STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM LEROY HUNTER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. DDC 04-441,
Honorable Dirk M. Sandefur, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jane M. Berger, Public Defender, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Honorable Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Jennifer Anders,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Brant S. Light, County Attorney; Mary Ann Ries, Deputy County
Attorney, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 27, 2006
Decided: August 22, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent. It shall be filed
as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and shall be reported by case
title, Supreme Court cause number and result in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable
cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 On the evening of October 27, 2004, Officer Jeff Bragg saw a vehicle driven by
William Leroy Hunter traveling northbound on 23rd Street and 10th Avenue South in
Great Falls, Montana. Officer Bragg observed cracks on the vehicle’s windshield that
“spidered down and to the right (passenger side) from the rearview mirror” and “up about
halfway from the bottom of the passenger side corner.” According to Officer Bragg, the
cracks in the windshield appeared to impair the driver’s clear vision of the road in
violation of § 61-9-405(2)(b), MCA. Officer Bragg stopped the vehicle and approached
the driver; subsequent observations led to Hunter’s arrest for both driving under the
influence of alcohol and operating a vehicle with a defective windshield.
¶3 Hunter argues on appeal that the District Court should have suppressed all
evidence resulting from the traffic stop for the reason that Officer Bragg “had no
probable cause to stop Hunter” because the two cracks in the windshield “do not rise to
meet the statute prohibiting drivers from operating a vehicle with a shattered or
materially defective windshield.” A district court, however, is only required to find that
an officer who instigates a stop had particularized suspicion for suspecting that the
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defendant committed or was in the process of committing an offense. Section 46-5-401,
MCA. “A determination as to whether the ‘particularized suspicion’ requirement of the
statute has been satisfied must be made in light of the totality of the circumstances giving
rise to the stop.” State v. Henderson,
. Given the undisputed facts, we conclude that the District Court correctly
determined that under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Bragg had particularized
suspicion to stop Hunter for cracks in the vehicle’s windshield that appeared to impair
Hunter’s vision in violation of § 61-9-405(2)(b), MCA.
¶4 It is appropriate to decide this case pursuant to our Order of February 11, 2003,
amending Section 1.3 of our 1996 Internal Operating Rules and providing for
memorandum opinions. It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us
that the appeal is without merit because the legal issues are clearly controlled by settled
Montana law which the District Court correctly interpreted.
¶5 We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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