UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Amanda Michelle Langill
v. Civil No. 13-cv-527-PB
Opinion No. 2015 DNH 002
Carolyn W. Colvin,
Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Amanda Michelle Langill seeks judicial review of the Social
Security Administration’s refusal to reopen her previously
denied claim for disability insurance benefits. The
Commissioner has moved to dismiss Langill’s complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, I
deny the Commissioner’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In July 2009, Langill, acting without legal counsel, filed
a claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. In that claim, Langill alleged disability due
to “[f]ibromyalgia, rapid heartbeat, sinus arrhythmia, and foot
problems.” Tr. 290. The Social Security Administration denied
Langill’s claim in October 2009. Langill did not timely seek
further review of the Commissioner’s denial, rendering the
decision final.
On August 2, 2011, Langill filed another claim for
disability benefits, this time represented by counsel. In that
claim, Langill sought supplemental security income as of her
application date. She also asked the Commissioner to reopen her
previously denied claim for disability insurance benefits,
alleging an onset date of December 31, 2008, her date last
insured. Her claim was denied in December 2011, and she
requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
That hearing took place on October 24, 2012.
On October 26, 2012, the ALJ found Langill disabled as of
her application date, August 2, 2011, and awarded her
supplemental security income benefits as of that date. Tr. 22.
The ALJ, however, declined to reopen Langill’s prior claim for
disability insurance benefits. Tr. 14-15. He found that
Langill had not submitted new and material evidence, and he
determined that Langill did not lack the mental capacity to
understand the procedures for seeking further review of her
claim when it was denied in October 2009. Tr. 14-15. Thus, he
concluded, Langill had failed to demonstrate good cause to
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reopen her initial claim. Tr. 14-15.
The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision in November
2013. On December 9, 2013, Langill filed a complaint in this
Court seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s refusal to reopen her
2009 application for disability insurance benefits. Doc. No. 1.
On May 23, 2014, Langill filed an amended complaint. Doc. No.
13. As is relevant here, the amended complaint alleges that
Langill “suffered violation of her due process because the ALJ
did not follow SSA regulations to determine if she had good
cause for re-opening . . . [Langill] showed good cause based on
mental capacity and new and material evidence.” Id. at 1.
The Commissioner now moves to dismiss Langill’s amended
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. No. 15.
II. ANALYSIS
As this Court recently explained:
The Social Security Act grants district courts
jurisdiction to review only “final decision[s]” of the
Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both the
Supreme Court and the First Circuit have held that the
Commissioner’s denial of a request to reopen a prior
claim is a discretionary action, not a “final
decision,” and therefore is not subject to judicial
review. See id.; Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,
108 (1977); Dvareckas v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 804 F.2d 770, 772 (1st Cir. 1986) . . . see
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also Martin v. Shalala, 927 F. Supp. 536, 543 (D.N.H.
1995). A claimant may avoid the final decision
requirement for judicial review only by raising a
colorable constitutional claim against the
Commissioner’s action. See Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108-
09; Dvareckas, 804 F.2d at 772.
Nerich v. Colvin,
2014 DNH 239, 14-15.
The amended complaint claims, in relevant part, that
Langill “showed good cause based on mental capacity.” Doc. No.
13 at 1. In other words, Langill argues both in the amended
complaint and in her motion to reverse the Commissioner’s
decision that she lacked the mental capacity to understand the
procedures for requesting further review of her initial claim
after the Commissioner denied it in 2009. See Doc. No. 13 at 1;
Doc. No. 11-1 at 5. An allegation of past mental impairment
that prevented an unrepresented claimant from timely seeking
further review of a denied claim can raise a constitutional
claim that is subject to judicial review. See Klemm v. Astrue,
543 F.3d 1139, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 2008); Boothby v. Soc. Sec.
Admin. Comm’r, No. 97-1245,
1997 WL 727535, at *1 (1st Cir. Nov.
18, 1997) (unpublished); Dupont v. Astrue,
2010 DNH 214, 5. To
be amenable to judicial review, however, the constitutional
claim must be “colorable.” Boothby,
1997 WL 727535, at *1. The
colorable constitutional claim requirement “is not an onerous
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standard.” Id. Only “patently frivolous” constitutional
claims, or those that are “wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or
frivolous,” will fail to satisfy the colorable standard. See
id. (internal quotations omitted).
After reviewing the record, I conclude that Langill’s
constitutional claim that she lacked the mental capacity to
understand how to appeal her 2009 denial is colorable. It is
undisputed that Langill was not represented by counsel when she
filed her initial claim. A doctor who examined Langill at
around the time her initial claim was denied determined that she
was suffering from depression and noted that she was taking
antidepressants. Tr. 280. The doctor also noted that Langill
was experiencing “memory changes” and “foggy brain” at that
time. Tr. 281. “While this is not overwhelming evidence, it
does amount to a claim that is not ‘wholly insubstantial,
immaterial, or frivolous.’” Dupont, 2010 DNH 214, 6 (quoting
Boothby,
1997 WL 727535, at *1) (finding colorable
constitutional claim under similar facts, where claimant alleged
that depression prevented her from understanding how to seek
further review of denied claim).
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Arguing that Langill’s claim is not colorable, the
Commissioner notes that Langill did not allege disability due to
mental illness in her initial claim and that other medical
evidence from 2009 undermines her depression diagnosis. See
Doc. No. 17 at 3. Although these facts might be relevant on
substantial evidence review of the ALJ’s decision, they do not
render Langill’s claim, which is supported by an objective
medical evaluation, “wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or
frivolous.” See Boothby, 1997 WL 727535, at *1. Because
Langill’s constitutional claim that depression and memory
problems prevented her from understanding how to appeal her 2009
denial is colorable, this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
it.
The Commissioner argues that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction in this appeal for two other reasons.
First, she contends that the amended complaint attacks only “the
merits of the ALJ’s finding that [Langill] had not demonstrated
good cause based on submission of new evidence,” an argument
that this Court would lack jurisdiction to hear. Doc. No. 15-1
at 3. That the Commissioner would make this argument is
understandable, given the complaint’s oblique and sparse
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articulation of the constitutional claim. Nevertheless, the
complaint pleads that Langill “showed good cause based on mental
capacity and new and material evidence.” Doc. No. 13 at 1
(emphasis added). That phrase may be fairly read to separately
challenge the ALJ’s refusal to reopen on the independent grounds
of both mental incapacity and new and material evidence. As the
Commissioner correctly observes, it is beyond question that this
Court lacks jurisdiction to hear any challenge to the ALJ’s
determination that the additional evidence offered by Langill
with her second claim was not new and material.1 The complaint,
however, raises the mental incapacity argument as an independent
basis on which to challenge the ALJ’s decision, and as I have
explained, this Court has jurisdiction to hear that
constitutional claim. The Commissioner’s argument, therefore,
is unpersuasive.
1
It is well settled that district courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction to review an ALJ’s conclusion that additional
evidence submitted by a claimant is not new and material and,
therefore, does not warrant reopening. See Dvareckas, 804 F.2d
at 772 (“Whether additional medical reports are new or material
or warrant reopening is precisely the type of issue which,
absent a constitutional claim, [federal courts] may not review .
. . .”); Nerich,
2014 DNH 239, 14-15. To the extent that
Langill means to press this argument, therefore, it is a
nonstarter.
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Second, the Commissioner argues that Langill’s
constitutional claim is inadequately pled because “[n]owhere in
her Amended Complaint does [Langill specifically] allege that
mental incapacity prevented her from properly litigating her
2009 SSI claim.” Doc. No. 15-1 at 3. Although the complaint
does not allege Langill’s mental incapacity argument with great
specificity, the complaint, amplified by Langill’s other filings
and the administrative record in this appeal, provides
sufficient notice of Langill’s claim that her depression and
memory problems prevented her from understanding how to seek
further review of her initial claim when it was denied in 2009.
See Doc. Nos. 13 at 1, 11-1 at 5; Tr. 15 (ALJ directly
addressed, and rejected, Langill’s mental incapacity claim).
Thus, I will not dismiss the complaint on this basis.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, I deny the Commissioner’s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction (Doc. No. 15). Pursuant to Magistrate Judge
Johnstone’s Order dated July 1, 2014, the Commissioner shall
file her Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the
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Commissioner, supporting Memorandum, and Joint Statement of
Material Facts within ten days.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro
Paul Barbadoro
United States District Judge
January 8, 2015
cc: D. Lance Tillinghast, Esq.
Robert J. Rabuck, Esq.
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