Blaisdell v . Rochester CV-03-138-JD 06/30/03
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
George Blaisdell
v. Civil N o . 03-138-JD
Opinion N o . 2003 DNH 113
City of Rochester, New Hampshire
O R D E R
The plaintiff, George Blaisdell, proceeding pro s e , returns
to this court to recover damages from the City of Rochester for
the loss of property which he claims occurred when the city
demolished a structure at 125 Charles Street, where Blaisdell
once lived. He brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Rochester deprived him of “personalty” without just compensation
in violation of due process. Rochester moves to dismiss
Blaisdell’s claim on the grounds that it is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and collateral estoppel.1
Background
Blaisdell alleges that he lived at 125 Charles Street,
Rochester, New Hampshire, from December of 1970 until February of
1
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v . Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v . Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413
(1923).
1993. The City of Rochester claimed a tax title to the house in
1985, and the city and Blaisdell litigated the issue of title to
the property. On February 2 3 , 1993, the 125 Charles Street
property was damaged by fire. The city took possession of the
property after the fire, removed vehicles from the property, and
had the house and garage demolished in April of 1993.
Blaisdell previously brought takings claims in this court,
along with other related state law claims, arising from the
removal of the vehicles and demolition of the 125 Charles Street
structures. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the city on
the takings claims because Blaisdell failed to show that the
State of New Hampshire did not provide adequate post-deprivation
remedies and because the record demonstrated that the city, not
Blaisdell, held legal title to the real property at 125 Charles
Street. Blaisdell then brought suit in state court against the
city and other defendants, alleging conversion of personal
property, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.
The state court granted summary judgment in the defendants’
favor except as to the conversion claim against the city. After
a two-week trial on the conversion claim in February of 2002, the
jury found against Blaisdell. Responding to questions on the
verdict form, the jury found that Blaisdell did not own or have a
2
right to possess or control any of the personal property,
including motor vehicles, at 125 Charles Street and that the city
was authorized to demolish the structure at 125 Charles Street.
Blaisdell’s suit here alleges that “[t]he City violated
Blaisdell’s right to just compensation under the fifth and
fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution regarding
the seizure, the destruction, and the taking of Blaisdell’s
personalty, which personalty Blaisdell had a legally recognized
property right i n , including actual possession and title to the
said personalty, in that the City has paid Blaisdell no just
compensation as required.” Complaint ¶ 3 3 .
Discussion
In considering a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court accepts the facts alleged
in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Calderon-Ortiz v . Laboy-Alvarado, 300
F.3d 6 0 , 63 (1st Cir. 2002). The court must determine whether
the complaint, construed in the proper light, “alleges facts
sufficient to make out a cognizable claim.” Carroll v . Xerox
Corp.,
294 F.3d 2 3 1 , 241 (1st Cir. 2002). The court may also
draw from undisputed court documents generated in proceedings
referenced in the complaint. See Prisma Zona Exploratoria de
3
P.R. v . Calderon, 310 F.3d 1 , 2 (1st Cir. 2002).
Rochester contends that Blaisdell’s takings claim is barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine due to the state court judgment
against Blaisdell on his conversion claim, based on the same
alleged property loss. Alternatively, Rochester asserts that the
claim is barred by collateral estoppel. Blaisdell believes that
because he originally brought the takings claim in this court and
the claim was denied when he failed to show that the state did
not provide adequate post-deprivation remedies, he is now
entitled to pursue the claim, having lost in state court.
Blaisdell is mistaken.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts
from reviewing state court judgments. Picard v . Members of
Employee Retirement Bd., 275 F. 3d 139, 145 (1st Cir. 2002).
Lower federal courts are barred from reviewing any claim that is
“inextricably intertwined” with claims decided in a state court.
Sheehan v . Marr,
207 F.3d 3 5 , 40 (1st Cir. 2000). Claims are
inextricably intertwined “if the federal claim succeeds only to
the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before
it.” Hill v . Town of Conway,
193 F.3d 3 3 , 39 (1st Cir. 1999).
To state a takings claim, Blaisdell must allege facts to
show that he had a legally recognized interest in property that
was taken by the city without just compensation. See Blaisdell
4
v . City of Rochester, Civil N o . 97-82-M, at *5-6 (D.N.H. Jan. 4 ,
1999). Blaisdell alleges that he had legally recognized property
rights in “personalty” that was located at 125 Charles Street.2
Contrary to Blaisdell’s allegations here, the jury in the
state proceeding found that he did not own or have the right to
possess or control any of the personal property he claimed at 125
Charles Street.3 For Blaisdell to succeed on his takings claim
in this court, the factfinder would necessarily have to decide
that Blaisdell owned or had property rights in the personalty he
claims so that the state determination was wrong. Such a
determination is therefore inextricably intertwined with the
state court determination and is barred by Rooker-Feldman.
Due process requires a constitutionally adequate review
process but does not guarantee that a claimant will be
successful. See Amsden v . Moran, 904 F.2d 7 4 8 , 756 (1st Cir.
1990). Blaisdell has pointed to nothing in the state proceeding
that would suggest an unconstitutional deprivation of due
2
“Personalty” is defined a s : “Personal property; movable
property; chattels; property that is not attached to real
estate.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1144 (6th ed. 1990).
3
It was previously determined in this court that the city
held legal title to the real property at 125 Charles Street. See
George Blaisdell v . City of Rochester, Civil N o . 97-82-M, at *6-7
(D.N.H. Oct. 1 9 , 1999).
5
process.4 Therefore, Blaisdell’s taking claim is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and is dismissed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss
(document n o . 4 ) is granted. The clerk of court shall enter
judgment accordingly and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Joseph A . DiClerico, J r .
United States District Judge
June 3 0 , 2003
cc: George Blaisdell, pro se
4
Although Blaisdell emphasizes the differences between his
conversion claim brought in state court and his takings claim
here, he does not explain why he did not bring the takings claim
in state court.
6
