No. 04-001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 210N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ALAN JAY LABUDA,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Hill, Cause No. DV 2003-011
The Honorable John C. McKeon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jeremy S. Yellin, Attorney at Law, Havre, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Jennifer Anders,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Cyndee Peterson, Hill County
Attorney, Gina Bishop, Chief Deputy Hill County Attorney, Havre, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 19, 2004
Decided: August 10, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. The decision shall
be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by
case title, Supreme Court cause number, and result to the State Reporter Publishing
Company and to West Group in the quarterly table of noncitable cases issued by this Court.
¶2 Alan Jay Labuda (Labuda) appeals the judgment of the Twelfth Judicial District
Court, Hill County, denying his motion to suppress.
¶3 We address the following issue on appeal and affirm: Did the officers have
particularized suspicion in stopping the minivan in which Labuda was a passenger?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 On May 28, 2002, Alex Giles (Giles), a traveling salesperson, was driving from Great
Falls back home to Havre. Around Big Sandy, Giles noticed that a vehicle had pulled out
behind him. The vehicle was traveling in the same direction as Giles; however, it was
traveling on the wrong side of the road. The vehicle eventually returned to the right side of
the road as it neared the Big Sandy city limits.
¶5 The vehicle then passed Giles, during which time Giles noted that the vehicle was “a
dark colored Chevy pickup.” Giles then noticed that the vehicle “began drifting from one
lane to the other, close to the ditch,” and that another vehicle that the driver of the pickup
had also passed “had to get to the shoulder of the road” to let the driver of the pickup by, as
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the driver did not pass in the appropriate lane.
¶6 Giles called 911, telling the dispatcher that he thought that the driver of the pickup
was driving under the influence. The 911 dispatcher asked Giles if it was possible for him
to get a license number. Hence, Giles drove “between 95 and 100 miles an hour” in order
to “catch” the pickup, traveling a distance of “14 or 15 miles” before getting behind the
pickup. Giles was then “a few feet behind,” the pickup, and he gave the dispatcher the
license number. He also noticed that the driver of the pickup “appeared to have kind of
longer, bushier hair and seemed to be wearing a baseball cap.” When asked for an
estimation of the driver’s height, Giles told the dispatcher that based on how tall the driver
seemed to sit in the driver’s seat, he estimated the driver’s height to be “around six-feet tall.”
¶7 Giles and the driver of the pickup then entered the town of Laredo, at which time
Giles pulled over and watched the driver drive to a residence. Giles then observed the driver
go back and forth from his residence to the pickup several times. He then saw another
vehicle--a minivan--turn off of the highway and drive to the same residence.
¶8 Giles next observed “the person that appeared to be driving the pickup” get into the
minivan. It was at this time that the summoned officers arrived, namely Deputy Dwyer and
Deputy Ross. However, before arriving, Deputy Dwyer received information from the
dispatcher that the vehicle matching the license and description relayed to her by Giles came
back registered to Labuda.
¶9 Upon arriving, Deputy Dwyer and Giles began talking “for a short time,” after which
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the minivan left the residence and proceeded to drive towards Giles, Deputy Dwyer, and
Deputy Ross. At that time, Deputy Dwyer stopped the minivan. Deputy Ross advised
Deputy Dwyer that he recognized the passenger in the minivan as Labuda. Deputy Dwyer
then spoke to Labuda, noting Labuda “was slurring his words,” and that he had to repeat the
questions he was asking Labuda several times because he could not understand Labuda’s
answers. Deputy Dwyer asked Labuda several questions without first giving him a Miranda
warning. Ultimately, Deputy Dwyer concluded that Labuda had been driving under the
influence. Another patrol officer then removed Labuda from the minivan and took Labuda
into custody.
¶10 Labuda moved to suppress the statements he made to Deputy Dwyer, which the
District Court denied. Ultimately, Labuda pled guilty to the charge of driving under the
influence of alcohol, second offense, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress.
¶11 Labuda now appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶12 We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion to suppress to determine
whether the district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the district
court’s conclusions of law were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Henderson,
1998 MT 233, ¶ 9,
291 Mont. 77, ¶ 9,
966 P.2d 137, ¶ 9. A district court’s findings of fact
are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial evidence; if the district court
misapprehended the effect of the evidence; or if a mistake has been committed. Henderson,
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¶ 9.
DISCUSSION
¶13 Did the officers have particularized suspicion in stopping the minivan in which
Labuda was a passenger?
¶14 Labuda argues that “[t]here is no record that either of the deputies were provided with
any identification of the suspect by Giles before or during the time of the stop of the van.”
In addition, Labuda argues that “[t]he only, on record, connection between the van and the
suspected pickup . . . was that it [the minivan] was coming from the general direction of
where the pickup was seen in a stopped position.” Such information, Labuda contends, does
not constitute objective data connecting the minivan to the driver of the pickup. Hence, the
stop of the minivan was illegal, and any evidence derived from the stop must be suppressed.
¶15 The State of Montana (the State) argues that “substantial evidence” connected Labuda
to the events that Giles witnessed. Specifically, the State argues that: (1) Giles followed the
pickup and saw it pull into a residence; (2) Giles never lost sight of the pickup and watched
the driver go to and from the pickup into the residence; and (3) Giles testified that he
believed the driver of the pickup was the same person in the minivan whom the officers
stopped. Hence, the State argues that “there was adequate evidence from which the district
court” could make the inference that Labuda--the passenger in the minivan--was also the
erratic driver of the pickup.
¶16 Under § 46-5-401(1), MCA, “a peace officer may stop any person or vehicle that is
observed in circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the person or occupant
of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” The
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existence of particularized suspicion is a question of fact, which a district court determines
in light of the totality of circumstances. State v. Lacasella, 2002 MT 326, ¶ 20,
313 Mont.
185, ¶ 20,
60 P.3d 975, ¶ 20. Particularized suspicion exists if: (1) an officer has objective
data from which to make certain inferences; and (2) the officer also has a suspicion that the
occupant of the vehicle is or has been engaged in wrongdoing. Lacasella, ¶ 20.
¶17 We adopted a three factor test in State v. Pratt (1997),
286 Mont. 156, 165,
951 P.2d
37, 42-43, to evaluate the totality of the circumstances under which an investigative stop is
made pursuant to a tip. These factors include whether: (1) the informant remains
anonymous or subjects himself to civil and criminal liability; (2) the report is based on
personal observations; and (3) the officer’s own observations corroborate the informant’s
information. State v. Hall,
2004 MT 106, ¶ 9,
321 Mont. 78, ¶ 9,
88 P.3d 1273, ¶ 9.
¶18 In addition, we held in State v. Elison,
2000 MT 288,
302 Mont. 228,
14 P.3d 456,
that the officer had particularized suspicion to stop Elison based on “Gibson’s [the non-
anonymous informant’s] report . . . [regarding] his personal observation of Elison smoking
from a brass pipe, appearing startled upon noticing the patrol car and attempting to hide the
pipe from view; Officer Conrad’s corroboration of Gibson’s description of the vehicle; and
Officer Conrad’s independent observation of Elison’s subsequent driving behavior which
appeared suspicious in light of Gibson’s report.” Elison, ¶¶ 22, 23. We held that “[t]hese
facts [we]re reliable objective data from which Officer Conrad could make certain
inferences, based on his [Officer Conrad’s] four years of experience and training, which
would lead to a resulting suspicion that Elison was engaged in wrongdoing.” Elison, ¶ 22.
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¶19 In Elison, the officer was informed by the non-anonymous informant that he observed
Elison “smoking from what he believed to be a marijuana pipe and that . . . [Elison] . . .
appeared startled and attempted to hide the pipe.” Elison, ¶ 7. The officer in Elison did not
witness any of the activity that the non-anonymous informant had, but the officer did locate
the truck that Elison was driving. Elison, ¶ 7. At that point, the officer stopped Elison’s
vehicle and “immediately smell[ed] the odor of marijuana,” and noticed that “Elison
appeared nervous, his eyes were red and glassy, and he would not sit still.” Elison, ¶ 8.
¶20 Here, just as in Elison, the non-anonymous informant, Giles, observed Labuda’s
erratic driving, followed Labuda to a residence, and observed Labuda exit his pickup, go to
and from his residence, and get into a minivan that arrived some time later. Giles relayed
his observations to Deputy Dwyer, upon Deputy Dwyer’s arrival near the residence. Deputy
Dwyer then observed the minivan pass by him, and was advised by Deputy Ross that Labuda
was in the passenger side. At that point, Deputy Dwyer stopped the minivan, and
subsequently noted that Labuda had difficulty in answering the questions asked of him and
that Labuda noticeably slurred his words.
¶21 Just as we held in Elison, Deputy Dwyer’s corroboration met the third factor of the
Pratt test. And, ultimately, all three factors of the Pratt test were established, and Deputy
Dwyer had particularized suspicion to justify his stop of Labuda.
¶22 There was an unbroken chain of events and observations starting with Giles’s
observations of Labuda driving on the wrong side of the road, to Giles’s observations of
Labuda’s pickup “drifting from one lane to the other,” to Giles’s observations of another
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vehicle having to get onto the shoulder of the road to facilitate Labuda’s passing, to Giles’s
following of Labuda’s pickup, to Giles’s observations of Labuda driving to a residence,
wherein Labuda went to and from the residence and his pickup, to Giles’s observations of
the minivan arrival and Giles entering the minivan on the passenger side, to Giles’s
statements to Deputy Dwyer and Deputy Ross of his observations, to Deputy Dwyer’s stop
of the minivan and Deputy Dwyer’s personal observations of Labuda’s state of apparent
intoxication following the stop. All three parts of the the Pratt test were satisfied. Hence,
particularized suspicion existed upon which Deputy Dwyer had objective data and a resulting
suspicion that Labuda was driving under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, we hold that
the District Court did not err in denying Labuda’s motion to suppress, as the deputies had
particularized suspicion to arrest Labuda for driving under the influence of alcohol.
¶23 Affirmed.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
We Concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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