ALBERT ERNEST INSUA,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MONTANA,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV 05-11
Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Albert E. Insua, self-represented; Deer Lodge, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Mardell Ployhar, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
William Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney; Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 12, 2013
Decided: July 9, 2013
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve
as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s
quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Appellant Albert E. Insua (Insua) appeals the order of the Fourth Judicial District
Court, Missoula County, that dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
¶3 A jury found Insua guilty of sexual intercourse without consent and three counts of
sexual assault in 2000. We affirmed Insua’s conviction on appeal. State v. Insua,
.
¶4 Insua timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief on December 20, 2004. The
district court denied Insua’s petition and we affirmed. Insua v. State,
.
¶5 Insua now has filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. Insua argues in his
second petition that new evidence demonstrates his innocence. The District Court denied
Insua’s second petition on the basis that “these matters have been brought before this Court
on several occasions and remittiturs filed affirmed the Court’s rulings.” The District Court
added that it has no further remedy for Insua. Insua appeals.
¶6 Insua argues that new evidence of the rape examination conducted on the victim
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would demonstrate his innocence. He claims to have attempted multiple times during trial to
acquire this information. We review a district court’s denial of a petition for post-conviction
relief to determine whether the court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its
conclusions of law are correct. Sanchez v. State,
.
¶7 Section 46-21-105(1)(b), MCA, bars a second or subsequent petition that raises
grounds for relief that reasonably could have been raised in the original petition. Insua’s
second petition raises no new claim that could not have been raised in his first post-
conviction petition. We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph
3(d) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions.
It is manifest on the face of the briefs and the record before us that the District Court
correctly applied the procedural bar to Insua’s claim.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ JIM RICE
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