Volume 3 — Maryland Chancery

This bill was filed by Robert Walsh and Stephen Cásenme against Thomas Smyth, Jr. John Blanton, John F. Gardner, Freeman Lewis, Thomas Gilbert, Benjamin Chew, Jofm Heathcote, James Dali, Isaac Wikoff, James Clayland, William Cox, Joseph Anthony and Son, and the heirs of John Lynch.

[The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinions, the .first of which was delivered on the 14th of February, 1850, as follows:]

[The bill in this ease was filed for tbe purpose of enforcing a contract for tbe sale of lands.

<p>This bill was filed on the 15th of June, 1825, by John Tessier and Samuel Smith and James A. Buchanan, trading under the firm of S. Smith fy Buchanan, against John M. Wyse, William A. Wyse, Eliza Wyse, Margaretta Wyse, Edward Wyse, Nicholas H. Wyse, Matilda Wyse, Francis 0. Wyse, Joseph Allender, and George Riston. The bill states, that William Wyse was indebted to the plaintiffs S. Smith 8f Buchanan, in the sum of $2,737 48, for sundry matters properly chargeable in account; that William Wyse made his will in the following words:</p> <p>‘Baltimore, 12th March, 1814, having at this perilous moment of my life committed myself to the care of Almighty God, whom I trust will receive my soul, I have only to request my affectionate wife and son John, in case of a deficiency of my estate to support and educate my children, that my real estate, and now known by the name of the Deer Park, be disposed of for the maintenance of said children, under the direction and management of my wife Rachel, and John Wysed</p> <p>The bill further states, that William Wyse afterwards, on the first of April, 1814, died so indebted, seised and possessed of a large real and personal estate, leaving a widow Rachel Wyse, and these defendants John M., William A., Eliza, Margaretta, Edward, Nicholas H,, Matilda and Francis O. Wyse, his children and heirs at law; that this his will was proved according to law on the 12th of April, 1814, and administration with the said will annexed was thereupon granted to his widow Rachel Wyse, who took possession of his personal estate accordingly; and, by her first account, passed on the 29th of June, 1816, shewed a balance of assets then in her hands of $5,712 34, and that the testator’s widow and son John M. Wyse, filed a petition in this court, admitting the claim of the plaintiffs S. Smith 8f Buchanan, and praying for the sale of the real estate as mentioned in the will. Upon which, on the first of October, 1816, it was decreed accordingly, that the lands be sold; but that the decree still remained unexecuted. The bill further states, that the plaintiffs S. Smith §• Buchanan, being indebted unto the plaintiff Tessier, in the sum of $4,500, on the 22d of January, 1820, assigned to him, in part satisfaction thereof, their claim upon the estate of William Wyse, deceased, which then remained wholly unpaid; and which claim, although passed by the Orphans Court, the administratrix being then unable to pay, she, on the same day, gave her bond, with the defendant John M. Wyse as her surety, to the plaintiff Tessier, for the payment of $4,325, with interest thereon, in one year from that time, that being the amount of both principal and interest of said claim then due; for which bond the plaintiff gave a receipt; but the said bond was accepted by the plaintiff Tessier, as an indulgence and benefit to the representatives of the teslator, it being expressly understood and agreed by the parties, that the said obligation should not, in any way, invalidate or destroy the plaintiff Tessier’s claim against the estate of the testator; that the bond not being paid when it became due, the plaintiff Tessier brought suits upon it; and at March term, 1822, of Baltimore County Court, the administratrix Rachel Wyse, and this defendant JohnM. Wyse, confessed judgments, but the bond, from which alone the precise sum due could be ascertained, having been lost, the definite amounts were never entered up, and those judgments therefore still remain altogether inoperative. The bill further states, that on the 16th of May, 1822, the defendant William A. Wyse, being indebted unto the defendant Riston, in the sum of $2,000, the said Rachel Wyse, with the defendants John M. Wyse, William A. Wyse, and Eliza Wyse, mortgaged their respective interests in the real and personal estate of the testator to secure the payment of the same to the defendant Riston; that afterwards Rachel Wyse departed this life: and after her death, on the 16th of July, 1823, letters of administration de bonis non, with the will annexed of the testator William Wyse, deceased, were granted to the defendant Joseph Allender, who returned an inventory and appraisement amounting to $2,293; that the difference which appears to be due to the testator’s estate between the balance in the account rendered by the said administratrix Rachel Wyse, and the amount of assets returned by the administrator Allender, was expended in the maintenance, support and education of the testator’s children.</p> <p>Whereupon the bill prayed, that the administrator de bonis non, might set forth and declare what had become of the personal estate of the testator; that the said receipt might be delivered up to be cancelled; that the mortgage to Riston might be set aside in favour of these plaintiffs; that the defendants or such of them as were liable therefor, might be ordered to pay the plaintiffs’ claim; or in default thereof, that so much of the real and personal estate of the testator as might be necessary for the satisfaction thereof be sold; and that the plaintiffs might have such other relief as the nature of their case might require.</p> <p>On the 8th of August, 1825, the defendant Riston put in his answer, in which he says, he cannot admit that the testator was indebted to the plaintiffs; but he admits that the testator made his will and died about the time staled, leaving a widow who administered on, and took possession of his estate; and also left the children as mentioned in the bill. This defendant says he knows nothing of the bill of complaint referred to as having been filed in this court. But he admits that a bond was given as stated, which he avers was received by the plaintiff Tessier, in full satisfaction of his claim against the estate of the deceased. This defendant also admits the recovery of the judgments; but does not admit, that they are inoperative by reason of the loss of the bond of which he knows nothing. This defendant moreover admits, that the mortgage was made to him as stated; that Rachel Wyse is dead; that after her death, administration de bonis non was granted to the defendant Allender; but he does not admit, that the said difference in the amount of the personal assets was expended in the maintenance and education of the children of the deceased. And finally, this defendant submits, that by the negligence and misconduct of the plaintiff Tessier, he has lost all right to demand any portion of either the real or personal estate of the testator; and that his only remedy is against the person of the defendant John M. Wyse or his estate, if he has any, &c.</p> <p>The defendants Eliza Wyse and Margaretta Wyse, on the 30th of September, 1825, put in their answer, in which they admit, that their father made his will and died seised and possessed of real and personal estate, leaving the children as mentioned, and a widow to whom administration was granted, and who took possession of the personal estate accordingly. They state, that a part of the real estate was sold under the decree mentioned in the bill, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the maintenance of the children of the deceased. But they expressly deny that the defendant Tessier ever had any claim against the testator, either as assignee or otherwise ; and they say they do not know the amount of the claim of S. Smith fy Buchanan.</p> <p>On the same day the infant defendants Edward, Jñcholas H., Matilda, and Francis 0. Wyse, put in their answer by their guardian, ad litem, in which they admitted the will and death of the testator as stated, and hoped that the court would protect their rights.</p> <p>The defendant Allender, by his answer, filed on the 14th of December, 1825, admits the will, the death of the testator, the administration to Rachel Wyse, her possession of the personalty, the making of the mortgage to the defendant Riston, the death of Rachel, and the granting of administration de bonis non to himself, and the inventory returned by him as stated in the bill. He also admits, that the testator was indebted to S. Smith fy Buchanan, but does not know the amount; nor does he know any thing of the assignment of their claim to the plaintiff Tessier; and he denies that he has any evidence of that claim in his possession.</p> <p>On the 13th of April, 1826, the defendant John M. Wyse filed his answer, in which he admits, that the testator was indebted to S. Smith &{ Buchanan; that he made his will, and that after his death, administration was granted to his widow Rachel Wyse, who is since dead; and that the testator left the children and died seised and possessed of real and personal estate, as set forth in the bill; that a decree was obtained for the sale of the real estate of the deceased, as directed by his will; and about sixty acres of it was sold, and the proceeds thereof appropriated to the benefit of his children; and that a mortgage was made, as stated, to the defendant Riston. This defendant further states, that it was agreed between the plaintiffs Rachel Wyse and this defendant, that in consideration of the plaintiff Tessier’s delivering to S. Smith ¡J Buchanan their note held by him, they would assign to him their claim upon the testator, for which his then administratrix Rachel Wyse and this defendant were to give their bond for the amount thereof, including principal and interest up to that time; which note was accordingly delivered, assignment made, and bond given by them and received by the plaintiif Tessier, in full satisfaction of his claim against the estate of the testator; and that the plaintiif Tessier never received the assignment of the account and claim of S. Smith 8f Buchanan, with a view of demanding payment of the estate of the testator; and that the said account and claim, with a receipt thereon, was in the possession of this defendant, but has been mislaid by him and cannot now be found. This defendant admits, that suits were brought and judgments obtained on the bond, as stated.</p> <p>The defendant William Jl. Wyse filed his answer on the 26lh of April, 1826, in which he admits, that the late William Wyse made his will; that after his death, administration was granted, &c. as stated in the bill. This defendant also admits, that the testator was indebted to S. Smith 8f Buchanan; but puts the plaintiff to the proof of the account: He, however, expressly denies, that the claim of S. Smith Buchanan, was by them assigned to the plaintiff Tessier, or that he now has, or ever had any such claim as the real estate which descended to this defendant from the testator, can legally or equitably be chargeable with; nor have S. Smith fy Buchanan now any claim, legal or equitable, against the said real estate. This defendant admits, that a part of the real estate of the deceased was sold under a decree of this court, and the proceeds thereof applied to the maintenance and education of his children.</p> <p>To these answers the plaintiffs put in a general replication; upon which commissions were issued, under which proofs were taken and returned. From the testimony it appears that William Wyse made his will, and died seised of real estate, consisting of houses, and a wharf in the city of Baltimore, and of a farm in Baltimore county; and possessed of a considerable amount of personal property, leaving a widow and children, as stated and named in the bill; that administration with his will annexed was granted to his widow Rachel Wyse, who on the 23d of July, 1814, returned an inventory of his personal estate, consisting of negro slaves, cattle, farming utensils, household furniture, merchandise, and other articles, amounting to $6,735 25; and by her first account, passed on the 29th of June, 1816, she admitted, she had assets then in her hands to the amount of $5,712 34. The claim of S. Smith fy Buchanan, and the assignment of it to Tessier; the giving of the bond by Rachel Wyse and John M. Wyse to Tessier, not as a payment, but merely as a collateral security, as stated in the bill, were fully established by several witnesses. It was also shewn, that judgments had been confessed; but that they remained ineffectual, as stated, because the bond had been lost by the attorney of the plaintiff Tessier. It was further shewn, that a mortgage had been made, as stated, to George Riston. That in the petition filed by Rachel Wyse and John M. Wyse in this court, for the sale of the testator’s real estate, called Deer Park, it was stated, that S. Smith if Buchanan had a claim against his estate; and that after the payment of that claim; deducting the commissions to the administratrix; and the widow’s third, the other two-thirds left for the support of the children, would be wholly inadequate for that purpose;' so that their interests and necessities Required a sale of the lands as directed by the testator. On the 1st of October, 1816, a decree was therefore passed directing a sale; which sale, as admitted by the answers of some of the defendants, was accordingly made. It was further shewn, that Rachel Wyse was dead; that administration de bonis non, with the will annexed, had been granted to Joseph Allender; who on the 23d of January, 1824, returned an inventory of the property which had come to his hands, amounting to $2,293, consisting of negro slaves, cattle, household furniture, and some other articles.</p>

[The proceedings in this cause originated in the equity side of Baltimore County Court on the 15th of May, 1841. The object of the bill, which was filed by the complainant Glenn, as the permanent trustee of the defendant, Charles Grover, an insolvent debtor, and as administrator of Eaton R. Partridge, in behalf of himself as such administrator, and other creditors of said Grover, is to set aside two deeds of conveyance.

<p>[CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS — LIMITATION OVER OF PERSONALTY.]</p> <p>A testator, after bequeathing certain pecuniary legacies to his four daughters, directed that his son John was “to hold the farm and have sufficient time to pay off the legacies,” and then gave a pecuniary legacy to another son ¡Joseph. Held — that all these legacies, including that to Joseph, are charges upon the real estate devised to John, and are to be paid, pan passu, out of the proceeds of the sale thereof.</p> <p>A testator bequeathed to his daughter the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars and two negro slaves, “and in case of her death, without issue, the property to go to her sisters. ” Held — that the limitation over is void as to the two hundred and fifty dollars, being after an indefinite failure of issue.</p> <p>The mere circumstance that the limitation over is to a person in esse will not of itself be sufficient, even as regards bequests of personalty, to restrict the words “dying without issue,” to mean a dying without issue at the death of the first legatee.</p> <p>Where the limitation over after a bequest of personalty is if the first legatee dies without “leaving” issue, the word “leaving” restricts the limitation over to a definite failure of issue.</p>

<p>[The facts of this case are fully stated in the opinion of the Chancellor.]</p>

[The only question in this case arises from the construction of the will and codicil of Patrick Ward, deceased, executed^on the 25th of March, 1881. The will and codicil are sufficiently set forth, in the opinion of the Chancellor.

[The original bill in this case was filed, on the equity side of Baltimore County Court, on the 25th of April, 1849, by Edward Dunn and others, creditors of one Erwin Cooper; and after stating said Cooper’s indebtedness to them, charges that, on the 3d of April, 1849, said Cooper, then being in a hopeless state of insolvency, executed a mortgage to the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad Company, of certain leasehold and personal estate, which mortgage is alleged to have been…

[The bill in this case was filed on the 10th of January, 1850, and alleges that the complainant was married to the defendant in 1824, since which time she has discharged the duties and obligations imposed upon her by her marriage-vows faithfully, and to the utmost of her ability.

<p>[The facts of this case are fully stated in the opinion of the Chancellor.]</p>

This bill was filed on the 21st of April, 1829, by James Bosley against The proprietors of the Susquehanna Canal.

[The bill in this case was filed by Thomas Robertson, on the 11th of August, 1846, for the sale of the real estate of Edward Parks, deceased, for the purpose of paying his debts. The allegations of the bill and answers, with all the facts of the case, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Chancellor. The original defendants to the bill were the brothers and sisters of the deceased, all of whom were adults, and some non-residents.

This case arose on cross caveats in the Land Office. Joseph W. Patterson and Evan T. Ellicott, who are admitted to have been the legal holders of the tract of land called Litten’s P'ancy, by virtue of a warrant of resurvey of that tract, claim the land in question under a certificate of resurvey, bearing date on the 6th of November, 1829, as a part of the tract called Litten’s Fancy Enlarged.

[The hill in this case was filed on the 21st of April, 1846, by Sarah E. Mitchell, who claimed to be a creditor of the cst?Je of James D. Mitchell, deceased, by reason of the devise contained in the will of Francis J. Mitchell, quoted in the opinion of the Chancellor, and of the facts charged in the bill, all of which are fully stated in said opinion. The bill asks that the said claim of the complainant he paid out of the personal estate of the said James D. Mitchell.

<p>[The facts of this case are fully stated in the opinion of the Chancellor.]</p>

[The bill in this case alleges the death of Abraham Slade, seized of real estate, and leaving a last will and testament, containing the devise quoted in the opinion of the Chancellor. That Josias Slade departed this life without heirs of his body. That Abraham Slade, the testator, had eight children, five of whom were sons, one of whom, John Slade, was the father of the female complainant, and died before the testator, Abraham.

[The real estate of Thomas Taylor, deceased, was sold, under the decree in this case, for the purpose of distribution among his children, his heirs at law, one of whom was Frances McVey, the wife of Jonathan McVey.

John M. Hepburn presented a petition to the General Assembly by which he claimed from the state a large sum of money as administrator de bonis non of John Hepburn, deceased, who was a creditor of William, and Robert Mollison, whose property had been confiscated, leaving the claim of the petitioner, as he alleges, unsatisfied.

<p>[fraudulent conveyances.]</p> <p>The fact, that a part of the consideration of a deed from a father to his son was paid in money, though it gives to the deed, in legal contemplation, the character of a bargain and sale, cannot preclude a Court of Equity from looking to the fact, that the difference between the sum paid, and the value of the property conveyed, was, in fact, a gift founded on the consideration of natural love and affection.</p> <p>A father conveyed to his son land worth upwards of $20,000. The deed professed to be for the monied consideration of $12,000, but only $5,000 was, in fact, paid in money by the son. Held — -that this was a voluntary conveyance to the extent of the excess of the value of the land over §5,000.</p> <p>The services rendered by the son to the father, whilst he lived with him, and during his minority, cannot be set up as a part of the valuable consideration of the deed.</p> <p>A father is entitled to the services of his son during the latter’s minority, even though he does not live with him, and can maintain an action for such services, unless he has, by some act of his own, divested himself of his control over his son.</p> <p>Indebtment, at the time of the execution of a voluntary conveyance, from a parent to a child, is prima facie, though not conclusive, evidence of a fraudulent purpose with respect to prior creditors.</p> <p>But this presumption may be repelled by showing that the grantor or donor, at the time of the gift, was in prosperous circumstances, possessed of ample means to discharge all his pecuniary obligations, and that the settlement upon the child was a reasonable provision, according to his or her condition in life.</p> <p>When the indebtedness of the grantor, and the voluntary character of the deed are established, it is incumbent on the party claiming under the deed to show affirmatively, and by evidence that leaves no reasonable doubt upon the subject, that the grantor did not, by the conveyance, strip himself of the means to pay all his creditors, but that there remains to him abundant resources to satisfy them in full.</p> <p>If there be a reasonable doubt of the adequacy of his means, or if his property be so circumstanced that delays, difficulties, and expense must be encountered before it can be made available to the prior creditors, the conveyance must fall.</p> <p>If the remaining property of the grantor is encumbered, and litigation or difficulties must be encountered before the creditors can realize their claims, they are hindered and delayed, and the presumption against the deed, for want of a valuable consideration, will be fatal to it.</p> <p>Such a deed cannot, however, be impeached, because it may produce inequality among the children of the grantor.</p> <p>Where there is a parol agreement respecting the purchase of lands, and a bond of conveyance is subsequently executed, this merges and extinguishes all previous agreements resting in parol.</p> <p>A cross-interrogatory by the plaintiff, after referring to the previous statement of the" witness, that he had given a bond of conveyance to the son, asked, “when he gave it, and in whose possession it is at this time ?” In reply, the witness says, “he does not know; the bond will speak for itself; that it was and supposes now is, in possession of his son’s counsel.” Held—</p> <p>That this did not prevent the plaintiff from excepting to parol proof of the date and contents of the bond, and that such exception should be sustained.</p> <p>In this case, it being proved that, at the date of the conveyance to the son, the father was in embarrassed circumstances, the residue of his real estate being previously incumbered by mortgage, and the conveyance being voluntary, to the extent of near §16,000, the Chancellor deoreed that it could not be permitted to stand against prior creditors.</p>

<p>[CONVERSION 01? REALTY INTO PERSONALTY — DOCTRINE OE RELATION.]</p> <p>Where land is sold under the Act to direct descents, or by a trustee under the Act of 1785, ch. 72, for the purposes of partition, or for the payment of debts where the personal estate proves insufficient, the mutation from realty to personalty is not effected until the sale has been finally ratified, and the purchaser has complied with the terms of it.</p> <p>The ratification of the sale, and compliance with the terms of it by the purchaser, when done, do not relate baolt and work a conversion from the day of sale.</p> <p>The doctrine of relation does not apply to such a case; this doctrine is founded upon a principle of equity, and is never admitted to prevail unless required to advance the purposes of equity.</p> <p>Patents of lands relate back to the certificate so as to overreach prior grants, only when the holder of the prior certificate has a superior equity.</p> <p>As betw'een the heirs at law, and the next of kin, the superior equity cannot be with the latter; the policy of the law is to permit the estate to descend in the line of the ancestor from whom it came, and the inclination of the courts should be in favor of the heir.</p>

[The bill in this case was filed on the 19th of December, 1849, by the administrator of Mary Crane, against the executors of her late husband, George Crane. Held: in her own right, certain bonds for moneys dne to her by sundry persons; that after her intermarriage she died, leaving her husband, the said George, surviving her, who has since died, leaving the defendants his executors.

This bill was filed on the 14th day of July, 1828, by Charles Salmon against Elizabeth Clagett, Edmund Clagett, Samuel A. Clagett, John W. Clagett, Thomas Clagett, and Richard II. Clagett. It is stated and appears, that some time in or before the year 1816, William Clagett died intestate, leaving a considerable real and personal estate, and the defendant Elizabeth his widow, and the other defendants his children.

[George S. Davis executed a deed, dated the 25th of Sept., 1840, by which he conveyed, for the consideration of $500, certain leasehold estate to Daniel B. Banks absolutely.

<p>[The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the following opinion of the Chancellor.]</p>

[The deed attacked by the proceedings in this case, was executed on the 6th of September, 1850, and the grantor, Clark, applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws on the 11th of December of the same year, and the complainant John H. Falconer, was appointed his permanent trustee, who filed the bill in this case on the 15th of April following.

[William Plummer executed his will on the 6th of September, 1834, by which he devised two tracts of land to Beale Gaither, “to him, his heirs and assigns for ever.” The testator died in January, 1836.

[The hill in this case was filed by the creditors of Roger Tydings, to vacate a deed executed by Thomas R. Reard, and wife, to Mary Ann Tydings, wife of the said Roger, as fraudulent as against them. The deed is dated the 8th of January, 1848, and purports to he for the moneyed consideration of $144.

[On the 4th December, 1850, the complainant filed his bill of complaint in this case, against the defendant O’Neill and others, stating in substance, that by deed dated 17th April, 1843, Catharine Drake conveyed to complainant certain real estate in that deed described, and all other her property in trust for her use during her life, with absolute power in any manner, and free from the control of any future husband, to dispose of said property, and in the event of a failure…

<p>This was a creditor’s bill filed on the 14th of October, 1813; upon which on the 25th of April, 1816, a decree was passed directing a sale of the real estate of Duncan Shipley, deceased, to pay his debts. The trustee reported several sales which were ratified. And by a further report, filed on the 21st instant, and now submitted for the order of the Chancellor, the trustee states, that as a part of the real estate of the late Duncan Shipley, he had heretofore sold a small piece of land supposed to contain ten acres, for three dollars and a quarter an acre, amounting to $33 31|, to Seth Warfield, who gave his single bill with two sureties for the payment of the purchase money; that the sale had been ratified; and after the purchase money became due, he had sued Warfield and his sureties for the debt, by warrant before a justice of the peace; who upon hearing the case was satisfied, as this trustee was informed and believes, that there was either no land at all included in the certificate of sale given by said trustee, or at most not more than three or four acres to which there was any title or claim in said trustee; and, therefore, there was, in his opinion, a total failure of consideration, and he gave judgment of non pros against this trustee, with costs; which this trustee paid, amounting to one dollar. Whereupon the trustee prayed to be allowed the costs so paid to him ; that the sale be rescinded, &c., especially as he, this trustee, inquired into the facts and circumstances, and was satisfied as to the truth of there being almost a total deficiency of the land sold.</p>

This bill was filed on the 22d of January, 1831, by Eli Hewitt against Rezin D. Hewitt and Jacob Hewitt; it states, that Eli Hewitt died in June, 1827, intestate, leaving these parties his children and heirs at law, that at the time of his death he was seised in fee simple of certain real estate, and possessed of some chattels real, which being in themselves incapable of division, it was prayed, that they might be sold and the proceeds divided among these parties.

[The principal question arising in this case was, whether certain machinery furnished by various parties and put up in a cotton mill, was or was not to be regarded as fixtures. The machinery furnished by the Messrs. Denmead, referred to in the opinion, consisted of a steam-engine of 75-horse power, with the boilers, tanks, and appurtenances, and constituted a part of the motive power of the machinery of the mill, the other part being water power.

Susan F. Williams, widow of William E. Williams, and guardian of his four infant children and heirs at law Elizabeth C. Williams, William S. Williams, Mary S. Williams, and Otho H. Wil-Uatfis, on the iStli of April, 1827, filed her petition, in -which, as amended, she set forth, that her wards were seised of a valuable farm, in Frederick county, called Ceresville, containing about five hundred and twenty acres ; and also of a tract of woodland, in the same county, containing…

<p>[The facts of this case are fully set forth iu the opinion.]</p>

<p>[The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.]</p>

<p>[The hill in this case was a creditor’s bill, for the sale of the real estate of John Beard, who died intestate. The decree was passed, the land sold, and the Auditor’s account distributing the proceeds ratified, when John D. Meekins, a judgment creditor of said Board, filed his petition for the vacating of the order of ratification, under circumstances stated in the following opinion of the Chancellor.]</p>

<p>[The facts of the case necessary for an understanding of the Chancellor’s opinion are sufficiently set out therein.]</p>

<p>[The bill in this case was filed on the 15th of December, 1841, by William W. McClellan and Maria, his wife, and states that the complainant, Maria, who is the daughter of Richard Rennet Mitchell, while an infant, became entitled to a large estate; that her said father was duly appointed her guardian, took possession of her property, and rendered several accounts thereof to the Orphans’ Court; and that, by the final one rendered on the 5th of March, 1834, he was indebted to the said Maria, as his ward, in the sum of $14,891 14, which sum, with interest from that day, the bill charges to be still due and unpaid, with some small deductions. That said Maria attained the age of eighteen years on the 9th of March, 1834, and married the complainant, William, on the 11th of December, 1837. That to secure payment to said Maria, of all sums due by said Richard as such guardian, to said Maria and her sister Elizabeth, now deceased, (of whom he was likewise guardian), said Richard conveyed by deed, dated the 25th of August, 1825, to John P. Kennedy and John Glenn, all his real and personal estate, large and valuable, including particularly all the property conveyed to him by deeds from Henrietta A. Bedford and Thomas H. Wright; that said conveyance being in trust for the object aforesaid, was accepted by said Kennedy and Glenn, but they, without .making any payment to the said Maria, or any sales towards that end, upon some arrangement with the said Henrietta and one John Hillen, for their indemnification against the claim of the said Maria, and her rights and demands under said trust, executed a deed, dated 2d of August, 1827, conveying to said Henrietta and her heirs all the estate which was conveyed to them by said Richard B. Mitchell, which deed was confirmed by another from the same parties, dated the 25th of October, 1832. That said Henrietta, by deed, dated the 18th of October, 1827, conveyed to said Hillen a part of said property in trust, to sell the same, and apply the proceeds to satisfy the claims provided for by the'said deed of trust to Kennedy and Glenn ; and that under this deed, said Hillen has sold two pieces of ground, one to the Union Bank of Maryland, and the other to Rezin Wright; and that under color of said deed, the said Hillen also conveyed another parcel of said estate to said R. B. Mitchell, which has since been sold under a decree of this ■Court, to satisfy part of the complainants’ claim against said Richard, as guardian as aforesaid, as by the proceedings in the cause wherein said decree was passed, between the present complainants as plaintiffs, and said Richard and Elizabeth A. Mitchell, and said Kennedy and Glenn as defendants, will appear. That the proceeds of the sales to the Union Bank and Wright were applied to satisfy debts of said Richard, other than his liabilities to the complainant, Maria. That said Elizabeth A. Mitchell heretofore released to said Richard, and duly and effectually declared herself satisfied for all demands against said Richard, as her guardian as aforesaid; and that she has since died. The bill prays that all the property conveyed to Kennedy and Glenn (except that sold by Hillen to the Union Bank, Wright, and Mitchell) may be sold, and the claim of the complainant, Maria, satisfied out of the proceeds; that Kennedy and Glenn may account for all their proceedings as trustees as aforesaid; and if complainants so elect, that said Henrietta may be decreed to pay complainants all the money she may have received from sales of any part of said estate, and that the executors of Hillen may account for all moneys received by their, testator, from any sales under color of the deed to him,, and if complainants so elect, pay them all such sums of money as under said obligation of indemnity might be claimed by said Kennedy and Glenn from said Hillen, and for general relief.</p> <p>The defendants to this bill were, the said Henrietta A. Bed-ford, Richard B. Mitchell, Kennedy and Glenn, the executors of Elizabeth A. Mitchell, and John Hillen, the three former of whom, together with the executors of Hillen, answered jointly, and admit the guardianship of said Richard B. Mitchell, his indebtedness to his ward, the complainant, Maria, on the 5th of March, 1834, in the sum of $14,891 14; and that said Maria attained the age of eighteen years, and married, as stated in the bill. Their answer then states and charges, that said Henrietta A. Bedford was the daughter of Gaining S. and Elizabeth Bedford (the latter being the only child of Daniel Deady, formerly of Baltimore) ; that her father died in 1809, and her mother afterwards married the said Richard Bennet Mitchell, and died in 1816. That by his marriage with her mother, the said Richard became her guardian, she having become possessed of a large property, by the will of her grandfather, the said Deady. That being young and inexperienced, and left altogether under the guidance and authority of the said Richard, she was unhappily persuaded by him to become his wife, and not knowing that in her circumstances and relationship, this was forbidden by the laws of Maryland, she was married to him. That whilst married to her mother, the said Richard had three children, Elizabeth, Maria, and Frederick, the latter of whom died a minor, and that Elizabeth has also died within a few years past. That the marriage between the said Richard and Henrietta took place on the 26th of February, 1825, and on the 23d of March following, the said Richard, as this defendant Henrietta alleges, using his influence over her, which was at that time greatly increased by the peculiar circumstances attending his pretended marriage, and exerting a control over her, which deprived her of the free exercise of her will and judgment, induced her to execute a deed to him, dated on that day, by which she convoyed to him all the property and estate which she had received under the will of her grandfather, being all the property and estate of which she was possessed; that on the following day (24th of March), she was in like manner induced to join with the said Mitchell, in a conveyance of all the said property to one Thomas H. Wright, and that on the 25th of March, 1825, being the next day, the said Wright rcconveyed all said property to said Mitchell, by which proceedings he became possessed of everything she had previously owned. That these conveyances were obtained from her, under a full and complete persuasion that she was at that time his wife, she being aware of no legal impediment to her marriage.</p> <p>The answer further states, that this marriage was subsequently renounced by the parties, and that said Henrietta, upon becoming acquainted with its nullity, from that time no longer cohabited with the said Mitchell, who was afterwards prosecuted criminally and convicted for his infraction of the law.</p> <p>The defendants, Kennedy and Glenn, further state, that soon after this marriage, to wit, on the 25th of August, 1825, for what reasons they are not aware, said Mitchell executed to them a deed of trust of all the property which had been conveyed to him by said Henrietta, in trust, first, to sell the whole or part thereof; secondly, after paying expenses, to pay the claims of the grantor’s two daughters, Elizabeth and Maria, his wards; and third, to pay over the residue to him. That about the date of that deed, they understood that said Henrietta, and her two half-sisters, Maria and Elizabeth, were living on good terms, and they were then and subsequently frequently informed by said Mitchell, that both Elizabeth and Maria had expressed determination to release their father from all claims they might have against him, when they should come of age. That after the prosecution against Mitchell, above referred to, and after said Henrietta had separated herself from him, and taken shelter under the protection of her friends, proceedings in Chancery was instituted by her, to set aside her deeds before referred to, made on the 23d and 24th of March, 1825, by a bill filed in this Court, in July, 1826, setting forth the grounds upon which she asked a decree declaring them void, and to compel a reconveyance of the property, to which proceedings the defendants beg leave to refer, and to make the same, and the facts therein stated, part of this their answer. That about this time, also, proceedings were instituted in the Orphans’ Court of Baltimore County, to deprive Mitchell of the guardianship of his daughters, and an order to that effect was passed, and John Hillen was appointed guardian in his place. That from the time of filing the above bill in Chancery, and their becoming acquainted with all the circumstances of the case, they never had a doubt but that Mitchell had improperly, and by exercise of undue influence over the said Henrietta, and under a misconception on her part of her relations and duties to him, obtained the deeds of March, 1825, and that the same would be set aside and annulled ; and being under this impression, they lent their aid to obtain an arrangement between the parties, by which further litigation, and its unpleasant disclosures of facts to the public, relating to the unfortunate and disastrous incident of the marriage might be prevented, and the interests of the said Henrietta be protected as fully as by a decree. These considerations led to a settlement, by which the proceedings in Chancery were abandoned, and they (Kennedy and Grlenn), together with said Mitchell, executed a deed to the said Henrietta, on the 2d of August, 1827, reconveying to her, as stated in the bill, all the property they had derived from Mitchell. That indemnity w'as given to them by said Henrietta and John Hillen, as part of said arrangement, said indemnity being intended to protect them against any possible demand that persons conceiving themselves to have a claim might make.# They admit they executed the deed of the 25th of October, 1832, as stated in the bill. They admit that it is true, that said Elizabeth A. Mitchell executed the release, as stated in the bill, on the 17th of November, 1827, immediately after she came of age, and was no more, as they understood, than a compliance with her previously often-expressed pui’pose.</p> <p>And these defendants further state (a fact which seems carefully excluded from the bill) that the complainant Maria also, upon her coming of age, and upon the rendition of her father’s final account as her guardian, in like manner executed a full and complete release of all demands against him, declaring herself satisfied and paid all that, by the account rendered, appeared to be due by her said guardian to her; said release being executed on the 12th of March, 1834, a copy of which, together with the account of her said guardian, rendered at that time, are filed with the answer as exhibits. That if it be true, as alleged, that the complainants have heretofore obtained a decree, by which a part of this property called “ Longworth ” has been sold to satisfy in part the complainant’s claim, such decree could only have been obtained by default, or neglect to defend the case on the part of defendants, or was given by consent of said Mitchell, and that the release of said Maria, above referred to, was either withheld from that case as from the present, or that it was not set up by those who were competent to set up and maintain the same; in any of which events, that decree cannot bind the parties to this suit. They expressly aver and charge, that the said release was freely and voluntarily made by said Maria after she arrived at age, and was made and executed in accordance with her previous often-expressed determination to execute the same when she should be competent to do so; and that it was given with the express motive of relieving her father, who was without property or the means of livelihood; that it was given from a concerted determination between her and her sister Elizabeth, both of whom had abundant means of support to do this act for the benefit of their father ; that it was done by Elizabeth on her part, in 1827, freely and in good faith, and as freely and in like, good faith was it done by the said Maria when she came of age; that it was never the purpose of either to charge their father with the payment of said debts, and much less their purpose to wring from the portion of their half-sister Henrietta (a portion greater than their own, but in fact by her misfortunes rendered much less) the payment of their own father’s debt to them, and by such act further to impoverish her that they might profit by it. They further charge that it is not, nor ever was the wish or the purpose of the said Maria to invalidate or set aside that release, made nearly four years before her marriage; that she does not fully concur with or join her husband in this suit, but is induced thereto by his control over her, and they pray the Court to take means to ascertain whether it is with her consent and approbation that she joined in this bill, and whether she seeks to invalidate the release executed by her as aforesaid, and whether it is her purpose, notwithstanding this release, to take the property of her half-sister Henrietta to pay the debt which her father once owed her and which she released, as above stated.</p> <p>They then aver that the debt, if any, was due and payable on the 9th of March, 1834, and long before that date; and that the same not having been demanded within three years after the same became due, is wholly barred by the statute of limitations, which they accordingly plead; and in conclusion, sum up their answer as follows:</p> <p>“ First. That the property mentioned and described in the deed of trust, from Mitchell to the defendants Kennedy and Glenn, was originally derived by the said Mitchell from the defendant, Henrietta Bedford, upon a false and fraudulent pretext of marriage, and that consequently both the original deed to Mitchell, and Mitchell’s deed to the defendants, Kennedy and Glenn, w'ere void. This consideration was the ground upon which the case in Chancery to set aside the deed was settled, the suit withdrawn, and the property reconveyed by Kennedy, Glenn and Mitchell, to the said Henrietta.</p> <p>“ Second. That there was nothing in the deed of trust to prevent the parties thereto from conveying the property to the said Henrietta, she agreeing on her part to meet any engagement which the trust might have created, if it were valid.</p> <p>“ Third. That there is no just claim on the part of the complainants, the same having been released. That said release is intentionally kept out of view by the complainants, and that the complainant, Maria, does not voluntarily concur in this suit to invalidate said release.</p> <p>“ Fourth. That the claim of the complainants, if they ever had any, is barred by limitations and cannot be recovered.”</p> <p>The documentary proof in the case, consists of the various deeds referred to in the bill and answers. 1st. The deed of the 23d of March, 1825, “between Henrietta A. Mitchell, otherwise called Henrietta A. Bedford” and Richard Bennet Mitchell, by which the former conveys to the latter, in fee simple, for the nominal consideration of “ five dollars,”' all the property of every description to which “ she is in any manner entitled under the last wills and testaments of her grandfather, Daniel Deady,” and “her grandmother, Winefred A. Pollock,” or under either of them. This deed was acknowledged by the grantor in the usual way, as a feme sole, and not as a married woman. 2d. The deed of the 24th of March, 1825, “ between Richard Bennet Mitchell and Henrietta A. Mitchell, his wife, lately Henrietta A. Bedford, and Thomas H. Wright,” by which the former conveyed to the latter the same property absolutely, in fee simple, for the consideration of “five dollars.” This de.ed was acknowledged by the grantor, Henrietta A., in due form as the wife of the said Richard. 8d. The deed of the 25th of March, 1825, from said Thomas H. Wright, reconveying the same property to Richard B. Mitchell, in fee also, for the consideration of the sum of “five dollars.” 4th. The deed of trust of the 25th of August, 1825, by which the said Richard B. Mitchell, for the nominal consideration of five dollars, “ and also for divers good causes and other valuable considerations,” conveyed to John P. Kennedy and John Glenn, all the property of every description to which the grantor is in any manner entitled under the deeds above mentioned, or “ in any other way whatsoever, whether in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy, or otherwise howsoever,” in trust, to sell and dispose of the same or any part thereof as to them shall seem most advantageous, for cash or on credit, and apply the proceeds, 1st, to the payment of costs and expenses attending the execution of the trust; 2d, “ to secure and insure the payment of all sums of money, now or that may hereafter be due, owing, or payable to Elizabeth Mitchell and Maria Mitchell, from the said Richard Bennet Mitchell as their guardian;” and 3d, to pay the residue after satisfying the above objects to the grantor, his heirs or assigns. ,5th. The deed of the 2d of August, 1827, from Kennedy, Glenn and Mitchell, to Henrietta A. Bedford, by which, after reciting the deed of trust from said Mitchell to Glenn and .Kennedy of the 25th of August, 1825, and “that whereas, the said Henrietta A. Bedford is willing and hath agreed to pay and satisfy all and singular the debts due by the said Richard Bennet Mitchell, and intended to be secured and paid by and from the said trust fund, and the said Henrietta A. Bedford hath actually paid or secured to be paid all and singular the aforesaid debts, and hath also agreed to indemnify and save harmless the said John P. Kennedy and John Glenn, from all responsibility and engagements heretofore incurred or entered into by or on account of the aforesaid trust,” the grantors convey the property therein described to the said Henrietta A. Bedford in fee simple. 6th. The deed of the 18th of October, 1827, from Henrietta A. Bedford to John Hillen. This deed recites that whereas, in the deed last mentioned, “it is witnessed, that in consideration that the said Henrietta A. Bedford had undertaken to indemnify and save harmless the said Kennedy and Glenn, on account of certain debts due and owing by said Richard B. Mitchell, and therein mentioned, or the non-payment thereof,” the said Glenn and Kennedy secured to her the property therein and hereinafter mentioned, “and, whereas, the said John Hillen hath agreed to become, and hath actually become bound and engaged, together with the said Henrietta A. Bedford, and as her security in a penal bond to the said Kennedy and Glenn, conditioned to secure them harmless, as aforesaid, and for the purpose of securing and saving harmless the said John Hillen, on account of the said securityship, as also for the purpose of enabling the said John Hillen to raise money for the payment of the said debts, or some of them, by a sale of the promises hereby conveyed or a part thereof,” and then conveys the same property mentioned in the preceding conveyance to said John Hillen, in trust, to sell the same or any part thereof, and apply the proceeds, 1st, to the payment of the expenses of the trust; 2d, “ to the payment of all or any of the debts hereinbefore mentioned, with the interest and costs thereon;” and 8d, to pay the balance and such of the property as may remain unsold to the grantor and her heirs and assigns. 7th. The deed of the 5th of October, 1882, from said Kennedy, Glenn and Mitchell, to Henrietta A. Bedford, confirming their deed of the 28th of August, 1825, and curing some supposed defect in the description of the property conveyed. These several deeds were all duly recorded.</p> <p>The complainants also filed as evidence, two accounts of Richard B. Mitchell, as guardian of Maria Mitchell, passed by the Orphans’ Court, the one dated the 18th of April, 1825, and showing a balance due the ward of $10,809 55. The other called the “fourth and final account” of said guardian, dated the 12th of March, 1834, showing a balance due the ward of $14,891 14, and craves an allowance for that amount, “for property and money delivered and paid over to his ward, the said Maria Mitchell, she being now of age, as per release recorded appears.” Also, a release by said John Hillen to Henrietta A. Bedford, dated the 2d of April, 1884, of the deed of trust of the 18th of October, 1827. This release, after reciting the object of the said deed of the 18th of October, 1827, and the securityship of said Hillen, and that, by the sale and conveyance thereunder by Hillen of two parcels of the property thereby conveyed, namely, one to the Union Bank of Maryland, and the other to Rezin Wright, “ and from and by the income of said trust estate and property, and otherwise all the debts, costs, commissions, and expenses mentioned, or intended to be secured by the deed of trust above referred to from the said Henrietta A. Bedford to the said John Hillen, have been paid, discharged, and fully satisfied, and the said John Hillen has become and is wholly relieved and exonerated from the securityship aforesaid, and all liability heretofore assumed for the said Henrietta A. Bedford, as is hereby acknowledged by the party of the first part hereto, wherefore this indenture is executed, and is intended to operate as a release and reconveyance of all said trust property and premises, excepting the parts” sold and conveyed as aforesaid, and excepting also the farm called “Longworth,” and the slaves and personal property thereon, which were conveyed and released absolutely by said Henrietta to said R. B. Mitchell, then reconveys the residue to the said Henrietta A. Bedford, her heirs and assigns.</p> <p>The complainants also filed a transcript of the proceedings upon a bill filed in this Court by the present complainants, on the 21st of May, 1838, against Richard B. Mitchell, to set aside certain conveyances made by the complainant, Maria, among which was the release by her to him as guardian, referred to in the answers of the defendants. These proceedings resulted in a decree passed by the Chancellor [Bland), on the 1st of July, 1840, declaring the conveyance fraudulent, and confirming the Auditor’s account, which set aside the release referred to. To this record the defendants excepted, upon the ground that they were not parties to the suit, and the decree was therefore not binding upon them, and that they being-parties in interest, the omission to make them parties to that suit was a fraud.</p> <p>The defenclants on their part proved that Richard B. Mitchell was removed from the guardianship of his children, Elizabeth and Maria, by an order of the Orphans’ Court, passed on the 29th of June, 1825, and John Hillen appointed guardian in his place on the 2d of July following. That Richard B. Mitchell was indicted in October, 1825, for marrying his stepdaughter, the said Henrietta A. Bedford, and was subsequently convicted and fined under this indictment. He then offered the following release, executed by the complainant, Maria, before a justice of the peace, on the 12th of March, 1834, “ Know all men by these presents, that I, Maria Mitchell, one of the heirs and legal representatives of Daniel Deady, deceased, have this day received from Richard B. Mitchell, my late guardian, possession of the following property and cash, viz.:</p> <p>“Possession of one-fifth of one-sixth of sundry leasehold estate, . . . $2,550 00</p> <p>Also one-fifth of one-sixth of same, . 330 13</p> <p>And in cash, ..... 11,711 14</p> <p>Making in the whole the amount of, . $14,891 14</p> <p>being in full of all property and cash due to me by my said guardian, and in consideration thereof, I do hereby release, acquit, exonerate, and discharge the said Richard B. Mitchell, his heirs, executors, and administrators, of and from all and every action, suit, claim, or demand, which could or might possibly be brought, exhibited, or prosecuted against him, them, or any of them, for or on account of the said sum of money and property, or the payment thereof, hereby declaring myself fully satisfied, contented, and paid the said amount as above specified.” This release was duly recorded in the Register of Wills’ office in Baltimore County. They also offered the parol testimony of Dr. Gunning S. Bedford, the brother of said Henrietta A. Bedford, in relation to the marriage of his sister with the said Richard B. Mitchell, and the undue influence exercised over by him, and sustaining the allegations of the answer in other particulars. This evidence the complainants excepted upon the ground that it consisted of declarations made by said Henrietta, and was mere hearsay. The cause coming on for final hearing, the Chancellor delivered the following opinion.]</p>

<p>[The clause of the will construed by the Chancellor in this case, is set out in his opinion.]</p>

[In this case, certain real estate was conveyed to a trastee; in trust, for the benefit of Richard Gambril for life, and after his death, for the benefit of Ms wife, in case she should survive Mm, during widowhood ; and after her death or marriage, for the benefit of their child or children, and their heirs and assigns. It was proved that at the date of this deed, the dwelling-house on this farm was a small log-house, in a dilapidated condition, and an unhealthy location.

[Solomon Betts devised by his will his country-place, containing about fifty acres, situated within the limits of the city of Baltimore, to his wife and Jacob G-.

[The allegations of the bill and answer, and the facts of this case, will be found fully stated in the following opinions of the Chancellor.]]

[The facts of this case are so fully stated in the several following opinions of the Chancellor, as to require no additional statement.]

This was a bill filed on the 18th of July, 1809, by Samuel Coombs, in behalf of himself and the other creditors of Richard Jordan, deceased, against Richard Jordan, Ann Jordan, and James Cook.

[The original bill in this case was filed on the 10th of July, 1848, by George MaNeir, the then guardian of Hezokiah W. Coberth, an infant, against the defendant Basil Shepherd, as administrator of Hezekiah Coberth deceased, the father of said infant, for an account of his administration of the personal estate of said intestate.

[In this case, by the consent of all parties interested, a decree was passed for the sale of 650 shares of bank stock, standing in the name of trustees, in trust for the use of Mary E. Abercrombie for life, with remainder to her children. Mrs. Abercrombie had assigned her interest in said stock to the Baltimore Life Insurance Company, which consented to the sale.

[The complainants • in this case, in March, 1847, purchased of the defendants, and three other parties, certain lands, and took a bond of conveyance therefor, signed by all the parties.

On the 15th of September, 1806, John JVabb, by his petition, stated, that Charles Morgan, of Talbot county, a relation of his by marriage, was incapable of managing his affairs, and a lunatic; wherefore he prayed that a writ Re Lunático Inquirendo might be issued, &c. To this petition was subjoined an affidavit of two persons stating, that they had known Morgan for some time past, and believed him to be a person deprived of his reason.

<p>[The facts of the case are fully stated in the Chancellor’s opinion.]</p>

This was a creditor’s bill filed on the 18th of March, 1820, in Baltimore County Court, by Edward Austin, Edward Austin the younger, Anthony Austin, and John Austin, partners trading under the firm of George Austin &f Co., against Deborah Cochran, William S. Cochran, Thomas L. Emory, and William G. McClure.

<p>On the petition of a widow in a creditor’s suit, a commission may be issued to assign her dower. — Another person may be admitted as a purchaser in place of him who was reported as such. — After the sale has been ratified, and the purchase money has become due, the purchaser, and his sureties, may be ordered to pay ; and, on their failing to do so, the land may be re-sold at the risk of the purchaser.</p> <p>Where it appears, in a creditor’s suit, that there is any personal estate left, the executor or administrator should be decreed to account. — A decree for a sale establishes the whole or a part of the plaintiif’s claim. — Where a creditor neglects, on being actually notified, to come in, under a creditor’s suit, against the estate of the deceased as his principal debtor, such debtor’s sureties will be discharged.— A discount in bar, if not distinctly specified and admitted, must be shewn and established by him who is to benefit by it, or it will be rejected. — Where there has been a partnership, the partnership debts must be first paid out of the joint estate; and the separate debts first paid out of the separate estate.</p> <p>Where it appears doubtful upon the face of the voucher, the claimant must shew whether the deceased was principal or surety. — Where the deceased was hound only as a surety, the principal and co-surety, if there be one, must be shewn to be insolvent. — The original bond, bill, or note, should be produced; or, if lost, an authenticated copy, or other proof. — No claim can be admitted which did not exist, as such, against the .deceased. — Claims withdrawn, to be re-stated, considered in the nature of an amended bill. — Where creditors come in so late as to require the distribution to be re-cast, they must defray the expense of such restatement.</p>

[A deed of trust was executed on the 15th of January, 1823, by John Hollins, Michael McBlair, and John Smith Hollins, conveying to certain trustees certain real and personal property, consisting of two pieces of land, situated in the city of Baltimore, and “ all and singular the stocks, chattels, effects, claims, debts, and sums of money” specified in two schedules annexed to the deed, in trust, to sell and collect the same, and apply the money arising therefrom, in the…

<p>[The facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the Chancellor’s opinion.]</p>

<p>[CHARGE UPOH REAL ESTATE DEVISED.]</p> <p>A testator devised two tracts of land to Ms son in fee, upon condition that lie sliall keep and maintain Ms mother during life: “ and it is moreover my desire that my said son do and sliall provide for my daughters, Elizabeth and Susan, good and sufficient boarding, and comfortable clothing, so long as they may remain single.” Held — that this was a charge upon the whole real estate devised to the son, and that the daughters of the testator are entitled to a reasonable annual allowance for their board and clothing, or a gross amount in commutation thereof,, out of the proceeds of the sale of the land.</p> <p>This annual allowance is not to be made out of the profits of the estate, in common with the devisee and his family, nor are the daughters to be limited to a proportion of the interest on the proceeds of the sale.</p>

[The facts of this case are stated in the report of the former opinion of the Chancellor, in 1 Maryland Chancery Decisions, 452.

This bill was filed in August, 1806, by Cumberland Dugan and Thomas McElderry against The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. Tbe bill itself with almost all the other papers in the case having been lost, a copy of the original bill and answer were, by consent, received in their stead.

[Nathan Levering, by bis will, dated the 1st of February, 1827, directed, that bis executors should bold bis real and other estate, not therein otherwise disposed of, until his youngest child should attain the age of twenty-one years; and then directs the whole residue of his estate, real and personal, to be equally divided among his children, and be transferred and delivered to them, in possession, on the arrival of his youngest child at the age of twenty-one years.

<p>[EXCEPTIONS TO TRUST] ge’s sales.]</p> <p>When a trustee deviates from the terms of the decree, objections to the ratification of the sale will be allowed to prevail, which would be disregarded if urged against a sale in conformity with the decree ; and no deviation is more obnoxious to objection than selling at private sale when the decree directs a public sale.</p> <p>The trustee is the mere agent of the Court, and if he does not conform to the authority delegated to him, it is for the Court to say whether it will ratify Ms acts as such agent.</p> <p>His instructions are contained in the decree, open to the inspection of all parties, and if he does not follow them, no one dealing with him has a right to complain if the Court should refuse to ratify his acts.</p> <p>After he has put the property in market agreeably to the terms of the decree, and has failed to get an acceptable bid, he may sell at private sale, and if no objection be made, the Court will, after notice in the usual way, ratify the sale.</p> <p>Objections merely capricious or arbitrary to such a private sale will not be allowed, but it is open to objections which would not prevail against a public sale.</p> <p>The decree directed a public sale, and after one ineffectual effort to sell at such sale, the trustee sold the property at private sale at #17 per acre. It was proved that this sale was the result of a misunderstanding between the trustee and the mortgagor, whom the former had consulted and advised with in relation to the sale, and that #20 per acre could then and now bo had for the property. Held—</p> <p>That the sale ought not to be ratified.</p> <p>Inadequacy of price is a stronger obj ection to a private sale than to a public one, when the decree directs the latter; and though the inadequacy in this case might not be sufficient, per se, to set the sale aside, yet this, added to the misunderstanding between the trustee and the mortgagor, is sufficient to defeat it.</p>

<p>[REGISTRY ACTS — 3IARSHAELING OR SECURITIES — NOTICE TO A DIRECTOR OR A CORPORATION.]</p> <p>Conveyances of equitable interests in lands, .are within the Registry Acts; and the conveyance of such interest first recorded, must be preferred, unless the grantee had actual notice of the prior unregistered deed.</p> <p>The design of the Registry Acts was, that all rights, incumbrances, or conveyances, touching, connected with, or in anywise concerning land, should appear upon the public records.</p> <p>The Act of 1831, eh. 205, sec. 3, authorizing bonds of conveyances to be recorded, does not, nor was it intended to, touch conveyances of the title, either legal or equitable; its object and effect is simply to authorize the registration of contracts to convoy, and not conveyances.</p> <p>If the subsequent mortgagee, whose deed is registered, had notice at the time of mating Ms contract, of the prior unregistered deed, he shall not avail himself of the priority of his registry, to defeat it.</p> <p>But such notice must have been received, or chargeable, when the second mortgage was executed; for if a right had vested, when the notice was received, he has then a right to try his speed in attaining a priority of registry.</p> <p>The registered conveyance will not bo postponed, unless the notice is so clearly proved, as to make it fraudulent in the purchaser, to take and register a conveyance in prejudice to the known title of the party holding the first conveyance.</p> <p>Notice given to a director of an incorporated institution, privately, or which he acquires from rumor, or through channels open to all alike, and which he does not communicate to his associates at the board, will not bind the institution.</p> <p>But if the notice is given to him officially, for the purpose of being communicated to the board, although such notice should not be so communicated, the institution is bound by it.</p> <p>If one party has a lien on, or interest in, two funds for a debt, and another party has a lien on, or interest in only one of the funds for another debt, the latter has a right in equity to compel the former to resort to the other fund, in the first instance, for satisfaction, if that course is necessary for the satisfaction of the claims of both parties.</p>

This bill was filed on tbe 17th of May, 1831, by Thomas Compton against The Baltimore and Susquehanna Rail Road Company, George Winchester, William Gibbs McJYeill, Charles Cheesborough, and William Stall.

[The following opinion of the Chancellor in this case, was delivered upon the hearing of the motion to dissolve the injunction which had been granted upon the bill of the complainant, restraining further proceedings upon a judgment which the defendants had recovered against him in Anne Arundel County Court.

This bill was filed on the 8th of February, 1831, by William Price, administrator of John Price, deceased, against Mary Tyson, Isaac Tyson and Moses Sheppard, administrators of JYathan Tyson, deceased.

[The real estate of Thomas Maekall, deceased, was sold under the proceedings in this case for the purpose of partition among his heirs-at-law, and claims were filed by various parties against the proceeds. These claims are disposed of in the following opinions of the Chancellor. Claim No. 1 is founded upon a judgment recovered against the said Thomas Maekall, by Joseph W. Reynolds, and is presented by the executors of the latter.

This bill was filed on the 23d of June, 1827, by William S. Moore and John McKim, junior, against John Odom, George Law, William G. Harrison, William F. Jinderson, and The President and Directors of the Franklin Bank of Baltimore.

[The real and personal estate of George R. Spalding, deceased, was sold under the proceedings in this case, for the purpose of paying his debts; and the claim against it of Basil D. Spalding, is considered and decided upon by the Chancellor, in the following opinion, in which all the facts relating to the claim, are fully stated.))

[The first opinion of the Chancellor in this case, delivered on the 22d of November, 1848, is reported in 1st Md. Ch. Decisions, 306. The decree of the Chancellor accompanying the opinion was as follows: “ This case standing ready for hearing, and having been fully argued by the solicitors for the complainant and the defendant, the proceedings have been read and considered.

This bill was filed on the 5th of November, 1830, by Samuel Deale against Richard Estep and Henry A. Hall, surviving administrators of Rezin Eslep, deceased, and The President, Directors and Company of the Farmers Bank of Maryland. The object of the bill was to be relieved against a judgment obtained by these defendants, and to stay proceedings at law on that judgment.

■ This bill was'filed on the 5th of May, 1831, by William Stewart against John Chew; it stated, that at a sale made under a decree of this court, the plaintiff had purchased a part of the.tract of land called Elkton Head Manor, and was then in possession of it; and that the defendant had committed, and was then committing great waste by cutting down timber trees and doing acts injurious to the land.

This bill was filed in Baltimore County Court on the 25th of August, 1831, by The Bellona Gunpowder Company of Maryland, against The Baltimore and Susquehanna Rail Road Company.

This case was brought before the Chancellor in the Land Office-on caveats by The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore against the issuing of patents on several certificates returned by Isaac McKim, Jannet Hollins, Joseph King, junior, Robert Howard, John White, Thomas Wilson, John Spear Nicholas, Dabney S. Carr, John S. Smith, Robert Smith and James Howard, for separate parcels of the ground called Smith’s Wharf. These certificates and caveats were entirely distinct.

[The bill, in this case, was filed for an injunction to restrain the defendant from building upon, or otherwise dispossessing the complainants of a certain lot, situated in the city of Baltimore. The allegations of the bill and answer are fully stated in the opinion of the Chancellor, delivered upon the hearing of the motion to dissolve the injunction which had been granted upon the bill.]

[The real estate of Motley Young, deceased, who died intestate, was sold under the proceedings in this case, in aid of his personalty, for the purpose of paying his debts, and distribution amongst his heirs-at-law. Several questions arose in the progress of the cause, upon which the Chancellor delivered opinions.

<p>A right to take out a warrant of resurvey is an incident only of a legal title derived from a patent, or of an imperfect legal title under a certificate compounded on.— Where the holder of a tract of land by a legal title, by a warrant of resurvey, takes in some contiguous vacancy, and then makes sale of the original tract by its name and description, as the vacancy embraced by the certificate, under the warrant of resurvey, does not thereby pass to the purchaser, he cannot obtain a patent upon such certificate of resurvey.</p>

[The deed attacked by the proceedings in this case, was executed by the defendant, Henry Hook, on the 2d of June, 1842, and conveys to the grantee, James H. Miller, a certain lot of ground in the city of Baltimore, and certain leasehold interests in other lots particularly described, with the buildings and improvements thereon, “and also all and singular the plate, household and kitchen furniture” of the grantor, “in trust, for the use of the said Henry Hook, and Sarah Hook,…

This bill was filed on the 25th of August, 1818, by John Ran-dull and wife against Thomas Hodges and others, the administrators of Charles D. Hodges, deceased, praying, that they might be ordered to account for the personal estate of the deceased; and to pay to the plaintiff Eliza, the share of the surplus to which she was entitled as one of the next of kin of the deceased.

<p>[The facts of this caso are fully stated in the opinion of the Chancellor.]</p>

This bill was filed on the 18th of June, 1829, by Joel Post, Allison Post, and Waldron B. Post, joint traders of the city of New York, and Henry 0. Middleton, of Virginia, against Benjamin B. Maclcall, Edmund Key and Margaret his wife, Louis Maclcall, Rebecca Maclcall, Christiana Maclcall, and Caroline Maclcall.

[The complainant, Mary Ringgold, and her husband William Ringgold, sold to the defendant William A. Gr.

<p>[partition.]</p> <p>This Court will not sustain a bill for a partition, whore the title of the complainant is denied, or not clearly established by the evidence; bnt will retain it for a reasonable time, to give him an opportunity to make out Ms title at law.</p> <p>The fact that the defendant relies upon lapse of time, and limitations founded on long possession, is a strong reason for leaving the complainant to make out his title at law.</p>

[The hill in this case was filed upon the equity side of Baltimore County Court, and alleges that Samuel Owings, by his will, devised his dwelling and plantation, lying across Owings’s Valley, in Baltimore County, .in equal portions to his daughters, Deborah, Hannah, and Urath, giving the lower or eastern portion, on which was his house, barn, saw-mill, and other improvements, to Deborah.

[William Pinkney Whyte, as permanent trustee of George Suter, an insolvent debtor, who applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws on the 13th of March, 1846, filed his bill on the 10th of May, 1847, to set aside a certain judgment confessed by said Suter to the Bank of Westminster, on the 26th of November, 1845, for $9250, as a fraud upon the insolvent system.

[The real estate of William T. Wootten, deceased, was decreed to be sold, under the proceedings in this case, for the purpose of paying his debts. The decree directed the trustee to give “ at least three weeks previous notice, inserted in some newspaper printed in Prince George’s County, and such other notice as he may think proper, of the time, place, manner, and terms of sale,” which were one-third cash, and the residue in two equal annual instalments.

[The defendant, Jesse Brown, executed a bill of sale on the 13th of December, 1847, conveying to the defendant, Robert Brannan, all his stock of goods in a certain store in the city of Baltimore, in consideration of §800 paid by the grantor to the grantee. An affidavit was made to this conveyance by Brown, the grantor, that he received the full sum of money set forth therein, and purported to have been, paid to him by Brannan, the grantee, on the 11th of April, 1847.

<p>[INTEREST ON LEGACY — CONSTRUCTION OE MARRIAGE ARTICLES.] •</p> <p>Where no time of payment is fixed by the will and no interest provided for by its terms, the rule is irrevocably established that the legacy is not payable until the expiration of one year from the testator’s death, and interest does not commence until then.</p> <p>But where a legacy is given by a parent to a child, or where the testator stands to the legatee in loco parentis and the latter is otherwise unprovided for, then, whether a future time is fixed for the payment or not, interest will be allowed from the testator’s death.</p> <p>If other funds are provided for the support of the legatee, then, whatever ’ the relation in which the testator stands to the former, the general rule applies.</p> <p>A testator directed by his will, that his estate should be equally divided between his wife and daughter when the latter should attain the age of eighteen or marry; and until then, that his wife should occupy and enjoy the whole estate, to be applied to the proper maintenance of his family and the liberal education of his daughter. Held—</p> <p>That this provision for the maintenance and education of the daughter raises a trust, which Chancery will enforce.</p> <p>A direction in a will, that the legacy shall be paid “forthwith upon the decease” of the testator, or “ as soon as possible,” is not sufficient to supersede the general rule, that the legacy is payable and bears interest only from the expiration of the year from the testator’s death.</p> <p>By the terms of marriage articles, it was provided that “ from and immediately after the death” of the intended wife, $20,000 were to be set apart out of the trust estate for the use of her daughter then living, provided she left no other issue living at her death; and if she left such other issue, then one equal child’s share of the trust property, provided such share did not exceed $20,000, but only that sum if it did. This sum was to be ascertained and decided in writing by three disinterested persons, to be appointed by the trustee, the daughter, and the intended husband. The wife died on the 25th of April, 1839, during the minority of the said daughter, and leaving other issue, and the $20,000 were set apart for the daughter on the 9th of June, 1842. Held—</p> <p>That under all the circumstances of this case, the daughter was not entitled to interest on this legacy, from the death of her mother.</p>

This bill was filed on the 21st of April, 1826, by Thomas I. Hall, administrator of Thomas Tongue, against Thomas T. McPherson.

[The hill in this case was filed upon the 7th of August, 1849. It alleges that Gustavus It. Barber, being seized of a tract of land called the President,” lying in Anne Arundel County, and of certain lots in the city of Annapolis, executed to Ann Ridgely, now deceased, a mortgage of the said property, by deed dated 10th January, 1840, to secure the sum of $2,000, due by him to her.

This bill was filed on the 30th of November, 1831, by Robert Ridgely against Michael Iglehart.

<p>[The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the Chancellor’s opinion.]</p>

This Gill was filed on the 15th of December, 1820, by James JVeale, administrator de bonis non of Anthony Hook, deceased, against Edward Hagthrop and Barbara Ills wife, administratrix of John Hook, deceased, William McMechen, John Calor, John S. King, John Weaver, Samuel Moore, George A. Hughes, John Fitzgerald, Catharine Rawlings and Benjamin Rawlings, executors of William Rawlings, Matthew Bennett and JYathaniel Chittenden.

This bill was filed on the 4th of January, 1823, by Addison Ridowt, Joseph Jubere, John J. Gibson, Ann O. Gibson, John L. Tilghman and Maria E. his wife, and Horatio Gibson, against The Cape Sable Company, Richard Catón, Robert Oliver and John Oliver.