[Cite as State v. Hundley,
2018-Ohio-3566.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 106235
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
CHARLES C. HUNDLEY
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-17-612938-A
BEFORE: Laster Mays, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 6, 2018
-i-
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Mark A. Stanton
Cuyahoga County Public Defender
By: Frank Cavallo
Assistant Public Defender
310 Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Jeffrey Schnatter
Assistant County Prosecutor
Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Charles C. Hundley (“Hundley”) appeals his
convictions. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
{¶2} This case arises from the shooting death of Gregory Clark (“G. Clark”) on
January 1, 2017. On January 20, 2017, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury charged
Hundley with:
Count 1: Murder, R.C. 2903.02(A), an unclassified felony, with one- and three-year firearm specifications;
Count 2: Murder, a violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), an unclassified
felony, with one- and three-year firearm specifications;
Count 3: Felonious assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), a
second-degree felony with one- and three- year firearm
specifications;
Count 4: Felonious assault, a violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), a
second-degree felony, with one- and three- year firearm
specifications;
Count 5: Involuntary manslaughter, a violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a
first-degree felony, with one- and three-year firearm
specifications;
Count 6: Having a weapon while under disability, a violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(2), a third-degree felony; and
Count 7: Receiving stolen property (firearm), a violation of
R.C. 2913.51(A), a fourth-degree felony.
Counts 1-5 also carried repeat violent offender and notice of prior conviction
specifications. At the time of the indictment, Hundley was on probation for attempted
failure to register a notice of change of address under R.C. 2950.05(E)(1).1
{¶3} Hundley was arraigned on January 25, 2017 and pled not guilty to the
indictment. A bench trial began on June 28, 2017. Count 7 was dismissed under
Crim.R. 29. Hundley was found guilty on July 25, 2017, of the remaining counts. On
August 15, 2017, Hundley received a life sentence with parole eligibility after 20 years.
I. Trial
{¶4} Testimony established that on December 31, 2016, Deonte Dudley
(“Dudley”) and Dudley’s girlfriend Kelasha Bedell (“Bedell”) hosted a party at their
home in Maple Heights, Ohio. A number of the couple’s friends and family members
were present. Hundley, Dudley’s stepbrother, arrived at the party with his girlfriend
Shakira Jones, her daughter Sequoia Jones, and the daughter’s boyfriend William Taylor
(“Taylor”). At midnight, a number of individuals were shooting guns outside. An hour
or two later, a group of attendees were in the basement dancing, talking, and drinking
when an altercation occurred, culminating in the shooting death of G. Clark, the brother
of Bedell.
1 State v. Hundley, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-14-587859-A.
A. State’s Case
{¶5} The state presented 17 witnesses. Bedell’s daughter, 11-year-old D.G.,
was in the basement and heard her uncle Marion Clark (“M. Clark”) speak to Taylor
about dancing too closely with one of D.G.’s minor cousins, M.K. Taylor responded by
pushing M. Clark. Hundley and others restrained the parties. D.G. pulled Hundley
away from M. Clark as D.G.’s mother, Bedell, and uncle G. Clark entered the basement.
{¶6} Bedell, Dudley, and G. Clark were trying to separate M. Clark and Taylor
when Hundley pulled a 9 mm Smith & Wesson gun from his waistband and fired at the
center of the group. D.G. saw G. Clark drop to the floor. She and the other children ran
to the second floor bedroom area until police arrived. D.G.’s 14-year-old cousin S.D. also
observed Hundley shoot G. Clark and confirmed D.G.’s testimony.
{¶7} Hundley’s brother Dudley testified that Taylor pushed M. Clark. Dudley was
standing between them when Bedell and G. Clark ran downstairs. Dudley heard a shot
and saw G. Clark lying on the floor. He did not see Hundley’s involvement with the
altercation or see Hundley with a gun that night.
{¶8} Bedell heard a commotion and ran to the basement followed by G. Clark to
find Dudley separating M. Clark and Taylor. She saw Hundley standing near the
children when he “stepped back,” pulled out a gun, and fired “for no reason at all,”
striking G. Clark in the head. (Tr. 378.)
{¶9} Bedell pushed her eight-year-old into the adjacent room and returned to see
the gun either on the couch or floor. She slid the gun under the couch so that nobody
else would get hurt and later informed police of the location of the firearm.
{¶10} Sergeant Matthew Berger (“Sgt. Berger”) with the Maple Heights Police
Department interviewed witnesses at the scene. Hundley told Sgt. Berger that he was in
the kitchen when the shot was fired. After interviewing D.G. and other minors who were
present during the shooting, Sgt. Berger questioned Hundley again. This time Hundley
said that he went to the basement because his brother was fighting with another male and
did not mention hearing a shot.
{¶11} Detective Thomas Halley (“Det. Halley”) and Detective Andrew Sperie
(“Det. Sperie”) with the Maple Heights Police Department (“MHPD”) responded to the
scene. Multiple shell casings were located around the property including several 9 mm
Hornady brand casings. Det. Sperie found the Smith & Wesson under the couch with the
assistance of Bedell, along with a brass shell casing.
{¶12} While police were questioning the adults on the lower levels of the
home, D.G. informed the police that an adult male with a gun was hiding on the second
floor. The male was identified as Jeffrey Jefferson (“Jefferson”), a friend of Hundley.
A black .38 caliber revolver was hidden under a towel in one of the children’s bedrooms.
{¶13} Forensic examinations of the black revolver, Smith & Wesson, Smith &
Wesson magazine and bullet casings were conducted. The DNA samples provided for
analysis included DNA from Hundley and Jefferson. Due to the mixtures of DNA
profiles on the firearms, the DNA results were inconclusive. A sample from the blood
stain on the basement floor was sourced solely to G. Clark as well as a sample from the
lower grip of the Smith & Wesson.
{¶14} The Smith & Wesson weapon was determined to be operable. The 9 mm
Hornady brand cartridge casing recovered from the basement floor, as well as several
casings recovered outside of the house, were fired from the Smith & Wesson; however,
the forensic examination did not absolutely confirm that the bullet that killed G. Clark
was fired from the Smith & Wesson.
{¶15} Joseph Felo, D.O. (“Dr. Felo”), chief deputy medical examiner for the
Cuyahoga County Coroner’s Office, testified that the bullet entered the left frontal scalp
of G. Clark. Two large and two small fragments of the jacketed bullet were recovered
from his body. Based on the measurements of the fragments, the bullet appeared to be of
medium caliber, such as a .38 caliber, .357 caliber or 9 mm.
B. Defense’s Case
{¶16} The defense presented two witnesses. Taylor testified that he
accompanied Hundley to the party. An hour or so after midnight, Taylor was in the
basement talking with Hundley and several others. M. Clark said something to Taylor
and grabbed Taylor by the collar. Taylor and M. Clark were restrained by the others
including Hundley’s brothers, Steven Goins (“Goins”) and Dudley.
{¶17} Taylor heard a gunshot and turned to see M. Clark holding a black
revolver. Taylor did not see Hundley holding a gun but identified the Smith & Wesson
as the gun that Hundley carries. Taylor did not wait for police to arrive because of a
warrant for an outstanding probation violation.
{¶18} Hundley also took the stand. Hundley admitted that he and several others
were shooting guns at midnight, and that he was shooting the Smith & Wesson containing
the Hornady brand ammunition. Hundley was proceeding down the basement steps
when he observed a “scuffle” between M. Clark and Dudley. (Tr. 928.)
Hundley: I grabbed Marion [M. Clark] by the left pocket of his waist
and tried to grab him around his head to pull him down. And I
noticed my little brother on the steps, I’m yelling for him to
pull [Marion’s] legs so he can’t stand up. And when I’m
doing this, I feel him juggling [sic] and he’s reaching for my
gun. So I reached down with my left hand, pulled the gun up
like this and I’m telling my brother [Deonte Dudley] to pull
his legs. By that time everybody’s pushing and pulling and
I’m into the wall and next thing I know I get struck and we
hear a gunshot.
(Tr. 928.)
{¶19} Hundley stated that he was “struck” on his left hand during the scuffle.
After the gunshot, Hundley was pushed from behind by an unknown person, and fell to
the ground. He saw M. Clark approaching with a black revolver and they began
scuffling with the gun when Bedell’s brother Joseph Watson (“Watson”) intervened.
Hundley ran upstairs to the driveway but remained on the scene.
{¶20} During cross-examination, Hundley admitted that: (1) there was only one
gunshot in the basement that night, (2) he owned and possessed the Smith & Wesson, (3)
the weapon was loaded with Hornady brand bullets, and (4) the brass shell casing
discovered at the scene was a Hornady brand casing. Hundley denied that the bullet that
killed the victim came from his gun.
{¶21} Hundley offered that the gun may have discharged accidentally when he
was struck in the hand during the scuffle. “I never pointed, aimed, or intended to shoot
no one.” (Tr. 960.) “[A] struggle was going on, I had the gun up in the air like this and
I’m making sure that [Marion] don’t flip me” “so the gun gets hit out of my hand and
everybody was pushing and shoving.” (Tr. 963.) Hundley was certain that M. Clark did
not strike his hand. Hundley was examined upon his arrest and medically diagnosed with
a contusion to his left thumb with no damage to the thumbnail.
{¶22} The trial court issued a verdict of guilty. Hundley appeals his
convictions.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶23} Hundley presents three assignments of error:
I. The trial court violated Hundley’s right to remain silent under the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution by permitting the state to
reference Hundley’s prearrest silence as substantive evidence of
guilt.
II. The trial court erred by finding Hundley guilty against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
III. Hundley was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
III. Discussion
A. Prearrest Silence
{¶24} Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,
96 S.Ct. 2240,
49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), holds
that the state may not seek to “draw an impermissible inference of guilt” from the silence
of a defendant who is in custody.” State v. Cannon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100658,
2014-Ohio-4801, ¶ 11, citing Doyle at 611. “‘Miranda warnings carry the state’s
‘implicit assurance’ that an arrestee’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent will not later be used against him.’”
Id., quoting Wainwright v. Greenfield,
474
U.S. 284, 290-291,
106 S.Ct. 634,
88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986).
{¶25} The Fifth Amendment is not implicated where prearrest silence is
involved because the state has not “‘induce[d] a defendant to remain silent.’” Id. at ¶ 12,
quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606,
102 S.Ct. 1309,
71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982).
The same is true of voluntary statements given after Miranda rights are administered, and
of post-arrest silence prior to a Miranda warning.
Id., citing Fletcher at 605-607 and
Anderson v. Charles,
447 U.S. 404, 408-409,
100 S.Ct. 2180,
65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980).
{¶26} Generally, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights would be violated by
allowing the state to use “pre-arrest silence in the state’s case-in-chief [which] would
force defendants either to permit the jury to infer guilt from their silence or surrender
their right not to testify and take the stand to explain their prior silence.” State v. Leach,
102 Ohio St.3d 135,
2004-Ohio-2147,
807 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 31.
{¶27} Hundley asserts the following exchange violated his Fifth Amendment
rights:
State: You were encountered by several police officers that night on scene,
you interacted with a couple of different officers, correct?
Hundley: Just two that I remember.
State: Two, okay. So the first one you were kind of standing with I
believe [was] Horace King?
Hundley: My father, my mother, my brother Steve.
State: Steve. And at that point when the officers asked where were you
guys when the shooting happened —
Hundley: I didn’t hear him say that. I think my father and one of them,
my father and my brother, one of them responded, said that
they were in the kitchen. I never responded because I didn’t
really hear the question.
State: Well, you had to have assumed what your father or mother or
whoever you heard respond, right, you heard them respond,
[i]n the kitchen?
Hundley: He didn’t directly ask me.
(Tr. 955-956.)
{¶28} Hundley moved for a mistrial, arguing that the state was attempting to use
Hundley’s prearrest silence as substantive evidence of Hundley’s guilt. The state
responded that Hundley was not under arrest and had not been Mirandized so no Fifth
Amendment protections were implicated.
{¶29} The trial court denied Hundley’s motion for a mistrial.
Court: Yeah. All he’s asking, to my ear, [counsel], is did you hear the
officer say to basically the group, [w]here were you? Part of
the group said, we were such and such a place and his
question, the essence of it, isn’t it true that you heard one or
more of your group say, [w]e were in the kitchen, and you
didn’t chime in to say, [w]ell, I wasn’t in the kitchen, I was
somewhere else.
(Tr. 956-957.)
{¶30} Hundley also challenges the use of prearrest statements during closing
arguments.
State: … but there are all these police officers standing on scene, he
never brings it to any of these officers[’] attention, that, [h]ey,
here’s what happened, you need to talk to the guy in the
glasses, because he was grabbing at me. You know the guy
you have in the back seat of the police car who’s acting out,
you need to talk to him.
Counsel: I would object to any comments made of the failure of the
defendant to actively make statements to the police. I think it
goes, just what you said earlier, your Honor, of creating an
issue, very severe issue.
And I understand there’s no jury here. If there would have
been a jury, my objection would have been much more
forceful or much more intense, but I trust in the [c]ourt to
handle that, but I would ask the prosecutor to refrain. I’d ask
the [c]ourt to remind the prosecutor that perhaps this is an
improper place to build with statements, even though it’s
closing argument.
(Tr. 1011-1012.)
{¶31} The court ruled:
The Fifth Amendment prevents the government from compelling testimony.
What [counsel for the state] is describing is a person who might,
depending on one’s view of the evidence, have reason to believe he’s going
to be suspected of a crime, who doesn’t, on his own, come forward to
inform the government that he shouldn’t be suspected and here’s why, so I
don’t think it’s unfair as to argument.
(Tr. 1012.)
{¶32} We first point out that Hundley testified during the trial, and the testimony
occurred during cross-examination and not the state’s case-in-chief. Leach, 102 Ohio
St.3d 135,
2004-Ohio-2147,
807 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 31. When a defendant testifies at trial,
the defendant has “‘cast aside his cloak of silence.’” Id. at ¶ 33, quoting Jenkins v.
Anderson,
447 U.S. 231, 238,
100 S.Ct. 2124,
65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). “Thus, use of
prearrest silence as impeachment evidence is permitted because it furthers the
truth-seeking process.”
Id. “[N]either the Fifth Amendment right to be free from
self-incrimination nor the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process is violated by the
use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility.” Leach at ¶ 21,
citing
Jenkins at 238, 240.
{¶33} We also note that “in a bench trial, the court is presumed to have
considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence.” State v. Willis, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90956, 2008-Ohio-6156, ¶ 15, citing State v. Post,
32 Ohio St.3d
380, 384,
513 N.E.2d 754 (1987). Therefore, we may presume that the decision of the
trial court was not impacted by the references. Id. at ¶ 16. The trial court’s explanations
in denying Hundley’s objections and in granting Hundley’s objections during closing
arguments supports the presumption that the trial court afforded due consideration to
Hundley’s position.
{¶34} Finally, we observe that pursuant to Crim.R. 52(A), “[a]ny error, defect,
irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded” “as
harmless.”
In order to find an error harmless, a reviewing court must be able to declare
a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 403,
358 N.E.2d 623 (1976). A reviewing court
may overlook an error where the admissible evidence comprises
“overwhelming” proof of a defendant’s guilt. State v. Williams, 6 Ohio
St.3d 281, 290,
452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983) . “Where there is no reasonable
possibility that unlawful testimony contributed to a conviction, the error is
harmless and therefore will not be grounds for reversal.” State v. Brown,
65 Ohio St.3d 483, 485,
1992-Ohio-61,
605 N.E.2d 46.
State v. Atkins-Boozer, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84151,
2005-Ohio-2666, ¶ 13.
{¶35} Assuming arguendo that an error occurred, we do not find that the record
supports that the allegedly “‘unlawful testimony contributed to [Hundley’s conviction].’”
Id., citing Brown at 485.
{¶36} Hundley’s first assigned error is without merit.
B. Manifest Weight
{¶37} Hundley argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We disagree.
{¶38} “‘Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in
inducing belief. Black’s [Law Dictionary] 1594 [6th Ed.1990].”’ State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997); State v. Wilson,
113 Ohio St.3d 382,
2007-Ohio-2202,
865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25.
{¶39} The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of fact. State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255,
2006-Ohio-2417,
847
N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37. During a bench trial
“‘[T]he trial court assumes the fact-finding function of the jury.
Accordingly, to warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest weight
of the evidence claim, this court must review the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses
and determine whether in resolving conflicts in evidence, the trial court
clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”
State v. Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602,
2009-Ohio-3906,
918 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 25 (8th
Dist.), quoting Cleveland v. Welms,
169 Ohio App.3d 600,
2006-Ohio-6441,
863 N.E.2d
1125, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
{¶40} Hundley points to inconsistencies in the testimony of the witnesses in
support of his manifest weight challenge. However, a number of witnesses personally
observed Hundley point and fire the Smith & Wesson. D.G. testified that she was
standing with Hundley when he pulled the gun from his waistband and fired. S.D. and
M.W. also witnessed the shooting. Bedell saw Hundley lift the gun and shoot G. Clark.
{¶41} M. Clark testified that Hundley’s younger brother Goins knocked the gun
from Hundley’s hand after the shooting. Bedell’s brother Watson heard a shot and saw
Hundley holding the Smith & Wesson. He also saw Goins attempting to take the gun
from Hundley.
{¶42} Hundley admitted that a single shot occurred in the basement and to
possession of the Smith & Wesson containing Hornady ammunition. He also stated that
he was holding the Smith & Wesson in the air during the struggle with M. Clark when an
unknown individual struck his hand causing the weapon to fire.
{¶43} Dr. Felo testified that the bullet fragments removed from G. Clark appeared
to be from a medium caliber weapon such as the 9 mm Smith & Wesson or .38 caliber
black revolver discovered in the home. A Hornady shell casing matching the remaining
ammunition located in the magazine of the Smith & Wesson was located on the basement
floor near the body. A revolver does not eject bullet casings.
{¶44} “The trier of fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.’” State v. Kurtz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99103,
2013-Ohio-2999, ¶ 26, quoting State v. Wilson,
113 Ohio St.3d 382,
2007-Ohio-2202,
865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 24.
{¶45} We do not find that the finder of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such
a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
ordered.’” Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602,
2009-Ohio-3906,
918 N.E.2d 170, at ¶
23-26, quoting Welms,
169 Ohio App.3d 600,
2006-Ohio-6441,
863 N.E.2d 1125, citing
Thompkins at 390.
{¶46} The second assigned error lacks merit.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶47} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Hundley must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. State v.
Trimble, 122 Ohio St.3d 297,
2009-Ohio-2961,
911 N.E.2d 242, citing Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
{¶48} Judicial scrutiny of defense counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential. Strickland at 689. In Ohio, there is a presumption that a properly licensed
attorney is competent. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279,
714 N.E.2d 905 (1999).
{¶49} Hundley offers that counsel’s improper failed impeachment of M. Clark
constituted ineffective assistance:
First, we determine “whether there has been a substantial violation of any of
defense counsel’s essential duties to his client.” When making this inquiry,
the court will presume that licensed counsel has performed in an ethical and
competent manner. Second, we determine whether “the defense was
prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Prejudice requires a showing to a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Bankston, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92777,
2010-Ohio-1576, ¶ 55.
{¶50} Counsel failed to use a written statement made by M. Clark to impeach M.
Clark’s trial testimony but subsequently attempted to use the statement during
cross-examination of the officer that took the statement. Counsel also failed to invoke
Evid.R. 609 to impeach M. Clark’s credibility for prior criminal acts. While counsel did
not secure a copy of the criminal history, counsel was able to secure testimony that the
witness had several felony drug convictions/charges as well as cases for having a weapon
while under disability.
{¶51} After reviewing the record, we agree that Hundley has failed to
demonstrate how he was prejudiced by counsel’s asserted errors and that “but for” the
errors, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.
{¶52} The third assignment of error is without merit.
IV. Conclusion
{¶53} Appellant’s convictions are affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s convictions having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS;
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY IN PART WITH
SEPARATE OPINION
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY IN PART:
{¶54} I respectfully concur in judgment only with respect to the discussion
regarding Hundley’s prearrest silence. I would find that any resolution of that argument
is unnecessary. Any perceived error in the admission of the prearrest silence was
corrected during the state’s rebuttal argument when the trial court, as the trier of fact in
the bench trial, stated it would not consider Hundley’s prearrest silence in rendering the
verdict. (Tr. 1069:3-12.) Any purported errors with respect to the initial admission of
the prearrest silence evidence and arguments are, at the worst, harmless under Crim.R.
52(A). As to the remaining assignments of error, I fully concur with the majority’s
conclusions.
