Moss v. Grabill CV-01-220-M 09/30/03
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Stephen M. Moss,
Plaintiff
v. Civil No. 01-220-M
Opinion No.
Robert L. Grabill,
Defendant
O R D E R
Having carefully reviewed the memoranda and affidavits
submitted, the court cannot find that defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Given the evidence of record, and
depending upon how it is presented at trial, a reasonable jury
could plausibly find that Grabill's statements to Donovan, as he
describes them and as Donovan describes them, substantially
exaggerated the gravity of the complaints actually received,
thereby giving the false impression that Moss had been accused of
serious sexual misconduct. At a minimum, the court cannot
conclude that, as a matter of law, all of the (alleged)
statements attributed to Grabill, considered in context, are
incapable of defamatory meaning. In other words, on this record,
the court is constrained to conclude that a jury might reasonably
conclude that the meaning intended (and actually conveyed) by
Grabill's (alleged) statements was that complaints alleging
serious sexual misconduct of some sort had been made against
Moss, when in fact none of the complaints directly accuses Moss
of such misconduct.
The complaints actually received could be construed as
comparatively benign.1 And, Grabill's comments to Donovan about
those complaints might be found to have conveyed, and were
intended to convey, the impression that serious misconduct had
been asserted. For example, while no complaint received seems to
directly accuse Moss of sexual misconduct, Grabill acknowledges
having said to Donovan "that the kind of complaints the camp had
received raised a guestion as to whether they had to be referred
to and processed through, the State of New Hampshire." A
reasonable trier of fact might plausibly conclude that Grabill
was referring to the reporting reguirements set forth in RSA 169-
C:29, relative to incidents of possible child abuse. Moreover,
Donovan alleges that Grabill said that "there are three known
1 Of course, a jury might reasonably view the complaints
as implicitly suggesting that Moss had engaged in inappropriate
sexual contact with campers. That guestion cannot, however, be
resolved as a matter of law.
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charges" and that "the good [Moss] did could not be offset by
what happened here" - statements a jury might plausibly conclude
falsely described the gravity of the complaints actually
received.
While plaintiff's case on the merits appears to be
particularly thin, and the interposed defenses particularly
strong, on this record summary judgment is simply not available.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment (document no. 28) is,
therefore, denied.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
September 30, 2003
cc: Robert R. Lucic, Esg.
Marie M. McPartlin, Esg.
Russell F. Hilliard, Esg.
Martha Van Oot, Esg.
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