[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at
96 Ohio St.3d 76.]
IN RE BICKNELL ET AL., APPELLANTS.
[Cite as In re Bicknell, 2002-Ohio-3615.]
Change of name—Request to change surnames of same-sex, unmarried,
cohabitating couple is reasonable and proper under R.C. 2717.01,
when—R.C. 2717.01(A), construed and applied.
(No. 2001-0609—Submitted April 10, 2002—Decided July 31, 2002.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, Nos. CA2000-07-140 and
CA2000-07-141, 2001-Ohio-4200.
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ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J.
{¶1} In January 2000, appellants, Jennifer Lane Bicknell and Belinda Lou
Priddy, filed individual applications with the Butler County Probate Court to have
their surnames changed to “Rylen,” which is a combination of letters from both of
their last names. The reason given on both applications was “Applicant desires to
legally have the same last name as her long-term partner of nine (9) years. This
name change will only add to the level of commitment they have for each other, as
well as that of their unborn child. Also, so that this tender and new family will have
a unified name in the eyes of the law.” At the time of the hearing on the
applications, Ms. Bicknell was pregnant by artificial insemination.
{¶2} A magistrate issued a decision denying both applications, writing, “To
grant their petitions would be contrary to the public good, contrary to encoded
public policy, and contrary to natural law.” Although the probate court rejected the
magistrate’s conclusions of law, it also denied the applications, concluding, “It is
not reasonable and proper to change the surnames of cohabitating couples, because
to do so would be to give an aura of propriety and official sanction to their
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cohabitation and would undermine the public policy of this state which promotes
legal marriages and withholds official sanction from non-marital cohabitation.”
{¶3} The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding:
“We find that there is support for the trial court’s determination that Ohio law
favors solemnized marriages and that cohabitation contravenes this policy.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that court
sanctioning of the use of the same surname by two unmarried cohabitants is against
Ohio’s public policy promoting marriage.” The cause is now before this court on
the allowance of a discretionary appeal.
{¶4} This is a case of first impression in Ohio, and in spite of the unique
circumstances involved, the only issue before us is whether the appellants’ request
to change their surnames is reasonable and proper under R.C. 2717.01. We hold
today that it is and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
{¶5} R.C. 2717.01(A) states:
{¶6} “A person desiring a change of name may file an application in the
probate court of the county in which the person resides. The application shall set
forth that the applicant has been a bona fide resident of that county for at least one
year prior to the filing of the application, the cause for which the change of name
is sought, and the requested new name.
{¶7} “…
{¶8} “Upon proof that proper notice was given and that the facts set forth
in the application show reasonable and proper cause for changing the name of the
applicant, the court may order the change of name.” (Emphasis added.) Moreover,
in Pierce v. Brushart (1950), 153 Ohio St. 372, 380,
41 O.O. 398, 402,
92 N.E.2d
4, 8, this court noted, “It is universally recognized that a person may adopt any
name he may choose so long as such change is not made for fraudulent purposes.”
Thus, we must determine whether appellants meet the requirements of R.C.
2717.01(A).
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January Term, 2002
{¶9} It is undisputed that appellants filed the applications in the Butler
County Probate Court, that they lived in Butler County for more than one year, that
they stated the reason for which the name changes were sought, and that they
identified the requested new name. Thus, this court must decide whether appellants
show reasonable and proper cause for changing their names.
{¶10} Other jurisdictions have considered this issue. In In re Bacharach
(2001), 344 N.J.Super. 126,
780 A.2d 579, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, was asked to consider whether the plaintiff would be able to
adopt a hyphenated surname to include the name of her same-sex partner. The court
began its analysis by observing, “It has been held that names should not be changed
for trivial, capricious, or other—reasons that a change of name will be refused if
the court entertains a serious doubt as to the propriety of granting it. …
[M]oreover, a judge may deny such requests if it is based upon an ‘unworthy
motive,’ the possibility of fraud on the public, fraudulent or criminal purposes or
that there is an overriding social policy, which militates against the change ….”
Id. at 129,
780 A.2d 579.
{¶11} The court reversed the judgment of the lower court, holding, “There
is no fraudulent or criminal purpose or any other substantial reason to deny
appellant the relief she seeks. We hold that the denial of her request was a
misapplication of judicial discretion, and we direct that the hearing judge execute
an order granting the application ….” Id. at 136,
780 A.2d 579. The court further
stated:
{¶12} “We underscore that the hearing judge did not base his decision on
any disapproval of appellant or her same-sex relationship. Rather he found that
there was an inappropriate purpose to the application and a potential fraud upon the
public because the name change might give the misperception that New Jersey
recognizes same-sex marriages as lawful.
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{¶13} “This concern is misconceived. Appellant and her partner can
exchange rings, proclaim devotion in a public or private ceremony, call their
relationship a marriage, use the same surname, adopt and rear children. All these
actions may be taken in full public view. None are offensive to the laws or stated
policies of this state. To deny the applicant a statutory change of a portion of her
surname to that of her same-sex partner on the hypothesis that some members of
the public may be misled about the legal status of same-sex marriages in New
Jersey is far-fetched and inherently discriminatory.” Id.,344 N.J.Super. at 135-
136,
780 A.2d 579.
{¶14} In the case at bar, appellants’ only stated purpose for changing their
names is to carry the same surname to demonstrate their level of commitment to
each other and to the children that they planned to have. Both acknowledge that
same-sex marriages are illegal in Ohio, and it is not their intention to have this court
validate a same-sex union by virtue of granting the name-change applications. Any
discussion, then, on the sanctity of marriage, the well-being of society, or the state’s
endorsement of nonmarital cohabitation is wholly inappropriate and without any
basis in law or fact.
{¶15} In summarizing her rationale for the name change, Ms. Bicknell
stated, “[W]e just want to share a name so that when we do have kids, when this
child is born seven or eight months from now, the three of us will share the same
name and we’ll be a family.”
{¶16} Similarly, in In re Application of Ferner (1996), 295 N.J.Super. 409,
415,
685 A.2d 78, in which the applicant petitioned to assume a single name, the
Superior Court of New Jersey stated that “a properly presented request should not
be denied because of an individual judge’s preferences or speculation about
whether the applicant has made a wise decision.”
{¶17} Finally, in In re McIntyre (1998), 552 Pa. 324, 330,
715 A.2d 400,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reasoned, “As the name change statute and the
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procedures thereunder indicate a liberal policy regarding change of name requests,
… we see no reason to impose restrictions which the legislature has not.”
{¶18} It is clear that appellants have no criminal or fraudulent purpose for
wanting to change their names. They are not attempting to evade creditors or to
create the appearance of a state-sanctioned marriage. Accordingly, we hold that
appellants’ name change applications are reasonable and proper under R.C.
2717.01(A) and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissents.
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.
{¶19} I dissent from the majority’s opinion.
{¶20} By our decision today, we have judicially read into a statute an
interpretation that I do not believe the General Assembly intended. Allowing
unmarried couples, whether homosexual or heterosexual, to legally assume the
same last name with the stamp of state approval is directly contrary to the state’s
position against same-sex and common-law marriages, neither of which Ohio
recognizes. This is a social policy decision that should clearly be made by the
General Assembly after full public debate and discourse, not by judicial legislation.
{¶21} Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of
the court of appeals.
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Scott E. Knox, for appellants.
Jillian S. Davis and Raymond Vasvari, urging reversal for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc.
Heather C. Sawyer, urging reversal for amici curiae Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc. and Ohio Human Rights Bar Association.
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David R. Langdon, urging affirmance for amicus curiae American Family
Association of Ohio.
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