Plch v . Warden CV-03-548-SM 08/31/04
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Vaclav Plch,
Petitioner
v. Civil N o . 03-548-SM
Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 127
Jane Coplan, Warden,
New Hampshire State Prison,
Respondent
O R D E R
In August of 1999, the dismembered body of a woman was found
in the Piscataquog River in Manchester, New Hampshire. The
victim was identified as Mary Stetson and an autopsy revealed
that she died as a result of multiple stab wounds. Petitioner,
Vaclav Plch, soon became a suspect and, after detectives located
him in Texas, he was charged with Stetson’s murder.
During the course of his criminal trial, Plch moved to
suppress incriminatory statements he had given to police,
asserting that they had been obtained in violation of his Miranda
rights. See Miranda v . Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Specifically, Plch claimed that the interrogating officers had:
(1) conducted the functional equivalent of interrogation after he
had invoked his right to counsel; and (2) failed to adequately
and accurately inform him of the full panoply of Miranda rights,
including, in particular, the right to have counsel present
during any questioning. The trial court denied Plch’s motion and
he was convicted of Stetson’s murder. In affirming Plch’s
conviction on appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
specifically addressed and rejected his Miranda claims. State v .
Plch,
149 N.H. 608 (2003). Plch is currently serving a sentence
of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Plch now seeks federal habeas corpus relief, see 28 U.S.C. §
2254, advancing the two Miranda claims that he fully exhausted at
the state court level. And, suggesting that there are no
genuinely disputed material facts, Plch moves for summary
judgment. The State objects and has itself moved for summary
judgment.
Standard of Review
Since passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the power to
grant federal habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to
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claims adjudicated on the merits in state court has been
substantially limited. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not
disturb a state conviction unless the state court’s adjudication
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Alternatively, habeas relief may be granted if the state court’s
resolution of the issues before it “resulted in a decision that
was contrary t o , or involved an unreasonable application o f ,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See also
Williams v . Taylor,
529 U.S. 3 6 2 , 399 (2000).
Here, Plch attacks the underlying state court decision
pursuant to section 2254(d)(1). S o , to prevail on his petition,
he must demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his
Miranda claims was contrary t o , or involved an unreasonable
application o f , clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court.
3
The United States Supreme Court recently explained the
distinction between decisions that are “contrary to” clearly
established federal law, and those that involve an “unreasonable
application” of that law.
Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court
may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]
Court on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has
on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under
the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas
court may grant the writ if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The Court also noted that an
“incorrect” application of federal law is not necessarily an
“unreasonable” one.
[T]he most important point is that an unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an
incorrect application of federal law . . . . Under
§ 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, then,
a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply
because that court concludes in its independent
judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied
clearly established federal law erroneously or
incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.
Id. at 410-11 (emphasis in original).
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Finally, it probably bears noting that a state court need
not rely upon, nor need it even cite, Supreme Court precedent in
order to avoid resolving a petitioner’s claims in a way that is
“contrary to” or involves an “unreasonable application of”
clearly established federal law. See Early v . Packer, 537 U.S.
3 , 8 (2002) (“Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation
of our cases - indeed, it does not even require awareness of our
cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the
state-court decision contradicts them.”) (emphasis in original).
With those principles in mind, the court turns to Plch’s
petition.
Discussion
I. Factual Background.
Because Plch does not challenge the factual findings made by
the state trial court and adopted by the state supreme court, see
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), they will be presented as set out in
State v .
Plch, supra.
Lieutenant Putney interviewed the defendant in a police
station interview room. He advised the defendant of his
rights by reading each right listed on the Austin Police
Department’s Miranda form, and asking the defendant if he
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understood that right. With regard to the right to counsel,
the following conversation took place:
MP Okay. It says you have the right to have a lawyer
present to advise you prior to you [sic] during an
questioning. Do you understand that?
VP Mmm.
MP Okay. If you are unable to hire a lawyer - okay, if
you can’t afford a lawyer - you have the right to have,
a h , you have a right to have a lawyer appointed to you
- to advise you prior to and during any questioning.
VP Yeah, what does that mean?
MP That means that if you can’t afford one, what happens
is you can apply u h , in court, you fill out an
affidavit - a financial affidavit saying that you can’t
afford a lawyer and the court will appoint one for you.
VP Mmm.
MP You understand that?
VP Yeah.
The defendant signed the Miranda waiver form and the
interview proceeded for approximately forty-five
minutes. At that point, the defendant stated: “Now I
want my lawyer.” The following colloquy then occurred:
MP You want a lawyer?
VP Yeah.
MP You can have a lawyer, but we know what happened that
night Billy. And you’ll get a lawyer. This was going
to be an opportunity, I guess for you to try to
convince us of the person you really are. But, that’s
not gonna happen. And you know what? You’re all done.
We can’t talk to you any longer Billy.
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VP I, I -
MP Billy, look at m e , just look at me and listen to me a
minute. Okay? We can not talk to you any longer. You
asked for a lawyer. And I have to play by the rules.
You understand that?
VP Ya.
MP I cannot ask you any more questions. As much as I’d
like t o , I can’t do that. If you have a change of
heart and you want to stand up and be the man you want
to be and let us know where those body parts are so
that family can rest, then you have to tell somebody
when you go down stairs that you want to talk to the
Detectives. We cannot go to you. We cannot talk to
you any longer. You have something to say, you have to
tell them that you want to talk to the Detectives. Do
you understand?
VP I understand.
The defendant was then left alone in the room for
approximately twenty minutes until Lieutenant Putney
returned and informed him of the charge he faced, which
prompted the following exchange:
MP But, this is the complaint against you? I just want
you to make sure that it’s clear. Okay? You’re being
charged with second degree murder, okay? That you
caused the death of Mary Stetson by stabbing her
multiple times in the chest, okay? That’s what this
complaint states, okay? Do you have any questions with
that at all?
VP That’s life [in] prison, right?
MP Ahh. Well, the penalty is up to the judge and we’re
not there yet - we’re not there yet. You understand?
VP Mmm.
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MP It’s serious - you understand that?
VP It’s serious. Very serious.
MP It is serious. Taking somebody’s life is serious....
Approximate forty minutes later, Detective Soucy and
Austin Police Detective Thompson took the defendant to
the booking room. The defendant began to make
potentially incriminating statements to Detective
Soucy, who immediately informed the defendant that he
could not speak to him because he had requested an
attorney. The defendant nevertheless indicated twice
that he wanted to talk at that time. Detective Soucy
consulted with Detective Thompson who proposed that
they finish the booking process and give the defendant
time to think. Detective Thompson then gave the
defendant the telephone extension of the homicide unit
and told him to have the booking officers call if he
still wished to talk.
Meanwhile, the detectives went to the homicide unit
where Detective Soucy spoke by telephone with the New
Hampshire attorney general’s office. Upon advice of an
assistant attorney general, Detective Soucy brought the
defendant back to an interview room to allow him a
chance to speak. The defendant was read his Miranda
rights, which he waived. During the ensuing interview,
the defendant made incriminating statements, including
revealing where he had disposed of the missing body
parts. The defendant was also interviewed again the
next day after an additional Miranda waiver.
The defendant moved to suppress his statements to the
detectives in the Texas interviews on the grounds that
Lieutenant Putney: (1) conducted the functional
equivalent of interrogation of the defendant after he
had requested counsel; and (2) failed to “adequately
and accurately” inform the defendant of his right to
have counsel present during questioning. The trial
court denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant
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contends that the court erred in its rulings on both
grounds.
State v . Plch, 149 N.H. at 610-613 (emphasis supplied).
II. Petitioner’s Claims.
A. Interrogation After Invocation of Right to Counsel.
In resolving petitioner’s Miranda claims, the state supreme
court first concluded that Lieutenant Putney’s recitation of the
charges pending against Plch (after Plch had invoked his right to
counsel), was not the functional equivalent of interrogation.
State v . Plch, 149 N.H. at 614 (citing Rhode Island v . Innis,
446
U.S. 291 (1980)). That decision is neither contrary t o , nor did
it involve and unreasonable application o f , clearly established
federal law. While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
that issue, several circuit courts of appeal have done so and
concluded that informing a suspect of the charges pending against
him or her is not the functional equivalent of interrogation.
See, e.g., Enoch v . Gramley,
70 F.3d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“Briefly reciting to a suspect in custody the basis for holding
him, without more, cannot be the functional equivalent of
interrogation.”); United States v . Payne,
954 F.2d 199, 202 (4th
Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Innis definition of interrogation is not so
9
broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory
statements by police officers concerning the nature of the
charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those
charges.”). See also United States v . Conley, 156 F.3d 7 8 , 83
(1st Cir. 1998).
The state supreme court did, however, conclude that
Lieutenant Putney’s statements to Plch concerning M s . Stetson’s
missing body parts, which were also made after Plch had invoked
his right to counsel, were “reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” State v . Plch, 149
N.H. at 614 (quoting Rhode Island v . Innis,
446 U.S. 2 9 1 , 301
(1980)). Accordingly, the court concluded that “the police
violated the dictates of Miranda and Innis by failing to cease
interrogation of the [petitioner].” Id. at 616.
Nevertheless, the court recognized that i f , following his or
her invocation of the right to counsel, a suspect initiates
further discussions with the police, accompanied by a knowing and
intelligent waiver of the right he or she had previously invoked,
the trial court may admit the suspect’s responses to further
10
questioning. Id. at 616 (citing Edwards v . Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981) and Smith v . Illinois,
469 U.S. 91 (1984)). Applying
those principles to the facts presented in petitioner’s case, the
court concluded that Plch initiated contact with the police
officers and held that such contact was not prompted by the
officers’ earlier improper statements. Id. at 617 (“Given the
significant time lapse and the [petitioner’s] continued denials
[of any knowledge regarding the location of the victim’s missing
body parts], we conclude that the [petitioner’s] initiation of
dialogue with the police was not prompted by Lieutenant Putney’s
improper comments.”). Next, the court concluded that the state
had demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt,1 that, prior to
resuming his conversation with police, petitioner knowingly and
intelligently waived his previously invoked right to counsel.
Id. at 617.
1
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that, under
the state constitution, the government must establish that a
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda
rights by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v . Gullick,
118 N.H. 9 1 2 , 915 (1978); State v . Phinney,
117 N.H. 145, 146-47
(1977). That standard of proof is higher than required by the
United States Constitution, see, e.g., Colorado v . Connelly,
479
U.S. 1 5 7 , 168 (1986), and application of that higher standard
obviously inures to the defendant’s benefit. It i s , for that
reason, neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable application
of” clearly established federal law. See generally Early v .
Packer,
537 U.S. at 8 .
11
The state supreme court plainly invoked and applied
pertinent Supreme Court precedent in resolving Plch’s claim.
And, the court’s determination that Plch initiated contact with
the police officers and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
cannot be said to have resulted from an unreasonable application
of that precedent. Consequently, as to the claim that he was
subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of his
constitutional rights, Plch’s petition for habeas corpus
necessarily fails.
B. Adequacy of Miranda Warnings.
Next, Plch makes two related arguments about the quality of
the Miranda warnings he received: first, he suggests that his
interrogators failed to adequately explain his right to have
counsel present with him during any questioning; and, second, he
asserts that the officers implicitly suggested that his right to
consult with counsel attached only at some future point in time
(perhaps when he returned to New Hampshire and could apply to the
court for appointed counsel). According to Plch, those
shortcomings entitle him to the habeas corpus relief he seeks.
12
As with his first claim, Plch advances a thorough and well-
supported argument in support of his view that the officers who
interrogated him violated the teachings of Miranda.
Significantly, however, that is not the focus of this court’s
inquiry. In fact, this court lacks jurisdiction to engage in a
de novo review of the substance and quality of the warnings
issued to petitioner. Instead, this court may only consider
whether, in resolving Plch’s claims, the state supreme court
arrived at a decision that was contrary t o , or involved an
unreasonable application o f , clearly established federal law, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated the standard by
which the adequacy of Miranda warnings is measured:
Miranda has not been limited to station house
questioning and the officer in the field may not always
have access to printed Miranda warnings, or he may
inadvertently depart from routine practice,
particularly if a suspect requests an elaboration of
the warnings. The prophylactic Miranda warnings are
not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but
are instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination is protected. Reviewing
courts therefore need not examine Miranda warnings as
if construing a will or defining the terms of an
easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings
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reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required
by Miranda.
Duckworth v . Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (citations and
internal punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
In applying that law and resolving Plch’s Miranda claims,
the state supreme court observed that, “[e]xamination of the
entire sequence of Miranda warnings [during Plch’s first
interrogation] reveals that Lieutenant Putney actually read the
rights to presence of counsel and appointment of counsel
separately, asking the [petitioner] after each whether he
understood that right.” State v . Plch, 149 N.H. at 618. A
transcript of that interview reveals the following exchange
between Lieutenant Putney (“MP”) and Plch (“VP”):
MP: Now I’m going to go over - go over these with you
a h , so you understand them okay?
VP Mmm.
MP It’s all, it’s all written down here so I’ll be able to
go right over it with you and make sure you understand
i t . If you have any questions, then you can - you can
a h , ask me and I’ll answer them for you.
VP Mmm.
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MP Okay. It says you have the right to have a lawyer
present to advise you prior to you [sic] during any
questioning. Do you understand that?
VP Mmm.
Transcript of First Interview with Vaclav Plch on August 1 5 ,
1999, Appendix to Respondent’s Memorandum (document n o . 1 7 ) , at
18-19. Later during that first interview, the interrogating
officers pressed Plch for details about the evening of M s .
Stetson’s murder and Plch responded by saying, “Now I want my
lawyer,” id. at 4 2 , and the interview was terminated. At a
minimum, Plch’s response demonstrates that he understood that he
had the right to terminate the interview at any time and that he
had the right to consult with an attorney before answering any
additional questions.
Subsequently, Plch initiated contact with the officers and
told them he wanted to talk with them. At the outset of that
second interview, the following exchange took place:
JS Do you remember saying that something bad
happened, but you think it was the alcohol? Okay.
We went over that blue form. That was your
Miranda rights - in the other room.
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VP Yes, yes.
MP We’re gonna go over them again with you.
VP You don’t have t o , I remember.
MP I know you remember, but you have the right not to talk
to u s . You know that, right?
VP But I want [to] and that’s my choice.
MP Yes it i s . And you know that you have a right to an
attorney.
VP Yes.
MP And you know that if you cannot afford an attorney, one
will be appointed to you. You understand that?
VP Yes.
MP Okay, and you understand that you have a right to stop
answering questions at any time, okay? You just say
the word - the same rules apply as a little while ago.
We’re all gonna be gentlemen over this thing here. No
hard feelings. You understand? Okay. Do you wish to
talk to us now without a lawyer?
VP Yes.
MP Okay.
VP But I am going to need one anyway. N o , not now.
MP Okay. You’re gonna get one eventually, but right now
you’re willing to talk without one. You sure about
that?
VP Yes.
MP I want to make sure that you’re sure.
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VP I’m sure.
MP Okay. Why don’t you tell us what you want to tell u s .
Id. at 46-47 (emphasis supplied). In light of the record
evidence, as well as the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s
identification and application of pertinent Supreme Court
precedent, this court cannot conclude that the state court’s
resolution of Plch’s claim that he was inadequately informed of
his right to have counsel present during any questioning was
either contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law. The court plainly applied
relevant Supreme Court precedent and concluded, not unreasonably,
that the warnings given to Plch “reasonably convey[ed] to [the]
suspect his rights as required by Miranda.” Duckworth v . Eagan,
492 U.S. at 203.
With regard to petitioner’s final assertion - that
Lieutenant Putney implicitly linked his right to counsel with
Plch’s return to New Hampshire - the state supreme court noted:
The [petitioner] also argues that Lieutenant Putney’s
explanation of the right to appointment of counsel
implied that he could only obtain counsel once he got
back to New Hampshire and could apply “in court.” The
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trial court found that Lieutenant Putney’s “statements
did not impermissibly link the [petitioner’s] right to
counsel to some unspecified future time” after
interrogation by the police. We agree. Lieutenant
Putney explicitly stated twice that the [petitioner]
had the right to have counsel present “prior to and
during any questioning.” We therefore find no error.
Nor do we find any other portions of the interview
cited by the [petitioner] indicate his failure to
understand this right. Accordingly, we conclude that
the warnings given the [petitioner] adequately informed
him of his right to counsel.
Id. at 618-19 (citation omitted).
As it did in resolving Plch’s related Miranda claim, the
state court identified and applied pertinent Supreme Court
precedent in resolving Plch’s assertion that he was inadequately
apprised of his right to the appointment of an attorney before
proceeding with any further questioning. And, regardless of
whether this court might apply that law in a manner more
favorable to Plch, “neither the reasoning nor the result of the
state-court decision contradicts” that law. Early v . Packer, 537
U.S. at 8 . Consequently, petitioner has not established (nor can
he establish) that the state court’s resolution of his claims was
“contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. §
18
2254(d)(1). Nor has petitioner established that the state
court’s resolution those claims was based upon an “unreasonable
application” of that law.
Id.
Conclusion
For purposes of reviewing Plch’s federal habeas corpus
petition, the court need not (and, in fact, lacks jurisdiction
to) determine whether the state court’s resolution of his claims
was “correct” or “incorrect.” See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-11
(“Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause . . . a
federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that
court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant
state-court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly.”). In other words, the question
before this court is not whether it might have ruled differently
on the claims that Plch advanced before the state supreme, nor is
it whether the state supreme court’s resolution was “correct”
under applicable precedent. Instead, the issue is whether the
state court decision is in conflict with, or amounts to an
unreasonable application o f , federal law. It is neither.
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The record in this case discloses that, in resolving Plch’s
Miranda claims, the state supreme court: (1) properly identified
applicable Supreme Court precedents; and (2) applied those
precedents in a thorough and thoughtful way that cannot be deemed
“unreasonable.” Accordingly, Plch is not entitled to federal
habeas corpus relief under section 2254.
In light of the foregoing, the State’s motion for summary
judgment (document n o . 16) is granted. Plch’s motion for summary
judgment (document n o . 14 ) is denied, as is his petition for
habeas corpus relief (document n o . 3 ) . The Clerk of Court shall
enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
August 3 1 , 2004
cc: Vaclav Plch, pro se
Michael A . Delaney, Esq.
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