No. 99-697
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2002 MT 88N
CHARLES L. BAKER, JR.,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead,
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Judge Presiding
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Charles L. Baker, Jr., pro se, Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
Honorable Mike McGrath; Attorney General; Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Thomas J. Esch, County Attorney; Eric S. Hummel, Deputy County
Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 11, 2002
Decided: May 2, 2002
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent but shall be filed as a
public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to
West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Charles L. Baker (Baker) appeals from the decision of the
Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denying his
petition for postconviction relief. We reverse.
¶3 We address the following issue on appeal:
Is Baker’s double jeopardy claim procedurally barred by § 46-
21-105(2), MCA, and if not, is he entitled to retroactive
application of our decision in State v. Guillaume?
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 In August 1995 Baker pled guilty to felony assault. In
September 1995 the District Court sentenced Baker to ten years in
the Montana State Prison with an additional ten years for use of a
weapon during the assault, to be served consecutively. The
District Court suspended five years of Baker’s total twenty-year
sentence.
¶5 On June 14, 1999, Baker filed a petition for postconviction
relief in the District Court, alleging that his ten-year sentence
under the weapon enhancement statute violated the double jeopardy
provision of the Montana Constitution. In support of this
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argument, Baker cited this Court’s decision in State v. Guillaume,
1999 MT 29,
293 Mont. 224,
975 P.2d 312.
¶6 The District Court denied Baker’s petition, concluding that
his double jeopardy claim was procedurally barred by the one-year
time bar set forth in § 46-21-102, MCA. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
¶7 In its Response Brief, the State concedes that the District
Court incorrectly applied the one-year time bar to Baker’s petition
for postconviction relief. Baker’s conviction became final prior
to April 24, 1996. Therefore, his postconviction relief petition
was subject to the pre-1997 version of § 46-21-102, MCA, which set
forth a five-year statute of limitations. We agree and conclude
that Baker’s petition was timely filed in the District Court.
¶8 The State argues that we should still uphold the District
Court decision since Baker’s claim is procedurally barred. It
claims he could have raised his double jeopardy claim on direct
appeal. The State cites to language in State v. Wells, 2001 MT 55,
¶ 12,
304 Mont. 329, ¶ 12,
21 P.3d 610, ¶ 12, that supports this
argument.
¶9 In Wells, we stated that “[t]he postconviction statutes do not
allow prisoners to raise matters that could have been raised on
direct appeal. . . . Wells could have raised her Guillaume double
jeopardy claim on direct appeal. Thus, she is additionally barred
from raising the issue in a petition for postconviction relief.”
Wells, ¶ 12 (citations omitted).
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¶10 Alternatively, the State argues that, if we find Baker’s
petition is not procedurally barred, we should still uphold the
District Court’s denial because we have consistently held that
Guillaume is only retroactively applied to cases that were not yet
final when Guillaume was decided.
¶11 We recently addressed both of these issues in State v.
Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54,
309 Mont. 63. In Whitehorn, we overruled
the exact language from Wells that the State relies on here. We
stated, “we overrule in part our holding in State v. Wells . . .
only to the extent that we held Wells was barred from raising a
double jeopardy claim in a petition for postconviction relief
pursuant to § 46-21-105(2), MCA, for failing to raise the issue on
direct appeal.” Whitehorn, ¶ 42. Therefore, Baker’s claim is not
procedurally barred because he did not raise it in a direct appeal.
¶12 Additionally, in Whitehorn, we reversed our previous line of
cases refusing to give retroactive application of Guillaume. We
concluded that we had erred in failing to distinguish procedural
rules from substantive rules when addressing retroactivity. We
held that this Court had erred “to the extent we limited
application of Guillaume to those cases pending on direct review.”
Whitehorn, ¶ 49. We reiterated, though, that defendants seeking
postconviction relief, whether under Guillaume or otherwise, are
still required to timely file petitions pursuant to § 46-21-102,
MCA. Whitehorn, ¶ 43.
¶13 Therefore, because Baker’s petition for postconviction relief
was timely filed, we reverse the District Court’s ruling denying
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Baker relief. We remand this matter to the District Court for
resentencing in accordance with our decision.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, dissenting.
¶14 I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion for the reasons stated at length in my
dissent in State v. Whitehorn, 2002 MT 54,
309 Mont. 63.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
Justice Jim Rice joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.
/S/ JIM RICE
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