Volume 201 — Connecticut Appellate Reports

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree with a firearm and assault of a peace officer with a firearm, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, B, rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present certain evidence to support his request that the trial court instruct the jury on self-defense. The petitioner's conviction stemmed from an incident in which state marshals, wearing police attire and badges, were attempting to serve a capias warrant on the petitioner at the front door of his residence. When the marshals informed him that they intended to take him into custody, the petitioner drew a firearm and began firing at the marshals. The marshals were unarmed and fled from the residence. The petitioner argued on appeal that B should have introduced the testimony of three individuals, J, H, and L, who had been present at various points in the confrontation and that, if he had done so, the trial court would have given the requested instruction on self-defense. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition and, there- after, denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal; it was not debatable among jurists of reason that B's performance did not prejudice the petitioner as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his criminal trial would have been different had B presented the testimony of J, H, and L, as the facts they would have testified to would not have justified a self-defense instruction, in light of the evidence that the marshals were readily identi- fiable, there was no evidence that any marshal unholstered or brandished a firearm while trying to take the petitioner into custody, and it was undisputed that at the time the petitioner was firing his gun, the marshals were fleeing from the petitioner. Argued May 20—officially released October 20, 2020

Convicted of the crimes of assault in the first degree by means of the discharge of a firearm and assault of a peace officer by means of the discharge of a firearm in connection with his actions in shooting at two state marshals, the defendant appealed to this court. State marshals Q and V arrived at the defendant's residence to serve a capias warrant and take the defendant into custody for failing to appear at a court proceeding. Q and V went to the front door of the defendant's residence and were wearing clothing that identified them as state marshals and they displayed badges. V was in possession of the capias warrant and also was wearing a state marshal's hat. When the defendant came to the door, he provided the marshals with a false name. When the marshals confronted him with his photograph and told him that they would be taking him into custody, the defendant reached back and pulled out a gun. V yelled ''gun,'' and Q and V, who were unarmed, retreated, running in opposite directions. Q received gunshot wounds to his left foot and right forearm, while V was uninjured. Bridgeport police officers arrived on the scene and subdued the defendant. The defendant's brother, L, who was at the residence, testified at trial that Q and V were readily identifiable as state marshals and that he did not observe that the mar- shals were armed until one of them stepped into the doorway to grab the defendant. Q and V testified that they heard multiple gunshots as they sought cover. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly declined to instruct the jury on self-defense. Held that the trial court did not err in rejecting the defendant's request for a jury instruction on self-defense; there was insufficient evidence to raise a question in the mind of a rational juror as to whether the defendant shot at Q and V in self-defense, as Q and V were readily identifiable as state marshals and it was undisputed that, at the time of the shooting, the marshals were in flight away from the defendant and, therefore, the jury could not reasonably have found that it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that Q and V were about to use deadly physical force or inflict great bodily harm and that it was necessary that he shoot at them to prevent such conduct. Argued May 20—officially released October 20, 2020

The plaintiff mortgage company brought a summary process action against the defendants, tenants of residential property, seeking immediate pos- session of the premises on the ground that the defendants' rights to occupy had terminated. According to the return of service, each defen- dant was served with a copy of the notice to quit by abode service. Following the defendants' failure to plead, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for default and rendered judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants thereafter filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that the notice to quit was not served on all of the designated occupants of the property, as required by statute (§ 47a-23). The defendants filed an affidavit of one of the occupants in support thereof and also filed a motion to open the judgment of possession. The trial court denied both of the defendants' motions. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court erred in denying their request for an evidentiary hearing despite their having raised a disputed issue of fact and that the absence of an evidentiary hearing led to clearly erroneous findings by the trial court. Held that the trial court properly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, as there was ample evidence to support the court's finding that the defen- dants were served with the notice to quit; the marshal's return of service was prima facie evidence that each defendant had been served by abode service, the affidavit submitted by the defendants, which was the only evidence submitted in support of their motion, did nothing to create a genuine dispute as to any pertinent jurisdictional fact, as it merely acknowledged that the affiant was serviced and made no statement based on the personal knowledge that the other defendants were not served, and there was no affidavit or other documentation from any other defendant to demonstrate that he or she had not been served in any manner, and, therefore, the court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motion to dismiss. Argued September 10—officially released October 20, 2020

Convicted of the crime of robbery in the first degree, the defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator and that he proved his affirmative defense of inoperability of the weapon used during the robbery. The perpetrator had pointed a gun at the employee on duty at a storage facility, took cash from her and then fled. Police officers searching the nearby area encountered a vehicle that came toward them but then reversed direction and left the area before crashing in a yard. The defendant fled from the crash scene before the police arrived and found cash, a gun and other items in the vehicle, which had been lent to the defendant by his girlfriend hours before the robbery. The storage facility employee described to the police what the defendant was wearing but was unable to identify him when the police brought her to a nearby store where he was arrested shortly after the robbery for a one-on-one identification. Held: 1. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant was the person who robbed the storage facility; the defendant owned and wore clothing and items similar to that worn by the perpetrator, some of which the police found in bushes near the crime scene and which contained the defendant's DNA, video surveil- lance showed an individual driving to a bush in a vehicle matching that which was owned by the defendant's girlfriend, exiting the vehicle and retreating behind the bush before returning to the vehicle wearing cloth- ing that matched that of the defendant at the time of his arrest, and the police found in the vehicle, which belonged to the defendant's girlfriend, a gun and money that approximated the amount stolen from the stor- age facility. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that his conviction of first degree robbery should be reversed because he proved the affirmative defense that the gun was inoperable at the time of the robbery; there was no evidence provided during the trial that addressed the operability of the gun at the time of the robbery, contrary to the defendant's claim that it was reasonable to infer that the gun was in the same condition at the time of the robbery as it was when the police tested it six months later and found it unable to discharge, the police officer who tested the gun was unable to testify about its operability prior to its recovery by the police or to state whether dirt found in the gun was the same type of dirt that was found on the defendant's clothes at the time of his arrest or the type of dirt that surrounded the items found in the bushes, the jurors were free to infer that the gun was not in the same condition at the time of testing as it was during the robbery, and, accordingly, the jury reasonably could have found that the defendant failed to prove his affirmative defense of inoperability. 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, which was based on his claim that a police officer's testimony constituted improper lay opinion under the applicable provi- sion of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 7-1) and an improper opin- ion on the ultimate issue of identity in violation of the applicable provi- sion of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 7-3): a. The police officer's testimony that the defendant's clothing appeared to be the same as that worn by the perpetrator in the surveillance footage did not constitute an improper lay opinion, as nonexpert opinion testimony about the appearance of persons or things was admissible in the discretion of the court. b. The police officer did not give an opinion on the ultimate issue of identity when she testified that the defendant was wearing pants similar to those of the perpetrator in the surveillance video and that the defen- dant was the individual seen at the storage facility in that surveillance video; the trial court ordered the identification testimony stricken from the record and instructed the jurors twice not to consider it in their deliberations, the defendant did not demonstrate that the stricken testi- mony was so prejudicial that the jury could not reasonably be presumed to have disregarded it, and, even if the identification testimony was improper, this court was not persuaded that it was harmful, as the jury was presented with significant other circumstantial evidence that connected the defendant to the robbery and provided a reasonable basis on which to conclude that he was the individual in the surveillance footage. 4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in failing to give the jury his requested instruction on identity, as the case did not involve issues of misidentification or lack of clarity and inconsistencies in identification, the jury instructions that were given were not incorrect, insufficient or misleading to the jury, and the defen- dant's reliance on the requirement that juries be given specific instruc- tions with regard to eyewitness identifications was unavailing, as the sole potential eyewitness to the robbery was unable to identify the defendant. Argued May 18—officially released October 27, 2020

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, the defendant appealed to this court, challenging the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss counts in the state's first substitute information. The defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, and her license was suspended for forty-five days pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (i)) as a result of her refusal to take a chemical alcohol test. The defendant was subsequently ordered not to operate a vehicle that was not equipped with an ignition interlock device. Forty-seven days after the suspension began, the defendant operated a vehicle that did not have an ignition interlock device installed in it and allegedly struck another motor vehicle. Thereafter, she was charged with, inter alia, operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension in violation of the applicable statute (§ 14-215 (c) (1)) and operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device in violation of the applicable statute (§ 14-227k (a) (2)). The defendant moved for a dismissal of these charges against her, claiming that the forty-five day suspension of her license had expired and that she had not yet been obligated to operate a motor vehicle with an ignition interlock device installed. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The state subsequently filed a second substitute information charging the defendant solely with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension. From the judgment of conviction, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the count of the state's first substitute information charging her with operating a motor vehicle while her license was under suspension: the text of § 14- 215 (c) (1) penalizes a person who operates a motor vehicle while, inter alia, her license is under suspension pursuant to § 14-227b, and the text of § 14-227b (i) (1) mandates the installation of an ignition interlock device in any motor vehicle operated by that individual before the resto- ration of her license, thus, the defendant's license remained suspended following the forty-five day statutory period until she installed an ignition interlock device, the defendant's reliance on case law that predated amendments to § 14-227b was unavailing, and this court declined to apply the rule of lenity where the statutory text concerning the lack of restoration on the forty-five day period of suspension is not ambiguous; moreover, the defendant lacked standing to bring an equal protection claim because she was not aggrieved: although the defendant claimed that requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device before a license suspension can be lifted imposes undue burdens on indigent individuals who cannot afford the fees associated with the installation of such a device, the defendant paid the fees to install an ignition interlock device and to restore her license, she did not identify any specific personal and legal interest that had been specially and injuri- ously affected, and there was no basis on the record to find that the defendant was reasonably likely to incur future criminal liability relating to the ignition interlock device requirement. 2. The defendant's appeal was dismissed with respect to her claim challeng- ing the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss the charge against her of operating a motor vehicle not equipped with an ignition interlock device from the state's first substitute information: the defendant's claim was moot as a result of the state's decision not to charge the defendant with a violation of § 14-227k (a) (2) in its second substitute information; moreover, the defendant's claim that the state could not recharge her with a violation of § 14-227k (a) (2) was not justiciable because it was not ripe, as it might never transpire. Argued June 19—officially released November 3, 2020

The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of the crimes of murder and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting death of the victim, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the respondent Commissioner of Correction violated his due process rights by eliciting perjured testimony from his criminal trial counsel at his first habeas trial. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing in part and denying in part the habeas petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied his petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion to open the judgment and to disqualify the judicial authority, which the court denied and the petitioner amended his appeal. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal; the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's claims were frivolous and not debatable among jurists of reason. 2. The habeas court properly dismissed as nonjusticiable that count of the petition that alleged that the petitioner's due process rights had been violated due to newly discovered evidence that the respondent's counsel elicited perjured testimony from his criminal trial counsel at his first habeas trial: the court lacked authority to open the judgment rendered in the first habeas action and, therefore, the court could provide no practical relief to the petitioner on his claim, rendering the case moot; moreover, the petitioner's allegations regarding his criminal trial coun- sel's testimony at the first habeas trial did not constitute a constitutional violation of the petitioner's liberty and, therefore, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. 3. The habeas court did not improperly deny those counts of the petitioner's petition alleging suppression of and failure to preserve evidence of K- 9 tracking of the alleged perpetrator during the police investigation of the murder: the court concluded that evidence of K-9 tracking had not been proven to exist, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was evidence of the K-9 track that the state suppressed or the police failed to preserve; moreover, the court's decision was predicated in part on its determination that the testimony of a patrol sergeant, that if he had performed a K-9 track, he would have written a report, and that he could not recall using a K-9, was credible, and it is not the role of appellate courts to second-guess credibility determinations. 4. This court declined to review the petitioner's claim that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his postjudgment motion to open the judgment and disqualify the judicial authority because the record was inadequate; the petitioner failed to follow the procedures required for disqualification, as the petitioner's affidavit and good faith certificate failed to comport with legal standards, the motion was not timely filed, there was no opportunity for a hearing to be held on the motion to disqualify to create a factual record for review and the petitioner failed to demonstrate good cause for failing to comply with the rules of practice. Argued September 14—officially released November 3, 2020

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved pursuant to a foreign judgment of dissolution, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her motion to open the judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Prior to their marriage in New York, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement, which the New York dissolution court determined was valid. During the dissolution proceedings, the parties entered into a stipulation that provided, inter alia, that it superseded the prenuptial agreement, that it was incorporated but not merged into the dissolution judgment and that it was to be governed by New York law. Following the dissolution of their marriage, the parties both moved to Connecticut, and the plaintiff registered the New York dissolution judgment in Connecticut pursuant to statute (§ 46b-71). In her motion to open, the plaintiff sought to have the trial court open the dissolution judgment, vacate the stipulation and order a new trial, claiming that the judgment was obtained through the defen- dant's fraudulent conduct in that he made material misrepresentations and failed to disclose certain assets in his sworn financial statement at the time the stipulation was negotiated. Following a hearing, the trial court, applying New York law, dismissed the plaintiff's motion to open, concluding that to challenge the validity of the stipulation, which was incorporated but not merged into the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff was required to bring a plenary action. Held that, although the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff's motion to open the dissolution judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because that court had jurisdiction to consider the motion pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 46b-1 and 46b-71 (b)), this court concluded that, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the trial court properly determined that the plain- tiff was required to bring a plenary action to vacate the stipulation, as the New York rule requiring a party to challenge a separation agreement that is not merged into the dissolution judgment through a plenary action is substantive and, as such, § 46b-71 and the stipulation required the trial court to apply that rule to the motion to open; accordingly, the trial court should have denied the motion to open rather than dismissed it, and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment denying the plaintiff's motion to open. Argued May 20—officially released November 10, 2020

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crime of home invasion, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, from which the peti- tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. On appeal, he claimed that the habeas court incorrectly concluded that his trial counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss the home invasion charge, to which the petitioner had pleaded guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), did not constitute ineffective assistance. Held that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as he failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged deficient performance; there was no evidence in the record showing that, but for his trial counsel's alleged deficient performance, the petitioner would have insisted on going to trial, and there was nothing to indicate that the dismissal of the home invasion charge would have resulted in any meaningful reduction in the petition- er's exposure to a lengthy period of incarceration. Submitted for disposition October 15—officially released November 10, 2020

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and entering related financial orders. He claimed that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance of the trial, erred by ordering him to pay periodic alimony to the plaintiff, contrary to the parties' prenuptial agreement, and erred by awarding certain real property to him in its distribution order. Held: 1. The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a continuance of the trial was not an abuse of discretion; although the delays in the trial caused by the illness of the defendant's counsel and by the lack of an available judge were outside of the parties' control, by the time of the defendant's motion, the matter had been pending for more than 1000 days and involved the custody of minor children, and the defendant's unsubstantiated claim that he required a continuance because could not miss additional days of work was unavailing. 2. The trial court properly concluded that the enforcement of the parties' prenuptial agreement would be unconscionable and properly awarded the plaintiff alimony; the defendant was responsible for his absence from the trial, which he claimed prevented him from contradicting the plaintiff's testimony regarding her capabilities or her employability, and there was evidence in the record that injuries the plaintiff sustained in a motor vehicle accident impaired her ability to work full-time and to achieve the earning capacity she had at the time she signed the prenuptial agreement, which represented a dramatic change in her financial circum- stances. 3. The trial court properly determined the ownership and value of certain real properties and properly awarded those properties to the defendant; the defendant had listed the properties and assigned values to the proper- ties in his prenuptial disclosure, there was evidence that the defendant had received mail regarding the properties from a taxing authority and the defendant did not appear at trial to challenge his ownership of the properties, and, because the defendant did not provide the court with a financial affidavit or other evidence of the value of the properties at the time of the dissolution, the court properly determined the value of those properties on the basis of the evidence that was available to it. Argued September 22—officially released November 10, 2020

Convicted of the crime of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the defendant appealed, claiming that the trial court commit- ted plain error pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 60-5) when it permitted W, the key witness against him, to testify instead of accepting W's invocation of his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. W previously had been charged with felony murder, robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in connection with the victim's death. A different trial court found no probable cause with respect to the felony murder charge against W and, after a trial, found him not guilty of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. When W invoked his fifth amendment privilege at the start of the state's direct examination of him, the court instructed counsel who had represented W during the proceedings in W's case to advise W of his rights. W then testified against the defendant, who did not object to or seek to preclude W's testimony. Held that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the defen- dant's appeal, as he lacked standing to challenge the trial court's rejec- tion of W's invocation of his fifth amendment privilege against self- incrimination; that right is a personal privilege that adheres to the person and not to information that may incriminate him, and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Argued September 22—officially released November 10, 2020

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff and from the trial court's granting of the plaintiff's motions for attorney's fees. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly basing the supplemental alimony awarded to the plaintiff on the defendant's gross, rather than net, bonus income, as the court had ample evidence at its disposal to adequately inform it as to the defendant's financial status with respect to his net bonus income; the trial court did not state that it relied on the party's gross earnings to form the basis of its order, the record demonstrated both parties' net available income, including the defendant's base pay, and it was apparent that the court intended its supplemental alimony order to be a function of the gross bonus income, which was a convenient and economical method of calculation, and was distinguishable from the court basing its order on the bonus gross income, especially as the court did not use gross income to calculate the periodic alimony order or the monthly and supplemental child support orders. 2. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not act in excess of its statutory (§ 46b-81) authority applicable to dissolution proceedings by ordering the parties to establish and to contribute to educational savings plans, as the court properly exercised its authority pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-56) to secure contemplated future educa- tional support orders by requiring each party to restore one half of the gift money that had been donated to the parties' two children from their grandmother and to protect it for their future use; the court's order to establish the plans was eminently fair, as both parties were ordered to contribute equally to their creation after they had used the children's gift money to renovate a home that the children will never occupy, although the defendant claimed that § 46b-81 was limited to orders regarding property division and did not permit the court to order future investment decisions for the parties, the trial court did not exceed its authority, as § 46b-81 was inapplicable, and that under the applicable statutes (§§ 46b-56 and 46b-84), the court was authorized to provide security for the enforcement of a future educational support order when it retained jurisdiction to make an order providing the children with an educational expectancy and, by ordering the establishment of two new savings plans, the court was not distributing marital property from one spouse to the other, but securing funds for the children's future educational needs. 3. The trial court erred in finding the defendant in contempt for violating the automatic orders in effect, pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 25-5), by renting a seasonal ski lodge, as it was undisputed that the plaintiff failed to file a written motion for contempt regarding the rental of the ski lodge: the defendant had no notice that he was facing a contempt finding with respect to the rental of the ski lodge, as the plaintiff's motion for contempt alleged only that the defendant violated the automatic orders in purchasing cryptocurrency; furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for one half of the cost the defendant incurred in renting the ski lodge and to reimburse the plaintiff for one half of the loss that he incurred as a result of a cryptocurrency investment he made after the imposition of the automatic orders, as the record sufficiently demonstrated that, contrary to the defendant's claims, the rental of the ski lodge and the investment in the cryptocurrency were not made in the usual course of business as provided in the exception to Practice Book § 25-5 for the transfer or disposal of marital property; the defendant admitted that he did not request permission from the plaintiff prior to purchasing the cryptocurrency, that he did not have accounts to make that type of investment prior to the commencement of the dissolution action, he did not discuss the rental of the seasonal ski lodge with the plaintiff, and, although the parties took vacations together during their marriage, the plaintiff did not ski, the parties never rented a ski lodge during their marriage, and the defendant shared the seasonal ski lodge with others; moreover, even in the absence of a contempt finding, a trial court has the authority to compensate a spouse for losses caused by a violation of the automatic orders by adjusting the distribution of marital assets in the injured spouse's favor. 4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to attribute an earning capacity to the plaintiff in determining alimony and child support, the record having sufficiently supported the court's determination to base its awards of child support and alimony on the plaintiff's actual income at the time of the dissolution, which it found to be zero, as such determi- nation was not contrary to law; the court expressly stated that it had considered all of the relevant statutes before rendering its judgment, and the trial court has broad discretion in varying the weight placed on each statutory criterion under the circumstances of each case. 5. The trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees for representation during the marital dissolution proceedings, postjudgment matters, and this appeal, as the trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in granting the plaintiff's motions for attorney's fees; this court, in affording the trial court every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its decision, found that the trial court could have relied on evidence relevant to each statutory (§ 46b-82) criterion as it applied to both parties, and that not awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees would have had the effect of undermining its other financial orders. Argued June 15—officially released November 17, 2020

The petitioner, a Jamaican national who previously had been convicted of various crimes, including murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claim- ing that his federal and state constitutional rights to due process were violated when he was denied a deportation parole eligibility hearing pursuant to statute (§ 54-125d (c)) after serving 50 percent of his sen- tence. The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the habeas peti- tion, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner had no liberty interest in a deportation parole eligibility hear- ing. The habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, that court having properly determined that the petitioner lacked a liberty interest in a deportation parole eligibility hearing pursuant to § 54-125d; the due process clause does not provide the petitioner with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in a deportation parole hear- ing, as there is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence; furthermore, § 54-125d did not create a liberty interest in parole eligibility or a parole eligibility hearing as the mandatory language ''shall,'' used in § 54-125d (c), was inapplicable to the petitioner and is limited to those persons whose eligibility for parole is restricted pursuant to a different statute (§ 54-125a (b) (2)), which does not include the crime for which the petitioner was convicted, namely, murder; moreover, § 54- 125d (b) vests the Department of Correction with discretion over depor- tation parole eligibility determinations and, thus, did not create an ''expectancy of release,'' but only a possibility of parole; additionally, although a sentencing court may refer a convicted person who is an alien to the Board of Pardons and Paroles for deportation, it cannot do so for a person convicted of a capital felony or a class A felony, and, as murder is a class A felony, the sentencing court did not have the discretion to refer the petitioner to the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Argued September 10—officially released November 17, 2020

The self-represented, incarcerated plaintiff brought this action against the defendants pursuant to federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), claiming violations of his federal and state constitutional rights. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to deportation parole or a deportation parole eligibility hearing pursuant to statute (§ 54-125d (c)) and, that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the defendants had violated his rights to due process by failing to implement policies, procedures, and/or regulations that provided him with a deportation parole hearing and/or with eligibility. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the trial court was affirmed on the alternative ground that the plaintiff lacked standing; the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he had a specific, personal, or legal interest in deportation parole eligibility as the possibil- ity of deportation parole created by § 54-125d does not create a legal interest in parole eligibility, and the failure to exercise discretion to grant a deportation parole eligibility hearing is not within the zone of interests protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Argued September 10—officially released November 17, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his constitu- tional right to confrontation was violated when the trial court allowed C, the state trooper who arrested him, to testify that the defendant's son, L, told him that the defendant had consumed two drinks on the night that he was arrested; even if this court assumed that C's testimony was inadmissible hearsay that violated the defendant's right to confronta- tion, the defendant's claim failed under the fourth prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233) because C's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the state's case against the defendant was strong and L's statement to C was cumulative and unlikely to have influenced the jury's verdict. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding his alleged refusal to submit to a breath test at the time of his arrest: a. Contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court did not commit plain error in instructing the jury that it could ''make any reasonable inference that follows'' from the defendant's alleged refusal to submit to a breath test, as the court's instruction substantially complied with the applicable statute (§ 14-227a (e)) and did not, when read in the context of the court's entire instructions, mislead the jury; moreover, the defendant implicitly waived his claim that the court's instruction diluted the state's burden of proof and violated his constitutional right to due process, as the court provided the defendant with a copy of its instructions thirteen days before the preliminary charge conference, the defendant had ample time to review the instructions, the court reviewed the instructions with counsel on the record, soliciting comments and proposed modifications, and both counsel affirmatively, and repeatedly, expressed their satisfac- tion with the court's instructions. b. The defendant's claim that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that his alleged refusal to submit to a breath test could be construed as consciousness of guilt because such an instruction was not factually supported by the evidence in view of the fact that he agreed to a blood test was unavailing: that court did not err in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt, as C testified, without objection, that the defendant agreed to submit to a breath test, then changed his mind, vacillating several times before he requested a blood test, and, therefore, the court's instruction advising the jury of its obligation to determine whether the defendant refused the breath test was not only proper but was necessary; accordingly, the court's instructions to the jury pertaining to the consciousness of guilt evidence did not rise to the level of egre- giousness and harm that would warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine. Argued September 16—officially released November 17, 2020

The plaintiff, the state of Connecticut, sought reimbursement from the defen- dant, pursuant to statute (§18-85a) and the applicable regulation (§ 18- 85a-2), for the cost of his incarceration after he had served a sentence for his conviction of certain crimes. The trial court granted the state's application for a prejudgment remedy to attach certain of the defendant's assets and thereafter granted the state's motion for summary judgment. The court rejected the defendant's claims that, inter alia, the assessed cost of his incarceration was based on an unreliable calculation and that his right to equal protection was violated because the state had not sought reimbursement for incarceration costs from other inmates. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment for the state, and the defen- dant appealed to this court, raising many of the same arguments that he raised in the trial court. Held that, after applying the well established principles that govern the review of a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and adopted its well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues. Argued October 20—officially released November 17, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from, inter alia, the defendant city of Waterbury for injuries that he suffered when F, a former police officer employed by the city, allegedly pushed the plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him, and a third party, C, assaulted the plaintiff by placing a sex toy against his buttocks. The plaintiff's operative complaint alleged, inter alia, that the city was liable pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n) for the damages he sustained as a result of F's negligence. The court rendered partial summary judgment in favor of the city, concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether F had engaged in wilful, rather than negligent misconduct, and that the identifiable victim subject to imminent harm exception to governmental immunity did not apply to the plaintiff's allegation that F failed to protect him from C's sexual assault. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew his remaining claims and appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court erred in granting the city's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim that F negligently pushed him to the ground and handcuffed him: the plaintiff proffered sufficient evidence to demon- strate the existence of genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether F's conduct was wilful or negligent, as a reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff was willingly handcuffed by F and was not, as the court concluded, an unwilling participant, there was an issue as to whether F was demonstrating the professional use of handcuffs on the plaintiff, and there was evidence in the record that F had shown a pattern of poor judgment while acting in his duties as a police officer, and the fact that F's use of handcuffs was in violation of the city's policy did not make his conduct per se wilful; moreover, the city's claim that this court should affirm the trial court's judgment on the alternative ground that F was not acting within the scope of his employment when he pushed the plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him was unavailing, as there was evidence in the record that F was acting within his period of employment, the location of the assault was within F's normal jurisdic- tion, F frequently visited this location both while on and off duty and, at the time of the assault, F was on his way to an activity related to his role as a police officer in which he often demonstrated the use of handcuffs and he was dressed in full police uniform issued by the city, including his duty belt with his handcuffs and weapons. 2. The trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in favor of the city on the basis that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was apparent to F that the plaintiff was an identifiable victim subject to imminent harm, as the city never raised this defense in its motion; the city argued only that F's conduct was wilful and outside the scope of his employment and, thus, the plaintiff never had the opportunity or reason to make the argument that this exception to discretionary act immunity applied. Argued June 19—officially released November 24, 2020

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court revoking his probation for his failure to pay restitution. The defendant had previously pleaded guilty to various offenses, including burglary and larceny, and was sentenced to probation. As a condition of his probation, the court ordered the defendant to make restitution in the amount of more than $18,000. Thereafter, he was charged with additional offenses and for violating certain terms of his probation, not involving the payment of restitution, to which he pleaded guilty. The trial court continued the defendant's probation. In the months that followed, the defendant paid a total of $850 in restitution. The state thereafter charged the defendant with violation of probation for failure to pay restitution. The trial court revoked the defendant's probation, having determined, on the basis of the defendant's prior statements made to the court at his first probation revocation hearing, that the defendant had the ability and the willingness to pay, and would make sufficient efforts to pay, but had failed to do so. On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in revoking his probation without first finding that his failure to pay the restitution was wilful. Held that the trial court erred in revoking the defendant's probation for failure to make restitution payments, as that court did not apply the correct legal standard and erred in making an implicit finding of wilfulness: as a prerequisite to incarceration for the failure to pay restitution, the trial court was required to make explicit findings on the record that a defendant had the ability to pay and, if so, whether the failure to pay was wilful, and, if not, whether the defen- dant made sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay; even if the trial court interpreted the defendant's statements made one and one-half years earlier at the first probation revocation hearing as an admission that he had the ability to pay, the court was still required to inquire into the reasons for the defendant's failure to pay and whether he failed to make good faith efforts to acquire legally the resources to pay, the evidence did not logically support the conclu- sion that the defendant had the ability to pay restitution during his probationary period because there was no evidence that he had any source of income or other assets that could be applied toward restitution, the court did not take into consideration the actual efforts the defendant made to acquire the resources to pay during the probation period, instead, improperly basing its conclusion that the defendant violated probation on the mere fact that he expressed an intention to make sufficient efforts, and, accordingly, the court failed to make the neces- sary finding that the defendant's failure to pay was wilful. Argued September 8—officially released November 24, 2020

The plaintiff sought to collect, inter alia, unpaid wages on behalf of two employees of the defendant W Co. A state marshal served two copies of the summons and complaint on the defendant B, W Co.'s president, in both his individual capacity and as president of W Co. Following the defendants' failure to respond to the plaintiff's pleadings, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for default and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to open the default judgment pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-212), claiming that they had been deprived of actual notice of the proceedings by the plaintiff's failure to serve the summons and complaint on W Co. The court denied the defendants' motion to open, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to open, as the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of § 52-212 in that the motion was not verified under oath by either the defendants or their attorney; furthermore, the defen- dants' claim that they lacked actual notice of the plaintiff's action because the summons listed a nonparty individual as W Co.'s registered agent for service was unavailing, the record having unequivocally indi- cated that both defendants were properly served with legal process by service in hand to B. Submitted on briefs September 17—officially released November 24, 2020

The plaintiff, who was a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust, brought an action for damages against his sisters, B and R, and against D, the administrator of the estate of the plaintiff's mother, S, in connection with the administration of the trust. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that B and S, who had been cotrustees of the trust, had breached their fiduciary duties to him, and that S, D and R had fraudulently concealed, pursuant to statute (§ 52-595), facts that were necessary to his causes of action against them. In 2004, S and B filed an application with the Probate Court to remove the plaintiff as a trustee pursuant to statute (§ 45a-242 (a)). The court thereafter issued a written decree in which it found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had neglected to perform the duties of the trust and ordered his removal as a trustee. The court also issued orders pertaining to certain antique automobiles that were part of the trust. S and B thereafter acted as cotrustees until June, 2013, when the Probate Court issued an order removing them as cotrustees and appointing a successor trustee. After S died in 2015, the Probate Court appointed D the administrator of her estate. The plaintiff commenced his action against B, R and D in May, 2017. The trial court thereafter granted motions to strike that were filed by D and B as to certain counts of the complaint against them that alleged that the trust was a contract they had breached. R, D and B subsequently filed separate motions for summary judgment in May, 2018, in which they alleged that all counts of the complaint against them were time barred pursuant to the three year tort statute (§ 52-577) of limitations. While the three motions for summary judgment were pending, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that added a count against B sounding in unjust enrichment, which was not thereafter adjudicated in the trial court's ruling on B's motion for summary judgment. The trial court then granted the summary judgment motions filed by R, D and B. The court determined, inter alia, that the plaintiff's allegations of wrongdoing described conduct that occurred from 1997 to 2013, and that R, D and B had met their burden of showing that the plaintiff's claims were time barred by § 52-577. The court further determined that there was no evidentiary basis for the plaintiff's claims that the statute of limitations in § 52-577 was tolled by the continuous course of conduct doctrine or by fraudulent concealment, and it con- cluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to when the plaintiff's causes of action accrued and when his action was com- menced. Held: 1. This court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that portion of the plaintiff's appeal that concerned the partial summary judgment rendered in favor of B, as it was undisputed that his unjust enrichment count against her remained pending; the plaintiff did not request a written determination from the trial court regarding the significance of the issues resolved by the partial summary judgment, the record did not contain a withdrawal or an unconditional abandonment of the unjust enrichment count, and, as that count remained unadjudicated, it presented the possi- bility that B could be found liable to the plaintiff for damages; accord- ingly, the portion of the plaintiff's appeal as to B was dismissed. 2. The trial court properly granted D's motion to strike the breach of contract count in the plaintiff's complaint, as S, by having agreed to perform her duties as a trustee, did not enter into a contract to perform provisions of the trust that were enforceable by an action sounding in contract; the plaintiff provided no authority in which a court has held that a trust beneficiary may bring an action sounding in contract against a trustee, the plaintiff having disregarded several critical distinctions between a trust and a contract, including that a trust needs no consideration to support it. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that his causes of action as a remainder beneficiary did not become ripe until S's death, as that proposition contravened precedent that § 52-577 operates as a bar to tort claims irrespective of when they accrue; none of the conduct on the part of the defendants that the plaintiff detailed in his complaint was alleged to have occurred after June, 2013, when S and B were removed as trustees, and, because the dates alleged in the complaint were the metric for purposes of applying the limitation period of § 52- 577, the trial court properly concluded that the defendants satisfied their burden of demonstrating the applicability of § 52-577 to the plaintiff's tort claims. 4. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether § 52-577 was tolled by the pendency of a final accounting in the Probate Court, the continuing course of conduct doctrine and fraudulent concealment: a. This court found unavailing the plaintiff's assertion that the trial court made a legal error when it concluded that the limitation period of § 52- 577 commenced in 2013 because the Probate Court had not yet approved the accountings submitted by S and B: the plaintiff's reliance on the statute (§ 52-579) governing actions against a surety on a probate bond was misplaced, as the limitation period in § 52-579 expressly is condi- tioned on the Probate Court's approval of a final accounting, there was no allegation or evidence of the existence of a probate bond, the operative complaint contained no claim against the surety of a probate bond, and the only facts under § 52-577 that were material to the trial court's ruling were the date of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint and the date the action was filed; moreover, the plaintiff provided no authority, nor was this court aware of any, in which it has been held that the limitation period of § 52-577 automatically is tolled for tort claims against a trustee due to the pendency of a final accounting in the Probate Court, this court was not inclined to articulate such a per se rule, and the accounting issue, which implicated the fiduciary duty of a removed trustee, properly fell within the purview of the continuous course of conduct doctrine. b. The trial court properly concluded that the continuing course of conduct doctrine did not apply to the plaintiff's claims against R; the plaintiff asserted in his complaint that he suffered money damages as a result of R's conduct from 1997 through 2013, he did not offer affidavits or other proof that R engaged in activity with respect to the trust after June, 2013, he did not allege that R owed a legal duty to him, and R never was a trustee and did not stand in a fiduciary relation to the plaintiff. c. Although the plaintiff met his burden of establishing that S owed a continuing fiduciary duty to account for trust assets following her removal as a trustee in June, 2013, he failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether S and D continually breached that fiduciary duty to the remainder beneficiaries, which resulted in an enhanced injury to him following S's removal as a trustee that would toll the limitation period in § 52-577; contrary to the plaintiff's allegation that S and D engaged in a continuous course of conduct by failing to account for the automobiles and automobile parts, which was the only factual allegation in the plaintiff's pleadings of a continuing breach of the fidu- ciary duty owed to remainder beneficiaries subsequent to S's removal, that failure did not constitute a series of events that gave rise to a cumulative injury, and the subsequent injury the plaintiff allegedly sus- tained following S's removal as trustee, which was the failure to obtain an accounting of the automobile assets, was the same injury he allegedly incurred prior to her removal. d. The trial court properly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the plaintiff's claim that S, D and R fraudu- lently concealed his causes of action against them such that the limitation period for those causes of action was tolled by § 52-595: the plaintiff's assertion that the defendants should bear the burden to demonstrate that they did not engage in fraudulent concealment was unavailing, as our Supreme Court has held that the burden of establishing fraudulent concealment belongs to the party seeking to avail itself of that tolling doctrine, and this court, as an intermediate appellate tribunal, was not at liberty to modify, reconsider or overrule precedent of the Supreme Court; furthermore, the plaintiff did not provide clear and unequivocal evidence that S, D or R had actual awareness of the facts necessary to establish the plaintiff's causes of action or that they intentionally concealed such facts from him, as the trial court carefully reviewed all of the materials that the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment, which did not show any intent on the part of the defendants to conceal facts or support a finding that their alleged concealment was directed toward delaying commencement of an action against them. 5. The plaintiff's appeal as to his claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion to open the judgment was moot; the plaintiff's request to submit what he asserted was newly discovered evidence that contra- vened D's contention that S had no continuing duty to the remainder trustees after her removal as a cotrustee in June, 2013, ostensibly sup- ported this court's legal conclusion that S owed such a duty following her removal; accordingly, there was no practical relief that could be afforded to the plaintiff, and that portion of his appeal challenging the propriety of the denial of his motion to open the judgment was dismissed. Argued February 10—officially released December 1, 2020

Convicted, on a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of the crime of robbery in the first degree, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because his prosecu- tion was time barred by the applicable five year statute of limitations (§ 54-193 (b)). The warrant for the defendant's arrest had been obtained by the police two weeks before the expiration of the limitation period, however, it was not executed until seven days after the statute of limita- tions had expired. Held that the trial court properly denied the defen- dant's motion to dismiss: contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court applied the correct legal test, as set forth in State v. Swebilius (325 Conn. 793), in determining whether the statute of limitations had been tolled; moreover, the trial court correctly determined that the state made reasonable efforts to serve the arrest warrant before the statute of limitations had expired and that the delay in the service of the warrant was reasonable, as the stipulated facts showed that, following the defen- dant's confession to the robbery, the state expeditiously prepared and obtained an arrest warrant and a writ of habeas corpus to transport the defendant, who was incarcerated at the time, to the Superior Court to serve him with the warrant before the expiration of the limitation period, and the fact that the defendant was not transported to the Superior Court and served with the warrant until seven days after the statute of limitations had expired did not undermine the reasonable efforts of the state; furthermore, the court properly based its decision, in part, on the state's assertion that the nine day delay from the signing of the writ of habeas to the transport of the defendant was not unusual given the logistical, practical and safety precautions associated with transporting a person from a correctional facility to a courthouse, as it was within the purview of the court to use its knowledge of the inner workings of the courts and the processes by which incarcerated persons are transported to the court in its determination of the state's efforts. Argued September 14—officially released December 1, 2020

The defendant, who had been charged with the crime of sexual assault in the fourth degree and had been granted permission to participate in the statutory (§ 54-56e) pretrial diversionary program of accelerated rehabilitation, appealed to this court after the trial court terminated the order of accelerated rehabilitation. At a hearing on additional conditions proposed for the defendant's participation in the accelerated rehabilita- tion program, the court concluded that the circumstances of the case were too serious based, inter alia, on the defendant's participation in a fraternal organization and, sua sponte, terminated his participation in the accelerated rehabilitation program. Held: 1. Contrary to the state's claim, the trial court's ruling terminating the defendant's participation in the accelerated rehabilitation program was a final judgment for the purposes of appeal; consistent with the ordinary meaning of the plain language of the court, this court concluded that the ruling, in which the court stated it was going to terminate the defendant's participation in the accelerated rehabilitation program, con- stituted a termination of the defendant's participation in the program under § 54-56e and not a reconsideration and denial of the program. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in terminating the defendant's partici- pation in the accelerated rehabilitation program: the defendant was not afforded notice that the court intended to terminate his participation in the program, the court did not allow the defendant to be heard on the issue of termination and the defendant did not have the opportunity to present evidence regarding successful compliance with the program; moreover, the court improperly based its decision to terminate the defendant's participation on extrajudicial information related to a frater- nal organization in which the defendant participated, the defendant was not informed of the source of the information or given any opportunity to review or to rebut it, and the mere allegation of concerning activities of the fraternal organization without additional evidence was an insuffi- cient basis to terminate the defendant's participation in the program. Argued September 15—officially released December 1, 2020

The plaintiffs, V and E, sought to recover damages for, inter alia, the allegedly wrongful death of the decedent, M, as a result of the defendants' negli- gence. The plaintiffs commenced the action in May, 2016. Despite various pleadings and motions filed by the defendants, the plaintiffs did not serve any discovery, take any depositions, close the pleadings, disclose any experts, or respond to outstanding discovery requests. Additionally, E died in May, 2016, and his estate was never substituted as the proper party in the case. Eventually, in February, 2018, the plaintiffs' counsel relayed to the trial court personal reasons why deadlines and discovery compliance were not met and represented that he needed to withdraw. Following more continuances, V was not able to obtain new counsel, and objected to the plaintiffs' counsel withdrawing from the case. In March, 2019, the court denied the motion to withdraw filed by the plaintiffs' counsel and, in April, 2019, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute with due diligence. On appeal to this court, the plaintiffs claimed that the court abused its discretion in rendering a judgment of dismissal. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to prosecute with due diligence; under the factors articulated in Ridgaway v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. (328 Conn. 60), the court's sanction of dismissal was proportional to the plaintiffs' misconduct in that the court carefully set forth a pattern of misconduct by the plaintiffs over the course of three years, the plaintiffs were clearly on notice of the possibil- ity of a sanction as the defendants began requesting a judgment of dismissal as a sanction in November, 2017, and the court repeatedly notified the plaintiffs that a dismissal would be forthcoming if they continued their pattern of delays, the court demonstrated the use of alternatives to dismissal by issuing new orders and warnings of dismissal but these alternatives failed and further alternatives were not required, and, although the court squarely put the blame for the repeated violations of its orders on the plaintiffs' counsel, the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs were aware of the misconduct. Argued September 16—officially released December 8, 2020

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crime of sexual assault in the third degree, sought a second writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because, at the time of his plea, he was under the influence of medication, he did not receive the benefit of an interpreter and his trial counsel had coerced him. The habeas court sua sponte dismissed the petition pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 23-29 (3)) as an improper successive petition. Thereafter, the habeas court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that his claim involved an issue that was debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve the issue in a different manner, or that the question raised was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp- erly dismissed his second habeas petition as an improper successive petition, as the second petition presented the same legal ground and sought the same relief as the first petition, and the petitioner failed to state new facts not reasonably available at the time of the first petition. Argued October 7—officially released December 8, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of breach of the peace in the second degree and assault of public safety personnel, the defendant appealed to this court. On election day on November 8, 2016, the defen- dant went to the polling place located at the Bethel Town Hall where he proceeded to remove papers from a dry erase board and throw them on the ground and erase information written on the board. He entered the part of the town hall where voting was taking place and was given a ballot, which he then refused to return. Volunteers asked a police officer, P, who was providing security, for assistance. The defendant, who continued to refuse to return the ballot, then placed the ballot in his pants and dared P to retrieve the ballot from his pants. At this point, the volunteers allowed the defendant to keep the ballot and the defendant exited the area, knocking over a basket of stickers as he did so. He then took several boxes of cookies from Girl Scouts who were selling cookies outside the voting location and, when told by P to return the boxes, threw them aggressively onto the table. P then began to escort the defendant out of the town hall and, as they were walking, the defendant spit on a picture hanging on the wall. The next day, two police officers, B and C, went to the defendant's home to serve a sum- mons for breach of the peace in violation of the applicable statute (§ 53a- 181 (a) (1)), based on the defendant's conduct the day before. C handed the summons to the defendant and asked that he sign it. The defendant crumpled the summons, threw it on the ground, and then spat in C's face, at which point the defendant was arrested and charged with assault of public safety personnel. Held: 1. The defendant's challenges to his conviction of breach of the peace in violation of § 53a-181 (a) (1) were unavailing: a. The evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction of breach of the peace in the second degree, as the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established that the defendant's conduct on November 8, 2016, was physically tumul- tuous and contained the requisite level of physicality. b. This court found unavailing the defendant's claim that § 53a-181 (a) (1) was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, as a reasonable person would anticipate that § 53a-181 (a) (1) would apply to the defen- dant's conduct on November 8, 2016. c. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the definition of ''tumultuous behavior'' in § 53a-181 (a) (1), as the defendant implicitly waived his claim of instructional error; defense counsel had an opportu- nity to review the jury charge language, acquiesced in the use of the instructional language at issue, and stated that he had no objection to the removal of the language now challenged by the defendant. d. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court committed plain error in its instructions to the jury, which was based on his assertion that the court's decision to remove certain language from the conduct element of § 53-181 (a) (1) may have led the jury to convict him for bad manners, rather than for conduct that portended imminent physical violence, as the court clearly instructed the jury that the defendant's conduct must be more than mere bad manners. 2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault of public safety personnel because the state failed to prove that C was acting in the performance of his official duties; C was on duty and wearing his uniform on November 9, 2016, and, on the basis of that fact, the jury reasonably could have concluded that his decision to accompany B to the home of the defendant and to issue the summons was made in his official capacity as a police officer and, therefore, C was acting within the scope of his employment. 5. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury regarding the law governing police discretion to issue and serve a summons on an individual who has not been arrested: the defendant implicitly waived his claim that the court's instructions were improper, as defense counsel had an oppor- tunity to review the jury instructions and did not object to them, he agreed that the instructions given were sufficient and, after the jury sent a note requesting clarification, he agreed with the court's decision not to further charge the jury on that issue, the court having concluded that the issue was one that the jurors had to deliberate on and reach themselves; moreover, the defendant could not prevail on his claim that the court committed plain error in declining to answer the jury's note requesting clarification as to when an officer's duties end, as there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would have concluded that C was not performing his lawful duty and acquitted the defendant because whether a police officer has lawful authority to conduct an arrest or serve a summons was irrelevant to the question of whether C was acting in the performance of his official duties. Argued October 6—officially released December 22, 2020

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, S Co. and P Co., for violations of the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA) (§ 52-552a et seq.) and the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). In 2012, the trial court rendered judg- ment for the plaintiff against S Co. in a separate action. Soon after the 2012 judgment, S Co. ceased doing business, and the former president of S Co. filed a certificate of incorporation forming P Co. The plaintiff alleged that S Co. had fraudulently transferred all of its assets to P Co. in order to prevent him from collecting on the 2012 judgment. The plaintiff requested punitive damages under CUTPA in his second revised complaint and in his posttrial brief; the trial court did not address punitive damages in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff on all counts. The court also awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees on his CUTPA count. The defendants appealed to this court. After the appeal had been filed, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint to conform the pleadings to the proof adduced at trial and a motion for punitive damages. The court granted the motion to amend but denied the motion for punitive damages. The defendants then amended their appeal. Held: 1. The defendants' original appeal was not taken from a final judgment, and this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it, but, nonetheless, the defendants' amended appeal was jurisdictionally proper; a final judgment was not rendered in this matter until the trial court had denied the plaintiff's motion for punitive damages, following the original appeal, and the defendants' amended appeal encompassed the claims raised by the defendants in their original appeal, in addition to the granting of the plaintiff's postjudgment motion to amend, and this court could review all of the defendants' claims in the context of their amended appeal. 2. The trial court abused its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint following judgment: no special circumstances existed to warrant the amended complaint, in which the plaintiff improp- erly asserted successor liability as a stand-alone claim, after the court had rendered judgment; moreover, by granting the motion to amend, the court enabled the plaintiff to present a claim after judgment that, standing alone, was not legally cognizable, as successor liability is a theory of liability to be alleged in support of a claim rather than raised as an independent claim. 3. The trial court did not err in determining that the defendants had vio- lated CUFTA: a. The trial court properly found that there had been a transfer of assets between S Co. and P Co., the record having supported the court's finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that S Co. transferred assets, specifi- cally two excavators, to P Co., but those were the only assets shown by the plaintiff to have been transferred, and a finding that any other assets were transferred by S Co. to P Co. would be based on assumption and speculation. b. The trial court properly determined that the defendants were liable under § 52-552e (a) (1) of CUFTA, in that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of S Co. having transferred assets to P Co. with an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the plaintiff; in determining that the defendants had violated § 52-552e (a) (1), the court found that the trans- fer between S Co. and P Co. met a number of the indicia of fraud set forth in § 52-552e (b), including that S Co. had been sued and the 2012 judgment was rendered before the transfer had been made, S Co., which the court found had ceased its business shortly following the 2012 judgment, was insolvent or became insolvent shortly following the trans- fer, and the formation of P Co. following the rendering of the 2012 judgment increased the difficulty facing the plaintiff in his efforts to collect on the judgment. c. The trial court improperly determined that the defendants were liable under § 52-552f (a) of CUFTA, as the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence that S Co. was insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result thereof; although there was evidence in the record demonstrating that S Co. became insolvent by the end of 2012, sometime following the transfer, there was no evidence reflecting the date of the transfer, thus, it could not be determined whether S Co. was insolvent at the time of the transfer, and there was insufficient evidence to make a finding as to whether the transfer of the excavators, itself, resulted in S Co. becoming insolvent. d. The trial court erred in encompassing any other property, besides two excavators, within its order of relief under CUFTA, as the order was overbroad in authorizing the attachment of property that was not subject to the action: the two excavators, which remain in the possession of P Co., were the only assets that were properly found, on the record, to have been fraudulently transferred from S Co. to P Co.; moreover, there was no error in the court's ordering that the plaintiff may attach the two excavators in the sum of the 2012 judgment, plus interest, and that the defendants were enjoined from transferring those excavators; furthermore, the defendants' claim that the court's relief under CUFTA was improper because the court failed to determine the value of the assets transferred pursuant to statute (§ 52-552i) was unavailing, as the court did not award damages under CUFTA, only a monetary sum in the form of attorney's fees under CUTPA, which had no bearing on the relief afforded under CUFTA, and the defendants' reliance on § 52-552i (b), which grants a trial court the discretion to award, as damages against the appropriate party, the lesser of the value of the asset transferred and the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, was misplaced. 4. The defendants' claim that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the count of his complaint sounding in a violation of CUTPA was unavailing; the crux of the defendants' contention was that the success of the plaintiff's CUTPA claim was predicated on the court's finding that the defendants had committed a fraudulent transfer under CUFTA, and, as the court properly determined that that the defen- dants had engaged in a fraudulent transfer in violation of § 52-552e (a) (1), the defendants' claim failed. Argued September 14—officially released December 22, 2020

The plaintiff, a minor child diagnosed with Down syndrome and without functional speech who was enrolled in the Hebron public school system, brought an action seeking damages from the defendants, the town of Hebron, the Board of Education, and eight of the board's employees, for, inter alia, negligence per se and statutory (§§ 46a-58 and 46a-75) discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants discriminated against him based on his disabilities by segregating him from students without disabilities and breached their duties to educate him in the least restrictive environment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff sought relief for the defendants' failure to provide special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.), thus triggering an administrative exhaustion requirement contained in that act and in the applicable state statutory (§ 10-76a et seq.) scheme that implements the federal act, thereby depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants specifically contended that, although the plaintiff did not allege a violation of the federal act, he sought relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education under the federal act and that, regardless of whether the complaint alleged a violation of the federal act, the federal act and state law (§ 10-76h) mandated exhaustion of administrative remedies insofar as the crux of the complaint was the alleged denial of a free appropriate public educa- tion. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, concluding that the plaintiff was required to exhaust his admin- istrative remedies but had failed to do so. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not allege a denial of a free appropriate public education and sought monetary relief, a remedy that was unavailable under the federal act. Held: 1. The plaintiff's appeal with respect to the defendant town and the board employees M and W was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for lack of a final judgment, as the judgment of dismissal did not dispose of all causes of action against these defendants. 2. The trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies, the plaintiff's complaint having clearly sought relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education: this court relied on the framework set forth in the United States Supreme Court decision in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools (137 S. Ct. 743), and adopted by our Supreme Court in Graham v. Friedlander (334 Conn. 564), in determining that, because the plaintiff's claims could not have been brought outside the school setting, the gravamen of the plaintiff's claims being that the defendants failed to educate the plaintiff in the least restrictive environment when it placed his desk and chair inside of a coatroom and did not permit him to spend a certain number of hours per week with children without disabilities, as provided for in his Individualized Education Plan, and that because the history of the proceedings prior to the filing of the complaint demonstrated that the plaintiff had invoked the formal procedures for filing a due process complaint under the federal act, the plaintiff sought relief for the denial of a free appropriate public education; moreover, the plaintiff could not avoid the exhaustion requirements under the federal act merely because he sought monetary damages; furthermore, the plaintiff was still required to follow the federal act's administrative procedures even though he could not be awarded monetary damages, as the exhaustion requirement requires a party to follow the administrative procedures, not that they be successful at any point in the process and, therefore, the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies when he began to pursue, but did not complete, the administrative remedies provided for under the federal act. Argued September 17—officially released December 22, 2020

The plaintiff, M Co., a mortgage company, sought a declaratory judgment to determine whether the defendants were lawful owners of shares of stock in M Co. In 1998, the defendants purchased 300 shares of stock in M Co. but, thereafter, they returned the certificate of stock and M Co. reimbursed the defendants their investment. M Co. alleged that in 2011, the stock certificate was returned to the defendants by V, the cofounder of M Co., and that the defendants' stock was improperly reissued or returned to them, without proper corporate authorization and for less than the fair value of the stock. The trial court determined that the defendants were not lawful shareholders of M Co. because, although they were listed as original shareholders, their ownership inter- est was relinquished soon thereafter, and V had no actual or apparent authority to issue shares in M Co. to the defendants. On appeal, the defendants claimed that M Co. alleged a claim of tortious financial misconduct and, therefore, the trial court improperly concluded that the declaratory judgment action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations (§ 52-577). Held that the trial court correctly determined that no statute of limitations applied to bar M Co.'s declaratory judgment action, rather, that the special defense of laches applied and that the defendants failed to prove that special defense: the trial court correctly interpreted that the allegations in M Co.'s complaint were not predicated on a note or agreement and that, despite the defendants' claim to the contrary, M Co. did not plead the elements of fraud, statutory theft, or conspiracy, and the defendants failed to identify those allegations in the complaint, M Co. did not seek damages but, rather, a judicial determi- nation as to whether the defendants were legally shareholders, and the determination of who had the superior claim was inherently an equitable one, particularly where there was no claim or finding that any of the parties engaged in tortious financial misconduct or breached a contract; moreover, the trial court's decision to take judicial notice of a related proceeding, in which V was found to have engaged in various acts of financial misconduct, related to the defendants' laches special defense, in that the trial court had an evidentiary basis on which to find facts that explained how the shares of stock were returned to the defendants in 2011 and how M Co. learned of V's misconduct, and the trial court in the present case did not find or imply that either of the defendants participated in any of V's misconduct. Argued September 14—officially released December 22, 2020

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of conspiracy to sell narcotics and possession of narcotics with intent to sell, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court violated his due process rights by shifting the burdens of proof and persuasion to him to prove that he had a legitimate source of income, which was based on his claim that the court erred in permitting a state Department of Labor representative, R, to testify that the defendant had no reportable wages, thereby suggesting that he earned a living selling drugs: the defendant's claim challenging R's testimony was evidentiary rather than constitutional in nature; moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting R's testimony and determining that the probative value of the evidence of the defendant's lack of reportable wages out- weighed its prejudicial effect, as that evidence was probative of whether the defendant was engaged in trafficking drugs and was not unduly prejudicial because R's testimony was not presented in a manner that would have improperly aroused the emotions of the jurors; furthermore, even if this court assumed that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting R's testimony, any error was harmless, as the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving that it was more probable than not that the admission of the testimony substantially affected the verdict. 2. The defendant's claim that the trial court erred in admitting impermissible expert opinion testimony from F, a police detective, on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant intended to sell narcotics was unavailing; that court did not abuse its discretion in admitting F's testimony, as his testimony concerned only general factors that he would consider when deciding to charge a person with possession of narcotics with intent to sell, including the general behavior of drug users and drug traffickers, and the prosecutor did not ask F for his specific opinion about whether the defendant possessed narcotics with intent to sell, and, therefore, F never expressed his opinion on the ultimate issue before the jury; more- over, even if this court assumed that the trial court improperly admitted F's testimony, the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving that the admission of F's testimony more probably than not affected the verdict and therefore was harmful. Argued September 9—officially released December 22, 2020