SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS.
No. CR-17-146
Opinion Delivered April 27, 2017
CHRISTOPHER ALLAN EASON, SR.
PETITIONER PRO SE MOTIONS FOR BELATED
APPEAL OF SENTENCING ORDER AND
V. FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
[CLARK COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
STATE OF ARKANSAS NO. 10CR-11-78]
RESPONDENT
HONORABLE ROBERT E. MCCALLUM,
JUDGE
MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL
DISMISSED; MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL MOOT.
PER CURIAM
On February 24, 2014, judgment was entered reflecting that petitioner Christopher
Allan Eason, Sr. had been found guilty by a jury of nine counts of first-degree battery and
sentenced to 3240 months’ imprisonment. An amended sentencing order was entered on
February 27, 2014, reflecting the same sentence. No appeal was taken, and Eason,
proceeding pro se, now seeks leave to proceed with a belated appeal. He also asks that
counsel be appointed to represent him on appeal. The motion for belated appeal was filed
here approximately thirty-six months after the amended sentencing order was entered.
Belated appeals in criminal cases are governed by Rule 2(e) of the Arkansas Rules of
Appellate Procedure—Criminal (2016). The Rule provides, in pertinent, part that “no
motion for belated appeal shall be entertained by the Supreme Court unless application has
been made to the Supreme Court within eighteen (18) months of the date of entry of
Cite as
judgment.” Eason first tendered the motion for belated appeal here on September 8, 2015,
but he did not tender the certified partial record necessary to file the motion until February
23, 2017. The eighteen-month period to file a motion for belated appeal in the case ended
on August 27, 2015. Accordingly, Eason did not meet his burden of filing a timely motion
under the Rule.
This court has consistently held that no motion for belated appeal will be considered
unless application is made within the eighteen-month period allowed by the Rule.
Gunderman v. State,
(per curiam).
Eason tendered his motion outside the eighteen-month period, but, even if he had tendered
the motion within that period, the tendering of a motion without the certified record
necessary to file it does not equate with the filing of the motion. Hayes v. State,
(1997) (per curiam) (The motion for belated appeal was dismissed
because the motion was tendered within eighteen months of the judgment but could not
be filed until the certified record was also tendered, which was outside the eighteen-month
period.).
It is incumbent on a petitioner to file a motion for belated appeal in a timely manner
because an untimely motion for belated appeal is subject to dismissal. Gentry v. State,
(2005) (per
curiam). As Eason failed to file the motion within the period allowed by Rule 2(e), the
motion is dismissed. The motion for appointment of counsel is moot.
Motion for belated appeal dismissed; motion for appointment of counsel moot.
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