133 Nev., Advance Opinion 51
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
LUIS GODOREDO PIMENTEL, III, No.-68710
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. JUN 2 2 2017
r BETH A. ER01NN
E - 0
"Ake :k-
rERK
13Vb-HIS
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant o a jury
verdict, of murder with use of a deadly weapon. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Carolyn Ellsworth, Judge.
Affirmed.
Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and William M. Waters and Howard
Brooks, Deputy Public Defenders, Clark County,
for Appellant.
Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson,
District Attorney, and Sandra DiGiacomo and Jonathan E. VanBoskerck,
Chief Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
OPINION
By the Court, CHERRY, C.J.:
Appellant Luis Pimentel appeals his conviction of first-degree
murder. Pimentel and Robert Holland had been shouting at each other
throughout the evening, mostly regarding a mutual female friend, before
Holland arrived at Pimentel's home to confront him. During the fight,
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Pimentel shot Holland twice, including once after Holland had already
collapsed from the first shot. Holland died from his wounds.
NRS 200.450 provides that if any "person, upon previous
concert and agreement, fights with any other person" and "[s]hould death
ensue to [the other] person in such a fight," the surviving fighter is guilty
of first-degree murder. Pimentel argues that NRS 200.450 is void because
it is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We hold that NRS
200.450 is not vague because it provides a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice of what conduct is prohibited and because it sets forth clear
standards that prevent arbitrary enforcement. We also hold that NRS
200.450 is not overbroad because it does not criminalize protected speech,
but the ensuing fight and potential resulting death.
In Wilmeth v. State, 96 Nev. 403, 405-06,
610 P.2d 735, 737
(1980), we held that where a challenge to fight is accepted and the
decedent unilaterally escalated the fight with a deadly weapon, the
survivor was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction. Although we
noted there could be some cases in which a mutual combatant could be
entitled to such an instruction, the factual differences between the instant
case and Wilmeth are not legally consequential. Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury that although
self-defense was available as a defense to first-degree murder under the
traditional theory of murder, it was not available as a defense to murder
under the challenge-to-fight theory.
We are also asked to consider whether the State's expert
witness violated the exclusionary rule by remaining in the courtroom
during other witnesses' testimony and whether she exceeded the scope of
her purpose by impeaching the defendant's trial testimony with
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statements he made to her during a court-ordered, independent
psychological examination. Due to an insufficient record, we are unable to
determine whether the expert's presence violated the exclusionary rule.
Regarding her testimony, however, we hold that it was error to allow the
expert witness to impeach Pimentel's testimony with statements he made
at his court-ordered evaluation, but we conclude that the error does not
require reversal, as it was harmless due to the fact that Pimentel's own
testimony was enough, in and of itself, to support his conviction. 1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Holland had been in a romantic relationship with Amanda
Lowe. Unbeknownst to Holland, Lowe also had a sexual relationship with
Pimentel. Pimentel and Lowe were together at a casino when Holland,
who found out the two were together, angrily confronted them. Casino
security eventually asked Holland to leave. Holland left, and Lowe
followed him outside, where Holland slapped Lowe, who then reentered
the casino. Holland, who remained outside, happened upon two of his
friends, Timothy Hildebrand and Shannon Salazar, in the parking lot and
asked them to enter the casino to convince Lowe to come back outside to
talk. Hildebrand and Salazar were unsuccessful. Holland later asked his
father, who came to pick him up, to find Lowe inside the casino to convince
her to talk to Holland outside. Holland's father was also unsuccessful.
Eventually, Pimentel and Lowe left the casino. Holland began
arguing with them as they walked to Pimentel's hotel room on the
property. Pimentel went to his room, but Lowe stayed in the parking lot
1Pimentel has raised other claims of error beyond those discussed in
this opinion. We have considered each claim and have concluded that they
are without merit.
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to talk to Holland. Holland again struck Lowe and security intervened.
Pimentel left his room and confronted Holland, and although no punches
were thrown at that time, the two shouted back and forth at each other in
a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as either a challenge-to-fight and as an acceptance thereof. 2
Alter this altercation, Hildebrand and Salazar drove Pimentel
and Lowe to Pimentel's apartment. Holland got a ride to Pimentel's
apartment from his father. Once at the apartment complex, Holland
punched Pimentel, initiating a fistfight. During the altercation, Pimentel
shot Holland twice, including once after he had already fallen to the
ground. 3 After shooting Holland, Pimentel threw the gun away. Pimentel
2 The record does not indicate either which, if any, words thefl jury
determined constituted a challenge or an acceptance. Pimentel's own
testimony, however, demonstrated at least two instances where a
reasonable juror might have found that he either challenged Holland or
accepted Holland's challenge. One example, is when Pimentel learned
that Holland struck Lowe, he shouted:
All right, you know what, that's enough, Dude. I
mean, seriously, you want to hit Aman—I mean,
you want to hit a woman why don't you just come
and hit a man then.
Pimentel also shouted, "NI ou know where I be," in response to Holland's
direct threats.
3 The parties dispute how this altercation took place. Pimentel
claims that Holland pulled a firearm on him before Pimentel disarmed and
shot Holland. The State claims that although Holland approached
Pimentel, it was Pimentel who initially drew the firearm. Although the
jury convicted Pimentel of first-degree murder, it acquitted him of
possession of a concealed firearm, indicating that the jury perhaps
believed Pimentel's account of these facts. For the purposes of this
opinion, who brought the gun to the fight is unimportant.
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fled the scene and boarded a bus. The police found Pimentel on the bus
not far from the scene of the shooting and arrested him.
In its initial criminal complaint, the State charged Pimentel
with murder with use of a deadly weapon under the theory that the
murder was committed with malice aforethought, premeditation, and
deliberation. See NRS 200.010. After the preliminary hearing, the State
added a charge of carrying a concealed weapon, see NRS 202.350, and a
theory of first-degree murder involving a killing as the result of a
challenge to fight, see NRS 200.450.
Pimentel noticed Dr. Briana Boyd as an expert witness who
would testify regarding post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In
response, the State filed a motion to compel Pimentel to submit to an
independent psychological examination. The State also supplemented its
notice of expert witnesses to include Dr. Melissa Piasecki, an expert in
forensic psychiatry. The district court granted the State's motion and
compelled Pimentel to undergo a psychological evaluation with Dr.
Piasecki.
After Pimentel rested, the State called Dr. Piasecki during its
rebuttal case. Dr. Piasecki had observed Lowe's, Pimentel's, and Dr.
Boyd's testimony prior to taking the stand. Dr. Piasecki answered
questions throughout her testimony comparing Pimentel's statements
during the evaluation to his statements during trial testimony.
After the close of evidence, Pimentel objected to the district
court's instruction regarding self-defense being unavailable under a
challenge-to-fight theory. Although the jury acquitted Pimentel of
possession of a concealed firearm, it found Pimentel guilty of first-degree
murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The jury, however, was not
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asked to indicate which theory of first-degree murder it used to convict.
The district court subsequently entered its judgment of conviction, in
which it sentenced Pimentel to 20-50 years for the murder conviction and
a consecutive term of 32-144 months for the deadly weapon enhancement,
DISCUSSION
NRS 200.450 is neither vague nor overbroad
Any "person, [who] upon previous concert and agreement,
fights with any other person or gives, sends or authorizes any other person
to give or send a challenge verbally or in writing to fight any other person,
the person giving, sending or accepting the challenge to fight any other
person" is guilty of at least a gross misdemeanor under the challenge-to-fight law. NRS 200.450(1). "Should death ensue to a person in such a
fight, or should a person die from any injuries received in such a fight, the
person causing or having any agency in causing the death. . . is guilty of
murder in the first degree. . . ." NRS 200.450(3).
Pimentel argues that NRS 200.450 is unconstitutionally vague
because it fails to define its essential terms, such as "previous concert and
agreement," "challenge," or "acceptance," and thus, one cannot reasonably
conform his or her conduct to avoid criminal liability. He also claims that
NRS 200.450's allegedly unascertainable terms allow for arbitrary
enforcement. Finally, Pimentel argues that NRS 200.450 is overbroad
because it can criminalize speech commonly used in trash-talking or other
commonplace uses. We disagree with each claim.
We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. Scott u.
First Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 101, 363 P.3d 1159, 1161
(2015). However, we begin with the presumption that a statute is
constitutional, and the challenging party has the burden to make a "clear
showing of invalidity." State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d
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550, 552 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we proceed
with the understanding that "every reasonable construction must be
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
NRS 200.450 is not unconstitutionally vague
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" Carrigan v. Comm'n
on Ethics, 129 Nev. 894, 899,
313 P.3d 880, 884 (2013). "A criminal
statute can be invalidated for vagueness (1) if it fails to provide a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited; or (2) if it is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement." Scott, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 101, 363 P.3d at 1164 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The key difference between the two tests is
that the first test deals with the person whose conduct is at issue, while
the second deals with those who enforce the laws, such as police officers.
Id. The two tests are independent of one another, and failing either test
renders the law unconstitutionally vague. Castaneda, 126 Nev. at 481-82,
245 P.3d at 553.
By requiring notice of prohibited conduct in a
statute, the first prong offers citizens the
opportunity to conform their own conduct to that
law. However, the second prong is more
important because absent adequate guidelines, a
criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep,
which would allow the police, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections.
Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist, Court, 122 Nev. 289, 293,
129 P.3d 682, 685
(2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
We have previously held that NRS 200.450 is not void for
vagueness. See Wilmeth v. State, 96 Nev. 403, 404-05,
610 P.2d 735, 736
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(1980). In the context of a fight that escalated to the use of a deadly
weapon and a death, we noted:
In the context of this case, we believe that the
statute provided appellant with sufficient warning
of the proscribed behavior. The statute proscribes
the conveyance or acceptance of a challenge to fight
when such a fight or confrontation results. The
degrees of punishment depend upon whether the
fight involves the use of a deadly weapon or
results in death. Here, there was a challenge and
an acceptance, a subsequent confrontation, and the
use of a deadly weapon was involved. There was
also a resulting death.
Id. at 405,
610 P.2d at 737 (citation omitted) (emphases added). 4
Pimentel argues that we limited our holding in Wilmeth to the
facts of that case. 5 This argument is unpersuasive. Even if we assume the
facts of the two cases are legally distinguishable, Pimentel challenges the
language of the statute itself, which is the same language that we
previously held to be not vague. Although the phrase "previous concert
and agreement" is not one commonly used today, when read in context, the
statute should be clear to a person of ordinary intelligence that the
4 Due to a printing error, a portion of the quoted language was
omitted from Volume 96 of the Nevada Reports; the full text of the court's
decision in Wilmeth was reproduced in the Pacific Reporter and is quoted
here.
5 TheWilmeth court did not provide much factual detail. What is
known, however, is that there "was a challenge and an acceptance, a
subsequent confrontation, and the use of a deadly weapon was involved.
There was also a resulting death." 610 P.2d at 737. We also know that
the appellant in Wilmeth argued that he should have been entitled to a
self-defense instruction because there was no prior agreement to use
weapons, but a deadly weapon was nonetheless involved. Id.
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prohibited act is to engage in a fight after one party issues a challenge to
fight and the other party issues an acceptance to that challenge.
Looking to the statute as applied to the facts of the case,
Pimentel is unable to distinguish the facts of this case from those of
Wilmeth. In this case both Pimentel and Holland shouted words, which
can reasonably be construed as either a challenge or acceptance to fight,
back and forth to each other. Although Holland struck Pimentel first, a
fight ensued. Pimentel used a deadly weapon regardless of who initially
possessed it. Finally, Holland died as a result of the fight and the use of
the deadly weapon. Accordingly, we conclude that a person of reasonable
intelligence would be aware that Pimentel's actions in this case
constituted either a challenge to fight or an acceptance thereof, and
participation in an ensuing fight. Therefore, NRS 200.450 is not vague
under the first test.
Regarding the second vagueness test, NRS 200.450 would be
vague "if it is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement." Carrigan, 129 Nev. at 899,
313 P.3d at 884.
Pimentel has put forth no evidence, nor is there anything in the record, to
indicate that some fight participants would be more or less likely to be
charged under NRS 200.450 than others. The police and prosecutors need
only look to find evidence that the fighters agreed to fight beforehand, a
fight actually took place, and in the case of murder charges, that one or
more of the fighters died as a result. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
that NRS 200.450 leads to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, and
thus, it does not fail the second test. Because NRS 200.450 does not fail
either vagueness test, it is not unconstitutionally vague, and we affirm the
district court on this ground.
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NRS 200.450 is not unconstitutionally overbroad
"Whether or not a statute is overbroad depends upon the
extent to which it lends itself to improper application to protected
conduct." Scott v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 101, 363
P.3d 1159, 1162 (2015) (quoting N. Nev. Co. v. Menicucci,
96 Nev. 533,
536,
611 P.2d 1068, 1069 (1980)). A law is overbroad when it has a
"seemingly legitimate purpose but [is] worded so broadly that [it] also
appl [ies] to" conduct protected by the First Amendment. 6 Id. We have
held that while even "minor intrusions on First Amendment rights will
trigger the overbreadth doctrine[,] . . . a statute should not be void unless
it is substantially overbroad in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Scott, a police officer pulled over a driver for running a stop
sign and suspected the driver was driving under the influence. Scott, 131
Nev., Adv. Op. 101, 363 P.3d at 1161. Scott, a passenger in the car, told
the driver that he did not have to do anything the officer said. Id. The
officer instructed Scott to remain silent, but Scott continued to advise the
driver. Id. The officer arrested Scott for violating a city ordinance
prohibiting interference with an officer performing his or her duties. Id.
We concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad
because it "encompasse[d] protected speech and [was] not narrowly
6 The First Amendment, however, does not protect all types of
speech, as "fighting words, or words that by their very utterance ... tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are not constitutionally
protected. Scott, 131 Nev., Adv. Op. 101, 363 P.3d at 1162 (2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (recognizing the fighting words exception to the
First Amendment's freedom of speech).
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tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words." Scott, 131
Nev., Adv. O. 101, 363 P.3d at 1163 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist, Court, 122 Nev. 289, 298,
129 P.3d
682, 688 (2006) (holding that county ordinance designed to punish
loitering for purposes of prostitution was overbroad because it punished
otherwise protected conduct that could indicate loitering for prostitution,
such as engaging in a conversation or waving one's arms); but see Ford v.
State, 127 Nev. 608, 619,
262 P.3d 1123, 1130 (2011) (holding that for an
inchoate crime like solicitation, where "the crime is complete once the
words are spoken with the requisite intent," the spoken words are not
protected speech when attempting to convince another to engage in an
unlawful act, such as prostitution).
Unlike the city ordinance in Scott, NRS 200.450 does not
criminalize speech because without an ensuing fight there is no criminal
liability. Moreover, without a resulting death, NRS 200.450(3) does not
provide for first-degree murder liability. Similarly to the felony-murder
rule, which provides "that the intent to commit the [underlying] felony
supplies the malice for the murder," see Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326, 332,
167 P.3d 430, 434 (2007), NRS 200.450 relies on a person's intent to fight
to satisfy the mens rea requirement to prove murder. NRS 200.450, like
the felony-murder rule, does not create a strict liability crime because the
initial intent to fight must be found to sustain a murder charge under the
challenge-to-fight theory. Because NRS 200.450 does not punish speech,
but only uses speech to demonstrate mens rea for an ensuing fight and
resulting death, it is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
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The district court properly instructed the jury regarding self-defense and its
inapplicability to challenge-to-fight murder theory
The district court instructed the jury that under the challenge- to-fight theory of murder, self-defense was not available "to someone who
engages in a challenge to fight and a death results," even though Pimentel
presented evidence that Holland escalated the fight by introducing a
firearm. 7 Pimentel argues that the district court erred by giving that
instruction because it relied upon Wilmeth v. State, 96 Nev. 403, 405-06,
610 P.2d 735, 737 (1980), where we did not categorically foreclose upon
asserting self-defense against a challenge-to-fight charge. Pimentel does
not, however, explain how his case differs from Wilmeth to entitle him to
assert self-defense under the challenge-to-fight theory. Although we agree
that self-defense might not always be unavailable as a defense to the
challenge-to-fight theory of murder, 8 we conclude that it was unavailable
in the instant case.
The district court has broad discretion to determine whether a
jury instruction is correct and proper. NRS 175.161(3); Crawford v. State,
121 Nev. 744, 748,
121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). A district court's decisions in
settling jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion or judicial
error. Id. A district court abuses its discretion if its "decision is arbitrary
or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether an instruction was an accurate
7 Jury Instruction 19 read: "Under the theory of challenge to fight for
First Degree Murder, the right of self defense is not available to someone
who engages in a challenge to fight and a death results."
8We are not asked to delineate in which cases a challenge-to-fight
murder defendant may assert self-defense, and we decline to do so now.
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statement of the law, however, is reviewed de novo. Funderburk v. State,
125 Nev. 260, 263,
212 P.3d 337, 339 (2009).
We have previously held that self-defense was not available as
a defense to a violation of NRS 200.450 when a defendant voluntarily
places himself in a situation where he issues or accepts a challenge to fight
and a fight occurs, even if the decedent unilaterally escalated the
situation. Wilmeth, 96 Nev. at 405-06,
610 P.2d at 737. Wilmeth involved
a case where, despite a challenge and an acceptance to engage in a
fistfight, the decedent allegedly brandished a weapon with no prior
agreement to use weapons, and therefore, Wilmeth felt entitled to his
proffered instruction on self-defense. Id. Although Wilmeth was in fact
given a standard self-defense instruction, we concluded that he was not
entitled to it, noting that "the instructions given improperly benefitted"
him. Id. at 407,
610 P.2d at 738.
Some foreign jurisdictions have provided exceptions to the
general rule that one cannot assert self-defense when engaged in mutual
combat. See, e.g., State v. O'Bryan, 123 A.3d 398, 408 (Conn. 2015)
(holding that despite a statute precluding mutual combatants from
asserting self-defense at all, an escalation exception applied because "the
requisite agreement does not exist when one party unilaterally and
dangerously escalates the previously equal terms of a fight"); State v.
Friday, 306 P.3d 265, 277 (Kan. 2013) (recognizing that the rule
prohibiting self-defense for mutual combat "does not destroy the right to
self-defense in all mutual combat cases; but for self-defense to justify the
killing, the defendant must be acting solely for the protection of the
defendant's own life, and not to inflict harm upon the defendant's
adversary" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gill v. State, 184 S.W.
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864, 864 (Tenn. 1916) (disagreeing with an instruction which held "that if
one willingly entered into a mutual combat with another without any
intent to do great bodily harm, and thereupon his adversary resorted to a
deadly weapon and was about to assault him therewith, he would not have
the right to defend himself or resort to such a weapon in his necessary
self-defense").
Other jurisdictions require that the defendant attempt to stop
fighting and clearly indicate that intent to the decedent. See, e.g., People
v. Nguyen, 354 P.3d 90, 112 (Cal. 2015) ("The right of self-defense is only
available to a person who engages in mutual combat if he has done all of
the following: foine, he has actually tried in good faith to refuse to
continue fighting; two, he has clearly informed his opponent that he wants
to stop fighting; three, he has clearly informed his opponent that he has
stopped fighting; and, four, he had given his opponent the opportunity to
stop fighting."); see generally 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 141 (2008) ("One
is not justified in using force which is either intended or likely to cause
death or great bodily harm if he or she is engaged in mutual combat,
unless he or she withdraws and effectively communicates that to the
victim.").
Nguyen required facts that are not present in the instant case,
i.e., the defendant's intent to stop fighting and his communication of that
intent to the decedent. Although the holdings from O'Bryan, Friday, and
Gill are not entirely unpersuasive, the fact remains that we have
previously held that self-defense does not apply in a challenge-to-fight
murder case merely because the decedent unilaterally escalated a fistfight
to one using a deadly weapon. See Wilmeth, 96 Nev. at 405,
610 P.2d at
737 (holding that one participant in a fight who kills the other may not
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claim self-defense even if the decedent went beyond the agreed upon terms
and introduced a deadly weapon). We hold no differently now.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by instructing
the jury that self-defense was unavailable under challenge-to-fight theory
in this case, and we affirm the district court on this ground.
We are unable to conclude that Dr. Piasecki's presence in the courtroom
violated the exclusionary rule
Pimentel argues that allowing Dr. Piasecki to listen to his, Dr.
Boyd's, and Lowe's testimony before taking the stand violated the
exclusionary rule. The State argues that Pimentel did not object to Dr.
Piasecki's presence below, nor does the record indicate that he ever
invoked the exclusionary rule. Because the record does not indicate that
Pimentel invoked the exclusionary rule, we are unable to grant him relief
on this issue.
Nevada's exclusionary rule requires, "at the request of a party,"
all witnesses to leave the courtroom "so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses." NRS 50.155(1) (emphasis added). Parties
or persons whose presence is essential to the party's cause are exempted
from the exclusionary rule. NRS 50.155(2).
The record lacks any indication that Pimentel invoked the
exclusionary rule at trial. At oral argument, Pimentel asserted that the
district court informed him, 15 minutes into trial, that it was too late to
request the bench conferences to be recorded. He also indicated that
because the bench conferences were not recorded, he was unsure whether
trial counsel invoked the exclusionary rule. The State confirmed that this
particular district court department requires parties to request recorded
bench conferences prior to trial and claimed that Pimentel did not, in fact,
invoke the exclusionary rule.
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We have previously held that a district court commits error
when it fails to record bench conferences in a criminal trial. See Preciado
v. State, 130 Nev. 40, 43,
318 P.3d 176, 178 (2014) ("Due process requires
us to extend our reasoning [requiring all bench conferences to be recorded
in capital cases] to defendants in noncapital cases, because regardless of
the type of case, it is crucial for a district court to memorialize all bench
conferences, either contemporaneously or by allowing the attorneys to
make a record afterward."). We need not reverse the conviction due to this
error, however, because Pimentel has not demonstrated that the missing
record is "so significant that [its] absence precludes this court from
conducting a meaningful review of the alleged errors. .. and the
prejudicial effect of any error." See id. (emphasis added).
At trial, Pimentel testified that he challenged Holland to hit
him, rather than Lowe. Pimentel also testified that after Holland
threatened him, he responded "you know where I be." As a result,
Pimentel's own testimony provided enough evidence that he either
challenged Holland to fight or accepted Holland's challenge to fight before
they actually fought and Holland died. Therefore, any harm done by
allowing Dr. Piasecki to remain in the courtroom prior to her own
testimony was not prejudicial because Pimentel provided enough evidence,
in and of itself, to support his conviction under the challenge-to-fight
murder theory. Moreover, the totality of the admissible evidence
presented was sufficient to convict Pimentel under either theory of
murder. Because Pimentel both failed to demonstrate that he invoked the
exclusionary rule at trial or that the missing record precluded us from
reviewing the prejudicial effect of the alleged exclusionary error, we affirm
the district court on those grounds.
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Dr. Piasecki's testimony impermissibly exceeded her scope as an expert
witness, but the error was harmless
Pimentel claims that Dr. Piasecki's testimony was supposed to
focus on Pimentel's psychological diagnoses and how they related to
Pimentel's actions on the night of the incident, but instead she compared
his trial testimony with his statements made to her during the psychiatric
interview. He adds that Dr. Piasecki served less as an expert and more as
an unfair impeachment tool. We agree with Pimentel, but nevertheless
conclude that the error is harmless.
Generally, the State may not use a healthcare provider to
introduce a defendant's un-Mirandized statements from a court-ordered
psychiatric evaluation. Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 819-20,
192 P.3d
721, 729 (2008). The State may, however, introduce rebuttal evidence
through a healthcare provider if it "(1) is relevant to undermining a
defendant's insanity defense, and (2) does not relate to the defendant's
culpability with respect to the charged crimes." Id. at 20, 192 P.3d at 729.
Furthermore, an expert may not opine as to the ultimate question of any
element of a charged offense because to do so usurps the jury's function.
Winiarz v. State, 104 Nev. 43, 51,
752 P.2d 761, 766 (1988).
Error of this nature must be reversed unless this court can
declare that it "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 50,
752
P.2d at 766. Harmless error is "[alny error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial rights." NRS 178.598.
Dr. Piasecki testified about what, if any, factor Pimentel's
PTSD played on the night of the shooting and refrained from opining as to
the ultimate question of any element of a charged offense, including
whether Pimentel intended to fight or intended to kill However, her
testimony exceeded the allowable scope when she compared Pimentel's
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prior un-Mirandized statements from the psychiatric evaluation with
Pimentel's trial testimony. See Winiarz, 104 Nev. at 51,
752 P.2d at 766;
Mitchell, 124 Nev. at 819-20,
192 P.3d at 729. Dr. Piasecki's testimony,
however, was ultimately harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the same
reason that her presence in the court room during other witnesses'
testimony was harmless, i.e. because the other evidence presented at trial,
including Pimentel's own testimony, was sufficient to sustain a first-degree murder conviction under either theory of murder as charged.
CONCLUSION
After considering all of Pimentel's claims on appeal, we
conclude that there are no instances of reversible error. Accordingly, we
order the judgment of conviction affirmed.
We concur:
Gibbons
J.
Hardesty
Altti
fiug
Parraguirre Stiglich
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