STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
AMANDA DENISE FOOTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DC 12-0520
Honorable Karen Townsend, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Lisa S. Korchinski, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Pamela P. Collins, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Kirsten H. Pabst, Missoula County Attorney; Andrew Paul, Deputy
County Attorney; Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: January 21, 2015
Decided: February 10, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Amanda Denise Foote (Foote) pled guilty to Criminal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs and Theft. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, sentenced Foote
to a term of three years, all suspended, and imposed several conditions on her suspended
sentence. The sole issue raised by Foote on appeal is whether the District Court abused
its discretion by imposing three of those conditions.
¶3 On October 28, 2012, Missoula City Police responded to a report of shoplifting at
a Murdoch’s Ranch store. Law enforcement officers arrested Foote and conducted a
search incident to arrest. Officers discovered stolen Murdoch’s merchandise and nine
blue prescription clonazepam pills in Foote’s possession. Foote admitted she did not
have a prescription for the drugs and stated the pills were given to her by an unidentified
friend.
¶4 In accordance with a plea agreement, the District Court sentenced Foote to a term
of three years, with all of that time suspended. The court imposed, and Foote objected to,
the following conditions:
19. The Defendant shall not possess or use any electronic device or
scanner capable of listening to law enforcement communications.
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22. The Defendant shall not knowingly associate with probationers,
parolees, prison inmates, or persons in the custody of any law enforcement
agency without prior approval from the Probation & Parole Officer. The
Defendant shall not associate with persons as ordered by the Court or Board
of Pardons and Parole.
26. The Defendant shall not drive without a valid driver’s license and
liability insurance.
¶5 Foote now appeals, challenging the District Court’s imposition of each of these
conditions. Pursuant to § 46-18-201(4), MCA, when a sentencing court suspends all or a
portion of the execution of a sentence, the court may impose upon the offender “any
reasonable conditions” during the period of the suspension of sentence. Reasonable
conditions are those specifically enumerated in §§ 46-18-201(4) and -202(1), MCA, as
well as those that are reasonably “necessary for rehabilitation or for the protection of the
victim or society.” Section 46-18-201(4)(q), MCA. In order to be reasonably related to
the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim or society, a sentencing
condition must have “a nexus either to the offense for which the offender is being
sentenced or to the offender himself or herself.” State v. Greensweight,
.
¶6 We conclude the conditions imposed by the District Court are reasonable and a
sufficient nexus exists. Condition 19 is reasonably necessary to ensure Foote’s probation
officer can properly supervise Foote and prevent Foote from obtaining advanced notice of
a planned search for stolen items or illegal substances in Foote’s home. Condition 22 is
reasonably necessary to prevent Foote from repeating the same criminal conduct that
gave rise to her conviction for possession of dangerous drugs. Condition 26 is reasonably
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necessarily for the protection of society and is duplicative of another condition that
requires Foote to be a law-abiding citizen. The District Court did not abuse its discretion
by imposing Conditions 19, 22, and 26.
¶7 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The
issues in this case are ones of judicial discretion and there clearly was not an abuse of
discretion.
¶8 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
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