Williamson v . Odyssey House CV-99-561-JD 11/01/00
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Marsha Williamson,
Guardian of Carmen Griffin
v. Civil N o . 99-561-JD
Opinion N o . 2000 DNH 237
Odyssey House, Inc.
O R D E R
The plaintiff, Marsha Williamson, Guardian of Carmen
Griffin, brings a tort action against Odyssey House, Inc., where
Carmen Griffin resided by court order when she was injured as the
result of her attempted suicide. Odyssey House moves for summary
judgment, contending that it is protected by absolute judicial
immunity and that it is not liable for Griffin’s injuries from
her attempted suicide. The plaintiff objects to summary
judgment.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The record evidence is taken in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See Zambrana-Marrero v . Suarez-Cruz, 172
F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir. 1999). “[A]n issue is ‘genuine’ if the
evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury could resolve
the issue in favor of the nonmoving party and a ‘material’ fact
is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing
law.” Fajardo Shopping Ctr. v . Sun Alliance Ins. Co.,
167 F.3d
1 , 7 (1st Cir. 1999). Summary judgment will not be granted as
long as a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the
nonmoving party. See Anderson v . Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
Background
Odyssey House, Inc. operates the Adolescent Therapeutic
Center in Hampton, New Hampshire, which is a long-term
residential facility for adolescents who are emotionally
disturbed and who have substance abuse problems. Carmen Griffin
was ordered into a placement at Odyssey House on March 3 , 1997,
when she was fifteen years old, based on the recommendation of
her Juvenile Services Officer. Griffin had a very troubled
history, and she was placed at Odyssey House because of her
substance abuse and extreme behavior, including suicidal and
self-abusive threats and actions.
Within days of her placement at Odyssey House, Griffin was
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put on a twenty-four hour watch because of her extreme behavior.
Griffin continued to demonstrate assaultive and self-abusive
behavior throughout her placement at Odyssey House. Her Juvenile
Services Officer recommended that she be committed to the New
Hampshire Youth Development Center (“YDC”). Odyssey House staff
opposed her removal, and the court continued her placement at
Odyssey House.
At the end of June when Griffin said that she felt suicidal,
she was transferred to the Portsmouth Pavilion where she was
hospitalized for a week. In August, she was repeatedly on
protection watches because of suicide threats, wrapping cords or
scarves around her neck leaving evidence of strangulation,
“cheeking” her medications, and attempting to leave the facility.
Despite the concerns about her behavior and her safety, her
psychiatrist recommended that she stay at Odyssey House with a
contract to control her behavior.
In September, Griffin’s placement was again reviewed in
court due to her extreme behavior and her Juvenile Services
Officer again recommended that she be committed to YDC. Odyssey
House staff continued to recommend her placement there through
September 2 2 , 1997, and the court continued Griffin’s placement
at Odyssey House. During September, Griffin exhibited self-abusive behavior and suicidal thoughts. On September 2 4 , Griffin
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intentionally choked herself and later barricaded herself in her
room. Griffin was informed that she would not be able to have a
home pass that weekend or participate in a meeting that night
because of her behavior. She was not seen by a therapist or put
on a precaution watch. An hour after the barricading incident,
she had again barricaded herself in her room and was then found
hanging by a belt from the sprinkler fixture in her room. As a
result of injuries caused by the suicide attempt, Griffin remains
in a persistent vegetative state.
Discussion
Odyssey House moves for summary judgment on the grounds that
it is entitled to judicial immunity and that it is not liable for
Griffin’s attempted suicide. Marsha Williamson, Griffin’s
guardian, contends that judicial immunity does not apply to
Odyssey House in these circumstances and that Odyssey House may
be liable for Griffin’s attempted suicide because of its special
custodial relationship with Griffin.
New Hampshire law provides immunity from liability to
judicial officers and those who are exercising judicial functions
for their actions taken in their judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity. See Gould v . Director, N.H. Div. of Motor Vehicles,
138 N.H. 343, 346 (1994). Judicial immunity depends upon the
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nature of the actions, not the title of the actor, and only those
actions that are judicial or quasi-judicial are protected by
immunity. See id. Other states have recognized that court-appointed experts, such as psychologists, may be protected by
quasi-judicial immunity for their actions taken within the scope
of their appointment because in that capacity they are acting as
an arm of the court. See, e.g., Diehl v . Danuloff,
2000 WL
1114341, at *6 (Mich. App. Oct. 3 , 2000); Politi v . Tyler,
751
A.2d 788, 796 (Vt. 2000) (Morse, J., dissenting); Delcourt v .
Silverman,
919 S.W.2d 7 7 7 , 786 (Tex. App. 1996).
In this case, at the very least, a factual dispute remains
as to whether Odyssey House was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity while Griffin was a resident and when she attempted
suicide. The facts of record suggest that Griffin was ordered to
the placement at Odyssey House, not that Odyssey House was
serving as a court-appointed expert in her case. In its capacity
as a residential placement for Griffin, Odyssey House was serving
the same function as any other court-ordered placement, such as a
placement at YDC. Based on the record facts, Odyssey House has
not demonstrated that it is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
Odyssey House also argues that it is not liable for
Griffin’s attempted suicide because under New Hampshire law a
negligence cause of action is not recognized for the suicide of
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another. See McLaughlin v . Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 337 (1983).
Odyssey House acknowledges that an exception to the nonliability
rule may exist in the circumstances of a prison and prisoner
relationship, but it argues that liability will only adhere if
the prison shows reckless disregard for the safety of the
prisoner. Odyssey House contends that it was not a prison and
did not show reckless disregard for Griffin’s safety.
An exception to the general rule of nonliability for
suicides is recognized “where the defendant has a specific duty
of care to prevent suicide,’ arising from the defendant’s
‘special relationship with the suicidal individual.’” Bruzga v .
PMR Architects, P.C., 141 N.H. 756, 758 (1997) (quoting
McLaughlin,
123 N.H. at 3 3 8 ) . That exception applies to “(1)
institutions such as jails, hospitals and reform schools, having
actual physical custody of and control over persons; and (2)
persons or institutions such as mental hospitals, psychiatrists
and other mental-health trained professionals, deemed to have a
special training and expertise enabling them to detect mental
illness and/or the potential for suicide.” McLaughlin,
123 N.H.
at 338; accord Murdock v . City of Keene,
137 N.H. 7 0 , 72 (1993).
In the special relationship context, the custodial party has a
duty to prevent the suicide of one in custody when the custodial
party “has actual knowledge of facts indicating that the prisoner
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is likely to commit suicide” and “fails to take reasonable
measures to prevent such an attempt.” Id. at 7 3 .
In this case, the facts of record suggest that Odyssey House
would likely fall into the special relationship exception to the
general rule precluding liability for a suicide. In addition,
sufficient facts exist in the record to create a genuine dispute
as to whether Odyssey House had sufficient information of the
likelihood that Griffin would attempt suicide to require
reasonable measures to prevent such an attempt. Therefore, a
trialworthy issue remains as to Odyssey House’s liability.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment (document n o . 11) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, Jr.
District Judge
November 1 , 2000
cc: Edgar D. McKean III, Esquire
Donald E . Gardner, Esquire
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