11/29/2016
DA 15-0570
Case Number: DA 15-0570
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2016 MT 314N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
RICHARD NORMAN KAMPF,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DC 12-436
Honorable David M. Ortley, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Chad Wright, Chief Appellate Defender, James Reavis, Assistant
Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Jonathan M. Krauss,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Ed Corrigan, Flathead County Attorney, Caitlin Overland, Deputy County
Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 14, 2016
Decided: November 29, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Richard Kampf (Kampf) appeals from his conviction in Flathead County Justice
Court and the ruling in his subsequent appeal to the Eleventh Judicial District Court.
After he received multiple misdemeanor citations on December 12, 2006, Kampf never
appeared to answer for the charges in Justice Court—despite the court issuing a bench
warrant—until he was arrested for Partner or Family Member Assault in 2012, and the
previous warrant was uncovered. He filed a motion to dismiss the 2006 citations on
Montana and United States Constitutional speedy trial grounds on September 18, 2012,
which the Justice Court denied. The court concluded that § 46–13—402(2), MCA, which
governs, among other things, speedy trial standards for misdemeanor prosecutions, had
not been satisfied because not more than six months had elapsed between the defendant’s
initial appearance to enter a plea and his subsequent trial. However, approximately six
years had passed since the county had issued the initial complaint against him and his
trial. The Justice Court held, and the District Court affirmed on appeal, that Article II,
Section 24, of the Montana Constitution does not apply to misdemeanor offenses, leaving
the six month window between appearance and trial in § 46–13–402(2), MCA, as the
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standard and sole basis of analysis for an alleged speedy trial violation in a misdemeanor
prosecution in Justice Court. We affirm.
¶3 We restate the issue for review as follows: Whether Article II, Section 24, of the
Montana Constitution, and the framework of analysis promulgated in State v. Ariegwe
2007 MT 204,
338 Mont. 442,
167 P.3d 815, apply to misdemeanor prosecutions.
¶4 Trooper David Mills cited Kampf on December 12, 2006 for driving while
suspended (§ 61–5–212, MCA); failing to carry proof of insurance (§ 61–6–302, MCA);
and following too closely (§ 61–8–329, MCA) in the aftermath of an accident. All of the
charges for which the citations were issued were misdemeanors. The citations required
Kampf to appear personally in Flathead County Justice Court on December 22, 2006.
Kampf did not appear before the court on December 22, and did not heed the court’s
warning letter sent on January 5, 2007. The Justice Court suspended his license on
January 29, 2007, and issued a bench warrant on March 6, 2007 for his failure to appear.
That warrant remained in effect until July 16, 2012, when Kampf was arrested on charges
of Partner or Family Member Assault (PFMA). He appeared in Justice Court on July 17,
2012, to answer for the PFMA charge and his misdemeanor citations. He pled not guilty
to all charges, but failed to appear at his omnibus hearing on August 28, 2012. In his
absence, the court set trial for his 2006 misdemeanor charges for October 16, 2012.
¶5 Through assigned counsel, Kampf moved to dismiss his misdemeanor charges on
Montana and United States constitutional speedy trial grounds on September 18, 2012,
but the Justice Court denied his motion by order on October 5, 2012. In his motion for
dismissal, Kampf argued that the delay between the filing of the complaint against him
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and his trial date, a span of approximately six years, violated his right to a speedy trial
under the United States and Montana Constitutions. In its order denying the motion, the
Justice Court reasoned that this Court’s decision in Ariegwe, the controlling framework
for constitutional speedy trial claims in Montana, did not apply to misdemeanor
violations. Rather than following Ariegwe by conducting a speedy trial hearing, the
Justice Court held that Ariegwe did not apply, and § 46–13–401(2), MCA, instead
controlled the analysis.
¶6 Less than six months had passed between Kampf entering a plea on July 17, 2012,
and his motion to dismiss being filed on September 18, 2012. Since the Justice Court
recognized § 46–13–401(2), MCA, as the only controlling authority, the court concluded
Kampf had not been denied his speedy trial right. Kampf did not appear at his bench trial
on October 16, 2012 and was convicted on all counts in absentia. Kampf appealed to the
Eleventh Judicial District Court, where the Justice Court’s rationale underlying the denial
of his motion to dismiss was upheld, and his convictions were affirmed.
¶7 On appeal from Justice Court, the District Court functions as an intermediate
appellate court. See §§ 3–5–303 and 3–10–115, MCA. On appeal to this Court, we
review the case as if the appeal had been filed originally in this Court. City of Bozeman
v. Cantu, 2013 MT 40, ¶ 10,
369 Mont. 81,
296 P.3d 461; State v. Ellison,
2012 MT 50,
¶ 8,
364 Mont. 276,
272 P.3d 646 (citing Stanley v. Lemire,
2006 MT 304, ¶ 26,
334
Mont. 489,
148 P.3d 643). “We examine the record independently of the district court’s
decision, reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard,
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its discretionary rulings for abuse of discretion, and its legal conclusions and mixed
questions of law and fact under the de novo standard.” Ellison, ¶ 8.
¶8 We have previously held that while “Ariegwe has no application in a statutory
speedy-trial claim,” a defendant is not precluded from pursuing both his statutory right to
a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy trial in the same matter. City of
Helena v. Heppner, 2015 MT 15, ¶¶ 13, 18,
378 Mont. 68,
341 P.3d 640. A statute may
not abrogate a constitutional provision, so a defendant is free to pursue constitutional
protections for a speedy trial when his claims under statutory protections fail or are
otherwise not available. Heppner, ¶ 18.
¶9 The Justice Court denied Kampf’s speedy trial claim on the grounds that Article II,
Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, and the Ariegwe framework do not apply to
misdemeanors. Rather than apply Ariegwe’s four factors and conduct a balancing test,
the court constrained its application of law to the provisions of § 46–13–401(2), MCA.
Additionally, it concluded that Kampf’s arraignment was the trigger date for a speedy
trial analysis, not the date the complaint was filed. Although the court was correct that
the date of Kampf’s arraignment was the trigger date for the misdemeanor statutory
speedy trial protections in § 46–13–401(2), MCA, it erred by not conducting a separate
constitutional speedy trial right analysis under Ariegwe.
¶10 Section 24 and Ariegwe do indeed apply to misdemeanor violations, but
misdemeanor defendants often times will be better served by moving to dismiss under the
smaller threshold window of six months, granted by the statutory protection of
§ 46-13-401(2), MCA. Although Kampf did not meet the statutory threshold of six
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months between arraignment and trial, he did meet Ariegwe’s threshold of 200 days
between complaint and trial. Kampf’s motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds
therefore should have been heard before the Justice Court, and analyzed consistent with
our ruling in Ariegwe: the Justice Court should have issued findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and conducted a balancing test of the four factors.
¶11 However, just as we may determine, in the absence of the Justice Court
conducting an Ariegwe analysis, that the threshold 200 days has been satisfied and
triggers a constitutional analysis, so too may we determine that Kampf’s avoidance of the
several hearing dates culminating in the issuance of a warrant outstanding for six years
conclusively establishes that he had not asserted and did not want his right to a speedy
trial. Factor (3) of the Ariegwe constitutional speedy trial analysis requires the court to
determine whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial. Ariegwe, ¶ 20.
Although we recognize that Ariegwe requires the trial court to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to each factor, Ariegwe, ¶ 117, remand under the facts present here
would be an exercise in futility. Kampf never appeared to answer the charges despite
having been provided notice to personally appear. Kampf also did not appear after the
Justice Court’s warning letter sent on January 5, 2007. Further, despite the suspension of
Kampf’s license for six years and an outstanding bench warrant for an equal amount of
time, Kampf continued to avoid trial until he was arrested for a new offense and the
outstanding warrant was discovered. Even then, Kampf failed to appear at his omnibus
hearing and was ultimately tried in absentia on October 16, 2012.
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¶12 Based on these facts, we have no difficulty concluding that although the Justice
Court erred in not conducting a constitutional speedy trial analysis, the record clearly
establishes Kampf did not want or assert his right to a speedy trial. Indeed, the record
demonstrates Kampf did everything he could to avoid a speedy resolution of these
proceedings.
¶13 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion
of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear
application of relevant standards of review.
¶14 Affirmed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ JIM RICE
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