131 Nev., Advance Opinion 11
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ERNESTO MANUEL GONZALEZ, No. 64249
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. DEC 3 1 2015
Tfic; IE K. LINDEMAN
CT. FASIAP3/44.E.E. ct;i5
;Hit F DEFE Dy LTRK ----
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant 't o a jury
verdict, of one count each of conspiracy to engage in an affray, carrying a
concealed weapon, discharging a firearm in a structure, murder in the
first degree with the use of a deadly weapon with a gang enhancement,
and conspiracy to commit murder. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
County; Connie J. Steinheimer, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Richard F. Cornell, Reno,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
District Attorney, and Terrence P. McCarthy, Deputy District Attorney,
Washoe County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, SAITTA, J.:
In the instant case, appellant challenges his conviction
arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
(0) 1947A es) 1-10152_
answer two questions from the jury during deliberations, when it gave a
defense-of-others jury instruction that was unduly confusing and not
supported by the evidence, when it refused to give his proffered
accomplice-distrust jury instruction, and when it refused to bifurcate the
gang-enhancement portion of the trial from the guilt phase. We agree
with appellant in several respects and hold that in situations where a
jury's question during deliberations suggests confusion or lack of
understanding of a significant element of the applicable law, the judge has
a duty to give additional instructions on the law to adequately clarify the
jury's doubt or confusion. We also hold that, to provide the defendant with
a fair trial, the guilt phase of trial must be bifurcated from the gang-enhancement phase. Because the district court failed to answer the jury's
question regarding a significant element of conspiracy, refused to bifurcate
the guilt and gang-enhancement portions of Gonzalez's trial, and
committed other errors, we hold that the cumulative effect of these errors
deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial. We therefore reverse
Gonzalez's judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2011, a brawl between members of two motorcycle gangs,
the Vagos and the Hell's Angels, occurred in a Sparks casino. The fight
was instigated by Stuart Rudnick, a member of the Vagos. During the
fight, another member of the Vagos, appellant Ernesto Manuel Gonzalez,
shot and killed Jethro Pettigrew, a member of the Hell's Angels.
Rudnick was initially charged as a coconspirator, but he
pleaded guilty to reduced charges and ultimately testified against
Gonzalez. Although Rudnick pleaded guilty prior to Gonzalez's trial, he
was not sentenced until after he testified against Gonzalez. At trial,
Rudnick testified that he and Gonzalez had a meeting prior to the fight
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A cek9
with the president of the international chapter of the Vagos. Rudnick
further testified that the president put out a "green light" on Pettigrew,
meaning that Pettigrew was to be killed, and that Gonzalez said he would
kill Pettigrew. No other witnesses testified to the existence of this
conspiracy to kill Pettigrew.
The jury found Gonzalez guilty on all counts. The district
court merged the convictions of challenge to fight resulting in death with
the use of a deadly weapon and second-degree murder with the conviction
of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Although the jury
found the alleged deadly-weapon and gang enhancements, the district
court only imposed sentences for the weapons enhancement. See NRS
193.169(1) (providing that additional enhancement sentence may be
imposed for only one enhancement "even if the person's conduct satisfies
the requirements for imposing an additional term of imprisonment
pursuant to another one or more" of the enhancement statutes).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gonzalez argues, among other claims, that the
district court abused its discretion: (1) when it refused to answer two
questions from the jury during deliberations, (2) when it gave a defense-ofothers jury instruction that was unduly confusing and not supported by
the evidence, (3) when it refused to give his proffered accomplice-distrust
jury instruction, and (4) when it refused to bifurcate the gang-enhancement portion of the trial from the guilt phase.
The district court's refusal to answer jury inquiries during deliberations
This court reviews the refusal to respond to jury inquiries for
an abuse of discretion. Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 591,
445 P.2d 938, 941
(1968).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A F(iZESo
During jury deliberations, a juror sent two questions to the
district court judge. The first question stated:
Legal Question:
Looking at Instruction no. 17: If a person
has no knowledge of a conspiracy but their actions
contribute to someone [else's] plan, are they guilty
of conspiracy?
The second question stated:
People in here are wondering if a person can
only be guilty of 2nd degree murder or 1st. Can it
be both?
Both Gonzalez's attorney and the State agreed that the
answers to both questions were no. The district court refused to answer
the first question, instead stating:
It is improper for the Court to give you additional
instruction on how to interpret Instruction no. 17.
You must consider all the instructions in light of
all the other instructions.
The district court also refused to answer the second question,
stating:
You must reach a decision on each count separate
and apart from each other count.
We create an exception to the rule in Tellis in situations where the
jury's question suggests confusion or lack of understanding of a
significant element of the applicable law
The current law regarding a judge's duty to answer a jury's
questions was promulgated in Tellis:
The trial judge has wide discretion in the manner
and extent he answers a jury's questions during
deliberation. If he is of the opinion the
instructions already given are adequate, correctly
state the law and fully advise the jury on the
procedures they are to follow in their deliberation,
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
4
(0) I947A
his refusal to answer a question already answered
in the instructions is not error.
84 Nev. at 591,
445 P.2d at 941.
Here, because Gonzalez does not allege that the given jury
instructions were inadequate or incorrectly stated the law, under our
decision in Tellis, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing
to answer the jury's questions. However, we are of the opinion that Tellis
does not go far enough in describing a judge's duty to answer questions
from the jury during deliberations.
We do not wish to completely overturn Tellis. However, we
believe that there should be an exception to the bright-line rule in Tellis
regarding situations where the jury's question suggests confusion or lack
of understanding of a significant element of the applicable law. See
United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Because
it is not always possible, when instructing the jury, to anticipate every
question that might arise during deliberations, the district court has the
responsibility to eliminate confusion when a jury asks for clarification of a
particular issue." (internal quotations omitted)); see also Harrington v.
Beauchamp Enters., 761 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Ariz. 1988) (holding that when
jurors "express confusion or lack of understanding of a significant element
of the applicable law, it is the court's duty to give additional instructions
on the law to adequately clarify the jury's doubt or confusion"); State v.
Juan, 242 P.3d 314, 320 (N.M. 2010) ("[W]hen a jury requests clarification
regarding the legal principles governing a case, the trial court has a duty
to respond promptly and completely to the jury's inquiry."). In such
situations, the court has a duty to give additional instructions on the law
to adequately clarify the jury's doubt or confusion. See Southwell, 432
F.3d at 1053; Harrington,
761 P.2d at 1025; Juan,
242 P.3d at 320. This is
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
5
“I) I947A
true even when the jury is initially given correct instructions. People v.
Brouder, 523 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); see also Harrington,
761
P.2d at 1025 (holding that the court has a duty to respond to the jury even
when "the original instructions were complete and clear").
Here, the jury's question on conspiracy went to the very heart
of that offense. Conspiracy is a knowing agreement to act in furtherance
of an unlawful act. Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 912,
124 P.3d 191, 194
(2005). When a defendant does not know that he or she is acting in
furtherance of an unlawful act, there can be no conspiracy. Because the
jury's first question suggested confusion or a lack of understanding of this
central element of the crime of conspiracy, we hold that the district court
abused its discretion when it refused to answer the question. However,
because the jury's second question did not suggest confusion or the lack of
understanding of a significant element of first- or second-degree murder,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to answer
that question.
The defense-of-others jury instruction
Whether a jury instruction accurately states the law is
reviewed de novo. Funderburk v. State, 125 Nev. 260, 263,
212 P.3d 337,
339 (2009). When the instruction concerns a defendant's right to self-defense, the issue is of constitutional magnitude. See United States v.
Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1414 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "a defendant
has a constitutional right to have the jury consider defenses [that] negate
[criminal liability]"); State v. Walden, 932 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Wash. 1997)
(indicating that an erroneous instruction on self-defense is an error of
constitutional magnitude); see also Harkins v. State, 122 Nev. 974, 989-90,
143 P.3d 706, 716 (2006) (although not identifying the error as one of
constitutional magnitude, reviewing whether an erroneous self-defense
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
6
10) I9474
jury instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a
review that is performed for constitutional errors). However, if the
defendant did not object to an instruction, the instruction is reviewed for
plain error. Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545,
80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003).
The defense-of-others jury instruction improperly contained an
instruction on self-defense that was not supported by the record
The trial court has the duty to instruct on
general principles of law relevant to the issues
raised by the evidence and has the correlative
duty to refrain from instructing on principles of
law which not only are irrelevant to the issues
raised by the evidence but also have the effect of
confusing the jury or relieving it from making
findings on relevant issues. It is an elementary
principle of law that before a jury can be
instructed that it may draw a particular inference,
evidence must appear in the record which, if
believed by the jury, will support the suggested
inference.
People v. Alexander, 235 P.3d 873, 935 (Cal. 2010) (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted).
Jury Instruction 34 states:
The killing of another person in self-defense
or defense of another is justified and not unlawful
when the person who does the killing actually and
reasonably believes:
1. That there is imminent danger that the
assailant will either kill him or any other
person in his presence or company or cause
great bodily injury to him or any other
person in his presence or company; and
2. That it is absolutely necessary under the
circumstances for him to use in self-defense
or defense of another force or means that
might cause the death of the other person,
for the purpose of avoiding death or great
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
7
(0) 1947A e
bodily injury to himself or any other person
in his presence or company.
A bare fear of death or great bodily injury is
not sufficient to justify a killing To justify taking
the life of another in self-defense or defense of
another, the circumstances must be sufficient to
excite the fears of a reasonable person placed in a
similar situation. The person killing must act
under the influence of those fears alone and not in
revenge.
An honest but unreasonable belief in the
necessity for self-defense or defense of another
does not negate malice.
The right of self-defense or defense of
another is not available to an original aggressor,
that is a person who has sought a quarrel with the
design to force a deadly issue and thus through his
fraud, contrivance, or fault, to create a real or
apparent necessity for making a felonious assault.
However, where a person, without
voluntarily seeking, provoking, inviting, or
willingly engaging in a difficulty of his own free
will, is attacked by an assailant, he has the right
to stand his ground and need not retreat when
faced with the threat of deadly force.
Actual danger is not necessary to justify a
killing in self-defense or defense of another. A
person has a right to defend from apparent danger
to the same extent as he would from actual
danger. The person killing is justified if:
1. He is confronted by the appearance of
imminent danger which arouses in his mind
an honest belief and fear that he or another
in his presence, is about to be killed or suffer
great bodily injury; and
2. He acts solely upon these appearances and
his fear and actual beliefs; and
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
8
(0) 1947A eta
3. A reasonable person in a similar situation
would believe himself or another in his
presence to be in like danger.
The killing is justified even if it develops
afterward that the person was mistaken about the
extent of the danger.
If evidence of self-defense, or defense of
others is present, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in
self-defense or defense of others. If you find that
the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense or defense of others, you must find the
defendant not guilty.
Thus, the defense-of-others instruction contained both an
instruction on defense of others and an instruction on self-defense.
However, Gonzalez never attempted to assert that he acted in self-defense
when he shot Pettigrew, and the evidence in the record does not support
that defense. No evidence was submitted at trial to support a finding that
Gonzalez was in, or believed he was in, imminent danger of serious bodily
harm or death when he shot Pettigrew. See NRS 200.200 (defining self-defense). Therefore, we hold that because the included self-defense
instruction was irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence and had the
effect of confusing the jury, it was erroneous. See Alexander, 235 P.3d at
935.
Intertwining the self-defense and defense-of-others instructions was
unduly confusing to the jury
Jury instructions that are unduly confusing may be erroneous.
United States v. Kalama, 549 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1976).
Here, instructions on self-defense and defense of others were
bizarrely combined into a single instruction in a way that could be
confusing to the jury. By intertwining the two defenses, the instruction
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
9
(0) 1947A e
was made unwieldy and unnecessarily confusing for the jury who was then
expected to untangle the resulting amalgamation. It could also have
misled the jury as to what defense Gonzalez was actually asserting.
Therefore, we hold that because the defense-of-others instruction was
unduly confusing, it was erroneous.
The district court did not commit plain error
However, Gonzalez failed to object to the defense-of-others
jury instruction. Therefore, we must review this instruction for plain
error. See Green v. State, 119 Nev. 542, 545,
80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003).
Plain error review considers "whether there was 'error,'
whether the error was 'plain' or clear, and whether the error affected the
defendant's substantial rights." Id. Here, while we find that the given
defense-of-others instruction was erroneous, we are not convinced that it
amounted to plain error. The given jury instruction, while confusing, does
not appear to be an incorrect statement of Nevada law. Therefore, we hold
that the district court did not commit plain error by giving its defense-ofothers jury instruction.
The district court abused its discretion by refusing to give an accomplice-distrust instruction
The district court is required to give a cautionary jury
instruction when an accomplice's testimony is uncorroborated. Howard v.
State, 102 Nev. 572, 576,
729 P.2d 1341, 1344 (1986). If the testimony is
corroborated, a cautionary instruction is favored, but failure to grant it is
not reversible error. Id. An accomplice-distrust instruction "advises the
jury that it should view as suspect incriminating testimony given by those
who are liable to prosecution for the identical charged offense as the
accused." Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 653,
878 P.2d 272, 282 (1994).
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
10
(0) 1947A
At trial, Gonzales proffered the following jury instruction with
regard to the State's witness, Rudnick.
You have heard testimony from ,a
witness who had criminal charges pending against
him. That testimony was given in the expectation
that he would receive favored treatment from the
government in connection with his case;
For this reason, in evaluating the testimony
of , you should consider the extent to
which or whether his testimony may have been
influenced by this factor. In addition, you should
examine the testimony of with greater
caution than that of other witnesses.
The district court rejected the instruction, stating that it was
"unnecessary given [the jury instruction on the duty of weighing the
witnesses' credibility]" and it is "inappropriate to single out any one
witness, especially in a case where most of the witnesses, the lay
witnesses certainly had interests other than solely being a lay witness
here."
The district court is incorrect in its belief that it is
inappropriate to single out any one witness as less reliable than others.
That is, in fact, the entire purpose behind our requirement that an
accomplice-distrust instruction be given when the accomplice's testimony
is uncorroborated. See Riley, 110 Nev. at 653,
878 P.2d at 282. Here, it is
uncontroverted that Rudnick was an accomplice of Gonzalez's because
they were both charged with conspiracy to commit the same murder.
Therefore, if Rudnick's testimony was uncorroborated, the district court
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
11
(0) 1941'A e
was required to give an accomplice-distrust jury• instruction as to his
testimony, and failure to do so was error. 1
Rudnick's testimony was uncorroborated
The State argues that because Rudnick's testimony was
partially corroborated by such things as the casino video of Gonzalez
shooting Pettigrew, a cautionary instruction was not required. While it is
true that parts of Rudnick's testimony were corroborated by the casino's
video recordings of the fight between the Vagos and Hell's Angels and the
subsequent killing of Pettigrew by Gonzalez, Rudnick's testimony about
the alleged conspiracy, which formed the basis for several of Gonzalez's
convictions, was uncorroborated by any other witnesses or evidence.
Furthermore, one of the central issues in this case was
whether Pettigrew's death was part of a premeditated conspiracy or
occurred in the course of a spontaneous clash between two biker gangs. It
would be absurd to conclude, as the State urges, that because some of an
accomplice's testimony is corroborated by video that is publicly known to
'We agree with the State that Gonzalez's proffered jury instruction
was broader than the typical accomplice •jury instruction in that it
cautioned the jury against the testimony of any person with criminal
charges pending against them in exchange for favorable treatment, and
not just accomplices. A more appropriate instruction would be one similar
to that proffered in Howard. 102 Nev. at 576,
729 P.2d at 1344 ("The
testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust. This does not
mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony, but you should
give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it
with care and caution and in light of all the evidence in the case." (internal
quotations omitted)). However, the district court nonetheless has "an
affirmative obligation to cooperate with the defendant to correct the
proposed instruction," Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 765,
121 P.3d 592,
596 (2005) (internal quotations omitted), and the failure to do so in the
case of an accomplice-distrust instruction is error.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
12
10) 1947A ett,
exist and is uncontroverted by the defendant, the entirety of the
accomplice's testimony is considered to be corroborated for the purposes of
Howard. Therefore, we hold that because material portions of Rudnick's
testimony were uncorroborated, the district court abused its discretion by
refusing to give an accomplice-distrust instruction.
The district court abused its discretion by refusing to bifurcate the
presentation of gang-enhancement evidence from the guilt phase of the trial
We normally review decisions regarding bifurcation of
enhancement portions of a trial for an abuse of discretion. See People v.
Hernandez, 94 P.3d 1080, 1085 (Cal. 2004) (reviewing district court's
refusal to bifurcate gang-enhancement portion of trial from guilt phase for
abuse of discretion). However, we have held that in situations where a
failure to bifurcate compromises a defendant's right to a fair trial,
bifurcation is mandatory. See Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118, 1126,
967
P.2d 1126, 1131 (1998) (holding that severance is mandatory in multicount
indictments where one count is of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon);
see also Morales v. State, 122 Nev. 966, 970,
143 P.3d 463, 465 (2006)
(holding that bifurcation procedure accomplishes the same policy goals as
the severance mandated in Brown).
"Mnstitutional values such as judicial economy, efficiency, and
fairness to criminal defendants often raise competing demands." Brown,
114 Nev. at 1126,
967 P.2d at 1131. However, in balancing these
demands, ensuring that a defendant's right to a fair trial is not
compromised is paramount. Id. We have previously held that when the
State seeks convictions on multiple counts, including a count of possession
of a firearm by an ex-felon, the prejudice to the defendant of introducing
evidence of prior convictions in order to establish that the defendant is an
ex-felon requires the severance of the counts. Id.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
13
(0) 1947A e
The State attempts to distinguish Brown from the current
case by alleging that evidence of a prior conviction is uniquely prejudicial.
However, we are not so certain. Is evidence of a prior conviction more
prejudicial than the evidence presented here by a gang expert—namely,
that Gonzalez was a member of a criminal gang whose members in
Arizona commonly sell narcotics, possess stolen property, and commit
assault and homicide? Is it more prejudicial than the evidence presented
by another gang expert that Gonzalez is a member of a criminal gang that
moves firearms, tries to set up robberies on dope dealers, tries to extort
motorcycles from people, traffics in narcotics, and commits rape? This,
among other highly prejudicial evidence used to prove the existence of a
criminal gang, is a type of evidence that would generally not be admissible
during a guilt phase of a trial but is statutorily admissible in order to
prove a gang enhancement. See NRS 193.168(7)(a)-(g).
This is not to say that evidence of gang affiliation is not still
admissible for other purposes, such as to show motive. See Butler v. State,
120 Nev. 879, 889,
102 P.3d 71, 78 (2004) ("This court has repeatedly held
that gang-affiliation evidence may be relevant and probative when it is
admitted to prove motive."). However, such evidence will not be
admissible in the guilt phase of a trial solely for the purpose of proving a
gang enhancement. Here, while some of the evidence admitted to prove
the gang enhancement would have also been admissible for other purposes
in Gonzalez's trial, other evidence, such as the evidence discussed above of
the types of crimes commonly committed by members of the Vagos, would
not have been. Although the gang enhancement in this case was
ultimately not imposed, the admittance of this evidence allowed the State
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
14
10) I947A
to tie Gonzalez to unrelated crimes committed by other members of the
Vagos.
Therefore, because the admission of highly prejudicial
evidence to prove a gang enhancement that would not otherwise be
admissible to prove the underlying crime compromises a defendant's right
to a fair trial, we hold that the guilt phase of a trial must be bifurcated
from the gang-enhancement phase. Thus, we conclude that the district
court abused its discretion by refusing to bifurcate the guilt and gang-enhancement portions of the trial.
Cumulative error
"[1]f the cumulative effect of errors committed at trial denies
the appellant his right to a fair trial, this court will reverse the
conviction." DeChant v. State, 116 Nev. 918, 927,
10 P.3d 108, 113 (2000).
"Relevant factors to consider in deciding whether error is harmless or
prejudicial include whether the issue of innocence or guilt is close, the
quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the errors directly affected Gonzalez's convictions for
conspiracy and, by extension, undermined his affirmative defense that he
was acting in defense of others. Furthermore, the crimes he was convicted
of were grave. Therefore, we hold that the cumulative effect of these
errors has denied Gonzalez the right to a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
The district court abused its discretion when it refused to
answer the jury's question that suggested the jury was confused or lacked
understanding of a significant element of conspiracy to commit murder. It
also abused its discretion when it refused to give an accomplice-distrust
instruction regarding Rudnick's uncorroborated testimony and refused to
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
15
(0) 1947A
bifurcate the guilt and gang-enhancement phases of Gonzalez's trial.
Therefore, because the district court's errors cumulatively denied
Gonzalez of his right to a fair trial, we order his judgment of conviction
reversed and remand to the district court for a new tria1. 2
J.
Saitta
We concur:
C.J.
Ha
J.
Parraguirre
2 Because we hold that the district court's errors discussed above
were enough to cumulatively warrant reversal, we do not reach the other
issues raised by Gonzalez.
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
16
(0) 194Th csgpa
