Roberts §• Drury, on the 3d of October, 1845, which continued until the 3d of April, 1847, when it was dissolved by mutual consent. That at the time of the dissolution, the firm was largely indebted to merchants in the city of Baltimore, and elsewhere, for the purchase of different articles of merchandise.

[The bill, in this case, was filed on the 28th of October, 1849, by the complainants as the legatees in reversion of Greenbury Lark, praying for the sale of a negro which was purchased by the defendant, Linstead, in the year 1829, from Amelia Lark, the widow, executrix and legatee for life of the said Greenbury.

This bill was filed, on the 8th of August, 1825, by William Sydney Winder, and Araminta, his wife, against John Diffenderffer and his three infant children, Amelia Diffenderffer, Michael Diffenderffer, and Charles R. Diffenderffer. The answer of the defendant John invoked into this case the proceedings in a suit instituted some time before in this court, which forms a preliminary and necessary illustration of the grounds of this controversy.

[The first order passed in this case, and which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has already been reported, (see page 42 of the February and March number,) and the questions now decided arise upon exceptions filed to the accounts of the Auditor disposing of the proceeds of the “Wheatfield Inn,” all of which, with the facts upon which they depend, are fully stated in the opinion.]

<p>[EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT AT LAW — RULES OF EVIDENCE — ACTION OF DETINUE— SUIT FOR MESNE PROFITS' — JURISDICTION.]</p> <p>A party who relies upon a judgment, is not restricted to the record - itself, but may show, by evidence dehors, what matters were litigated between the parties and decided by the court.</p> <p>The complainant, the administrator of A., who died in 1821, recovered, in May, 1839, in an action of detinue, several negro slaves from the defendant, the administrator of B., and-then filed his bill in equity for the recovery of their hires and services from the death of A. In the pleadings in the action at law, the parties do not appear in their representative characters. Held—</p> <p>That it was competent for the complainant to show, by evidence, that the title to these negroes, as derived by the parties from their respective intestates, was put in issue and decided in the case at law ; and, that from the time of the institution of that action, the verdict and judgment are conclusive between them.</p> <p>Yet, the effect of this recovery is not, by retro-action, to be considered as concluding the parties from all examination into the title, from the death of A., in 1821.</p> <p>The action of detinue proceeds upon the ground of property in the plaintiff, at the time of action brought; and, therefore, the recovery in that action proves no more than that, at the time of its institution, the right of property, either absolute, or special, was in the plaintiff.</p> <p>The absence of the negroes sold by the sheriff from the place of sale, and other irregularities in the proceedings, though they might furnish a sufficient ground for setting aside the sale, on motion to the court, upon the return of the writs of execution, are not sufficient to induce this court, after a lapse of twenty-five years, to treat the sale as a nullity.</p> <p>Examined copies of the contents of the assessors’ books of the several counties may be received in evidence. It would be attended with infinite inconvenience, and would defeat one of the great purposes for which these hooks are made, if their contents could not be proved, except by the production of the books themselves.</p> <p>The objection to the jurisdiction of this court may be taken either by way of exception, or by an amended answer.</p> <p>In this case, the objection to the jurisdiction was not made until the trial on the merits. The case had been once referred to the Auditor by an order passed with consent of parties, under which order, accounts were stated and a large mass of evidence taken, at great expense ; and the delay had been so great, that if the complainant should now be turned round to his remedy at law, he would be defeated by the plea of limitations. It was Held—</p> <p>That in cases where the want of jurisdiction is apparent, the delay and the circumstances under which the objection is made, cannot be regarded ; but if there be any doubt upon the subject of jurisdiction, the court may take these circumstances into consideration and be induced by them to give less heed to the objection, than if it had been made at an earlier stage of the cause.</p> <p>It was further Heed — that, in this case, the plaintiff had not that plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, which would deny him the aid of a court of equity.</p>

[The complainants filed their bill in this court, on the 20th of December, 1848, in which they state, that a certain William G. Jackson, of Prince Georges county, died in the year 1831, leaving a last will and testament, by which he devised his whole estate, real, personal and mixed, to his wife, Barbara Jackson, for life, and after her death to be equally divided among his children; and appointed his wife sole executrix thereof.

[A bill was filed on the 13th of July, 1847, by Henry D. Brown and Charles A. Waters, for a sale of the real and personal estate of the defendant, Jacob Waters, which was conveyed to them by said Jacob, by a deed dated on the 12th of May, 1846, which, though absolute on its face, is admitted to have been intended as a security for a certain indebtedness in which the grantor then stood to the grantees.

This bill was filed on the 22d of January, 1824, by Edward Campbell, Randolph Campbell, James Cunningham, and Catherine his wife, against John McHenry, It states, that William Campbell, the father of these plaintiffs, Edward, Randolph, and Catherine, being seized and possessed of a large real and personal estate, on the 8th of September, 1821, made his will, by yrhich he gave the whole of his property to the plaintiff, Edward, and the defendant, in trust, as follows : ‘All…

[The agreement and statement of facts, upon which this cause came before the court, is as follows : “In this case, various questions have arisen between James Kent, as a creditor of Alexander Harris, deceased, and as purchaser of parcels of the real estate of the deceased, on the one part; and Mackall Harris and others, heirs at law of Joseph Harris, deceased, and as such, claiming to be creditors of the said Alexander Harris, deceased.

[On the 5th of March, 1844, the complainants filed their bill. It alleges, that the said Benjamin is largely indebted to the complainants, on account of the principal and interest of their claims against him, which they exhibit with their bill.

[This is a creditor’s bill filed in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 29th of September, 1841, by John Glenn, the complainant, in behalf of himself and other creditors of Beale Randall, one of the defendants.

[Jacob Gibson, late of Talbot county, deceased, died in January, 1818, seized and possessed of large and valuable real estate, leaving a widow, Rebecca Gibson, entitled to dower therein, and leaving also, a last will and testament, duly executed on the 29th of November, 1817, which was regularly admitted to probate by the Orphans’ Court of said county, on the 13th of January, 1818.

This bill was filed on the 7th of November, 1825, by George Ellicott against Joshua Warfield and Rachel Welch the administrators, and Derastus Welch, John Welch, JYicholas Welch, Rachel Welch and Howard Welch, the infant heirs of the late Nicholas Welch, and Warner Welch, with whom the administratrix Rachel had intermarried.

This bill was filed on the 26th of June, 1828, by John Henry Maccubbin against Elizabeth Matthews, William D. Matthews, Mary E. Matthews, John E. Matthews, Jesse Matthews and John Hall.

This hill was filed on the 22d of May, 1829, by The President and Directors of the Bank of Maryland against Cumberland Dugan, surviving executor of James Clarke, deceased. The hill charged, that the executors of the deceased by their improper, negligent, and illegal conduct had so managed the assets of the deceased, that a large amount of them had been wasted; in consequence of which his creditors had not been paid.

[The object of the bill in this cause is to obtain as pecific execution of a contract for a mortgage, made between John R. Dali, of Washington county, and William Schley, of the city of Baltimore, acting as trustee under the will of the late John McKim, Jr., and the appointment of the Chancellor, for the use of Eliza McKim Duncan, and Ann McKim Handy, married women, in relation to the lands and real estate of the said John E. Dali, for the sum of $12,000, and to remove the…

This case arose in the land-office upon cross-caveats, the one by The Baltimore and Ohio Rail Road Company, as the holders of a certificate of a tract of land, called Clara Fisher, against the issuing of a patent on the certificate for the tract of land, called River’s Bend; and the other by The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, as the assignee of a certificate obtained by William W Hoye, of the tract of land, called River’s Bend, against the issuing of a patent on the…

This bill was filed on the 15th of November, 1824, by Edmund II.

[The bill was filed in this case by R. W. Gill, as trustee of Mrs. Duncan and others, and by Mrs. Duncan and other cestui que trusts.

[The opinion of the Chancellor, delivered at the final hearing of this cause upon its merits, and which also contains a full statement of all the facts and proceedings therein, has already been reported.

<p>[The facts of the cause are so fully set forth in the opinion, as to require no additional statement.]</p>

[The proceedings originated on the equity side of Baltimore County Court, and were removed to this court upon suggestion, on the 12th of November, 1850. The allegations of the bill and the facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion.

This bill was filed on the 29th of October, 1827, by Thomas Hammond, Philip Hammond, George W. Hammond, John Hammond, and Charles Hammond, against Rezin Hammond, Elizabeth Hammond, Matilda Hammond, Harriet Hammond, and Philip IL Mewburn.

[The bill in this case was filed on the 6th of July, 1846. All its material averments, as well as the admissions and defences taken in the answer and proofs in the cause, are fully stated in the opinion.

<p>[remedies at law and in equity upon mortgages.]</p> <p>It is a well settled rule, that a mortgagee may sue, at the same time, in law, upon his bond or covenant, and in equity, upon his mortgage ; the case of a mortgagee forming an exception to the general rule, that a party shall not he permitted to sue at law and in equity at the same time for the same debt.</p> <p>In this case, one mortgagee had recovered judgments at law for his debt, upon one of which judgments, an appeal had been taken, and was still pending in the Court of Appeals, the other remained unsatisfied in the County Court, the other mortgagee had simply institued a suit at law, hut had recovered no judgment. Held—</p> <p>That each of these cases come within the rule, which permits a morgtagee to sue at law upon the bond or covenant, and in equity, upon his mortgage.</p> <p>The bill in this case, was filed on the 10th of January, 1849, by the complainant, for the foreclosure of a mortgage, and. sale of the mortgaged premises, of which his intestate was the assignee in part. The defendant, the mortgagor, after claiming in his answer, various credits on account of the mortgage debt, resisted the decree, upon the ground, that the complainant had already recovered a judgment at law upon the bond, to secure the payment of which, the mortgage was given, and insists that such reconveyance, was an election by complainant, to proceed at law to recover all that was due him by the defendant, and that he cannot now file his bill in equity, for the recovery of the same debt.</p> <p>An agreement of the parties, was filed on the 18th of July, 1849, by which i* was agreed, that the credits claimed by the defendant should he allowed, and the question submitted for the decision of the Chancellor, which are stated in the following opinion delivered on the 14th of August, 1849.</p>

<p>[DIVORCE-WRIT OF NE EXEAT — CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.]</p> <p>Upon a bill for a divorce a mensa and alimony, Baltimore County Court decided that the writ of ne exeat might be granted upon the affidavit of the wife alone, that her husband, the defendant, intended to leave the state, and depart beyond the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>The power of the wife to make this affidavit was at one time denied, and there can be no doubt, that in the cases in which she is permitted to make it against her husband, her affidavit may be corroborated by the oaths of other persons, deposing to the acts and declarations of the husband manifesting his purpose to remove beyond the jurisdiction of the court.</p> <p>A suit for a divorce commenced in Baltimore County Court, in virtue of the act of 1841, ch. 262, which conferred upon the Chancellor and the county courts, as courts of equity, jurisdiction over the subject of divorces, is within the terms of the afet of 1824, ch. 196, which authorizes the removal of all equity suits then depending, or thereafter to be commenced, in any of the county .. courts of the sixth judicial district, to the Court of Chancery, notwithstanding no law existed, giving the courts of equity jurisdiction in cases of divorce, at the time the act of 1824 was passed.</p> <p>It is well settled in England, that the Court of Chancery will not issue the writ of ne exeat, in cases of alimony, unless there has been a decree for alimony in the spiritual court; nor will it be granted pending an appeal from such decree, by the husband, nor for alimony pendente lite, nor for any other sum than that actually due for alimony and cost; but in New York the writ has been granted upon the petition of the wife pendente lite.</p> <p>In this ease, where the writ issued of ne exeat upon the naked, unsupported oath of the complainant, before a decree had passed establishing her right to alimony, and where such right was disputed by strong averments of the answer, and the allegation of an intention to remove from the state was positively denied by the defendant, the Chancellor granted a motion to discharge the writ, upon the case presented by the bill and answer.</p>

[The petition in this case, for a divorce a mensa et thoro, was filed in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 31st of October, 1850. It alleges the marriage of the petitioner with the defendant on the 17th of February, 1848, that since said marriage, the petitioner has been a correct, faithful, and irreproachable wife. That her said husband, unmindful of his duties and obligations, has habitually treated her with cruelty and violence.

' [The -petiiicrn ’for a divorce in this case, was filed in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 1st of February, T850\ and states that the petitioner was married to the defendant on. the 29th of November, 1849, and lived with him as his wife un't’il the 28th of January, 1850, sedulously fulfilling her duties as such.

<p>[The Chancellor has given a full statement of the pleadings and facts in the cause, in the following opinion :]</p>

[The bill was filed on the 25th of November, 1843, by the complainant, Henry F. Frieze, and after alleging his appointment as administrator of Rachael Forsyth, states and charges that John Glenn and David Stewart, the defendants, as administrators c. t. a. of Alexander Forsyth, heretofore filed their bill against the said Rachael, charging her with a failure to comply with the terms of sale made by them as administrators as aforesaid, and praying for a decree for the sale of…

[A decree was passed on the 23d of May, 1845, for a sale of the real estate of Jonathan Evitts, late of Caroline county, deceased, for the purpose of partition among his children and heirs at law, upon a bill, filed by such of the heirs as were of age, against those that were infants.

[The facts of the case are sufficiently set forth in the opinion. The case of Crawford vs. Severson, referred to, will be found reported in 5 Gill, 443.]

[The original bill in this case was filed in the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 25th of August, 1845.

[The bill in this case was filed on the 9th of September, 1850, by Amelia M. Tayman of Anne Arundel County, against her husband, Levi S*. Tayman, for a divorce. It alleges her marriage with the defendant some time in the year 1849, and that since that time she has resided with, and demeaned herself towards him as a chaste, loving and obedient wife.

This bill was filed on the 19th of November, 1829, by John W. Duvall, administrator of William Warfield, deceased, against The President,… Held: in his own name, seven shares of stock in the institution of the defendants, on each of which fifty dollars had been paid; that after his death the defendants brought suit, and recovered judgment against the plaintiff, as administrator of the said intestate, to bind a due proportion of assets, which had or might come to hand; that…

This petition was filed on the 6th of August, 1817, by Edward Thomas, in which he states, that the late William Dealdns had, by his last will, devised his real estate to be sold by his executor Francis Deakins, for the payment of his debts; that Francis Deakins had died, leaving the trust reposed in him unexecuted; that letters of administration, de bonis non with the will annexed, had been granted to John Hoye; and that the petitioner was a creditor of the testator to a…

[The bill was filed on the 20th of May, 1850, and states that the complainant, in the year 1849, sold a body of wood growing on his farm, supposed to contain about 1,000 cords, to one Henry Myers, at the price of 45 cents per cord, and for which said Myers was to pay him at that rate as soon as 100 cords were cut, and so from time to time for every 100 cords, and was not to carry any away until paid for.

<p>[The ground upon which the bill was dismissed, in this case, renders a statement of the facts unnecessary.]</p>

[The bill in this case was filed on the 13th of June, 1848, and alleges, that the complainant is the owner of a mill used for the manufacture of paper, situated on Deep Run, which forms part of the division line between Howard District and Anne Arundel County : that the mill-dam is built across said ..run, about 150 perches above the mill: that near the said dam, and on the Anne Arundel side of said run, there lies a tract of land in which are beds of iron ore, the property…

This bill was filed on the 16th of October, 1823, by Samuel Jones of Joshua, and Ann his wife, against Richard G. Stockett and Henry Wayman.

[The defendant, William McMakin, and a certain John F. Forrest, composing the firm of McMakin & Co. being indebted unto the complainants, being the several persons constituting the firms of Wylie & Wilson, Camper, Berkley & Bruff, Baugher, Buckey & Orndorf, Levering & Clark, Fite & Grinnel, Frederick Fickey & Sons, and Lewis Lauer, William Loney and William H. McLean, on the 21st July, 1848, executed their several promissory notes to the several complainants, for the amounts…

<p>[The facts of the case, are fully stated in the opinion.]</p>

[The bill was filed in this case on the 15th of August, 1849, by the complainant, alleging, that a certain Patrick Macauley, of Baltimore county, had lately died intestate, possessed of valuable real and personal estate — that he was largely indebted unto different persons, and among others to the complainant — that administration on his personal estate had been duly granted unto Joseph J. Speed and Henry Webster, and that his said personal estate was wholly insufficient for…

The proceedings in this cause were instituted on the equity side of Baltimore County Court by the complainant, as trustee of George S. Davis, an insolvent debtor, for the purpose of having a deed executed by Davis, to the defendant, dated the 25th of September, 1840, and purporting to be an absolute conveyance, declared a mortgage.

[The bill in this ease was filed on the 24th of June, 1846, and alleges that a partnership was formed on the 1st of January, 1838, by the following agreement, a copy of which is exhibited with the bill. “ Whereas, it is this day agreed by and between Charles Wood, Cyrus Gault and John B. Emory, all of the city of Baltimore, to become joint partners in the granite cutting business, which said partners do' agree and bind themselves to the following regulations, that is to say:…

<p>This bill was filed on the 27th of October, 1817, by Edward Tilly, Horatio Tilly, Margaret Tilly, and Elizabeth Tilly, infants by Nicholas Brewer, their next friend, against Lucretia Tilly and Sarah Tilly. The bill states that Richard Higgins, on the 11th day of November, 1807, made his last will and testament, by which, so far as relates to this case, he devised as follows:</p> <p>‘ I give and bequeath unto my son Joshua Clarke Higgins and his heirs, forever, all that plantation whereon I now live, called and known by the name of Part of White Hall, and What you Will, except one hundred and fifty acres thereof, to be laid off at the discretion of the said Joshua Clarke Higgins, which said one hundred and fifty acres, including the house where John O’Hara lives, I give and bequeath to my said son, in trust to and for the separate use of my daughter Elizabeth Tilly for and during her natural life, and to and for the maintenance of the children of the said Elizabeth Tilly, until they arrive at the age of tweny-one, remainder to the said Joshua Clarke Higgins and his heirs for ever. If my said son Joshua Clarke Higgins shall purchase the plantation whereon Jasper Edward Tilly now lives for the use of my daughter Elizabeth for and during her natural life, and to and for the use of her children until they shall respectively arrive at the age of twenty-one, then the said one hundred and fifty acres to be the property of the said Joshua Clarke Higgins and his heirs for ever.’</p> <p>And then, after some other devises and bequests, the testator further says, £ It is my will, that the whole of my real and personal estate shall remain undivided, and undisturbed for and during the space of five years from the first day of April next, subject to the control and direction of my son Joshua Clarke Higgins, and in his possession, the proceeds to be applied to the payment of my just debts; and if there should be any surplus, the same to belong to, and be the property of my son Joshua Clarke Higgins for his care and trouble.* And then, after one other disposition, the testator, in conclusion, says, ‘ I do hereby constitute and appoint my son Joshua Clarke Higgins to be the executor of this my last will and testament.* This will was duly attested by three witnesses, and proved in the Orphans Court of Anne Arundel county on the 22d day of December, 1807.</p> <p>The bill further stated, that Joshua C. Higgins had departed this life; that Jasper E. Tilly had been appointed trustee for the benefit of the said Elizabeth and her children; that the said Jasper E. Tilly and Elizabeth Tilly were both dead, leaving these parties her children, all of whom were then under age; that Nicholas Brewer had been appointed trustee for them, and had taken upon himself the trust; and that the said land was not in a state of improvement, such as to produce any advantage to these parties; but might be sold to the advantage of all concerned. Whereupon it was prayed that a decree might be passed for the sale of their interest, and that they might have such other relief as the nature of the case should require.</p>

<p>[The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the opinion.]</p>

[The bill was filed by Septimus D. Sewell, of Harford county, on the 20th of August, 1849. It alleges that a certain Joshua Swan, late of Baltimore county, deceased, was in his lifetime seized and possessed of certain lands, lying in the county last aforesaid, which, on the 22d of October,' 1819, he conveyed to his daughter, Emily Augusta Swan, now the wife of the defendant, James Baxter.

This bill was filed on the 2d of December, 1829, by Larkin Buckingham, administrator of Thomas Evans, deceased, against Jasper Peddicord, Jeremiah BartheUow, and Ashury Peddicord.

[The bill in this case was filed on the 4th of August, 1849, by the Union Bank, and states, that on the 25th of July, 1846, Edward M. Kerr, assigned to the bank, as collateral security for all his liabilities to, it, certain promissory notes, a list of which, together with the assignment, is filed with the bill. That the bank proceeded to collect said notes and apply the proceeds to discharge said liability, which was effected in the month of December, 1846.

This biE was filed on the 15th of January, 1825, by William Brewer against Elizabeth Murdock, in which it was stated, that the late Gilbert Murdock and the defendant, his then wife, on the 27th of February, 1822, to secure to the plaintiff the payment of the sum of $500 on or before the 27th of February, 1825, and the annual payment of the interest thereon, mortgaged to him a tract of land, belonging to her, caEed Proctor’s Forest; that the whole interest had been paid as it…

[The complainants in this case, were Samuel Ellicott, junior, Elias Ellicott, Philip T. Ellicott, John A. Ellicott, Andrew Ellicott, Andrew Ellicott, jr., Benjamin Ellicott, Benjamin H. Ellicott and George Ellicott, all children of uncles of the whole or half blood of Charles T. Ellicott, deceased, whose property is the subject of controversy in this suit, and who died without issue, leaving the defendant, Thomas Ellicott, his uncle, and the complainants, and others,…

[The bill in this case was filed on the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 28th of April, 1848, and alleges, that by an order passed in the High Court of Chancery, upon a certain agreement, made on the 22d of July, 1836, in a cause in said court, between Joseph McKim, plaintiff, and Joseph M. McKim and others, defendants, John Scott and John Glenn were appointed trustees for receiving and investing certain moneys belonging to the estate of Samuel McKim, deceased,…

[This case came before the Chancellor as judge of the land office, upon a caveat to a certificate for “Hoskins’ Island,” filed by Pearson Chapman, the caveator, on the 23rd of August, 1851.

James Corrie, by his petition, stated that his brother John Corrie, late of the Island of 'Trinidad, had died there, leaving a considerable real and personal estate, which, by his last will, he had given to the children of his six brothers and sisters; that the petitioner had eight infant children, who were consequently entitled to one-sixth part of the estate so devised and bequeathed; and that by the laws of Trinidad, the estate so given to his infant children, could only…

[The bill was filed on the 24th of May, 1843, by the complainants, in behalf of themselves and all others interested under a deed of trust therein mentioned ; and states that the corporate body then styled the Washington Medical College of Baltimore, but now, (by virtue of the act of 1838, ch. 138,) styled the Washington University of Baltimore, did, by a deed, dated 24th of July, 1835, convey to the complainants, Conkling, Frasier, Corner and Mayer, the leasehold piece of…

This bill was filed on the 9th of July, 1825, by Nicholas Watkins and Adam and John Miller, against Christiana M. Worthington, Nicholas Worthington, Brice I. Worthington, Mary W. Worthington and Betty Worthington, The bill sets out, that the plaintiffs sue in behalf of themselves and others, creditors of Beale M. Worthington, deceased; that the deceased died indebted to the plaintiff Watkins in the sum of $234 04, with interest from the 9th of February, 1824, on a note under…

[The bill in this case was filed on the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 5th of September, 1849, by the complainants, for the sale of a certain cotton factory, and other real estate, mortgaged by the defendant, Mason, to the complainants, by two deeds of mortgage : the first dated the 29th of September, 1848, professes to secure the sum of $22,499 33, which the mortgagor owed the complainants, and for which, with the interest thereon, he passed the several…

[The bill in this case was filed on the 4th of March, 1845, by the complainants, Ephraim K. Barnum and Zenos Barnum, as executors of David Barnum, deceased; and states, that on the 8th of July, 1844, the complainants, as executors as aforesaid, sold certain parcels of land situated in Baltimore county, to Catharine M. McClellan and Catharine M. Raborg, for the sum of $12,000; but at that price to be freed and cleared from a mortgage given by their testator, to one George…

[The bill was filed on the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 7th of December, 1849, by Allen, the complainant, and states, that sometime in the summer of 1848, about the month of August, the defendant, Burke, entered into a parol contract with the plaintiff, by which the defendant stipulated and agreed, in consideration of the plaintiff’s leasing to him certain .premises on Union Dock, in the city of Baltimore, (and of which the defendant in pursuance of such…

This bill was filed on the 14th of September, 1818, by Anna Gebetha Margdretta Wandelohr, formerly of Chambersburg, in the state of Pennsylvania, but then of the city of Baltimore, against John Franciscus and Philip B. Sadtler.

In order that the opinion of the court upon the two cases which, under the name of Brown against Wallace, were together brought before it, discussed, and submitted for judgment, may be fully and correctly understood, it will be necessary to make a report of the previous case of Mitchell against Mitchell, instituted in this court, out of which those cases arose, and upon which they were founded.

This bill was filed on the 6th of April, 1829, by Edmund B. Addison, and Eliza D. Addison his wife,' against William D. Bowie, Ann D. Bowie, Walter B. Bowie, Kitty Bowie, Richard D. Bowie, and John Contee.

This bill was filed on the 26th of February, 1822, by George Andrews and Ennion Williams, against Ann Scotton, Robert E. Scotton, Alice Ann Scotton, Stephen Scotton, and Ashur Foulke.

This bill was filed on the 20th of September, 1830, by John Waring, against Henrietta M. Waring, Catherine H. Waring, Susan Waring, Grace Waring, Eleanor Waring, Eliza Waring, Richard M. Waring, Sally Waring, and Sarah C. Waring.

This bill was filed on the 17th of November, 1829, by Marcella Worthington, administratrix of Thomas Worthington, deceased, against Temperance Lee, Thomas Lee, Joshua Lee, John Lee, William Lee, Caleb Lee, Jesse Lee, William Byrum and Clarissa his wife, Independence Houck and Matilda his wife, John Wilson and Penelope his wife, Jacob Faner and Mary his wife, Eleanor Lee, and TJshley Lee.

This petition was filed on the 11th of October, 1830, by Grafton B. Duvall against The President, Directors and Company of the Farmers’ Bank of Maryland.