Slip opinions decided 2017 — Colorado Court of Appeals

Ponzi Scheme—Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act—Principal—Net Profits—Innocent Investor—Reasonably Equivalent Value. Taylor invested $3 million in a hedge fund run by Mueller, a licensed securities broker. During the period of his investment, Taylor received a series of payments from the fund. Taylor withdrew all of his money about one year after investing and made a profit of over $487,000. Later, the Colorado securities commissioner discovered that the hedge fund was a Ponzi scheme and Mueller was convicted of various criminal offenses. Lewis was appointed receiver to collect and distribute Mueller's assets to the creditors and investors he defrauded through the Ponzi scheme. Lewis filed a claim under the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA) seeking to void the transfer of net profits that Taylor received. The district court granted Lewis summary judgment. The Court of Appeals considered this case on remand to "address whether CUFTA requires Taylor to relinquish any amount of money exceeding his principal investment in the Ponzi scheme." The parties agreed that Taylor was an innocent investor he withdrew his principal and profits in good faith and he gave reasonably equivalent value for the return of his principal. The parties disagreed whether Taylor gave reasonably equivalent value in exchange for his receipt of the net profits. Taylor argued that the district court erred by ruling that he did not give reasonably equivalent value for transfers he received that exceeded his principal investment. The Court reasoned that a Ponzi scheme receives benefit for using an innocent investor's money for a period of time, regardless of whether the money is used for proper or fraudulent purposes, and the use of the money for a period of time has value. An innocent investor in a Ponzi scheme may be entitled to keep some of the funds exceeding the principal amount if such funds constituted a reasonably equivalent value on the principal investment. Therefore, the district court erred by not accounting for the time value of Taylor's principal investment when determining whether he gave reasonably equivalent value under CRS § 38-8-109(1) for transfers he received from Mueller's fund.

Temporary Restraining Order—Preliminary Injunction—Motion for Directed Verdict—Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs (collectively, ART) provided training, seminars, and business support software for healthcare professionals specializing in "active release techniques." ART's owner hired Xtomic, LLC to manage ART's information technology (IT) services and provide IT support. Years later, a co-owner of Xtomic and a former employee of ART, among others, formed Select Seminar Services, LLC to market seminar training for a different soft tissue technique than that offered by ART, using software programs that Xtomic had developed, including a program that ART also used. ART petitioned for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and asserted several claims. Xtomic asserted counterclaims, including, as relevant here, a claim for abuse of process. Xtomic argued that ART had an ulterior motive to use the lawsuit as a means to harass Xtomic and run it out of business. ART moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied, relying primarily on (1) ART's settlement with the former employee (2) ART's reputation for filing lawsuits to control the behavior of former associates and business partners and (3) letters that ART sent to numerous individuals who were not directly involved in the litigation to preserve various documents. A jury found in favor of Xtomic. On appeal, ART contended that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict on Xtomic's abuse of process counterclaim. The abuse of process tort was developed as a remedy for the filing of what could be a meritorious action that is manipulated to obtain an improper advantage unrelated to the substance of the action. Abuse of process focuses not on the alleged wrongdoer's motivations or intentions, but on whether the legal system was used for its intended purpose. Here, ART's settlement with the former employee was not evidence of abuse of process because the settlement was used as intended, to resolve a conflict without a trial. Second, ART's reputation for filing or its abuse of process in other lawsuits has no bearing on the allegations here. Third, the letters ART sent were not a legal proceeding or a court process. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted ART's motion for a directed verdict on the abuse of process counterclaim as a matter of law. The jury's verdict in favor of Xtomic on the abuse of process claim and the damages award predicated on that verdict were vacated, and the case was remanded to amend the damages award accordingly.

Insurance Policy—Coverage—Surface Water—Exclusions. Martinez filed a claim with his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (American Family), for water damage to his home caused by hail and rain that collected at the bottom of the home's below-ground window wells. American Family denied the claim because "flooding" and "surface water" were excluded from coverage under the policy. Martinez filed suit for declaratory judgment on the coverage issue, among other claims. The trial court granted American Family's motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue. On appeal, Martinez argued that his policy did not bar coverage as a matter of law and, accordingly, the district court erred in granting American Family's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the insurance agreement and applied the Colorado Supreme Court's definition of surface water and the plain-language definitions of "the earth's surface" and the precipitation at issue in this case. The Court concluded that the precipitation that fell on Martinez's home and then flowed into the window wells was all surface water, which the insurance policy unambiguously barred from coverage as a matter of law. The summary judgment was affirmed.

Property Tax Valuation—Standing—Fee Owner. Traer Creek-EXWMT LLC (Traer) is a lessee of a commercial building on Tract B. Under a "Declaration of Easements," Traer is contractually obligated to pay the property taxes "directly to the appropriate taxing authorities." But since Traer assumed the lease, the owner has made those payments and Traer has reimbursed the owner. Traer (but not the owner) initiated the statutory protest and adjustment process to challenge the 2015 valuation of Tract B, and the assessor declined to adjust the valuation. Traer appealed the notice of determination to the Eagle County Board of Equalization (Board), which upheld the valuation. Traer then appealed the Board's decision to the district court, which dismissed the case based on lack of standing. On appeal, Traer contended that the district court erred in ruling that it did not have statutory or common law standing to object to and protest a valuation. The fee owner is the only party given statutory standing to object to and protest the assessor's valuation of real property in fee. Traer's contention that he has common law standing fails because when a statute limits standing, a court cannot disregard that limitation by employing notions of common law standing. Traer also argued that the court improperly adopted the Board's factual assertions concerning the amount of Traer's leased space and his tax liability to the owner. The Court determined that these assertions are irrelevant to the standing issue, so any error as to those facts is harmless. The judgment was affirmed.

Juvenile—Delinquent—Pre-Adjudication Placement—Department of Human Services—Standing. D.Z.B. had a complex history with the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (Department) and the juvenile court. Over the Department's objection, the court placed him in a residential child care facility managed by the Department, in lieu of bond, while his adjudication was pending. On appeal, the Department asserted that the court lacked authority to place D.Z.B. in the facility preadjudication and in lieu of bond over the Department's objection. The Department was not a party to the delinquency actions against D.Z.B., so it alleged as an injury the costs of D.Z.B.'s care. The obligation and costs of D.Z.B.'s care are incidental to his delinquency action because the Department has a statutory duty to care for and house children removed from their homes in delinquency actions. Thus the Department did not show an injury in fact. Further, the Children's Code does not confer standing on the Department to challenge a juvenile court's ruling regarding preadjudication placement. The Department lacked standing to appeal. The appeal was dismissed.

Condominium Declaration—Common Expenses—Amendment—Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act—Motion for Leave to Amend—Indispensable Parties. The Francis parties are trusts and their fiduciaries and other individuals with ownership interests in the Aspen Mountains Condominiums. The parties' dispute arose from a contested 2010 vote that amended the original 1972 condominium declaration to reallocate the common interest shares and common expenses. The 1972 declaration had originally allocated common interest shares and common expenses based on unit size, and the amended declaration reallocated common interest shares equally among all units. Common expenses increased for the Francis parties, and they later filed suit, seeking a judgment voiding the reallocation of the common interest shares. The trial court ruled in favor of the Aspen Mountain Condominium Association, Inc. (AMCA), finding that the 2010 amendment had been properly adopted. On appeal, the Francis parties first contended that the trial court erred by partially granting AMCA's motion for a determination of law. Here, the declaration required a unanimous vote to alter the percentage of the undivided interests in the general common elements. The trial court erred by holding that the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act, which went into effect in 1992, nullified the 1972 declaration's requirement of a unanimous vote to alter ownership interests in the common elements. The Francis parties also contended that the trial court erred in denying their motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert additional breach of fiduciary duty claims against AMCA. The motion was submitted after the discovery deadline and only a few months before trial. Further, the case had been pending for more than five years, and the Francis parties had already amended the complaint five times and could have added the newly asserted claim at any point. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend. Next, the Francis parties argued that the trial court erred by denying their CRCP 59(a) motion to amend the judgment based on failure to join as indispensable parties the beneficiaries of the various trusts included among the Francis parties. The proposed additional parties were alleged to be beneficiaries of trusts that were already parties to the action and were represented by their respective trustees. As a matter of law, the beneficiaries' interests were sufficiently protected by the trustees' participation in the action on their behalf. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded with directions.

Breach of Contract—Unjust Enrichment—Colorado Wage Protection Act—Civil Theft—Conversion—Economic Loss Rule—Attorney Fees. Bermel entered into a "Contractor Agreement" with BlueRadios, Inc. under which he provided engineering services to BlueRadios. He also signed a "Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement" (PIAA). The parties later ended their relationship. Anticipating that he might end up in litigation over unpaid wages, Bermel breached the PIAA by forwarding to his personal email account thousands of BlueRadios emails and attachments, some of which contained proprietary information. Bermel sent a demand letter to BlueRadios for unpaid wages, which BlueRadios paid. Bermel thereafter filed a lawsuit against BlueRadios asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Colorado Wage Protection Act (CWPA). BlueRadios filed counterclaims against him, including breach of contract civil theft, under CRS § 18-4-405 and conversion. The court granted summary judgment in favor of BlueRadios on Bermel's CWPA claim, and following trial, found Bermel liable on all of BlueRadios' counterclaims. On appeal, Bermel contended that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that the economic loss rule barred BlueRadios' claim for civil theft. Because the economic loss rule is a judicial construct and a civil theft claim is a statutory cause of action, the economic loss rule does not preclude a cause of action under the civil theft statute. Bermel also argued that the trial court erred in granting BlueRadios' motion for summary judgment on his CWPA claim, contending that the court failed to apply the CWPA's definition of "employee" when it concluded he was an independent contractor. The evidence attached to BlueRadios' motion for summary judgment did not establish that Bermel was free from control and direction under his contract or that he was customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business related to the service performed. Accordingly, BlueRadios failed to establish that no genuine dispute of material fact existed as to whether, under the parties' contracts, Bermel was an employee for purposes of the CWPA. Finally, BlueRadios was entitled to its appellate attorney fees under the civil theft statute. The summary judgment on the CWPA claim was reversed, the judgment was otherwise affirmed, and the CWPA claim was remanded for further proceedings.

Fair Campaign Practices Act—Campaign and Political Finance Amendment—Statute of Limitations. The Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills (Alliance) was established to work for the common good and general welfare of the Woodmen Hills community. Before the 2014 Woodmen Hills Metropolitan District board of directors' election, Alliance sent postcards and created Facebook posts directed at undermining the character of a board candidate. Campaign Integrity Watchdog, LLC (CIW) filed a complaint with the Secretary of State alleging a violation of § 9 of the Campaign and Political Finance Amendment, Colo. Const. Art. 28 (Amendment) and various violations of the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA). The matter was referred to the Office of Administrative Courts. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the alliance was a "political committee" under the FCPA and it failed to register and file required reports as of the first day of the hearing, June 26, 2014. Thus Alliance violated the FCPA. The ALJ imposed a fine and ordered Alliance to register with the Secretary of State and file all required reports. Alliance filed a motion to stay the decision, which was denied, and immediately thereafter filed a notice of appeal, which it then withdrew. About a year later, CIW filed a complaint in district court to enforce the ALJ's decision. Alliance filed a CRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss alleging the Amendment's one-year statute of limitations barred CIW's enforcement action. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding it time-barred under the Amendment. On appeal, both parties agreed that the statute of limitations is triggered by the date of "violation" in § 9(2)(a) of the Amendment, but disagreed about what "violation" means. The Court of Appeals concluded that "violation" means the act(s) of breaking or dishonoring the FCPA or Amendment and therefore the statute of limitations began running the day following the last such act. The Court then reviewed CIW's complaint and concluded it could be read to allege a continuing violation of the Amendment, and the record does not show when or if the continuing violation ended. The complaint states a plausible claim of a continuing violation sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The order dismissing the complaint was reversed and the case was remanded.

Bad Faith—CRS § 10-3-1116—Jury Instructions—Statutory Delay—Attorney Fees. Nibert and her husband were injured when a car collided with their motorcycle. As relevant to this appeal, Nibert had an underinsured motorist (UIM) policy through Geico Casualty Co. (Geico) with a $25,000 coverage limit. Geico offered Nibert $1,500 to settle her claim. Nibert sued Geico for breach of contract, common law bad faith, and statutory delay under CRS § 10-3-1116. After discovery and before trial, Geico paid Nibert the $25,000 UIM coverage limit to settle the breach of contract claim. A jury returned verdicts awarding Nibert $33,250 in noneconomic damages on her bad faith claim and $25,000 for her statutory delay claim. The trial court entered judgment on the jury's verdict for the bad faith claim and judgment of $50,000 for damages on the statutory delay claim. It also granted Nibert's motion for attorney fees in the amount of $118,875.30. On appeal, Geico argued that the trial court failed to adequately instruct the jury on its theory of defense that challenges to debatable claims are reasonable. The trial court relied on the Colorado pattern jury instructions governing common law bad faith and first-party statutory claims. While it did not accept Geico's tendered instructions on these issues, it allowed Geico to present expert testimony regarding the "fairly debatable" issue and to argue its theory of defense to the jury. The Court of Appeals concluded that the instructions, as given, adequately instructed the jury on the applicable law and the parties were afforded ample opportunity to present their case theories to the jury. The trial court's ruling was neither manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, nor a misapplication of the law. Geico then argued that the trial court erred in awarding Nibert recovery of two times her UIM benefit as a penalty. CRS § 10-3-1116(1) provides a first-party claimant the right to bring an action for "two times the covered benefit." Geico argued that the trial court should have allowed a setoff of the ultimate statutory damages award in the amount of $25,000 previously paid to Nibert on her UIM claim. The Court agreed with other divisions that have concluded that a statutory damages award of two times a delayed benefit—even when that benefit has already been paid, resulting in an effective payment of three times the contracted benefit—is contemplated by the plain meaning of CRS § 10-3-1116. Geico also contended it was error to award attorney fees incurred to prosecute the common law bad faith and statutory delay claims, both before and after the date when payment of the UIM benefit was delayed. They argued the attorney fees should be limited to the period from the date the benefit was first delayed to the date the benefit was actually paid. The Court found no support for Geico's argument that the section does not contemplate an award of attorney fees incurred litigating anything other than a contractual claim or incurred for the time before and after a delayed benefit accrues and is paid. The Court also granted Nibert's request for an award of her appellate attorney fees.

Prejudgment Interest under CRS § 13-21-101(1). Munoz was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist (UM). Munoz opened a UM claim with his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (American Family). American Family made settlement offers to Munoz but maintained it was not required to pay prejudgment interest because it was only required to do so after a judgment had been entered by a court. Munoz accepted American Family's final offer, understanding that it did not include interest. Munoz then sued American Family and the UM. Munoz moved under CRCP 56(h) for a determination whether American Family was required to include prejudgment interest as part of its UM claim settlement. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that the insured is entitled to such interest only when a judgment has been entered and interest is awarded as a component of damages assessed by the jury's verdict or the court. On appeal, Munoz argued that the trial court erred because prejudgment interest is a necessary element of compensatory damages that makes an injured party whole. American Family countered that the plain language of CRS § 13-21-101 states that prejudgment interest can only be awarded after a judgment, based on a damages award determined by a trier of fact, has been entered. The Court of Appeals determined the plain language of the statute requires, prior to prejudgment interest being awarded, that (1) an action must be brought (2) the plaintiff must claim damages in the complaint (3) there must be a finding of damages by a jury or the court and (4) judgment is entered. The judgment was affirmed.

Interlocutory Appeal—Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Sterling Ethanol, LLC and Yuma Ethanol, LLC (collectively, Companies) are ethanol manufacturing plants that are sources of air pollution in northeastern Colorado. They are required to operate in accordance with air permits issued by the Colorado Air and Pollution Control Division (Division). After the Division issued two compliance orders addressing the Companies' alleged violations of their air permits, Companies sought timely administrative review from the Air Quality Control Commission (Commission), which operates pursuant to the Colorado Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (APPCA). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Commission issued a final order affirming the Division's orders. Companies filed a motion to reconsider, which the Commission denied. Companies then filed a complaint in the district court 69 days after the Commission issued its final order and 35 days after the Commission denied its motion to reconsider. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the complaint was untimely filed. The district court denied the motion. The district court, on the Commission's request, certified for review the question whether the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the APPCA, and the Commission's procedural rules, read together, compel the conclusion that the complaint was untimely filed, thus depriving the Court of Appeals of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court held that the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss because Companies' complaint was untimely. The party seeking judicial review must file a complaint within 35 days of the effective date of the Commission's final order, even if that party first filed a motion to reconsider, and the Commission declined to reconsider its order. The plain language of the APPCA, the APA, and the Commission's procedural rules required such a conclusion. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for entry of an order dismissing the action.

. Self-Defense Jury Instruction—Assault. Defendant had an altercation with his cousin during which defendant cut his cousin's back with a straight-edge razor, causing a wound that required 12 stitches. There was some evidence at trial that defendant acted in self-defense. The district court denied defendant's request for a self-defense instruction because the court found he did not provide evidence that he was not the initial aggressor. Defendant was convicted on a jury verdict finding him guilty of second degree assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred when it failed to give the jury a self-defense instruction. A defendant need not disprove that he or she was the initial aggressor to benefit from a self-defense instruction when there is any evidence to support a self-defense theory. Once the defendant offers evidence of self-defense, and the prosecution offers evidence that defendant was the initial aggressor, the jury should be provided with the self-defense instruction, including the initial aggressor exception, and be permitted to weigh the evidence and decide whether self-defense has been disproved. Here, the district court failed to properly instruct the jury on the law of self-defense, the prosecution did not bear the burden of disproving self-defense, and defendant was deprived of his right to acquittal on that ground. Accordingly, the error was not harmless. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

42 USC § 1983—Indemnification—Defense Costs—Insurance—Employer Liability Law. A City of Lakewood (City) police officer was killed by friendly fire, and his widow filed a lawsuit under 42 USC § 1983, alleging that the City and various fellow officers had violated the deceased officer's rights under the U.S. Constitution. The City sought indemnification for its own defense costs and those of the officers named in the lawsuit, which the City has an independent statutory duty to cover. The insurance company, Safety National Casualty Corporation, denied coverage. The district court concluded that a § 1983 claim did not arise under an employer liability law of any state and granted summary judgment for the insurance company. On appeal, the City contended that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance company because the policy unambiguously covers all defense costs incurred by the City in connection with the § 1983 lawsuit. Specifically, the City argued that the § 1983 municipal liability claim must be covered by the employers' liability portion of the policy because it is a claim based on work-related injuries that falls outside the ambit of the workers' compensation laws. However, this overstates the scope of the coverage under the policy. By the policy's plain terms, the common law claims must arise under the laws of Colorado or "other State(s)." Section 1983 is not a law of Colorado or any other state. Therefore, the City's defense costs, which were sustained because of liability imposed as a result of the widow's § 1983 claim, did not arise from a state workers' compensation or employers' liability law and were not covered by the policy. Next, the City contended that it was entitled to reimbursement for amounts it paid to cover the fellow officers' defense costs. The policy's definition makes clear that the term "Employee" refers to the injured employee, not to an employee potentially responsible for the injury. "Loss" means payments by the City to the injured employee and the employee's dependents. Therefore, the City's indemnification payments to the officers named in the lawsuit do not qualify as losses under the policy and the City is not entitled to reimbursement from the insurance company. The judgment was affirmed.

Real Property—Residential—Commercial—Ad Valorem Taxes—Burden of Proof. James and Mary Ellen O'Neil purchased the subject property and built a log house on it for their use as a vacation home and as an inheritance for their sons. The house was initially classified for tax purposes as residential. After the O'Neils listed the property as available for short-term, overnight rental, the Conejos County Assessor (Assessor) reclassified the property, for ad valorem tax purposes, from residential to commercial. The O'Neils filed a petition for abatement with the Conejos County Board of Commissioners (County), which was denied, and then appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (Board), which overturned the Assessor's action and returned the property's classification to residential for the relevant years. On appeal, the County contended that the Board improperly classified the O'Neils' property as residential. The County asserted as a procedural error that that the Board failed to apply the presumption in favor of the Assessor's property classification. The Board's order demonstrated that it implicitly applied the presumption in favor of the County, and the O'Neils met their burden of proof to overcome that presumption. On the merits, the Board determined that the proper classification of the property was "residential" because its "predominant and actual use was as a second home." The Board's determination had a reasonable basis in law and was supported by substantial evidence in the record. The order was affirmed.

Senior Facility—Residential—Commercial—Breach of Contract—Construction Defect Action Reform Act—Homeowner Protection Act of 2007—Accrual—Statute of Limitations—Public Policy—Manifestation of a Defect. Broomfield Senior Living Owner, LLC (Broomfield) brought claims against R.G. Brinkmann Company (Brinkmann) for breach of contract, negligence, negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of express warranties in connection with Brinkmann's construction of Broomfield's facility. Brinkmann moved for summary judgment, raising both contractual limitations and statutory limitations defenses to all of Broomfield's claims. The trial court granted Brinkmann's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to civil claims had expired before Broomfield filed its complaint and that Broomfield had waived its rights to assert claims for repairs under the contract by failing to give Brinkmann timely notice of defects or adequate time to make repairs. On appeal, Broomfield contended that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and applying the accrual provisions of the contract rather than the accrual provision of the Construction Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA), titled the "Homeowner Protection Act of 2007" (HPA). Under the parties' contract, the contractual limitations period expired independent of when the acts or failures to act were discovered, while CDARA links the accrual of construction defect claims to their discovery. The HPA renders a contract's limitation or waiver of CDARA's rights and remedies void as against public policy in cases involving claims arising from residential property. The Court of Appeals determined that the term "residential" is "unambiguous and means an improvement on a parcel that is used as a dwelling or for living purposes." Here, the building is used as a home for senior residents. Accordingly, the senior facility is "residential property," Broomfield is a "residential property owner," and the HPA applies. As such, the contract's terms limiting the accrual of claims are void as a matter of public policy, and the relevant statutory claims accrual periods apply, making Broomfield's action timely. Broomfield also contended that the trial court erred in precluding its breach of warranty claim based on its failure to give Brinkmann an opportunity to correct the defects. The Court determined that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding whether Brinkmann received prompt notice of the defects and whether it had an adequate opportunity to correct its work. Broomfield further argued that the trial court erred in concluding that its negligence claims were barred and that it failed to establish that Brinkmann performed design services. The Court concluded that these claims were not barred and the parties offered conflicting design services evidence. Further, a genuine issue of fact remains concerning whether the alleged defects are patent or latent. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Campaign Finance Laws—Independent Expenditure Committee. Campaign Integrity Watchdog LLC (CIW) alleged that the Colorado Republican Party Independent Expenditure Committee (CORE) violated various campaign finance laws. CIW's claims stemmed from two earlier campaign finance proceedings against CORE. An administrative law judge (ALJ) imposed a penalty of $200 against CORE in the first case, and in the second case, an ALJ imposed a $600 aggregate penalty and awarded $255 in costs. The Colorado Republican Party paid these amounts on CORE's behalf. CORE did not disclose these payments on its periodic campaign finance disclosure reports. Around the same time, a private party paid $50,000 to a law firm to settle CORE's legal expenses. CORE disclosed this payment as a "contribution" in its periodic campaign finance disclosure report. CIW alleged that CORE did not comply with the disclosure requirements of Colo. Const. art. 28, the Fair Campaign Practices Act (FCPA), and the Colorado Secretary of State's Rules Concerning Campaign and Political Finance. CIW maintained that the payments by the Republican Party should have been disclosed as "donations" or "contributions" and the payments should have been disclosed as "expenditures." The ALJ granted CORE's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under CRCP 12(b)(5). On appeal, CIW again contended that CORE was required to report some payments as donations or contributions, and all payments as expenditures. CORE was not required to report some payments as donations because (1) the donations were not made for the purpose of an independent expenditure and so were not required to be reported (2) the law requiring some entities to report contributions does not apply to an independent expenditure committee and (3) the payments here were not expenditures under the relevant statutory and constitutional definitions. The order was affirmed.

Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence. The victim started her car and left it running while she went inside her home to retrieve some belongings. When she returned to where the car had been parked, the car was gone. She immediately reported the theft to the police. A few days later, a police officer pulled over the stolen car. Leverton and two women were passengers. Leverton told the officer that the car belonged to the victim, whom he claimed was his girlfriend. Leverton was arrested and transported to the police station. After removing Leverton from the police vehicle, the officer discovered a pipe typically used to smoke methamphetamine. Leverton was initially charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Shortly thereafter in a separate case he was charged with theft by receiving. The cases were later joined on the prosecution's motion, over defendant's objection. The women passengers testified at Leverton's trial and were questioned by the prosecutor about oral statements they allegedly had made to police following their arrests. Leverton was convicted as charged. On appeal, Leverton argued that the trial court erred when it rejected his guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge and then permitted the prosecution to add that charge to the theft complaint because the result was that he was effectively charged with the same offense in two separate cases. He claimed that this violated Colorado's mandatory joinder statute and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. The Court of Appeals noted that Leverton did not allege that he was reprosecuted for either offense after he was convicted or that he was sentenced or otherwise punished multiple times for those offenses. Here, the prosecution moved to join the two offenses prior to Leverton's attempt to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge. The court's procedure met the purpose of the mandatory joinder statute, to prevent successive prosecutions, and Leverton raised no claim of unfair prejudice resulting from the procedure. Further, the court acted within its discretion when it rejected Leverton's guilty plea to the petty offense. And because the court had not accepted Leverton's guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge, double jeopardy had not attached and there was no due process violation. Leverton next argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to examine the two women witnesses about their prior statements to the police, alleging this evidence was inadmissible and violated his confrontation rights. Both women testified that they did not remember what happened the night the stolen car was pulled over, nor did they remember any statements they made to the police. To impeach the witnesses, the prosecutor was entitled to confront them with the exact language of their prior inconsistent statements. Therefore, the court properly admitted the statements. Leverton also argued that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed theft or possessed drug paraphernalia. A few days after the car had been reported stolen, the police found Leverton sitting in the car's front passenger seat. Though Leverton told the police that the car had been given to him by the victim, his statement was directly refuted by the victim's testimony that she had never met him. This and other evidence was sufficient to support the theft by receiving conviction. There was also sufficient evidence concerning the pipe found in the police vehicle for the jury to convict Leverton of possession of drug paraphernalia. Leverton also argued that his convictions were based on his associations with other persons. Having found that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence proving that Leverton and not some other person committed the crimes, the Court rejected this argument. The judgment was affirmed.

Private Property—Trespass—Injuries—Negligent Driving—Premises Liability Act. Plaintiff was a passenger in a car that was traveling through a private alley owned by defendants. Plaintiff's vehicle collided with a Denver East Machinery Company (DEMC) truck driven by Freund. A police accident report determined that Freund was at fault and drove carelessly when rounding a corner of the DEMC building without looking or slowing down. Plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and negligence per se. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the accident occurred on their private property, plaintiff could only assert claims under the Premises Liability Act (PLA). The trial court granted the motion but allowed plaintiff to amend her complaint to assert a PLA claim, which plaintiff did. Defendants moved again for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion, determining that plaintiff was a trespasser, and because she did not allege a willful or deliberate injury, she was not entitled to relief. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the PLA does not preclude her negligent driving claim and that the court erred in entering the initial summary judgment against her. The PLA limits the liability of landowners for injuries occurring on their property and preempts common law tort claims against landowners by specifying the duties owed to particular classes of injured plaintiffs. Such preempted claims include those for negligence per se against landowners for damages occurring on their premises. The collision arose from activities conducted on defendants' property thus the PLA controlled, and plaintiff was a trespasser who could only recover if she could demonstrate that defendants injured her willfully or deliberately. Plaintiff made no such allegations. The judgment was affirmed.

Dependency and Neglect—Indian Child Welfare Act—Notice—Burden of Proof. In this dependency and neglect case concerning L.L., his mother, A.T., told the juvenile court at a shelter hearing that she had possible Apache Native American ancestry. Later, A.T. filed written information that included tribal card numbers and roll numbers. The Denver Department of Human Services (Department) did not send notice of the proceedings to any of the Apache Tribes. A.T. again stated that she had Indian heritage at a pretrial hearing, but the juvenile court did not address whether the Department used due diligence to identify and work with an Apache Tribe to verify whether L.L. is a member or is eligible for tribal membership. The court also did not treat L.L. as an Indian child pending verification from the tribe. Following a jury verdict, the court adjudicated L.L. dependent and neglected. On appeal, A.T. contended that the order should be reversed because the Department did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) notice requirements. First, when there is "reason to know" the child is an Indian child, the juvenile court must ensure that the Department sends notice to any identified Indian Tribe. Second, the court must "[t]reat the child as an Indian child, unless and until it is determined on the record that the child does not meet the definition of an 'Indian child.'" Here, the Department did not meet its obligation to provide notice of the proceedings to any of the Apache Tribes. The juvenile court did not address whether the Department used due diligence to identify and work with an Apache Tribe to verify whether L.L. was a member or was eligible for membership and did not treat L.L. as an Indian child pending the Tribes' verification. A.T. also contended that the juvenile court violated ICWA by not requiring the jury to base its findings on a heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard. There is no language in ICWA or associated rules or guidelines that indicates a heightened burden of proof for the adjudicatory hearing in a dependency and neglect proceeding. Thus, the state is only required to prove the allegations in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence in all adjudications, whether involving Indian or non-Indian children. The juvenile court did not err when it instructed the jury regarding the Department's burden of proof. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act—Probation—CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) and (b)—Crime of Violence— Sex Offender. Al-Turki was convicted under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (LSA) of 12 counts of unlawful sexual contact through use of force, intimidation, or threat. The district court ultimately sentenced him to indeterminate prison terms of six years to life. Al-Turki renewed his previously filed Rule 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence, arguing that he was eligible for a probationary sentence under CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Al-Turki contended that he was eligible to have his indeterminate term of incarceration sentence, which was imposed under the LSA and the crime-of-violence statute, CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(b), modified to probation under CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(a). The mandatory sentencing for violent crimes statute, CRS § 18-1.3-406(1), differentiates between crimes of violence that involve sex offenses (CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(b)) and those that do not involve sex offenses (CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(a)). CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(b) provides that defendants convicted of a sex offense that is a crime of violence "shall" be sentenced to an indeterminate term of incarceration. Thus, a crime-of-violence sex offender is not eligible for probation. Al-Turki was convicted of a sex offense that is a crime of violence. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(b) precluded it from modifying Al-Turki's sentence to probation. The order was affirmed. 2017 COA 40. No. 14CA0842. People v. Davis. Wiretapping—Conspiracy—Habitual Criminal—Unanimity Instruction—Single Transaction—Limiting Instruction—Prior Conviction—Jury. After an investigation that entailed wiretapping, the People charged defendant with one count of conspiracy to distribute a schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine) and several habitual criminal counts. A jury convicted defendant of the conspiracy charge, and the district court, after finding that defendant was a habitual criminal, sentenced him to 48 years. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in not requiring the prosecution to elect the overt act on which it was relying to prove the conspiracy charge or not giving the jury a special, modified unanimity instruction regarding the overt act. When the People charge a defendant with crimes occurring in a single transaction, they do not have to elect among the acts that constitute the crime, and a special unanimity instruction (one that tells the jury that it must agree unanimously as to the act proving each element) need not be given. A defendant can participate in a number of crimes or events to accomplish a single conspiracy. The Colorado Supreme Court has indicated that the following factors tend to show a single criminal episode: the alleged acts occurred during the same period, the type of overt act alleged is the same, the unlawful objective of the conspiracy is the same, and the same evidence would be relevant to the charges. Here, the actions occurred in a relatively short time frame, evidence of defendant's phone conversations with one person primarily established the conspiracy, and all the overt acts on which the jury could have relied were done in furtherance of the same unlawful objective. Therefore, the evidence presented in this case showed one criminal episode, and hence one conspiracy. Though the prosecution alleged numerous overt acts in furtherance of the single conspiracy, that did not require unanimous agreement by the jurors as to the precise overt act defendant committed. Therefore, the district court did not err, much less plainly err, in failing to require an election or to give the jury a special unanimity instruction. Defendant also contended that the district court erred in not providing the jury a limiting instruction. However, defendant did not request a limiting instruction, and a trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte does not constitute plain error. Defendant further contended that his rights to jury trial and due process were violated when the judge, instead of the jury, found that he had been convicted of prior felonies. The Colorado Supreme Court has held that the fact of a prior conviction is expressly excepted from the jury trial requirement for aggravated sentencing. The judgment was affirmed. 2017 COA 41. No. 14CA1030. People v. Valdez. Murder—Robbery—DNA Evidence—Collateral Estoppel—Expungement—Constitutionality—Katie's Law—Surveillance Camera—Evidence—Jury. A jury convicted Valdez of first degree murder after deliberation and several other charges arising from the robbery of a jewelry store during which one of the two hooded robbers shot and killed the owner. Valdez did not testify but defended based on misidentification. Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole on the first degree murder count, was consecutively sentenced to 32 years on the aggravated robbery count, and received concurrent sentences on the other counts. On appeal, Valdez argued that the match of his DNA to the DNA evidence from the crime scene was derived from a sample unconstitutionally collected when he was arrested on an unrelated charge in a traffic case. Valdez's DNA sample was taken during his arrest for aggravated driving under restraint—habitual offender. Although Valdez pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor in that traffic case and was eligible to apply for DNA expungement under CRS § 16-23-105 (part of Katie's Law), he failed to either move to suppress the DNA sample before pleading guilty or seek expungement based on his misdemeanor plea. The constitutionality of Katie's Law was not determined in the traffic case. Because Katie's Law, as applied to Valdez, is constitutional, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. Valdez also argued that the district court erred in admitting a surveillance camera video of the robbery in progress depicting the owner's dying moments because it was unfairly prejudicial, and further erred by improperly giving the jurors unfettered access to replay all of the videos during deliberations. The recording of the robbery in progress showed the actual crime. Therefore, it was not unfairly prejudicial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the surveillance video from the overhead camera. Additionally, the videos were played for the jurors only after their request, and the court clerk supervised the playback. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to limit the number of times the jury could view the videos or in refusing to impose other restrictions on the jury's consideration of them. Having affirmed Valdez's convictions on all charges, including first degree murder, Valdez's argument that it was error to impose a lesser sentence consecutively rather than concurrently is moot. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. 2017 COA 42. No. 15CA0852. Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA v. Mason. Credit Agreement—Jury Demand—Equitable—Non-Disclosure—Abandonment—Estoppel—Waiver—Consent—Conversion—Bankruptcy—Collateral Estoppel—Damages. Zachary funded his farming operations with loans from Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA and Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, FLCA (collectively, Farm Credit). Zachary was having difficulty paying his debt to Farm Credit and had planted crops on seven farms for the coming harvest. Written agreements between Farm Credit and Zachary granted Farm Credit a perfected security interest in Zachary's crops (Crop Collateral) and their proceeds. Farm Credit refused to continue funding Zachary's farming operations and Zachary was unable to cultivate the Crop Collateral. Zachary's father, James, thereafter took over the cultivation of the Crop Collateral. James never attempted to transfer the Crop Collateral or its proceeds to Farm Credit. Farm Credit filed a complaint for various claims against Zachary and other parties, but not James. Zachary thereafter filed for bankruptcy. As part of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Farm Credit filed an amended complaint alleging that Zachary transferred the Crop Collateral to James. Farm Credit later amended the state trial court complaint to add James as a defendant. Ultimately, the trial court entered a judgment against James, finding him liable for converting the Crop Collateral and awarding Farm Credit damages plus interest. On appeal, James argued that the trial court erred in striking his demand for a jury trial. Based on the complaint, Farm Credit's remedy was in the nature of a foreclosure, an equitable action. Because the basic thrust of the underlying action was equitable and not legal in nature, the trial court did not err in striking James's demand for a jury trial. James also asserted that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Zachary's debt because Farm Credit did not disclose it before trial, and this nondisclosure was intentional and material. However, this nondisclosure was harmless because the amount of debt far exceeded the most optimistic estimate given for the Crop Collateral's value at the time of conversion. Therefore, James was not denied an adequate opportunity to defend against Farm Credit's assertion that the value of the outstanding debt exceeded the value of the collateral, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the action as a result of this nondisclosure. James next contended that the trial court reversibly erred when it determined that the defenses of abandonment, estoppel, waiver, and consent did not relieve him of liability for conversion. The written agreements evidencing Farm Credit's perfected security interest in the Crop Collateral were "credit agreements" within the meaning of the Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds. Thus, any waiver involving Farm Credit's rights to the Crop Collateral, including proceeds, would need to be in writing to be effective. Here, there was never a written waiver. Additionally, while the record shows that Farm Credit acquiesced to James's cultivation and harvest of the otherwise doomed Crop Collateral, it does not show that Farm Credit consented to its security interest being completely extinguished. Finally, there is no evidence in the record showing Farm Credit manifested intent, or took action, to abandon the Crop Collateral and related claims at any point, including during the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting James's defenses of waiver, consent, abandonment, and estoppel. James further contended that the trial court erred when it determined that the bankruptcy court's decision did not preclude Farm Credit from recovering on its claims and denied James's motion for a directed verdict. Here, the legal issues before the bankruptcy court were different from those before the trial court. Because the issues litigated in the two proceedings at issue were not identical, the trial court correctly determined that collateral estoppel did not apply to the legal issues before it and properly denied James's motion for a directed verdict. Lastly, James argued that the trial court misapplied the law when assessing damages by determining that the date of conversion was the date of harvest rather than when James took over the crops' cultivation. Because the trial court applied the correct standard in assessing damages and the record supports the trial court's factual findings, there was no error with the damages award. The orders and judgment were affirmed. 2017 COA 43. No. 15CA1886. Allison v. Engel. Landowners—Default Judgment—Finality—CRCP 54(b) —Jurisdiction—Certification. The parties own adjacent parcels of property and for a number of years have had disagreements about the precise boundaries of their neighboring parcels. The Allisons filed a complaint asserting two trespass claims and a claim for declaratory relief. The Engels filed various counterclaims. Numerous motions were filed, and the district court ultimately certified a default judgment on the counterclaim for unjust enrichment as final under CRCP 54(b). The Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs as to whether the unjust enrichment counterclaim is a separate claim for purposes of CRCP 54(b) and whether there is no just reason for delay of an appeal pertaining solely to that counterclaim. Generally speaking, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. Thus, jurisdiction over an appeal from an order the district court has certified as final under Rule 54(b) depends on the correctness of that certification. Here, the district court gave two reasons for concluding that there was no just reason for delay: (1) "avoid[ing] duplicative efforts" and (2) obtaining "a clear sense of direction in terms of the issues to be considered" at trial. The first reason is plainly insufficient to justify certification because the same could be said about any case involving multiple claims or parties as to which a dispositive ruling is entered on one claim, or as to one party, before trial. The second reason is also insufficient to justify certification because it is not a proper function of Rule 54(b) certification to assuage a district court's doubts about its decision or to provide "guidance" in the resolution of claims. The district court's reasons do not show that any party will suffer hardship or injustice unless an immediate appeal of the default judgment on the single counterclaim is allowed. The district court abused its discretion, and the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed. 2017 COA 44. No. 15CA2132. International Network, Inc. v. Woodard. Breach of Contract—Exclusive Right-to-Sell Listing—Statute of Limitations—Jury Instructions. Woodard (seller) owned a 100-acre ranch. In 2006 he signed an exclusive right-to-sell listing agreement with International Network, Inc. (broker). The agreement was for a six-month listing period and provided for a percentage commission to be paid to broker upon sale. Seller had the absolute right to cancel the agreement at any time upon written notice. Approximately four months into the listing period, seller began negotiating with an attorney who represented a group of potential buyers. Seller did not disclose his negotiations to broker. About a month after commencing these discussions, seller abruptly cancelled the listing agreement without cause. Broker ceased marketing the property. After the listing period had expired, but within the 90-day holdover period set forth in the agreement, seller and the buyers finalized an agreement resulting in the sale of the property. Seven years later, broker initiated this action against seller for breach of contract based on seller's failure to comply with the referral provision, which required seller to conduct all negotiations for the sale of the property through broker and refer to broker all communications received from prospective buyers. Following trial, a jury found in favor of broker and awarded damages in the amount of the commission that would have been owed under the listing agreement. On appeal, seller argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and his post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because broker's breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations. CRS § 13-80-101(1)(a) states that a breach of contract claim must be commenced within three years after accrual of the cause of action, and accrual occurs when the breach is discovered or should have been discovered. It was undisputed that seller breached the referral provision in 2006. Seller argued that under the facts, broker should have realized there might have been a breach of the referral provision and through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it in 2006. Broker asserted it had no knowledge of seller's duplicity until broker's agent heard seller's testimony in another lawsuit in 2011 in which seller testified he had violated the listing agreement and intentionally concealed his negotiations to avoid paying a commission. Therefore, in commencing this action in 2013 broker was within three years of its discovery of the breach. Based on the record, the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to broker, compelled a different result. Seller also argued that it was error to not give a jury instruction on the elements of liability for recovery on a real estate commission claim, contending that the broker was not the procuring cause of the sale. Here, seller breached the referral provision and cannot use his intentional concealment of his negotiations to prevent broker from obtaining damages in the form of a commission. The court did not err in rejecting seller's procuring cause instruction. Seller contended the trial court erred by rejecting seller's proposed jury instruction on the affirmative defense of laches. The trial court ruled, and the Court agreed, that seller's improper conduct precluded his assertion of a laches defense. Seller further argued that the court erred in denying him the right to impeach broker's agent with certain evidence. The court precluded seller's questioning due to lack of a sufficient foundation and acted within its discretion in limiting seller's cross-examination. Broker requested attorney fees and costs in accordance with the agreement, which the Court awarded. The judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded for further proceedings to award broker's costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. 2017 COA 45. No.16CA0029. In re Marriage of Roth. Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Death of Arbitrator During Pendency of Arbitration. The parties agreed to arbitrate the permanent orders issues in their dissolution of marriage. The agreement provided that the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act (CUAA) governed the proceedings the arbitrator would reserve jurisdiction for 20 days after issuing an award to allow the parties to seek clarification, correction, or modification of the award and if jurisdiction was reserved on an issue, the arbitrator would hear it unless he was unavailable. The arbitrator issued an award, and both parties submitted timely requests for modification and clarification of the award. During the process of submitting these requests, the arbitrator died. Five days later, wife moved in district court to appoint a replacement arbitrator under CRS § 13-22-215(5). A week later husband moved to confirm the arbitrator's award under CRS § 13-22-222. The trial court found that wife was essentially seeking to relitigate the permanent orders, and it denied her motion and granted husband's motion to confirm the award and entered a dissolution decree incorporating the award. On appeal, wife argued that under the CUAA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award while the parties' requests to modify or correct it were pending before the arbitrator. She contended that upon the death of the arbitrator, the court had subject matter jurisdiction only to appoint a replacement arbitrator. Under the CUAA, a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement divests the district court of jurisdiction on all matters submitted to arbitration pending the conclusion of the arbitration. Here, due to the timely requests for modification or correction of the award, the arbitration proceedings had not concluded at the death of the arbitrator and subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award was not in the district court. Under the CUAA, the district court only had subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a replacement arbitrator to complete the proceedings. Wife further contended that the district court erred by denying her motion to appoint a replacement arbitrator. Because it is undisputed that the parties' chosen arbitrator could not act, the district court was required to appoint a replacement arbitrator. The district court's judgment confirming the arbitration award was vacated, its order denying wife's motion to appoint a replacement arbitrator was reversed, and the case was remanded to appoint a replacement arbitrator to complete the arbitration proceedings. 2017 COA 46. No. 16CA0164. Malpica-Cue v. Fangmeier. Mistake on Special Verdict Form—CRE 606(b). Malpica-Cue sued Fangmeier for damages resulting from a car accident. After trial, the jury filled out a Special Verdict Form B that included three different damages amounts. All six jurors signed the form, and the judge read the verdict and each separate amount of damages aloud in open court. The jury foreman confirmed the verdict. Counsel for both parties declined to poll the jury. Fangmeier filed a post-trial motion averring that while the jurors were still in the courthouse, defense counsel spoke with some of them about the amount of damages they had awarded. They said they had intended to award $2,500 for noneconomic losses, $18,373.38 for economic losses, and $0 for physical impairment or disfigurement. The total damages intended, $20,873.38, had mistakenly been added together and inserted on the line for physical impairment and disfigurement, making the total damages $41,746.76. Defense counsel told the court clerk that all six jurors agreed they had made a mistake on the verdict form and wanted to fix it. The judge denied counsel's request to reconvene the jury that day and told him to file a motion. Fangmeier filed a motion asking the court to vacate the jury verdict awarding $41,746.76 and enter judgment awarding $20,873.38. The motion included an affidavit from the jury foreman saying the jury had made a mistake. The district court denied the motion, stating that CRE 606(b) precluded it from considering the foreman's affidavit. On appeal, Fangmeier argued that the foreman's affidavit should not have been precluded because an exception to Rule 606(b) allows jury testimony regarding "whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form." Here, all the jurors agreed that there should have been no recovery for physical impairment or disfigurement and the foreman misread the jury form, so the exception applies. While the affidavit by itself does not require the verdict to be changed, Fangmeier is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Thus, it was error to not reconvene the jurors on the day the trial ended and in later failing to reconvene the jurors to ascertain the true verdict in response to the post-trial motion. The order was vacated and the case was remanded. 2017 COA 47. No. 16CA0920. Whitelaw, III v. Denver City Council. CRCP 106(a)(4) —Rezoning Decision—Due Process—Spot Zoning. Plaintiffs Whitelaw, III and various neighbors (the neighbors) sought judicial review of the rezoning decision of defendant Denver City Council (the Council). Cedar Metropolitan LLC (Cedar) applied to rezone a 2.3-acre parcel. To build an "age-targeted" apartment complex on the site, Cedar sought to tear down a blighted church and rezone the parcel from single family home to a zone district that allowed three-story apartment buildings. The neighbors are property owners who live in the neighborhood near the parcel. They challenged the rezoning efforts, asserting it would hurt their property values, create traffic and parking problems, cause hazards to pedestrians, and degrade the character of the surrounding neighborhood. Following an eight-hour hearing, the Council granted the request to change the zoning. The neighbors challenged the rezoning in district court under CRCP 106(a)(4). The district court rejected all of their claims. On appeal, the neighbors asserted various claims, principally violation of their right to due process. They made five due process arguments. The Court of Appeals will affirm a rezoning decision unless the governmental entity exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, which occurs if the body misapplied the law or no competent evidence supports its decision. The neighbors first argued that a lobbyist for Cedar communicated before the hearing with Council member Susman, in whose district the parcel lies, through her private email account and by phone. They alleged that the failure to disclose these communications to the public before the hearing deprived them of their due process rights because they did not have notice and an opportunity to rebut the information on which the Council may have impermissibly relied in making its determination. Despite evidence of approximately 50 pages of such emails, the neighbors pointed to no evidence that they had a "substantial prejudicial impact" on the outcome of the proceedings. In fact, Susman voted against the rezoning. The neighbors did not overcome the presumption that the Council members acted with integrity, honesty, and impartiality, and they showed no prejudice from the communications. Second, the neighbors asserted their due process rights were violated due to the involvement of Cedar's architect, who was also a member of the City's Planning Board, in the application process. The Planning Board recommended that the Council approve the rezoning. The architect submitted the application to the Board, but did not attend the Planning Board meeting or vote on the rezoning and thus complied with the Denver Municipal Code. Further, the Planning Board's recommendation is not appealable because it is not a "final decision" reviewable under CRCP 106(a)(4). Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not review this claim. Third, the neighbors argued that their due process rights were violated because certain Council members' comments at the public hearing reflected "flawed quasi-judicial decision making" and showed they "relied on irrelevant factors and information outside of the hearing record" in making their decision. The neighbors failed to demonstrate a lack of competent evidence supporting the Council's decision or that any individual member relied on factual information outside the hearing record or ignored the record in casting their vote. There was competent evidence in the record to support the Council's decision. Fourth, the neighbors argued their due process rights were violated because the Council stepped outside of its neutral, quasi-judicial role and supported Cedar by improperly applying the protest petition procedure of the Denver City Charter. The protest procedure provides that if opponents gather signatures from property owners representing 20% or more of the land area within 200 feet of the perimeter of a proposed rezoning, the rezoning must pass the Council by a super-majority (10 members). Opponents gathered 17% of the perimeter zone signatures and the rezoning passed 8 to 4. The neighbors argued that the City improperly applied the protest procedure by including City-owned park land but not allowing a procedure for residents to obtain petition signatures from the City. The Court disagreed, finding that the City's calculation of the 200-foot protest petition area was in accordance with the Denver Charter. Fifth, the neighbors alleged a due process violation because some Council members received "substantial" political contributions from lobbyists and were therefore biased in the rezoning vote. Evidence of this was not in the record before the Council and therefore was not reviewable by the Court. The neighbors also argued that the rezoning decision must be vacated because, as a matter of law, it did not comply with the City's zoning ordinance, alleging it was not consistent with the City's adopted plans no specific circumstances justified the rezoning and the rezoning fails to further the public health, safety, and general welfare. The record shows that the Council members engaged in lengthy discussions about the criteria and evidence, including testimony presented by both proponents and opponents at the hearing. The Council did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed zoning was consistent with the City's adopted plans the rezoning resulted in uniformity of district regulations and restrictions the rezoning furthered the public health, safety, and general welfare circumstances justified the rezoning and the rezoning was consistent with the description of the applicable neighborhood context and the stated purpose and intent of the proposed Zone District. Finally, the neighbors argued that the rezoning was impermissible spot zoning because it did not further Denver's comprehensive plans and was therefore an abuse of discretion. The Court disagreed. Here, the rezoning was not out of character with the adjacent area and furthered the City's adopted plans. The judgment was affirmed.

Wiretapping—Conspiracy—Habitual Criminal—Unanimity Instruction—Single Transaction—Limiting Instruction—Prior Conviction—Jury. After an investigation that entailed wiretapping defendant's telephones, defendant was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute a schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine) and several habitual criminal counts. A jury convicted defendant of the conspiracy charge, and the district court, after finding that defendant was a habitual criminal, sentenced him to 48 years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in not requiring the prosecution to elect the overt act on which it was relying to prove the conspiracy charge. When the People charge a defendant with crimes occurring in a single transaction, they do not have to elect among the acts that constitute the crime, and a special unanimity instruction need not be given. A defendant can participate in a number of crimes or events to accomplish a single conspiracy. Here, the actions occurred in a relatively short time frame, evidence of defendant's phone conversations with one person primarily established the conspiracy, and all the overt acts on which the jury could have relied were done in furtherance of the same unlawful objective. Therefore, the evidence presented in this case showed one criminal episode, and hence one conspiracy. Further, though the prosecution alleged numerous overt acts in furtherance of the single conspiracy, that did not require unanimous agreement by the jurors as to the precise overt act defendant committed. Therefore, the district court did not err, much less plainly err, in failing to require an election or to give the jury a special unanimity instruction. Defendant also contended that the district court erred in not providing a limiting instruction to preclude the jury from considering witnesses' guilty pleas or desires to plead guilty as evidence of his guilt. Here, defendant did not request a limiting instruction, and a trial court's failure to give a limiting instruction sua sponte does not constitute plain error. Lastly, defendant contended that his rights to a trial by a jury and to due process of law were violated when the judge, instead of a jury, found that he had been convicted of three prior felonies. The fact of a prior conviction is expressly excepted from the jury trial requirement for aggravated sentencing. Therefore, there was no error. The judgment was affirmed.

Murder—Robbery—DNA Evidence—Collateral Estoppel—Expungement—Constitutionality—Katie's Law—Surveillance Camera—Evidence—Jury. A jury convicted Valdez of first degree murder after deliberation and several other charges arising from the robbery of a jewelry store during which one of the two hooded robbers shot and killed the owner. Valdez did not testify but defended based on misidentification. Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole on the first degree murder count, was consecutively sentenced to 32 years on the aggravated robbery count, and received concurrent sentences on the other counts. On appeal, Valdez argued that the match of his DNA to the DNA evidence from the crime scene was derived from a sample unconstitutionally collected when he was arrested on an unrelated charge in a traffic case. Valdez's DNA sample was taken during his arrest for aggravated driving under restraint—habitual offender. Although Valdez pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor in that traffic case and was eligible to apply for DNA expungement under CRS § 16-23-105 (part of Katie's Law), he failed to either move to suppress the DNA sample before pleading guilty or seek expungement based on his misdemeanor plea. The constitutionality of Katie's Law was not determined in the traffic case. Because Katie's Law, as applied to Valdez, is constitutional, the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress. Valdez also argued that the district court erred in admitting a surveillance camera video of the robbery in progress depicting the owner's dying moments because it was unfairly prejudicial, and further erred by improperly giving the jurors unfettered access to replay all of the videos during deliberations. The recording of the robbery in progress showed the actual crime. Therefore, it was not unfairly prejudicial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the surveillance video from the overhead camera. Additionally, the videos were played for the jurors only after their request, and the court clerk supervised the playback. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to limit the number of times the jury could view the videos or in refusing to impose other restrictions on the jury's consideration of them. Having affirmed Valdez's convictions on all charges, including first degree murder, Valdez's argument that it was error to impose a lesser sentence consecutively rather than concurrently is moot.

Credit Agreement—Jury Demand—Equitable—Non-Disclosure—Abandonment—Estoppel—Waiver—Consent—Conversion—Bankruptcy—Collateral Estoppel—Damages. Zachary funded his farming operations with loans from Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, ACA and Farm Credit of Southern Colorado, FLCA (collectively, Farm Credit). Zachary was having difficulty paying his debt to Farm Credit and had planted crops on seven farms for the coming harvest. Written agreements between Farm Credit and Zachary granted Farm Credit a perfected security interest in Zachary's crops (Crop Collateral) and their proceeds. Farm Credit refused to continue funding Zachary's farming operations and Zachary was unable to cultivate the Crop Collateral. Zachary's father, James, thereafter took over the cultivation of the Crop Collateral. James never attempted to transfer the Crop Collateral or its proceeds to Farm Credit. Farm Credit filed a complaint for various claims against Zachary and other parties, but not James. Zachary thereafter filed for bankruptcy. As part of a bankruptcy adversary proceeding, Farm Credit filed an amended complaint alleging that Zachary transferred the Crop Collateral to James. Farm Credit later amended the state trial court complaint to add James as a defendant. Ultimately, the trial court entered a judgment against James, finding him liable for converting the Crop Collateral and awarding Farm Credit damages plus interest. On appeal, James argued that the trial court erred in striking his demand for a jury trial. Based on the complaint, Farm Credit's remedy was in the nature of a foreclosure, an equitable action. Because the basic thrust of the underlying action was equitable and not legal in nature, the trial court did not err in striking James's demand for a jury trial. James also asserted that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Zachary's debt because Farm Credit did not disclose it before trial, and this nondisclosure was intentional and material. However, this nondisclosure was harmless because the amount of debt far exceeded the most optimistic estimate given for the Crop Collateral's value at the time of conversion. Therefore, James was not denied an adequate opportunity to defend against Farm Credit's assertion that the value of the outstanding debt exceeded the value of the collateral, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the action as a result of this nondisclosure. James next contended that the trial court reversibly erred when it determined that the defenses of abandonment, estoppel, waiver, and consent did not relieve him of liability for conversion. The written agreements evidencing Farm Credit's perfected security interest in the Crop Collateral were "credit agreements" within the meaning of the Credit Agreement Statute of Frauds. Thus, any waiver involving Farm Credit's rights to the Crop Collateral, including proceeds, would need to be in writing to be effective. Here, there was never a written waiver. Additionally, while the record shows that Farm Credit acquiesced to James's cultivation and harvest of the otherwise doomed Crop Collateral, it does not show that Farm Credit consented to its security interest being completely extinguished. Finally, there is no evidence in the record showing Farm Credit manifested intent, or took action, to abandon the Crop Collateral and related claims at any point, including during the bankruptcy adversary proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in rejecting James's defenses of waiver, consent, abandonment, and estoppel. James further contended that the trial court erred when it determined that the bankruptcy court's decision did not preclude Farm Credit from recovering on its claims and denied James's motion for a directed verdict. Here, the legal issues before the bankruptcy court were different from those before the trial court. Because the issues litigated in the two proceedings at issue were not identical, the trial court correctly determined that collateral estoppel did not apply to the legal issues before it and properly denied James's motion for a directed verdict. Lastly, James argued that the trial court misapplied the law when assessing damages by determining that the date of conversion was the date of harvest rather than when James took over the crops' cultivation. Because the trial court applied the correct standard in assessing damages and the record supports the trial court's factual findings, there was no error with the damages award.

Landowners—Default Judgment—Finality—CRCP 54(b) —Jurisdiction—Certification. The parties own adjacent parcels of property and for a number of years have had disagreements about the precise boundaries of their neighboring parcels. The Allisons filed a complaint asserting two trespass claims and a claim for declaratory relief. The Engels filed various counterclaims. Numerous motions were filed, and the district court ultimately certified a default judgment on the counterclaim for unjust enrichment as final under CRCP 54(b). The Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs as to whether the unjust enrichment counterclaim is a separate claim for purposes of CRCP 54(b) and whether there is no just reason for delay of an appeal pertaining solely to that counterclaim. Generally speaking, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments. Thus, jurisdiction over an appeal from an order the district court has certified as final under Rule 54(b) depends on the correctness of that certification. Here, the district court gave two reasons for concluding that there was no just reason for delay: (1) "avoid[ing] duplicative efforts" and (2) obtaining "a clear sense of direction in terms of the issues to be considered" at trial. The first reason is plainly insufficient to justify certification because the same could be said about any case involving multiple claims or parties as to which a dispositive ruling is entered on one claim, or as to one party, before trial. The second reason is also insufficient to justify certification because it is not a proper function of Rule 54(b) certification to assuage a district court's doubts about its decision or to provide "guidance" in the resolution of claims. The district court's reasons do not show that any party will suffer hardship or injustice unless an immediate appeal of the default judgment on the single counterclaim is allowed. The district court abused its discretion, and the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction. The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

Breach of Contract—Exclusive Right-to-Sell Listing—Statute of Limitations—Jury Instructions. Woodard (seller) owned a 100-acre ranch. In 2006 he signed an exclusive right-to-sell listing agreement with International Network, Inc. (broker). The agreement was for a six-month listing period and provided for a percentage commission to be paid to broker upon sale. Seller had the absolute right to cancel the agreement at any time upon written notice. Approximately four months into the listing period, seller began negotiating with an attorney who represented a group of potential buyers. Seller did not disclose his negotiations to broker. About a month after commencing these discussions, seller abruptly cancelled the listing agreement without cause. Broker ceased marketing the property. After the listing period had expired, but within the 90-day holdover period set forth in the agreement, seller and the buyers finalized an agreement resulting in the sale of the property. Seven years later, broker initiated this action against seller for breach of contract based on seller's failure to comply with the referral provision, which required seller to conduct all negotiations for the sale of the property through broker and refer to broker all communications received from prospective buyers. Following trial, a jury found in favor of broker and awarded damages in the amount of the commission that would have been owed under the listing agreement. On appeal, seller argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict and his post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because broker's breach of contract claim was barred by the statute of limitations. CRS § 13-80-101(1)(a) states that a breach of contract claim must be commenced within three years after accrual of the cause of action, and accrual occurs when the breach is discovered or should have been discovered. It was undisputed that seller breached the referral provision in 2006. Seller argued that under the facts, broker should have realized there might have been a breach of the referral provision and through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it in 2006. Broker asserted it had no knowledge of seller's duplicity until broker's agent heard seller's testimony in another lawsuit in 2011 in which seller testified he had violated the listing agreement and intentionally concealed his negotiations to avoid paying a commission. Therefore, in commencing this action in 2013 broker was within three years of its discovery of the breach. Based on the record, the Court of Appeals could not conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to broker, compelled a different result. Seller also argued that it was error to not give a jury instruction on the elements of liability for recovery on a real estate commission claim, contending that the broker was not the procuring cause of the sale. Here, seller breached the referral provision and cannot use his intentional concealment of his negotiations to prevent broker from obtaining damages in the form of a commission. The court did not err in rejecting seller's procuring cause instruction. Seller contended the trial court erred by rejecting seller's proposed jury instruction on the affirmative defense of laches. The trial court ruled, and the Court agreed, that seller's improper conduct precluded his assertion of a laches defense. Seller further argued that the court erred in denying him the right to impeach broker's agent with certain evidence. The court precluded seller's questioning due to lack of a sufficient foundation and acted within its discretion in limiting seller's cross-examination. Broker requested attorney fees and costs in accordance with the agreement, which the Court awarded. The judgment was affirmed and the case was remanded for further proceedings to award broker's costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Death of Arbitrator During Pendency of Arbitration. The parties agreed to arbitrate the permanent orders issues in their dissolution of marriage. The agreement provided that the Colorado Uniform Arbitration Act (CUAA) governed the proceedings the arbitrator would reserve jurisdiction for 20 days after issuing an award to allow the parties to seek clarification, correction, or modification of the award and if jurisdiction was reserved on an issue, the arbitrator would hear it unless he was unavailable. The arbitrator issued an award, and both parties submitted timely requests for modification and clarification of the award. During the process of submitting these requests, the arbitrator died. Five days later, wife moved in district court to appoint a replacement arbitrator under CRS § 13-22-215(5). A week later husband moved to confirm the arbitrator's award under CRS § 13-22-222. The trial court found that wife was essentially seeking to relitigate the permanent orders, and it denied her motion and granted husband's motion to confirm the award and entered a dissolution decree incorporating the award. On appeal, wife argued that under the CUAA, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award while the parties' requests to modify or correct it were pending before the arbitrator. She contended that upon the death of the arbitrator, the court had subject matter jurisdiction only to appoint a replacement arbitrator. Under the CUAA, a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement divests the district court of jurisdiction on all matters submitted to arbitration pending the conclusion of the arbitration. Here, due to the timely requests for modification or correction of the award, the arbitration proceedings had not concluded at the death of the arbitrator and subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award was not in the district court. Under the CUAA, the district court only had subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a replacement arbitrator to complete the proceedings. Wife further contended that the district court erred by denying her motion to appoint a replacement arbitrator. Because it is undisputed that the parties' chosen arbitrator could not act, the district court was required to appoint a replacement arbitrator.

Mistake on Special Verdict Form—CRE 606(b). Malpica-Cue sued Fangmeier for damages resulting from a car accident. After trial, the jury filled out a Special Verdict Form B that included three different damages amounts. All six jurors signed the form, and the judge read the verdict and each separate amount of damages aloud in open court. The jury foreman confirmed the verdict. Counsel for both parties declined to poll the jury. Fangmeier filed a post-trial motion averring that while the jurors were still in the courthouse, defense counsel spoke with some of them about the amount of damages they had awarded. They said they had intended to award $2,500 for noneconomic losses, $18,373.38 for economic losses, and $0 for physical impairment or disfigurement. The total damages intended, $20,873.38, had mistakenly been added together and inserted on the line for physical impairment and disfigurement, making the total damages $41,746.76. Defense counsel told the court clerk that all six jurors agreed they had made a mistake on the verdict form and wanted to fix it. The judge denied counsel's request to reconvene the jury that day and told him to file a motion. Fangmeier filed a motion asking the court to vacate the jury verdict awarding $41,746.76 and enter judgment awarding $20,873.38. The motion included an affidavit from the jury foreman saying the jury had made a mistake. The district court denied the motion, stating that CRE 606(b) precluded it from considering the foreman's affidavit. On appeal, Fangmeier argued that the foreman's affidavit should not have been precluded because an exception to Rule 606(b) allows jury testimony regarding "whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form." Here, all the jurors agreed that there should have been no recovery for physical impairment or disfigurement and the foreman misread the jury form, so the exception applies. While the affidavit by itself does not require the verdict to be changed, Fangmeier is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Thus, it was error to not reconvene the jurors on the day the trial ended and in later failing to reconvene the jurors to ascertain the true verdict in response to the post-trial motion.

CRCP 106(a)(4) —Rezoning Decision—Due Process—Spot Zoning. Plaintiffs Whitelaw, III and various neighbors (the neighbors) sought judicial review of the rezoning decision of defendant Denver City Council (the Council). Cedar Metropolitan LLC (Cedar) applied to rezone a 2.3-acre parcel. To build an "age-targeted" apartment complex on the site, Cedar sought to tear down a blighted church and rezone the parcel from single family home to a zone district that allowed three-story apartment buildings. The neighbors are property owners who live in the neighborhood near the parcel. They challenged the rezoning efforts, asserting it would hurt their property values, create traffic and parking problems, cause hazards to pedestrians, and degrade the character of the surrounding neighborhood. Following an eight-hour hearing, the Council granted the request to change the zoning. The neighbors challenged the rezoning in district court under CRCP 106(a)(4). The district court rejected all of their claims. On appeal, the neighbors asserted various claims, principally violation of their right to due process. They made five due process arguments. The Court of Appeals will affirm a rezoning decision unless the governmental entity exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, which occurs if the body misapplied the law or no competent evidence supports its decision. The neighbors first argued that a lobbyist for Cedar communicated before the hearing with Council member Susman, in whose district the parcel lies, through her private email account and by phone. They alleged that the failure to disclose these communications to the public before the hearing deprived them of their due process rights because they did not have notice and an opportunity to rebut the information on which the Council may have impermissibly relied in making its determination. Despite evidence of approximately 50 pages of such emails, the neighbors pointed to no evidence that they had a "substantial prejudicial impact" on the outcome of the proceedings. In fact, Susman voted against the rezoning. The neighbors did not overcome the presumption that the Council members acted with integrity, honesty, and impartiality, and they showed no prejudice from the communications. Second, the neighbors asserted their due process rights were violated due to the involvement of Cedar's architect, who was also a member of the City's Planning Board, in the application process. The Planning Board recommended that the Council approve the rezoning. The architect submitted the application to the Board, but did not attend the Planning Board meeting or vote on the rezoning and thus complied with the Denver Municipal Code. Further, the Planning Board's recommendation is not appealable because it is not a "final decision" reviewable under CRCP 106(a)(4). Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not review this claim. Third, the neighbors argued that their due process rights were violated because certain Council members' comments at the public hearing reflected "flawed quasi-judicial decision making" and showed they "relied on irrelevant factors and information outside of the hearing record" in making their decision. The neighbors failed to demonstrate a lack of competent evidence supporting the Council's decision or that any individual member relied on factual information outside the hearing record or ignored the record in casting their vote. There was competent evidence in the record to support the Council's decision. Fourth, the neighbors argued their due process rights were violated because the Council stepped outside of its neutral, quasi-judicial role and supported Cedar by improperly applying the protest petition procedure of the Denver City Charter. The protest procedure provides that if opponents gather signatures from property owners representing 20% or more of the land area within 200 feet of the perimeter of a proposed rezoning, the rezoning must pass the Council by a super-majority (10 members). Opponents gathered 17% of the perimeter zone signatures and the rezoning passed 8 to 4. The neighbors argued that the City improperly applied the protest procedure by including City-owned park land but not allowing a procedure for residents to obtain petition signatures from the City. The Court disagreed, finding that the City's calculation of the 200-foot protest petition area was in accordance with the Denver Charter. Fifth, the neighbors alleged a due process violation because some Council members received "substantial" political contributions from lobbyists and were therefore biased in the rezoning vote. Evidence of this was not in the record before the Council and therefore was not reviewable by the Court. The neighbors also argued that the rezoning decision must be vacated because, as a matter of law, it did not comply with the City's zoning ordinance, alleging it was not consistent with the City's adopted plans no specific circumstances justified the rezoning and the rezoning fails to further the public health, safety, and general welfare. The record shows that the Council members engaged in lengthy discussions about the criteria and evidence, including testimony presented by both proponents and opponents at the hearing. The Council did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the proposed zoning was consistent with the City's adopted plans the rezoning resulted in uniformity of district regulations and restrictions the rezoning furthered the public health, safety, and general welfare circumstances justified the rezoning and the rezoning was consistent with the description of the applicable neighborhood context and the stated purpose and intent of the proposed Zone District. Finally, the neighbors argued that the rezoning was impermissible spot zoning because it did not further Denver's comprehensive plans and was therefore an abuse of discretion. The Court disagreed. Here, the rezoning was not out of character with the adjacent area and furthered the City's adopted plans. The judgment was affirmed.

Felony—Plea Agreement—Immigration—Deportation—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Prejudice. The prosecution charged defendant with distributing and conspiring to distribute a controlled substance, class three felonies. Defendant later pleaded guilty to an added count of distribution of a schedule III controlled substance as a class four felony, in exchange for dismissal of the original charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to Community Corrections (Comcor) for five years. Comcor, however, rejected defendant when Immigration and Customs Enforcement placed him on an immigration detainer following his conviction. The trial court therefore resentenced defendant to 42 months in prison followed by three years of mandatory parole. Unbeknownst to defendant and defense counsel, the conviction triggered automatic mandatory deportation under federal law. Defendant filed a Crim. P. 35(c) petition for postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground of ineffective assistance of his plea counsel based on the erroneous advice regarding deportation. The postconviction court denied the petition. Although the court agreed that plea counsel failed to properly advise defendant, it determined that defendant did not suffer prejudice because due to the purported evidence against him, even if defendant had known the consequences of his plea, it would not have been rational for him to reject the plea offer. The court further concluded that even if he had established prejudice, defendant was not entitled to relief due to the circumstances of his providency hearing. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred in determining that his plea counsel's deficient performance did not prejudice him. When an alien defendant enters a guilty plea based on erroneous representations as to deportation consequences, he will in most cases be permitted to withdraw the plea. Here, defendant presented some objective corroborating evidence of his prejudice claim (e.g., his plea counsel's testimony confirming defendant's concerns about deportation and her erroneous advice about deportation). Although the prosecution's case against defendant appeared to be strong, it cannot be concluded that a conviction would have resulted if defendant went to trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that rejecting the guilty plea offer and going to trial would have been a rational decision for defendant. Because defendant established a reasonable probability that his plea counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of the plea process, he was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. The order was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

Sexual Assault on a Child—Illegal Sentencing—Consecutive Sentences—Concurrent Sentences—Sentence Enhancers—Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998—Double Jeopardy—Due Process—Laches—Speedy Sentencing—Cruel and Unusual Punishment. A jury found Wiseman guilty of acts constituting sexual assault on a child under the age of 15 by one in a position of trust. Wiseman received four sentences, three of which were to run consecutively, and one to run concurrent to two others. While Wiseman was incarcerated in the Department of Corrections (DOC), the district court, at the DOC's request, reviewed his sentence and determined that consecutive terms were mandated by law on all four of his sentences. The effect of the court's order was to increase Wiseman's sentence to 46 years imprisonment. On appeal, Wiseman contended that he was subject to, at most, two convictions and sentences in this case, and that the district court erred in determining that consecutive sentences were statutorily required. Counts seven and eight did not encompass "additional" substantive crimes for which one or more separate sentences could be imposed they acted as mere sentence enhancers for counts one and three. Consequently, in entering separate convictions and sentences for counts seven and eight, the district court erred. As to the types of sentences, concurrent sentencing is required when offenses are supported by identical evidence. Here, Wiseman's convictions were not supported by identical evidence and arose out of different incidents. Under the circumstances, Wiseman was subject to concurrent or consecutive sentencing, in the court's discretion. The district court, therefore, erred in concluding that it was statutorily required to impose consecutive sentences. Wiseman requested that the case be remanded for reinstatement of the original judgment of conviction and sentences. But Wiseman's crimes were punishable by indeterminate sentencing under the Colorado Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act of 1998 (SOLSA). Thus, Wiseman's original and revised sentences were both illegal, and a remand for the imposition of a "legal" indeterminate sentence under SOLSA is required: Wiseman must be sentenced for each conviction to an indeterminate sentence having a minimum term of a certain number of years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. Wiseman objected to the imposition of another sentence that could expose him to the potential of serving life in prison. He asserted that imposing an indeterminate sentence at this point in time, over 15 years after he was initially sentenced, violated double jeopardy, due process, laches, speedy sentencing, and cruel and unusual punishment principles. Because Wiseman was put on notice by the statute that his offense would be subject to an indeterminate sentence, he lacked a legitimate expectation of finality in his original sentence. Thus, correcting the illegal sentence does not violate double jeopardy. There is no due process violation because Wiseman has no fundamental right to avoid serving a lawful sentence of which he should have been aware, and the State of Colorado has legitimate interests in the correct application of its laws and avoiding the precedential risk of irregular enforcement of its laws. The doctrine of laches is not applicable in the context of a Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Court of Appeals found no basis on which Wiseman may assert that resentencing him would violate a constitutional right to speedy sentencing under Crim. P. 32(b). Lastly, the Court disagreed that the imposition of a legal, indeterminate sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment because (1) Wiseman's premise that he had an expectation that he would be immediately released on parole under his original sentence is wrong, and (2) such a claim cannot be predicated on the negligence of executive agencies or the courts in failing to impose or correct a sentence at a much earlier date. The sentence was vacated and the case was remanded with instructions.

Bank Robbery—Joinder—Special Prosecutor—Statements to Police—Settlement Negotiations—CRE 408. Butson was charged in three cases with bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery. Butson was interviewed by police, waived his Miranda rights, and provided details about the planning and commission of the robberies. He later moved to suppress his statements on the theory that he made them during the course of settlement discussions and therefore they were inadmissible at trial under CRE 408. The trial court denied the motion. Butson was also charged with witness tampering based on a letter he sent to a witness. Because the prosecutor in the bank robbery cases had handled the letter, Butson contended that he was entitled to a special prosecutor in all of his cases. The court determined that the prosecutor was not a potential witness in the witness tampering case and denied Butson's request for a special prosecutor. The prosecution moved to join the three bank robbery cases for trial, which motion was granted, and a jury found Butson guilty of all but two counts. The witness tampering case was later dismissed. On appeal, Butson first contended that the district court erred by joining the three bank robbery cases for trial. A trial court may try two or more criminal complaints together if the offenses could have been joined in a single complaint. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same charging document if the offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on two or more connected acts or transactions or are part of a common scheme or plan. Here, Butson and his sons committed all of the robberies during the course of a few months, all involved the same banks in relatively close proximity to each other, and all were sufficiently similar in planning and execution. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in joining the cases for trial. Butson next contended that where the lead prosecutor in the consolidated bank robbery cases was endorsed as a witness in the later-filed witness tampering case, the district court erred in denying his motion for a special prosecutor. Butson argued that a special prosecutor was necessary to prevent the appearance of impropriety created by the prosecutor's potential appearance as a witness in the related witness tampering case. However, appearance of impropriety is not a basis for disqualification, and Butson failed to show any prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Butson's motion for a special prosecutor. Butson also contended that his statements to police during a custodial interrogation constituted settlement negotiations, or an offer to compromise a claim, and therefore the interview was inadmissible under CRE 408 to prove his guilt. Generally, Rule 408 bars the admission in a criminal proceeding of statements made in connection with the settlement of a civil claim. As Butson acknowledges, his statements to police, even if construed as an offer to compromise, were made during discussions concerning criminal charges, not a civil claim. Moreover, his statements, which he made to a government agent, would be admissible under an exception to the rule. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress the statements. The judgment was affirmed.

Estate—Jurisdiction—Constructive Trust—Testamentary Capacity—Undue Influence—Jury Trial—Contempt. Dr. Arlen E. Owens (the decedent) hired Dominguez as his private caregiver in 2010. The decedent died in July 2013. After the decedent's death, his brother and only living heir, Owens, filed a petition for informal probate of the decedent's will, and later a petition for determination of testacy and for determination of heirs, alleging that the will that the decedent had signed in 2012 was the product of undue influence by Dominguez and that the decedent had lacked the capacity to execute the will. He also filed a complaint for recovery of estate assets and asked the court to invalidate the will and order the decedent's estate to be administered under intestate distribution statutes. In 2015, Owens also filed a petition to set aside non-probate transfers for three bank accounts for which Dominguez was payable-on-death (POD) beneficiary. The court imposed a constructive trust over the POD accounts. The court later upheld the will but found that the decedent had not had the capacity to execute the POD designations and had been unduly influenced by Dominguez. After issuance of the final judgment, the court issued a contempt order against Dominguez for violating the constructive trust that included the condition that she could purge the contempt by paying back the money from the bank accounts. On appeal, Dominguez contended that the district court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the POD designations and impose a constructive trust on the POD accounts because Owens and the estate did not have standing to make such requests. A district court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection with estates. The claims regarding the POD designations arose in connection with and were essential to the estate administration. Thus, the court had jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust, Owens had standing, and the court had jurisdiction to resolve the issues surrounding the POD designations. Dominguez next asserted that the district court erred when it determined that the decedent had not had the testamentary capacity to designate Dominguez as beneficiary of the POD accounts and that Dominguez had unduly influenced the decedent to designate her as beneficiary of the three accounts. However, the record supports the court's factual findings and its assessment of the credibility of each witness, and the Court of Appeals did not displace the district court's conclusions. Dominguez next argued that the district court erred when it prevented her from exercising her right to a jury trial. Because Dominguez had the opportunity to exercise her right to a jury trial and failed to do so, she waived her claims to such right. Dominguez also contended that the district court erred in concluding that the existence of nonliquid assets can be the basis for determining that a contemnor has the present ability to pay. Here, Dominguez could not provide a coherent, consistent account of what had happened to the funds in the POD accounts. The contempt order was supported by analysis of evidence on the record. Thus, the court did not err in holding Dominguez in contempt. The Court of Appeals also concluded that neither party was entitled to attorney fees. The judgments were affirmed.

Marital Agreement—Creditor Claim—Final Order—Notice of Appeal—Evidence. Before their wedding, Mr. and Mrs. Gadash executed an antenuptial agreement (the first marital agreement). Under the terms of the first marital agreement, each spouse waived any right to the other's pre-marital property. In 1978, they entered into a second marital agreement, wherein Mrs. Gadash waived her right to an elective share of Mr. Gadash's estate and any benefit that would pass to her from it. In 2001, Mr. and Mrs. Gadash entered into a third marital agreement, wherein they mutually waived rights to certain real property listed in two exhibits attached to the agreement. The third marital agreement specifically incorporated the terms of the first marital agreement but was silent as to the second marital agreement. In 2008, Mr. Gadash executed his last will and testament. In it, he left all of his probate estate to his daughter, who is the personal representative of the estate. He also left a $2,000 gift to Mrs. Gadash. Mr. Gadash died in 2014. His will was admitted to probate in an unsupervised estate administration. Mrs. Gadash later filed a petition for spouse's elective share of the estate and filed a separate creditor's claim against the personal representative for compensation for end-of-life services. The probate court ruled that the creditor's claim was barred for failure to protest the personal representative's notice of disallowance before the statutory deadline. Separately, the court denied the petition for spouse's elective share. On appeal, Mrs. Gadash contended that the probate court erred in barring her creditor's claim. The personal representative contended that the probate court's order barring the creditor's claim was a final order that Mrs. Gadash failed to timely appeal. Mrs. Gadash's petition for spouse's elective share and creditor's claim initiated independent proceedings. Therefore, the probate court's order barring Mrs. Gadash's creditor's claim was a final order, which Mrs. Gadash failed to timely appeal, and the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider this claim. Mrs. Gadash also contended that the probate court erred when it considered the terms of the second marital agreement in denying her petition for spouse's elective share. Specifically, she argued that the second marital agreement was rendered void by the third marital agreement. The third marital agreement contained no language indicating that it constituted the entire agreement between the parties with respect to its subject matter, and it expressly limited its scope to "only . . . those properties described" in the exhibits attached to the third marital agreement. It said nothing about the already existing document pertaining to the same general subject matter, nor did it purport to supersede the second marital agreement. Moreover, the second and third marital agreements govern distinct property. Thus, they are independently enforceable and can be given full force and effect without contradicting one another. Therefore, the third marital agreement did not render the second marital agreement void and the probate court properly considered the second marital agreement. The appeal was dismissed in part and the order was affirmed.

Firefighter—Injury—Occupational Disability Benefits—Fire and Police Pension Association—Policemen's and Firemen's Pension Reform Act—Fire Chief—Amended Complaint. Dolan joined North Metro Fire Rescue in 1986, and in 2007, he sustained an injury that prevented him from passing the physical tests for firefighting duties. After approximately two years of attempted rehabilitation, North Metro terminated Dolan. Dolan promptly filed for occupational disability benefits with the Fire and Police Pension Association (FPPA). While working for North Metro, Dolan also worked for the Elk Creek Fire Protection District: he was Elk Creek's paid fire chief from 1998 through 2003 he returned as a volunteer in 2008 and in 2010, he was again hired as a paid fire chief. Dolan initially received disability benefits, but these were later revoked based on a finding that because his position at Elk Creek had involved fire protection, he was ineligible for benefits under the Policemen's and Firemen's Pension Reform Act (the Act). A hearing officer recommended that Dolan repay the benefits he received after he signed his employment contract with Elk Creek in 2010, and the FPPA's Board of Director's (Board) affirmed the recommendation. Dolan filed for CRCP review of the Board's decision in district court and also asserted several common law claims against FPPA. The district court affirmed the Board's decision. Dolan then moved to amend his complaint, which was denied as untimely, and a trial was held on his remaining common law claims. The court found for FPPA and entered final judgment against Dolan. On appeal, Dolan argued that the Board and the district court misapplied the law in discontinuing his disability benefits because, since his termination from North Metro, he was never re-employed in a position directly involved with the provision of fire protection under the Act. Re-employment in a full-time salaried position that directly involves the provision of fire protection precludes a firefighter from collecting disability benefits. Because Dolan acted in a command capacity at the scenes of fires and accidents, the hearing officer concluded it was not necessary to find that he was involved in "hands on" firefighting or medical care to conclude that his position was directly involved with the provision of fire protection. The Board adopted the hearing officer's conclusions of fact and law that Dolan's duties as Elk Creek fire chief directly involved fire protection. Because nothing in the Act suggests that re-employment at a position directly involved with the provision of fire protection must be limited to physically fighting fires, the district court and the Board did not misapply the law in determining that Dolan was no longer eligible for disability benefits after re-employment at Elk Creek. Dolan also argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint when it determined his claim was untimely. Dolan sought leave to amend his complaint on August 30, 2013, approximately one year after he filed his initial complaint, seven months after the district court initially found in favor of the FPPA, and four months after the district court finalized its CRCP 106 order. Because Dolan presented the district court with an as-applied challenge to the FPPA regulations, the court correctly determined that claim was time barred by CRCP 106(b). Further, even if Dolan's claim presented a facial challenge to the FPPA regulations, the court's denial of his claim was not error because Dolan failed to show that his delay in bringing the claim was justified. The judgment was affirmed.

Crim. P. 35(c)—Notice—Public Defender. Higgins pleaded guilty to felony menacing, and the court sentenced him to 18 months in prison. Higgins thereafter filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion and requested counsel to represent him on his motion. The district court sent a copy of Higgins's motion to the prosecution and, after receiving the prosecution's response, denied the motion without a hearing and without hearing from the public defender's office. On appeal, Higgins contended that the district court erred by departing from the procedure outlined in Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) and (V) and that the court's error required reversal. The court has the authority to summarily deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing if the motion, files, and the record clearly show the defendant is not entitled to relief. However, if the court does not summarily deny the motion, the court is required to send a copy of the motion to the prosecutor and, if defendant has requested counsel, to the public defender's office, who are given an opportunity to respond to the motion. Here, the court failed to send a copy of the motion to the public defender's office. Thus, the court erred by departing from the Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV) and (V) mandatory procedure. The error was not harmless because it affected the fairness of the proceedings. The order was reversed and the case was remanded.

Harassment—Text Messages—Evidence—Domestic Violence—Sentencing—Sixth Amendment. The victim and Heisler dated for three years. After they broke up, the victim told Heisler that she no longer wished to communicate with him. Heisler ignored the victim's request and sent her numerous text messages and letters, and eventually traveled from Florida, where he lived, to Colorado to talk to the victim in person—uninvited and unannounced. When the victim saw Heisler outside of her home, she called the police. Heisler was ultimately found guilty of harassment and sentenced to jail time and probation, and because the conduct underlying his conviction included an act of domestic violence, he was ordered to complete domestic violence treatment. On appeal, Heisler contended that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the text messages he sent to the victim because they were not properly authenticated under CRE 901(a). Here, the prosecution introduced printouts of the text messages, and the victim testified that they accurately reflected the texts she received, she recognized the number as being Heisler's and had used that number to communicate with him, and she recognized the content of the text messages as being from Heisler. In addition, the content of the text messages included corroborative evidence that they came from Heisler. Accordingly, the text messages were properly authenticated and it was not error to admit them into evidence. Heisler also contended that the domestic violence sentencing statute, CRS § 18-6-801(1)(a), is facially violative of his constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He argued that the statute improperly authorizes the trial court to make a factual determination that the underlying crime of conviction included an act of domestic violence and unconstitutionally imposes a mandatory penalty (domestic violence treatment) above the minimum of the presumptive sentencing range (here, a $50 fine). He further contended that the trial court should have instructed the jury to determine whether his offense included an act of domestic violence and erred in denying his request for that instruction. CRS § 18-6-801(1) allows a trial court to make a factual finding that the defendant's underlying criminal conviction included an act of domestic violence. Court-ordered domestic violence treatment is not a form of punishment, and the statute does not mandate a penalty. The court did not err in denying Heisler's request for a jury instruction. No Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The judgment and sentence were affirmed.

Forum Non Conveniens—Judicial Inefficiency—Double Recovery. Cox, a Colorado resident, stayed at a hotel in California owned by defendant Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC (Sage). Sage's members are Colorado residents, and its principal place of business is in Denver. WS HDM, LLC (WS HDM), incorporated in Delaware and licensed to do business in California, owns and operates the hotel. Cox fell on the hotel property and fractured his femur. Cox sued Sage in Denver District Court and WS HDM in California state court. Sage's motion to dismiss the action in Denver District Court under the doctrine of forum non conveniens was granted. On appeal, Cox argued that the Denver District Court erred in granting Sage's motion to dismiss because there were no unusual circumstances sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of Colorado courts hearing cases brought by Colorado residents. Colorado law is clear that the doctrine of forum non conveniens has "only the most limited application in Colorado courts." Thus, unless there are "most unusual circumstances," a Colorado resident's choice of a Colorado forum will not be disturbed. Cox is a Colorado resident and claims to prefer to sue Sage in Colorado. Even though Cox filed a related suit in California state court, the existence of that lawsuit does not trump Cox's choice of forum in Colorado. Further, the California state court suit is against a different defendant, and the record does not indicate that the joinder of Sage in Cox's California state court suit is mandatory. Nor does the risk of double recovery overcome the presumption in favor of Colorado courts hearing suits filed by Colorado resident plaintiffs. The Denver District Court erred in dismissing Cox's action. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Dependency and Neglect—Allocation of Parental Responsibilities—Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The Mesa County Department of Human Services (Department) assumed temporary custody of 8-year-old M.S. and initiated a dependency and neglect proceeding. Mother lived in Texas. The court, by stipulation, adjudicated M.S. dependent or neglected. The Department then moved for a permanent allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) for M.S. to mother. The magistrate determined it was in M.S.'s best interests to be placed with mother and issued an order granting permanent APR to mother. Father appealed, and a Court of Appeals' division dismissed for failure to obtain district court review. Father then filed a petition for district court review, which was denied, and he appealed again. Initially, the Court of Appeals addressed the Department's argument that the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) does not apply to dependency and neglect proceedings once a child has been adjudicated dependent and neglected. The UCCJEA does not exempt any stage of a dependency and neglect proceeding from its purview. The Court, sua sponte, concluded that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue the permanent APR order. Under the UCCJEA, the court that makes an initial custody determination generally retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. As a result, a Colorado court, absent temporary emergency jurisdiction, may only modify a custody order issued by an out-of-state court under limited circumstances. Here, a California court had issued a custody order before the initiation of the dependency and neglect proceeding. The magistrate did not confer with the California court that issued the custody order or make a determination as to whether the California court had lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Consequently, the magistrate failed to acquire jurisdiction under the UCCJEA before issuing the APR order that effectively modified the California custody order. The judgment was vacated and the matter was remanded to the district court to direct the magistrate to determine whether it has jurisdiction to issue an APR order that modifies the California custody order.

Termination of Parental Rights—Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978—Continuing Inquiries. In 2013, the Chaffee County Department of Social Services (Department) initiated a dependency and neglect proceeding involving Tr.D. Respondents denied the child was a member or eligible for membership in an Indian tribe, and the Department represented it had determined the child was not an Indian child. The petition was later withdrawn and the case closed. In 2015, the Department initiated another dependency and neglect proceeding concerning Tr.D. and 6-month-old A.D. after mother and father were arrested on drug charges. The children were placed in foster care and adjudicated dependent and neglected. Treatment plans were developed for both parents, but neither could overcome their addictions. The Department ultimately filed a petition to terminate parental rights and stated that the children were not Indian children. No evidence concerning the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was elicited at the termination hearing. The trial court terminated parental rights and found the provisions of the ICWA did not apply. On appeal, mother argued that the record failed to support the court's ICWA finding because no questions were asked about possible Indian heritage during the proceedings and therefore the Department didn't meet its "continuing inquiry" duty under the ICWA. The Department argued that the ICWA issue was resolved in the prior case and the trial court satisfied the ICWA requirements in this case because it took judicial notice of its ICWA finding in the previous case. The Department reasoned that because A.D. is a full sibling of Tr.D., the court's previous finding as to Tr.D. must also apply to her. The ICWA required the Department to conduct new inquiries to determine whether the children were Indian children. Because there was no evidence in the record of such inquiries, further proceedings were required. Because the ICWA inquiry may result in the court determining that the children are not Indian children, the Court of Appeals addressed the other issues raised on appeal. Mother argued that the grounds for terminating her parental rights were not established by clear and convincing evidence. Based on the record before it, the Court disagreed. Father argued that the record did not support the finding that reasonable efforts were made to avoid the removal of the children from their home and to promote reunification of the family. Specifically, father argued that a dispute over venue delayed his ability to participate in a drug program, averring that reasonable efforts required not just providing services, but providing services "at the right time." The Court determined that father waived his right to raise this issue when he expressly agreed to hold the motion to change venue in abeyance and therefore failed to seek a ruling from the court. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Unlawful Possession—Prescription—Affirmative Defense—Prosecutorial Misconduct. Defendant was charged with simple possession after the police found Percocet and Vicodin in her purse for which she did not have a prescription. At trial, defendant's neighbor testified that she had prescriptions for both medications and that she had asked defendant to hold her prescriptions while they were out that evening because her purse was too small and she did not wish to leave the medications at home. A jury convicted defendant of possession and the trial court sentenced her to probation. On appeal, defendant contended that she could lawfully possess the medications if she was "acting at the direction of the legal owner of the controlled substance," and the trial court erred by failing to give the jury an affirmative defense instruction. The language defendant relies on in CRS § 18-18-413 may present a defense to the crime of unauthorized possession of a prescribed controlled substance. However, CRS § 18-18-413 is a separate offense, and it does not present an affirmative defense to unlawful possession under CRS § 18-18-403.5, under which defendant was charged. Further, the trial court did not err in failing to tie the instruction to the elemental instructions given to the jury because the error would have to have been plain and obvious, which it was not. Thus, the trial court did not commit plain error by declining to adopt this construction sua sponte. Defendant further contended that the trial court plainly erred by not giving an affirmative defense instruction based on the prescription exception in CRS § 18-18-302(3)(c), which allows lawful possession by "[a]n ultimate user or a person in possession" of the medication "pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner." CRS § 18-18-302(3)(c) is an affirmative defense to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. However, this affirmative defense did not apply to the charges against defendant because she did not have a valid prescription from a practitioner. Further, even assuming that the court erred in sua sponte failing to give this affirmative defense, such error would not be reversible error because it was not obvious and substantial. Finally, defendant argued that the prosecutor committed reversible error by arguing that CRS § 18-18-413 was not an affirmative defense to CRS § 18-18-403.5 and by misstating the evidence in closing arguments. Because CRS § 18-18-413 is not an affirmative defense to CRS § 18-18-403.5, and the prosecutor's statements were reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor's arguments both during voir dire and closing argument were proper.

Contract—Limitation on Liability—Setoff—Jury Award—Statutory Costs—Prejudgment Interest—Post-Judgment Interest—Expert Testimony—Willful and Wanton—Settlement Statute—Costs. Taylor Morrison of Colorado, Inc. (Taylor) was the developer of a residential subdivision. Taylor contracted with Terracon Consultants, Inc. (Terracon) to provide geotechnical engineering and construction materials testing services for the development of the subdivision. Taylor and Terracon agreed to cap Terracon's total aggregate liability to Taylor at $550,000 (Limitation) for any and all damages or expenses arising out of its services or the contract. After homeowners notified Taylor about drywall cracks in their houses, Taylor investigated the complaints and then sued Terracon and other contractors for damages relating to those defects. After trial, the jury awarded Taylor $9,586,056 in damages, but also found that Terracon's conduct was not willful and wanton. The court concluded that the Limitation includes costs and prejudgment interest and applied it to reduce the jury's $9,586,056 damages award to $550,000. It also deducted the $592,500 settlement received from the other liable parties to arrive at zero dollars. The court found that neither party prevailed for purposes of awarding statutory interest and further concluded that neither Terracon's deposit of $550,000 into the court registry nor its email to Taylor addressing a mutual dismissal constituted a statutory offer of settlement that would have allowed Terracon a costs and fees award. On appeal, Taylor contended that the trial court erroneously deducted the setoff from the Limitation instead of deducting it from the jury damages verdict. The correct approach is to first apply the setoff against the jury verdict and then apply the contractual limitation against this reduced amount. Thus, Terracon's liability according to the Limitation should have been a final judgment of $550,000 for Taylor. Taylor next contended that the trial court erred when it concluded that the Limitation, by its terms, includes statutory costs and prejudgment interest. The pertinent contract language states that the Limitation applies to "any and all" expenses "including attorney and expert fees." Thus, the Limitation's language covers costs associated with interpreting and enforcing the contract. Taylor further argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the Limitation does not include prejudgment interest within its cap on liability. The Limitation caps Terracon's liability for "any and all injuries, damages, claims, losses, or expenses." (Emphasis in original.) Because prejudgment interest is a form of damages, the Limitation also covers prejudgment interest. Taylor also asserted that post-judgment interest is not covered by the Limitation. The Court of Appeals agreed because post-judgment interest is not an element of compensatory damages. Taylor next argued that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony concerning willful and wanton conduct was reversible error. Here, the court allowed the experts to testify about the factual conduct and opine on Terracon's performance using characterizations within their expertise, but prevented testimony about legal concepts outside their expertise and whether a legal standard was met. Terracon argued on cross-appeal that the trial court erred by not awarding it costs under Colorado's settlement statute. Terracon's deposit of $550,000 into the court registry pursuant to CRCP 67(a) was not a settlement offer because Taylor did not have the option to reject it. The statute requires both an offer and a rejection thus the statute was not triggered, and Terracon is not entitled to costs. Further, Terracon's email did not comply with CRS § 13-17-202 because this alleged "settlement offer" contained nonmonetary conditions that extended the offer beyond the claims at issue. Therefore, there was no error in denying costs to Terracon.

Claimant sustained a back injury at work lifting a hydraulic unit from his truck. Within two months he was back to work and placed at maximum medical improvement. Soon thereafter he complained of excruciating lower back pain, but both his original doctor and a specialist concluded that this new lumbar strain was not work-related but related to normal age-related degenerative changes. Claimant sought temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits from the date of his injury and temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from when his low back pain flared up. An administrative law judge (ALJ) rejected the request for benefits, finding that (1) his lower back pain was unrelated to his work injury, and (2) because he had continued working, claimant had not suffered a wage loss and was not entitled to either TPD or TTD benefits. The ALJ dismissed his requests. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed but remanded the case to the ALJ to determine whether claimant was entitled to change his physician. On appeal, claimant argued the separation of powers doctrine is violated by having workers' compensation cases heard in the executive branch. In rejecting this argument, the Court of Appeals followed Dee Enterprises v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, which held that the statutory scheme for deciding workers' compensation cases does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Claimant then argued his equal protection claims should be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard. The Court held that the rational basis test applies to equal protection challenges in the workers' compensation context. Under that test, "a statutory classification is presumed constitutional and does not violate equal protection unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the classification does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose." Claimant argued that his and other workers' compensation litigants' rights to equal protection were violated because workers' compensation cases are not heard by judges. The Court concluded that legitimate governmental goals provide a rational basis for employing executive branch ALJs and the Panel to decide workers' compensation cases. The Court rejected claimant's contention that his right to equal protection was violated because his claim was heard by an ALJ and the Panel. Claimant then contended that the Panel's dual role as decision-maker and then-named litigant if a case is appealed "reeks of impropriety." The requirement that the Panel be added as a party is not arbitrary and serves the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act of ensuring thorough and expeditious review and enforcement of ALJ and Panel orders. Claimant also challenged on equal protection grounds CRS § 8-43-404(5)(a)(II)(A), which exempts governmental entities and health care providers from providing an injured worker with a list of four physicians from whom the worker may seek medical care for his injury. The Court concluded that a rational basis exists for excluding employees of those two types of employers from the four-physician referral requirement. Thus, there was no equal protection violation. The Court rejected claimant's three non-constitutional arguments, which were that: (1) the exemption from the four-physician referral requirement did not apply because claimant's employer did not meet the requirements of CRS § 8-43-404(5)(a)(II)(A) (2) substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's factual findings and (3) the ALJ made numerous evidentiary errors.

Claimant was president of the local union. She worked for Pueblo County (employer). Union membership is required for workers in a bargaining unit, and union dues are deducted from workers' paychecks. Participation in union meetings is voluntary. Claimant stayed after work for a union meeting, which was held immediately after claimant clocked out for the day and took place in a conference room in the building in which she worked. The purpose of the meeting was to review and revise the new collective bargaining agreement. After the meeting, claimant walked to the adjacent parking lot where she normally parked for work. While getting in her car, she slipped on ice and injured herself. She filed a workers' compensation claim for her medical expenses. An administrative law judge (ALJ) denied and dismissed the claim, finding the claimant "was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injury." The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) disagreed, finding the union activities were "sufficiently incidental" to claimant's work "as to be properly considered as arising out of and in the course of employment." It remanded to the ALJ to determine benefits. On remand, the ALJ ordered employer to pay all of claimant's reasonable, necessary, and related medical expenses. The Panel affirmed. On appeal, employer argued that the Panel erred in holding that the post-work injury sustained immediately following claimant's attendance at a union meeting arose out of and in the course of employment. An injury arises out of employment when it originates in an employee's work-related functions and is sufficiently related to those functions to be considered part of employment. It is not essential that an employee be engaged in an obligatory job function. This was a case of first impression in Colorado but has been addressed in a number of other states. In general, injuries sustained during "unilateral union activities conferring, if any, only a remote or indirect benefit upon the employing enterprise" are not covered. However, the leading treatise recognizes a trend toward finding a mutual employer-employee benefit in actions of union officers. The Court of Appeals concluded that union activity cases in Colorado should be analyzed under the mutual benefit doctrine to determine compensability. This doctrine requires courts to examine the circumstances of each case to determine whether a union activity is of mutual benefit to the employer and employee. Here, where a union officer participated in a union meeting that served to facilitate ongoing negotiations between the union and employer concerning a new collective bargaining agreement, there was mutual benefit to employer and employee. Further, once mutual benefit is established, the location of the injury is not determinative. Accordingly, the injuries sustained were compensable.

Workers' Compensation—Occupational Disease—Apportionment—Previous Injury. Claimant Hutchison has worked as a trailer mechanic for Pine Country, Inc. (employer) since 1990. Claimant began experiencing knee pain in 2012. In October 2014, when his symptoms worsened, claimant reported his knee pain to his employer as a work-related occupational disease. The employer contested the claim on relatedness grounds, and supported its position with an independent medical examination, which concluded that claimant had osteoarthritis and was overweight and suggested that claimant's employment was not the cause of the arthritis. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that one-third of claimant's injury was work-related. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed the ALJ's decision.On appeal, claimant challenged the apportionment of his benefits award. Claimant contended that his knee condition arose from repetitive kneeling and crawling necessitated by his work as a trailer mechanic, rather than from a specific incident, and therefore, it should be covered as an occupational disease. Here, because claimant's knee condition was one ongoing disease with both work- and non-work- related causes, there was no separate "previous injury" as anticipated by CRS § 8-42-104(3) it was instead one injury with multiple causes. The Panel therefore properly concluded that the CRS § 8-42-104(3) prohibition against apportionment for a previous injury did not apply. Further, the order is consistent with case law. Claimant also contended that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's apportionment. The Court of Appeals concluded that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's apportionment findings and held that the Panel did not err when it declined to set aside the ALJ's order on that basis. The order was affirmed.

Batson Challenges—Peremptory Strikes—Jurors—Testimony—Expert Opinion—Lay Witness—Prosecutorial Misconduct—Jury Instructions—Cumulative Error Doctrine. Defendant was charged with first degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first degree burglary. Among other evidence presented, his girlfriend and Detective Garcia testified at his trial. He was convicted as charged and sentenced. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred when it denied his challenges, under Batson v. Kentucky, to the prosecutor's peremptory strikes excusing three prospective jurors—one who identified himself as African-American and two who identified themselves as Hispanic—asserting that the prosecutor's "race-neutral" reasons for removing the jurors were not worthy of belief. One challenged juror was disinterested, the second juror had a negative experience with law enforcement and a belief that police officers sometimes misidentify suspects, and the third juror had previously faced criminal charges from the same district attorney's office and had a negative view of law enforcement. Therefore, the trial court's Batson findings are supported by the record. Defendant next argued that the admission of several portions of Garcia's testimony constituted reversible error: (1) Garcia was not admitted as an expert witness, but gave opinions regarding whether the gun depicted in the video surveillance was real. Although this was improper, it did not constitute plain error. (2) Garcia testified about the manner in which the gun was being used. Any error in admitting this testimony was harmless. (3) It was not error for Garcia to identify defendant. No specialized knowledge is necessary to recognize an individual in a video and this evidence was probative of a material fact. (4) Garcia testified regarding probable cause, which was not relevant however, this was not plain error. (5) Garcia testified but had no personal information about the reasons why defendant's girlfriend was crying during the police interview. This testimony was not obviously improper and did not undermine the fairness of the trial. (6) Garcia opined about defendant's statement regarding another perpetrator. Even if this was improper, it did not undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial. (7) Garcia opined about the truthfulness of defendant's statements to police. Though this testimony was improper, it does not rise to the level of plain error because there was other sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Defendant next asserted that the prosecutor engaged in reversible misconduct. Although the prosecutor stepped over the line when he repeatedly suggested that the girlfriend was committing perjury, the prosecutor did not threaten or coerce her, and any misconduct was not reversible. The prosecutor also commented on the girlfriend's truthfulness. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that her testimony was false, and thus these comments were proper. Finally, although the court did not condone the prosecutor's comment on defendant's decision not to testify, the comment did not amount to plain error. Defendant further argued that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the predicate crime of theft and when it failed to define the word "intent." While the jury instructions were deficient, (1) the record demonstrates that the specification of the underlying crime was not a controverted element of the burglary offense therefore, the court's failure to instruct the jury on theft was not plain error, and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the court's failure to define the culpable mental state similarly did not constitute plain error. Finally, defendant argued that the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors and prosecutorial misconduct violated his right to a fair trial. The errors were relatively small events occurring over a two-day trial during which substantial evidence was presented. Defendant received a fair trial in spite of the identified errors. The judgment was affirmed.

Protection Order—Constitutionality—Evidence—Possession of Weapon. A police officer observed L.C. in a public park after hours. The officer contacted L.C. and discovered that he was subject to a protection order, which provided, among other things, that L.C. was not to "possess or control a firearm or other weapon." When the officer searched L.C.'s backpack, he found a knife with a five and one-half inch blade inside a sheath. L.C. was found guilty of violating a protective order and unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. He was adjudicated delinquent and sentenced to probation. L.C. petitioned for district court review, which was denied. On appeal, L.C. contended that CRS § 18-12-105, which defines the offense of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The statute is not unconstitutionally vague, and the merits of L.C.'s overbreadth argument were not addressed because he did not raise it in the district court. L.C. also contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he carried a concealed knife "on or about his . . . person," as required to sustain a conviction for the statutory violation. He argued that because the knife was in a sheath in an interior zippered compartment of his backpack, it was not readily accessible and therefore was not "on or about" his person. The Court of Appeals disagreed with L.C.'s interpretation. L.C. further contended that because the prosecution failed to prove that he did anything directed at the protected person named in the protection order, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated it. Violation of a protective order does not always require proof that the accused contacted the protected person. Thus, evidence that the protection order contained a provision prohibiting L.C. from possessing a weapon and that L.C. was found in possession of a weapon was sufficient to sustain his conviction for violation of a protection order. The judgment was affirmed.

Condemnation—Highest and Best Use—Lost Income—Costs. The Board of County Commissioners of Weld County (the County) filed a petition in condemnation to extend a public road over 19 acres of DPG Farms, LLC's 760-acre property (the property). When condemnation proceedings were initiated, the property was used primarily for agricultural and recreational purposes. The parties stipulated to the County's immediate possession of the 19 acres and proceeded to a valuation trial. The dispute centered on the highest and best use of 280 acres that contained gravel deposits. DPG's experts testified about the highest and best use of the property. The district court determined, as a matter of law, that the evidence was too speculative to support a finding that water storage was the highest and best use of the relevant area (Cell C) instead, it determined that the highest and best use of those acres was gravel mining, but not water storage as well. The jury awarded DPG $183,795 in damages for the condemned property and nothing for the residue. DPG then requested costs. The district court rejected a substantial portion of the costs on grounds that they were disproportionate to DPG's success and that certain expert evidence had been excluded. On appeal, DPG contended that the district court erred in rejecting water storage as the highest and best use of certain portions of the property. The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence that the district court's determination was based on and concluded that the district court did not err in determining, as a matter of law, that the evidence was too speculative to support a jury finding that water storage was the highest and best use of Cell C. DPG also argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of lost income, arguing that it was admissible pursuant to an income capitalization approach to valuing the property. DPG's evidence of a potential income stream was admissible not as the measure of its damages but rather as a factor that could inform the fair market value of the property. And both the appraiser and the mining expert testified that the potential income stream from mining informed their fair market valuations. Because the lost income evidence, on its own, did not reflect the proper measure of damages, the district court correctly excluded it. Finally, because the income valuation evidence presented by DPG's experts was properly excluded, the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting DPG's award of costs on this basis. The judgment and cost order were affirmed.

Ponzi Scheme—Investments—Insurance—Fraud—Personal Jurisdiction—Long Arm Statute—Colorado Securities Act—CRCP 12(b)(2)—CRCP 9(b). This case arises out of a Ponzi scheme that defrauded at least 255 investors out of $15.25 million dollars. To implement the scheme, Schnorenberg formed KJS Marketing, Inc. in Colorado to obtain funds for investment in insurance and financial products sales companies. Schnorenberg hired Reyes, a California resident, and Kahler, a Wyoming resident, to solicit investor funds on behalf of KJS and its successor company, James Marketing. Rome, the Securities Commissioner for the State of Colorado, brought claims against Schnorenberg, Reyes, and Kahler for securities fraud, offer and sale of unregistered securities, and unlicensed sales representative activity. The Commissioner also sought a constructive trust or equitable lien against Schnorenberg's mother (among others), who resides in Wyoming, as a "relief defendant," based on allegations that she received some of the improperly invested funds. Reyes, Kahler, and Schnorenberg's mother moved to dismiss all claims against them under CRCP 12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction. Reyes and Kahler also sought dismissal of the securities fraud claim on the ground that it failed to meet the CRCP 9(b) particularity requirements. (Neither Schnorenberg nor KJS is a party to this appeal.) The district court granted all of these motions without conducting an evidentiary hearing. In written orders, the court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over each of the nonresident defendants, and that the Commissioner's securities fraud claim failed to "link any particular factual allegations to actual false representations" made by Reyes or Kahler. On appeal, the Commissioner contended that the district court erred in dismissing the claims against Reyes, Kahler, and Schnorenberg's mother for lack of personal jurisdiction. Here, the Commissioner sufficiently alleged that Reyes and Kahler violated the Colorado Securities Act (CSA) because the transactions at issue pertained to securities that originated in Colorado. Taking the allegations together, the activities of Reyes and Kahler made it reasonably foreseeable that they could be haled into a Colorado court to answer the allegations. Further, the exercise of jurisdiction over them does not offend due process principles. Schnorenberg's mother received funds from her son that had been transferred from Colorado accounts, and she knew or should have known that the money came from investors in her son's "Colorado-based investment scheme." The Commissioner's action against Schnorenberg's mother arises from her activities' consequences in Colorado, and it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over her, despite the somewhat limited nature of her direct contacts with Colorado. The Commissioner also argued that the district court erred in dismissing the claims against Reyes and Kahler under the CSA on the ground that the Commissioner failed to meet his pleading burden under Rule 9(b). The Commissioner's complaint provided sufficient particularity to give Reyes and Kahler fair notice of the claim for securities fraud and the main facts or incidents upon which it is based. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

Attorney Fee Dispute—Referral Fees—Division of Fees. Grinnan is a general practitioner with limited experience in personal injury cases. Grinnan's friend Kelley asked Grinnan to represent him in a personal injury case. Grinnan obtained Kelley's approval to involve Scott Larson., P.C. in the case, and Larson entered into a contingency fee agreement with the Kelley family. As relevant here, the agreement identified Grinnan as "associated counsel," stated that Grinnan would be paid a percentage of Larson's fee "not to exceed 100%," and provided that Larson was responsible for paying case expenses. Grinnan was not a signatory to the agreement. Larson brought claims against various entities and settled with one early in the case. From Larson's $333,333 fee on this settlement, he sent Grinnan a check for $50,000. After three years of litigation, the case settled. Based on the settlements, the contingent fee agreement entitled Larson to a fee of $3,216,666.67. Larson had incurred about $300,000 in costs. Larson and Grinnan couldn't agree on how to divide the contingent fee. Grinnan entered his appearance, and the court granted his request that all attorney fees paid to Larson be placed in a restricted interest bearing account. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a detailed written order allocating the attorney fees. The trial court declined to divide the fees in proportion to services and found that Grinnan had assumed joint responsibility for the litigation. The court divided the fees by awarding Grinnan 20% of the $333,333.34 from the first settlement and 12.5% of the $2,883,333.33 fee from the other two settlements. The court also awarded Grinnan prejudgment interest at the rate of 8% from the date the settlement checks were issued until final judgment entered on the fees allocated to him. It also awarded Larson interest on the fees placed in the restricted account less the fees awarded to Grinnan (as a wrongful withholding). The court declined to award costs, finding that neither lawyer was the prevailing party. On appeal, Larson asserted that Grinnan never assumed joint responsibility because he did not assume responsibility for the representation as a whole. The Court of Appeals found that Grinnan had assumed one of the two components of joint responsibility—financial responsibility for the case—because of Grinnan's exposure to liability for any malpractice of Larson. A remand was necessary to determine whether he also assumed ethical responsibility, the second component, on which the court had made no findings. As guidance to the trial court on remand, the Court analyzed the ethical responsibility issue. It concluded that a referring lawyer must: actively monitor the progress of the case make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm of the lawyer to whom the case was referred has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct and remain available to the client to discuss the case and provide independent judgment as to any concerns the client may have that the lawyer to whom the case was referred is acting in conformity with the Rules of Professional Conduct. On remand, if the court finds that Grinnan assumed ethical responsibility, the court's fee award will stand, subject to appeal by Larson. If the court finds that Grinnan did not assume ethical responsibility, he is only entitled to fees in proportion to the services he performed, with the referral fees to be reallocated to Larson, subject to appeal by Grinnan. The Court concluded that Grinnan failed to preserve issues he raised on cross-appeal. Grinnan also contended that the trial court erred in finding a wrongful withholding. The Court found no error in the trial court's award of prejudgment interest to Larson based on Grinnan's wrongful withholding. The Court also noted that on remand the trial court could reconsider its decision not to award costs based on its findings on ethical responsibility. The attorney fees award was vacated, the cross-appealed rulings were affirmed, and the case was remanded.

Public Utility—Subject Matter Jurisdiction—Enforcement of Tariffs—Common Law Claims. The Public Service Company of Colorado, d/b/a Xcel Energy Co. (Xcel), is a utility company regulated by the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC). Development Recovery Company, LLC (DRC) was the assignee of claims from real estate developers who entered into extension agreements (agreements) with Xcel for the construction of distribution facilities to provide gas or electric service for homes in new developments. The agreements specified that they were governed by the PUC's rules and regulations and referred several times to Xcel's extension policies. The extension policies on file with the PUC are referred to as tariffs and provide that extension contracts are based on the estimate of the cost to construct and install the necessary facilities to provide the requested service. The tariffs explain in detail how construction costs and payments are to be handled. DRC filed a complaint against Xcel alleging various common law claims and violation of CRS § 40-7-102, related to an unspecified number of agreements between developers and Xcel over the course of 18 years. Xcel moved to dismiss, arguing that this matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC or, alternatively, if the PUC did not have exclusive jurisdiction, the court should nevertheless refer the matter to the PUC under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The district court agreed with Xcel on both grounds and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, DRC argued that the district court has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over DRC's common law claims, asserting that the trial court erred in concluding that the substance of its claims is merely the enforcement of tariffs. The Court of Appeals noted that the PUC has exclusive jurisdiction in its constituted field, including enforcement of tariffs. The Court concluded that all of DRC's claims substantively involved enforcement of the tariffs (essentially, how costs were to be calculated and paid). Further, even if DRC has a cause of action under CRS § 40-7-102, exhaustion of administrative remedies before the PUC is required. DRC also asserted that the district court must have jurisdiction because only it can award the relief sought. DRC cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court simply by requesting relief in the form of damages. Further, the PUC has authority to order reparations where excessive charges have been collected by a public utility for a product or service, which is a potential remedy in this case. The judgment was affirmed.

Custody—Child and Family Investigator—Second Degree Forgery—Attempt to Influence a Public Servant—Invited Error—Waiver—Constructive Amendment—Lesser Included Offense—Jury Instructions—Mens Rea. During a child custody dispute, Hoggard forwarded to the court-appointed child and family investigator a chain of emails between her and her ex-husband. Hoggard allegedly falsified that email chain by adding five sentences that made it appear that her ex-husband had threatened her. As a result of that alleged falsification, Hoggard was convicted of second degree forgery and attempt to influence a public servant. As an initial matter, the People argued that the doctrines of invited error and waiver preclude appellate review of Hoggard's instructional error claims. Although Hoggard's counsel approved the disputed jury instructions, it was an oversight, not a strategy, and therefore not invited error. Further, the failure to object to the jury instructions was not a waiver under the circumstances of this case. Hoggard contended on appeal that the trial court constructively amended the second degree forgery charge by instructing the jury on the uncharged and more serious offense of felony forgery. Although the trial court's forgery instruction was erroneous, instructing the jury on felony forgery was not a constructive amendment because Hoggard was both charged with and convicted of second degree forgery, a lesser included offense of felony forgery. Further, there is no reasonable likelihood that the instructional error affected the outcome of the trial. Hoggard next argued that her conviction for attempt to influence a public servant must be reversed because the trial court did not instruct the jury on the required mens rea for each element of the offense, thereby violating her constitutional due process rights. Although the trial court's instruction on the charge tracked the statute, it did not expressly require the jury to find that Hoggard acted with intent as to the third and fourth elements of the crime: that she intended to attempt to influence a public servant and that she intended to do so by means of deceit. Nor did the instruction set off the mens rea requirement as a separate element. Accordingly, the trial court's instruction on attempt to influence a public servant was erroneous and the error was obvious at the time of trial. However, because there was no reasonable probability that the trial court's instructional error contributed to Hoggard's conviction, it was therefore not plain error. The judgment was affirmed.

Sex Offender—Registration—Evidence—Affirmative Defense—Uncontrollable Circumstances. Wilson was required to register as a sex offender and failed to do so. He was then convicted of failure to register as a sex offender. On appeal, Wilson contended that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knowingly failed to register as a sex offender. Wilson argued that because he was evicted from the motel he was staying at on the last day of the five-day period, he had an additional five days to register. A defendant is guilty of failing to register as a sex offender when, as relevant here, he does not register with his local law enforcement agency within five business days after being released from incarceration. The evidence is sufficient to support the fact that Wilson knowingly failed to register as a sex offender within five days of being released. Further, the statute required Wilson to register within five days of his release without regard to where he was living or whether his location changed during that five-day period. Wilson next contended that the trial court erred in "disallowing the affirmative defense of uncontrollable circumstances." However, lack of a fixed residence is not an uncontrollable circumstance, and Wilson did not present any credible evidence that uncontrollable circumstances existed that prevented him from registering as a sex offender. Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting his affirmative defense. The judgment was affirmed.

First Degree Assault—Abbreviated Proportionality Review—Habitual Criminal—Prior Convictions—Extended Proportionality Review. A jury convicted Oldright of first degree assault based on evidence that he hit the victim in the head with a metal rod. Following trial, the court conducted an abbreviated proportionality review, adjudicated Oldright a habitual criminal, and sentenced him to 64 years in prison. Oldright's prior offenses included aggravated driving after revocation prohibited, forgery, fraud by check, theft by receiving, and theft. On appeal, Oldright contended that the court erred in finding that the triggering offense was grave or serious. Oldright's triggering offense, first degree assault, is a grave and serious offense because the legislature deems it a crime of violence and an extraordinary risk crime, Oldright used a deadly weapon to commit the crime, and the victim suffered serious bodily injury. Oldright also argued that the court erred in concluding that all of his prior convictions were serious simply because they were felonies. Although first degree assault is a grave and serious offense, not all of Oldright's prior offenses were serious because the General Assembly had reclassified three his prior felony convictions as misdemeanors (making them an ineligible basis for habitual sentencing), and one of the prior felonies from a class 4 felony to a class 5 felony. Because the court failed to consider these legislative changes in determining whether Oldright's sentence was disproportionate, the sentence was vacated and the case was remanded for an extended proportionality review of Oldright's habitual criminal sentence.

In 2014 COA 149, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for failure to poll the jury about exposure to extraneous, prejudicial information. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to this Court. Before the Court's mandate was issued, defendant requested that the Court decide two unresolved issues, either of which could lead to reversal of the judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding her guilty of vehicular homicide, driving under the influence (DUI), and other related charges arising from a collision between her truck and a taxi. The Court granted the request. Defendant first argued that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the DUI affirmative defense of having consumed alcohol between the time she stopped driving and when her blood alcohol testing (BAC) occurred. Defendant testified at trial that she was sober when the accident occurred at about 10:30 a.m., but 15 minutes later, she drank a Vitamin Water bottle that contained one-half 99 proof schnapps. Defendant was contacted by two police officers at 10:58 a.m. She later failed a roadside sobriety test and was taken to a hospital for blood draws. The prosecution presented expert evidence that defendant's BAC would have been .274 at the time of the accident. Defense counsel did not request the trial court to instruct the jury on the DUI affirmative defense of having consumed alcohol between the time she stopped driving and when the testing occurred. It was undisputed that there was sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on the affirmative defense. The prosecution argued that by proving that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, it necessarily disproved the affirmative defense that defendant did not become intoxicated until a later time. As the Supreme Court stated in Montoya v. People, 2017 CO 40, a defense that operates solely by negating elements of the crime is disproved by the proving of those elements. Accordingly, the Court found no error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury sua sponte on the affirmative defense. Defendant then argued, for the first time, that a jury instruction and the court's response to a related jury question reduced the prosecution's burden. The instruction in question explained that "the amount of alcohol in the Defendant's blood at the time of the commission of the offense, or within a reasonable time thereafter, as shown by chemical analysis of the Defendant's blood or breath, gives rise to the following [listing of statutory presumptions]." During deliberations, the jury asked whether this was at or around 10:30 a.m. (the time of the accident) or at any time thereafter (on or around the time she was stopped by the police at 10:58 a.m.). Following discussion with counsel, the court answered that it could be either or both, but that any decision must be unanimous. Defense counsel did not object to the instruction and participated in the formulation of the answer to the jury question. The Attorney General thus argued that defendant invited any error. The Court declined to address the invited error argument because defendant did not argue there was an incorrect statement of the law. Defendant's argument that the instruction encouraged conviction based on her intoxication "a reasonable time after" the accident is directly contradicted by another instruction that required the prosecution to prove that defendant had been intoxicated when the accident occurred. In addition, defendant did not show how the jury could have found her heavily intoxicated at 10:58 a.m. but not 28 minutes earlier. Defendant also did not produce evidence to contradict the prosecution's expert that chugging alcohol at 10:45 a.m. would not explain the results of the three later blood draws, given how the body metabolizes alcohol. Finally, prior cases hold that 30 minutes after an accident is not "more than a reasonable time" afterward. Consequently, the Court declined to reconsider whether the prosecution disproved the affirmative defense. The Court interpreted defendant's last argument as raising a temporal discrepancy between the charging document and the references to "a reasonable time after" in the jury instruction and court's response to the question. Based on the extensive colloquy on both the instruction and the court's answer to the jury question, in which defense counsel actively participated, the Court concluded any error was invited. The judgment was affirmed.

At defendant's suppression hearing, Officer Gonzales testified that he saw a truck parked in an alley that then left the alley and eventually parked outside a house for about 15 minutes. The house had been the subject of a search roughly seven weeks earlier that turned up illegal drugs. When the truck drove off, Officer Gonzales followed it, saw it turn without signaling, and pulled it over. Defendant was driving the truck. The officer recognized defendant's passenger from previous contacts with her, "including drug contacts" involving the use of methamphetamine. At Officer Gonzales's request, Sergeant Folks came to the scene with his certified drug-detection dog, Kilo. Kilo alerted, the truck was searched, and the officers found a "glass pipe commonly used to smoke methamphetamine" that contained white residue. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in his truck, arguing that the police violated his constitutional rights by conducting a dog sniff search without reasonable suspicion and by otherwise searching his truck without probable cause. The court denied the suppression motion, the case proceeded to trial, and defendant was convicted of both counts. On appeal, defendant contended that under the Colorado Constitution, the deployment of the drug dog was a search requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The Court of Appeals first noted that Amendment 64 legalized possession for personal use of marijuana of one ounce or less by persons 21 or older. Therefore, under Colorado law, a drug dog's alert can reveal, in addition to contraband, the presence of something in which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy (i.e., the possession of one ounce or less of marijuana). Consequently, a dog sniff should be considered a "search" for purposed of article II, section 7 of the state constitution where the occupants of the vehicle are 21 years or older. Defendant also argued that the dog's alert, in combination with other relevant circumstances, did not give police reasonable suspicion to search his truck and thus the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. A warrantless search effected by a dog sniff of the exterior of a vehicle must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Under the circumstances of this case, the police lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion, the dog sniff was invalid, and the methamphetamine recovered as a result should have been suppressed. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded.

J.C. obtained a temporary civil protection order (CPO), issued on JDF Form 399, against her ex-boyfriend Hartsuff. The county court made the CPO permanent in 2015. Among other things, the CPO states that it does not expire and only the court can change it. It prohibits contact of any kind and includes a notice to the protected person that she cannot give the restrained person permission to change or ignore the order. The restrained person is similarly notified that if he violates the order because he believes the protected person has given permission, he is wrong and can be arrested and prosecuted. J.C. called the police and stated Hartsuff was on her front porch threatening her. In addition, J.C. showed the responding officer text messages and logs of phone calls from Hartsuff over the previous two days. Hartsuff was charged with harassment and violation of a protection order, both as acts of domestic violence. Hartsuff raised the affirmative defense of consent, which the trial court allowed. The district attorney sought judicial review pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4), contending that the harm sought to be prevented by the CPO statute is broader than simply contact between the protected and restrained persons and includes preserving the integrity of a court order and preventing domestic violence. The district court found no abuse of discretion and remanded to proceed with trial. The district attorney appealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether the affirmative defense of consent as defined in CRS § 18-1-505 is available to a defendant who is criminally charged with violating a CPO. The Court of Appeals considered the entire statutory scheme relating to the offense of a violation of a protective order to give effect and meaning to all its parts. Under CRS § 18-1-505, the defense of consent of the victim is not available to any crime unless "the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." The Court found the "harm or evil" clause ambiguous and unclear. It therefore examined the legislative history, consequences of a given construction, and goals of the relevant statutes. Following an extensive analysis, the Court concluded it was error as a matter of law to allow the affirmative defense of consent for the crime of violation of a protection order.

The Weld County Department of Human Services (Department) filed a motion with the juvenile court to dismiss a dependency and neglect petition involving C.S. Father agreed to the dismissal but requested expungement of administrative findings of child abuse made against him by the Department. The court dismissed the case and denied father's request, finding that father could obtain due process through an administrative hearing. On appeal, father argued that the juvenile court denied him a fundamentally fair proceeding when it dismissed the case without also ensuring the expungement of the administrative child abuse filing that led to the filing of the case. The Court of Appeals concluded that the juvenile court lacks authority to order expungement of child abuse and neglect records and reports, and the court's order granting the parties' voluntary dismissal of the petition is not final and appealable. The Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The appeal was dismissed.

While Johnson was serving probation in a criminal impersonation case and deferred judgment in a menacing case, he was charged with, among other things, felony murder and robbery. Johnson was arrested, jailed, and held without bond in the latter case pending his combined preliminary hearing and bond hearing. After Johnson's arrest in the murder case, the prosecution filed motions to revoke his deferred judgment in the menacing case and his probation in the criminal impersonation case based on the offenses charged in the murder case. The revocation court issued an arrest warrant in the menacing and criminal impersonation cases because of allegations that he had not complied with the terms of his probation. The trial court set bond in the murder case. Later the revocation court held a hearing to determine whether it would grant Johnson's request for bond in the menacing and criminal impersonation cases. The revocation court denied these requests, drawing a distinction between these cases and the pending murder case based on the fact that the murder case was preconviction and the other cases were postconviction. On appeal, Johnson asserted that the revocation court was "constitutionally required" to set bond in the menacing case and the criminal impersonation case and abused its discretion when it refused to set bond, with the result that Johnson is being unconstitutionally held without bond. He asserted that the motions to revoke in the menacing case and the criminal impersonation case are "new charges" for which he has a right to bond because he has not yet been "convicted" of them. The Court of Appeals considered whether the same set of rules governs a court's decision to set bond in two categories of cases: cases in which bond is set for persons who have been charged with felonies and are awaiting trial, and cases in which defendants have pleaded guilty to felonies, courts have sentenced them to probation or placed them on deferred judgments, and the prosecution then files motions to revoke the probation or deferred judgments. The Court decided that the same set of rules does not apply because (1) defendants in the first category are presumed to be innocent, but defendants in the second category have admitted their guilt and are not therefore entitled to many of the fundamental rights that those in the first category enjoy. In addition, probation revocation and revocation of deferred judgment proceedings are focused on whether the sentences that courts originally imposed are still appropriate and (2) Colorado's constitution and the pertinent bond statutes recognize the separation between the two categories. In the first, the law requires courts to set bond for defendants who await trial, subject only to a few clearly delineated exceptions. In the second, the law gives discretion to set bond. Here, the Court concluded that Johnson's criminal impersonation and menacing cases fell into the second category the revocation court therefore had discretion to deny his request for bond in those cases and the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his request for bond because the record supported its decision. The appeal was dismissed.

First Degree Arson—Criminal Mischief—Lesser Included Offense—Res Gestae Evidence—Impeachment—CRE 608(b)—Witness Disclosure. Welborne and his mother set fire to the house in which they lived and filed false insurance claims based on the fire. Welborne was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison for arson, six years for criminal mischief, six years for attempted theft, and eight years for theft—all to be served concurrently. On appeal, Welborne contended that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his earlier insurance claims to the same company. The prior false insurance claims involved the same company, related to a material fact, and were logically relevant to the charges. Evidence of Welborne's false but fruitful insurance claims was highly probative of whether he acted to deceive the same insurance company with the intent to permanently deprive it of money. The trial court instructed the jury on the limited purposes of the evidence. The evidence was properly admitted under CRE 404(b) and as res gestae evidence. Welborne further contended that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to impeach him with his California theft conviction. The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of Welborne's prior theft offense under Rule 608(b) as probative of truthfulness or dishonesty. Although the prosecutor presented evidence of the conviction rather than the underlying facts, any error was harmless. Welborne also argued that the trial court erred by barring him from calling a witness to impeach the testimony of his former girlfriend. Disclosure of this witness was not timely, and Welborne's offer of proof did not show that the testimony was admissible or that the witness would impeach the girlfriend's testimony that Welborne had started the fire. Finally, Welborne contended that criminal mischief is an included offense of first degree arson and, therefore, those convictions must merge. Because criminal mischief requires proof that the acts were committed in a single criminal episode, while first degree arson does not, criminal mischief is not an included offense of first degree arson. The judgment was affirmed.

Forgery—Urinalysis Results—Attempt to Influence a Public Servant—Probation—Res Gestae Evidence—Prosecutorial Misconduct. Carian was on probation for possession of a controlled substance, and mandatory drug tests were a condition of his probation. Carian completed some tests, but missed others and also returned tests with positive results. When Carian's probation officer served him with a revocation complaint for various probation violations, Carian handed her fraudulent urine drug test results from Wiz Quiz, an unapproved urinalysis facility. Carian was convicted of forgery and attempting to influence a public servant. On appeal, Carian contended that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of forgery under CRS § 18-5-102(1)(d) because the urinalysis results at issue were not a "public record" or "an instrument filed or required by law to be filed or legally fileable in or with a public office or public servant." While the urinalysis results from Wiz Quiz were "instrument[s]" within the reach of the statute, they were not filed, required by law to be filed, or legally fileable, thus the evidence did not support his forgery conviction. Carian also contended that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence under the doctrine of res gestae showing that he had been previously convicted of a drug offense. Regardless of whether the admission of such evidence was error, it did not substantially influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the proceedings regarding his conviction for attempting to influence a public servant. Thus, any error in its admission was harmless. Carian further contended that the prosecutor committed misconduct, during both his opening statement and his rebuttal closing, by asking the jury to hold Carian accountable for wasting public resources and "squandering" the opportunity to rehabilitate himself on probation. Although the prosecutor's statements were improper, the admission of such statements does not warrant reversal under either plain or harmless error review.

Garrison had an affair with the victim's wife. After the affair ended, Garrison and his wife set up through Google a Gmail account in the victim's name. Using that account, they sent themselves derogatory and threatening emails. Based on these emails, Garrison and his wife made police reports against the victim and provided related documents to the police. They sought a protection order against the victim and testified about the emails at the hearing. The police filed charges against the victim. When it was later determined that Garrison and his wife had set up the Gmail account, charges against the victim were dismissed, and the Garrisons were charged. At trial police officers gave testimony about Internet Protocol (IP). Garrison was convicted of first degree perjury, attempt to influence a public servant (three counts), conspiracy to attempt to influence a public servant, possessing a defaced firearm, and felony menacing. On appeal, Garrison first contended that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a continuance of the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying him a continuance, and Garrison was not prejudiced because, as discussed below, he is entitled to a new trial on his convictions related to the IP address testimony. Garrison also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to present expert testimony regarding tracing IP addresses through the lay testimony of police officers. Where an officer's testimony is based not only on his perceptions and observations of the crime scene but also on specialized knowledge or experience, the officer must be properly qualified as an expert. The concept of an email transmission including an IP address, which can be linked to an Internet service provider (ISP), and in turn traced to the physical location of a particular ISP customer, is not within the knowledge or experience of ordinary people. Thus, because some of the police testimony on direct examination was based on particular experience and specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this portion of the testimony as lay testimony. The error was not harmless because this information was central to the prosecution's case on the charges of first degree perjury, attempt to influence a public servant (three counts), and conspiracy to attempt to influence a public servant. The charges of possessing a defaced firearm and felony menacing were unrelated to IP addresses. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Using an alias, Allman presented himself to the victim as a businessman who had recently moved from Washington to Colorado. Allman moved into the victim's basement, gained her trust, and when the victim left on vacation, Allman accessed the victim's bank accounts and stole money from them. Allman also opened several credit cards in the victim's name, moved out of her home, took her car, and obtained over $40,000 of credit in her name. Allman was convicted of eight counts of identity theft, two counts of forgery, one count of aggravated motor vehicle theft, and one count of theft from an at-risk adult. He was sentenced consecutively for some counts and concurrently for others.

Following remand, the district court denied the Kleins' request for attorney fees and costs pursuant to a line of credit agreement (LOC) between them and Tiburon Development LLC (Tiburon). The district court granted Tiburon's and Sell's (a member of Tiburon) motions for attorney fees and costs.

A certified class of Colorado oil and gas royalty owners (the Class) and EnCana Oil & Gas (USA), Inc. (EnCana) litigated, beginning in 2005, EnCana's alleged underpayment of royalties on natural gas it produced. In 2008, EnCana and the Class entered into a settlement agreement that detailed payment of funds to settle past claims, established the methodology EnCana would use for future royalty payments, and included an arbitration clause. The district court's final judgment approved and incorporated the settlement agreement, dismissed the 2005 case with prejudice, and reserved jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. In 2016, oil and gas royalty owners (Owners), purporting to act on behalf of the Class, filed a demand for arbitration alleging EnCana had underpaid royalties owed to Class members in violation of the settlement agreement. EnCana filed a new case in district court asserting that (1) the class ceased to exist when the 2005 case was dismissed with prejudice in 2008, and (2) the 2008 settlement agreement did not authorize arbitration on a class-wide basis. The district court found that the class had not ceased to exist and the claims should be resolved in class-wide arbitration, and entered summary judgment against EnCana. On appeal, EnCana contended that the district court erred in finding that the Class continued after the case was dismissed. The Court of Appeals determined that the Class survived the 2008 dismissal because (1) compliance with the settlement agreement became part of the dismissal order, so the district court retains jurisdiction to give effect to the agreement and (2) the agreement continues for the lives of the leases or royalty agreements covered by the settlement agreement and expressly burdens and benefits successors and assigns of the parties.

Disciplinary charges were filed against Ruybalid IV during his tenure as District Attorney for the Third Judicial District, located in Las Animas and Huerfano Counties (Counties). The Counties refused to assume Ruybalid's defense and he hired private counsel to represent him. Ruybalid eventually admitted to violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. After resolving the disciplinary action, Ruybalid filed a complaint for declaratory relief for his attorney fees and other costs incurred in the disciplinary proceeding. The district court concluded that Ruybalid stated neither a statutory nor an equitable claim for relief, and it dismissed the complaint. On appeal, Ruybalid's primary contention was that he is statutorily entitled to attorney fees and costs under CRS § 20-1-303 and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. CRS § 20-1-303 states that a district attorney "shall be allowed to collect and receive from each of the counties in his district the expenses necessarily incurred in the discharge of his official duties for the benefit of such county." Because the statute does not explicitly authorize awarding parties to a legal proceeding attorney fees and costs, it does not create an exception to the long-established presumption that parties pay their own way. Ruybalid also argued that he should be reimbursed as a matter of public policy. The Court of Appeals did not consider the merits of this argument, concluding that matters of public policy are better addressed by the General Assembly. The Court also observed that Ruybalid's complaint did not state a plausible claim for relief it simply parroted the statutory language, asserting a legal conclusion without supporting factual allegations. Ruybalid also contended that the district court erred in dismissing his promissory estoppel claim. However, the allegations in the complaint failed to state a promissory estoppel claim. The judgment was affirmed.

The trial court ordered Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) to establish a conservatorship account for the benefit of Kylee Becker (the beneficiary) to be maintained by her father, Aaron Becker (Becker). It was intended to be a restricted account for the beneficiary's settlement funds obtained as a result of a personal injury claim. In its order, the court stated that no funds could be withdrawn from the account except by "separate certified order of this court." Wells Fargo complied with the order and deposited funds into the account, but allowed Becker to make unauthorized transfers from the account until it had a negative balance. The trial court issued a show cause order to Wells Fargo and Becker related to the removal of funds without a court order. After a hearing, the trial court found Becker and Wells Fargo jointly and severally liable for breach of fiduciary duty, and ordered Wells Fargo to restore the funds to the account. Wells Fargo moved to reconsider the order to restore funds, arguing that the trial court should have considered the percentage of fault attributable to it and Becker as required by CRS § 13-21-111.5. Wells Fargo requested that the trial court determine the relative degrees of liability between it and Becker regarding mismanagement of the account, and determine the amount of the depleted funds actually spent for the beneficiary's benefit, to not afford her a double recovery. The trial court denied the motion based on its power to supervise fiduciary administration of estates under CRS §§ 15-10-501 to -505. On appeal, Wells Fargo contended that the trial court erred when, in denying the motion for reconsideration, it did not apportion liability between Wells Fargo and Becker. Based on a plain reading of the statutes and their interpretation in appellate decisions, the trial court correctly determined that CRS § 13-21-111.5 does not apply in this case. Title 13 was intended to contemplate limitations on damages only for actions brought as a result of negligence or another tort. Wells Fargo also contended that the trial court erred by ordering it to restore the full amount to the restricted account because, based on the evidence produced at trial, Becker withdrew some of those funds to pay for food, schooling, and other necessities for the beneficiary. The trial court was required to make findings regarding the amount of funds actually used for the beneficiary and failed to do so. The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded to the trial court for further factual findings, and based on those findings, entry of an order regarding the amount of Wells Fargo's liability, if any.

After defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), officers impounded his vehicle because it was parked in front of a gas pump at a gas station. The officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle and discovered a sealed box containing items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Based on those items, they obtained a warrant to search the vehicle and found additional items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search and warrant. The trial court denied the motion. A jury convicted defendant of DUI, careless driving, and possession of chemicals, supplies, or equipment with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court should have excluded evidence discovered in the inventory search of his vehicle and under the subsequently issued warrant. A vehicle is lawfully taken into custody if the seizure is authorized by law and department regulations and is reasonable. Inventory searches are an exception to the warrant requirement and are reasonable if (1) the vehicle was lawfully taken into custody (2) the search was conducted according to "an established, standardized policy" and (3) there is no showing that police acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation. Here, the decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable, and the inventory search was conducted according to standard policy and was constitutional. Because the inventory search was constitutional, evidence obtained under the subsequently issued warrant could not have been tainted. Defendant next argued that the prosecutor improperly quantified the concept of reasonable doubt and lowered the burden of proof by using a puzzle analogy during closing argument. The prosecutor used a puzzle analogy to convey the difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof beyond all doubt, which other courts have found permissible. Further, the prosecutor used the analogy to rebut the defense argument that evidence of defendant's guilt was speculative. The Court of Appeals concluded there was no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's analogy contributed to defendant's conviction. Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. Therefore, any impropriety in the prosecutor's analogy was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lastly, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence that he intended to manufacture methamphetamine. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to manufacture methamphetamine. The judgment was affirmed.

Jones was required to register as a sex offender. In 2011, he registered as a sex offender with the Aurora Police Department (Aurora P.D.) in Colorado. In August 2012, Jones was released from prison onto parole in an unrelated case, and he was given a voucher to stay at a particular motel in Aurora (and in Adams County). On August 12, 2012, Jones updated his sex offender registration with the Aurora P.D., listing the motel's address as his new residence. On August 20, 2012, when the voucher expired, Jones left the motel and did not return. He did not report a change of address with the Aurora P.D. and did not register as a sex offender with any other local law enforcement agency in Adams County or in any other jurisdiction in Colorado until 2013. The People charged him with failure to register as a sex offender between August 26, 2012 and November 28, 2012. At the close of evidence of his trial, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that (1) the prosecution presented no evidence of where he resided during the relevant time period, and (2) ceasing to reside at an address and thereafter lacking a fixed residence does not fall within the meaning of "changing an address" under CRS 18-3-412.5(10(g). The trial court denied the motion, and Jones was convicted of the charge. On appeal, Jones contended that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove that he failed to register "upon changing an address" under CRS § 18-3-412.5(1)(g). The Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (Act), CRS §§ 16-22-101 to -115, requires sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement agency where the person resides. CRS § 16-22-108(3)(i) criminalizes the failure to register upon "ceasing to reside at an address and [thereafter] lacking a fixed residence." A violation of this section must be charged under the catchall provision in CRS § 18-3-412.5(1). Here, the prosecution elected to charge Jones only under CRS § 18-3-412.5(1)(g), which criminalizes the "[f]ailure to register with the local law enforcement agency in each jurisdiction in which the person resides upon changing an address, establishing an additional residence, or legally changing names." Although Jones was required to register as a sex offender in each jurisdiction where he resided, there was no evidence that Jones had a fixed residence during any portion of the relevant time period. Because the evidence at trial did not establish a violation of CRS § 18-3-412.5(1)(g), he was wrongfully convicted under that statutory provision. The judgment was vacated.

In 1995, Butler was convicted in Colorado and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment for sexually assaulting a child. In 1999, the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) placed Butler in a Minnesota prison, where he served the remainder of his Colorado sentence until he was released in 2006. A month after his release, Butler attempted to contact L.W., prompting L.W. to report abuse he had allegedly suffered as a child between January 1992 and May 1995. Charges were then brought against Butler in the present case based on L.W.'s allegations of sexual assault, and he was convicted. Butler filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion asserting that the charges were barred by the applicable 10-year statute of limitations. The postconviction court denied Butler's motion based on tolling of Colorado's limitations period while Butler was incarcerated and thus "absent from the state of Colorado." Butler did not raise the statute of limitations argument on direct appeal. The people initially contended that Butler was barred from pursuing his statute of limitations claim in a postconviction proceeding under the abuse of process rule. However, under an exception to the abuse of process rule, any claim that the sentencing court lacked subject matter jurisdiction may be pursued in a postconviction proceeding. Consequently, Butler's claim was not barred. On appeal, Butler contended that the postconviction court erred in ruling that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of the statute of limitations' tolling provision because he was absent from Colorado while he was incarcerated in Minnesota for his prior Colorado convictions. The Court of Appeals concluded that a defendant is "absent" from Colorado for statute of limitations purposes when he has been transferred by the DOC to an out-of-state facility to serve out the remainder of a Colorado sentence. Consequently, the applicable 10-year limitations period was tolled while Butler was in Minnesota. Additionally, under the circumstances here, the prosecution's failure to plead Butler's absence from the state did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed. The order was affirmed.

Sodexo America, LLC (Sodexo) provides food services and food to the Colorado School of Mines (Mines) pursuant to a contract with Mines. Mines, in turn, contracts with its students to provide them food (the food obtained, prepared, and served by Sodexo) through various meal plans. The City of Golden (City) taxes Sodexo for students' use of the meal plans. Sodexo collects and remits sales tax on campus food purchased with cash, check, or credit card. But the City also assesses Sodexo for sales tax on transactions whereby students swipe meal cards in exchange for meal plan meals, which taxation Sodexo challenged. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Sodexo's challenges to the City's assessment and denial of refunds. On appeal, Sodexo contended that the City can't tax it for meals purchased by Mines' students under the students' contracts with Mines. The Golden Municipal Code states that the City may levy sales tax on the purchase price of food, but exempts from taxation wholesale sales. Under the relevant contract and pursuant to the plain language of the Code, no sales occur between Sodexo and Mines' students with meal plans instead, Sodexo sells meal plan meals to Mines at wholesale. Because the Code expressly exempts wholesale sales from taxation, the City's assessment is invalid. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for entry of judgment in Sodexo's favor and for any other proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Husband and wife executed a premarital agreement providing that husband would pay wife "during her lifetime" and wife would be entitled to receive from husband "during her lifetime" monthly payments on the filing of a petition for dissolution. In exchange for the monthly payments, wife waived maintenance. Husband and wife's marriage ended in 1996, and husband consistently made monthly payments to wife under their separation agreement until his death. When husband's estate refused to continue making the payments, wife filed the underlying action. The district court ruled that the premarital and separation agreements obligated the estate to continue making the monthly payments to wife until her death or remarriage. The court also awarded wife attorney fees and costs under the prevailing party provisions of the agreements. On appeal, the estate contended that the district court erred in ruling that husband's obligation under the premarital and separation agreements to make monthly payments to wife survived his death as an obligation of his estate. The premarital and separation agreements reflect agreement regarding the duration of the monthly payments relative to the life or marital status of the wife, but say nothing about what would happen on husband's death. The separation agreement also released the parties and their estates from claims and demands. Therefore, husband's personal obligation to pay ended when he died, absent a clear indication to the contrary, which neither the premarital nor separation agreement provided. The estate also contended that the district court erroneously awarded wife attorney fees and costs and that it should have been awarded its own attorney fees under the prevailing party provisions of the agreements. The Court of Appeals agreed. The order and judgments were reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

Stanley's automobile insurer, Geico Indemnity Co. (Geico), entered into a "Release in Full of All Claims" (release) with the victim and her husband. Under the settlement, Geico paid the victim $25,000 for all claims related to and stemming from the accident in exchange for a full and final release of all claims against Stanley and Geico. Thereafter, Stanley pleaded guilty to felony vehicular assault, driving under the influence, and careless driving. The prosecution filed a motion to impose restitution and attached a report from the Crime Victim Compensation Program (CVCP). It showed that the CVCP had paid the victim $30,000, the maximum amount allowable by statute, for pecuniary losses proximately caused by Stanley's criminal conduct. The Court awarded Stanley a $25,000 setoff against restitution for the amount paid by Geico, and ordered him to pay the $5,000 net amount. On appeal, the prosecution argued that Stanley should not receive a setoff for the settlement funds because the release was an unapportioned settlement that did not "earmark" the proceeds for the same expenses compensated by the CVCP, leaving open the possibility that the victim used the proceeds for losses not compensated by the CVCP. When a victim receives compensation from a civil settlement against a defendant, the defendant may request a setoff against restitution "to the extent of any money actually paid to the victim for the same damages." For purposes of a setoff, however, the court cannot allocate proceeds from an unapportioned civil settlement agreement without "specific evidence that the settlement included particular categories of loss," because in civil cases victims may recover both pecuniary losses covered by the restitution statute and other damages specifically excluded under the restitution statute. Because the information needed to determine whether a victim has been fully compensated or has received a double recovery is known only by the victim, once a defendant has shown that a civil settlement includes the same categories of losses or expenses as compensated by the CVCP and awarded as restitution, the defendant has met his burden of going forward, and the prosecution may then rebut the inference that a double recovery has occurred. Here, Stanley met his burden of proving a setoff, but the victim may have used some or all of the settlement proceeds for losses not compensated by the CVCP. The order was affirmed, and the case was remanded to permit the prosecution to show that the victim did not receive a double recovery from the settlement proceeds and the CVCP payment.

Arson—Attempted Murder—Custody—Motion to Suppress—Consecutive Sentences—Identical Evidence—Crime of Violence—Concurrent Sentences—Discretion. Espinoza set fire to an apartment complex. As part of the investigation, police transported Espinoza to the police station, where he waited for several hours before being interviewed. Police ended the interview when Espinoza invoked his right to counsel. Espinoza filed a motion to suppress his statements from the videotaped interview with police, alleging that he was in custody and police failed to give him Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion. A jury found Espinoza guilty of 10 counts of attempted murder, 23 counts of first degree arson, 10 crime of violence counts, and multiple misdemeanors. On appeal, Espinoza contended that the trial court failed to consider several factors in finding that he was not in custody at the police station, including the several-hour wait in the interview room, the presence of two armed detectives during the interview, and the confrontational question near the end of the interview. The record showed that Espinoza agreed to speak with the detectives, consented to a pat-down search, and rode unrestrained to the police station. The detectives told Espinoza that he was not under arrest and was free to leave, Espinoza was not physically restrained, and the tone of the interview was conversational. The trial court's detailed factual findings, supported by the record, show that Espinoza was not in custody when interviewed by the detectives. Espinoza next contended that the trial court misapprehended the applicable law when it ruled that it was required to impose consecutive sentences for his attempted first degree murder convictions. Despite naming different victims, Espinoza's 10 attempted murder convictions were supported by identical evidence because the same evidence (the single act of fire-setting) formed the basis of each conviction. The Court of Appeals held that separately named victims do not create separate crimes of violence under CRS § 18-1.3-406(1)(a) when identical evidence supports each conviction, and in such circumstances, a court has discretion to impose concurrent sentences under CRS § 18-1-408(3). Here, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences under the mistaken belief that it had no discretion to impose concurrent sentences. The judgments of conviction were affirmed. The sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing.

Sentencing—Presentence Confinement Credit—Residential Community Corrections Placement. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months in community corrections. He escaped two months after reporting to community corrections. Following his arrest, the district court resentenced him to 18 months in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC), and he was given 67 days of presentence confinement credit (PSCC) for the time he was confined in the county jail before his initial sentencing and 23 days of PSCC for the time he spent in jail between his arrest and resentencing. The court denied defendant's request for PSCC related to the time he spent in community corrections because he had escaped. On appeal, defendant contended and the People conceded that the court erred by not awarding him PSCC for the time he spent in the residential community corrections program. Time spent by a defendant in jail, in a DOC facility, or as a resident in a community corrections facility constitutes confinement under CRS § 18-1.3-405, because those facilities limit an individual's liberty. Thus, when a defendant is resentenced to DOC custody after revocation of a direct sentence to community corrections, he is entitled to credit for time served in a residential community corrections placement. Here, defendant is entitled to 62 days of PSCC for the 62 days he spent in a residential community correction placement. Further, his escape from community corrections did not negate his right to PSCC because CRS §18-1.3-301(1)(k) does not apply to PSCC awards. The order was reversed and the was case remanded for the district court to correct the mittimus to reflect that defendant is entitled to a total of 152 days of PSCC.

Habitual Criminal—Sufficiency of Evidence—Prior Felony Conviction—Collateral Attack—Excusable Neglect—Extended Proportionality Review. A jury convicted Kadell of six counts of robbery and one count of aggravated motor vehicle theft, each of which is a class 4 felony. The prosecution filed habitual criminal counts, and Kadell moved to suppress his prior felony convictions as a way to collaterally attack those convictions. The motion was untimely, but Kadell argued that his failure to timely file was the result of excusable neglect. The trial court did not rule on the excusable neglect claim. Before sentencing, the trial court adjudicated Kadell a habitual criminal based on three prior felony convictions, including, as relevant here, one in 1997 for attempted cultivation of marijuana. In accordance with the habitual criminal statute, the trial court imposed a 24-year sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections, four times the presumptive maximum sentence for a class 4 felony. On appeal, Kadell contended that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence under the habitual criminal statute because there was insufficient evidence that he was convicted of three qualifying felonies before his current convictions. He argued that his 1997 conviction for attempted cultivation of marijuana did not count as a felony under the habitual criminal statute because when he committed his offenses in this case, attempted cultivation of marijuana was no longer a felony in Colorado unless the defendant possessed more than six plants, and the trial court had no evidence of how many plants were involved in the 1997 conviction. As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals concluded that for a prior drug felony conviction to qualify as a predicate offense under the habitual criminal statute, the prosecution must prove that the prior offense of conviction remained a felony under Colorado law at the time the defendant committed the new offense, even when the prior conviction was entered in Colorado. The prosecution did not present sufficient evidence of this fact at Kadell's sentencing hearing. Kadell next argued that the trial court erred by finding that his failure to timely file a collateral attack on his prior convictions was not the result of excusable neglect. The issue of excusable neglect is a question of fact to be resolved first by the trial court. The record does not reflect that the trial court ruled on Kadell's excusable neglect claim. Kadell further sought an extended proportionality review of his sentence. This argument is moot at this juncture. The sentence was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

The victim was shot 11 times and was found by bystanders, who asked him questions. The victim answered their questions but did not provide the shooter's name. On the way to the hospital, the victim identified Cockrell as the shooter to an officer who rode in the ambulance. The victim died soon thereafter during surgery. No DNA, fingerprint, or other forensic evidence tied Cockrell to the victim's murder. The primary evidence against him was the victim's dying declaration identifying Cockrell as the shooter and a bystander's statement that he saw a car leaving the area around the same time the victim was found that matched the description of the car Cockrell drove. The trial court denied Cockrell's motion to suppress the dying declaration and to find CRS § 13-25-119 unconstitutional. Cockrell was found guilty of first degree murder and two crime of violence sentence enhancers. On appeal, Cockrell contended that CRS § 13-25-119, the dying declaration statute, is unconstitutional on its face because it violates the Confrontation Clause. Dying declarations are an exception to the hearsay rule because of their guarantee of trustworthiness, and precluding their admission would in many cases result in a failure of justice. The Court of Appeals held that dying declarations are an exception to the Confrontation Clause and the dying declaration statute is constitutional. Cockrell also contended that the victim's statement did not satisfy the statutory requirements for admission of dying declarations. The first statutory requirement was satisfied because the parties agreed that the victim believed he was going to die he had 11 gunshot wounds and death was imminent, and he made statements indicating he feared he was going to die. As to the other three requirements, Cockrell argued that (1) the statements were not voluntary (2) the statements were made in response to questions calculated to lead the deceased to make the particular statement and (3) the victim was not of sound mind when he made the statements. However, the record supports the trial court's finding that (1) the victim's statements were voluntarily made (2) the questions asked of the victim were designed to gather facts with no apparent pretense and (3) although the victim was in a great deal of pain and had trouble breathing, he was conscious and alert and answered questions appropriately, and thus was of sound mind when he identified Cockrell as his shooter. Lastly, Cockrell contended that there was insufficient evidence to support his first degree murder conviction. Based on the evidence presented, it was rational for the jury to have found Cockrell guilty as charged. The judgment was affirmed.

Administrative Law Judge—Campaign Contributions—Value of Services—Reportable—CRS §§ 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) and -103(6)(b). An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing and determined that the Colorado Republican Committee (CRC) improperly failed to report three payments for vendor tables at its 2016 Republican Party assembly and convention. The CRC was fined and sanctioned for failing to report contributions. On appeal, CRC contended that the ALJ erred in determining that the three payments for vendor tables at the convention were reportable contributions under state law and not properly reported by CRC. CRS § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) requires political committees to report receipt of contributions of $20 or more and to report expenditures and obligations. CRS § 1-45-103(6)(b), which defines "contribution," applies to all contributions "for which the contributor receives compensation or consideration," and thus applies to the payments at issue here. Under the plain language of this section, political parties are required to report only that portion of payments for services that exceeds the value of the services rendered. Here, Campaign Integrity Watchdog provided no evidence that the value of the vendor tables was actually less than the $350 CRC charged. Therefore, the ALJ erred in finding that the payments at issue were reportable contributions under state law. The part of the order imposing a fine and sanctions against CRC for failing to disclose the relevant payments was reversed.

Foreign National—Immigration—Criminal Attorney—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Deportation. Juarez is a Mexican foreign national who has lived in Denver since he was approximately 6 years old. In 2009 he was granted lawful permanent residence status. In 2011, after cocaine was found in his possession, Juarez was charged with one felony count of possession of a controlled substance. Juarez pleaded guilty to possession of a schedule V controlled substance, a class 1 misdemeanor. During his providency hearing, Juarez's attorney acknowledged that this misdemeanor under Colorado state law was the equivalent of a felony under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Juarez told the court that he understood that the plea could affect his immigration status. Juarez was sentenced to drug court, and after testing positive for THC, he was deported to Mexico. He filed motions for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, which were denied. On appeal, Juarez argued that his attorney performed deficiently by failing to inform him that he would be subject to "mandatory deportation" if convicted. Juarez's attorney acted within the objective standard of reasonableness by informing Juarez that he was "very likely" to be deported by entering into the plea agreement. Therefore, Juarez's attorney provided constitutionally effective representation. Juarez also argued that his attorney was required to advise him that his guilty plea would result in lifetime inadmissibility to the United States, mandatory detention, and destruction of the defense of cancellation of removal. Criminal defense attorneys are not required to function as immigration lawyers, and the Court of Appeals found no support for these arguments. Counsel's performance was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The order was affirmed

Robinson was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, and unlawful sexual contact. During opening statement in his criminal prosecution, the prosecutor described the incidents to the jury using race-based statements. Defense counsel did not object and the trial court did not admonish the prosecutor or instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statements. The jury convicted Robinson of two counts of unlawful sexual contact and two counts of the lesser included offense of attempted sexual assault. The trial court sentenced Robinson under the Sex Offender Lifetime Supervision Act to four years to life imprisonment. On appeal, Robinson argued that the prosecutor's description of "a dark penis going into a white body" during opening statement constituted prosecutorial misconduct amounting to plain error, requiring reversal of his convictions. Viewed objectively, the prosecutor's opening statement, by its words and in the context it was presented to the jury, was an appeal to racial prejudice and improper. The statements cast serious doubt on the reliability of Robinson's convictions. Robinson also argued that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she implied that Robinson was unfaithful to his girlfriend. The nature of Robinson's relationship with the woman with whom he lived, and whether he might have been unfaithful to her, was irrelevant. The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

A confidential informant (CI) approached a police investigator with a potential target for a controlled drug buy. The investigator arranged for the CI to purchase methamphetamine from Mendez in a controlled drug buy with concealed audio and video. After the buy, the People charged Mendez with distribution of a schedule II controlled substance. Mendez moved to suppress evidence obtained during the CI's entry into his apartment. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Mendez contended that his conviction must be reversed because the video recording of the controlled buy should have been suppressed as the result of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals concluded that the use of video surveillance by a CI in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Mendez invited the CI into his apartment to engage in a drug transaction. Because Mendez consented to the CI's presence in his home, he gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy in what the CI could observe or visually record. The district court properly denied the motion to suppress the resulting video recording. Mendez next asserted that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide an adequate remedy for a discovery violation. He argued that the prosecution's failure to disclose a conversation between the CI and a police investigator about the Department of Homeland Security constituted a violation of his constitutional rights and the district court's chosen remedy deprived him of a fair trial. As a sanction for the discovery violation, the district court ordered the investigator to make himself available for an interview with defense counsel to determine the scope of his representations to the CI. The district court denied defense counsel's request that the CI be subject to recall for cross-examination. The district court's discovery sanction was inadequate because Mendez was given no opportunity to cross-examine the CI about whether he believed he would receive immigration support from Homeland Security for his willingness to participate in the controlled buy. That belief could have been relevant to the CI's motive, regardless of the investigator's memory of the conversation. And the district court's remedy did not cure that potential prejudice. Nevertheless, the district court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not warrant reversal given the overwhelming evidence against Mendez at trial, and the fact that Mendez was able to successfully call the CI's credibility into doubt by the end of trial. Finally, Mendez argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to limit the jury's access to the video recording and transcript during deliberations. A district court need not limit juror access to non-testimonial evidence. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to allow the jury unfettered access to the video recording and transcript. The judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of sexual assault on his 9-year-old great niece, Y.P. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the forensic interviewer who had interviewed Y.P. to testify that Y.P. didn't show any signs of having been coached. Although such testimony ordinarily is improper (because it's tantamount to vouching for the child's credibility), in this case the testimony was admissible to rebut defendant's defense theory that Y.P. had made up the allegations. Because defendant opened the door to this testimony, it was not error to allow it. Defendant also contended that the district court erred by allowing evidence of his prior acts of a sexual nature involving other relatives in violation of CRE 404(b). He argued that the prior acts were too dissimilar to his alleged assault of Y.P. to be admissible. Evidence that defendant physically assaulted two female relatives who lived with him was probative of defendant's intent to sexually assault another female at his home and was relevant to refute his claim that Y.P. fabricated the allegation. Further, the other act evidence was especially relevant because Y.P.'s testimony was the only direct evidence of defendant's guilt. Thus the potential for unfair prejudice did not outweigh the evidence's probative value, and the district court did not err in admitting evidence of these acts. Additionally, evidence that defendant masturbated in front his 19-year old niece several times (although he did not physically assault her) was also relevant and no more potentially prejudicial than the evidence of the acts involving the other two relatives. But even assuming that allowing this evidence was error, any error was harmless. The judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was charged and arrested for allegedly murdering his wife. The district court set a $500,000 bond. Defendant posted bond through Perna by paying a $25,000 premium. Thereafter, defendant cooperated with all court orders and appeared at all hearings. Fourteen months later, just before defendant's trial was to begin, Perna moved to surrender defendant back into the custody of the court. The court granted the motion. Defendant spent several days in jail while his family secured a second bond and paid another $25,000 premium to a different surety to secure defendant's release. Defendant was ultimately acquitted. Defendant moved for return of the premium he had paid to Perna, which the court partially granted, ordering Perna to return $11,031.25 to defendant. On appeal, Perna contended that the district court erred by ordering that he refund a portion of the bond premium to defendant. Under CRS § 16-4-110(1)(d), a court may order return of all or part of the premium defendant paid to prevent unjust enrichment only if the surrender occurred before the defendant's initial appearance. Here, Perna surrendered defendant to the court 14 months after the court process began, well after defendant's initial appearance. Accordingly, the court was without the authority to order Perna to refund all or part of defendant's premium. The order was vacated.

T.T. accepted voluntary mental health treatment, but the physician did not believe T.T. would remain in a voluntary program and filed a certification for short-term treatment pursuant to CRS § 27-65-107. The district court issued a notice of certification for short-term treatment. Six days later the physician filed a notice of termination of involuntary treatment. Two years later T.T. learned that his name still appeared on the court's index of cases. The clerk refused T.T.'s request to remove his name. T.T. filed a pro se motion requesting that his name be omitted from the court's index in accordance with CRS § 27-65-107(7). The district court denied the motion without making any factual findings or legal conclusions. A division of the Court of Appeals issued an order remanding the case for the district court to hold a hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court granted in part T.T.'s motion to omit his name from the index by directing the Arapahoe County Clerk to omit his name from "any list generated or produced, even for the purpose of storage." The court also denied in part, stating that T.T's name will "remain in the [Eclipse] database for the purposes of the Clerk of Court's maintenance of records and to comply with Section 27-65-107(7)." On appeal, T.T. argued that the district court erred in denying his motion because based on the plain language of the statute and the stipulated facts, his name should also have been omitted from the Eclipse system when he was released from treatment. The public's right to access to official records is not absolute. Court records for mental health cases, including indices, are not open to public access. The plain language of CRS § 27-65-107(7) requires the clerk to omit a respondent's name from the index of cases after the clerk is notified of a respondent's release from involuntary treatment. Finding the phrase "omit the name of the respondent from the index of cases in such court" to be ambiguous, the Court of Appeals liberally construed this language in light of the General Assembly's stated objective to "provide the fullest possible measure of privacy, dignity, and other rights to persons undergoing care and treatment for a mental health disorder." The Court concluded that the index of cases in this instance referred to the Eclipse system. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for the district court to order T.T's name be omitted from the Eclipse system and lists generated from that system.

Plaintiffs petitioned to present a ballot initiative to the residents of Sheridan. Sheridan's City Clerk, Sagee, rejected some of the signatures plaintiffs had collected, leaving them short of the number required for the initiative to be considered. Plaintiffs contested the decision, and the City Clerk upheld it after a protest hearing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court 35 days later pursuant to CRS § 31-11-110(3). The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to file within the CRCP 106 28-day time limit. On appeal, plaintiffs conceded that the 28-day jurisdictional bar applied and they filed 35 days after the relevant final decision. They argued that strict application of the time limit to them as pro se parties deprived them of their constitutional right of initiative. The Court of Appeals construed plaintiffs' argument to be an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory time bar. The Court found plaintiffs pro se status irrelevant pro se parties must comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by attorneys. The Court concluded that applying CRCP 106(b)'s jurisdictional deadline to plaintiffs' Rule 106(a)(4) petition does not deprive them of or unduly burden their constitutional right of initiative. The judgment was affirmed.

Owners of fishing and hunting memberships (petitioners) were taxed on the parcels of real estate allocated to them in their membership agreements. The parcels are part of a larger tract of land used as a hunting and fishing club (club). Membership in the club is granted to those who hold a deed to one of the parcels that collectively comprise the club grounds. Members cannot make improvements on their parcels or exclude other club members. The club retains control over the grounds and grants all members equal access, regardless of the parcel to which they hold title. A member's right to access the grounds can be revoked if the member owes money or violates club rules. Petitioners initiated this action after they disagreed with the county's assessment of their parcels. The Hinsdale County Board of Equalization (BOE) affirmed the assessor's valuation. Petitioners appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA), which affirmed the BOE's decision. On appeal, petitioners argued that the law permits the court to look beyond the title to the substance of the parties' rights when determining ownership. The Court of Appeals concluded that the club was the true property owner because it enjoyed the most significant incidents of ownership. The members effectively had a license to use club grounds, even though they held bare legal title to the parcels. Therefore it was the club, and not the members, that had to bear the real property tax burden. Further, the BAA erred in affirming the assessor's valuation because it was based on the personal property value of petitioners' licenses to use club grounds rather than the value of the parcels as real property. The order was reversed and the case was remanded with directions.

In 1984, Mackey executed a deed (Mackey deed) purporting to convey to Jefferson County a permanent public easement over a portion of the southeast corner of her property. Jefferson County executed a deed to the City of Lakewood (Commissioners deed) conveying the Mackey deed easement using the same legal description. The Commissioners deed contained a reverter clause that required Lakewood to use the easement exclusively for public open space, park, and recreational purposes. In 2011, the Armstrongs bought the property from Mackey's successor in interest and occupied it. After the Armstrongs attempted to obstruct the easement's use by locking a gate at one entrance to it, Lakewood filed suit. The district court entered summary judgment for Lakewood, finding that the easement was a valid express easement appurtenant. On appeal, the Armstrongs asserted that the district court erred in granting Lakewood's motion for summary judgment because the Commissioners deed violates the statute of frauds and is void for failing to legally describe the easement itself or the dominant estate. An easement does not require the precise description that a possessory interest does. While an instrument must identify with reasonable certainty the easement created and the dominant and servient estates, no particular words are necessary. Here, although the Commissioners deed does not expressly describe a dominant estate, it describes the entire servient estate and describes the easement itself with reasonable certainty and is not rendered invalid by any deficiency in the easement's description. Further, the easement was recorded in the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder's Office over 25 years before the Armstrongs' purchase of the property. Therefore, the Armstrongs had constructive notice of the easement. The Armstrongs also contended that the district court impermissibly looked to extrinsic evidence to interpret the Commissioners deed. However, a court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the description of an easement in a deed is reasonably certain or instead is invalid for vagueness. The district court did not err in considering undisputed extrinsic evidence to determine that the easement's description encompassed the entire servient estate and what, if any, dominant estate the easement served for the purpose of determining whether the easement was identified with reasonable certainty and was therefore valid. The Armstrongs further contended that the district court erred in enforcing the Commissioners deed because the reverter clause in the deed had been triggered, so the deed expired. The easement's use is the determinative factor for triggering the reverter clause, not the zoning of the land benefited. Lakewood produced undisputed evidence showing that the dominant estate served by the easement has been continuously used exclusively for public open space, park, and recreational purposes. The reverter clause was not triggered. The Armstrongs additionally argued that the Commissioners deed was void because Jefferson County did not have the authority to purchase the easement for use by Lakewood. Here, Jefferson County had the authority to purchase an easement for access to a public park or open space owned by Lakewood under its implied powers to promote public projects or public open space and parkland. The order was affirmed.