Smith v . Penn Tank Lines CV-00-220-JD 05/29/01
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
James E . Smith, et a l .
v. Civil N o . 00-220-JD
Opinion N o . 2001 DNH 103
Penn Tank Lines
and Agchem Service
O R D E R
The plaintiffs, James E . Smith and Leslie Smith d/b/a Smith
Farm Orchard, bring claims of negligence, breach of contract, and
violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act against
Penn Tank Lines and Agchem Service, arising from harm to the
plaintiffs’ apple orchard after pesticide spraying. Agchem
ordered the pesticide from Sunoco, Inc. and arranged to have it
delivered by Penn Tank Lines. Penn Tank Lines moves for summary
judgment and Agchem joins Penn Tank Lines’s motion. The
plaintiffs object.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The record evidence is construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences
are construed in that party’s favor. See Mauser v . Raytheon Co.
Pension Plan for Salaried Employees, 239 F.3d 5 1 , 56 (1st Cir.
2001). A material fact is one that “has the potential to change
the outcome of the suit under the governing law” and a factual
dispute is genuine if “the evidence about the fact is such that a
reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving
party.” Grant’s Dairy--Me., LLC v . Comm’r of M e . Dep’t of
Agric., Food & Rural Res.,
232 F.3d 8 , 14 (1st Cir. 2000).
The party with the burden of proof cannot rely on
speculation or conjecture and must present “more than a mere
scintilla of evidence in its favor.” Invest Almaz v . TempleInland Forest Prods. Corp., 243 F.3d 5 7 , 76 (1st Cir. 2001). An
absence of evidence on a material issue weighs against the party
who would bear the burden of proof at trial on that issue. See
Perez v . Volvo Car Corp.,
2001 WL 432414, at *3 (1st Cir. May 2 ,
2001).
2
Background1
In 1997, the Smiths operated two apple orchards in the area
of Barnstead, New Hampshire. One of the orchards was owned by
William and Charles Lord. As they had in past years, in early
1997, the Lords purchased a pesticide, Sun Spray 6 E , from Agchem
to spray in the orchards. The pesticide was shipped by Penn Tank
Lines from the manufacturer, Sunoco, to Agchem. Agchem unloaded
the pesticide into containers, and Agchem contracted with another
delivery service to transport the pesticide to the Lords.2
The Smiths and the Lords sprayed their orchards with the
pesticide as they had done in past years. After spraying, James
Smith noticed that the leaves on his trees began to suffer from
burns. He inspected the remaining pesticide and found that it
was not the same color as in past years.
Penn Tank Lines had a sample of the remaining pesticide
analyzed by Mark F. Young of Young Laboratories, Inc. and
submitted a copy of his report with its motion for summary
judgment. The report concluded that pesticide separated into two
1
Since neither party complied with the requirements of LR
7.2(b) to include a properly supported factual statement in their
memoranda, the factual summary here is for background information
only.
2
The Lords were plaintiffs in this suit until April 2 4 ,
2001, when they filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.
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levels with water, which had a greater density than the solvent
used in the petroleum pesticide spray, constituting the lower
level. When the spray is mixed, the water distributes through
the petroleum pesticide, making a cloudy emulsion. The upper
layer of the sample was determined not to contain diesel fuel.
The deadline for disclosure of the plaintiffs’ expert
witnesses was February 1 , 2001. As of March 2 6 , 2001, the
plaintiffs had not disclosed an expert witness.
Discussion
The plaintiffs allege that Agchem was negligent in
“supplying and delivering a contaminated, defective, or otherwise
unfit product that did not properly complete its intended
purpose.” Compl. ¶ 1 2 . The plaintiffs further allege that
Agchem breached its contract with the Lords to provide and
deliver uncontaminated pesticide and that the Smiths were third-party beneficiaries of that contract. As to Penn Tank Lines, the
plaintiffs allege that it was negligent in contaminating or
knowingly transporting contaminated pesticide and breached its
contract with Agchem, to which the plaintiffs were third-party
beneficiaries, to deliver uncontaminated pesticide. The
plaintiffs also allege that both defendants’ actions violated the
New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act.
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The defendants argue that the plaintiffs cannot prove their
claims, which all rely on proof that the pesticide was
contaminated and caused damage to the orchards, without an expert
witness. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has required expert
evidence, “whenever the matter to be determined is so distinctly
related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as
to be beyond the ken of the average layman.” Lemay v . Burnett,
139 N.H. 633, 635 (1995); accord Willard v . Park Indus., Inc.,
69
F. Supp. 2d 2 6 8 , 272 (D.N.H. 1999); Powell v . Catholic Med. Ctr.,
749 A.2d 3 0 1 , 306 (N.H. 1999). The defendants contend that the
nature and source of the alleged contamination and the cause of
the plaintiffs’ claimed damages are beyond the general knowledge
and experience of jurors.
The court agrees that the properties and operation of a
pesticide for use in an apple orchard is beyond jurors’ general
knowledge and experience. Since the defendants have submitted
the report of their expert witness about the pesticide in
question, the plaintiffs cannot avoid summary judgment on their
claims absent contrary expert testimony. The plaintiffs argue
that James Smith can testify about the nature and performance of
the pesticide. Such testimony, however, is based on his
particular experience with pesticides as part of his occupation
of operating apple orchards. In that regard, therefore, he would
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be testifying as an expert witness based on his experience in
operating apple orchards. See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Kumho Tire C o .
v . Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Similarly, the
plaintiffs’ res ipsa loquitur argument relies on a foundation of
evidence that could only be provided by an expert.
The plaintiffs represent that they have now, belatedly,
disclosed an expert witness and claim to have submitted their
disclosure to the defendants and to the court as Exhibit 1
attached to their memorandum.3 No such exhibit was attached to
the plaintiffs’ objection and memorandum filed with the court.
Even if an expert has now been disclosed, the plaintiffs do
not dispute that they did not comply with the timeliness
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(C). As
a result, they are obligated under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(c)(1) to show that the delay in their disclosure is
either justified or harmless. See Wilson v . Bradlees of New
England, Inc., 2001 WL 521356, at *6 (1st Cir. May 1 7 , 2001);
Ortiz-Lopez v . Sociedad Espanola De Auxilio Mutuo Y Beneficiencia
De P.R.,
2001 WL 454516 (1st Cir. May 3 , 2001). The plaintiffs
have done neither.
3
Although the plaintiffs represent that they disclosed an
expert witness’s report in documents produced to Penn Tank Lines
in September of 2000, the plaintiffs acknowledge that they did
not comply with Rule 26(a)(2).
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The plaintiffs argue instead that the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is premature because discovery is continuing in
the case. Although the plaintiffs do not reference Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(f), or comply with the rule’s requirements,
they apparently seek its relief. C f . Ricci v . Alternative Energy
Inc., 211 F.3d 157, 159 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000) (party seeking Rule
56(f) protection must file appropriate affidavit); Simas v . First
Citizens’ Fed. Credit Union,
170 F.3d 3 7 , 45 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating five requirements for relief under Rule 56(f)).
The continuing discovery, which the plaintiffs argue should
delay summary judgment, pertains to the date of the delivery of
the pesticide and the identification of the tanker involved in
the delivery. The plaintiffs do not explain how those matters
are material to the present issue of their failure to timely
disclose an expert witness. Although the plaintiffs argue that
the disclosure deadlines should have been extended, they did not,
and still have not, moved for such an extension. Therefore, the
plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing that further
discovery would aid them in justifying their lack of an expert
witness to invoke the protection of Rule 56(f). See, e.g., FDIC
v . Kooyomjian, 220 F.3d 1 0 , 15 (1st Cir. 2000); Resolution Trust
Corp. v . North Bridge Assocs.,
22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir.
1994).
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The defendants are correct that the plaintiffs cannot prove
their claims without the testimony of an expert witness as to the
nature and source of the alleged pesticide contamination and the
damages caused by the contamination. The defendants submitted
the uncontested report of their expert witness to show that the
pesticide was not contaminated. Therefore, based on the record
presented, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Since Penn Tank Lines’s third-party claim against Sunoco is in
essence an indemnification claim and arises only in the event
that Penn Tank Lines is found to be liable to the plaintiffs,
that claim is dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Carreiro v . Rhodes
Gill & Co., Ltd., 68 F.3d 1443, 1451 (1st Cir. 1995).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (document n o . 29) is granted. The third-party
complaint against Sunoco, Inc. is dismissed as moot. The clerk
of court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, J r .
District Judge
May 2 9 , 2001
cc: Kenneth G. Bouchard, Esquire
George W . Lindh, Esquire
Eric A . Kane, Esquire
Kevin M. Leach, Esquire
John B . Reilly, Esquire
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