[Cite as State v. Williams,
2019-Ohio-4414.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vsCase No. 2018CA00151
DEANNA WILLIAMS
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Canton Municipal
Court, Case No. 2018TRC05678
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: October 24, 2019
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
KRISTEN BATES-AYLWARD STACEY M. ZIPAY
CANTON LAW DIRECTOR ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
JASON P. REESE 201 Cleveland Avenue, SW
CANTON CITY PROSECUTOR Suite 104
KRISTINA M. LOCKWOOD Canton, Ohio 44702
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
218 Cleveland Avenue SW
Canton, Ohio 44702
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant Deanna Williams appeals from the denial of her motion to
suppress evidence in the Canton Municipal Court, Stark County. Appellee is the State of
Ohio. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} Shortly after 2:00 AM on July 14, 2018, Appellant Williams received a
telephone call from a friend who had been a passenger in a vehicle stopped for OVI by
the Ohio State Highway Patrol on Mahoning Road in Canton. The friend, who was not
required by law enforcement to stay at the scene, asked appellant if she could drive over
and give her a ride home. Appellant agreed to do so.
{¶3} Upon her arrival, appellant, driving solo, pulled her vehicle in behind the
police cruiser utilized that night by OSHP Trooper Matthew Boyer, who had effectuated
the traffic stop. Following agency protocol, Trooper walked over to appellant’s vehicle to
make sure she was licensed and in a proper condition to drive.
{¶4} According to the trooper’s subsequent testimony, when he approached
appellant’s open car window, he immediately detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage.
He also observed that appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. The trooper noted
that appellant, when asked, “stated she had been drinking.” Supp. Tr. at 10. After Trooper
Boyer asked appellant to exit her vehicle, he continued to detect the smell of an alcoholic
beverage on her person. He placed appellant in the back seat of his police cruiser and
called for assistance.
{¶5} A few minutes later, OSHP Sergeant Johnnie Maier arrived. He later
testified that he immediately observed the odor of alcohol on her breath and bloodshot
glassy eyes. He also recalled that appellant “said she had been drinking and taking some
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 3
medication.” Supp. Tr. at 17. Appellant thus again admitted to drinking alcohol. Sergeant
Maier also observed that appellant was walking “a little bit slowly and a little bit oddly.”
Supp Tr. at 18. Sergeant Maier then had Williams perform field sobriety tests, and after
the conclusion of those tests, Williams was arrested and charged with OVI under R.C.
4511.19(A)(1)(d) and (D)(1)(d).
{¶6} On August 29, 2018, appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of her encounter with law enforcement on July 14, 2018, asserting
she had been subjected to an unlawful seizure and a prolonged detention. The trial court
conducted a suppression hearing on August 31, 2018, at which time booth Trooper Boyer
and Sergeant Maier were called to testify.1 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
denied appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant thereupon pled no contest to, and was
found guilty of, OVI. Appellant was ordered, inter alia, to pay a fine of $375.00 and serve
180 days in jail, with all but three days suspended.
{¶7} A formal judgment entry denying the motion to suppress was issued on
September 5, 2018.
{¶8} On October 1, 2018, appellant filed a notice of appeal. She herein raises
the following sole Assignment of Error:
{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BY FINDING THAT THERE WAS REASONABLE, ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO SEIZE APPELLANT/PROLONG APPELLANT'S DETENTION FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ADMINISTERING FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS.”
1 We find no indication of any bodycam or dashcam video footage being presented
during the suppression hearing.
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 4
I.
{¶10} In her sole Assignment of Error, appellant argues the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress. We disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶11} There are three methods of challenging on appeal a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. First, an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact.
Second, an appellant may argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or
correct law to the findings of fact. Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has
incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. When
reviewing this third type of claim, an appellate court must independently determine,
without deference to the trial court's conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate
legal standard in the given case. See State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19,
437
N.E.2d 583; State v. Williams (1993),
86 Ohio App.3d 37,
619 N.E.2d 1141; State v. Curry
(1994),
95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96,
641 N.E.2d 1172; State v. Claytor (1993),
85 Ohio App.3d
623, 627,
620 N.E.2d 906; State v. Guysinger (1993),
86 Ohio App.3d 592,
621 N.E.2d
726. The United States Supreme Court has held that as a general matter determinations
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. See
Ornelas v. United States (1996),
517 U.S. 690, 699,
116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663,
134 L.Ed.2d
911.
Appellant’s Initial Contact with Law Enforcement
{¶12} Police officers are generally permitted to engage in “consensual
encounters” with citizens without running afoul of Fourth Amendment prohibitions on
searches and seizures. See State v. Crouse, 5th Dist. Licking No. 16 CA 37, 2017-Ohio-
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 5
1097, ¶ 19 (additional citations omitted). We review the issue of the existence of a
consensual encounter by examining the totality of the circumstances. See Florida v.
Royer (1983), 460 U.S. 491, 506–507,
103 S.Ct. 1319,
75 L.Ed.2d 229.
{¶13} In the case sub judice, appellant does not dispute that her “initial interaction”
with Trooper Boyer was a consensual encounter, and that the trooper had the duty to
ensure she was validly licensed to drive and appeared sober. See Appellant’s Brief at 8.
We will therefore proceed to consider the next stage of the events ultimately leading to
appellant’s arrest.
Detainment for Field Sobriety Tests
{¶14} A request made of a validly detained motorist to perform field sobriety tests
is generally outside the scope of the original stop, and must be separately justified by
other specific and articulable facts showing a reasonable basis for the request. State v.
Albaugh, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2014 AP 11 0049, 2015-Ohio-3536, ¶ 18, quoting
State v. Anez (2000),
108 Ohio Misc.2d 18, 26–27,
738 N.E.2d 491. Although requiring a
driver to submit to a field sobriety test constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, courts have generally held that the intrusion on the driver's liberty
resulting from a field sobriety test is minor, and the officer therefore need only have
reasonable suspicion that the driver is under the influence of alcohol in order to conduct
a field sobriety test. See State v. Bright, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 2009–CA–28, 2010-Ohio-
1111,
2010 WL 1035466, ¶ 17, citing State v. Knox, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2005–CA–74,
2006-Ohio-3039,
2006 WL 1661628. In reviewing this issue, we apply a “totality of the
circumstances” approach. See, e.g., City of Fairfield v. Lucking, 12th Dist. Butler No.
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 6
CA2002–12–303,
2004-Ohio-90,
2004 WL 47400, ¶ 8, citing State v. Freeman (1980),
64
Ohio St.2d 291,
414 N.E.2d 1044.
{¶15} Reasonable suspicion constitutes something less than probable cause.
State v. Logan, 5th Dist. Richland No. 07–CA–56, 2008–Ohio–2969, ¶ 15, citing State v.
Carlson (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 590. Also, it is well-established that an officer's
reasonable articulable suspicion does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant's conduct has satisfied the elements of the offense. State v. Willis, 5th Dist.
Licking No. 14 CA 103, 2015–Ohio-3739, ¶ 25, citing Westlake v. Kaplysh,
118 Ohio
App.3d 18, 20,
691 N.E.2d 1074 (8th Dist.1997).
{¶16} In State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Licking No. 09–CA–42, 2010-Ohio-1232, we
reiterated that under well-settled Ohio law, “where a non-investigatory stop is initiated and
the odor of alcohol is combined with glassy or bloodshot eyes and further indicia of
intoxication, such as an admission of having consumed alcohol, reasonable suspicion
exists.” Id. at ¶ 34, citing State v. Wells, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 20798, 2005-Ohio-
5008 (additional citations omitted). See, also, State v. Beeley, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L–05–
1386,
2006-Ohio-4799, ¶ 16.
{¶17} As we observed in our recitation of the facts, Trooper Boyer, the first officer
involved in the events of July 14, 2018, made the decision to have appellant sit in his
cruiser after the initial encounter along Mahoning Road. Sergeant Maier then arrived to
assist. After Sergeant Maier had detected an odor of alcohol on appellant’s breath,
noticed her bloodshot, glassy eyes, heard her admit to consuming alcohol, and observed
her walk as "slow” and “odd,” the decision was made to perform field sobriety tests.
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 7
{¶18} Appellant relies in particular upon this Court’s 2014 decision in State v.
Keserich. In that case, the responding officer testified he had stopped Keserich’s vehicle
at approximately 2:00 a.m. on a weekend night for an unilluminated license plate. Upon
making contact, the officer noticed Keserich’s eyes were “bloodshot and watery.”
Keserich admitted he had consumed two drinks of alcohol. Based on those facts, the
officer decided to conduct field sobriety tests. Once Keserich stepped out of his vehicle
prior to performing the tests, the officer detected an odor of alcohol on his person. See
State v. Keserich, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 14-COA-011, 2014-Ohio-5120, ¶ 9. We ultimately
reversed the trial court's judgment denying Keserich’s motion to suppress, with one judge
dissenting. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶19} We first note Keserich involved a stop for equipment violation, although
comparison of that factor to the consensual encounter involved in the present case carries
minimal weight in our analysis. However, unlike Trooper Boyer in the case sub judice, the
officer in Keserich did not immediately detect an odor of alcohol upon making contact with
the driver, although the Keserich officer did smell alcohol after the driver got out of the
car. Also, while appellant in the present case drove alone, the vehicle in Keserich was
occupied by several passengers who had been smoking, creating the question that the
condition of the driver’s eyes could have been caused by something other than alcohol.
See id. at ¶ 18. More importantly, we specifically noted that Mr. Keserich had “exhibited
no clues of impairment in his normal walking ….” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶20} We therefore find, upon a de novo review, that the troopers articulated
sufficient reasonable grounds to justify the request to have appellant engage in field
sobriety testing.
Stark County, Case No. 2018CA00151 8
Probable Cause to Arrest
{¶21} At the suppression hearing, defense counsel made clear that she was
limiting her arguments to the question of reasonable suspicion to detain appellant in the
cruiser and to proceed to field sobriety testing. See Supp. Tr. at 4-5. Thus, the issue of
probable cause to arrest was not at issue, and the same holds true for the present
appellate briefs.
Conclusion
{¶22} Upon review of the totality of the facts and circumstances presented herein,
we find no error in the trial court's denial of appellant’s suppression motion, as there was
reasonable suspicion demonstrated to detain appellant at the scene for the purpose of
field sobriety testing.
{¶23} Appellant's sole Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Canton Municipal Court,
Stark County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, J.
Hoffman, P. J., and
Baldwin, J., concur.
JWW/d 1010
