¶1with whom CALKINS, J., joins, concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
¶2[¶ 31] I join the Court’s opinion except for the portion that vacates the award of restitution to the indirect purchasers.
¶3[¶ 32] The sole reason asserted by Wein-schenk and RWB on appeal for setting aside the trial court’s award of restitution to the indirect purchasers is their argument that restitution can be awarded only for consumers from whom Weinschenk and RWB directly acquired money or property as a result of an unfair or deceptive trade practice. The Court properly rejects this argument, citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989); and FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 99 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C.1999). Nonetheless, the Court vacates the restitution awarded to the indirect purchasers, relying on reasons not raised before the trial court and not addressed in the parties’ briefs.
¶4[¶ 33] The trial court based its restitution award for both the direct and indirect purchasers on competent evidence of the estimated cost of replacing the defective roofs and windows, and of other specific repairs at the homes of the direct and indirect purchasers. In its written decision, the trial court carefully evaluated the conflicting expert testimony regarding the cost of repairing the defects in each home. The Court concludes, however, that there was no evidence “that the indirect purchasers sustained either a substantial injury or ascertainable loss,” and that they “may have received a discounted price as a result of the indicated defects.”
¶5[¶ 34] Neither of the Court’s conclusions are compelled by the record evidence in this case. The Court should instead defer to the trial court’s assessment of the significance of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn. See Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 13, 770 A.2d 592, 600.
¶6[¶ 35] Of even greater concern is the Court’s assignment of error to the absence of “evidence that the indirect purchasers relied on Weinschenk or RWB’s misrepresentations.” The Court does riot cite a single authority to support this newly announced construction of 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 (2002) requiring proof of actual reliance by indirect purchasers. We should refrain from substantially reducing the availability of UTPA remedies for consumers without the benefit of a thorough analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and its policy objectives.
¶7[¶ 36] I would affirm the judgment in all respects.