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2003 DNH 206

Gaylor v. McLaughlin, et al.

New Hampshire District Court

Decided November 19, 2003

New Hampshire District Court · decided 2003-11-19

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (§ 300002 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994)

Relies on Rowe v. Burton · A. A. v. New Jersey

Decided 2003-11-19

Gaylor v . McLaughlin, et a l .           CV-03-337-B   11/19/03

                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Dorothy Gaylor, et a l .

     v.                             Civil N o . 03-337-B
                                    
2003 DNH 206
Phil McLaughlin, et a l .

                              O R D E R

     Plaintiffs Dorothy Gaylor, William Gaylor, and Richard

Gaylor (“plaintiffs”) are the parents and brother of convicted

felon, Gregory Gaylor (“Gaylor”).   After Gregory Gaylor absconded

during his criminal trial, state officials placed a notice on the

internet seeking information concerning his whereabouts.     The

notice identified plaintiffs’ familial relationships to Gaylor

and listed their names, addresses, home telephone numbers and

Texas drivers license numbers. 1 Plaintiffs complain that

defendants’ disclosure of their personal information violated

their constitutional right to privacy and the Driver’s Privacy

Protection Act (“DPPA”), 
18 U.S.C. § 2721
, et seq.      They also



       Plaintiffs assert that defendants also disclosed their
Social Security numbers. However, the notice, which plaintiffs
attached to their complaint, lists only Gaylor’s Social Security
number.
assert state law claims for defamation and invasion of privacy.

Defendants have moved to dismiss.



                     I.   CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM

     Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable claim that

defendants’ disclosure of their names, home addresses, and

telephone numbers violated their constitutional right to

privacy.2 Even if I assume that plaintiffs had a legitimate

expectation that this information would remain private — an

assumption that is difficult to make in the modern world in which

such information is readily available from non-governmental

sources — defendants’ decision to disclose the information cannot

support a right to privacy claim because it was narrowly tailored

to serve the state’s legitimate interest in apprehending     a

fugitive.   See, e.g., A.A. ex rel. M.M. v . New Jersey, 
341 F.3d 206, 211-12
 (3d Cir. 2003) (governmental interest in disclosing

name and address of sex offender).    While drivers license numbers

are not readily available from non-governmental sources and it is

     2
       Plaintiffs do not base their claim on defendants’
disclosure of their familial relationships to Greg Gaylor.       If
they has asserted such a claim, it would fail for the same
reason.
                                -2-
not clear how the disclosure of the numbers furthered defendants’

effort to apprehend Gaylor, their decision to disclose the

information does not give rise to a constitutional claim because

a drivers license number is not the kind of deeply personal

information that the right to privacy was intended to protect

from public disclosure. See Rowe v . Burton, 
884 F. Supp. 1372, 1384
 (D. Alaska 1994).



            II.   DRIVER’S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT CLAIM

     Plaintiffs’ DPPA claim fails because defendants were engaged

in a legitimate law enforcement activity when they disclosed the

information that they allegedly obtained from    motor vehicle

records.   The DPPA provides that personal information obtained

from motor vehicle records may be disclosed     “[f]or use by any

government agency, including any court or law enforcement agency,

in carrying out its functions . . . .”   
18 U.S.C. § 2721
(b)(1).

The disclosure that occurred in this case plainly qualifies under

this exception as defendants disclosed the information in

furtherance of a lawful effort to apprehend a fugitive.




                                -3-
                       III.    STATE LAW CLAIMS

      Plaintiffs claim that the internet notice defamed them and

wrongly placed them in a false light because it created a false

impression that they had been engaged in criminal activity.       I

reject these claims because the notice could not be read by any

reasonable person to imply that plaintiffs had been engaged in

criminal activity.    Instead, the only reasonable way to read the

notice is to understand it to assert that plaintiffs are the

parents and brother of a wanted felon, a fact that plaintiffs

concede is true.



                          IV.    CONCLUSION

      Defendants’ motion to dismiss (doc. n o . 3 ) is granted.

      SO ORDERED.




                                        Paul Barbadoro
                                        Chief Judge

November 1 9 , 2003

cc:   Dorothy Gaylor, pro se
      Richard Gaylor, pro se
      William Gaylor, pro se
      Andrew Livernois, Esq.


                                  -4-

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