No. 02-540
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2003 MT 18N
CALVIN SKELTON,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA
Respondent and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade, Cause No. ADC 98-457
The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Calvin Skelton, Deer Lodge, Montana (Pro Se)
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Ilka Becker,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brant Light, Cascade County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 9, 2003
Decided: February 11, 2003
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court
1996 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be
cited as precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case title,
Supreme Court cause number and result to the State Reporter
Publishing Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of
noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Calvin Skelton (Skelton) appeals from the order entered by the
Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, denying his
petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
¶3 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in
denying Skelton’s petition.
BACKGROUND
¶4 In October of 1998, the State of Montana (State) charged
Skelton by information with felony riot, felony criminal mischief
by accountability, felony arson by accountability and misdemeanor
assault. During the course of the proceedings, Skelton moved to
dismiss the case based on lack of a speedy trial; the District
Court denied the motion. Skelton subsequently pleaded guilty to
the felony riot charge pursuant to a plea agreement in which the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The plea agreement
also expressly provided that Skelton reserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to dismiss. The District Court sentenced
Skelton to 5 years at the Montana State Prison and entered judgment
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on the conviction and sentence. Skelton then appealed the denial
of his motion to dismiss and we affirmed the District Court in a
nonpublished opinion. See State v. Skelton, 2001 MT 18N.
¶5 In February of 2002, Skelton petitioned the District Court for
postconviction relief, arguing that he was denied his
constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and a
speedy trial. The State responded that Skelton’s claims both
lacked merit and were procedurally barred. The District Court
denied the petition and Skelton appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 We review a district court’s denial of a petition for
postconviction relief to determine whether the court’s findings of
fact are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law correct.
State v. Wright, 2001 MT 282, ¶ 9,
307 Mont. 349, ¶ 9,
42 P.3d 753,
¶ 9.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Did the District Court err in denying Skelton’s petition for
postconviction relief?
¶8 Skelton first argues that the District Court erred in denying
his petition because he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the underlying proceedings. In analyzing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in postconviction proceedings, we
apply the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington
(1984), 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674. Wright, ¶
11. The Strickland test requires that a defendant establish that
his counsel’s performance was deficient and the deficient
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performance prejudiced the defense. Wright, ¶ 11. A defendant
must satisfy both prongs of the test; if an insufficient showing is
made regarding one prong, there is no need to address the other.
Dawson v. State, 2000 MT 219, ¶ 21,
301 Mont. 135, ¶ 21,
10 P.3d
49, ¶ 21. Furthermore, where a defendant entered a guilty plea,
“prejudice is established if the [defendant] demonstrates that, but
for his counsel’s deficient performance, he would not have pled
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Wright, ¶ 11.
Finally, a petition for postconviction relief must identify facts
supporting the alleged grounds for relief and be accompanied by
affidavits, records or other evidence establishing those facts.
Section 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA.
¶9 Skelton contends that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he only spoke with her twice over the telephone, did not
meet her in person until the eve of trial, was not informed that
different counsel would be representing him at his sentencing and
failed to make arrangements for witnesses to testify in his behalf.
However, Skelton does not allege how any of these perceived
deficiencies of his counsel prejudiced him or that he would not
have pleaded guilty to the riot offense had they not occurred. Nor
does he provide any factual basis, via affidavits or other
evidence, as required by § 46-21-104(1)(c), MCA, which would
support an allegation of prejudice had he made one. We conclude,
therefore, that Skelton has failed to establish the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test and his ineffective assistance of counsel
argument fails.
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¶10 Skelton also argues that the District Court erred in denying
his postconviction relief petition because he was denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial. However, as the State
points out, Skelton raised--and we resolved--this issue in his
direct appeal. Claims which were, or reasonably could have been,
raised on direct appeal may not be raised or decided in a
postconviction relief proceeding. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA.
Moreover, under the doctrine of res judicata, claims which were
raised on direct appeal cannot be raised again in a postconviction
relief proceeding. Hagen v. State, 1999 MT 8, ¶ 13,
293 Mont. 60,
¶ 13,
973 P.2d 233, ¶ 13. We conclude, therefore, that Skelton is
barred from raising his speedy trial argument here.
¶11 Finally, Skelton argues that his rights guaranteed by Article
II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution were violated in that he
was denied the opportunity to have his witnesses testify
(one way or the other) on his behalf, and a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the County or District in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed as
guaranteed by the Montana Constitution.
Skelton provides no further analysis or citation to legal
authority, however, in support of this conclusory contention. Rule
23(a)(4), M.R.App.P., requires that an appellant’s arguments be
supported with citation to legal authority and we will decline to
address arguments that are not so supported. State v. Anderson,
1999 MT 60, ¶ 21,
293 Mont. 490, ¶ 21,
977 P.2d 983, ¶ 21.
Consequently, we decline to address Skelton’s argument here.
¶12 We hold that the District Court did not err in denying
Skelton’s petition for postconviction relief.
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¶13 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM REGNIER
/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
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