STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
LUKE SORAICH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 96-065
Honorable Gregory R. Todd, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jami Rebsom, Jami Rebsom Law Firm, PLLC, Livingston, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, C. Mark Fowler, Assistant
Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 12, 2017
Decided: April 26, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Luke Soraich appeals the order of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court denying his
petition to suspend the remainder of his deliberate homicide sentence and for an order
sentencing him to boot camp. We affirm.
¶3 In 1997, Soraich—then twenty years old—was sentenced to 100 years in Montana
State Prison for deliberate homicide. He petitioned the District Court in 2016 to suspend
his remaining sentence and order that he attend boot camp. The District Court denied
Soraich’s petition, concluding that it did not have statutory authority to modify his sentence
and that he was ineligible for boot camp.
¶4 We review a district court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. State v. Cooksey,
. Our role in interpreting a statute is to
“ascertain and declare what is in terms or substance contained in a statute, and not to insert
what is omitted or omit what is inserted.” Cooksey, ¶ 32 (citation and internal quotations
omitted). In doing so we look to the plain language of the statute. Cooksey, ¶ 32.
¶5 “In order to be eligible for participation in the boot camp incarceration program, an
inmate . . . must be serving a sentence . . . for a felony offense other than a felony
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punishable by death.” Section 53-30-403(2), MCA (emphasis added). At the time Soraich
was convicted, the deliberate homicide statute provided that
[a] person convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide shall be punished
by death as provided in 46-18-301 through 46-18-310, by life imprisonment,
or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than 10 years or
more than 100 years, except as provided in 46-18-219 and 46-18-222.
Section 45-5-102(2), MCA (1997). Soraich was not sentenced to death, and he argues that
the State never sought the death penalty or suggested that any aggravating factors existed
that could have supported its imposition in his case. His argument misconstrues the statute.
The felony for which Soraich was convicted—deliberate homicide—was “punishable by
death,” whether or not that punishment was imposed. Section 53-30-403(2), MCA.
Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of § 53-30-403(2), MCA, Soraich was
ineligible for participation in the boot camp program. The District Court correctly
concluded as much.
¶6 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our
Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the
Court, the case presents a question controlled by statute. The District Court’s interpretation
of the law was correct and we affirm its order denying Soraich’s petition to suspend the
remainder of his sentence and sentence him to boot camp.
/S/ BETH BAKER
We Concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE
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