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2018 Ohio 5244

State v. Kitchen

Ohio Court of Appeals

Decided December 7, 2018

Ohio Court of Appeals · decided 2018-12-07

Final appealable order-denial of double-jeopardy motion to dismiss Final appealable order-denial of speedy-trial motion to dismiss Double Jeopardy-retrial following mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct

Relies on Oregon v. Kennedy · Crist v. Bretz · State v. Loza

Decided 2018-12-07

[Cite as State v. Kitchen, 
2018-Ohio-5244
.]


                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :    Case No. 18CA3640

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                       :

v.                                                :    DECISION AND
                                                       JUDGMENT ENTRY
MICHAEL KITCHEN,                                  :

        Defendant-Appellant.                      :   RELEASED: 12/07/2018
                                              APPEARANCES:

Michael L. Benson and Mark D. Tolles, II, Benson & Sesser, L.L.C., Chillicothe, Ohio,
for appellant.

Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Ross
County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
Harsha, J.
        {¶1}     Following a declaration of a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct

and scheduling of a new jury trial, the Ross County Court of Common Pleas denied

Kitchen’s motions to dismiss the charge against him based on double-jeopardy and

constitutional speedy-trial claims.

        {¶2}     Because the common pleas court’s interlocutory entry denying his motion

to dismiss based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not constitute a final,

appealable order, we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of that assignment of error.

        {¶3}     We do have jurisdiction to address Kitchen’s assertion that the trial court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy. However, we reject it

because in general, there is no double-jeopardy bar to a retrial following a trial court’s

granting of a criminal defendant’s motion for a mistrial. And he has not established the

narrow exception to the general rule, which requires the request for a mistrial be
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                               2


precipitated by prosecutorial misconduct that was intentionally calculated to cause or

invite a mistrial.

       {¶4}    Here, the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by violating the trial

court’s order barring it from introducing any evidence of what Kitchen said in recorded

footage that was not disclosed to him before trial. However, there is no evidence that

the state intended to cause a mistrial by asking an officer one question regarding a

statement Kitchen made on the undisclosed footage. Specifically, (1) there was no

sequence of overreaching before the single question; (2) the state resisted Kitchen’s

request for a mistrial and appeared genuinely surprised that it had violated the court’s

order; and (3) the trial court concluded that although the state had committed

prosecutorial misconduct by eliciting testimony that violated its order, it was not the

state’s intent to cause the mistrial. We overrule Kitchen’s first assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgment denying the double-jeopardy motion to dismiss.

                                          I. FACTS

       {¶5}    The Ross County Grand Jury returned a secret indictment charging

Michael Kitchen with one count of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03, a third-

degree felony. The Ross County Sheriff’s Office arrested Kitchen and following his

arraignment the next day, he was released from custody upon posting a recognizance

bond. In its bill of particulars the state alleged that Kitchen engaged in vaginal

intercourse with Sara Howell, who was not his spouse, when he knew that she was

unaware that the act was being committed.

       {¶6}    In its opening statement at the jury trial, the state asserted Sara Howell

and her boyfriend let Kitchen, her high school friend, sleep over on a couch in their
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                               3


apartment in Chillicothe after going to eat. After her boyfriend left the next morning for

work, Howell awoke in her bedroom to discover that Kitchen was engaged in sex with

her without her consent. Kitchen finished the sexual act, left the room, and went back to

sleep on the couch in another room. After exchanging text messages with her father

and a friend, Howell contacted the police, made a report, and was administered a rape

kit. The testing determined that Kitchen’s DNA was found in semen in both Howell’s

vaginal and anal cavities.

       {¶7}   In Kitchen’s counsel’s opening statement, he contended that Kitchen and

Howell engaged in consensual sex, which had been initiated by Howell. He further

conceded that when Kitchen was awakened by three law enforcement officers

responding to Howell’s report of sexual battery, he lied that he did not have sex with

Howell because he was terrified and did not know what Howell had told them.

       {¶8}   The state’s first witness, Chillicothe Police Officer Shane Simmons,

testified that he and Officer Chip Campbell were dispatched to Howell’s apartment to

respond to a reported sexual assault. They talked to Howell and then entered the

apartment, where they observed Kitchen asleep on a couch. Then they contacted

Detective Twila Goble, who arrived and with Officer Campbell, they began questioning

Kitchen after advising him of his Miranda rights. Officer Simmons’s body camera was

activated during his interaction with both Howell and Kitchen. On cross-examination

Kitchen’s attorney played the body camera footage that had been provided to him by

the state in discovery. However, Officer Simmons testified that the footage shown was

not the end of his body camera footage. He indicated he had viewed other footage from

his body camera concerning the reported sexual battery.
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                               4


       {¶9}      Outside the presence of the jury Officer Simmons explained that there was

approximately 21 minutes of additional footage of Officer Campbell interrogating Kitchen

that the police had failed to disclose to the prosecutor because the old body cameras

would download footage to the server in multiple sections when it became too lengthy.

Kitchen moved for a mistrial based on the state’s failure to disclose this evidence in

discovery. The trial court overruled Kitchen’s motion, ordered the state to provide

Kitchen with a copy of the undisclosed body camera footage, and continued the case

until the next morning to permit Kitchen and his counsel to review the footage.

       {¶10} The next morning after receiving the previously undisclosed recording of

Officer Simmons’s body camera footage, Kitchen’s attorney again asked for a mistrial,

generally asserting that “there would have been different statements and procedure and

strategy in this case had we been provided it.” He claimed that even if this additional

undisclosed footage was excluded, “it still doesn’t alleviate the issue that the jury knows

a video exists and is not going to be play[ed] and I’ve made statements, or

representations, that the video would be played ….” Significantly, the parties and the

trial court agreed that the state’s failure to provide this footage to the defense was

unintentional.

       {¶11} The state noted Officer Simmons’s and Detective Gobles’s statements in a

Master Incident Report, which the state had provided to Kitchen and his counsel,

referenced several of Kitchen’s statements from the undisclosed body camera footage:

(1) Kitchen told the officers that he did not remember having sex with Sara; (2) Kitchen

told Officer Campbell he had a dream last night about having sex with his girlfriend; and
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                               5


(3) Kitchen stated that his girlfriend had told him that he had groped her in his sleep

before.

       {¶12} The trial court denied Kitchen’s second motion for mistrial because: (1)

despite his concession that he initially told police he did not have sex with Howell,

Kitchen’s defense of consensual sex was consistent with what both the undisclosed and

disclosed portion of Officer Simmons’s body camera footage revealed; (2) portions of

the undisclosed body camera footage were disclosed to Kitchen in the police reports the

state gave to the defense in discovery; and (3) although there were discrepancies and

inconsistencies created by the state’s Crim.R. 16 violation, they were not substantially

material to Kitchen’s defense.

       {¶13} Nevertheless, the trial court prohibited the state “from utilizing any portion

of the undiscovered video in any way, shape or form,” but permitted the defense to use

it in any way it felt necessary. The court finally noted that it had not had an opportunity

to review the undisclosed footage, but that it would reserve further ruling until the court

had the chance to compare it with the reports that were provided in discovery.

       {¶14} Upon return from recess the trial court instructed the jury that “[b]ased

upon the State’s failure, not the defense, … to provide the remainder of the video, this

Court has ruled that the undisclosed portion will not be admitted into evidence.

Therefore, you are not to draw any inference that the Defendant has failed to produce

the remainder of the video ….” The parties then concluded their examination of

Officer Simmons.

       {¶15} On the state’s direct examination of its next witness, Officer Campbell, it

questioned him about statements Kitchen had made addressing why he stayed at
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                      6


Howell’s apartment that night. Apparently, Kitchen told the officers that he and Howell

had been friends for a while and they had not spoken for some time. Kitchen’s counsel

objected to this testimony on the basis that it had not been disclosed in discovery, but

the state countered that Kitchen’s statement was contained on the disclosed body

camera footage. The trial court overruled the objection, but again warned the state that

“if this officer testified about anything said only on the undisclosed portion, that is a

violation of my order and if he violates my order or any other officer violates my order, I

will grant a mistrial.”

       {¶16} Subsequently, the state asked Officer Campbell “when you were speaking

with the Defendant in this case, did you happen to ask him about any dreams he might

have had?” and the officer responded that he had. Kitchen objected and moved for a

mistrial.

       {¶17} The assistant prosecutor opposed the motion and stated that it was her

understanding that she was permitted to ask about statements that were on the

undisclosed part of the body camera footage if they were in fact contained in the police

reports provided in discovery. Kitchen’s statement about the dream was on both the

undisclosed footage and the disclosed police reports. The assistant prosecutor stated

that it was not her intent to violate the court’s order and moved to strike her question

and Officer Campbell’s answer, and release the witness. The trial court noted that it did

not understand how the assistant prosecutor had misinterpreted its order; it granted the

mistrial. In its entry declaring the mistrial the court noted that it initially overruled

Kitchen’s motion for a mistrial based on the state’s violation of Crim.R. 16, but granted

Kitchen’s renewed motion when the state violated the court’s curative order.
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                 7


       {¶18} Subsequently, the trial court set the retrial date. Over four months after

the mistrial and two months after rescheduling of the trial Kitchen filed motions to

dismiss based on double-jeopardy and his constitutional speedy-trial rights. Kitchen

claimed that the state intentionally goaded him to request a mistrial because of its

prosecutorial misconduct and that the over five-month delay between the mistrial and

the scheduled retrial was constitutionally unreasonable. The state responded.

       {¶19} After the state responded the trial court denied Kitchen’s motions to

dismiss in two separate entries issued on the same date. Addressing double jeopardy

the court concluded that “[a]lthough this Court cannot understand how his ruling was

misinterpreted by the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, this Court cannot find that the

offending question was designed to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial. It

certainly was prosecutorial misconduct, but this Court cannot find that i[t] was the

intention of the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney to cause a mistrial.” On the

constitutional speedy-trial claim the court concluded “the five month delay in

rescheduling the Defendant’s trial does not constitute presumptive prejudice” and

“[e]ven in considering the four factor balancing test this Court cannot determine that the

five month delay is constitutionally unreasonable.”

                             II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶20} Kitchen assigns the following errors for our review:

       1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MICHAEL KITCHEN’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON
          DOUBLE JEOPARDY GROUNDS.

       2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT MICHAEL KITCHEN’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON
          SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS.
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                  8


                                  III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

                                       A. Jurisdiction

       {¶21} Kitchen contests the trial court’s entries denying his motions to dismiss on

double-jeopardy and constitutional speedy-trial claims. Before addressing the merits of

the assignments of error, we must determine whether this appeal is properly before us.

Although the parties do not suggest that we lack jurisdiction, “litigants cannot vest a

court with subject-matter jurisdiction by agreement”; subject-matter jurisdiction is

properly raised by an appellate court sua sponte. See Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v.

Haddox, L.L.C., 
120 Ohio St.3d 493
, 
2008-Ohio-6323
, 
900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 22
; State ex

rel. Dunlap v. Sarko, 
135 Ohio St.3d 171
, 
2013-Ohio-67
, 
985 N.E.2d 450, ¶ 13
.

       {¶22} Courts of appeals have “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to

review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record

inferior to the court of appeals within the district.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section

3(B)(2). “R.C. 2505.03(A) limits the appellate jurisdiction of courts of appeals to the

review of final orders, judgments, or decrees.” See State ex rel. Bd. of State Teachers

Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Davis, 
113 Ohio St.3d 410
, 
2007-Ohio-2205
, 
865 N.E.2d 1289, ¶ 44
.

       {¶23} Clearly “the denial of a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a

final, appealable order.” State v. Anderson, 
138 Ohio St.3d 264
, 
2014-Ohio-542
, 
6 N.E.3d 23, ¶ 6
. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to address the merits of Kitchen’s first

assignment of error.

       {¶24} However, “an order denying a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is

not a final appealable order ….” See State v. Payne, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA3,
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                9


2016-Ohio-1411
, and cases cited there. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction to address

the merits of Kitchen’s second assignment of error, which we dismiss.

                                   B. Double Jeopardy

       {¶25} Kitchen asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to

dismiss, which was based on double-jeopardy grounds. We apply a de novo standard

of review to address the denial of that motion. State v. Anderson, 
148 Ohio St.3d 74
,

2016-Ohio-5791
, 
68 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 20
.

       {¶26} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice

put in jeopardy of life or limb.” This protection applies to Ohio citizens through the

Fourteenth Amendment and is additionally guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the

Ohio Constitution, and prohibits the state from subjecting a defendant to multiple trials

for the same offense. See Crist v. Bretz, 
437 U.S. 28, 38
, 
98 S.Ct. 2156
, 
57 L.Ed.2d 24

(1978) as cited in Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin’s Oh. Prac. Crim. L., Section 72:2 (3d

Ed.2018).

       {¶27} Generally, “[w]hen a trial court grants a criminal defendant’s request for a

mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial.” State v. Loza, 
71 Ohio St.3d 61, 70
, 
641 N.E.2d 1082
 (1994), citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 U.S. 667, 673
,

102 S.Ct. 2083
, 
72 L.Ed.2d 416
 (1982); Katz & Giannelli, Baldwin’s Oh. Prac. Crim. L.,

Section 74:5 (3d Ed.2018) (“The United States Supreme Court has never been willing to

accept a rigid rule that would automatically bar retrial under any circumstance following

a mistrial, holding, instead, that in most instances a mistrial granted with the consent or

on the motion of a defendant does not bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause”).
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                10


       {¶28} Nevertheless, the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have

recognized a narrow exception to the general rule exists when prosecutorial misconduct

giving rise to a successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke or goad the

defendant into moving for a mistrial. 
Kennedy at 676, 679
; 
Loza at 186
. This

determination requires the trial court to examine the totality of the circumstances to

make a factual finding of the prosecutor’s intent; it is entitled to great deference on

appeal notwithstanding our general de novo review. See, e.g., State v. Webster, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-130700, 
2014-Ohio-5647,¶ 10
, citing 
Kennedy at 675
; see also

Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton Cty., Ohio, 
668 F.3d 804, 812
 (6th

Cir.2012) (“Although we review the state proceedings de novo, we nevertheless find it

appropriate to give deference to the trial court's factual finding regarding the intent of the

prosecutor because it was in the best position to make the finding”).

       {¶29} “A reviewing court may consider the following factors in determining

whether the required intent to provoke a mistrial existed: (1) whether there was a

sequence of overreaching prior to the single prejudicial incident; (2) whether the

prosecutor resisted or was surprised by the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; and (3) the

findings of the trial and appellate courts concerning the intent of the prosecutor.” State

v. Betts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88607, 
2007-Ohio-5533, ¶ 27
, citing State v. Girts, 
121 Ohio App.3d 539, 553
, 
700 N.E.2d 395
 (8th Dist. 1997); see also 
Kennedy at 680

(Powell, J., concurring); State v. Greene, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 02 CA 122, 2005-

Ohio-2420, ¶ 24.

       {¶30} In reviewing these factors here, we find no sequence of overreaching by

the prosecuting attorney before the single question concerning whether Officer
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                11


Campbell had asked Kitchen about any dreams he might have had. The trial court had

previously determined that the state had failed to provide discovery of the 21 additional

minutes of Officer Simmons’s body camera footage, but the parties agreed, and the

court found, that the discovery violation was unintentional and caused by the recording

system used at the time. See Betts at ¶ 26, citing 
Girts at 553
 (“Mere negligence will

not suffice to show intent to provoke a mistrial”). The next instance of misconduct that

Kitchen cites is when the assistant prosecutor asked Officer Campbell what statements

Kitchen had made about why he stayed at Howell’s apartment the night before the

incident. But the trial court overruled his objection to this question, and the record does

not contain any evidence that would contradict that ruling—the state represented that

this evidence was contained in the body camera footage that had been properly

disclosed to Kitchen in discovery. Therefore, there was no sequence of overreaching

by the prosecutor before the question that prompted the mistrial.

       {¶31} Moreover, even assuming that Kitchen could have established a sequence

of overreaching before the conduct that resulted in the mistrial, the Supreme Court of

the United States held in Kennedy, 
456 U.S. 667, at 675-676
, 
102 S.Ct. 2083
, 
72 L.Ed.2d 416
, that “[p]rosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or

overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant’s motion … does not

bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded

by the Double Jeopardy Clause.” See also State v. Hodges, 
2018-Ohio-447
, 
105 N.E.3d 543, ¶ 18
 (7th Dist.).

       {¶32} Looking at the second factor, the record establishes that the state

consistently and vehemently resisted Kitchen’s motions for mistrial. And it apparently
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                             12


was genuinely surprised by the motion and the trial court’s declaration of a mistrial. The

assistant prosecutor professed confusion over whether she was permitted to elicit

testimony concerning dreams when the substance of those same statements was

previously disclosed in discovery through police reports. Although this did not prevent

the trial court’s declaration of mistrial, the state’s confusion and its resistance does

indicate that the state was surprised by it.

        {¶33} On the final factor the trial court found that although the prosecutor’s

violation of its order warranted a mistrial, the solitary question to Officer Campbell

concerning Kitchen’s dreams was not intended by the prosecutor to force a mistrial as a

strategic trial tactic. This line of questioning concerned peripheral evidence that did not

substantially detract from Kitchen’s stated defense of consensual sex and his admission

that he had initially lied to the officers that he did not have sex with Howell. Because

the trial court’s conclusion on this issue is supported by the record, we accord it the

deference it is entitled to. Webster, 
2014-Ohio-5647, at ¶ 10
, citing Kennedy, 
456 U.S. 667, 675
, 
102 S.Ct. 2083
, 
72 L.Ed.2d 416
.

        {¶34} Based on our de novo review we agree with the trial court that this case

does not fit within “the narrow exception adopted by the United States Supreme Court in

Kennedy … reserved for the limited set of circumstances where the nature of the

state’s misconduct clearly and unquestionably demonstrates its intent to cause or invite

a mistrial.” See State v. Kelly, 
2015-Ohio-1948
, 
34 N.E.3d 513
, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).1 We

overrule Kitchen’s first assignment of error.


1 Although the parties assert that no Ohio case has ever found that this strict standard to prove a double-

jeopardy violation based upon prosecutorial misconduct was satisfied, our own research uncovered at
least one case. In State v. Owens, 
127 Ohio App.3d 65
, 
711 N.E.2d 767
 (6th Dist.), an appellate court
held that the state goaded a defendant into seeking a mistrial when the prosecutor vigorously fought for
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                              13


                                           V. CONCLUSION

        {¶35} For lack of jurisdiction, we dismiss Kitchen’s second assignment of error,

which contests the denial of his motion to dismiss on constitutional speedy-trial grounds.

Having overruled Kitchen’s first assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court denying his motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds.

                                                               APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND

                                                                              JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.




more than three months and won the right to retain the confidentiality of an informant’s identity, but the
prosecutor then revealed the name of the informant during the state’s opening statement. Needless to
say, the facts in that case are distinguishable from the facts here.
Ross App. No. 18CA3640                                                                  14



                                    JUDGMENT ENTRY

      It is ordered that the APPEAL IS DISMIISSED IN PART AND THE JUDGMENT
IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously
posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme
Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court.
If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the
sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of
the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court
of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as
of the date of such dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. & McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.


                                            For the Court


                                            BY: ________________________
                                                William H. Harsha, Judge




                                  NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.

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