Grenier v. Key Flora

                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



Patricia Grenier

   v.                                      Civil No. 12-cv-325-LM
                                           Opinion No. 

Key Floral, Inc.



                               O R D E R

    Patricia Grenier has sued her former employer, Key Floral,

Inc., in three counts, asserting claims for discrimination and

retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“ADEA”), 

.    Before the court is defendant’s

motion for summary judgment.    Plaintiff objects.   For the

reasons that follow, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

denied.

                     Summary Judgment Standard

    “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.”    Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Cortés–Rivera v. Dept. of

Corr., 

 (1st Cir. 2010)); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a).   When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the

court must “view[] the entire record ‘in the light most

hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.’”    Winslow v.

Aroostook Cty., 

 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Suarez

v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2000)).

    “The object of summary judgment is to ‘pierce the

boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in

order to determine whether trial is actually required.’”       Dávila

v. Corp. de P.R. para la Diffusión Púb., 

 (1st

Cir. 2007) (quoting Acosta v. Ames Dep’t Stores, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2004)).   “[T]he court’s task is not to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”     Noonan v. Staples,

Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

    “The nonmovant may defeat a summary judgment motion by

demonstrating, through submissions of evidentiary quality, that

a trialworthy issue persists.”   Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T

Mobility P.R., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting

Iverson v. City of Boston, 

 (1st Cir. 2006)).

That is, “the party seeking to avoid summary judgment must be

able to point to specific, competent evidence to support his [or

her] claim.”   Sánchez-Rodríguez, 

 (quoting Soto-

Ocasio v. Fed. Ex. Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 1998))

(internal quotation marks omitted).




                                 2
                             Background

    Key Floral provides flowers for sale in retail stores,

primarily Hannaford supermarkets.     In June of 1998, Key Floral’s

president, Luis Chaves, hired Grenier as a floral technician.

Floral technicians manage floral displays in individual

locations.    When Chaves hired Grenier, she was approximately 55

years old.

    In September of 2008, Grenier began working as the floral

technician for two Key Floral locations, one in Pelham and one

in Hudson.    In October of 2009, Grenier asked to work at only

one location.   Key Floral granted her request, and from October

of 2009 through March 6, 2010, she worked at the Hudson

location, logging approximately 20 hours per week.

    For each of its locations, Key Floral budgets the number of

hours it should take a floral technician to perform his or her

duties.   In Hudson, Grenier exceeded her budgeted hours every

week from November of 2008 through February of 2009.    Over the

last four or five weeks that Grenier worked in Hudson, a

supervisor told her that she needed to reduce the number of

hours she worked.    Other Key Floral management personnel,

including Chaves, also spoke with Grenier about keeping her

hours down.




                                  3
    On March 6, Chaves met with Grenier and informed her that

she was being moved from Hudson to Nashua, where she was to work

as a helper to Lori Andrews, who was the floral technician at

that location.   She was to receive the same rate of pay, but

work about half the number of hours she had worked in Hudson.

Chaves explained that her assignment to work as a helper was

based upon her inability to perform her duties in Hudson in the

budgeted number of hours.   Grenier has testified that at the

March 6 meeting, Chaves asked her how old she was.   Chaves does

not recall doing so.   It is undisputed that Chaves commented

that “we all slow down as we get older,” and also opined that

another Key Floral employee who was older than Grenier needed to

slow down.

    After she was informed of her reassignment, Grenier went to

Nashua to speak with Andrews.   It is undisputed that Grenier:

(1) told Andrews she felt that Chaves should not have asked her

how old she was, and that she felt she was being discriminated

against because of her age, see Def.’s Mem. of Law, Ex. 1,

Grenier Dep. (doc. no. 10-2) 56:5-7, June 4, 2013; and (2)

mentioned Chaves’s comments about the Key Floral employee who

Chaves said needed to slow down because of his age, see 

.   The circumstances under which Grenier’s conversation

with Andrews took place are subject to a modest dispute.     Key




                                 4
Floral says it took place in front of Hannaford employees;

Grenier says that any Hannaford employees who may have been

physically present for the conversation were out of earshot.       In

any event, after the conversation, Key Floral’s Director of

Business Development, Judy Sousa, called Grenier to caution her

about talking about Key Floral business in front of Hannaford

employees.    Sousa did not take any disciplinary action against

Grenier based upon her conversation with Andrews.

    The record includes a memorandum, dated March 20, 2010, in

which Sousa wrote the following:

         Lori Andrews had called me to inform me that Pat
    G had be[en] speaking to her + to Hannaford employees
    about her meeting w/Lou [Chaves] + the outcome of that
    meeting.

         I had a follow up letter to that meeting for Pat
    to read + sign for her employee records. I felt that
    it was better for her to come to the office to sign +
    also clear up any issues that she had with myself or
    Lou at that time. . . .

         Lou + I sat down with her + went over again that
    she was being placed in Nashua w/Lori Andrews 2 days a
    week Tuesday + Thursday w/10-12 hours per week.

         Pat was still upset at the outcome of the
    previous meeting. . . . She also stated that she did
    no[t] like some of the things Lou said to her after
    her 10 plus years of employment w/Key Floral.

Pl.’s Mem. of Law, Ex. 12 (doc. no. 32-13), at 1-2.

    On April 1, Grenier reported to work at the Nashua

location.    There, she found a large shipment of flowers that had




                                   5
not yet been processed.    After searching part of the shipment

for its invoice, with no success, and after trying to track down

Andrews, also without success, Grenier went into a workroom used

by Key Floral personnel.    There, next to her own work bag, she

saw a tote bag that Andrews used to carry work-related

materials.    Given her understanding that Key Floral personnel

had been directed to leave personal bags in their cars, or put

them in lockers provided by Hannaford, Grenier believed that the

tote bag next to hers was also a work bag.

    Sticking out of the top of that bag, Grenier saw a manila

envelope or folder containing a particular piece of Key Floral

paperwork that typically accompanied invoices.    In search of the

invoice, Grenier removed the folder from Andrews’s bag and began

perusing its contents, which she has described as a single sheet

of paper.    As Grenier was doing so, Andrews walked into the

room.

    Later that day, Andrews called Sousa “to complain[] that

Ms. Grenier had gone through her personal handbag.”    Def.’s Mem.

of Law, Ex. 2, Sousa Aff. (doc. no. 10-3) ¶ 5.    At Sousa’s

request, Andrews prepared a statement that included the

following:

    Upon entering my [work] area I saw Pat [Grenier]
    looking through my paperwork folder. She had it in
    her hand and was shuffling thru the paperwork inside.
    I was on confer[e]nce call still and all I could say



                                  6
    in response was “What?” I was still trying to compute
    what I was seeing. She said “Oh good morning Lori[],
    I was looking for the invoice.” I told her “it was
    with the shipment.” It’s always with the shipment.
    I’ve never put the invoice in my personal purse in the
    last 7 years I’ve worked for Key Floral!!! I don’t
    know of any reason she wouldn’t look with the
    shipment, look on my clipboard or ask Jim Malloy where
    it was. Pat has been here on a Thurs for the past 3
    or 4 weeks[s]. She knows I’m upstairs on conference
    call @ 8:30. I check in the delivery after that and
    during conference call time she usually changes water
    in cut racks, works on re-works, or waters plants.
    I’ve never had an issue with my purse and people going
    thru it. I keep it on the floor and I usually have my
    watering tank in front of it, blocking it from sight.
    In that folder she was rifling thru I have all my
    personal paperwork I carry in my purse. My pay stub I
    received at the office when I was there on Wed., tax
    paperwork, a bank statement, coupons, etc., my
    personal documents!!! For my eyes only. I felt very
    shocked and violated.

Def.’s Mem. of Law, Ex. 2, Attach. C (doc. no. 10-6), at 1-2

(emphasis in the original).

    On April 2, Chaves met with Grenier to discuss the incident

involving Andrews’s bag.   At that meeting, Grenier admitted to

taking a manila folder out of the bag, but denied rummaging

through it to find the folder.   In her deposition, she describes

part of the meeting this way:

    And anyway, I tried to explain, and he kept saying did
    you put your hand in her bag? And I said I put my
    hand on the manila envelope which said April 2010
    calendar. Yes, I did bend down and pulled it out.
    But he’s saying rummaging through her purse. I said .
    . . no, I didn’t rummage through anything. I didn’t
    look at anything. I just wanted to find the invoice.
    I saw something that was supposed to be with the
    invoice. I didn’t know she [Andrews] picked it [the



                                 7
    calendar] up at the office. I saw it and I looked at
    it, and there was no invoice in it, and I put it – she
    saw me have it. I told him she saw me open it and I
    put it back in her presence.

         And he . . . asked me if I wanted anybody looking
    in my personal belongings, and I said no. I said but
    – but – but on. No buts. No buts. That’s it.
    You’re done. And I’m going but Lou, Lou, can I talk
    to you privately? No. You’re done. I said Lou,
    almost in tears, I said do you know what day this is?
    And he said yeah. Yeah. Delivery day, Friday. Day
    after delivery day. He says I got deliveries to work
    on. That’s what he said. I got deliveries to work
    on. Because people were getting a Friday delivery,
    too. And he said no. I don’t have time. I said Lou,
    we’ve been friends for 25 or 30 years, I said you’re
    not even going to let me explain?

Grenier Dep. 96:4-97:6.   The reason Key Floral gave for

discharging Grenier was her violation of a Key Floral standard

of conduct under which it was a dischargeable offense to go

through the personal possessions of a co-worker.

    Based upon the forgoing, Grenier sued Key Floral in three

counts, asserting that Key Floral: (1) demoted her on account of

her age, in violation of 

(a)(1); (2) discharged

her on account of her age, in violation of 

(a)(1); and (3) discharged her because she opposed Key

Floral’s age discrimination, in violation of 

(d).


                            Discussion

    Key Floral moves for summary judgment on each of Grenier’s

three claims.   In the discussion that follows, the court first




                                 8
considers Grenier’s two age-discrimination claims, one based

upon her demotion (Count I), the other based upon her discharge

(Count II).   Then, the court turns to Grenier’s retaliation

claim (Count III), which is also based upon her discharge.


    A. Age Discrimination (Counts I & II)

    Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to

discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,

or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”

(a)(1).   “The employee bears the burden of

proving that [her] age was the but-for cause” of the employment

action she challenges.   Adamson v. Walgreens Co., 

 (1st Cir. 2014).

    “Where, as here, the employee lacks direct evidence,
    [courts] utilize the burden-shifting framework
    developed by the Supreme Court to facilitate the
    process of proving discrimination.” Bonefont–
    Igaravidez v. Int’l Shipping Corp., 

    (1st Cir. 2011) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
    Green, 

, 802–05 (1973)).

         The first step of this framework requires the
    employee to establish his prima facie case by
    producing evidence that shows: “(1) that [she] was at
    least forty years old [at the time of the employment
    action at issue]; (2) that [her] job performance met
    the employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) that [she]
    suffered an adverse employment action such as a
    firing; and (4) that the employer filled the position,
    thereby showing a continuing need for the services
    that [she] had been rendering.” Meléndez v.
    Autogermana, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2010).



                                 9
    Doing so gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
    discrimination and shifts the burden of production —
    but not persuasion — “to the employer to articulate a
    legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
    decisions.” Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). If the employer meets this burden,
    “the focus shifts back to the plaintiff, who must then
    show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
    employer’s articulated reason for the adverse
    employment action is pretextual and that the true
    reason for the adverse action is discriminatory.”
    Gómez–González v. Rural Opportunities, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation mark
    omitted). At the summary judgment stage, the
    plaintiff need not prove [her] case, but must proffer
    sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
    material fact as to whether [she] was fired [or
    otherwise treated adversely] because of [her] age.
    See Domínguez–Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2000).

Adamson, 

 (parallel citations omitted).


         1. Demotion

    Key Floral argues that Grenier cannot establish either the

second or the third elements of a prima facie case of age

discrimination based upon its assigning her to work as a helper

rather than as a floral technician.    It further argues that even

if Grenier could establish a prima facie case, she cannot

demonstrate that Key Floral’s explanation for its action was a

pretext for age discrimination.    The court does not agree.

    With regard to the second element of Grenier’s prima facie

case, Key Floral argues that her inability to keep her hours

within the budget at Hudson demonstrates that her job



                                  10
performance did not meet expectations.   That argument is

foreclosed by Acevedo-Parrilla v. Novartis Ex-Lax, Inc., 

, 139, (1st Cir. 2012), in which the court of appeals

held that the district court cannot consider the employer’s

explanation for taking an employment action when determining

whether the employee has established a prima facie case.

Because the record includes uncontested evidence that Grenier

was proficient at performing the duties of a floral technician,

she has established the second element of her prima facie case.

    So, too, has Grenier established the third element.     While

Key Floral attempts to minimize the employment action it took on

March 6, by calling it a transfer rather than a demotion, it is

undisputed that while Grenier continued to be paid at the same

hourly rate she received as a floral technician, her hours were

effectively cut in half.   It is also undisputed that she was no

longer a floral technician, in charge of managing a location,

but was merely a helper, an assistant to a floral technician.

At this stage, that is enough to establish an adverse employment

action.

    In sum, the court cannot agree that Grenier has failed to

carry the light burden of establishing her prima facie case.

Because Grenier concedes that Key Floral has carried its own

light burden of articulating a legitimate non-discriminatory




                                11
reason for her new work assignment, the court turns to the third

stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.    In the analysis that

follows, the court bears “in mind that [it] should exercise

particular caution before granting summary judgment for

employers on such issues as pretext, motive, and intent.”

Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 140 (quoting Santiago-Ramos v.

Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 2000);

citing Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 

 (1st

Cir. 1998)).

    Key Floral argues that Grenier cannot establish that the

reasons it gave for assigning her to work as a helper were

pretextual, because: (1) the only evidence she has of ageism

consists of stray comments; and (2) the person who made the

decision to change her work assignment, Chaves, also made the

decision to hire her, and did so when she was 55 years old.

Those arguments present questions for the jury, not a basis for

granting summary judgment.

    With regard to Key Floral’s stray-comments argument, the

court notes that “‘[i]t is settled that statements made by

decisionmakers can evidence age discrimination.’”    Acevedo-

Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 143 (quoting Kelley v. Airborne Freight

Corp., 

 (1st Cir. 1998)).    “Moreover, in

evaluating such remarks made by a decisionmaker, [courts should]




                               12
consider[] their temporal proximity and causal connection to the

[employment] decision.”    

 at 144 (citing Meléndez, 

).   Regarding the probative value of workplace remarks,

the court of appeals has explained:

    Although statements directly related to the challenged
    employment action may be highly probative in the
    pretext inquiry, mere generalized “stray remarks,”
    arguably probative of bias against a protected class,
    normally are not probative of pretext absent some
    discernible evidentiary basis for assessing their
    temporal and contextual relevance.

Ortiz-Rivera v. Astra Zeneca LP, 

 (1st

Cir. 2010) (quoting Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2001)).

    Based upon the distinction drawn in Straughn, Chaves’s

ageist comments can hardly be characterized as mere generalized

stray remarks.   They were made by the supervisor who demoted

Grenier, at the meeting where he informed her of his decision.

As evidence of discriminatory intent, the source and the timing

of Chaves’s ageist comments could not be more favorable to

Grenier’s claims.

    That, however, is not quite the end of the story.    In

Acevedo-Parrilla, where the employee’s supervisor told the

employee, on two occasions, “that employees ‘who had been in the

company for a long time[] were not performing,’” 696 F.3d at

143, the court explained that it was “by no means suggesting




                                 13
that these remarks, which are also susceptible to a benign

interpretation are, on their own, sufficient to sustain [the

plaintiff’s] burden.”    Id. at 144 n.8.   The court went on to

say:

       [W]e do find that they may be considered in
       conjunction with other evidence . . . to determine if
       the aggregate proof satisfies the plaintiff’s burden
       on summary judgment to raise an issue of fact
       regarding discriminatory motive. Cf. Straughn v.
       Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2001)
       (holding that stray remarks may be considered evidence
       of bias only in combination with other evidence and if
       they were temporally close and causally related to the
       adverse employment decision).

    Like the plaintiff in Acevedo-Parrilla, Grenier has

produced evidence of disparate treatment, see 

,

which “can provide evidence of discriminatory animus,” 

 at

144 (quoting Vélez, 

).      Specifically, she has

produced evidence that floral technicians who were younger than

her had exceeded their budgeted hours, some to a greater extent

than she had, and that she was the only floral technician who

had ever been demoted to a helper position on account of going

over budget on work hours.    Key Floral’s “stray-comments”

argument is not persuasive.

       Equally unpersuasive is Key Floral’s reliance upon the

same-actor theory.   In Proud v. Stone, 

 (4th Cir.

1991), a case in which the age-discrimination plaintiff was

hired and fired by the same person within a six-month span, the



                                 14
court explained that “employers who knowingly hire workers

within a protected group seldom will be credible targets for

pretextual firing,” 

, because the fact that the same

person hired and fired “creates a strong inference that the

employer’s stated reason for acting against the employee is not

pretextual,” 

   The First Circuit has recently explained its

interpretation of that legal theory:

    [T]he so-called “same actor inference” states that
    “[i]n cases where the hirer and the firer are the same
    individual and the termination of employment occurs
    within a relatively short time span following the
    hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination
    was not a determining factor for the adverse action
    taken by the employer.” LeBlanc [v. Great Am. Ins.
    Co.], 6 F.3d [836,] 847 [(1st Cir. 1993)] quoting
    Proud v. Stone, 

 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Pina v. Children’s Place, 

 (1st Cir. 2014).

Here, the ten years between Grenier’s hiring and her demotion is

not the “relatively short time span” contemplated by the courts

that have adopted the same-actor inference.

    Because neither Key Floral’s “stray-comment” argument nor

its reliance upon the same-actor inference entitles it to

judgment as a matter of law on Grenier’s first age-

discrimination claim, its motion for summary judgment, as to

Count I, is denied.




                                15
         2. Discharge

    In Count II Grenier asserts a second age-discrimination

claim, this one based upon her discharge.     Key Floral argues

that Grenier cannot establish her prima facie case and that,

even if she could, she cannot demonstrate that Key Floral’s

explanation for her discharge was a pretext for age

discrimination.   The court does not agree.

    Key Floral’s only argument regarding Grenier’s prima facie

case is that an employee who has gone through another employee’s

personal effects cannot be considered to be meeting her

employer’s legitimate expectations.   But, as the court has

already explained, such an argument is foreclosed by Acevedo-

Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 139.   Because Grenier has established her

prima facie case, and concedes that Key Floral has articulated a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason for her discharge, pretext

is again the determinative issue.

    When assessing pretext, the court must focus on the

perception of the decisionmaker, and whether he or she actually

believed the reason given for the adverse employment action.

See Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 140-41 (citing Gray v. N.E.

Tel. & Tel. Co., 

, 256 (1st Cir. 1986)).     To

demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must show both that the

proffered “explanation is unworthy of credence,” id. at 141




                                16
(quoting Williams v. Raytheon Co., 

 (1st Cir.

2000); citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 

 (2000)), and “that the pretextual reasons were

‘intended to cover up the employer’s real motive: age

discrimination,’” 

 at 143 (quoting Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co.,

 (1st Cir. 1991)).

    Turning to the first part of the pretext analysis, Grenier

has produced undisputed evidence that would allow a reasonable

jury to conclude that Key Floral’s explanation for discharging

her is not worthy of credence.   That evidence includes: (1) the

haste with which Chaves made the decision to discharge an

employee with whom he had a longstanding personal and

professional relationship, and who, in his view, was proficient

in all aspects of her work as a floral technician; (2) Chaves’s

refusal to give Grenier a chance to explain her side of the

story, even after she told him that she had merely taken a piece

of Key Floral paperwork out of Andrews’s work bag while looking

for an invoice; and (3) the lack of any meaningful investigation

into what was clearly a complicated situation, given the

multiple characterizations of the bag at issue (work bag versus

personal bag), and the multiple characterizations of Grenier’s

actions (“going through” Andrews’s bag versus removing a single,

visible document from it).




                                 17
       Turning to the second part of the analysis, Grenier has

also produced undisputed evidence from which a reasonable jury

could conclude that Key Floral’s explanation for discharging her

was intended to cover discriminatory animus.    That evidence

includes: (1) Chaves’ ageist comments, which he made less than a

month before he discharged Grenier and which betrayed a belief

that older workers were not able keep up with younger ones, see

Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 144 (holding that plaintiff

established triable issue on “temporal proximity and causal

connection” where employer’s “remarks were made, at most, six

months prior to [plaintiff’s] termination, and expressed

[decisionmaker’s] displeasure at older employees’ long tenure at

the company”); and (2) Key Floral’s disparate treatment of

Grenier with respect to her demotion.    Chaves’s ageist comments

are, arguably, somewhat less strongly connected to his decision

to discharge Grenier than they are to his decision to demote

her.    Viewed in the light most favorable to Grenier, however,

the record supports the inference that Chaves’s discriminatory

animus had not dissipated in the brief time between his comments

and his decision to discharge Grenier.

       Based upon the facts and the reasonable inferences that may

be drawn therefrom, a rational jury could find that Chaves fired




                                 18
Grenier because of her age.    Accordingly, as to Count II, Key

Floral’s motion for summary judgment is denied.


    B. Retaliation (Count III)

    Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees . . . because such

individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this

section.”   

(d).   As with Grenier’s age-

discrimination claims, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework applies.   See Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC, 

 (1st Cir. 2012).    Under that framework,

    succeeding on a claim of retaliation . . . entails
    proof that “(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in protected
    conduct under federal . . . law; (2) [she] suffered an
    adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection
    existed between the protected conduct and the adverse
    action.” McMillan v. Mass. SPCA, 

, 309
    (1st Cir. 1998). In order to make a prima facie
    showing of these elements, it is not necessary that
    the plaintiff succeed on the underlying claim of
    discrimination; “[i]t is enough that the plaintiff had
    a reasonable, good-faith belief that a violation
    occurred; that [she] acted on it; that the employer
    knew of the plaintiff’s conduct; and that the employer
    lashed out in consequence of it.” Mesnick v. Gen.
    Elec. Co., 

 (1st Cir. 1991).

         Once the plaintiff makes [her] prima facie
    showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce
    evidence of a “legitimate, non-retaliatory reason” for
    the adverse employment action. McMillan, 

. If the defendant produces such evidence, the
    burden reverts to the plaintiff to prove that “the
    real reason for the decision” was retaliatory. 

Trainor, 

.



                                  19
    Key Floral argues that Grenier cannot establish the second

or third elements of her prima facie case that she was

discharged in retaliation for opposing age discrimination.        It

further argues that even if Grenier can establish her prima

facie case, she cannot show that the reason it gave for

discharging her was pretextual.     Key Floral is mistaken.

    With regard to the second element of the prima facie case,

i.e., an adverse employment action, Key Floral relies upon the

undisputed fact that Sousa did not explicitly discipline Grenier

for discussing company business in front of outsiders.        But that

fact has no bearing on whether some subsequent adverse

employment action was taken for the purpose of retaliating

against Grenier for opposing Key Floral’s age discrimination in

her conversation with Andrews.

    Key Floral’s argument with regard to the third element,

i.e., a causal connection between her protected activity and her

discharge, is no more persuasive.      Less than a month passed

between Grenier’s protected activity and her discharge, and,

based upon Sousa’s March 20 memorandum, defendant does not

dispute that less than two weeks passed between Chaves’s

learning of Grenier’s conversation with Andrews and Grenier’s




                                  20
discharge.1   Either span falls comfortably within the range of

time spans the First Circuit has found sufficient to satisfy the

causation element of a prima facie retaliation case.   See

Mariani-Colón v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. ex rel. Chertoff, 

 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We conclude that the ‘temporal

proximity’ between appellant’s allegations of discrimination in

June 2002 and his termination in August 2002 is sufficient to

meet the relatively light burden of establishing a prima facie

case of retaliation.”) (quoting Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica,

Inc., 

 (1st Cir. 2006)).

     Turning to pretext, the court has already described the

undisputed evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to

conclude that Key Floral’s explanation for discharging Grenier

is unworthy of credence.   The summary-judgment record also

includes evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that

Key Floral’s explanation was intended to cover up retaliatory

animus.   As evidenced by Sousa’s March 20 memorandum, Key

Floral’s concerns over Grenier’s conversation with Andrews

     1
       Grenier has submitted an affidavit in which she says that
the meeting described in Sousa’s memorandum did not occur, see
Pl.’s Mem. of Law, Ex. 10 (doc. no. 32-11) ¶ 10, and argues that
Sousa’s memorandum may have been fabricated. Whether or not the
meeting actually took place, and regardless of the authenticity
and/or accuracy of the memorandum, the existence of that
memorandum establishes a critical factual link in the causal
chain: At the time he discharged Grenier, Chaves knew about her
complaint to Andrews that Key Floral had discriminated against
her because of her age.


                                21
remained alive long after Sousa spoke with Grenier about it on

March 6.

      Based upon the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn

therefrom, a rational jury could find that Chaves fired Grenier

in retaliation for opposing Key Floral’s age discrimination.

Accordingly, as to Count III, Key Floral’s motion for summary

judgment is denied.

                            Conclusion

      For the reasons detailed above, defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, document no. 10, is denied.

      SO ORDERED.



                               __________________________
                               Landya McCafferty
                               United States District Judge



July 10, 2014

cc:   Debra Weiss Ford, Esq.
      Ellen Purcell, Esq.
      K. Joshua Scott, Esq.
      Martha Van Oot, Esq.




                                22