____________________________________
RAY L. SCOTT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WES C. HIGGINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
____________________________________
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV-96-637A,
The Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Patrick F. Flaherty, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Kenneth E. O’Brien, Hash & O’Brien, Kalispell, Montana
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Submitted on Briefs: December 20, 2006
Decided: February 7, 2007
Filed:
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Clerk
Justice John Warner delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section 1, Paragraph 3(d)(v), Montana Supreme Court 1996 Internal
Operating Rules, as amended in 2003, the following memorandum decision shall not be
cited as precedent. It shall be filed as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court and its case title, Supreme Court cause number and disposition shall be included in
this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and
Montana Reports.
¶2 Defendant Wes Higgins appeals from denial of his Motion for Relief from
Judgment issued July 2, 2004, by the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County. We
affirm.
¶3 This appeal is the most recent step in protracted litigation encompassing numerous
claims, cases, and courts. Indeed, this Court has recently upheld the denial of a Motion
for Relief from Judgment made by Higgins in a related case. See Higgins v. Vortex
Fishing Systems, Inc.,
.
¶4 In 1996, Scott sued Higgins seeking specific performance of a stock purchase
agreement for stock in Vortex Fishing Systems, Inc. Higgins filed an answer
enumerating certain affirmative defenses, including the allegation that Scott had
fraudulently increased his ownership interest in Vortex. In 1998, the District Court ruled
Scott was entitled to specific performance of the agreement and specifically found Scott
had not fraudulently increased the number of his Vortex shares.
¶5 Almost six years after this ruling, Higgins filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment, pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b), specifically claiming he had proof that the
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District Court’s 1998 ruling in favor of Scott was based on fraudulent statements Scott
had made to the court. The District Court denied this motion as untimely and Higgins
appealed.
¶6 The District Court correctly determined that pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b),
motions seeking relief from a judgment or order must be filed within a certain timeframe.
In instances such as this, where a party seeks relief on the basis of fraud, the motion must
be brought within 60 days. Here, Higgins brought his claim almost six years after the
judgment. This is simply too late.
¶7 Moreover, as Higgins acknowledges, the decision to grant relief from a judgment
is discretionary with the district court. We review the denial of a motion for relief of
judgment under 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. In re P.D.L.,
. Upon review of the record presented, we see no
abuse of discretion in the District Court’s refusal to grant Higgins’ motion.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ JOHN WARNER
We Concur:
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
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