Mangosoft v . Oracle Corp. CV-02-545-SM 09/21/04
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Mangosoft, Inc. and
Mangosoft Corporation,
Plaintiffs
v. Civil N o . 02-545-SM
Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 141
Oracle Corporation,
Defendant
O R D E R
This is a suit for patent infringement. Plaintiffs,
Mangosoft, Inc. and Mangosoft Corporation (collectively,
“Mangosoft”), say defendant, Oracle Corporation,
is making, selling, and/or offering for sale computer software
that infringes two of Mangosoft’s patents: United States Patent
N o . 6,148,377 (“the ‘377 patent”) and United States Patent N o .
5,918,229 (“the ‘229 patent”). The court held a Markman hearing,
at which the parties presented evidence and argument in support
of their respective constructions of various terms used in the
patents’ claims. See generally Markman v . Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Subsequently, the parties filed post-
hearing memoranda.
Legal Standard Governing Claim Construction
Patent infringement analysis involves two steps: first,
properly construing the asserted claim; and second, determining
whether the accused method or device infringes the asserted claim
as properly construed. See Vitronics Corp. v . Conceptronic,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Markman v .
Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 9 6 7 , 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff’d,
517 U.S. 370 (1996)). Step one of that process - claim
construction - presents a question of law to be resolved by the
court. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v . Hewlett-Packard Co.,
182 F.3d
1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The second step - determining
whether the accused process or device infringes the patent -
presents a question of fact.
Id. At this stage of the
litigation, the court is focused exclusively on the first step:
properly construing the meaning and scope of various claim terms
used in the ‘377 and ‘229 patents.
Construing patent claim terms generally means ascertaining
the meaning of those terms in light of the intrinsic evidence of
record, which includes: the claims, the specification, and the
prosecution history. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. But, the
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court may consider extrinsic evidence as well. See Apex Inc. v .
Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“Courts may also review extrinsic evidence to assist them in
comprehending the technology in accordance with the understanding
of skilled artisans and as necessary for actual claim
construction.”). Extrinsic evidence is external to the patent,
“such as expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
technical treatises and articles.” Pitney-Bowes,
182 F.3d at
1308 (citing Vitronics,
90 F.3d at 1584). See generally Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic Controls v . Mega Systems LLC,
350 F.3d 1327,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The ordinary and customary meaning of a
claim term may be determined by reviewing a variety of sources.
Some of these sources include the claims themselves, dictionaries
and treatises, and the written description, the drawings, and the
prosecution history.”) (citations omitted).
The court observed in Vitronics that, “In most situations,
an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any
ambiguity in a disputed claim term. In such circumstances, it is
improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.” Id., at 1583.
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Nevertheless, even when patent language is unambiguous, a court
may still consider extrinsic evidence for limited purposes.
Vitronics does not prohibit courts from examining
extrinsic evidence, even when the patent document is
itself clear. Moreover, Vitronics does not set forth
any rules regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony into evidence. Certainly, there are no
prohibitions in Vitronics on courts hearing evidence
from experts. Rather, Vitronics merely warned courts
not to rely on extrinsic evidence in claim construction
to contradict the meaning of claims discernible from
thoughtful examination of the claims, the written
description, and the prosecution history - the
intrinsic evidence.
Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1308 (citations omitted) (emphasis
supplied). Consequently, the court concluded:
Thus, under Vitronics, it is entirely appropriate,
perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult
trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim
construction it is tending to from the patent file is
not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly
apposite, and widely held understandings in the
pertinent technical field. This is especially the case
with respect to technical terms, . . . . Indeed, a
patent is both a technical and a legal document. While
a judge is well-equipped to interpret the legal aspects
of the document, he or she must also interpret the
technical aspects of the document, and indeed its
overall meaning, from the vantage point of one skilled
in the art. Although the patent file may often be
sufficient to permit the judge to interpret the
technical aspects of the patent properly, consultation
of extrinsic evidence is particularly appropriate to
ensure that his or her understanding of the technical
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aspects of the patent is not entirely at variance with
the understanding of one skilled in the art.
Id. at 1309 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). See also Key
Pharms. v . Hercon Lab. Corp.,
161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Giving proper effect to disputed technical terms in a patent
requires a court to construe them as they would be construed by
those skilled in the relevant art. See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v .
BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A technical
term used in a patent document is interpreted as having the
meaning that it would be given by persons experienced in the
field of the invention, unless it is apparent from the patent and
the prosecution history that the inventor used the term with a
different meaning.”). See also Ferguson,
350 F.3d at 1338 (“In
the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the
claim terms, the words take on the full breadth of the ordinary
and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary
skill in the art.”). Here, nothing suggests that the terms in
dispute are used in the patents in any way other than as they
would be commonly understood by those skilled in the relevant
art. With respect to the patents at issue here, a person skilled
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in the relevant art would hold a bachelor’s degree in computer
science or electrical engineering and have two to three years
experience in the field of distributed computing.
In this case, the court has, with appreciation, relied upon
the capable expert testimony presented by the parties to obtain a
general understanding of the computer system described in the
‘377 patent, as well as the method for providing “distributed
control over a structured store of data” described in the ‘229
patent.
Discussion
I. The Patents at Issue.
Generally speaking, the patents, taken together, teach a
“distributed shared memory system.” They describe computer
systems consisting of groups of computers linked by a network
connection, also known as a “cluster” or “computer cluster.”
Each computer, or “node,” in the cluster manages its own memory
(both volatile and non-volatile) and, employing the inventions,
makes that memory available to other nodes in the cluster. And,
says Mangosoft, unlike earlier systems, which only provided a
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means for sharing data stored in non-volatile memory (e.g., hard
disks), these inventions allow nodes to also share volatile
memory (e.g., random access memory or “RAM”) with other nodes in
the cluster. Thus, the inventions teach a means by which nodes
may share both non-volatile and volatile memory space, by
creating a “pool” of shared memory space which is accessible by
all nodes participating in the system.
The ‘377 patent teaches a computer system that allows
multiple computers to share volatile and non-volatile memory
resources. Claim 1 , the sole independent claim of the patent,
teaches:
A computer system having a shared addressable memory
space, comprising
a data network for carrying signals representative
of computer readable information, and
a plurality of computers, each of said plurality
of computers sharing the shared addressable memory
space and including
an interface, coupled to said data network,
for accessing said data network to exchange
data signals therewith,
a local volatile memory device coupled to
said computer and having volatile storage for
data signals,
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a local persistent memory device coupled to
said computer and having persistent storage
for data signals, and
a shared memory subsystem for mapping a
portion of said shared addressable memory
space to a portion or the whole of said
persistent storage and said volatile storage
to provide thereby addressable persistent and
volatile storage for data signals accessible
by each of the plural computers, said shared
memory subsystem including
a distributor for mapping portions of
said addressable memory space across
said plurality of local persistent
memory devices, to distribute said
addressable memory space across said
plurality of local persistent memory
devices, and
a disk directory manager for tracking
said mapped portions of said addressable
memory space to provide information
representative of which of said local
persistent memory devices has which of
said portions of said addressable memory
space mapped thereon.
The ‘377 patent, 15:56-67 - 16:1-23 (emphasis supplied).
The ‘229 patent is a continuation-in-part of the application
that issued as the ‘377 patent, and it incorporates the ‘377
patent by reference. See ‘229 patent at 1:4-10, 14:58-65.
Drawing on the ‘377 patent’s shared memory system for providing
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an addressable shared memory space across the physical memory
devices of multiple computers on a network, the ‘229 patent
teaches methods for providing distributed control and persistent
storage for a “structured store of data,” including database
records and web pages.
The ‘229 patent contains 5 independent claims (claims 1 , 3 0 ,
3 1 , 3 4 , and 35) and 32 dependent claims. All terms disputed by
the parties are included in independent claim 1 , which teaches:
A method for providing distributed control over a
structured store of data, comprising:
providing a plurality of nodes inter-connected by
a network, each of the plurality of nodes sharing
a shared addressable memory space of a shared
memory system and including (i) an interface for
accessing the network, (ii) a local volatile
memory device coupled to the node and providing
volatile storage, (iii) a local persistent memory
device coupled to the node and providing
persistent storage, and (iv) a shared memory
subsystem for mapping a portion of the shared
addressable memory space to at least a portion of
the persistent and volatile storage to provide
thereby addressable persistent and volatile
storage accessible by each of the plurality of
nodes, the shared memory subsystem including (a) a
distributor for mapping portions of the
addressable memory space across the plurality of
local persistent and volatile memory devices to
distribute the addressable memory space across the
plurality of local persistent and volatile memory
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devices, and (b) a disk directory manager for
tracking the mapped portions of the addressable
memory space to provide information representative
of which of the local persistent and volatile
memory devices has which of the portions of the
addressable memory space mapped thereon;
storing on each node an instance of a data control
program for manipulating the structured store of
data to provide multiple, distributed instances of
the data control program;
interfacing each instance of the data control
program to the shared memory subsystem; and
operating each instance of the data control
program to employ the shared memory system as a
memory device having the structured store of data
contained therein, whereby the shared memory
system coordinates access to the structured store
of data to provide distributed control over the
structured store of data.
‘229 patent, 28:21-59 (emphasis supplied).
The parties disagree as to the meaning of the following
phrases, as used in the ‘377 and ‘229 patents: (1) “shared
addressable memory space”; (2) “local memory device”; (3) “shared
memory subsystem”; (4) “structured store of data”; and (5) “each
of said plurality of computers.”
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II. Claim Construction.
A. “Each of Said Plurality of Computers”
The parties agree that the word “plural” means two or more.
They disagree, however, as to what is meant by the word “each,”
when used to modify the phrase “of said plurality of computers.”
As noted above, the ‘377 patent describes a “computer system
having a shared addressable memory space, comprising . . . a
plurality of computers, each of said plurality of computers
sharing the shared addressable memory space.” ‘377 patent,
15:58-63 (emphasis supplied).
Oracle asserts that the quoted language requires all of the
computers participating in the shared memory system to share the
shared addressable memory space. Oracle’s position rests upon
its interpretation of the words which describe a “plurality of
computers” participating in a shared memory system, and require
that “each of said plurality” share the shared addressable memory
space. In other words, according to Oracle, if the “plurality”
of computers participating in the system is five, then all five
of those computers (i.e., each computer making up said plurality)
must share the shared addressable memory space.
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Mangosoft, on the other hand, says the phrase “each of said
plurality” requires only that two or more of the computers in the
overall system actually share the shared addressable space. That
i s , Mangosoft asserts that the phrase “each of said plurality”
does not modify the “plurality of computers” that form the
system, but instead refers to a smaller subset of computers
(i.e., a new plurality). S o , according to Mangosoft, if the
plurality of computers participating in the shared memory system
is five, only two of those computers need actually share the
shared addressable memory space. The court disagrees.
Mangosoft’s interpretation of the disputed claim language is
not supported by the precedent upon which it relies, nor is it
consistent with customary uses of the words “each” and “said.”
Had Mangosoft intended the interpretation it advances here, it
likely would have used language such as “comprising . . . a
plurality of computers, some of which share the shared
addressable memory space.” Alternatively, it might have said “a
plurality of which” or “two or more of which” or “a subset of
which” share the memory space. It did not. Instead, the ‘377
patent uses very specific language, which must be given meaning.
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Mangosoft’s interpretation of the disputed language does not give
meaning to the words “said” or “each” and, instead, “render[s]
the contested terms surplusage.” Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v .
Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also
Lantech, Inc. v . Keip Mach. Co.,
32 F.3d 5 4 2 , 546 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (“All limitations in a claim must be considered
meaningful.”).
As used in the ‘377 patent, the phrase “said plurality”
refers to the plurality of computers that form the system. And,
the word “each” refers to that same plurality of computers; it
does not refer to a new, smaller subset of the original plurality
of computers. Accordingly, the court construes the disputed
language - “A computer system having a shared addressable memory
space, comprising . . . a plurality of computers, each of said
plurality of computers sharing the shared addressable memory
space” - to mean: a computer system having a shared addressable
memory space, comprising two or more computers, every one of
which of those two or more computers participating in the system
has access t o , and may contribute t o , the shared addressable
memory space.
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The court, however, agrees with Mangosoft to the extent it
says that not all computers on a particular network must
necessarily participate in the system described in the ‘377
patent. In other words, the ‘377 patent teaches a system in
which fewer than all computers on a network may participate in
the described shared addressable memory system. See, e.g.,
“Summary of the Invention,” ‘377 patent at 2:22-29 (“The
invention provides systems that can create and manage a virtual
memory space that can be shared by each computer on a network and
can span the storage space of each memory device connected to the
network.”) (emphasis supplied). See also “Abstract,” ‘377 patent
at page 1 (“Distributed shared memory systems and processes . . .
that optionally spans across each memory device connected to the
computer network. Accordingly, each node on the network having
the distributed shared memory system of the invention can access
the shared memory.”) (emphasis supplied).
B. “Shared Addressable Memory Space”
Here, the parties’ dispute appears to focus on whether the
“shared addressable memory space” must be addressed by a common
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addressing scheme. Oracle asserts that it must, while Mangosoft
disagrees. Specifically, Mangosoft says:
[T]he shared addressable memory space is shared by the
plural computers. That method of sharing and
addressing, however, need not be through the use of
common addresses. Indeed, it is the shared memory
subsystem, . . . that allows the different computers to
address the shared addressable memory space without the
requirement of common addresses. As [Mangosoft’s
expert] explained, the shared memory subsystem provides
the necessary translation to allow the various nodes to
address the shared addressable memory space, even if
they don’t utilize common addresses, or by the analogy,
a common language (e.g., some speak English, some
French, some Norwegian). While Oracle argued that the
nodes all must speak English (or use common addresses),
that argument ignores entirely the role of the shared
memory subsystem in providing the necessary
translation. Moreover, it ignores the claim language
that does not contain the “common addresses”
limitation, the Federal Circuit law that prohibits
reading into the claim limitations from the preferred
embodiment, and the doctrine of claim differentiation.
Mangosoft’s Supplemental Brief (document n o . 46) at 1 1 .
Claim 1 of the ‘377 patent does not specifically require
that the nodes participating in the shared memory system utilize
a “common” addressing scheme. Instead, claim 1 simply provides
that the memory subsystem component of each participating node
tracks the data and available memory space in the system. See,
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e.g., ‘377 patent 7:27-37 (“The memory subsystems further track
the data stored in the local memory of each node and further
operate network connections with network 38 for transferring data
between the nodes 12a-12c. In this way, the memory subsystems
32a-32c access and control each memory element on the network 38
to perform memory access operations that are transparent to the
operating system 1 6 . Accordingly, the operating system 16
interfaces with the memory subsystem 32 as an interface to a
global memory space that spans each node 12a-12c on the network
38.”). It would, then, appear that the “memory subsystem”
functions in a manner similar to a traditional network server,
translating the various addressing schemes utilized by each node
on the system.
In other words, the memory subsystem is capable of
translating the various “languages” spoken by each participating
node; they need not all speak a common language. And, contrary
to Oracle’s suggestion, claim 1 of the ‘377 patent does not
require the use of either “common memory addresses” or “global
memory addresses;” those requirements appear only in particular
embodiments of the patented system. The court will not read
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those embodiments into the patent as limitations. See, e.g.,
Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v . Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d
1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A]lthough the specifications may
well indicate that certain embodiments are preferred, particular
embodiments appearing in a specification will not be read into
the claims when the claim language is broader than such
embodiments.”).
Accordingly, the court construes the phrase “shared
addressable memory space” to mean memory space distributed across
the volatile and non-volatile memory of all nodes participating
in the patents’ shared memory system (though not necessarily all
nodes on the network), which shared memory space can be accessed
by the various participating nodes using one or more addresses.
The participating nodes need not, however, utilize a common or
global addressing scheme. As described in the embodiment
depicted in Figure 3 of the ‘377 patent, the use of a “global
address generator” is optional. ‘377 patent at 8:41-47.
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C. “Local Memory Device”
The parties disagree as to whether a local memory device
must be “attached” to only a single computer (Oracle’s view), or
whether it need only be “accessible” by a computer without having
to go through another node or computer controlling access to that
device (Mangosoft’s view). Neither party has, however, explained
precisely how this dispute i s , for purposes of Mangosoft’s
infringement claims, a meaningful one. Nevertheless, because the
parties seek an interpretation of that term, the court will
provide one.
The court concludes that, at the time the ‘377 patent
issued, one of ordinary skill in the relevant art would
understand that the word “local” is used to describe computer
devices that are directly attached to a single computer’s
processor (by, for example, the computer’s b u s ) , without the need
for an intervening communication channel. Thus, “local” devices
are distinct from “shared” or “networked” or “remote” devices
which, by virtue of some intervening communication channel, might
be accessed by more than one computer (though a “local” device
18
might also be “shared” with other nodes, through such an
intervening communication channel).
Nevertheless, Mangosoft asserts that the use of the word
“coupled” in the claim language (i.e., “local . . . memory device
coupled to said computer”) suggests that the device need not be
“directly attached” to the computer but may, instead, communicate
with the computer’s processor in a more “indirect” manner. See
‘377 patent at 16:1-4. See also ‘229 patent at 28:29-32. The
court is not persuaded. The use of the word “coupled” simply
makes clear that the local memory device in question must be
“local” to the particular computer being described. It does not
serve to modify or redefine the commonly understood meaning of
the word “local,” as used at the time the patents issued.
Were the court to construe the disputed claim language as
Mangosoft suggests, that construction would ignore the word
“local.” In other words, by simply requiring a computer memory
device that is somehow “linked” to a computer (whether directly
or indirectly), Mangosoft’s construction would recast the claim
so that it merely requires “a memory device coupled to a
19
computer.” Importantly, however, the claim language requires a
local memory device that is coupled to a computer. To avoid
rendering the word “local” entirely superfluous (or, at best,
redundant), it must be given a meaning other than “coupled.”
Accordingly, as used in the ‘377 patent (as well as the ‘229
patent), the word “local” when used to modify a computer device
means a computer device (e.g., a hard drive) that is directly
attached to a single computer’s processor by, for example, the
computer’s bus (though it may, of course, be accessed by other
computers through any number of the interconnection technologies
discussed in the exhibits to the declaration of David Klausner
(submitted with Mangosoft’s Opposition Brief (document n o . 4 3 ) ) .
That is to say, a computer memory device that is “local” to one
computer may also be shared with, or accessed by, other computers
on the network (or, of course, other computers participating in
the shared memory system).
D. “Shared Memory Subsystem”
Both the ‘377 and ‘229 patents describe the use of a “shared
memory subsystem for mapping a portion of said shared addressable
20
memory space to a portion or the whole of said persistent storage
and said volatile storage . . ..” ‘377 patent at 16:6-9. See
also ‘229 patent at 28:31-34 (“a shared memory subsystem for
mapping a portion of the shared addressable memory space to at
least a portion of the persistent and volatile storage . . . . ” ) .
Oracle asserts that the “shared memory subsystem” described in
the patents is a means-plus-function claim. The court disagrees.
First, the absence of the word “means” undermines Oracle’s
claim. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v . VSI Int’l, Inc., 174 F.3d
1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen an element of a claim does
not use the term ‘means,’ treatment as a means-plus-function
claim element is generally not appropriate.”). Second, the claim
element “shared memory subsystem” recites sufficiently definite
structure to dispel the argument that it is a means-plus-function
claim. Third, the phrase “shared memory subsystem” appeared in
both patents and technical literature at the time the ‘377 patent
issued. See, e.g., Exhibit J to Mangosoft’s Opposition Brief,
United States Patent n o . 5,341,475 (describing a communication
system for exchanging data, which employs a shared memory
subsystem). See also Mangosoft’s Opposition Brief at 15-16
21
(representing that the phrase “shared memory subsystem” appeared
in at least nine U.S. Patents filed before the ‘377 patent, as
well as in academic literature).
With regard to the word “mapping” - a function performed by
the shared memory subsystem - Oracle asserts that it means
“assigning a correspondence between the addresses of portions of
virtual memory to the addresses of portions of physical memory.”
Oracle’s Claim Construction Brief (document n o . 36) at 2 3 .
Mangosoft, on the other hand, says that Oracle’s construction of
the word is too narrow in two respects. First, it says the word
“mapping” means simply “defining or establishing a relationship,”
rather than assigning a direct correspondence. Mangosoft’s Claim
Construction Brief at 1 6 . Next, it says that the plain language
of the claim provides only that a portion of the shared
addressable memory space must be mapped to a portion or the whole
of the system’s persistent and/or volatile storage. It does not,
says Mangosoft, require the mapping of portions of the system’s
virtual memory to portions of the system’s physical memory.
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The word “mapping,” as used in the patents at issue, would
be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to mean
“creating an association between.” See, e.g., Oracle’s Claim
Construction Brief at 23 (citing IEEE Standard Dict. of Elec. and
Electronics Terms (6th ed. 1996) at 627 for the proposition that
to “map a range of addresses” means “to create an association
between a range of a process’s address space and a range of
physical memory or some memory object, such that a reference to
an address in that range of the address space results in a
reference to the associated physical memory or memory object.”).
Accordingly, the memory subsystem described in the ‘377 patent
and the ‘229 patent creates an association or relationship
between the shared addressable memory space and some or all of
the local persistent and local volatile memory space of the
participating nodes.
E. “Structured Store of Data”
Finally, the parties disagree as to the meaning of the
phrase “structured store of data,” as used in the ‘229 patent.
See, e.g., ‘229 patent at 28:24. Specifically, they disagree as
to whether the referenced data must reside exclusively in
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persistent storage. Oracle asserts that it must, while Mangosoft
says storage of the structured data need not be limited to
persistent (i.e., non-volatile) devices.
The claims of the ‘229 patent do not make clear whether the
referenced structured store of data may be (or must be) located
in any particular form of memory. In support of its view that
such data must reside exclusively in non-volatile storage, Oracle
points out that the specification repeatedly describes the
structured store of data as being “persistent data.” See, e.g.,
‘229 patent at 3:19-22 (“The invention can be understood as
structured storage systems, and related methods, that employ a
globally addressable unstructured memory system to maintain a
structured store of persistent data within a shared memory
space.”). Consequently, says Oracle, if the data themselves are
“persistent,” they must necessarily reside on a persistent (non-
volatile) storage medium. And, according to Oracle, by
repeatedly stating throughout the specification that the data are
“persistent,” the patentees have (albeit implicitly) defined the
phrase “structured store of data” to mean data which are stored
on a persistent memory device. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Network
24
Servs., Inc. v . Covad Communs. Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1277
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he written description provides guidance as
to the meaning of the claims, thereby dictating the manner in
which the claims are to be construed, even if the guidance is not
provided in explicit definitional format. Because the patentees
used the [disputed] term throughout the entire patent
specification, consistent with a single meaning, they defined
that term by implication.”) (citations and internal punctuation
omitted). See also SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v . Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,
242 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“While it is true, of course, that the claims define the scope
of the right to exclude and that the claim construction inquiry,
therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of
the claim, the written description can provide guidance as to the
meaning of the claims, thereby dictating the manner in which the
claims are to be construed, even if the guidance is not provided
in explicit definitional format.”) (citations and internal
punctuation omitted).
The court is not persuaded that the “structured store of
data” as referenced in the ‘229 patent’s claims must, as a matter
25
of construction or of necessity, reside in persistent storage.
Claim 1 of the ‘229 patent teaches a “method for providing
distributed control over a structured store of data” among all
nodes of a cluster participating in the addressable shared memory
space system. That system, as described above, includes the use
of (and storage of data on) both persistent and volatile memory
devices, which are shared and accessible by all participating
nodes. See ‘229 patent at 28:32-37. Nothing in the claim
language suggests that, unlike other forms of data (which may be
stored in persistent memory, volatile memory, or both), the
“structured store of data” is somehow unique and must, instead,
reside exclusively in persistent storage. In fact, the entire
purpose of the ‘229 patent would be defeated if such data were
restricted exclusively to persistent storage.
The references in the specification to “persistent data”
(rather than “persistent storage” or “persistent memory”) simply
suggest that the system is designed, and the data organized, in
such a way that should one or even all of the participating nodes
lose data stored in volatile memory, the “structured store of
data” is still “persistent” and can be recovered (by, presumably,
26
collecting and compiling the various redundant portions of it
that were distributed to the non-volatile memory of the
participating nodes). In other words, the “persistent data” are
stored in the various volatile and non-volatile memory devices
attached to participating nodes in such a way that even if all
data are lost from volatile memory, they can be reconstructed
from the various portions that were stored on non-volatile memory
devices (there i s , of course, no requirement that the data not be
duplicated - in fact, it is possible that a particular piece of
datum could be stored in multiple locations: in the RAM of one
node, on the hard drive of another node, and again in the RAM of
a third node). In short, the court is not persuaded by Oracle’s
assertion that by referencing the structured store of data as
“persistent data,” the patentees have limited the scope of the
patent’s claims to require that such data reside exclusively on
non-volatile forms of storage media.
Accordingly, the court construes the phrase “structured
store of data” to mean data that are organized in some recognized
fashion (e.g., database files, word processing document files, or
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Web pages) and stored in the volatile and/or non-volatile memory
of the various nodes participating in the shared memory system.
F. Summary
Having carefully reviewed both the ‘377 and ‘229 patents, as
well as the expert opinion and argument presented by the parties,
the court construes the disputed terms and phrases in the patents
as follows:
1. “A computer system having a shared
addressable memory space, comprising . . . a
plurality of computers, each of said
plurality of computers sharing the shared
addressable memory space” means a computer
system having a shared addressable memory
space, comprising two or more computers,
every one of which of those two or more
computers participating in the system (though
not necessarily every node on the network)
has access t o , and may contribute t o , the
shared addressable memory space.
2. “Shared addressable memory space” means a
memory space distributed across the volatile
and non-volatile memory of all nodes
participating in the patents’ shared memory
system (though not necessarily all nodes on
the network), which shared memory space can
be accessed by the various participating
nodes using one or more addresses. The
participating nodes need not, however,
utilize a common or global addressing scheme.
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3. “Local,” when used to modify a computer
device, means a computer device (e.g., a hard
drive) that is directly attached to a single
computer’s processor by, for example, the
computer’s bus. Such a “local” device may,
however, be shared with and accessible by
other nodes on the network (and, of course,
other nodes participating in the shared
memory system).
4. “Mapping” means creating an association or
relationship between the shared addressable
memory space and some or all of the local
persistent and local volatile memory space of
the participating nodes.
5. “Structured store of data” means data that
are organized in some recognized fashion
(e.g., database files, word processing
document files, or Web pages) and stored in
the volatile and/or non-volatile memory of
the various nodes participating in the shared
memory system.
Conclusion
For the purposes of this litigation, the disputed terms
contained in the ‘377 patent and the ‘229 patent shall have the
meanings ascribed to them in this order.
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SO ORDERED.
Steven J. McAuliffe
United States District Judge
September 2 1 , 2004
cc: Dorian Daley, Esq.
Paul T . Ehrlich, Esq.
Paul J. Hayes, Esq.
Matthew D. Powers, Esq.
Martha Van Oot, Esq.
Alexander J. Walker, Esq.
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