Volume 200 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The plaintiffs, M and H, sought to recover damages from the defendants for personal injuries they allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident in which their vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by the named defendant. Following a trial, at which M and H testified, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding them economic damages but no noneconomic damages. Thereafter, the trial court granted the plaintiffs' joint motion for additurs, ordered additurs of $8000 to the award to M and $6500 to the award to H, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiffs' motion for additurs; that court failed to identify the part of the trial record that supported its conclusion that the jury's failure to award noneconomic damages was unreasonable under the facts of this case; moreover, even if the court had sufficiently identified facts in the record to support its order of additurs, this court, after having undertaken a fact intensive analysis, determined that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove any noneconomic damages for pain and suffering caused by the subject accident, given the inconsistent and conflicting testimony and evidence, and the jury could have determined that the plaintiffs lacked credibility. Argued May 29—officially released September 8, 2020

The defendant, who had been convicted on pleas of guilty to robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, appealed to this court from the trial court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claimed that the agreement with the state under which he pleaded guilty required that his sentence run concurrently with a sentence he was then serving on an unrelated conviction. The plea agreement provided, inter alia, that, if the court imposed a period of incarceration of less than twenty years, it could impose a period of special parole, provided that the period of incarcera- tion and the period of special parole did not cumulatively exceed twenty years. Defense counsel requested that the sentence the court would impose run concurrently with the sentence the defendant was then serving. The court sentenced the defendant to concurrent terms of fourteen years of incarceration on the robbery charges followed by six years of special parole and ordered that the sentence run consecutively to the sentence the defendant was currently serving. On appeal, the defendant claimed that his rights to due process were violated because the court did not advise him that his sentence could run consecutively to the sentence he was then serving, and because his sentence violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States constitution. Held: 1. The defendant's unpreserved claim that the trial court accepted his guilty pleas without advising him that his sentence could run consecutively to the sentence he was then serving could not be reviewed; review under State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) was unwarranted because the defendant could file another motion to correct an illegal sentence, and this court's decision to decline review would not result in any hardship or injustice to the defendant. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the combination of the sentence of incarceration followed by special parole violated the prohibition against double jeopardy; the defendant's sentence was expressly authorized by statute (§ 53a-28 (b) (9)), and the combined period of incarceration and special parole did not exceed the maximum statutory sentence for the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. Argued June 15—officially released September 15, 2020

The plaintiff, F, whose marriage to the defendant, P, previously had been dissolved, appealed to this court from the summary judgment rendered in favor of the defendants, an attorney and a law firm, who represented P in several interrelated dissolution proceedings. F sought to recover damages from the defendants as a result of alleged vexatious litigation, which arose out of a declaratory judgment action involving a trust. F was the beneficiary of the trust and, during the pending dissolution matter, the trustees, without F's knowledge or consent, formed a new trust and decanted the assets of the original trust into the new one. The trustees then brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking approval of their actions in forming the new trust. The defendants brought a cross complaint against F in the declaratory judgment action, alleging that F violated his duty to preserve marital assets by allowing the trustees to remove assets from the marital estate. The trial court rendered sum- mary judgment in favor of F on the cross complaint, concluding that P failed to state a cause of action. On appeal, F claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in determining that the defendants had probable cause to bring the cross complaint. Held that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as that court properly determined that the defendants had probable cause to bring and to prosecute the cross complaint; contrary to F's argument, the trial court applied the correct standard for determining whether the defendants had probable cause to prosecute the cross complaint, and properly determined that a meritless action did not necessitate the conclusion that it lacked probable cause or was frivolous, the viability of the cross complaint did not depend on any false allegation that F knew of the trustees' intention to decant the original trust prior to the actual decanting and did not allege that F failed to act prior to the decanting, rather, the cross complaint alleged that F failed to act after becoming aware of the trustees' decanting of the original trust, and, accordingly, the court properly rejected F's contention that the defen- dants lacked probable cause because they knew that F only learned about the decanting after the fact, the trial court correctly determined that the lack of precedent in other jurisdictions did not render the defendants' cross complaint as being without probable cause, as the extensive record in the interrelated cases and the briefs submitted dem- onstrated that the defendants zealously sought a remedy for their client, and, when presented with the trustees' action, the defendants attempted to defend and vindicate their client's interests. Argued January 13—officially released September 15, 2020

The plaintiffs, J, A and their minor child, sought to recover damages from the defendant for trespass, nuisance and invasion of privacy, and the defendant filed a counterclaim against J and A alleging claims of trespass, private nuisance, invasion of privacy, defamation and defamation per se in connection with an ongoing dispute between the parties, who are neighbors. Following prior litigation between the parties and in response to vandalism in the parties' neighborhood, the defendant installed sur- veillance cameras on the rear of her property, facing the backyard of the plaintiffs' property, which upset J and A because, inter alia, they believed that the cameras were angled to monitor their child's play area. Soon thereafter, J and A installed floodlights in their backyard that emitted bright light into the defendant's yard and through her windows, and the defendant discovered a website connected to J that contained references that she was associated with child pornography. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant on the complaint and on the counterclaim and awarded $292,000 in noneco- nomic damages against both J and A on the private nuisance and intru- sion on seclusion invasion of privacy claims, and $250,000 as to both the defamation claim and false light invasion of privacy claim against J. The jury also found that the actions of J and A were sufficiently reckless or intentional to justify an award of punitive damages. There- after, the court denied the motion to set aside the verdict filed by J and A, awarded the defendant $32,600 in punitive damages and ordered a permanent injunction against J and A, limiting their use of the floodlights directed at the defendant's property and requiring J to remove the defam- atory statements about the defendant from the website. The court subse- quently granted the defendant's motion for contempt, finding J and A in contempt for failing to comply with its permanent injunction order. On J and A's amended appeal to this court, held: 1. J and A's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict because it failed to inquire adequately into possible juror misconduct was unavailing: J and A waived their claim that that court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of possible juror misconduct, as they assented to the court's decision to proceed with the trial without conducting further inquiry after its prelimi- nary inquiry into the issue; moreover, under the circumstances, the court properly limited the scope of its investigation of possible juror misconduct, it conducted a sufficient inquiry into the issue and its conclusion as to the absence of juror misconduct was adequately sup- ported by the record. 2. J and A could not prevail on their claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the verdict on the count alleging private nuisance against A and the jury's finding of recklessness, as there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict as to A; contrary to J and A's contention that A could not be liable for private nuisance because there was no direct evidence of her participation in the circumstances that led to the private nuisance claim, the jury was free to infer, on the basis of the circumstantial evidence before it, that A maintained sufficient control and responsibility regard- ing the activities on the subject premises to find her liable, and the jury was presented with evidence depicting a number of instances from which it could infer that A participated in the creation of the private nuisance intentionally and with a reckless disregard for the rights of the defendant. 3. J and A could not prevail on their claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the verdict because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on the counts alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy against J and its finding of actual malice: a. There was sufficient evidence on which the jury reasonably could have concluded that J's actions in connection with the website constituted defamation, as the ample evidence linking J to the creation and mainte- nance of the website was sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to infer that he had registered the website domain name using a credit card and that he posted the statements about the defendant that the jury determined to be defamatory. b. There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict on the claim of false light invasion of privacy as to J, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that the false light into which the defendant had been placed, as an alleged child pornographer, would be highly offensive to a reason- able person and that J created and maintained the website that published this accusation with knowledge that it was false for the purpose of antagonizing the defendant by misrepresenting her character. c. There was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to find that J acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory statements about the defendant on the website, as the jury reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of the ongoing hostile relationship between the parties, J and A's refusal to discuss the defendant's concerns about the floodlights and J and A's call to the police when the defendant put a letter in their mailbox, that the website had been created solely to attack the defendant in her role as J and A's adversary. 4. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the verdict on the ground that jury awarded double damages to the defendant; although the awards of $292,000 against both J and A for the private nuisance and intrusion on seclusion invasion of privacy claims related to the lights did not constitute duplicative damages, the awards of $250,000 as to both the defamation and false light invasion of privacy claims against J related to the website were duplicative, and, therefore, the court should have set aside the verdict on that ground. 5. J and A could not prevail on their claim that the trial court improperly awarded punitive damages to the defendant: J and A's contention that that court was required hold an evidentiary hearing, sua sponte, on punitive damages was unavailing, and the court's award of $32,600 in punitive damages to the defendant was well within its broad discretion; moreover, this court declined to review the J and A's argument that the trial court should have submitted to the jury the issue of the amount of punitive damages rather than resolving that issue itself, as J and A could not complain on appeal that the court's bifurcation of the punitive damages determination, to which they agreed at trial, entitled them to relief. 6. The trial court correctly determined that a permanent injunction was warranted; because that court's memorandum of decision fully addressed J and A's claim on appeal, this court adopted it as the proper statement of the facts and applicable law on this issue. 7. The trial court properly held J in contempt for failing to comply with its permanent injunction order requiring him to take down the website that contained the defamatory statements about the defendant; that order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous to support a finding of contempt, the record was unequivocally clear that J did not comply with the order and J failed to prove that his failure to comply was not wilful. Argued March 5—officially released September 15, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's motions to modify alimony and for contempt. Pursuant to the parties' separation agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, the defendant was required to pay the plaintiff periodic alimony equal to 30 percent of his gross annual compen- sation, up to an annual maximum limit. Thereafter, the trial court, follow- ing an evidentiary hearing, determined that the alimony provision was intended to include payments made to the defendant from certain pen- sion benefits and, accordingly, granted the plaintiff's motion to modify the alimony order. The court additionally found the defendant in con- tempt for his failure to pay alimony, and this appeal followed. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in interpreting the separation agreement to include his supplemental pension as a basis for a modification of alimony, which was based on his claim that the agreement unambiguously did not include that pension as part of gross annual compensation: the court correctly determined that the alimony provision was ambiguous, and correctly interpreted ''gross annual compensation'' as including the supplemental pension; moreover, the language of the agreement provided that the list of pay- ments qualifying as ''gross annual compensation'' was not exhaustive, and it was apparent from the record that counsel and the defendant contemplated the fact that once he began receiving this supplemental pension, that event could serve as a basis for the plaintiff to file a motion to modify. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in failing to interpret the separation agreement as distributing the supplemental pension to him at the time of dissolution was unavailing; the defendant's argument was belied by the facts in the record and arguments of counsel at the modification hearing, and the fact that the defendant crossed off the reference to the supplemental pension on his financial affidavit, remov- ing it from the list of property considered marital assets, led this court to conclude that the supplemental pension was neither considered a marital asset nor distributed at dissolution. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the alimony award: the court properly found that the alimony provision was modifiable with the exception of the annual maximum limit; the alimony provision was intended to remain modifiable upon a finding of a substantial change in circumstances, because there was no provision stating that alimony was nonmodifiable, and the actions taken by the court and counsel at the dissolution hearing ensured that the provision would remain modifiable; moreover, the court found a substantial change in circum- stances, and applied the applicable statutory factors (§ 46b-82); further- more, the court did not abuse its discretion as to the amount of alimony it ordered because, in order to ensure that the plaintiff received an award sufficient to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to the dissolution of the marriage, the court modified the alimony award, in accordance with the intention of the original alimony order. 4. The trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt: although the court found the defendant in contempt for wilfully violating the separation agreement's provisions relating to alimony, the court also indicated that the agreement was ambiguous as to whether the supplemental pension was considered employment related income; this court, having agreed with the trial court that the provision was ambigu- ous, concluded that the alimony order was not clear and that the defen- dant's failure to make payments from it could not be considered a wilful violation of an unambiguous order and, therefore, the record did not support the court's conclusion that the defendant's failure to pay was wilful. Argued May 27—officially released September 15, 2020

The plaintiff, a business invitee of the defendant company, brought a prem- ises liability action against the defendant, seeking damages for personal injuries she sustained when two empty boxes fell off a shelf and struck her in the head and shoulder as she was walking in an aisle of the defendant's store. After a trial to the court, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The court applied the mode of operation rule enunciated in Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc. (281 Conn. 768), and concluded that the boxes fell and struck the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence. The court determined that the store manager, M, and another employee, R, had been stocking merchandise in an adjacent aisle when a box on the top shelf of that aisle toppled over and into the boxes on the top shelf of the aisle in which the plaintiff was walking, thereby causing the boxes to fall off the shelf and onto the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly applied the mode of operation rule. Held that the evidence did not support the imposition of liability under the mode of operation rule or the affirmative act rule, under which proof of notice is not necessary because the defendant itself created the unsafe condition, as there was no evidence as to what caused the boxes to fall on the plaintiff: the plaintiff, relying on the mode of operation rule, failed to make out a prima facie case of negligence, as the record did not demonstrate that the defendant had a specific method of operation that was different from the general operation of a similar business, the only evidence about the regularity of any hazard came from M, who was unaware of merchandise ever falling onto a customer, the potential for which did not give rise to a regularly occurring or inherently foreseeable hazard, and the record was devoid of evidence that the plaintiff's injuries occurred within a limited zone of risk where the risk of injury was continuous or foreseeably inherent as a result of the mode of operation at issue; moreover, the evidence was insufficient to establish that an affirmative act on the part of the defendant caused the boxes to fall on the plaintiff, as M's testimony that neither he nor R touched the top shelf of the aisle in which they were working was not contradicted by any other evidence, there was no evidence that their actions in that aisle disrupted the boxes on the top shelf, and the court, even if it disbelieved M's statements, was not allowed to infer the opposite proposition, much less to infer that M and R negligently knocked over those boxes into the boxes that struck the plaintiff, and a photograph of the shelving that the plaintiff took following the incident was insufficient to permit an inference that M and R engaged in an affirmative act that led to the boxes falling on her. Argued January 9—officially released September 15, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for statutory theft in connection with her actions in withdrawing certain funds from a retirement account belonging to the plaintiff. The defendant had pre- viously represented the plaintiff in her divorce proceedings, as a result of which the plaintiff received one half of her former husband's pension funds, which were subsequently placed in an individual retirement account. Through the defendant's representation of the plaintiff, she obtained confidential information about the plaintiff and used it to with- draw money from the account without the plaintiff's knowledge or permission over a period of three years. In the defendant's answer, she raised the statute of limitations as a special defense, although she did not specify the statute on which she relied. The plaintiff did not plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in avoidance of the special defense of the statute of limitations in pleadings or at trial and, instead, raised it in posttrial briefs. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that she did not authorize the defendant to remove moneys from the IRA and that the defendant took those funds with the intent of depriving the plaintiff of those moneys. The trial court also rejected the defendant's statute of limitations defense, concluding that the continuing course of conduct doctrine, despite being improperly pleaded, operated to toll the three year statute of limitations. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the plaintiff's continuing course of conduct argument despite improper pleading. Held: 1. The court did not abuse its discretion in applying the continuing course of conduct doctrine, as it was within its discretion to reach the merits of the plaintiff's continuing course of conduct claim once it was put before the court, and it was within the court's discretion to determine that no party was prejudiced by the lapse in pleading; both parties failed to comply with the rules of practice, this court could not say that the trial court decided the matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic or decided the matter on the basis of improper or irrelevant factors, the defendant had ample opportunity to address the continuing course of conduct doctrine during posttrial briefing but she failed to specify how she was prejudiced by the plaintiff's posttrial invocation of that doctrine, and the trial court was in the best position to determine whether either party had been unfairly prejudiced by the defendant's failure to specify the statute on which her defense rested or by the plaintiff's failure to timely raise the continuing course of conduct doctrine in avoidance of that special defense. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly concluded that the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations, as this court concluded that this claim was briefed inadequately; the defendant's brief contained no citations and no legal authority, or citations to evidence in the record in support of her claim. 3. The trial court's findings that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the defendant's actions and had not consented to or authorized them were not clearly erroneous, as such findings were supported by the evidence and this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that any mistake had been committed; it was not the function of this court to retry the case or to reassess the credibility of the witnesses. Argued March 4—officially released September 15, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from certain postjudgment rulings of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the court improperly calculated his child support arrearage in violation of statute (§ 46b-224) and granted the plaintiff's motion to modify his alimony obligation without first providing him notice that it would act on the motion. The parties had filed a litany of postjudgment motions between April, 2016 and Decem- ber, 2017, that were either repeatedly continued or not acted on by the trial court. Thereafter, the court in January, 2018, issued an order notify- ing the parties that it would address all pending motions on a certain date in February, 2018. Held: 1. The defendant received adequate notice in satisfaction of his right to due process that the trial court might dispose of the plaintiff's motion for modification of alimony at the February, 2018 hearing: the January, 2018 order unambiguously stated that all pending motions were to be addressed at the February, 2018 hearing, the court had notified the parties at a previous hearing that the issue of alimony was to be addressed with all the other pending motions, at no point did the court affirmatively state that it would not rule on the motion for modification, and nothing in the record suggested that the defendant was without notice or that his ability to present evidence or to cross-examine the plaintiff was hindered; moreover, at no point did the defendant state his surprise or express the need for more time to present evidence, the record having suggested that he argued his position before the court and attacked the substance of the plaintiff's financial affidavit she pre- sented in support of her motion. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly ordered him to reimburse the plaintiff for her expenses related to fixing the septic system at the marital residence, which was based on his assertion that the court abused its discretion by failing to consider the plaintiff's conduct relative to his efforts to make the repairs himself; the court acted well within its discretionary authority in ordering reim- bursement, as the defendant was obligated under the dissolution judg- ment and a prior court order to maintain the residence until it was sold, there was no dispute that the septic system required repairs due to recurring problems, the court plainly considered the arguments of both parties and the evidence proffered in rendering its decision, and the defendant's unpreserved claim that the court failed to apply the unclean hands doctrine was without merit, as the defendant did not raise that doctrine with the court, which considered his argument that the plaintiff allegedly prevented him from accessing the septic system and was enti- tled to broad discretion in deciding whether to apply the unclean hands doctrine. 3. The trial court improperly failed to apply § 46b-224 in calculating the defendant's child support arrearage, the court's prior transfer of custody from the plaintiff to the defendant having suspended his child support obligation under § 46b-224 until the child was returned to the plaintiff's custody; the court improperly refused to deduct from the arrearage the amount for the period of time that the child was in the defendant's custody, as it appeared that the court refused to credit that time because the defendant had not filed a motion for modification of child support, § 46b-224 plainly required that a court order changing custody shall operate to suspend a child support order, and because the court made no finding as to the precise period of time that the child was in the defendant's custody, that issue had to resolved on remand. Argued February 6—officially released September 15, 2020

The plaintiff inmate appealed to this court from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendant D, a commissary operator at the correctional facility in which the plaintiff was incarcer- ated. The plaintiff brought an action against D in his individual and official capacities, claiming under federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983) that D violated his rights under the first amendment by denying his application to work in the prison commissary in retaliation for claims the plaintiff previously had filed against other Department of Correction employees. The plaintiff further alleged that D discriminated against him on the basis of race in employment assignments and violated the takings clause of the fifth amendment by misappropriating from inmate trust accounts the interest earned on inmates' Social Security benefits. The plaintiff had been employed in the prison commissary in 2006 until he was given a disciplinary citation and his employment was terminated, which he did not dispute. More than seven years later, he applied for an assignment in the commissary, but was denied by D because of the prior termination. At the time the plaintiff's application was denied, the prison had a written policy that provided that, for an inmate to be eligible to work in the commissary, he must have not been previously terminated from a com- missary position. The trial court dismissed the first two counts of the plaintiff's complaint, in which he sought money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against D in his individual capacity. The court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because sovereign immunity barred those claims. The court rendered summary judgment on the plaintiff's remaining claims because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e (a)) or to seek permission from the Claims Commissioner, pursuant to statute (§§ 4-141 through 4-165) to sue the state. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over his claims for com- pensatory relief against D in his individual capacity and in concluding that D was entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Held: 1. The trial court erred when it dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdic- tion the first two counts of the plaintiff's complaint, as sovereign immu- nity did not bar his claims for compensatory relief against D in his individual capacity: the trial court's application of the test established in Somers v. Hill (143 Conn. 476) to determine if the plaintiff's claim under § 1983 was against the state and, thus, barred by the eleventh amendment was incorrect, as the Supreme Court's decision in Sullins v. Rodriguez (281 Conn. 128) made clear that § 1983 claims must be analyzed pursuant to federal law and that the eleventh amendment analysis of Somers is wholly inapplicable, and, although the plaintiff named D in his official and individual capacities as the party against whom he sought relief, this court viewed the claim for damages as against D solely in his individual capacity, and, thus, the plaintiff's articulation of D's capacity in the complaint was sufficient to commence a § 1983 claim against a state officer in his individual capacity. 2. D was entitled to summary judgment on the first count of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged retaliation, and the second count of the com- plaint, which alleged discrimination, failed as a matter of law: a. The plaintiff failed to submit any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that there was a causal connection between his protected first amendment activity and the adverse employment action, as he produced no evidence disputing his termination from the commissary in 2006 or the existence and applicability of the prison's hiring policy, and he produced no evidence that D had any role in the adoption of the policy or that it was not applied in a consistent fashion to all inmates. b. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to D's discriminatory intent, as the plaintiff's prior termination from his job as a commissary line worker constituted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the denial of his application for employment in the commissary; although the plaintiff proffered evidence that tended to show that he was a member of a protected class who was qualified for the position and had suffered an adverse employment action, he failed to offer any evidence, direct or circumstan- tial, that established an inference of discrimination underlying D's rejec- tion of his application, and this court could not infer from his allegations of discrimination alone that D acted with discriminatory intent. 3. The plaintiff's takings claim failed as a matter of law, as he neither alleged nor submitted any evidence regarding an appropriation of his property or any evidence of an unconstitutional taking by D, his right to recover having been limited to the allegations set forth in his complaint, which alleged that inmates without Social Security numbers are denied employ- ment in the commissary. Argued February 19—officially released September 22, 2020

The petitioner, who had been found guilty of two counts of witness tampering and sentenced to concurrent terms of one year of imprisonment on each count, appealed to this court from the judgment of the habeas court, dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The petitioner's total effective sentence expired in December, 2011, after which he pleaded guilty to charges that had been lodged against him in 2008 and 2010 and for which he was sentenced to thirty years of incarceration. The habeas court deter- mined that, because the petitioner already had served his sentence for the witness tampering convictions at the time he filed his petition, he was not in custody, as required by the statute (§ 52-466) governing the filing of habeas corpus petitions. On appeal, the petitioner claimed that the habeas court improperly concluded that he was not in custody on his convictions of the witness tampering charges. Held that the habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as his sentence on the convictions of the witness tampering charges had expired long before he filed his habeas petition and, thus, he was not in the custody of the respondent Commissioner of Correction at the time he filed that petition; although the petitioner claimed that the sentences on the 2008 and 2010 convictions, and his sentence on the witness tampering convictions, should be treated as consecutive sentences under Garlotte v. Fordice (515 U.S. 39) because he lost one year of jail credit on the witness tampering convictions, the fact that he was sentenced to one year of incarceration on the witness tampering charges while he was in pretrial confinement on the 2008 and 2010 charges did not convert the former into a consecutive sentence as to the concurrent sentences on the latter convictions, which were imposed after the sentences on the witness tampering convictions had been fully served, any effect on the petitioner's jail credit due to his time served on the witness tampering convictions was merely a collateral conse- quence of those convictions that was not sufficient to render him in custody for the purpose of a habeas petition, and the mere fact that he was incarcerated at the time he filed the habeas petition was not suffi- cient to satisfy the custody requirement for purposes of subject mat- ter jurisdiction. Argued March 11—officially released September 22, 2020

The plaintiffs, M and M Co., appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of the defendant town planning and zoning commission denying their application for a special permit to construct a crematory on property owned by M that is located in an industrial park in the town. Prior to filing their application, the plaintiffs proposed a text amendment to the town's zoning regulations that would make the operation of a crematory a specially permitted use in the town's two industrial zones. Following the commission's approval of the text amendment, the plaintiffs submit- ted their special permit application and an application to construct and operate a crematory. Thereafter, the commission adopted a text amendment filed by the intervening defendant that repealed the prior text amendment, and, after holding four public hearings, it denied the plaintiffs' special permit application, determining that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that their application satisfied certain criteria for special permits set forth in the applicable town zoning regulation (§ 8.5.E). The Superior Court subsequently dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal, concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's denial of the plaintiffs' application, and the plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the Superior Court improperly concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the commission's denial of their application for a special permit, as there was substantial evidence in the record from which the commission reasonably could have determined that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that their application satisfied the general standards set forth in §§ 8.5.E.3 and 8.5.E.4 of the zoning regulations: on the basis of the testimony and the evidence in the record, the commission reasonably could have concluded that, by allowing the plaintiffs to operate a crematory at the location they proposed, the development of the industrial park and surrounding area and the welfare of the town would be adversely affected in that businesses and individu- als would be less inclined to either remain in or to purchase property in and around the industrial park and property values in the industrial park and surrounding area would be depressed; moreover, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, the Superior Court properly relied on St. Joseph's High School, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission (176 Conn. App. 570) in dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal. 2. The plaintiffs' claim that the commission improperly failed to consider their application for a special permit on the merits because of its predis- position to keep a crematory from being located in the industrial park and its conviction that it made a legislative misjudgment in adopting their proposed text amendment was unavailing: contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion that the commission's reasons for denying their application were insufficient, the commission authored a detailed resolution of denial in which it stated that it denied the plaintiffs' application, in part, because it failed to satisfy both § 8.5.E.3 and § 8.5.E.4 of the zoning regulations, and this court concluded that the commission's denial of the application on the basis of those provisions was supported by substantial evidence; moreover, the plaintiffs' reliance on Marmah, Inc. v. Green- wich (176 Conn. 116) in support of their predetermination claim was misplaced because, unlike in that case, in which deliberation over the plaintiff's site plan application was afforded one public hearing before being denied, the plaintiffs' application in the present case was afforded attention at four public hearings at which the commission entertained an immense amount of evidence and testimony; furthermore, to the extent that the plaintiffs challenged the commission's authority to repeal a text amendment to the zoning regulations despite contrary findings that it made when had it adopted the amendment, that argument was without merit in light of the commission's broad discretion when acting in a legislative capacity. Argued May 13—officially released September 22, 2020

The plaintiff, a minority member of the defendant B Co., a Connecticut limited liability company, sought to recover damages from B Co. and the defendant C for, inter alia, breach of contract, and sought the dissolu- tion of B Co. on the ground of oppressive conduct. The plaintiff and C formed B Co. for the purposes of purchasing and operating a cafe. C received a 60 percent interest in B Co. and the plaintiff received a 40 percent interest in B Co. A hurricane caused the cafe to be closed for a period of time, and, despite an oral agreement between C and the plaintiff that neither would take any guaranteed payments from B Co. for fifty-two weeks, the plaintiff continued to take cash from B Co. during this period. C subsequently reconstructed the cafe's financial history, which revealed that the plaintiff had misappropriated approxi- mately $190,000 of B Co.'s funds. C amended the operating agreement of B Co., and terminated the plaintiff as a manager of B Co., terminated the plaintiff's son as an employee, stopped payment on certain checks issued to the plaintiff and changed the locks on the cafe to prevent the plaintiff from accessing the building. The plaintiff commenced the present action asserting various claims, including breach of fiduciary duty and oppression by C, and seeking the dissolution of B Co. pursuant to statute (§ 34-267 (a) (5)), and B Co. filed a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty. After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants as to all counts of the plaintiff's complaint, and in favor of B Co. on the count of its counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that B Co.'s counterclaim stated a claim on which relief could be granted: B Co. pleaded facts which sufficiently alleged a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, specifically, that the plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to B Co., that the plaintiff breached that duty by acting in a manner that would personally benefit himself in the form of using B Co.'s funds for his own interests at the expense of the interests of B Co., and that B Co.'s damages were a result of the plaintiff's conduct; the plaintiff's emphasis on B Co.'s use of the term ''misappropriation'' was misplaced, as B Co.'s allegation that the plaintiff misappropriated funds was simply a recitation of facts describing con- duct in support of its claim for breach of fiduficary duty, rather than an attempt to state a cause of action for ''misappropriation.'' 2. The trial court improperly applied a six year statute of limitations to B Co.'s counterclaim: notwithstanding B Co.'s claim that it had set forth an action for an accounting, to which a six year statute of limitations would apply pursuant to statute (§ 52-576), B Co.'s counterclaim did not allege that it either made a demand of the plaintiff to furnish an accounting or that the plaintiff refused its demand, instead merely requesting in its prayer for relief an accounting of all B Co.'s funds that the plaintiff misappropriated; moreover, all of B Co.'s financial information was available to it by the time it filed its counterclaim, as evidenced by its calculation of the specific amount of money that the plaintiff had misappropriated; thus, although B. Co's counterclaim alleged that the plaintiff breached a fiduciary duty, it did not properly allege that the plaintiff's breach of that duty necessitated an accounting, and the plaintiff's breach of his fiduciary duty to B Co. did not prevent B Co. from ascertaining the amount of money that the plaintiff misappro- priated; B Co.'s counterclaim, rather, set forth a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, which is governed by a three year statute of limitations under the applicable statute (§ 52-577), and, because the question of whether the plaintiff's tortious conduct fell within that three year period implicated issues of fact, the trial court's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. 3. The trial court improperly rejected the plaintiff's application to dissolve B Co. on the ground of oppression pursuant § 34-267 (a) (5) because that court applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the plaintiff's claim: this court concluded that a new trial was warranted on the plain- tiff's claim of oppression as to all of the complained of conduct, except for the plaintiff's termination of employment, as it was clear from the record that the court did not assess the plaintiff's claim of oppression by focusing on his reasonable expectations as a minority member of B Co. Argued December 5, 2019—officially released September 29, 2020

Convicted of the crime of breach of the peace in the second degree, the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant was involved in an altercation with an instructor at a tractor trailer training school, where he was enrolled. The altercation began in the school's student breakroom and then continued outside to a parking lot area in front of a garage on the premises. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insuffi- cient to support a finding that the conduct giving rise to the conviction had occurred in a public place, a necessary element of the applicable statute (§ 53a-181 (a) (1)). Held: 1. The state could not prevail on its argument that the defendant's claim on appeal was unreviewable in that the defendant, through counsel, explicitly waived his right to have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the altercation occurred in a public place under § 53a-181 (a) (1) by conceding during closing argument that the altercation occurred in a public place, as defense counsel's remarks, whether viewed either in isolation or alongside the state's closing arguments and the court's jury instructions, did not demonstrate that the defendant intentionally relinquished or abandoned his right to have the state prove the public place element beyond a reasonable doubt. 2. The evidence was not sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of breach of the peace in the second degree, as the cumulative force of the state's evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to sus- taining the verdict, was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the area in which the altercation occurred was a public place; the plain and ordinary meaning of ''public'' confirmed that the legislature intended for § 53a-181 (a) (1) to apply only to conduct that occurs on property that is held out for use by all members of the public, not just select groups, and, based on the text of the statute, its relationship to other statutes, and the plain meaning of the word ''public,'' the meaning of the term ''public place'' in § 53a-181 (a) was plain and unambiguous, and the state produced no evidence showing that the area in which the altercation occurred was used or held out for use by the public, and the jury was left to speculate about the characteristics of the location. Argued June 17—officially released September 29, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of alleged prosecutorial improprieties during the state's closing argument and the state's examination of its witnesses, which resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair trial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the court pursuant to statute (§ 53a-70 (b) (2)). Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial as a result of alleged prosecutorial improprieties: the prosecutor's references to the complainant as the ''victim'' did not constitute prosecutorial impropriety as the prosecutor's use of the word ''victim'' was relatively infrequent, the court repeatedly instructed the jurors that the arguments of counsel were not evidence, the prosecutor reminded the jury at the beginning of her rebuttal that closing arguments were ''arguments,'' and, when defense counsel objected to the prosecu- tor's use of the word ''victim'' during closing argument, the trial court sustained the objection and immediately instructed the jury to disregard it, whereby the prosecutor promptly apologized in front of the jury; moreover, the prosecutor's statements expressing her opinion on the credibility of the victim during closing argument were proper argument because they reflected reasonable inferences that the jury could have drawn from the evidence produced at trial, and, as it was the defendant's theory of defense that the evidence showed that that the victim made up the allegations against the defendant, the prosecutor was allowed to address that argument in her closing argument; furthermore, the prosecutor did not improperly elicit comments on the credibility of the victim from the state's witnesses, as the witnesses' inappropriate answers to otherwise proper questions did not constitute prosecu- torial impropriety. 2. The defendant's unpreserved claim that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was under ten years of age at the time of the first sexual assault to support the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the court pursuant to § 53a- 70 was unavailing, as the victim testified that she was nine years old at the time of the first sexual assault, and this testimony, in conjunction with her testimony concerning the dates of the other incidents, provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to answer the interrogatory in the affirmative; moreover, even though the jury was presented with conflicting evidence as to the victim's age at the time of the first sexual assault, the jury was free to believe the victim's testimony that she was nine years old at the time, and, therefore, this court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding. Submitted on briefs April 6—officially released September 29, 2020

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction an action he brought against the defendants in which he sought to claim ownership of a campground unit that had been sold to A Co. by B, the conservator and executor of the estate of R. The plaintiff alleged that, in 2009, after R and R's wife had agreed to transfer the unit to him, he learned that the deed that was to transfer ownership to him had not been recorded and that A Co. and C Co. had potential ownership claims to the unit. In 2014, the plaintiff filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition but did not list the unit as property of his estate. In 2017, the plaintiff recorded a lis pendens and commenced an action to quiet title to the unit. In June, 2017, R petitioned the Probate Court for a voluntary conservatorship of his estate and person. The Probate Court granted R's petition and appointed B as conservator of R's estate and person. B, as conservator, executed a deed that conveyed the unit to A Co., which was approved by the Probate Court. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants H and P had witnessed the deed and were aware of his 2017 action. The Probate Court ended the voluntary conservatorship the next day, and the deed for the unit was recorded in the land records that same day. The plaintiff did not file an appeal to challenge any of the Probate Court's actions. Thereafter, in October, 2017, R agreed to quitclaim title to the unit to the plaintiff in exchange for his withdrawal of the 2017 action. A Co. then informed the plaintiff that it owned the unit. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss that were filed by B, C Co., H and P, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked standing as a result of his failure to disclose in the bankruptcy proceeding his interest in the unit. The court determined that, as a result of that failure, the plaintiff's claim to the unit belonged to the bankruptcy trustee, who was not a party to the plaintiff's action against the defen- dants. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the trial court improperly concluded that he lacked standing and that, because the Probate Court lacked statutory (§ 45a-646) authority to appoint B as conservator, all subsequent proceedings in the Probate Court were void ab initio. Held: 1. This court would not consider the plaintiff's collateral challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Probate Court: the plaintiff's claim, which he raised, for the first time, on appeal to this court, that the Probate Court lacked authority under § 45a-646 to appoint B as conservator, was based on certain letters that related to B's appointment as conserva- tor, which the Probate Court did not address in its decrees and for which there is no evidence that the Probate Court received; moreover, the plaintiff did not set forth any reason why he should be permitted to raise his collateral attack on the Probate Court's actions when he failed to appeal from the proceedings in that court and failed to raise his claim in the trial court, and the facts and circumstances of the present case did not constitute the exceptional case in which the lack of jurisdiction was so manifest as to warrant review. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly concluded that he lacked standing, as all of the claims he alleged in his complaint belonged to the bankruptcy estate; the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue his claims in those counts of his complaint that he asserted arose after the resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings and pertained to the October, 2017 quitclaim deed, as all of the alleged conduct purportedly occurred in September, 2017, when R's voluntary conservatorship terminated and the unit was transferred to A Co., and, thus, the only basis for the plaintiff to have standing to raise those claims was his interest in the unit that originated in 2009, which undisputedly belonged to the bankruptcy estate. Argued February 19—officially released September 29, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of various crimes, including murder, in connec- tion with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed. One individual, R, witnessed the shooting and called 911, but later, R was unable to identify the defendant in a photographic array prepared by the police. Several weeks after the shooting, the defendant and V were discussing the shooting in the defendant's vehicle, and the defendant admitted to having killed the victim. Without the defendant's knowledge, V had recorded the conversation on his cell phone and brought the recording to the police and, as the police requested, V then e-mailed the recording to the police. The state introduced a copy of V's recording into evidence at trial, over the defendant's objection. Held: 1. The trial court acted within its discretion when it limited two of defense counsel's closing arguments by providing the jury with curative instructions: a. Defense counsel improperly asked the jury to engage in speculation and improperly commented on facts not in evidence when counsel asked the jury to consider why the state did not ask R to make an in-court identification of the defendant, there having been no evidence in the record on which the jury could have based such a conclusion and counsel was well aware of the reason why the state did not make such a request; moreover, because it was well within the court's discretion to give its own curative instruction to the jury, the defendant's claim that the court was required to use the jury instruction language set forth in State v. Dickson (322 Conn. 410) was unavailing, as that argument was based on an incorrect reading of Dickson, and the jury instruction language therein was inapplicable. b. Defense counsel's investigative omission argument regarding the lack of a voice exemplar taken from the defendant to question whether it was the defendant's voice on the recording made by V improperly commented on facts not in evidence, the record having contained no evidence that defense counsel ever questioned any of the state's wit- nesses regarding a voice exemplar, ever sought a voice exemplar, or presented any testimony, expert or otherwise, on the subject of voice exemplars or police investigative techniques. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a copy of the recording of the defendant's confession was unavailing: the court did not abuse its discretion because a copy of the recording, rather than the original, was admissible pursuant to the applicable provi- sions of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§§ 10-1, 10-2, and 10-3) and there was ample evidence in the record from which the court could have concluded that admission of the copy of the recording would not be unfair to the defendant; accordingly, because the provisions of the Code of Evidence ensured a fair and just outcome, this court declined to exercise its supervisory powers to heighten the requirements for the admission of copies of digital evidence. Argued May 15—officially released September 29, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's postjudgment motion to ''clarify and effectuate'' the dissolution judgment. During their marriage, the parties founded E Co. The plaintiff owned 10 percent of its corporate stock and the defen- dant owned the remaining 90 percent of the corporate stock. In its dissolution judgment, the trial court found that the parties each owned a 50 percent equitable interest in E Co. and ordered, inter alia, that the parties execute a redemption agreement to effectuate the buyout of the plaintiff's 10 percent ownership of E Co.'s corporate stock and a deferred compensation agreement to effectuate the buyout of the plaintiff's remaining 40 percent equitable interest in E Co. In her motion, the plaintiff requested that the court clarify whether it intended to have her receive her 40 percent interest in E Co. tax free, notwithstanding that the dissolution judgment required the parties to execute a deferred compensation agreement to carry out that buyout. She further requested that the court order the defendant to execute certain corporate docu- ments prepared by her counsel, which included a redemption agreement pursuant to which the plaintiff would receive her entire 50 percent interest in E Co. tax free and did not include a deferred compensation agreement. The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, stating that it was clarifying the terms of the dissolution judgment and that it intended that the plaintiff receive the 40 percent interest of E Co. tax free in the buyout. In addition, the court ordered the defendant to execute the corporate documents prepared by the plaintiff's counsel. Held that the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by opening and modifying the dissolution judgment in granting the plaintiff's motion to ''clarify and effectuate'' the dissolution judgment when the plaintiff did not request such relief; although, in granting the plaintiff's motion, that court modified, rather than clarified, the dissolution judgment, the court properly exercised its statutory (§ 52- 212a) authority to open and modify the judgment because the plaintiff, within four months of the judgment, filed a motion that, despite being titled as a motion to ''clarify and effectuate'' the dissolution judgment was, in substance, a motion to open and modify the judgment pursuant to § 52-212a, and the defendant was apprised of the relief requested by the plaintiff and that the dissolution judgment would be modified if the court granted her motion. Argued May 18—officially released September 29, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various drug and weapons charges, appealed to this court following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had been convicted at a second trial after our Supreme Court had reversed the judgment of conviction at his first trial. At the petitioner's first habeas trial, the court reporter alleged that the habeas judge, C, a police detec- tive, and P, the prosecutor at both of the petitioner's criminal trials, were involved in a scheme in which C gave hand signals to P during her testimony that prompted the judge to interrupt or to allow P to finish her answer before offering a different answer and an opportunity to amend her response. The Office of the Chief State's Attorney there- after conducted an investigation and prepared a written report, and the habeas judge declared a mistrial after more than six months passed since the judge had last heard evidence. At the petitioner's second habeas trial, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that P, at his first criminal trial, had intentionally failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in viola- tion of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) and elicited perjured testimony from L, who, in exchange for leniency in connection with a drug offense he had been charged with, cooperated with the police in arranging to purchase drugs from the petitioner. The petitioner further alleged that P's Brady violations constituted prosecutorial impropriety that rendered his prosecution at his second criminal trial a violation of his right against double jeopardy. Finally, the petitioner alleged that F, his defense coun- sel at the second criminal trial, had rendered ineffective assistance and had a conflict of interest that resulted from F's employment as a police officer while representing the petitioner. The habeas court denied each of the petitioner's claims, and rendered judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his petition for certification to appeal. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petition- er's petition for certification to appeal on the ground that it improperly denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing to preclude the testimony of P and C: the court's prohibition of P's testimony would have frustrated its ability to adjudicate the petitioner's claims, the need for an evidentiary hearing was outweighed by the time and resources that would have been expended to conduct such a proceeding, and, although the court invited the petitioner to make whatever record he wanted as to the hand-signaling scheme that might support his Brady and double jeopardy claims, the petitioner did not make an offer of proof, call P, C or the court reporter as witnesses or bring to the court's attention the report by the chief state's attorney's office; moreover, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the court was not required to conduct a collateral evidentiary hearing to explore the hand-signaling incident, as the second habeas trial was a collateral hearing that was dedicated in part to the adjudication of his Brady and double jeopardy claims, the court's denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing was harmless, as any evidence developed at such a hearing as to P's intent to commit Brady violations or that damaged her credibility would not have meaningfully enhanced the merits of his double jeopardy claim, and, even if the petitioner had proven that P's nondisclosures constituted a Brady violation, the relief was a new trial, which he received when the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction at his first trial; furthermore, the petitioner could not prove his double jeopardy claim, as the evidence overwhelm- ingly supported the petitioner's convictions, and, thus, it was unlikely that P would have believed during the petitioner's first criminal trial that he was likely to be acquitted in the absence of her allegedly inten- tional Brady violations, and, although L falsely testified during the first criminal trial that he had been arrested for possession of narcotics he purchased from the petitioner, the source of the drugs that led to L's arrest was of minimal relevance to the charges against the petitioner, as the police officers who testified never stated that those drugs were connected to L's cooperation with the police. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioner certification to appeal on the ground that it improperly denied his claim that F rendered ineffective assistance; the petitioner did not present this court with any law that held that F's simultaneous representation of the petitioner and his employment as a police officer established a conflict of interest, the petitioner did not point out any specific instances that suggested that F's interests were compromised for the benefit of a third party or any errors by F that were so serious that he did not function as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and, although the petitioner asserted that F had a conflict of interest because he was required by statute (§ 54-1f) to arrest the petitioner if F had reasonable grounds to suspect that the petitioner had committed a felony crime, the petitioner did not direct this court to any specific instance in which § 54-1f or any other legal obligation F had as a police officer impaired his ability to provide the petitioner with adequate and uncom- promised defense representation. Argued June 17—officially released September 29, 2020

The plaintiff sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant P, who filed an answer with special defenses and counterclaims. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike all of the defendant's special defenses and counterclaims. Several of the special defenses challenged the plaintiff's standing to commence the foreclosure action. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the plaintiff had standing and granted the plaintiff's motion to strike the special defenses that implicated the plaintiff's standing and denied the motion to strike as to the remaining special defenses and all of the counterclaims. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring the foreclosure action; the court found credible evidence demonstrated that the note had been endorsed in blank prior to the commencement of the foreclosure action and had been in the plaintiff's possession until the time of trial; moreover, the defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff, as holder of the note, was the rightful owner of the debt, as the court clearly credited testimony regarding when the note was endorsed and rejected assertions made by the defendant that the plaintiff was not in possession of the note during a certain time period. 2. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court properly concluded that a decision of a New York court did not have preclusive effect under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; the parties in the present case were not in privity with the parties in the New York case and the cases involved factually distinct claims and different loans. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether the trust for which the plaintiff is trustee ever received the note and mortgage was unavailing; the court did in fact address this argument in its memorandum of decision on the foreclosure complaint and clearly rejected it, and the defendant failed to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the plaintiff was owner of the debt and entitled to enforce the terms of the note and mortgage and it was unclear whether the defendant could even challenge the nature of the transfer. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making certain evidentiary rulings denying certain of the defendant's motions and requests; it was not improper for the court to deny the defendant's motion for leave to add special defenses as that request was made more than three years after the commencement of the foreclosure action and only after the court had granted in part the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's special defenses; moreover, the court was within its discretion to deny the defendant's requests for deposition commissions in light of the fact that the defendant failed to show that certain of the proposed individuals had any knowledge of the note or that the denial hamstrung his ability to rebut the plaintiff's presumption of ownership of the note; further- more, the court properly determined that cease and desist orders of a New York state agency directed at the original lender that the defendant sought to introduce into evidence were irrelevant to the issue of standing, and the defendant did not pursue their admissibility. Argued January 21—officially released October 6, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of two counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of statute (§ 53-21 (a) (1) & (2)), stemming from his alleged sexual abuse of his minor child, the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence portions of the video recording of a forensic interview with the defen- dant's child conducted by C, a licensed clinical social worker, because the child's statements failed to satisfy the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against hearsay as set forth in the Code of Evidence (§ 8-3 (5)): the state failed to adequately demonstrate that the statements were reasonably pertinent to obtaining medical treatment as the state could not demonstrate that the child understood C's interview to be for medical treatment, the child had received medical care prior to the forensic interview and the record did not establish that the forensic interview was used to inform the subsequent medical examination of the child, and the basic purpose of the interview was for an investigative purpose; moreover, the court's error was not harmless and substantially affected the jury's verdict, as there was a lack of corroboration in the form of witnesses to the alleged sexual abuse or physical evidence, the child's trial testimony was at times contradictory but also inconsistent with statements made during the forensic interview, and the fact that the jury deadlocked on a count of sexual assault in the first degree supported the conclusion that the admission of portions of the forensic interview played a significant role in the jury's verdict of guilty of two counts of risk of injury to a child. Argued May 11—officially released October 6, 2020

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of sexual assault in the second degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he requested a jury instruc- tion, which the trial court accepted and modified before instructing the jury, that contained a mandatory presumption that, if the jury believed that the petitioner's prior sexual misconduct had occurred, it was required to find that that conduct supported a theory that the petitioner had a propensity to commit similar criminal sexual misconduct. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal using a Judicial Branch form on which he marked a box that stated that his grounds for appeal were written in a separate Judicial Branch form that pertained to the application for the appointment of appellate counsel and the waiver of fees, costs and expenses for the appeal to this court. The petitioner failed to attach that application form to his petition for certifi- cation to appeal. After the habeas court denied the petition for certifica- tion to appeal because it did not state any grounds for appeal, the petitioner filed an application for appointment of counsel form on which he identified the proposed grounds for appeal. The habeas court there- after granted the application for a waiver of fees, costs and expenses and appointed appellate counsel, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal: the habeas court was not apprised of the issue or issues that the petitioner sought to raise on appeal, as the petition for certification to appeal form did not state any grounds on which he proposed to appeal, the petitioner did not attach the application form to his petition for certification to appeal form, and, although the petitioner claimed that the habeas court should have reasonably con- cluded that he intended to appeal from the denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the habeas court was left to speculate as to what issue or issues he might have sought to raise on appeal, and his concession that certain other potential claims fell outside the scope of the habeas court's denial of certification to appeal did not negate his failure before the habeas court; furthermore, the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was unavailing, as the trial court provided the jury with limiting instructions concerning the evidence of his prior sexual misconduct that were sufficient to counteract any ambiguity in his counsel's requested instruction, the petitioner was not prejudiced by the court's jury instruction, as the factual similarities between the prior sexual misconduct and that with which he was charged made the evidence of the prior misconduct so probative of his propensity to commit similar misconduct that there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different, irrespective of any ambiguity in the court's instruction regarding the petitioner's prior sexual misconduct, and there was strong evidence to support the jury's finding that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse with the peti- tioner. Argued July 1—officially released October 6, 2020

The plaintiff administrator of the estate of the decedent sought to recover damages from the defendant S for negligence in connection with the drug overdose and subsequent death of the decedent at her residence. He alleged that, on the day that the decedent overdosed, B, who lived with S at her residence, invited the decedent to consume drugs at the residence where the decedent became unresponsive and unconscious, that the decedent thereafter died and that the decedent's injuries and death were caused by S's negligence in that she knew or should have known that drugs were being used on the premises and she failed, inter alia, to take any action to remove the drugs from the premises. S filed a motion for summary judgment and an affidavit in support thereof in which she averred that she did not invite the decedent to her residence and B did not ask her permission to have him there, that she was not present at her residence when the decedent was there and that she did not learn that he had been there until the day after he had overdosed. Thereafter, the trial court granted, over S's objection, two motions filed by the plaintiff for an extension of time to respond to S's motion for summary judgment. Nearly two weeks after the second deadline date and four days before the rescheduled date for oral argument on S's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed a third motion for an extension of time, which the court did not act on. Thereafter, following a hearing, the trial court granted S's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in effectively denying his third motion for an extension of time to respond to S's motion for summary judgment because additional time for discovery was needed to obtain B's medical records and to perform depositions of other witnesses was unavailing; the plaintiff already had been granted two prior motions for an extension of time and there were no affidavits before the trial court articulating with specificity what additional discov- ery might justify a further continuance of the hearing and, potentially, the trial, the third motion for an extension of time was filed just four days before the rescheduled hearing and there was an absence of information verified by affidavit detailing precisely what facts were within the exclu- sive knowledge of the person to be deposed. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly granted S's motion for summary judgment, which was based on his assertion that that court erred in determining that there was no disputed issue of material fact that S did not owe a duty of care to the decedent: no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether S was at her residence when the decedent was there, as the only evidence before the court on that issue was S's affidavit in which she averred that she was not present when he was there; moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's contention that S had a duty to aid and to protect the decedent because she knew or should have known that B possessed drugs and alcohol in her residence and that they would cause the decedent harm, on the basis of the evidence presented, this court could not conclude that an ordinary person in S's position would anticipate that the decedent would ingest drugs in her residence and suffer serious physical injuries that would result in his death, and the plaintiff did not allege any recognized special relationship of custody or control between the decedent and S that would warrant the imposition of a duty; furthermore, the plaintiff's assertion that S owed the decedent a duty of care under the theory of premises liability was without merit, as he failed to provide any case law to support his contention that B's possession of drugs and alcohol constituted a defect on S's premises. Argued February 18—officially released October 6, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of unlawful restraint in the first degree and breach of the peace in the second degree in connection with an incident involv- ing his former wife, T, and their two sons, the defendant appealed to this court. He claimed that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial and that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on a certain lesser included offense. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated when T testified on cross-examination as to his prior bad acts and arrests, his claim being unpreserved and not of constitutional magnitude: the claim was not reviewable because the defendant failed to preserve it at trial by either moving to strike the testimony at issue or seeking a curative instruction; moreover, the defen- dant's claim was not of constitutional magnitude, and, therefore, not reviewable under the second prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), the admission of evidence of a defendant's other crimes being controlled by the law of evidence, not principles of constitutional law. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial impropriety in that one of the two prosecutors who represented the state objected during his cross-examination of a witness despite not having conducted the direct examination of that witness, the claimed error having not constituted prosecutorial impropri- ety; our rule of practice (§ 5-4), on which the defendant based his claim, concerns the examination or cross-examination of a single witness by counsel for one party, and there is nothing explicit in the rule regarding whether one counsel alone is required to object to opposing counsel's examination of a witness. 3. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of unlawful restraint in the second degree, his claim being unpreserved, as it was waived; the defendant did not submit a request to charge, ask the court to include an instruction on that lesser included offense after he had reviewed the court's proposed charge, or take an exception to the charge as given, and therefore acquiesced in the charge and waived the right to raise the claim on appeal. Argued June 29—officially released October 6, 2020

The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the parties joint legal custody of their minor child and giving the defendant unsupervised visitation. The plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in awarding the defendant unsupervised visitation and in not finding that he had substance abuse issues. After the commencement of her appeal, the plaintiff filed a postjudgment motion to modify the custody and visitation order. The court modified the visitation order, changing the defendant's visitation to supervised visits and finding that the defendant had substance abuse issues. Held that the plaintiff's appeal was dismissed as moot because the aspects of the custody order that she challenged on appeal were superseded by the subsequent order issued in response to the plaintiff's motion to modify; moreover, although an order superseding the order of joint legal custody was not issued, the plaintiff failed to adequately brief this issue on appeal and, therefore, any claim of error pertaining to the order of joint custody was not properly before this court. Argued May 22—officially released October 6, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it went beyond the scope of this court's remand order in a prior appeal involving the parties when construing their separation agreement, which had been incorpo- rated into the dissolution judgment, and calculating the alimony arrear- age the plaintiff owed to the defendant. In her prior appeal to this court from the judgment dissolving her marriage, the defendant claimed that the dissolution court erred in calculating the plaintiff's alimony obliga- tion on the basis of his W-2 income without considering the K-1 distribu- tions to him from A Co., of which he was an owner. This court concluded that the separation agreement was ambiguous as to whether the K-1 distributions from A Co. were to be included in the plaintiff's pre-tax income from employment and, if so, to what extent. This court further concluded that the dissolution court had improperly granted the plain- tiff's motion to modify alimony. In its rescript, this court thus reversed the dissolution court's granting of the plaintiff's motion to modify ali- mony and the court's calculation of his alimony arrearage, affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the parties' intent and to determine the plaintiff's alimony arrearage accordingly. On remand, the trial court first determined that the intent of the parties was that some K-1 distributions to the plaintiff from A Co. should be included in the plaintiff's pre-tax income. The court then found that the parties had adopted the reasonable compensation calculation to establish the plaintiff's pre-tax income for alimony pur- poses and modified his alimony obligation for the nearly four years prior to the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony. Held: 1. The trial court acted within the scope of this court's remand order when it used the methodology of reasonable compensation to determine the plaintiff's pre-tax income in the context of effectuating the parties' sepa- ration agreement, the relevant provisions of which this court had deter- mined to be ambiguous: the trial court's use of the plaintiff's reasonable compensation instead of his pre-tax income did not alter the terms of the separation agreement and change the formula on which the dissolution proceedings were premised. 2. The defendant could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred when it used the plaintiff's reasonable compensation to determine his alimony obligation, which was based on her assertion that this court's determination that the alimony calculation was to be made using pre- tax income was the law of the case: because the trial court acted within the scope of this court's remand order, it could not have violated, and did not fail to abide by, the principle that an appellate court's opinion establishes the law of the case, and, contrary to the defendant's assertion, this court's affirmance of the trial court's judgment in all respects other than its granting of the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony and calcula- tion of his arrearage did not mean that the trial court correctly used his actual income rather reasonable compensation to calculate the arrearage and did not establish the trial court's calculations as the law of the case on remand; furthermore, this court's affirmance of the trial court's judgment in other respects addressed the trial court's decisions to decline to award the defendant interest and to reject her claim that the trial court erred in failing to find the plaintiff in contempt. 3. The defendant's claim that the trial court improperly considered the plaintiff's argument, which he did not advance in prior proceedings, that his alimony obligation should be based on his reasonable compensa- tion was unavailing; although the defendant's assertion rested on the principle that an appellant who fails to brief a claim abandons that claim, the plaintiff was the appellee in this appeal and in this court's decision that reversed in part the trial court's judgment, and our Supreme Court has declined to depart from the principle that an appellee will not be deemed to have forfeited a claim that could have been, but was not, brought in the context of an appellant's appeal. 4. The trial court's determination of the plaintiff's pre-tax income on the basis of his reasonable compensation was not clearly erroneous, as the court reasonably found that the parties had adopted the reasonable compensation calculation in their separation agreement and properly carried that methodology forward, that determination having been sup- ported by evidence in the record. 5. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not improperly modify alimony retroactively for a period of four years prior to the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony, that court having interpreted and effectuated the separation agreement's alimony provision as it was directed to by this court's remand order; the trial court determined the plaintiff's alimony obligation for those four years, calculated the overpayment or underpayment for each year and, after having separately found that the plaintiff had established a substantial change in circum- stances, reduced his alimony obligation to zero retroactive to the day after he served the defendant with his motion to modify alimony. Argued May 15—officially released October 6, 2020

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the postjudgment orders of the trial court modifying the original unallocated alimony and child support order and awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees. The parties' separation agree- ment, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, required the defendant to pay the plaintiff 40 percent of his annual gross base cash salary and 25 percent of his gross cash bonus as unallocated alimony and child support from September, 2016 to March, 2023. In December, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for modification in which he sought to reduce his unallocated alimony and child support payments, alleging that there was a substantial change in circumstances because, inter alia, two of the parties' children had reached the age of majority. The trial court granted the motion for modification and ordered that the percentage of annual gross base salary that the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff as unallocated alimony and child support be reduced to 37.5 percent, retroactive to the date the motion was filed. The court also ordered the defendant to pay $27,500 of the plaintiff's attorney's fees. Held: 1. The trial court abused its discretion when it determined the amount of the modified unallocated alimony and child support order; in modifying the original unallocated alimony and child support order, that court failed to unbundle the child support award from the alimony award and failed to consider and apply the child support guidelines and, thereby, to make a finding, as required by the guidelines, as to the presumptive amount of child support payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for the relevant dates, and, if necessary, a finding as to whether, on the basis of the child support guidelines, those amounts were inequitable or inappropriate and a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate. 2. This court declined to reach the merits of the defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay $27,500 of the plaintiff's attorney's fees; because that court's modified unallocated alimony and child support order will be reconsidered in its entirety on remand, its award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff was remanded for reconsideration in light of the newly calculated child support and ali- mony awards that will be issued at that time. Argued May 29—officially released October 13, 2020

The plaintiff hospital sought to recover damages in connection with unpaid medical services that it provided to the defendant. The hospital billed Medicare for payment, which initially paid the entire balance. Subse- quently, Medicare rescinded coverage for a portion of the services after discovering that the defendant had workers' compensation coverage for a portion of those medical expenses. The hospital informed the defen- dant of this development and asked the defendant to contact Medicare to resolve the coverage dispute. The defendant refused to contact Medi- care and did not submit payment for the remaining balance to the hospital. Thereafter, the matter was referred to an attorney fact finder, who issued his report, finding that the defendant owed a balance to the plaintiff and that the defendant failed to prove her special defense of non compos mentis. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection to the fact finder's report and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the fact finder's conclu- sions were not based on evidence presented at trial. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the fact finder's conclusions were not based on evidence presented at trial was unavailing, as there was adequate support in the record for the findings of fact reached by the fact finder; the record contained sufficient evidence for the fact finder to conclude that the plaintiff provided medical services to the defendant, that the defendant owed a balance for the services rendered, and that the defen- dant had not paid the balance and, therefore, the fact finder's findings were based on evidence presented at trial and were consistent with the applicable rule of practice (§ 19-8). 2. The defendant's claim that the fact finder improperly failed to consider her contention that the plaintiff had a duty to contact Medicare to resolve the coverage issue was unavailing, as the defendant's pleadings did not provide a legal framework from which the fact finder could properly assess whether it was the plaintiff's duty to resolve the coordination of benefits issues; the failure to perform a contractual or legal duty must be alleged as a special defense, and as there was no such special defense properly before the fact finder, the fact finder had no obligation to consider evidence not relevant to the legal issues before it. 3. The trial court properly denied the defendant's objections to the fact finder's report, as there were sufficient subordinate facts contained in the record for the fact finder's recommendations, and there was no legal framework for the fact finder or the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff failed to perform a contractual or legal duty; the fact finder was not required to determine whether the plaintiff had a duty to dispute Medicare's claim that its liability was secondary, and the trial court appropriately declined to do so as well. 4. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that a certain hospital debt collection statute (§ 19a-673d) compelled judgment in favor of the defendant, as the record revealed that § 19a-673d did not appear in the operative pleadings; although the defendant originally pleaded a different statute (§ 19a-673) concerning collections by hospitals from uninsured patients as a special defense, that special defense was ulti- mately stricken, the defense was not repleaded, and it was not distinctly raised before the fact finder. Argued May 15—officially released October 13, 2020

The plaintiff mother, as the administratrix of her daughter's estate, sought to recover damages in connection with her daughter's drowning death in an aboveground pool from the defendants, the town of Plainfield and two town employees, for their failure to inspect the pool to ensure that mandated safety measures had been installed. The plaintiff was a tenant of the property where the accident occurred. The pool did not have a self-closing or self latching gate, or a pool alarm, which were required as part of the state building code. The defendants filed a notice of intent to seek apportionment pursuant to statute (§ 52-102b), as to the property owners for their alleged negligence in failing to ensure that the pool met all required safety requirements. The defendants also filed an appor- tionment complaint, as to the former tenants of the property, alleging that they were negligent in failing to notify the defendants that the pool had been constructed and that an inspection was needed. The plaintiff thereafter filed an objection to the defendants' notice of intent to seek apportionment as to the property owners, and an objection to the defen- dants' apportionment complaint against the former tenants, on the ground that the plaintiff's cause of action in the revised complaint was not grounded in negligence but, rather, an intentional or reckless tort pursuant to the municipal liability statute (§ 52-557n (b) (8)), and, there- fore, the apportionment statute was inapplicable. The trial court sus- tained the plaintiff's objections. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's objections on the basis that the plaintiff's revised complaint implicated both exceptions to municipal immunity contained in § 52-557n (b) (8) and that the first exception employed a negligence standard, not a recklessness standard, thus allowing the defendants to seek apportionment. Held that the trial court erred in sustaining the plaintiff's objections to the defendants' efforts to seek apportionment: the plaintiff alleged in her complaint that at all relevant times the town's employees acted within the scope of their employment with the town, those employees and thus, the town, knew that a pool had been built at the property and had actual notice that the construction of the pool was completed in violation of the applicable laws and/or that the pool constituted a hazard to health or safety, thereby alleging that the town employees, with actual knowledge of a violation of a law and/or the existence of a hazardous condition, failed to conduct an inspection, in accordance with the first exception of § 52-557n (b) (8), which contains a negligence standard, and unlike the second exception of § 52-557n (b) (8), recklessness is not an element of the actual notice exception; as a result of the plaintiff's allegations of a claim of negligence on the part of the municipal actors, the defen- dants can seek apportionment as to the negligence of the former tenants and property owners pursuant to the apportionment statute (§ 52- 572h (o)). Argued June 17—officially released October 13, 2020

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant's motions for contempt. He claimed that the court improperly determined that he wilfully had failed to comply with his financial obligations to the defendant despite a lack of any finding by the court regarding his assertion that he lacked the ability to pay and found that his investment in a certain franchise, C Co., breached the parties' separation agreement despite also finding that he was current on his financial obligations to the defendant at the time that the invest- ment was made. Held: 1. The trial court's findings that the plaintiff engaged in wilful violations of his financial obligations were clearly erroneous and it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to have considered the issue of the plaintiff's ability to pay or to have rejected that defense before finding that his failure to meet his financial obligations was wilful: the plaintiff unques- tionably raised as a defense that he no longer could fully satisfy his financial obligations as set forth in the dissolution judgment because he had suffered a considerable drop in income due to health problems, and, in support, provided evidence regarding his finances; moreover, the court expressly credited some of the plaintiff's evidence in its written decision and made no indication that it did not credit any of the financial information provided by the plaintiff and the defendant provided no contrary financial records to the court, and the court's finding of wil- fulness stood in direct contradiction to the facts found related to the plaintiff's ability to pay; accordingly, the plaintiff met his burden of both raising the inability to pay defense and presenting evidence supporting it that was at least in part credited by the court. 2. The trial court's interpretation of the parties' separation agreement was clearly erroneous, and its finding that the plaintiff breached the agree- ment by investing in C Co. could not stand; the only evidence before the court was that the plaintiff's investment in C Co. occurred in July, 2015, which unquestionably was before the earliest date on which the plaintiff's obligation to make a lump sum installment payment arose pursuant to the agreement, December, 2015, and, because the agreement limited the plaintiff's right to make such investments only in the event that he was not current on his lump sum payment obligations, and no such obligation existed at the time he invested in C Co., the court's finding was a misinterpretation of the express terms of the agreement. Argued February 20—officially released October 13, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, H and city of New Haven, for injuries she sustained when she was struck by a police cruiser driven by H while she was a pedestrian crossing a city street. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her economic and noneconomic damages. In calculating the noneconomic damages, the trial court found that the emotional trauma suffered by pedestrians struck by vehicles is ''generally greater'' than that suffered by the occupants of a motor vehicle involved in an accident. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held that the trial court's factual finding that pedestrians struck by motor vehicles suffer greater emotional trauma than occupants of a motor vehicle involved in an accident was clearly erroneous; there was no evidence in the record to support the court's finding and it was not a matter of common knowledge but, rather, a determination subject to verification by medical science and, in light of the weight given by the court to this finding in reaching its award of noneconomic damages and the lack of subjective complaints from the plaintiff regarding any emotional trauma she suf- fered, the judgment with respect to the award of noneconomic damages was reversed and the matter was remanded for a new hearing in damages. Argued June 29—officially released October 13, 2020

The plaintiff, A Co., sought to foreclose municipal tax liens on certain real property owned by the defendant estate. After A Co. had commenced this action, R Co. was substituted as the plaintiff and filed an amended complaint. Thereafter, the estate was defaulted for failure to plead, and the trial court granted R Co.'s motion for judgment and rendered judgment in part in favor of R Co. as against the estate as to certain counts of the amended complaint. On the estate's appeal to this court, held that the estate's appeal was dismissed as moot, there having been no practical relief that that this court could grant, as the judgment as against the estate was a nullity because the estate was not a legal entity that could be sued, and, therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment against it; moreover, vacation of the judgment as against the estate was appropriate under the circumstances of this case because the estate did not cause the appeal to be moot and it would prevent the judgment from spawning legal consequences and clear the path for future relitigation of the issues. Argued December 4, 2019—officially released October 20, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant bank for viola- tions of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) that she alleged occurred in its handling of the modification process with respect to her mortgage. The plaintiff had obtained a mortgage loan from W Co. that was secured by certain real property. The plaintiff and W Co. thereafter engaged in discussions regarding a mortgage modification and eventually reached an agreement. A few days prior to the consummation of the modification agreement, W Co.'s assets, including the plaintiff's existing loan, were acquired by the defendant after W Co. was deemed a failed financial institution and was taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The plaintiff continued to submit applications for various loan modifications or programs but failed to obtain new loan terms until several years later, when the plaintiff and the defendant executed a new loan agreement. The plaintiff commenced the present action alleging that the defendant engaged in deceptive and unfair trade practices with respect to the loan modification process and the defendant filed a counterclaim, seeking to foreclose on the mortgage. After a jury trial, the jury found in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's CUTPA claim. After a bench trial on the counterclaim, the court found in favor of the defendant and rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. From the judgment, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim of error as to the trial court's judgment of strict foreclosure, the plaintiff having failed to adequately brief that claim; the plaintiff's briefs contained no citation to any evidentiary rulings made within the bench trial on the defendant's foreclosure counterclaim that the plaintiff claims were in error and, therefore, any claim that the judgment of strict foreclosure was made in error was deemed abandoned. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion in limine to preclude evidence of W Co.'s conduct pertaining to the 2008 modification agreement was dismissed as moot, the plaintiff having failed to challenge both of the court's independent bases for its evidentiary ruling; the court granted the motion in limine because W Co.'s conduct was not pleaded in the plaintiff's complaint and because the defendant could not be held liable for W Co.'s purported conduct without the plaintiff first having exhausted her administrative remedies pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforce- ment Act of 1989 (FIRREA) but, on appeal, the plaintiff challenged only the court's interpretation and application of FIRREA and, therefore, this court could grant no practical relief to the plaintiff. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion in limine to preclude evidence of a consent order between the defendant and the federal government on the basis that it was not relevant to the pleadings: the consent order made no reference to the plaintiff or her mortgage loan and the plaintiff did not allege in her pleadings the activity of the defendant that the government had identified as being improper; moreover, because the plaintiff failed to adequately brief how the preclusion of two other documents was harmful, this court declined to consider the plaintiff's claim of error as to the court's evidentiary ruling regarding these two documents. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's request to amend her complaint; the request to amend was filed the morning that the jury trial was to begin and the court noted its concern that allowing the amendment would cause an undue delay of the trial due it its substantial changes to the pleadings. Argued February 10—officially released October 20, 2020