STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SETH LINDGREN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Teton, Cause No. DC 05-009
Honorable Marc G. Buyske, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Meghan Lulf Sutton, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Attorney General; Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Joe Coble, Teton County Attorney; Laurie McKinnon,
Choteau, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 28, 2006
Decided: December 27, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be cited
as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and
its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in this Court's
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Seth Lindgren appeals from a judgment entered against him in the Ninth Judicial
District Court, Teton County, on grounds that the court lost jurisdiction when the State of
Montana failed to comply with statutory time requirements for holding a transfer hearing to
bypass youth court and charge him directly in District Court. We affirm.
¶3 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d) of our
1996 Internal Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, which provides for memorandum
opinions. The issue presented is clearly controlled by settled Montana law.
¶4 Lindgren was 17 years old when he committed the subject burglary offense. Pursuant
to §§ 41-5-203(1) and -206(2) and (4), MCA, the District Court acquired jurisdiction over
Lindgren’s case when the Information was filed in the District Court. The court then
committed a statutory error in failing to timely hold a transfer hearing pursuant to § 41-5-
206(3), MCA. A court’s statutory error must not be confused with whether the court had the
power or capacity to proceed in the first instance. Sanders v. State,
(citation omitted).
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¶5 A district court may not be reversed for a statutory error unless the record shows the
error was prejudicial. See § 46-20-701(1), MCA. Lindgren has not argued that an earlier
transfer hearing would have resulted in his case being transferred to the youth court; nor has
he challenged any of the District Court’s reasons for not transferring his case. The record
shows that Lindgren was free on his own recognizance during the entire District Court
proceeding. As a result, we conclude any error from the delay in holding a transfer hearing
was harmless. In addition, as the District Court recognized in its order denying Lindgren’s
motion to dismiss the charges against him, even if the court had dismissed this case due to the
failure to timely hold a transfer hearing, the State would not have been precluded from
refiling an Information in District Court.
¶6 Affirmed.
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
We concur:
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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