COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
2017COA127
Court of Appeals No. 13CA1296
City and County of Denver District Court No. 11CR1007
Honorable John W. Madden IV, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Alfredo Juarez,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM
Booras and Dunn, JJ., concur
Announced October 19, 2017
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, John Plimpton, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado; Rachel C. Funez, New Castle,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Alfredo Juarez, appeals the postconviction court’s
order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion seeking to withdraw his
guilty plea. We conclude that Juarez’s plea counsel was not
ineffective when he advised Juarez that his plea to a class 1
misdemeanor would “probably result in deportation,” and,
therefore, we conclude Juarez is not entitled to withdraw his guilty
plea. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Background
¶2 Juarez is a Mexican foreign national who has lived in Denver
since he was approximately six years old. After graduating from
high school, he married a United States citizen, and in 2009 he was
granted lawful permanent residence status. His parents live in
Denver, he has two children who are United States citizens, and he
has not returned to Mexico at any time prior to his deportation at
issue in this case.
¶3 In early 2011, the police were called to Juarez’s residence after
he got into a fight with family members. Officers were forced to tase
Juarez to subdue him and, in a search incident to arrest, cocaine
was found in his possession. Juarez was charged with one felony
count of possession of a controlled substance and hired Mr. Tatum
1
to represent him. At the same time, Mr. Whitehead, an immigration
attorney, was also representing Juarez in an unrelated matter
concerning his lawful permanent residence status.
¶4 Tatum received multiple continuances in the criminal case in
an attempt to negotiate a plea with the district attorney that would
not result in Juarez’s deportation from the United States. Tatum
understood that there was no option short of a misdemeanor for
less than one ounce of marijuana that would guarantee avoidance
of deportation. Ultimately, Juarez pleaded guilty to possession of a
schedule V controlled substance, a class 1 misdemeanor, with a
stipulated sentence of two years of drug court probation.
¶5 During Juarez’s April 2012 providency hearing, Tatum
informed the court as follows:
The reason this case has . . . dragged on for a
long time is because [co-counsel] and I have
spent a lot of time trying to figure out if there
was . . . a disposition that would be . . . better
for him, immigration-wise.
....
Unfortunately . . . that never occurred. We
have . . . at all times advised him that it is our
understanding -- although we’re not -- I’m not
an expert in immigration law, but based on my
consultation with immigration attorneys -- that
2
this plea very likely will result in either
deportation or some type of exclusion from the
United States.
He is a legal resident. He does have a green
card. But it’s fairly well known now that any
drug offense other than simple possession of
under an ounce of marijuana will have
negative immigration consequences.1
....
I -- I cannot tell him any stronger. You know,
this is a misdemeanor under Colorado state
law, but it is the equivalent of a felony under
the immigration and naturalization act, and,
you know, I have made him aware of that . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
¶6 The court then asked Juarez if he understood “that this plea
could . . . affect your immigration status. Do you understand that?”
[Juarez]: Yeah.
The Court: Okay. And even knowing that, do
you want to proceed with this disposition
today?
[Juarez]: (Indistinguishable.) There’s nothing I
can do, you know. It was -- I don’t know. This
whole case just was something that should
have . . . never really happened, you know. It
was all due to my dumb behavior, but, you
know, we tried to make it work, but we can’t
1In response to this comment by Tatum, the court stated, “Or it
could.” (Emphasis added.)
3
get it to what we have to, so we got to go with
what . . . we can do now.
....
The Court: Mr. Juarez, understanding all the
consequences, both the immigration
consequences, the potential that if you violate
probation I could sentence you pursuant to
what I told you . . . do you still want to . . .
take this plea today?
[Juarez]: Yeah.
(Emphasis added.)
¶7 The court sentenced Juarez to two years of drug court
probation as recommended in his plea agreement.
¶8 In May 2012, Juarez tested positive for THC, and the drug
court imposed a suspended two-day jail sentence on the condition
his THC levels drop. Because his THC levels did not drop, the drug
court imposed the two-day jail sentence in early June. When
Juarez again failed to lower his THC levels in late June, the court
imposed a three-day sentence. During this second period of
incarceration, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) placed a hold on Juarez and began deportation proceedings.
An order of removal was entered by the immigration court on
September 5, 2012, and Juarez was ultimately deported to Mexico.
4
¶9 In October 2012 and January 2013, Juarez filed motions for
postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.
Juarez argued Tatum failed to advise him that his guilty plea would
subject him to (1) mandatory deportation; (2) lifetime inadmissibility
to the United States; (3) mandatory detention; and (4) destruction of
the defense of cancellation of removal. But for these errors, Juarez
alleged, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have
risked going to trial.
¶ 10 The postconviction court held a hearing over three days in
which Tatum, Juarez (via internet connection from Mexico), and
Whitehead testified. The testimony of each is summarized below:
Tatum stated that “immigration was always, I think, the
paramount consideration” for Juarez; that he “was aware
that the plea agreement proposed by the District Attorney
was not acceptable because it would likely get Mr. Juarez
deported”; and that “I specifically asked Mr. Juarez if he
wanted to take the Class 1 misdemeanor deal that had
been offered, and I told him, ‘Your immigration attorney
advised you that a plea to the Class 1 misdemeanor will
probably result in deportation.’”
5
Juarez testified Tatum and Whitehead told him the plea
would make him deportable,2 but “[t]hey never said you
are going to get deported. They never said you are going
to get deported as soon as you are free. You are going to
get deported, they never said that.” Juarez also testified
his attorneys never explained that “the misdemeanor plea
carried absolutely no benefit over the felony” for
immigration purposes; that he “could be subject to
mandatory lifetime inadmissibility”; that he could be
subject to “mandatory immigration detention”; or that his
plea would “destroy[] a defense to deportation.”
Whitehead stated that his general practice at the time
was to inform his clients “you are going to probably be
placed in removal proceedings or you are going to be
facing a permanent bar []to admissibility into the
country.” He also stated, “What I remember telling Mr.
Juarez . . . was that if he pled guilty to the drug offense
2 Defendant testified, “I know I was pleading guilty to a
misdemeanor that would make me deportable according to the
information that my lawyer gave me and according to what he
knew.”
6
that was being offered to him at the time . . . that he
would, 1, probably be placed in remov[al] proceedings
and, 2, . . . probably be facing a permanent bar.”
¶ 11 After listening to arguments and reviewing the case law on
effective assistance to noncitizen defendants, the postconviction
court denied Juarez’s motion in a written order. The court held:
[I]n Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
130 S.
Ct. 1473 (2010), . . . the United States
Supreme Court found that, under the present
immigration laws, deportation is an integral
part of the penalty that may be imposed on
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to
certain crimes. In doing so, it noted that
deportation is a particularly severe penalty,
even though it is not technically a criminal
sanction. . . . Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court held that, under the Sixth
Amendment’s guarantee of effective
representation, “counsel must inform her
client whether his plea carries a risk of
deportation.” Id.,130 S. Ct. at 1486 (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court used this precise
language — “risk of deportation” — multiple
times in Padilla.
....
The Defendant was advised and was aware
that his plea carried a risk of deportation.
Further, the risk of deportation was correctly
quantified as being very likely. As such, the
Court finds that the Defendant has not
established either prong of the Strickland test
7
and that his attorney did not provide
ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Defendant’s attorney, Mr. Tatum, knew
early on that the Defendant was a legal
resident of this country but was not a citizen.
Accordingly, he had an obligation to
investigate whether the plea offer made to the
Defendant would make the Defendant eligible
for deportation. He did this by consulting with
an experienced immigration attorney, Lillian
Shea, as well as the Defendant’s own
immigration attorney, Mr. Whitehead. As a
result of those consultations, he had a correct
understanding that, if the Defendant accepted
the plea bargain in this case, he would likely
be deported. More importantly in this case,
Mr. Tatum also advised the Defendant of this
fact. Pursuant to Padilla, Mr. Tatum’s
obligation was to advise the Defendant
“whether his plea carrie[d] a risk of
deportation,” Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486, and
Mr. Tatum met this obligation.
¶ 12 The court went on to state that Juarez’s argument that the
advice he received was ineffective because Tatum did not tell him
his guilty plea would trigger “the automatic, mandatory and
permanent removal provision of deportability” was “an illusory
distinction” “contrary to the specific language in Padilla.” As the
court noted, “[t]he only thing the additional language does is create
a misleading impression of the probability of actual deportation.”
Indeed, “whether a person who is deportable will actually be
8
deported is not absolute, certain or guaranteed.” Thus, by advising
Juarez “that if he took the plea offer in this case he would likely be
deported, Mr. Tatum accurately related the effect of the plea under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) and also provided additional, correct information
as to the probability of deportation which was not explicit under the
statute.”
¶ 13 The court further held that the “other purported deficiencies”
raised by Juarez — failure to advise he would be permanently
barred from reentry into the United States, failure to advise his
guilty plea would destroy a defense to removal called cancellation of
removal, and failure to advise his guilty plea would subject him to
mandatory immigration detention without the possibility of bond —
do not fall under the ambit of consequences that defense attorneys
are required to advise their clients of in order to provide effective
representation. “Addressing the first of those purported failures,
there is no express requirement in Padilla that an attorney must
advise a defendant whether his plea will make him inadmissible.”
And regarding the defense of cancellation of removal and mandatory
detention,
9
[i]f defense attorneys were required to have
that degree of familiarity with immigration law,
then they would presumably also be required
to understand concepts such as withholding of
removal, the application of the Convention
Against Torture, and exemption from
inadmissibility for refugees. . . . [T]he defense
position would require an attorney to advise a
defendant of a collateral consequence to a
collateral consequence.
¶ 14 The court also concluded that Juarez failed to establish
prejudice because, “[k]nowing that the best offer he could obtain
made him eligible for deportation,” Juarez “accepted that risk and
took the plea.” “He had been advised at least by Mr. Tatum and Mr.
Whitehead that if he took the plea bargain he would very likely be
deported and that he would be permanently barred from returning
to the United States. Knowing these consequences, the Defendant
still chose to plead guilty.”
Ultimately, the Defendant’s primary desire was
to avoid deportation if he could do so. When it
became clear that the prosecution would not
offer a plea which would avoid that risk and
that he would likely lose at trial, he chose what
he perceived to be his next best option —
avoiding a felony conviction. The decision was
a rational one under the circumstances. . . .
[I]t strongly appears that the Defendant’s
decision was motivated by the hope that he
might not actually be deported even though he
knew this outcome was very likely.
10
II. Counsel’s Representation Did Not Fall Below an Objective
Standard of Reasonableness
¶ 15 On appeal, Juarez first argues that under Padilla, Tatum
performed deficiently by failing to inform him that he would be
subject to “mandatory deportation” if convicted. Thus, although
counsel did inform him that he was “very likely” to be deported,
Juarez argues that this advice was deficient because counsel
should have told him that his conviction “would absolutely result in
deportation” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012). We disagree
and conclude that plea counsel acted within Padilla’s objective
standard of reasonableness. To the extent our holding conflicts
with the division in People v. Campos-Corona,
2013 COA 23, we
decline to follow that opinion as an untenable expansion of Padilla.
See People v. Delgado,
2016 COA 174, ¶ 27 (one division of the
court of appeals is not bound by the decision of another division in
a different case).
A. Standard of Review
¶ 16 An appeal from an order denying a claim of ineffective
assistance of plea counsel presents a mixed question of law and
fact. We defer to the postconviction court’s findings of fact if
11
supported by the record, and we review the conclusions of law de
novo. People v. Stovall, 2012 COA 7, ¶ 18.
B. Law
¶ 17 “The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the effective
assistance of counsel at ‘critical stages of a criminal proceeding,’
including when he enters a guilty plea.” Lee v. United States, 582
U.S. ___, ___,
137 S. Ct. 1958, 1964 (2017) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012)). In Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S.
668 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test to
determine whether a criminal defendant is entitled to relief as a
result of constitutionally deficient representation. “To demonstrate
that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must
show that counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness’ and that he was prejudiced as a result.” Lee,
582 U.S. at ___,
137 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at
688, 692).
¶ 18 A defense attorney must advise a noncitizen defendant about
potential immigration consequences to his or her plea:
When the law is not succinct and
straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney
need do no more than advise a noncitizen
12
client that pending criminal charges may carry
a risk of adverse immigration consequences.
But when the deportation consequence is truly
clear . . . the duty to give correct advice is
equally clear.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369 (footnote omitted). Under
8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission has
been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a
State . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . , other than a single
offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of
marijuana, is deportable.”
¶ 19 “The severity of deportation — ‘the equivalent of banishment
or exile,’ Delgadillo v. Carmichael,
332 U.S. 388, 390-91,
68 S. Ct.
10,
92 L. Ed. 17 (1947) — only underscores how critical it is for
counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of
deportation.” Padilla,
559 U.S. at 373-74. Therefore, “the Sixth
Amendment requires an attorney for a criminal defendant to
provide advice about the risk of deportation arising from a guilty
plea.” Chaidez v. United States,
568 U.S. 342, 344 (2013).
C. Analysis
¶ 20 We read Padilla’s requirement that a defense attorney give
“correct advice,” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369, as a requirement to give
13
advice that informs his or her client “about the risk of deportation
arising from a guilty plea.” This advice need not be unequivocal,
and it does not require counsel to tell a defendant that his plea will
subject him to “mandatory removal,” “presumptively mandatory
deportation,” or “automatic or mandatory deportation.” We reach
this conclusion because, although a noncitizen defendant is
deportable for a controlled substance conviction under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(i), deportation is not guaranteed. See State v. Shata,
868 N.W.2d 93, 108 (Wis. 2015) (“Although a controlled substance
conviction makes an alien ‘deportable,’
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i),
such a conviction will not necessarily result in deportation.”).
¶ 21 As noted by Whitehead at the postconviction hearing:
[In] my 40 years of [practicing] immigration
[law] I learned there is nothing absolutely . . .
certain or guaranteed with the immigration
service. And just because a person may be
mandator[ily] subject to it doesn’t necessarily
mean they will automatically be placed in
proceedings.
ICE takes a look at a case -- on a case by case
basis as do the trial attorneys with the
government. And just because the statute
calls for something doesn’t necessarily mean
they’ll automatically do it. There is a
likelihood they will do it. But if you are telling
somebody there is a guarantee something is
14
going to happen within the immigration
confines it may not happen.
Indeed, “the executive branch has essentially unreviewable
prosecutorial discretion with respect to commencing deportation
proceedings, adjudicating cases, and executing removal orders.” Id.
(citing Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471,
482-85 (1999)).
¶ 22 Tatum not only advised Juarez of the risk of deportation, he
quantified it by stating that it was “probable”3 and that drug
offenses “will have” negative consequences. Indeed, Juarez
understood these warnings to mean that “[t]here [was] nothing [he]
c[ould] do” because he could not get a plea deal “to what [I] have
to.”
¶ 23 In addition, removal proceedings for Juarez began only after
he thrice violated the terms of his drug court probation. Once he
was confined in county jail for violating his probation, ICE placed a
hold on him and began removal proceedings. This raises the
question of whether such a proceeding would have been initiated
3 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1806 (2002) defines
“probable” as “that almost certainly is or will prove to be something
indicated.”
15
had Juarez not violated his probation, resulting in his
incarceration. When viewed in this context, Tatum’s advice to
Juarez correctly conveyed that the risk of deportation was “very
likely” and “probable,” and that his guilty plea would have adverse
consequences. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 9 N.E.3d 789, 799
(Mass. 2014) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“There was no inaccuracy or
soft pedaling of advice here.”); Shata,
868 N.W.2d at 111 (The
defendant’s “attorney gave him advice that there was a ‘strong
chance’ of deportation, which was absolutely correct. Correct
advice is not deficient.”).
¶ 24 We acknowledge that a majority of jurisdictions have
interpreted Padilla as requiring counsel to inform a noncitizen
defendant that conviction for a deportable offense will either result
in deportation or subject a defendant to “mandatory deportation.”
United States v. Al Halabi,
633 F. App’x 801, 803 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[W]here the law clearly dictates that removal is presumptively
mandatory, a defense attorney’s failure to advise his client of that
fact falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.”); United
States v. Rodriguez-Vega,
797 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“[W]here the law is ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ that the conviction
16
renders removal virtually certain, counsel must advise his client
that removal is a virtual certainty.” (quoting Padilla, 559 U.S. at
368-69)); United States v. Urias-Marrufo,
744 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir.
2014) (“[D]efense counsel has an obligation under the Sixth
Amendment to inform his noncitizen client ‘that the offense to
which he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this
country.’” (quoting Padilla,
559 U.S. at 360)); United States v.
Akinsade,
686 F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he admonishment
did not ‘properly inform’ Akinsade of the consequence he faced by
pleading guilty: mandatory deportation.”); Budziszewski v. Comm’r
of Corr.,
142 A.3d 243, 246 (Conn. 2016) (“In circumstances when
federal law mandates deportation and the client is not eligible for
relief under an exception to that command, counsel must
unequivocally convey to the client that federal law mandates
deportation as the consequence for pleading guilty.”); Hernandez v.
State,
124 So. 3d 757, 760, 762 (Fla. 2012) (Where counsel
informed the defendant a plea “could/may” affect his immigration
status, “Hernandez’s counsel was deficient under Padilla for failing
to advise Hernandez that his plea subjected him to presumptively
mandatory deportation.”); Encarnacion v. State,
763 S.E.2d 463,
17
466 (Ga. 2014) (“An attorney’s advice as to the likelihood of
deportation must be based on realistic probabilities, not fanciful
possibilities. . . . [W]e find that where, as here, the law is clear that
deportation is mandatory and statutory discretionary relief is
unavailable, an attorney has a duty to accurately advise his client
of that fact. It is not enough to say ‘maybe’ when the correct advice
is ‘almost certainly will.’”) (citation omitted); DeJesus, 9 N.E.3d at
794 (“We conclude that advising a defendant faced with
circumstances similar to those in this case that he is ‘eligible for
deportation’ does not adequately inform such a defendant that, if he
were to plead guilty . . . then, upon apprehension, his removal from
the United States would be presumptively mandatory under Federal
law.”); Salazar v. State,
361 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Tex. App. 2011) (“[T]he
correct advice, which was that the plea of guilty would result in
certain deportation, was not given. Both the terms ‘likelihood’ and
‘possibility’ leave open the hope that deportation might not occur.
Consequently, these admonishments were inaccurate . . . .”); State
v. Sandoval,
249 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Wash. 2011) (“If the applicable
immigration law ‘is truly clear’ that an offense is deportable, the
defense attorney must correctly advise the defendant that pleading
18
guilty to a particular charge would lead to deportation.” (quoting
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369)); see Campos-Corona, ¶ 13 (“Because
Campos-Corona was not advised of mandatory removal, we
conclude that the postconviction court erred in finding counsel’s
performance was reasonable.”).
¶ 25 We think that the advice given by Tatum meets the general
spirit of that standard. But if it does not, we nevertheless see no
fault in it. We cannot say that counsel’s advice must be couched in
terms of absolute certainty or must incorporate talismanic
language. Consequently, we find more persuasive cases in those
jurisdictions that have concluded that because deportation is not
automatic after conviction for a deportable offense, Padilla does not
require an attorney to advise a client that he will, with 100%
certainty, be deported. Chacon v. State,
409 S.W.3d 529, 537 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2013) (holding defense counsel’s advice that the defendant
would “very likely be deported and wouldn’t be able to come back”
was constitutionally effective assistance); Commonwealth v.
Escobar,
70 A.3d 838, 842 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“We do not read
the statute [
8 U.S.C. § 1227] or the [Padilla] court’s words as
announcing a guarantee that actual deportation proceedings are a
19
certainty such that counsel must advise a defendant to that
effect.”); Neufville v. State, 13 A.3d 607, 614 (R.I. 2011) (“Counsel is
not required to inform their clients that they will be deported, but
rather that a defendant’s ‘plea would make [the defendant] eligible
for deportation.’” (quoting Padilla,
559 U.S. at 368)) (alteration in
original); Shata,
868 N.W.2d at 109 (“Because deportation is not an
absolutely certain consequence of a conviction for a deportable
offense, Padilla does not require an attorney to advise an alien
client that deportation is an absolute certainty upon conviction of a
deportable offense, including a controlled substance offense.”); see
DeJesus,
9 N.E.3d at 799-800 (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“[D]eportation
has not been demonstrated to be inevitable in the aftermath of
every plea of guilty that creates either ‘eligibility’ or even a
‘presumption’ of deportation. . . . [T]he deportation proceeding is
contingent on there being an ‘order’ of removal from the Attorney
General of the United States, and there still remain discretionary
avenues to avoid deportation, albeit limited ones.”). Instead, we
conclude, taking into account the language counsel actually uses
and the circumstances of the noncitizen client (such as the ability
to read and understand English), a criminal defense attorney may
20
provide effective assistance even when using equivocal terms such
as “likely,” “strong chance,” or “probably.”
The Padilla Court ultimately “[held] that
counsel must inform her client whether his
plea carries a risk of deportation.” Padilla, 559
U.S. at 374,
130 S. Ct. 1473 (emphasis added).
The Court did not hold that an attorney must
inform an alien client that a conviction for a
deportable offense will absolutely result in
deportation. The Court did not require an
attorney to use any particular words, such as
“inevitable deportation,” or to even convey the
idea of inevitable deportation.
Shata, 868 N.W.2d at 98 (alteration in original).
¶ 26 In Campos-Corona, a division of this court held that while both
counsel and the trial court advised the defendant “his plea could, or
likely would, result in deportation and difficulty re-entering the
United States,” ¶ 12, “[b]ecause Campos-Corona was not advised of
mandatory removal,” ¶ 13, the postconviction court erred in finding
counsel’s performance reasonable. But the division summarily
reached this conclusion in two paragraphs with little discussion or
analysis of Padilla and the concomitant case law. In any event, had
the division considered the above-mentioned case law and reached
the same conclusion, we would respectfully disagree. Indeed, we
would have concluded that counsel’s advice that “a guilty plea
21
would make renewing [Campos-Corona’s] permanent residence
status difficult, if not impossible, and that he would likely be
deported,” id. at ¶ 3, was not constitutionally deficient.
¶ 27 The record supports the postconviction court’s findings that
Juarez was correctly advised and fully understood the risk of his
plea prior to pleading guilty. Given Juarez’s acknowledgment that
he knew he could not reach a plea that would prevent his
deportation, plus the multiple layers of advice he received (including
inquiry by the court regarding immigration consequences prior to
accepting his guilty plea), we are satisfied that Tatum provided
constitutionally effective representation. As stated by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, “[t]he bottom line is that an attorney’s
advice must be adequate to allow a defendant to knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily decide whether to enter a guilty plea.”
Shata, 868 N.W.2d at 107. The advice Juarez received from Tatum
allowed him to do so. The fact that Juarez’s subsequent behavior
resulted in his incarceration and eventual deportation does not
make the advice given by his counsel constitutionally ineffective.
22
III. Additional Contentions
¶ 28 Juarez goes on to argue that Tatum was required to advise
him that his guilty plea would result in lifetime inadmissibility to
the United States, mandatory detention, and destruction of the
defense of cancellation of removal.4 We find no support for these
arguments in the language of Padilla. Indeed, the Padilla Court
said “[i]mmigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of
its own” in which “the deportation consequences of a particular plea
are [often] unclear or uncertain.” 559 U.S. at 369. Padilla does not
require criminal defense attorneys to function as immigration
lawyers. Juarez’s arguments to the contrary expand Padilla past
any commonsense reading. See People v. Vicente-Sontay,
2014 COA
175, ¶ 38 (“[The defendant] cites no authority . . . nor have we seen
any, requiring counsel to advise a defendant on the particulars of
cancellation of removal when the defendant’s eligibility for such
relief is unclear.”).
4We note, as did the postconviction court, that the defense of
cancellation of removal was not available to Juarez because he was
not a lawful permanent resident of the United States for five years
prior to his arrest and conviction in this case. See
8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(2), 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012); accord People v. Vicente-Sontay,
2014 COA 175, ¶¶ 37-38.
23
¶ 29 Because we conclude that counsel’s performance was “within
the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases,”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (quoting McMann v. Richardson,
397
U.S. 759, 771 (1970)), we need not consider whether counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced Juarez in this case.
IV. Conclusion
¶ 30 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE BOORAS and JUDGE DUNN concur.
24
