132 Nev., Advance Opinion 71
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
DAWNETTE R. DAVIDSON, No, 67698
Appellant,
vs. FILED
CHRISTOPHER B. DAVIDSON,
Respondent. SEP 2 9 2016
1E K. LINDEMAN
CLA E • 01' MtE.C•U Y
,, , •
BY 44.. A 1
CHI F DE' 'TV CLERK
Appeal from a district court order denying a posti-decree
motion to enforce a provision of a divorce decree. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; Vincent Ochoa, Judge.
Affirmed.
Mills, Mills & Anderson and Gregory S. Mills and Daniel W. Anderson,
Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Hofland & Tomsheck and Bradley J. Hofland, Las Vegas,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.'
OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, J.:
Nevada's statute of limitations for actions on judgments, NRS
11.190(1)(a), provides that an action to enforce the provisions of a
judgment or decree from any state or federal court be commenced within
six years. NRS 11.200 dictates that the limitations period commences
-The Honorable Nancy M. Saitta, Justice, having retired, this
1
matter was decided by a six-justice court.
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"from the last transaction or the last item charged or last credit given." In
the underlying district court action, appellant Dawnette Davidson moved
the family division of the district court to enforce a term of the parties'
decree of divorce, which required her ex-husband, respondent Christopher
Davidson, to pay Dawnette one-half of the equity in the marital home
according to a 2006 appraisal in exchange for Dawnette quitclaiming the
residence to Christopher. Dawnette commenced this action more than six
years after she delivered the quitclaim deed. According to Dawnette, her
motion was timely because NRS 125.240 allows the family division of the
district court to enforce its decrees without time limitations. She also
asserts that her motion was timely because the parties resided together in
the marital home until 2011 and it was unreasonable for her to pursue
payment from Christopher while she enjoyed the benefits of the residence.
We conclude that the Nevada Legislature did not grant the
family divisions of the district courts the authority to endlessly enforce
divorce decrees except where the Legislature specifically provided for
enforcement regardless of the age of the claim, see, e.g., NRS 125B.050
(allowing enforcement of a child support order without a time limitation
for commencing the action). We also conclude that the accrual time for the
limitations period in an action on a divorce decree commences "from the
last transaction or the last item charged or last credit given." See NRS
11.200. Here, the last transaction occurred in 2006, when Dawnette
delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher. As Dawnette delivered the
quitclaim deed more than six years before she moved the family division of
the district court to enforce the decree, her claim is time-barred.
FACTS
The district court granted Christopher and Dawnette a decree
of divorce in 2006. Their decree required Dawnette to execute a quitclaim
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deed and release all of her rights in the marital residence. In exchange,
the decree required Christopher to pay one-half of the equity in the
residence, according to the appraised value in 2006, to Dawnette.
Approximately two weeks after the parties divorced, they reconciled and
cohabitated in the marital residence until 2011. They never remarried.
The parties agree that Dawnette executed the quitclaim deed, and
Christopher claims that he refinanced the property and paid half of the
equity to Dawnette. However, Dawnette denies that Christopher ever
made payment.
In 2014, Dawnette filed a motion to enforce the decree,
claiming that she never received her half of the equity in the property.
Christopher opposed the motion, arguing that he had previously paid
Dawnette her half of the equity. He also argued that the statute of
limitations barred Dawnette's claim. In response, Dawnette argued that
the statute of limitations had not yet begun to run because the decree did
not provide a date by which Christopher was required to tender payment
to her. Without deciding whether Christopher paid Dawnette, the district
court denied Dawnette's motion. The court concluded that an action to
enforce a decree of divorce must be commenced within six years pursuant
to NRS 11.190(1)(a) and that Dawnette's claim was therefore untimely.
On appeal, Dawnette argues that (1) the district court erred
when it ruled that NRS 11.190(1)(a) barred her action to enforce the
decree because NRS 125.240, not NRS 11.190(1)(a), applies to motions to
enforce a decree of divorce; and (2) even if NRS 11.190(1)(a) does apply,
the statute of limitations had not expired because accrual of the statute of
limitations does not begin until demand for performance is made or a
reasonable amount of time has passed. Christopher argues that the
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district court's order denying her motion is not appealable and that the
district court correctly ruled that the statute of limitations for Dawnette's
claim had passed.
DISCUSSION
Whether this court has jurisdiction to consider Dawnette's appeal
In his answering brief, Christopher argues that no statute or
court rule allows this court to review an order denying a motion for
enforcement of a judgment. He asserts that although NEAP 3A(b)(8)
allows an appeal from an order after final judgment, the order, to be
reviewable, must impact a party's rights based on a previous judgment.
He asserts that the order at issue interprets the parties' previous decree,
but the order does not amend the decree or alter the parties' rights under
it. In her reply, Dawnette argues that the district court's order denying
her motion is appealable pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(8) because it impacts
her right to one-half of the equity in the marital residence, as set forth in
the decree of divorce. We agree with Dawnette.
NRAP 3A(b)(8) allows an appeal from any "special order
entered after final judgment." In Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 914,
59
P.3d 1220, 1221 (2002), this court held that, "to be appealable .. . , a
special order made after final judgment must be an order affecting the
rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously
entered."
In the instant case, Dawnette appeals from the district court's
decision and order, which denied her motion to enforce the parties' decree
of divorce. The decree of divorce was the final judgment. It adjudicated
all of the parties' rights regarding child custody and support, spousal
support, and the division of property. See Gumm, 118 Nev. at 916,
59 P.3d
at 1223. In her motion, Dawnette sought to enforce her right to receive
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half of the equity in the marital residence, according to the 2006 appraisal
value. Her right to receive these funds was established by the decree.
Accordingly, the order from which Dawnette appeals is a "special order
entered after final judgment," see NRAP 3A(b)(8), because the order
denied her claim for one-half of the equity in the property and thus affects
Dawnette's rights "growing out of the judgment previously entered," see
Gumm, 118 Nev. at 914,
59 P.3d at 1221. Therefore, this court has
jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal.
Whether the family division of the district court may enforce its decrees
without time limitations
Notwithstanding NRS 11.190(1)(a), Dawnette argues that
NRS 125.240 gives the district court plenary power to enforce a decree of
divorce any time after it is entered. She claims that because NRS
11.190(1)(a) and MRS 125.240 conflict with each other, this court must
give NRS 125.240 priority over NRS 11.190(1)(a). Christopher asserts
that all courts have continuing jurisdiction to enforce their decrees. But,
he maintains, continuing jurisdiction does not nullify the statute of
limitations and grant a court perpetual authority. We agree with
Christopher.
We review questions of statutory construction de novo. L Cox
Constr. Co. v. CH2 Invs., LLC, 129 Nev. 139, 142,
296 P.3d 1202, 1203
(2013). This court's goal in construing statutes is to uphold the intent of
the Legislature and harmonize the statutes, if possible.
Our task is to ascertain the intent of those who
enacted the provisions at issue, and to adopt an
interpretation that best captures their objective.
We must give words their plain meaning unless
doing so would violate the spirit of the provision.
Whenever possible, we construe provisions so that
they are in harmony with each other. Specific
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provisions take precedence over general
provisions.
Guinn v. Legislature of State of Nev., 119 Nev. 277, 285,
71 P.3d 1269,
1274-75 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers,
122 Nev. 930,
142 P.3d 339 (2006).
Dawnette's argument that NRS 125.240 allows the family
division of the district court to enforce its decrees and judgments without
any time limitations is unavailing. NRS 125.240 applies to actions for
separate maintenance. However, the parties' action in this case was one
for divorce, see NRS 125.010 to 125.185, not separate maintenance, see
NRS 125.190 to 125.280. NRS 125.250 states that "[lin all cases
commenced under NRS 125.190 to 125.280, inclusive, the proceedings and
practice must be the same, as nearly as may be, as those provided in
actions for divorce." Although the proceedings in a separate maintenance
case must mirror divorce proceedings as much as possible, this court has
never held that the reverse is also true, and we decline to do so today.
Accordingly, even if NRS 125.240 allowed the family division to enforce its
orders in separate maintenance actions without any time limitations, the
statute does not apply to the instant matter, which concerns a decree of
divorce.
Additionally, if the Nevada Legislature intended to eliminate
the statute of limitations for enforcement of all family division orders, it
would have specifically given the district courts such authority. This is
evidenced by another statute applying to the enforcement of family
division orders. In NRS 125B.050, the Legislature specifically invested
the district courts with the authority to enforce child support orders
regardless of the age of the claim:
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3. If a court has issued an order for the
support of a child, there is no limitation on the
time in which an action may be commenced to:
(a) Collect arrearages in the amount of that
support; or
(b) Seek reimbursement of money paid as
public assistance for that child.
(Emphasis added.) The Legislature has not provided such authority for
family division orders that divide the parties' joint property. Therefore,
we conclude that, other than child support orders, Nevada law does not
exclude the family division from the limitations period in NRS
11.190(1)(a).
Similarly, in 2015, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS
125.150(3) to provide a limitations period for postjudgment motions to
adjudicate omitted assets in divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance
cases. The current statute mandates that the aggrieved party must file
such a motion within three years of the discovery "of the facts constituting
fraud or mistake." NRS 125.150(3). The same statute provides the family
division with "continuing jurisdiction to hear such a motion." Id. Thus,
we conclude that the Legislature does not equate "continuous jurisdiction"
with unending jurisdiction, as the three-year limitations period for
postjudgment motions to adjudicate omitted assets demonstrates.
Dawnette further claims that the Legislature did not intend
for a divorce litigant to receive a windfall for the full value of a marital
property by waiting for the six-year limitations period to end and then
selling the property and retaining the full value of the proceeds. While
Dawnette's argument has merit, we believe that the Legislature also did
not intend for parties to endlessly "sit" on potential claims. See Doan v.
Wilkerson, 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 48, 327 P.3d 498, 501 (2014) ("The policy in
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favor of finality and certainty. . . applies equally, and some might say
especially, to a divorce proceeding ") The Legislature provided NRS
17.214, which Dawnette could have used to prevent Christopher from
allegedly receiving a double windfall. NRS 17.214 allows a judgment
creditor to renew a judgment and avoid the harsh results that could
accompany the expiration of a statute of limitations. Unfortunately,
Dawnette failed to avail herself of the statute's protections. Moreover, as
we have previously reasoned, "LW' the legislature had intended to vest the
courts with continuing jurisdiction over property rights [in divorce cases],
it would have done so expressly." Id. (quoting Kramer v. Kramer,
96 Nev.
759, 762,
616 P.2d 395, 397 (1980) (alteration in original)).
In Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 322,
579 P.2d 1246,
1246-47 (1978), this court determined that NRS 11.190 barred a party's
recovery of alimony payments that were more than six years old. There,
the parties' divorce decree ordered the ex-husband to make ten monthly
alimony payments of $1,000 to his ex-wife. Id. at 322,
579 P.2d 1246. The
first payment was due on July 1, 1971, but the ex-wife never received any
payments. Id. On November 29, 1977, the ex-wife filed a motion seeking
a judgment on the arrearages, and the district court subsequently entered
a judgment in the amount of $5,000 on the ex-wife's behalf. Id. at 322,
579
P.2d at 1247. The lower court said that recovery of the first five payments
was barred by the six-year limitation in NRS 11.190. Id. This court
agreed that NRS 11.190 applied to the former wife's motion and held that
"[t]he six-year period prescribed by that statute commenced to run against
each installment as it became due." Id. We see no reason to deviate from
our prior holding and conclude that a claim to enforce a divorce decree,
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whether through motion practice or through an independent action, is
governed by the limitations period under NRS 11.190 and NRS 11.200. 2
Lastly, our holding is consistent with several other states that
apply limitations periods to enforcement of property distribution
provisions in divorce decrees. 3 Thus, we conclude that no basis exists for
us to create a new rule that excuses property distribution provisions in
divorce decrees from NRS 11.190(1)(a) and that the six-year statute of
limitations in NRS 11.190(1)(a) applies to the instant case.
Whether the statute of limitations has expired for Dawnette's action
Dawnette asserts that even if NRS 11.190(1)(a) does apply, the
district court should have concluded that the statute did not begin to run
until after the parties' post-decree separation in 2011. She contends that
because the decree did not contain a deadline by which Christopher was to
2We do not distinguish between a motion and an independent action
to enforce a divorce decree because "[a] party is not bound by the label he
puts on his papers." NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 652,
218 P.3d
853, 857 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "A
motion may be treated as an independent action or vice versa as is
appropriate." Id.
3 See, e.g., Cedergreen v. Cedergreen, 811 P.2d 784, 786 (Alaska 1991)
(limiting actions upon divorce decrees to ten years); Mark v. Safren, 38
Cal. Rptr. 500, 503-04 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (imposing a ten-year statute of
limitations upon a divorce decree); O'Hearn v. O'Hearn, 638 A.2d 1192,
1195 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (restricting litigation upon a divorce decree
to a 12-year statute of limitations); Tauber v. Lebow, 483 N.E.2d 1140,
1142 (N.Y. 1985) (placing a six-year statute of limitations on claims from
divorce decrees); Wichman v. Shabino, 851 N.W.2d 202, 205 (S.D. 2014)
(recognizing a limitations period of 20 years to enforce a divorce decree);
Abrams v. Salinas, 467 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Tex. App. 2015) (subjecting a
case upon a decree of divorce to a ten-year limitations statute); Kessimakis
v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (constraining a
suit on a divorce decree to an eight-year statute of limitations).
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tender her interest in the marital property, the time for Christopher's
performance was within a reasonable time after the parties' final
separation. Dawnette contends that because she was still living in the
marital residence and enjoying the benefits of the property, she did not
need to seek enforcement of her interest. Christopher charges that even
without an express deadline, NRS 11.200 sets when the time begins to
run. He explains that the time began to run in 2007, when he refinanced
the marital residence because that was when the last undertaking on the
property occurred. We conclude that the statute of limitations expired six
years after Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher.
NRS 11.200 states as follows:
The time in NRS 11.190 shall be deemed to date
from the last transaction or the last item charged
or last credit given; and whenever any payment on
principal or interest has been or shall be made
upon an existing contract, whether it be a bill of
exchange, promissory note or other evidence of
indebtedness if such payment be made after the
same shall have become due, the limitation shall
commence from the time the last payment was
made.
According to NRS 11.200, the statute of limitations began running when
there was "evidence of indebtedness" for half of the equity in the marital
property to Dawnette. NRS 11.200 comports with our holding in Borden v.
Clow, 21 Nev. 275, 278,
30 P. 821, 822 (1892). 4 There, we explained that
the running of the statute of limitations begins when a deed is delivered.
This court was asked to determine when the statute of limitations began
4Although the Borden case is over 100 years old, we have never
overruled its holding, nor do we find cause to do so now.
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to run in a case where the defendant gave the plaintiff an absolute deed to
real property in order to secure a debt. Id. at 276,
30 P. at 821. The
parties neglected to set a date upon which the payment would be due and
disputed whether the plaintiffs cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations for contracts. Id. at 276-77,
30 P. at 821. We concluded that
the delivery of the deed triggered the statute of limitations:
It is a rule in regard to the statute of
limitations, applicable in all cases, that the
statute begins to run when the debt is due, and an
action can be instituted upon it. There was no
agreement between the parties as to when this
indebtedness should be paid; therefore the statute
began to run immediately upon the delivery of the
deed to the defendant.
Id. at 278,
30 P. at 822 (emphasis added). Thus, evidence of indebtedness
occurred with the delivery of the deed. Here, the latest time at which the
debt was due, pursuant to Borden, was after Dawnette delivered the
quitclaim deed to Christopher in 2006. As a result, the statute of
limitations for Dawnette's claim has expired. See NRS 11.190(1)(a).
Instead of looking to NRS 11.200 and Borden, Dawnette relies
upon our holding in Mayfield v. Koroghli, 124 Nev. 343, 349,
184 P.3d 362,
366 (2008). She asserts that it was not reasonable for her to pursue her
half of the equity in the marital residence while she was still living
there—up until 2011. In Mayfield, we held that
a fundamental principle of contract law is that the
time for performance under a contract is not
considered of the essence unless the contract
expressly so provides or the circumstances of the
contract so imply. If time is not of the essence, the
parties generally must perform under the contract
within a reasonable time, which depends upon the
nature of the contract and the particular
circumstances involved.
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124 Nev. at 349,
184 P.3d at 366 (footnotes and quotations omitted). Even
if the decree of divorce were a simple contract, Dawnette does not explain
why a "reasonable time," see id., to demand performance under the decree
of divorce was after the parties separated in 2011, instead of when she
delivered the deed in 2006. We conclude that Dawnette's claim—that it
was not reasonable to demand performance while she enjoyed the benefits
of the marital residence—is unpersuasive. Dawnette apparently believed
that her delivery of the deed was reasonable and Christopher's refinancing
of the property was reasonable. Therefore, demanding payment, despite
living in the marital residence, was likewise reasonable. Moreover, the
consideration for receiving half of the equity was Dawnette's deliverance
of the deed so that Christopher could title the house in his name alone.
The decree does not indicate that she was to vacate the residence in
consideration for half of the equity. Consequently, Christopher became
indebted to Dawnette when she delivered the deed to him, not when she
vacated the residence in 2011.
Thus, we conclude that NRS 11.200 and our holding in Borden
apply here and the statute of limitations began running after Dawnette
delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher in 2006. Because the statute
of limitations expired in 2012, Dawnette's motion is time-barred pursuant
to MRS 11.190(1)(a).
CONCLUSION
We hold that the six-year statute of limitations in NRS
11.190(1)(a) applies to claims for enforcement of a property distribution
provision in a divorce decree entered in the family divisions of the district
courts. Like any other claim "upon a judgment or decree of any court of
the United States, or of [any court of] any state or territory within the
United States," see NRS 11.190(1)(a), actions to enforce the provisions of a
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divorce decree must be initiated within six years. We further hold that
when a litigant seeks to enforce a provision in a decree awarding him or
her half of the equity in marital property, the statute of limitations begins
to accrue when there is evidence of indebtedness, which occurred in this
case when Dawnette delivered the quitclaim deed to Christopher.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
We concur:
ay
Parraguirre
4t,A J.
Hardesty
J.
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