Slip opinions decided 2019 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

The trial court erred in (1) not applying the lodestar method to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees due under a fee-shifting provision of a contract between the parties, (2) not finding the conduct of a plaintiff and its attorneys frivolous under R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(ii), and (3) not addressing defendant's argument that another plaintiff and its attorneys engaged in frivolous conduct.

The United Policy provided primary liability coverage while the Progressive Policy provided excess coverage for the Underlying Litigation.

On certification of default.

Manifest weight best interest of the children restrictive visitation abuse of discretion removal of guardian ad litem. Under the guidelines of R.C. 2151.281 and Juv.R. 4, Mother was not entitled to a GAL, and the outcome of the proceeding was not based solely on GAL representation for Mother. Mother participated during the hearing, competently testifying, presenting her concerns, and responding to the custodian's testimony. It was properly determined that it was not in the best interest of the children to change custody or modify the visitation schedule. It was not an abuse of discretion or against the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court limited Mother's visitation.

Sufficiency manifest weight and sentencing. A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. A reviewing court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. A conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. When sentencing a defendant, the court must consider the purpose and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the serious and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. R.C. 2929.11(A) and (B) state that the "overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes" and requires that the sentence be "commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact upon the victim.

Summary judgment contract interpretation. A trial court does not err by interpreting clear and unambiguous contract provisions, where the interpretation gives effect to the parties' agreed upon intent.

The trial court erred by entering summary judgment for Appellee on Appellant's claims for negligence and conversion. Appellant's own affidavit is sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to both claims. The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment for Appellee on Appellant's claim that Appellee violated R.C. 5321.04(A)(8). This statutory provision did not apply, and Appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that claim. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's motion to dismiss. Contrary to Appellant's claim otherwise, the statute governing Appellant's charge for failing to stop after an accident, R.C. 4549.02, does not violate Appellant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Appellant suffered actual prejudice as the result of pre-indictment delay. Appellant also failed to establish that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request such a hearing, as Appellant did not demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Judgment affirmed.

The record establishes that the police did not extend appellant's detention beyond what was reasonably necessary to resolve the issues associated with the traffic stop and to issue a traffic citation. The approximate 30-minute time period between when the officer began writing the citation and when the canine unit alerted on appellant's vehicle was therefore reasonable under the facts presented in the instant case. Judgment affirmed.

Invalid arrest warrant

A trial court may toll a term of community control ordered in one case until a prison term ordered in another case has been completed.

The trial court erred in valuing a boat at its new price when the boat was used, and also erred in assigning the value of a boat twice to appellant in its property distribution. However, the trial court did not err in valuing and dividing other marital property where the evidence supported the trial court's decision. The trial court properly ordered spousal support after considering all pertinent factors, including appellee's earning ability, whether appellee cohabitated with another during the divorce proceedings, and whether appellant's health was too poor to pay spousal support.

The trial court erred in sentencing appellant after revoking his community control, as the court failed to award appellant jail-time credit for all the time he was confined as required by R.C. 2967.191. As it was unclear from the record the extent to which appellant's liberties, freedom of choices, and movement were restrained while he was at the Community Correctional Center, the matter was remanded for the trial court to determine whether appellant's participation at the Center constituted "confinement" entitling him to jail-time credit.

Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of freight carrier where freight broker failed to satisfy the second Globe factor requiring a showing of legal liability.

CRIMINAL - right to plead guilty other acts evidence timeliness joinder of offenses Crim.R. 14 plain error substitution of appointed counsel sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF - res judicata ineffective assistance trial counsel appellant unable to advance argument in direct appeal based on evidence outside the record hearing not mandatory, but trial court must determine whether supporting evidentiary documents contain sufficient operative facts, if true, establish substantive grounds for relief State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (1999).

CRIMINAL - reckless operation R.C. 4511.20 sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence

CIVIL - lease agreement amendment and extension forcible entry and detainer damages hearing res judicata claim preclusion issue preclusion R.C. 1923.03 personal liability for unpaid rent holdover tenant.

Trial court's instructing a receiver to proceed with a purchase agreement for a tract of land was a final appealable order and was not an abuse of discretion.

Judgment reversed case remanded. The legal requirement for injury in a tort case is not demanding: "a plaintiff need only show some slight injury for the question of damages to go to the jury." Loudin v. Radiology & Imaging Servs., 128 Ohio St.3d 555, 2011-Ohio-1817, ¶ 19. It is inconsistent with the standard of review on summary judgment, where evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party, to dismiss appellant's evidence of injury as being insufficient as a matter of law. In review, summary judgment was inappropriate as to all of the three claims set forth in the complaint, i.e., medical negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of services and consortium.

On petition for reinstatement.

On application for reinstatement.

eviction – forcible entry and detainer – commercial tenant – judicial process – self-help repossession – moot – summary judgment – new arguments on appeal

No contest plea/R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)/Explanation of circumstances

R.C. 2917.11(A)(1)/Crim.R. 29/Self defense/Waiver of objection

ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to object, hearsay, business records exception, probative value, prejudicial effect, motion to suppress, R.C. 2933.83, photo array, folder system, substantially similar system, plain error

Drug Trafficking Heroin

Kidnapping and rape convictions supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

There is competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's decision and this court found no plain error and the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the judgment.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion for summary judgment on its political subdivision immunity. The appellees adduced evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the appellant was negligent for the manner in which it chose to clear the blockage from the sewer line which allegedly resulted in a sewage backup in the appellees' basement. Furthermore, the appellant's decision to force water into the sewer line with the Jet-Vac truck was not a discretionary decision pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(5), because the appellant provided no evidence of any specific decision that it made regarding its alleged negligence that involved weighing alternatives or a high degree of official judgment or discretion. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that genuine issues of material fact exist and that the appellant was not entitled to summary judgment as to the issue of immunity. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling either of Appellant's motions to suppress. There was no Miranda violation, because Appellant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Rather, he was lawfully detained for investigatory purposes. Appellant's consent to search his car was valid. When the officer asked for the consent, Appellant was being detained lawfully. The officer did not need a particular reason to search the car. Brady did not establish a violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), because he failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the affidavit supporting the warrant to search a USB drive contained a false or misleading statement. The affidavit provided a substantial basis to find probable cause that the USB drive contained evidence of sexual assault. The 77-year aggregate prison sentence imposed by the trial court was not contrary to law. The sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, because each individual prison sentence was within the authorized statutory range. The record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings. Videos found on a USB drive show Appellant raping his daughter on numerous occasions. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.) (Donovan, J., concurring in both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion.)

After reviewing the entire record as prescribed by Anders, we find no issues with arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

Upon motion, a trial court, under R.C. 2711.02(B), must stay litigation when the movant establishes that it is a party to a written contract which includes an arbitration provision, that an issue presented by the litigation is referable to arbitration, and that the movant is not in default in proceeding with the arbitration. The motion before the trial court met these requirements. Further, the presence of claims or parties that are not subject to the arbitration provision is not a basis upon which a trial court may deny a stay as to such claims or parties. Thus, the trial court erred when it did not stay the litigation as to claims and parties not subject to the arbitration provision. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Hall, J., concurring in judgment only.)

The appellant's statutory maximum sentence for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Contrary to the appellant's argument, the record does not demonstrate that the trial court failed to satisfy its obligation to consider the "seriousness" and "recidivism" factors in R.C. 2929.12. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court committed plain error by vacating a default judgment in Appellant's favor, and reversal is required under the plain error doctrine. Appellee's motion to vacate (urging Civ.R. 60(B) relief) was filed before the trial court entered the final default judgment. The court, therefore, should have considered the motion as one for reconsideration or as a Civ.R. 6(B) motion for enlargement of time to object to the magistrate's decision. Once the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision and entered final judgment, the pending motion no longer existed and was presumed to have been denied. Appellee then appealed from the final default judgment and raised the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate. However, that appeal was dismissed as untimely, and a final judgment existed, resolving all claims between the parties. Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to set aside the default judgment.

Shared parenting/Custody/Parenting time/Restriction on filing further pleadings/Abuse of discretion

INVITED ERROR – EVIDENCE – PHOTOGRAPHS – COUNSEL – APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – SENTENCING – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The admission of statements by a victim who did not testify at trial was invited error where the state did not elicit the statements on direct examination of the police officer witness, defense counsel asked the witness about the statements on cross-examination, and the state questioned the witness about the statements on redirect examination. The trial court did not err in admitting a photograph of a child victim that showed the child's full body with medical tubing where the photograph was relevant to prove serious physical harm and physical harm by means of a deadly weapon, the photograph was not needlessly cumulative, and the probative value of the photograph was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to defendant. Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where defense counsel admitted in opening argument that defendant had struggled with substance abuse: counsel's admissions were tactical decisions and defendant failed to overcome the presumption that those admissions were sound trial strategy. The appellate court cannot consider on appeal defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on matters outside the record. The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant where defendant failed to affirmatively show that the court did not consider the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 sentencing factors, and where the record shows that the trial court engaged in the requisite analysis and made the findings necessary to support the imposition of consecutive sentences and that those findings were supported by the record.

Sufficient evidence of sexual conduct to support conviction of rape of child under 13 where victim, victim's father, and SANE nurse provided testimony supporting state's position that appellant put his fingers in victim's vagina. Jury did not lose its way in resolving credibility issues in favor of state. Sentence of life in prison without parole not disproportionate to conduct involved, did not violate appellant's substantive due process rights, and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award appellant the negative equity in the real property, failing to divide all alleged business debts, and failing to classify a post-divorce filing purchase of a vehicle as separate property.

CIVIL - In this breach of contract case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Appellant breached the contract.

Appellant's conviction of violating a township zoning resolution was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court's order that appellant reimburse township is vacated because it was entered without appellant having an opportunity to object and without a hearing. Appellant's conviction of obstructing official business was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant failed to demonstrate that his actions were privileged.

The trial court did not err in finding that the evidence supported the petitioners' request for a civil stalking protection order. Trial court's specific condition on the orders of protection relating to the respondent's internet postings about petitioners was not unconstitutional.

Defendant-appellant's possession-of heroin, -cocaine, and –criminal tools trafficking-in-drugs corrupting-another-with-drugs convictions are based on sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not commit plain error by denying defendant-appellant's motion for severance. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment. The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence.

The trial court has the discretion to permit the prosecution to ask leading questions of a State's witness on direct examination in order to allow the State to develop the witness's testimony. In this case, the use of leading questions on direct examination did not present a Confrontation Clause issue.

substantial compliance—field sobriety tests—2945.75

manifest weight—credibility—new trial

sexual battery – gross sexual imposition – substantially impaired – prosecutorial misconduct – bolstering – hearsay – resulting prejudice – sufficiency – manifest weight – ineffective assistance of counsel

trade name, Deceptive Trade Practices Act, R.C. 4165.02, prior user

Contracts–trial court's determination to use company's tax returns for purposes of calculating "net profits" not against the manifest weight of the evidence when company vice president offered conflicting accounts of how she determined net profits trial court entitled to find vice president's testimony not worthy of belief trial court's finding that employer agreed to provide employee health insurance coverage not against the manifest weight of the evidence when three out of four people present at meeting during which employment offered testified that employer would provide health insurance appellant's argument that trial court failed to charge cost of motorcycle trailer against appellee's share of net profits unsupported–instead, trial court did charge cost of motorcycle trailer to appellee trial court's finding that golf cart in appellee's possession constituted gift not against manifest weight of the evidence

Enforcement of arbitration agreement, law-of-the-case doctrine, Civ.R. 60(B), Evid.R. 702, expert witness, manifest weight of the evidence. A trial court's reversal and remand places the parties in the same position they were in prior to the error. A trial court's determination of an expert witness's qualification will not be reversed unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion. The trial court's finding that the signature on the arbitration agreement was valid is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Felony sentence R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 minimum. Judgment affirmed where appellant failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support his sentences under the relevant statutes or that his sentences were contrary to law. The record reflected that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. Appellant failed to show that the trial court erred by imposing more than the minimum sentence.

Motion to vacate restraining order juvenile court custody proceeding Civ.R. 65. Juvenile court erred in denying motion to vacate restraining order that precluded paternal grandmother from having contact with mother. Even assuming juvenile court had authority to issue a restraining order in custody action under Civ.R. 65, restraining order at issue did not comply with Civ.R. 65(D). Restraining order did not set forth the reasons for its issuance, was unlimited in time, and was not sufficiently specific as to its terms. Further, there were issues both with the manner in which juvenile court joined grandmother as party for purposes of issuing the restraining order and the manner in which the restraining order was issued. Mother conceded that juvenile court erred in ordering grandmother to pay mother's attorney fees and legal expenses associated with grandmother's motion to vacate the restraining order.

Habitual sexual offender Megan's Law retroactive application constitutional former R.C. 2950.06 State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753 State v. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 407, 1998-Ohio-291, 700 N.E.2d 570. Judgment affirmed. Defendant presented no evidence of any judgment that he was required to register under the registration laws that preceded Megan's Law. The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected claims that the retroactive application of Megan's Law is unconstitutional. As a result, the trial court was within its authority to classify the defendant as an habitual sex offender with a twenty-year registration requirement.

Civ.R. 10(D)(2) affidavit of merit medical claim refiled action extension good cause dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Civ.R. 41(B)(1) notice opportunity to respond. Although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding appellant failed to demonstrate good cause warranting an extension of time to file an affidavit of merit in a refiled medical malpractice action, the court erred by dismissing the action without affording appellant notice and an opportunity to respond. Case was remanded with instructions to grant plaintiff-appellant an opportunity to respond by filing an affidavit of merit as required by Civ.R. 12(D)(2)(a), or by providing further information to show "good cause" warranting an extension pursuant to Civ.R. 10(D)(2)(b) and (c).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - parties failed to prove value of marital business trial court did not err in equitably dividing company's assets undetermined proceeds from pending lawsuit are marital property subject to equitable division under R.C. 3105.171(B).

CRIMINAL LAW - community control sanctions forfeiture of nursing license constitutes abuse of discretion duration of community control no abuse of discretion in decision not to impose intervention in lieu of conviction court has discretion not a right.

CRIMINAL LAW - post-sentence motion to vacate merger void versus voidable R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) does not bar appellate review of merger argument even if jointly recommended sentence, but only on direct appeal res judicata.

CIVIL - motion to dismiss Civ.R. 60(A) nunc pro tunc lacked authority pending appeal nullity Civ.R. 5(D) and (E) motions must actually be filed for court to rule on and address merits email filing ex parte communication must demonstrate prejudice.

CIVIL - dismissal for failure to prosecute final judgment motion for reconsideration in trial court is a nullity and cannot be appealed no jurisdiction.

post conviction relief

Complicity to commit burglary

Juvenile's delinquency adjudication for abduction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering juvenile delinquent to complete a sex offender treatment program.

The court lacks jurisdiction to address appellant's appeal where the trial court disposed of only one of the multiple violations of community control alleged against appellant.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the parties' shared parenting plan to require adult supervision of the parties' children after school. The court considered the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), including testimony about the wishes of the parents and children, the children's adjustment to the Boys & Girls Club, and the children's level of maturity, before finding it was in the children's best interest to have adult supervision after school until their father returned home from work.

The trial court did not err by sentencing appellant to serve an aggregate 14-year prison sentence nor did the trial court err by ordering appellant to pay restitution where the trial court met all its statutory obligations prior to imposing consecutive sentences and ordering appellant to pay the amount of restitution requested to cover the victim's funeral expenses.

The trial court's decision to grant appellee a monetary judgment upon finding appellant breached a contract requiring him to reimburse appellee for tickets and hotel room to a country music festival in exchange for a ticket to a different country music concert was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's decision that appellant breached a binding and enforceable contract.

Defendant property owner appeals a decision granting summary judgment to a bank in a foreclosure action. The court properly granted the bank summary judgment where the bank supported its motion with an affidavit establishing all requirements to obtain foreclosure. The defendant moved to strike the affidavit on various grounds but then failed to reassert those arguments on appeal, resulting in waiver.

Intimidation of a witness obstructing official business domestic violence sufficiency manifest weight credibility. Appellant's convictions for kidnapping, intimidation of a witness, and obstructing official business were affirmed. The evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdicts, and the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) supported by the record. Imposition of consecutive sentences affirmed where trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were supported by the record.

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment R.C. 4123.01(C) workers' compensation benefits "coming-and-going rule" "zone of employment" totality of the circumstances. The trial court correctly found that Parrish was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits, and properly granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied Parrish's partial motion for summary judgment. Parrish was not within the "zone of employment" when he was injured. Further, there is no causal connection between Parrish's injury and his employment based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the accident.

JUVENILE - Trial court erred in failing to make a best interest determination in granting Appellee custody of the children herein. No due process error occurred relating to notice to Appellant of the hearing date or her opportunity to be heard or have counsel.

CRIMINAL - Trial court did not err in convicting Appellant of OVI and failure to yeild as the state did prove sufficient evidence of his prior conviction for OVI.

CRIMINAL - Appellant's conviction for felonious assault and assault are supported by the record, not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and show serious physical harm. Trial court did not err in overruling the Crim.R. 29 motion.

Sufficiency manifest weight. A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. A reviewing court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. A conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the most exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.

Summary judgment opportunity to arbitrate grievance collective bargaining agreement agreement to arbitrate statutory age discrimination claim statute of limitations R.C. 4112.02 180 days grievance procedure tolling R.C. 4112.14 alternative pleading Civ.R. 56(F) motion. Trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant-employer where plaintiff-employee's age discrimination claim under R.C. 4112.02 was barred by the 180-day statute of limitations the allegation in plaintiff's complaint that he was a member of a protected class under R.C. 4112.14 did not alternatively plead a cause of action under R.C. 4112.14 plaintiff's use of the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement did not toll the statute of limitations.

Appeal of order granting summary judgment in slip and fall case

Motion to Correct Sentence - Res Judicata

Motion to Stay and Refer to Arbitration

forrcible entry and detainer - restitution ordered - tenant moved out

This Court affirmed a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, reversing a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. The common pleas court found there was no just cause to terminate Lancaster's employment.

Judgment reversed. When viewing the summary judgment evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint was filed within four years of the defendant's last culpable act or omission. As such, the statute of repose in R.C. 2305.113(C) did not bar the plaintiff's complaint for medical negligence.

Judgment affirmed trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Civ.R. 37(A)(5) and entering a default judgment as a sanction pursuant to Civ.R. 37(B)(1)(f).

Appellant failed to file a motion to set aside the magistrate's order and thus waived her right to argue the merits of the order on appeal. Further, where the record does not indicate that the magistrate or trial court committed plain error, and appellant's brief did not provide legal errors for review nor a transcript that would support any conclusion otherwise, an appellate court must presume the regularity of the trial court's proceedings and affirm its decision. Judgment affirmed.

Civil: motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) timeliness of motion law of the case doctrine.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – EVIDENCE – PARENTAL UNSUITABILITY: Where both father and maternal grandparents filed motions for custody of the minor child, the juvenile court erred in applying a best-interest analysis and awarding custody to grandparents where there was insufficient evidence that father was unsuitable and that an award of custody to father would be detrimental to the child. Where there was insufficient evidence that father was unsuitable, the juvenile court's judgment denying father's motion for custody and granting custody to the child's grandparents must be reversed and judgment entered awarding custody to father. [But see DISSENT: Where the juvenile court erred in applying a best-interest analysis in awarding custody to grandparents and denying father's motion for custody, the cause should be remanded so that the juvenile court can determine father's suitability using the appropriate criteria.]

On certification of default.

On application for retirement or resignation pursuant to Gov.Bar R. VI(11).

sexual offender registration, R.C. 2950.04, R.C. 2950.05, sufficiency, manifest weight, allied offenses

motion to suppress, probable cause, OVI, single-vehicle accident, slurred speech, glossy eyes, alcohol

R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), due process, notice, juvenile adjudication of delinquency

permanent custody – adjudication – dependent child – R.C. 2151.28(L) – failure to file objections – in camera interview – due process – right of confrontation – clear and convincing evidence – manifest weight of the evidence

Motion to Suppress Officer's Mistake of Law Not Reasonable as Statute Unambiguous

motion to suppress – driving under the influence – probable cause – totality of the circumstances – adequate factual findings

spousal support, R.C. 3105.18, magistrate's decision, failure to object, plain error, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), independent review

Motion to withdraw plea

fee agreement, appellate jurisdiction, summary judgment, Civ. R. 56(C), contract interpretation, Civ.R. 60(B)

Civ.R. 60(B), abuse of discretion, illegal, public policy, inequitable

denying application for reconsideration and en banc consideration forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to hearsay rules and confrontation clause.

petition for a writ of mandamus motion ruled upon prior to filing of petition for writ of mandamus moot

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – WAIVER OF COUNSEL – COMPETENCY – OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE – WITNESSES – SENTENCING – ALLIED OFFENSES – R.C. 2941.25: The trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte order a competency evaluation before allowing defendant to waive trial counsel, because defendant did not manifest any observable signs of incompetency during his proceedings such that a reasonable judge would experience genuine doubt his competency. Defendant's endorsement of fringe views did not mean that he could not cooperate with his attorney or understand the judicial proceedings against him. The trial court's admission of other-acts evidence during the testimony of a state's witness did not rise to the level of plain error where defendant elicited similar testimony on cross-examination, and the state presented overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. The trial court did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or his right to compulsory process when it failed to construe defendant's pro se motions requesting discovery as requests for assistance in subpoenaing the state's nontestifying informant, where the record demonstrated that defendant knew the identity of the informant and how to subpoena witness, and that he had been provided the assistance of a legal advisor. The trial court erred by sentencing defendant to separate, concurrent terms for allied offenses of similar import where the trial court had determined at sentencing that the offenses of possessing marijuana and trafficking in marijuana were allied offenses of similar import, and the state had elected to pursue the trafficking offense.

SEX OFFENSES: The trial court did not err in dismissing the indictment charging defendant with failing to verify his current address and failing to provide notice of an address change, or in directing the sheriff to remove defendant's name from the sex-offender registry, because defendant was not subject to Megan's Law's sex-offender registration and reporting requirements where there was nothing in the record to demonstrate that defendant had committed felonious assault with a sexual motivation.

POSTCONVICTION—JURISDICTION: Defendant's postconviction challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the firearm specification accompanying an aggravated-robbery charge was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction: the claim was reviewable under R.C. 2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief, because the claim sought relief based on an alleged due-process violation during the proceedings leading to the aggravated-robbery conviction, R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) but the postconviction statutes did not confer jurisdiction to entertain the claim, because the claim did not satisfy R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)'s time restrictions or R.C. 2953.23's jurisdictional requirements for entertaining a late postconviction claim and the claim, even if demonstrated, would not have rendered the conviction void.

EXPUNGEMENT: R.C. 2953.32 identifies the requirements for an applicant seeking to have records of her convictions sealed, but R.C. 2953.36 precludes the sealing of records of certain offenses, including when the victim of the offense was less than sixteen years of age and when the offense was a misdemeanor of the first degree or a felony. While the text of R.C. 2919.23 does not define who is the victim of the proscribed conduct, other provisions of the Revised Code, when read in pari materia, make it clear that a child enticed, taken, kept, or harbored is a victim of an interfering-with-custody offense.

Denial of motion to vacate

Permanent custody/Failure to appoint guardian ad litem

Criminal: felony sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) clear and convincing evidence.

Appellant-Father did not file objections to a magistrate's decision overruling his motion for contempt regarding visitation and his motion seeking a custody change. Appellate review, therefore, is confined to a plain error analysis. But a claim that a judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence, as Appellant asserts, is not subject to a plain error analysis. Further, a review of the record does not reveal that overruling either motion constituted an abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed.

In permanent custody case, appointed counsel filed briefs for Father and Mother pursuant to Anders v. California, identifying no issues with arguable merit and concluding that the juvenile court's judgment granting custody of M.W. to MCCS was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Arguments raised in Mother's and Father's identical briefs following the Anders brief lack merit the juvenile court was not required to factor adoption possibilities into its analysis. The grant of permanent custody to MCCS was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to Appellee on Appellant's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, as expressed in sections 106.1 and 307.1 of the Ohio Building Code. Neither section expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action. Judgment affirmed.

Taylor was convicted of domestic violence, and his argument that R.C. 2919.25 is "unconstitutionally overbroad" fails. With respect to the victim's 9-1-1 recording and her recorded conversations with Taylor while he was in jail, plain error is not demonstrated in defense counsel's failure to object or in the trial court's admission of this evidence. Plain error also is not demonstrated in the jury instructions regarding or the prosecutor's remarks in closing argument about consciousness of guilt. Taylor was not denied the right to confront his accuser. Taylor's convictions for aggravated burglary, carrying a concealed weapon, domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and domestic violence were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Taylor's handgun was subject to forfeiture. Taylor's right to a speedy trial was not violated. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by preventing Appellant from cross-examining a witness about the witness's drug use. Appellant did not make the argument regarding relevancy of the anticipated evidence in the trial court that he makes on appeal, and even if he had, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence. Moreover, Appellant forfeited all but plain error with respect to the issue raised. Appellant did not argue plain error on appeal. Even if he had, the trial court's ruling was not plainly erroneous. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurs.)

Where Defendant charged with purposeful murder testified that he did not realize his handgun was loaded, he did not pull the trigger, and the gun "just went off" during a struggle with someone who grabbed the weapon from inside a vehicle that was pulling away, the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide. Judgment reversed on that conviction, affirmed as to all other convictions, and remanded for further proceedings. (Hall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Trial self-representation untimely invoke other-acts evidence abuse of discretion harmless error cumulative less restrictive evidentiary alternative firearm specification manifest weight storage fee forfeiture standing third party codefendant contrary to law similar offenders inconsistent sentence. Defendant's request to represent himself in the middle of trial was untimely and, therefore, did not properly invoke the right to self-representation. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the state to introduce other acts testimony. However, the error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Defendant's firearm specifications are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant lacked standing to contest storage fees related to a third party. The trial court did not act clearly and convincingly contrary to law by imposing a greater sentence on defendant than his codefendant.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening untimely application good cause actual innocence. The application for reopening was denied where the applicant failed to show good cause for untimely filing. A claim of actual innocence does not establish good cause. Further, the claim of actual innocence relies on evidence that did not exist at the time of the appeal and could not form the basis for an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

Police officer's testimony defendant's truthfulness harmless error motion for mistrial. Defendant's convictions for aggravated murder and conspiracy affirmed. Error in admitting police officer's testimony regarding defendant being deceitful deemed harmless, because of substantial evidence of guilt. Defendant failed to show that a fair trial was impossible therefore, court did not err by denying motion for mistrial.

Domestic violence self-defense nondeadly force manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court applied correct standard for establishing claim of self-defense where the defendant used nondeadly force. Defendant's domestic violence conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where evidence showed that the defendant created the situation that gave rise to the affray. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he erroneously suggested that the defendant might have a duty to retreat where there was no evidence that the trial court applied the wrong standard for determining a claim of self-defense and the evidence showed that the defendant created the situation that gave rise to the fight.

Sever multiple counts Crim.R. 8(A) Crim.R. 14 Evid.R. 404(B) modus operandi "other acts" evidence ineffective assistance of counsel relevant evidence unfair prejudice probative value hearsay voir dire cumulative error sufficient evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court's failure to sever multiple counts against eight victims was not plain error where the evidence related to the counts was simple and direct, and the evidence related to the separate counts would have been admissible at the different trials if the counts had been tried separately. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a severance of multiple counts, objecting to evidence or making a more substantial argument in support of a motion for acquittal where the outcome of the trial would not have changed even if counsel had done these things. Since the only error identified on appeal related to a harmless error, the cumulative error doctrine was inapplicable. Four counts of extortion relative to four victims were not supported by sufficient evidence where there was no evidence that the defendant threatened to expose material that would subject the victims to ridicule, hatred, contempt, or loss of reputation to induce them to commit an unlawful act. There was also insufficient evidence of a furthermore finding that a victim was under 18 years old at the time of a kidnapping offense. The remaining convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and by the manifest weight of the evidence.

Sentencing purposes and principles of felony sentencing seriousness and recidivism factors liens paper terrorism. Thirty-month sentence was not contrary to law and was supported by the record where the defendant's failure to take responsibility for his action and extensive criminal record indicated he would likely reoffend.

R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c) Am.Sub.H.B. No. 49 community control sanctions violation fifth-degree felony 90-day maximum sentence technical violation. The trial court's judgment sentencing defendant to 12 months in prison for violating the terms of her community control sanctions is affirmed. Defendant failed to report to the probation department after she was sentenced. Defendant's failure to report to the probation department was not a technical violation under the recently enacted R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c). Thus, the trial court was not limited to sentencing defendant to 90 days in prison as required under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) when a defendant commits a technical violation of his or her community control sanctions.

R.C. 2929.15 fourth-degree felony technical violation of community control sanction. Following defendant's conviction for fourth-degree felony, trial court erred in imposing 30-month sentence for her violations of community control that were based upon "technical violations." Under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii), a maximum sentence of 180 days of imprisonment could be imposed.

R.C. 2929.15(B)/penalties for violation of community control sanctions technical violations. Appellant's violations of her community control sanctions were technical violations and not new criminal offenses. The trial court's 17-month sentence was contrary to law.

Sentence contrary to law void authority R.C. 2953.08 aggravated murder R.C. 2929.03(A) statutory language legislative intent parole eligible indefinite sentence. Because the trial court imposed a sentence that does not comport with the statutory language set forth in R.C. 2929.03(A), the trial court exceeded its authority in sentencing.

manifest weight - sufficiency - ineffective assistance - prosecutorial misconduct

Untimely Post Conviction Relief Petition

Both parties concur that the trial court violated Crim.R. 11(E). Reverse and remand.

R.C. 2930.13 and 2930.14 apply where a victim elects to make a statement regarding the impact of the crime.

Trial court order granting appellee's motion for attorney's fees is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part. Settlement, reasonable attorney's fees, contract, de novo review, abuse of discretion.

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's action in forcible entry and detainer. Agent tenement occupier R.C. 1923.01(C)(2) R.C. 1923.02(A)(5) Civ.R. 17.

The trial court erred when it granted appellees' motions to dismiss as Section 858.01 is a valid exercise of the village's taxing power.

City is entitled to immunity on appellant's wrongful death claims where the evidence fails to demonstrate that the city's removal of safety nets from its fire engines constituted willful or wanton misconduct.

Appellant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered guilty pleas. No ineffective assistance of counsel.

R.C. 2929.14(C), consecutive sentences, statutory construction, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Defendant-appellant's domestic-violence and disrupting-public-services convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's domestic-violence and disrupting-public-services convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

felony sentencing, statutory sentencing factors, R.C. 2929.12, R.C. 2929.11, sexual battery, gross sexual imposition

R.C. 2917.21 – telecommunications harassment – harass, abuse, or intimidate – purpose – manifest weight – plain error

Information guilty plea postrelease control gun specification maximum penalty waiver of presentment to grand jury. Defendant's guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary where court explained the mandatory nature of postrelease control and that service of three-year prison term on gun specification was required before service of sentence on underlying felony. Defendant waived right to challenge any defects in the manner in which he waived his right to a grand jury indictment by pleading guilty to the charges.

Civ.R. 60(B) notification e-filing system abuse of discretion. Trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to vacate summary judgment for employer where plaintiff was promptly served with employer's motion for summary judgment pursuant to the trial court's local rules for electronic filing, and did not check docket or user's notification page to learn of motion, and court ruled on it six weeks later.

Motion for new trial leave Crim.R. 33, Loc.R. 11(D) untimely abuse of discretion. Judgment affirmed. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial was proper because the defendant did not file a motion for new trial within the time prescribed by Crim.R. 33 and did not seek leave from the court prior to filing the untimely motion. Additionally, the trial court did not have to wait ten days before ruling on the motion for a new trial because Crim.R. 33 does not require a scheduled reply time and the defendant did not seek leave from the trial court to file a reply to the state's opposition.

Divorce parenting plan jurisdiction modification best interests due process hearing notice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the terms of the parenting plan. The trial court's failure to hold a full hearing on the modification order did not violate appellant's due process rights.

Indian Child Welfare Act permanent custody temporary custody legal custody best interest of the child. Trial court did not violate Indian Child Welfare Act where there was no evidence that the children were "Indian children" as defined by the act. Order granting permanent custody to CCDCFS was supported by clear and convincing evidence where evidence showed the children could not and should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, and permanent custody was in the children's best interest. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to proceeding without complying with the Indian Child Welfare Act where there was no evidence that the children were "Indian children" as defined by the act.

Nunc pro tunc. The state conceded that the journal entry did not reflect what the juvenile court decided at the sentencing hearing. When clerical mistakes are raised on appeal, Ohio appellate courts may remand the issue to the trial court and direct that the court correct the misstatement through a nunc pro tunc entry. The juvenile court is directed to issue a nunc pro tunc entry to correct the journal entry to reflect what was done at the sentencing hearing.

CIVIL - class-action certification Time-Bar Class reconsideration final appealable order former Ohio 15-year statute of limitation New Hampshire three-year statute of limitation R.CC. 2305.03(B) Ohio's borrowing statute accrual of cause of action statute applies because cause of action was filed after effective date cause of action in Ohio extinguished in July 2003 Unifund never possessed a vested right trial court must address remaining Civ.R. 23 factors discovery argument unripe cross-assignments of error overruled.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - Contempt indirect alleged violation of visitation order contempt determination must be based upon specific orders in prior judgment party is not required to look beyond four corners of judgment to see what her duties are to opposing party no response to counterproposal as to summer visitation dates witness credibility R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) motion for change of custody change of circumstance alleged interference with visitation by residential parent.

JUVENILE - termination of parental rights service notice Juv.R. 16 Juv.R. 18(D) inapplicable R.C. 2151.414 R.C. 2151.29 one week from service by publication hearing proceeded on sixth day after service was complete court was without full jurisdiction to proceed as to father service complete on mother appeared no prejudice mother lacks standing to assert father's statutory right.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal reasons do not justify delay of over three years before filing appeal.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - termination reinstatement to prior position as a police officer R.C. 119.12(M) R.C. 2506.04 abuse of discretion standard.

CIVIL - manifest weight of the evidence estate beneficiary form change.

Criminal: consistency in sentencing R.C. 2929.11(B) issue not preserved for appellate review ineffective assistance of counsel failure to establish prejudice.

Defendant's conviction for telecommunications harassment for sending Snapchat texts and photograph of his penis to a 13-year-old victim was supported by sufficient evidence where the texts and photograph were sent with purpose to harass the victim. Defendant's conviction for sexual imposition for touching the 13-year-old victim's breast was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

A defendant who pled guilty to two counts of theft in separate cases appeals from the restitution order. Clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion that the court erred in imposing restitution on each case in an amount equal to the total of claimed losses for both cases, effectively doubling the restitution award. The restitution order was vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings on restitution.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to change the surname of his daughter where appellant failed to carry his burden to prove that the name change was in his daughter's best interest.

Appellant's appeal was not from a final appealable order because the juvenile court's stay of unsupervised visitation did not impact any substantial rights and was only a way to maintain the status quo in the proceedings.

The domestic relations court did not err by granting appellant and appellee reciprocal domestic violence civil protection orders against one another where such a decision finding each had committed domestic violence supported by competent credible evidence was therefore not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The domestic relations court did err, however, by requiring the parties to remain at least 500 feet apart from each other where the parties were joint owners in a home and where granting exclusive occupancy to either of the parties was not appropriate under the unique facts and circumstances presented.

The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence seized after a traffic stop where the sergeant observed two traffic violations supporting the valid traffic stop and where the odor of raw marijuana emanating from appellant's vehicle led the sergeant to search appellant's trunk where he found additional marijuana.

The defendant appeals his conviction for the aggravated murder of his son. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. A detective's brief testimony concerning the defendant's pre-arrest silence was improper but the defendant received a fair trial because of substantial evidence of guilt. The trial court properly overruled the defendant's motion to suppress certain statements to police where he was not in custody during police questioning. The state submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate prior calculation and design where the defendant admitted using a hatchet to strike fatal blows to his unconscious son to ensure that he was "finished off." The jury did not lose its way in finding that the defendant did not establish self-defense.

Appellant's appeal was not from a final appealable order because the juvenile court's stay of unsupervised visitation did not impact any substantial rights and was only a way to maintain the status quo in the proceedings.

Appellant's appeal was not from a final appealable order because the juvenile court's stay of unsupervised visitation did not impact any substantial rights and was only a way to maintain the status quo in the proceedings.

Elections—Prohibition—Writ of prohibition sought to compel board of elections to remove a proposed charter amendment from the February 26, 2019 special-election ballot—Writ denied.

Breach of lease hydraulic fracturing self-serving affidavit

procedendo trial court has no duty to provide indigent criminal defendant copies of original papers and transcripts to pursue federal habeas corpus action

domestic violence no evidence that appellant was not aware of his right to testify appellant failed to file complete transcript necessary for review App.R 9 no ineffective assistance of counsel

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, Crim.R. 29, motion for acquittal, identification

Civ.R. 55, default judgment, magistrate decision, manifest weight of the evidence, conversion, unjust enrichment, compensatory damages, testimonial evidence, punitive damages

permanent custody – manifest weight of the evidence – failure to remedy – best interest of the child

arbitration – procedural unconscionability – substantive unsconscionability – public policy

final judgment, modification, attorney's fees, effective date, jurisdiction, void

football, default judgment, damages, captioned assignment of error, burden on appeal

Relator is entitled to statutory damages where respondents failed to respond in any way to his public records requests for two and a half months.

On certification of default.

Domestic: termination of spousal support contempt proceedings.

contempt granted in part

Criminal: felonious assault manifest weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence merger separate and identifiable harm assistance of counsel speedy-trial R.C. 2945.71.

Criminal: validity of guilty plea Crim.R. 11 knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily ineffective assistance of counsel.

Where a hearing officer completely omitted to consider a significant item of evidence directly bearing on factors it was required by the Ohio Administrative Code to consider, it committed an error of law and the Industrial Commission was entitled to exercise continuing jurisdiction to correct the error. This Court is not required to infer from silence that the hearing officer considered the item of evidence, particularly where other aspects of the hearing officer's decision suggest that the hearing officer otherwise attempted to make a diligent inventory of the evidence it considered.

Trial court did not err by affirming SPBR decision that terminated employee was protected by whistleblower statute and that whistleblower activity motivated the termination because trial court could find there was reliable, probative, and substantial evidence to support conclusion that employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that criminal activity occurred and that superiors may have considered whistleblower activity in deciding to terminate employee.

Trial court did not err in entering judgment for appellee where appellant failed to appear for trial because, even if he did not receive actual notice, appellant had constructive notice sufficient to satisfy due process based on the entry of the trial date on the docket

In an R.C. 3702.60 appeal of an adjudication order issued by the Director of the Ohio Department of Health, which granted the certificate of need ("CON") application filed by the owner/developer of a new nursing facility, the owner of a nearby existing nursing facility failed to demonstrate that allegedly deficient documentation provided in the CON application, lack of need for the new facility, or the negative impact of the facility on existing providers required reversal where the order was nonetheless supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. Order affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion for a de novo sentencing hearing and limited the scope of the resentencing hearing to the proper imposition of post-release control with regard to his convictions for four counts of rape. Appellant's remaining assignments of error are barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

No trial court error when it sentenced appellant to a nine-month prison term sanction for violating his community control sanction. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was neither deprived of his right to presentment to a grand jury nor of his right to due process of law.

The trial court did not err in denying Appellant's pro se "Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence" and a corresponding supplemental motion, because all the claims raised therein were barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The appellant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to provide advance notice of intent to use other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B). The trial court properly excluded the evidence on relevance grounds. Therefore, the failure to provide advance notice did not prejudice the appellant. The trial court did not err in overruling a suppression motion that challenged the reliability of information contained in a search warrant affidavit. The information came from an identified citizen witness who provided her basis of knowledge and whose reliability could be presumed under the circumstances. The appellant's convictions for murder and related offenses were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Evidence found pursuant to a warrantless search of appellant's vehicle was not subject to suppression under the automobile exception, where the police officer testified that he detected a very strong odor of raw marijuana upon approaching the vehicle and appellant acknowledged that he was in possession of marijuana. The permissible scope of the search extended into the trunk of the vehicle because the officer smelled raw, rather than burnt, marijuana.

The trial court's conclusion that the contested expense was a medical expense was supported by the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Appellant in contempt of court for his failure to pay this expense. The trial court, however, abused its discretion regarding the attorney's fee award because the amount awarded was not supported by the record. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the entry of a modified judgment.

R.C. 2107.24 construed. Probate court erred in denying application to admit a document to probate as the will of the decedent pursuant to R.C. 2107.24. R.C. 2107.15 is not applicable to a will admitted pursuant to R.C. 2107.24.

Trial court thoroughly considered Fish factors in considering appellant's motion to withdraw guilty plea and did not abuse discretion in overall conclusion denying the motion. Trial court did not err in imposing prison sentence where sentence was not contrary to law, court did not make incorrect findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), R.C. 2929.14 (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or R.C. 2929.20(I), and there existed no clear and convincing evidence that the sentence was not supported by record.

The juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied Mother's motions to show cause and granted Father's motion for child support. The order of the juvenile court on Mother's motions to show cause is reversed and remanded to the juvenile court to either conduct an evidentiary hearing or issue a revised judgment setting forth the court's rationale for the summary overruling of the motions. The order of the juvenile court on Father's motion for child support is reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, since Mother had a due process right to be heard on the issue of child support.

Trial court properly denied appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion to dismiss.

On Jones's direct appeal, this Court remanded the matter to the trial court to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive life sentences on two counts of aggravated murder. On appeal from his resentencing, appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California asserting two potential assignments of error, and Jones asserted three pro se assignments of error. The lengthy delay between this Court's remand and Jones's resentencing, although a serious administrative lapse, did not prejudice Jones, since he could not have been released during the delay. Ineffective assistance of counsel appointed for resentencing is not demonstrated. Furthermore, Appellant's pro se argument that appellate counsel is per se ineffective for filing an Anders brief herein lacks merit. Judgment affirmed. (Hall, J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err in refusing to give a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of duress. The appellant's own testimony established that she had the ability to withdraw or escape from any immediate threat that she faced after two armed men exited her car and walked a block away after dark to shoot at a residence. She then drove them to another location and they again exited her car, walked away and shot at another residence. She did not leave and did not call the police on her cell phone on either occasion. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court properly suppressed evidence. DVR system not properly seized because it was not specified and did not fit naturally into items specified in search warrant. Plain view exception inapplicable because incriminating nature of DVR system not immediately apparent. Good-faith exception to exclusionary rule inapplicable because reasonably well-trained officer would have known that wording of warrant did not encompass DVR system.

Trial court granted summary judgment to mortgagee-bank on its reverse mortgage foreclosure claim. The trial court did not err in concluding that mortgagee complied with its contractual and regulatory obligation to provide 30 days' notice of default prior to instituting foreclosure proceedings. However, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether mortgagee sought and obtained HUD's approval prior to demanding immediate repayment of the loan from homeowner. Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings. (Hall, J., dissenting.)

Convictions for bribery, felonious assault and burglary are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Application for reopening motion for clarification App.R. 26(B)

Abuse of discretion injunctive relief equitable remedy

Political subdivision immunity duty of care, right-of-way professional driver employee liability wanton conduct reckless conduct

Sentence guilty plea motion to withdraw manifest injustice abuse of discretion knowing voluntary plea defense counsel prediction ineffective assistance recommendation range plea agreement breach life sentence juvenile. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's postsentence Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty pleas where manifest injustice did not result from defense counsel's inaccurate sentence prediction and where the record supports a finding that appellant's guilty pleas were voluntarily and intelligently made. Sentence was affirmed when appellant failed to show that a breach of the plea agreement occurred or that the imposition of a 29-year aggregate term of imprisonment is tantamount to a life sentence imposed on a juvenile offender.

R.C. 2971.03(E) consecutive service void sentence. The trial court was required to impose consecutive service of the base sentences imposed on the gross sexual imposition counts under R.C. 2971.03, and the trial court was without authority to impose the sentences concurrently.

Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, Crim.R. 32.1, right to counsel, waiver. The absence of a thorough colloquy concerning the defendant's waiver of trial counsel and request for appointment of new trial counsel establishes that the defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel and that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to counsel. Therefore, his convictions are vacated, and the case is remanded for the trial court to hold (1) a hearing to advise the defendant of the perils of self-representation and determine whether the defendant should be appointed new counsel, and (2) a hearing on the defendant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Transcript manifest weight prorated rent. Where an appellant fails to include in the record for appellate review a copy of the transcript of a trial court hearing, there is a presumption of regularity of the proceedings. This court is constrained in reviewing appellant's manifest weight argument because of a lack of a transcript of the trial court's hearings. Appellant's manifest weight argument is therefore rejected. Because the rental agreement did not provide for prorated rent, appellant's holdover of the premises after the expiration of the term of the lease required appellant to have to pay a full month's rent.

Adoption consent justifiable cause continuance discretion discovery counsel evidence credibility probate child support employment. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Mother's request for a continuance.

Anders brief, R.C. 2929.20, judicial release, abuse of discretion. After independent review pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), this court finds no errors in the trial court that were prejudicial to appellant. Appointed counsel's motion to withdraw is granted.

Guilty plea R.C. 2943.031 immigration non-citizen consequences. Trial court erred in its determination that it was not the trial court's responsibility to determine whether a defendant is a United States citizen. Pursuant to R.C. 2943.031 the court is required to advise all defendants at the time of a guilty or no contest plea that their conviction may have potential immigration consequences.

Ineffective assistance of counsel–trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to request R.C. 2913.03(C) affirmative defense instruction in trial for violating R.C. 2913.04(C) and (D)–evidence did not support finding that appellant's mistaken belief regarding use of OHLEG and LEADS was reasonable constitutionality of R.C. 2913.04(C) and (D)–trial court did not plainly err by failing to conclude that appellant's convictions violated due process rights for failing to adequately define proscribed conduct ineffective assistance of counsel–counsel's potential conflict of interest did not warrant presumption of prejudice when counsel's potential conflict did not prevent counsel from subjecting state's case to meaningful adversarial testing.

final appealable order, lesser included offense, judgment of conviction, resolution of all counts charged in indictment

Appellant's conviction for fourth-degree assault of a peace officer was supported by sufficient evidence and was otherwise not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record provided ample evidence indicating appellant acted knowingly when he kicked a police officer in the face while that officer was assisting paramedics tend to appellant's injuries after appellant attempted to commit suicide by slitting his wrist.

R.C. 2950.05, change of address, sufficiency, manifest weight, Megan's Law

Trial court did not err in determining that counsel did not render ineffective assistance at trial and defendant did not demonstrate that the charges he was convicted of are allied offenses of similar import thus he was not entitled to merger of the charges.

divorce, objections, plain error, motion for an extension of time, Civ.R. 53

Trial court erred in holding that defendant's violations of R.C. 4511.33 and R.C. 4511.13 did not justify traffic stop.

CRIMINAL - disqualification conflict of interest breach of confidence prejudice motion for new trial Crim.R. 33(A) newly discovered evidence postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 ineffective assistance of counsel right to testify res judicata

CRIMINAL LAW - possessing criminal tools sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence torn plastic bags packaging drugs sufficient, credible evidence strike testimony jury presumed to follow instructions due process reference failure to testify no direct implication of need to testify in own defense prosecutor may comment on defendant's failure to offer evidence.

CIVIL - moot costs Civ.R. 54(D) otherwise direct no abuse of discretion.

CRIMINAL LAW - warrantless search unreasonable search and seizure R.C. 2925.03 R.C. 2925.11 R.C. 2923.24 plain-view exception motion to suppress probable cause reasonable suspicion

CIVIL - foreclosure proceeding motion to stay pending modification and settlement negotiations pro se no assignments of error App.R. 18(C) App.R. 16(A)(1)-(7) Loc.R. 16(E) appeal dismissed.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Mandamus used to compel performance of duty judgment issued duty completed judge has no duty to explain basis of jurisdiction in mandamus action.

Motion to Vacate Convictions Venue Res Judicata

Change of Custody Change of Circumstances

Plaintiff in the Court of Claims entitled to damages for unlawful contract termination at state university because of improper tenure review process caused by Provost's blatant refusal to abide by university rules or employment contract provisions. Plainitff retained a continued right to employment at university once the terminal year per the contract is triggered by a valid negative tenure decision process. Judgment reversed and matter remanded for a determination of plaintiff's damages.

The trial court did not err in entering judgment for the State because: (1) the challenged provisions of Sub.H.B. 5, passed by the 130th General Assembly, do not violate the Ohio Constitution's Home Rule Amendment (2) the challenged provisions of Am.Sub. H.B. 49, passed by the 132d General Assembly, do not violate the Ohio Constitution's Home Rule Amendment (3) Am.Sub. H.B. 49 does not violate the Ohio Constitution's One-Subject Rule and (4) the plaintiffs failed to establish any other violation of the Ohio Constitution. Additionally, the failure of the trial court to notify the plaintiffs that it intended to decide the case on its merits following the preliminary injunction hearing did not warrant reversal because plaintiffs failed to establish that they suffered any prejudice due to the lack of notice.

The trial court erred in granting OPERS's motion to dismiss the equal protection claim.

Trial court erred and violated the law of the case doctrine in granting judicial release to appellee when it found that certain factors mitigating the seriousness of appellee's criminal conduct existed despite the court of appeals' determination in a prior appeal in the case that the existence of those factors were unsupported by the record. The record clearly and convincingly failed to support the trial court's additional finding, on remand, that other substantial grounds mitigating appellee's criminal conduct existed. Because the record clearly and convincingly failed to support the existence of any of the R.C. 2929.12(B) factors mitigating appellee's criminal conduct, the record clearly and convincingly failed to support the trial court's finding, pursuant to R.C. 2929.20(J), that a sanction other than prison would not demean the seriousness of appellee's offenses. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for the trial court to issue an order denying appellee's motion for judicial release.

Real estate professional with an inactive Ohio license did not demonstrate that he could conduct a real estate transaction in Ohio.

Appellant failed to raise due process claim related to unexplained delay in resentencing before the trial court therefore, he forfeited all but plain error review. Appellant failed to demonstrate plain error because appellant's prison sentence was extended as a result of resentencing and the unexplained delay did not result in him serving additional prison time. Appellant's claim was also barred by res judicata because he could have asserted it during prior appeal.

Mistrial Denied - No Abuse of Discretion

not final and appealable, dismissed

prohibition mandamus parentage action contempt proceedings for mother's willful failure to comply with trial court's order granting father limited visitation adequate remedy at law

plea agreement, double jeopardy, ripeness

APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: Appellate review is strictly limited to the record on appeal which consists of three categories of documents identified in App.R. 9: the original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court the transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits and a certified copy of the docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court. The appellant bears the burden of identifying in the record the error on which an assignment of error is based when an appellant relies upon facts shown in a transcript of proceedings, that duty includes the obligation to order a transcript of any proceedings he considers necessary for inclusion in the record, and to ensure that the transcript of the proceedings is filed with the clerk of the trial court under App.R. 10(A). When an appellant has failed in his duty to ensure that the record on appeal includes the items necessary to the resolution of the assigned errors, the reviewing court presumes the regularity of the lower court's proceedings. A reviewing court cannot rely on matters raised in briefs, or attached thereto, but not supported in the record, to resolve assignments of error. When the record on appeal is silent as to what transpired in the juvenile court and does not reflect any claimed defect in the adult court's subject-matter jurisdiction, a reviewing court cannot sustain the appellant's assignments of error challenging that jurisdiction. When an appellant has failed to ensure that the record on appeal contains transcripts of the evidentiary hearings before the juvenile court, or the juvenile court's rulings on those evidentiary matters, including whether there was probable cause to believe that the appellant had used a firearm to commit aggravated robbery, whether other offenses at issue arose from a common nucleus of operative facts with the firearm offense, whether the appellant was amenable to rehabilitation as a juvenile, and the juvenile court's entries actually transferring jurisdiction to the trial court and characterizing whether those transfers were mandatory or discretionary, a reviewing court cannot reach assignments of error alleging that the trial court improperly exercised jurisdiction over the appellant.

CHILDREN – APPELLATE REVIEW – BINDOVER – JURISDICTION: Appellate review is strictly limited to the record on appeal which consists of three categories of documents identified in App.R. 9: the original papers and exhibits thereto filed in the trial court the transcript of proceedings, if any, including exhibits and a certified copy of the docket and journal entries prepared by the clerk of the trial court. When an appellant has failed in his duty to ensure that the record on appeal includes the items necessary to the resolution of the assigned errors, the reviewing court presumes the regularity of the lower court's proceedings. The juvenile court's entry of dismissal for want of prosecution was not a determination that the juvenile was delinquent, left the parties as if the action had never been commenced, and did not affect the juvenile's substantial rights thus the juvenile court's entry, entered in a special proceeding, was not a final order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(2). Ordinarily, R.C. 2152.12(B) permits a juvenile court to order the transfer of a discretionary-transfer delinquency case only if the court has found at a hearing, inter alia, that the child was not amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system and should be subject to adult sanctions to ensure the safety of the community but a juvenile court may transfer jurisdiction of a discretionary-transfer delinquency case without an amenability hearing as long as it has found probable cause to believe that the juvenile also committed a mandatory-transfer offense and that both the mandatory-transfer offense and the additional discretionary charges arose from a common nucleus of operative facts. Where there is no evidence of record that a discretionary-transfer delinquency case and a mandatory-transfer delinquency case, which included acts committed by the same juvenile, arose from a common nucleus of operative facts, the juvenile court is not relieved of the requirement under R.C. 2152.12(B) to conduct further hearings or to make findings with respect to the juvenile's eligibility to be tried as a juvenile. When a juvenile court's entry improperly transfers jurisdiction to an adult court that then exercises that flawed jurisdiction, including a remand to the juvenile court under the reverse-bindover scheme, every subsequent entry of record is a legal nullity. An appeal is commenced only by the timely filing of a notice of appeal the failure to file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to review the lower court's actions. Absent a proper bindover procedure, the juvenile court has the exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be a delinquent, and thus a judgment imposed by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is void.

post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.21, mitigation investigation, American Bar Association guidelines, law of the case, ineffective assistance of counsel, hearsay, non-hearsay, abuse of discretion

mistrial, abuse of discretion, sufficiency, weight of the evidence kidnapping, gross sexual imposition, abduction

Criminal: credibility of an affidavit res judicata ineffective assistance of counsel Evid.R 608(B) and 613(C) abuse of discretion.

manifest weight, violation of CPO, alternative findings

Mandamus, Ohio Public Records Act, medical devices, inmate, failure to plead sufficient facts

The trial court did not err in re-sentencing Appellant, pursuant to this Court's mandate, to correct the imposition of post-release control on his felonious assault offense. Appellant has not yet served his sentence for felonious assault. Appellant's argument regarding the imposition of financial sanctions is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at his limited re-sentencing hearing. Judgment affirmed.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Barnes pled guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and agreed to a sentence of between three to five years and restitution, and the State dismissed one count of robbery and one count of burglary. Counsel for Barnes filed a brief pursuant to Anders v California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Counsel's three potential assignments of error, namely whether the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 in accepting Barnes's guilty plea, whether the trial court erred in not considering R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 at sentencing, and whether Barnes received ineffective assistance of counsel by pleading guilty instead of no contest, lack arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to find that wife in a divorce action was "voluntarily underemployed" so as to warrant imputing additional income to wife for purposes of calculating spousal and child support. Neither did the trial court abuse its discretion by declining to award husband a portion of wife's earnings deposited into an account that husband had stipulated was to be wife's separate property, or by ordering husband to pay a significant portion of wife's attorney's fees based on the parties' disparate incomes. Finally, trial court did not deny husband due process through its rulings that excluded irrelevant, cumulative, and/or not-proffered evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Convictions for felonious assault and felony murder are not based on insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellant, while voluntarily intoxicated through his use of acid, LSD, and Ketamine, closed his eyes and drove his vehicle at a high rate of speed resulting in a collision that injured two railroad workers and killed a third.

Appellant, following either a resentencing determination or a probation revocation, was sentenced to serve a 90-day jail sentence. The trial court denied a stay request, and Appellant has served the sentence. Though the procedure used by the trial court was erroneous, Appellant's appeal, since it only attacks the already served sentence, is, despite the stay request, moot. Appeal dismissed.

Appellant's argument that the trial court failed to consider that the State's case was based on a faulty victim interview was not raised in the trial court. Therefore, all but plain error is waived, and, since the witness interview is not part of the record, plain error has not been demonstrated. Judgment affirmed.

No ineffective counsel where appellant proceeded pro se and had help from standby counsel. Officers properly named as drug-trade experts. No sufficient and competent, credible evidence to support some of appellant's 57 drug convictions. No error in grouping counts on verdict forms. Court erred, in part, in sentencing appellant.

Trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial where the documents submitted by appellant do not on their face demonstrate that appellant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence.

Appellant's claim that his guilty plea to theft was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered lacks merit because, during the plea proceedings, the trial court properly notified Appellant of its authority to impose an additional, consecutive prison term as a judicial sanction for Appellant committing the theft offense while on post-release control. Appellant also failed to establish that the trial court committed plain error by failing to cite on the record the case number for which Appellant was placed on post-release control, and that post-release control was not properly imposed in the prior case. Judgment affirmed.

Juvenile, rape, R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), manifest weight of the evidence, credibility of victim, abuse of discretion, credibility contest, deference to trial court, statements to the investigating officer, plain error, non-custodial interrogation

At the sentencing hearing, trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences. Trial court failed to incorporate findings into judgment. Nunc pro tunc.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering modification of the parties' shared parenting time. The issue of whether Appellant was appropriately found in civil contempt for his failure to pay Appellee her portion of the equity in the marital home is moot because Appellant, in order to purge the contempt finding, has now paid Appellee her portion of the home's equity. The trial court did abuse its discretion by ordering Appellant to equally divide the balance of his 401(k) account without taking into consideration whether the account included any non-marital funds or whether he was entitled to an offset based upon Appellee's withdrawal of funds from her 401(k) account. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing firefighter/EMT to provide lay opinion testimony that passenger's injuries following automobile collision were consistent with her being the passenger, not the driver, of the vehicle. Judgment affirmed.

Following defendant's guilty plea to two counts of vehicular assault, trial court's imposition of consecutive, 15-month prison sentences was not contrary to law where court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Further, any consideration of defendant's intoxication and excessive speed were not prohibited by plea agreement and were based upon the record and the presentence investigation report.

Trial court did not err in sentencing appellant on burglary conviction. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying Appellant's monthly child support obligation to an amount that was above the baseline amount provided in R.C. 3119.04(B). In addition, the trial court was not required to make specific findings on the deviation factors it considered under R.C. 3119.23 when issuing its modification. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant has not established self-defense, and her conviction for domestic violence is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim and appellant had conflicting stories about the events leading to appellant spraying mace at the victim, and neither party's testimony was credible.

The probate court did not err by dismissing Appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court correctly concluded that it had no jurisdiction to address issues relating to the obligations of Appellee Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana to Appellant under his homeowner's insurance policy. Judgment affirmed.

Right to testify firearm specification R.C. 2941.145(A) R.C. 2941.141(A) manifest weight. Although the trial court was not required to advise appellant of his right to testify, the trial court did in fact advise appellant of this right, and appellant waived this right. Appellant's convictions on the one-year and three-year firearm specifications were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Final appealable order R.C. 2505.02 one-subject rule Article II, Section 15(D) of the Ohio Constitution severance. The trial court erred when it severed provisions of S.B. 331 that were not challenged by appellees' one-subject rule challenge. The trial court's judgment entry severing the unchallenged provisions is vacated.

Megan's Law civil manifest weight of the evidence plea agreement. In 1996, the General Assembly enacted Ohio's version of the federal "Megan's Law" legislation, which created a comprehensive registration and classification system for sex offenders. Under Megan's Law, a sentencing court was required to determine whether a sex offender fell into one of three classifications (1) sexually oriented offender, (2) habitual sex offender, or (3) sexual predator. This court reviews these determinations under a civil manifest weight of the evidence standard. This is because a sex offender classification under Megan's Law is considered civil in nature. A plea agreement is generally contractual in nature and subject to contract law standards. Plea agreements should be construed strictly against the government. "When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." State v. Parham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105983, 2018 Ohio 1631, quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971).

Sexually violent predator specifications plain error Ex Post Facto Clause Confrontation Clause allied offenses. The application of the sexually violent offender definition found in R.C. 2971.01, as amended in 2005, to appellant violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. At the time of appellant's offenses, appellant was not eligible for sexually violent predator specifications under the language of R.C. 2971.01 as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 104 Ohio St. 3d 106, 2004-Ohio-6238, 818 N.E.2d 283. The application of the 2005 amended version of R.C. 2971.01 to appellant violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because it enhanced the sentencing penalties available for his previously committed offenses. The Confrontation Clause was not violated when the trial court admitted the skype testimony of a noncitizen witness who was unavailable due to deportation. The trial court erred in failing to merge appellant's kidnapping and rape offenses as allied offenses where the asportation of the victim was slight.

Trial court's determination that appellants did not establish that a novation occurred in this case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court correctly determined that the defendant-appellee did not breach her contract with the plaintiff-appellant. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by sentencing the defendant-appellant to 60 months in prison because the sentence is within the permissible statutory range, the trial court properly considered the criteria found in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and his sentence is not otherwise contrary to law.

forum non conveniens, venue

selling, R.C. 519.21, cultivation, zoning exemption, manifest weight, viticulture

post-release control, R.C. 2967.28, mootness, restitution, Crim.R. 32(C)

CIVIL - divorce medical records physician-patient privilege discovery abuse of discretion R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e) seeking custody places mental and physical condition at issue spousal support R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(c) mental condition of parties shall be considered in determining spousal support

CIVIL - motion to vacate jurisdiction service void voidable Civ.R. 5 summons cross-claim procedural deficiency

CRIMINAL LAW - Felony sentencing felony OVI R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) appellate standard of review contrary to law sentence clearly and convincingly not supported by record repeated failure to abide by condition of community control.

CIVIL - wrongful death summary judgment expert report ultimate issue Evid.R. 704 common knowledge of the jury speculative Evid.R. 702 inadmissible political subdivision school district employees exception to statutory immunity malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - Mandamus issues previously raised are barred by res judicata.

APPELLATE REVIEW - misdemeanor conviction voluntarily satisfied sentence did not seek stay of execution did not suffer collateral disability or loss of civil rights appeal is moot.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal reason does not justify delay of over three years before filing appeal.

POST CONVICTION RELIEF - R.C. 2903.02(B) murder post conviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) a petition for post conviction relief must be filed no later than 365 days from the date the trial transcript was filed in the court of appeals res judicata.

Bond of $1 million with no 10% security deposit not excessive where petitioner is being retried after being convicted of 27 serious sexual offenses. Given that first jury was convinced of petitioner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and trial court already evidenced intent to incarcerate petitioner for life if he is found guilty a second time, incentive to abscond is great, therefore, justifying substantial increase in bond. Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.

The probate court made proper findings of facts and conclusions of law where this court was able to make a meaningful review of the court's decision. The probate court properly considered the superintendence rules as aiding its analysis of the issues, but the rules do not carry the force of law or provide a means for reversal on appeal

The juvenile court erred by adjudicating appellant a delinquent child for having committed an act that if charged as an adult would constitute inducing panic as a second-degree felony rather than as a first-degree misdemeanor where the state provided no evidence that appellant's threat caused the evacuation of any school or institution of higher education.

The trial court did not err by granting appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) upon finding appellant's claims alleging fraud and wrongful execution was an impermissible collateral attack on a foreign judgment initiated through a separate lawsuit rather than through proceedings regarding the domestication of the foreign judgment.

A defendant appeals from his convictions for multiple burglary and attempted burglary offenses. The evidence submitted was sufficient to establish the defendant's identity and that he took a substantial step towards burglarizing several homes.

Voluntary manslaughter jury instruction that begins with "the defendant claims that at the time of the offense" did not identify the defendant as the party who requested the instruction and did not indicate in any respect that the instruction was requested by the defendant. Lead detective's testimony as to whether the defendant was truthful and made sense during his interview did not relate to the defendant's truthfulness but to whether the defendant's statements were consistent with the evidence uncovered by the police investigation. The trial court did not err in not merging the offenses of murder and improperly discharging a firearm into a habitation at sentencing where the offenses involved separate victims, and each offense caused a "separate, identifiable harm."

Trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where it made the requisite findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and those findings were memorialized in its journal entry.

Suppression of evidence Crim.R. 29 judgment of acquittal sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence authentication of evidence Evid.R. 901 refresh recollection withdrawal of counsel reopen case Evid.R. 803 excited utterance R.C. 2945.10 order of trial proceedings plain error Evid.R. 404(B) other acts evidence merged counts R.C. 2941.25. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence to establish the elements of the crimes and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Merged counts are not convictions under R.C. 2941.25 and need not be reviewed for sufficiency because any error would be harmless. Appellant's motion to suppress his confession was properly denied. Appellant was Mirandized and there is no evidence that appellant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The authentication of prison letters and telephone calls under Evid.R. 901 was sufficient. The videotape of a witness's original statement to police should not have been used to refresh the witness's recollection under Evid.R. 612 but was harmless error in light of the presumption that the trial court considered only admissible evidence during the bench trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the withdrawal of cocounsel. No conflict of interest existed and a disagreement with cocounsel's strategy did not jeopardize appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Deviation from the order of proceedings under R.C. 2945.10 is within the sound discretion of the trial court. The demeanor of the distraught witness and the statement "my son" at the scene shortly after the shooting qualified as an excited utterance under Evid.R. 803(2). The testimony that police had not determined whether shots fired into the residence of appellant's girlfriend several days after the shooting was connected with appellant did not constitute other acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) and did not rise to the level of plain error.

Ineffective assistance of counsel guilty plea prejudice bill of particulars defective indictment prison term statutory range cruel and unusual punishment. By pleading guilty, a defendant waives his or her claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant does not claim the guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Moreover, by pleading guilty, a defendant waives the right to challenge an indictment as defective. A defendant does not show prejudice where counsel failed to demand a bill of particulars when the record reflects that the state filed a bill of particulars as part of initial discovery responses. A defendant's claim that his or her prison sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment fails where the defendant does not challenge an individual sentence as being outside of the terms of a valid statute and only complains about the aggregate prison sentence.

Consecutive Sentencing - Forfeiture - Court Costs

Guilty plea presentence motion to withdraw pro se abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Powell's pro se presentence motion to withdraw where the record demonstrates Powell was represented by competent counsel, he provided no evidentiary support for claims asserted in the motion, and he failed to rebut the presumption that his plea was knowing and voluntary.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentences R.C. 2953.08. The sentences are affirmed because the trial court did not err in failing to provide reasons in support of the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings that were incorporated into the final sentencing entry in the relevant case. In addition, the lack of a criminal history does not preclude the imposition of consecutive sentences when the alternative findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(b) are made and supported by the record.

The trial court did not err in convicting defendant of aggravated robbery and felony murder or in sentencing defendant to an aggregate sentence of 18 years to life imprisonment.

Trial court erred in holding appellants' declaratory judgment action was an improper attempt to circumvent a special statutory proceeding trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellants' claim for tortious interference.

Consumer's application for enforcement of an arbitration award pursuant to R.C. 2711.09 constitutes an "action" under R.C. 1345.09(D) of the Consumer Sales Practices Act and triggers the 30-day time period in R.C. 1345.092(A) for supplier to offer a statutory "cure" under the act. Based on the cure offer, supplier's motion to modify arbitrator's treble damages and attorney fees award was proper in R.C. 2711.09 action. Trial court should have modified the arbitration award to comply with the law as expressed under the CSPA, R.C. 1345.092(G), and pursuant to R.C. 2711.11(A) of the arbitration statute. Common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in denying supplier's motion for a hearing on its Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Judgment overruled in part and affirmed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with de novo appellate review.

Trial court erred in denying appellant's successive petition for postconviction relief, without a hearing, because the trial court's decision shows that it did not consider one of the affidavits submitted in support of appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and because the affidavits submitted with the petition, if believed, arguably support a finding that appellant was unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts on which his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel relies and that, but for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, no reasonable jury could have found appellant guilty of the offenses. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for the trial court to consider all the evidence submitted in support of the petition and to re-determine whether appellant is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his petition.

RES JUDICATA – CLAIM PRECLUSION – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL – STANDING: Where the city sued defendant company, which provided advertising benches in the city's rights-of-way, the trial court did not err in entering a judgment in favor of the city that ordered defendant to pay fines, penalties and costs for 55 violations of the city's municipal code, upheld 75 additional violations, and denied defendant's counterclaims, because all of defendant's claims were adjudicated against it in a prior case between the parties or could have been raised in the prior case, and defendant's asserted injury due to alleged violations of defendant's constitutional rights could not be redressed because it had not otherwise complied with the requirements of the city's municipal code.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – NEGLIGENCE – EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORT – R.C. 2745.01: Where plaintiff employee suffered a severe hand injury when a coworker activated a mixing machine, the trial court erred in dismissing under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) the employee's negligent-inspection claim against two companies hired by the employer to inspect the machine and to ensure that it had the required guards where the employee alleged in his complaint that his employer had a duty to ensure the safety of the equipment at his workplace, the employer had contracted that duty away to the companies, and the companies had failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the machine. The trial court erred in dismissing under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) the employee's R.C. 2745.01 intentional-tort claim against his employer, because the allegations that the employer had actual knowledge that barrier guards were required for the mixing machine, the employer had removed barrier guards from the mixing machine, and, despite the danger, had required the employee to operate the mixing machine without the guards, stated a claim for relief with sufficient particularity to satisfy the heightened pleading standard set forth in Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1998), and its progeny.

INSURANCE – ATTORNEY FEES: Because the duty to defend is significantly broader than the duty to indemnify, the trial court did not err when it determined that third-party defendant insurance company had a duty to defend its insured against a public-nuisance lawsuit, which alleged property damage as a result of the insured's negligence and sought an injunction ordering the insured to immediately restore the damaged property: although the complaint did not specifically request compensatory damages, it was still a "suit for damages" under the insurance policy where, due to the nature of the damages and the immediate need for repair, the complaint demanded that the insured expend money to immediately restore the damaged property. Attorney fees are recoverable where an insurance company wrongfully refuses to defend an action however, the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees for the insured's consultation with a criminal defense firm where the insurance policy specifically excluded coverage for damages caused by an insured's criminal acts. The trial court did not err in declaring that an exclusion contained in the commercial general-liability insurance policy, which excluded coverage for property damage to a part of any property that must be repaired because the insured's work was incorrectly performed on it, did not apply to preclude coverage where the insured was not seeking coverage for property damage to property that was a part of the insured's contracted work, but instead was seeking coverage for damage done to property belonging to third parties.

NEW TRIAL–APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: The common pleas court abused its discretion in overruling without an evidentiary hearing that part of defendant's Crim.R. 33(A)(2) and (A)(6) motion seeking a new trial on Brady and actual-innocence grounds, but not the part of the motion seeking a new trial on ineffective-counsel grounds: Crim.R. 33 contemplates a hearing, the nature of which is discretionary with the court the court could not, consistent with Calhoun, have decided the actual-innocence claim in a "paper hearing" and the new-trial motion, on its face, demonstrated substantive grounds for relief on the Brady and actual-innocence claims, but not on the ineffective-counsel claim. In the appeal from the common pleas court's judgment overruling on the merits defendant's Crim.R. 33(A)(2) and (A)(6) motion for a new trial, App.R. 3(C) precluded the state from arguing in defense of that judgment that the grounds for relief presented in the motion were time-barred under Crim.R. 33(B), because the common pleas court had granted defendant's Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file the new-trial motion, and the state did not, as App.R. 3(C)(1) required, file a cross-appeal.

ADOPTION: In resolving stepfather's petition to adopt children without the consent of their natural father, the probate court properly weighed father's minimal efforts to reestablish contact with his children as well as mother's limited actions to interfere or discourage that contact therefore, the probate court did not lose its way in making the determination that father's failure to contact the children, over the course of the whole statutory look-back period, was not excused by justifiable cause.

R.C. 3107.07, consent to adoption not required, failure to pay maintenance and support

adjudication – abuse – dependent – manifest weight – endangered

permanent custody, manifest weight of the evidence, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e), six-month extension of temporary custody, significant progress, prejudice

land contracts – null and void – breach of contract – unjust enrichment – affirmative defenses –

Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-16(B)(14) – rules of statutory interpretation apply to administrative rules – last-antecedent rule – Ohio Consumer's Sales Practices Act (CSPA) – R.C. 1345.09 – magistrate's decision – damages hearing – sufficiency of the damages evidence – measure of actual economic damages in CSPA claims – election of remedies – benefit of the bargain – expectancy damages – rescission – reliance damages – economic damages – treble damages – noneconomic damages – intentional or malicious conduct – attorney's fees – knowingly commit a CSPA violation – court costs – offer to cure

denial of petition for postconviction relief

P.C. - Transfer to Another County Not Warranted When No Evidence of Residence in Other County & Disruption of Child's Foster Placement

The trial court did not err by denying the petitioner-appellant's successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21 and R.C. 2953.23. Even though the petition relied upon recently obtained evidence from discovery proceedings in federal court, the petitioner-appellant failed to demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which the claims for relief relied, or that the evidence demonstrated the requisite constitutional error under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court to hear his petition.

Trial court did not have continuing jurisdiction to hear and determine appellant's motion to correct jail-time credit because appellant did not meet his burden under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii).

The decision and order of the Board of Tax Appeals is affirmed. Applying the commercial-activity tax to a Georgia corporation's gross receipts from the sale of tangible personal property delivered to Ohio distribution centers did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

Judgment reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, considering the totality of the circumstances—including evidence of appellees' actual knowledge of the danger and prior similar occurrences—appellants' have created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellees were on notice that harm was foreseeable, and that appellees knew, or should have known, that there was a substantial risk of harm to its patrons. Based on the record and the controlling authority on these issues, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Relator's petition for a writ of mandamus is sua sponte dismissed for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2969.25. Respondent's motion to dismiss held moot, and relator is ordered to pay cost.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – DUE PROCESS – MIRANDA – SELF-INCRIMINATION – COUNSEL – EXPERT WITNESS – EVIDENCE – ALLIED OFFENSES – R.C. 2941.25: Where the record demonstrates that the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, limited references to his post-Miranda silence did not violate defendant's right to due process or his right to remain silent. [But see DISSENT: The state violated defendant's right against self-incrimination when it used defendant's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt, and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the evidence of defendant's guilt was not overwhelming.] Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of defendant's girlfriend's apartment where none of the evidence seized was consequential to the material issues at trial. Any prejudice defendant suffered due to the state's failure to correct testimony from a forensic expert about gunshot stippling on the shooting victim, who may have been wearing a sweatshirt about which the expert was unaware and which would have affected the expert's opinion, was cured when defense counsel addressed the issue with the witness during cross-examination. Because the murder of one victim and the felonious assault of another victim were the sole aggravating harms in the aggravated-burglary and aggravated-robbery counts related to each victim, the three offenses related to each victim were allied offenses of similar import. Aggravated-burglary counts that have as their aggravating factors the physical harm of different victims are not allied offenses of similar import, because the harms are separate and identifiable. An aggravated-burglary count predicated on defendant's possession of a firearm is not an allied offense of similar import to an aggravated-burglary count relating to the same breaking and entering but aggravated by physical harm to a victim, because the harms are separate and identifiable.

CONTRACTS – POOLING SERVICES AGREEMENT – DUTIES OF TRUSTEE – DAMAGES – STANDING: Under New York law, where a pooling services agreement states that, prior to an event of default, the duties and obligations of the trustee shall be determined solely by the express provisions of the agreement, the trustee has no implied duties. Prior to an event of default, the trustee's duties were limited to those specifically set out by the pooling services agreement and the trustee had no implied duty to supervise or enforce the duties of other parties to the agreement. General allegations of a breach of a representation or warranty are insufficient to provide notice to a trustee: a trustee only discovers the breach of a representation or warranty upon actual knowledge of a violation of a specific breach as to a specific loan. Sampling is an inappropriate way to establish breaches of representations and warranties, because breaches must be loan-specific and sampling does not show loans with material breaches. Where the pooling services agreement required notice to be provided to the master servicer to trigger an event of default, and no notice was provided, there was no event of default. Where the pooling services agreement required notice to the trustee for the trustee's duties to be elevated to those of a prudent person under the circumstances, and no notice was given, the trustee's duties were not elevated. Plaintiffs were not entitled to damages where no breach of contract was established. Under New York or Ohio law, once a holder of certificates transfers them, it loses standing to bring claims arising out of the certificates.

R.C. 2151.414/Permanent custody/Clear and convincing evidence/Best interest

Because appellant failed to file a direct appeal of the trial court's order overruling his "motion for relief of post-release control," his claim regarding the violation of his double jeopardy rights is barred by res judicata. Nevertheless, the trial court did not err when it imposed a prison sentence and a term of post-release control on appellant after he violated his community control. Both the initial prison sentence and the term of post-release control were part of appellant's original sentence. Accordingly, the trial court did not violate Brown's right to be free from double jeopardy. Judgment affirmed.

Gearhardt was entitled to a hearing on his "Application for Sealing of Conviction and Arrest," pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(B). The State concedes that the trial court erred in denying his application without a hearing. Reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err in confirming an arbitration award entered in favor of a labor union. The award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement because it did not conflict with the agreement's express terms and was rationally supported by the agreement. The parties agreed to assign a specific task to a particular job classification, and there was also a past practice of having only employees in that job classification perform the task. This past practice was unequivocal, was clearly enunciated, and was followed for a reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both parties. It, therefore, was binding on the parties. Even if the past practice had not been binding, the collective bargaining agreement specifically required past practices or precedent to be considered in interpreting the agreement. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in confirming and refusing to vacate an arbitration award in favor of union and against transit authority with regard to transit authority's practice of contracting outside entities to provide a portion of transportation services mandated for individuals with disabilities. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority by interpreting the applicable collective bargaining agreement as prohibiting transit authority from subcontracting driving duties normally performed by union bus operators. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in finding that the defendant clearly and unambiguously invoked her right to counsel during a police interview and in suppressing the defendant's subsequent statements to police on that basis. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. (Froelich, J., dissenting.)

Appellant, following his admission that he violated several community control sanction conditions, was ordered to serve a second six-month jail term. A stay was not requested and the jail term has been served. Though the trial court was without authority to impose a second six-month jail term, Appellant's appeal, since it attacks only the already served jail term, is moot. Appeal dismissed.

Trial court did not err by failing to conduct a hearing before denying defendant's post-appeal motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Trial court lacked jurisdiction to permit defendant to withdraw his guilty pleas after the court of appeals had affirmed defendant's conviction. In addition, the undisputed facts establish that the search warrant on defendant's residence was timely executed, thereby negating defendant's claim that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise defendant of a possible defense based on an untimely search. Finally, defendant's reply memorandum in the trial court affirmatively waived a hearing on his motion to withdraw. Under such circumstances, trial court was not required to hold a hearing on defendant's motion. Judgment affirmed.

The record supports the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's vehicle was lawfully towed based upon a standardized police department policy. The record further supports the trial court's conclusion that in all respects the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a standardized, routine policy and that the officer's conduct conformed to the policy. Finally, the record does not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Following the revocation of his community control and the imposition of a three-year prison term, defendant claimed that the trial court's original imposition of community control was void, rendering the imposition of the three-year prison sentence void. Defendant's appeal is not moot, even though he has served the three-year sentence, because he is on post-release control. Defendant's original community control sentence and his three-year sentence upon revocation were not void. Defendant's claims are barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the appellant, a prison inmate, had failed to establish that public records he requested were "necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim," as required by R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Judgment affirmed.

CIVIL - relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) res judicata

CRIMINAL LAW - assault convictions for tempering wih evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), and tampering with records, R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) were based on insufficient evidence since the state provided no evidence of the requisite mens rea.

JUVENILE - neglected child R.C. 2151.03(A) dependent child R.C. 2151.04(A), (B), and (C) standing to file complaint Juv.R. 10(A) R.C. 2151.27(A)(1) final order objections Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d) continuance Juv.R. 23 reasonable efforts to prevent removal R.C. 2151.419(B)(1) adequate parental care

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL - standing R.C. 2506.04 adjoining landowners who were not parties to the appeal to the trial court do not have standing to appeal from trial court's decision to the court of appeals.

CIVIL - failure by appellants in a construction dispute to post a supersedeas bond renders the appeal moot when construction has commenced.

ONTRACTS - construction contract the record supports the trial court's judgment that plintiff contractor wa owed money.

CIVIL - denial of judgment on the pleadings final appealable order R.C. 2744.02(C) statutory immunity employee of political subdivision school district malicious purpose, in bad faith, wanton or reckless negligence exceptions to immunity individual capacity official capacity R.C. 2744.02(B) R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).

CRIMINAL - Fourth Amendment warrantless search motion to suppress reasonable suspicion citizen informant

CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL - it is reversible error for a trial court to fail to inform a defendant that he or she is waiving the right to jury trial when accepting a plea.

CIVIL - debt decedent's estate summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) claim against estate R.C. 2117.06 executors and administrators R.C. 2113.15 due process property interest nonclaim statute self-executing

Under a plain error standard of review, a bill of particulars identifying a predicate offense (felonious assault) to support the indicted offense (felony murder) cured an otherwise defective indictment that failed to include any predicate offense.

Prison sentence for fourth-degree felony properly imposed. Trial court complied with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

No trial court error when it imposed consecutive sentences on appellant for separate felony convictions. Judgment affirmed. Felonious assault, aggravated murder, consecutive sentences

Trial court erred in finding the Declaration of Restrictions was ambiguous. Summary judgment reversed.

Appellant's conviction for fourth-degree receiving stolen property must be reduced to a misdemeanor of the first degree where the jury verdict form did not include the level of the offense or a statement recognizing the presence of aggravating elements. Trial court's imposition of one-year and three-year firearm specifications relative to the same felony is contrary to law.

Summary judgment appropriate where no evidentiary material supports non-movant's cause of action for prescriptive easement because no 21-year period demonstrated.

Administrative license suspension appeal. BMV must present prima facie evidence of compliance with R.C. 4511.192.

Probate court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a guardian for the ward.

Where appellant actively participated in arbitration proceedings, the court did not err in confirming the award and denying appellant's motion to vacate. R.C. 2711.02(D) R.C. 2711.02(B) jurisdiction.

Debtor's argument that municipal court lacked jurisdiction under R.C. 1925.02(A)(2)(a)(ii) not well-taken where action was not brought in small-claims court. Summary-judgment in favor of purported assignee of account not proper where it failed to establish that account was validly assigned to it and failed to establish elements necessary to action on an account.

Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct for failure to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary, failure to uphold and apply the law and to perform all duties of the judicial office fairly and impartially, and engaging in ex parte communications—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension.

Confrontation Clause—testimonial hearsay—excited utterance—sufficiency—manifest weight—ineffective assistance

civil stalking protection order, R.C. 2903.214, R.C. 2903.211, pattern of conduct

motion for protective order – in camera inspection – motion to compel - interrogatories – peer review privilege – R.C. 2503.252

forfeiture, plain error, Crim.R. 52(B), sentencing, pre-sentence investigation report, indictment, victim impact statement

Defendant-appellant's driving-under-OVI-suspension convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Juvenile did not rebut inference that stop sign was compliant with Ohio law with any actual evidence.

The trial court did not err in admitting into evidence recorded interviews the victims made to appellant's trial counsel, as the recordings were relevant and necessary to explain the events surrounding the victims' recantations. Admission of the evidence did not violate appellant's constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution or his rights under Crim.R. 16. Furthermore, appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit where appellant failed to show that certain jurors were actually biased against him or were in need of being rehabilitated before being seated on the jury

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to represent himself. Trial court did not err in failing to engage in a detailed inquiry regarding the nature and extent of defense counsel's potential conflict of interest.

The trial court did not err in classifying appellant a sexual predator under Megan's law where the state presented clear and convincing evidence that appellant had been convicted of committing a sexually-oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses.

Accelerated calendar judgment entry.

An executrix appeals from the probate court's decision finding her transfer of estate property fraudulent. Competent and credible evidence supported the probate court's finding that the executrix intended to fraudulently convey the estate property to settle a personal debt. The probate court abused its discretion in failing to remove the executrix and appoint a successor fiduciary. The matter was remanded for appointment of a successor fiduciary.

Appellees are entitled to summary judgment because appellant released appellees' liability by signing a release of any risk associated with the use of appellees' facilities, which included the massage chair that collapsed with appellant causing her injuries.

Due process/equal protection/appointment of counsel

Due process/Equal protection/Appointment of counsel

Evid.R. 404(B)/other-acts evidence CrimR. 52(A)/harmless error. The state's introduction of appellant's prior theft did not meet the Evid.R. 404(B) exceptions for admission of prior acts and was harmful and prejudicial to appellant.

R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 purposes and principles of felony sentencing seriousness and recidivism factors. The defendant's 15-year sentence for various felony offenses was not contrary to law under R.C. 2953.08 where the trial court, in imposing the sentence, considered the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12 in determining the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11

Record on appeal transcript. The appellant has the duty to file the transcript or such parts of the transcript that are necessary for evaluating the trial court's decision. Failure to file the transcript prevents an appellate court from reviewing an appellant's assigned errors. Thus, absent a transcript or alternative record under App.R. 9(C) or (D), this court must presume regularity in the proceedings below.

Concurrent sentences separate crimes. The Ohio Supreme Court has held: A defendant has no constitutional right to concurrent sentences for two separate crimes involving separate acts. Additionally, if the sentence for a particular offense is not disproportionately long, it does not become so merely because it is consecutive to another sentence for a separate offense or because the consecutive sentences are lengthy in aggregate. Upon review, we find that the individual sentences imposed in Dukes's three separate cases are all within the statutory range. In addition, the sentences imposed were not disproportionate to Dukes's conduct, especially as it relates to the attempted felonious assault conviction. As a result, the complained-of sentences are not greatly disproportionate to the offenses as to shock the sense of justice of the community.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Appellant argues that the trial court failed to make the findings required for the imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), in order to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must find that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender, that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and that at least one of the following also applies: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct. (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. Because the trial court failed to make all the findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the imposition of consecutive sentences was contrary to law and must be vacated

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12/sentencing consecutive sentences merger of counts. The trial court found numerous reasons to justify a prison sentence for appellant and further made specific findings for the purpose of consecutive sentences. Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law. The harm caused by appellant's breaking and entering and theft of the company's computer equipment was dissimilar. The trial court's failure to merge the two counts was not error.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) breach contract fiduciary duty condominium bylaws and declarations negligent and wanton misconduct declaratory judgment. The trial court's judgment granting summary judgment to the condominium association is affirmed. Plaintiff did not meet her burden of establishing that genuine issues of material fact remain regarding her claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent and wanton misconduct, and declaratory judgment. The clear and unambiguous terms of the association's declaration and bylaws established that plaintiff was responsible for the maintenance and repair of her heating and cooling system. There was no evidence that the association acted negligently or in a wanton manner, nor was there any evidence that the association breached a duty to plaintiff. Further, plaintiff did not present any evidence that the declaration and bylaws were unreasonable.

Petition to return property, summary judgment, lack of jurisdiction. Trial court properly granted summary judgment after it found it lacked jurisdiction over the petition for return of property as the property that the petitioner sought was in the possession and control of the federal, not the state, government.

Crim.R. 11 knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea nonconstitutional notifications restitution merger consecutive sentences contrary to law typographical error journal entry. Where a trial court imposes an appropriate sentence in open court at the sentencing hearing, it may correct a typographical error with a nunc pro tunc entry so that the sentencing entry reflects that sentence imposed at the hearing. R.C. 2929.12 factors are not part of the consecutive sentences analysis. A trial court may not order a defendant to pay restitution for economic loss for an amount that is not supported by the record. A guilty plea does not violate Crim.R. 11 where the defendant claims the prosecutor stated that counts should merge during negotiations but argues against merger at sentencing. Crim.R. 11 does not require the trial court to determine restitution at the time of a guilty plea. Moreover, a defendant, by agreeing to pay restitution to one victim, does not prevent the trial court from requiring him or her to pay restitution to another victim.

Motion to enforce settlement agreement valid contract. The recorded telephone conversations submitted as evidence failed to establish that there was a meeting of the minds therefore no valid contract was formed, and appellant never executed a release. It was error for the trial court to grant appellee's motion to enforce the settlement agreement.

Workers' compensation—Permanent total disability—R.C. 4123.53(A)—Industrial commission may order additional medical examination of claimant when commission identifies why another examination is necessary or would be helpful, and claim is suspended until claimant submits to exam—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ affirmed.

CIVIL - Trial court erred in part as Citibank failed to establish that Appellant assented to any explicitly set forth interest rate over the statutory limit and we remaned. All other assignments of error are overruled.

JUVENILE - Trial court did not comply with procedural protections to ensure parent facing termination of parental rights received adequate notice of the permanent custody hearing and erred.

CRIMINAL - Trial court did not err in denying Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing and his conviction is not null and void.

CRIMINAL - Because Appellant's sentences for felonious assault, aggravated burglary, and violation of a protection order are void in part, we remand for re-sentencing.

CRIMINAL - No error occurred in the trial court as to Appellant's conviction for complicity to tampering with evidence as to his Crim.R. 29 Motion, subject-matter jurisdiction or admission of evidence.

Trial court's decision did not constitute a final appealable order.

Public records. On respondent's objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the court sustained respondent's second objection wherein the respondent claimed the special master improperly ordered respondent to compile a summary of medical records that were privileged. The court did not enter a ruling on respondent's first, third, and fourth objections. The court modified the report and recommendation, and adopted, as modified, the report and recommendation.

Public records. On respondent's objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the court determined that the special master applied an incorrect standard of proof relative to a claim of attorney-client privilege. The court did not adopt the special master's recommendation for partial production of certain documents because, based on the court's review of the disputed documents, the court concluded that the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege. The court determined that, as a matter of equity, the circumstances of the case warranted the assessment of court costs against the requester. The court modified and adopted the special master's report and recommendation.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 R.C. 149.433 infrastructure security video format investigatory undercover. Overview: Requester sought a copy of security camera video of a shooting incident outside the Jefferson County Courthouse. Respondent asserted that the entire recording was both a security record and an infrastructure record, and that release of portions of the video would endanger the life or safety of law enforcement personnel and witnesses. The special master found that none of the video content met the definition of an infrastructure or security record, and that respondent failed to show that release of any portion of the video could endanger the life or safety of any law enforcement personnel or witness. The special master further found that the video must be exported, at requester's choice, in any video format available in the agency's software. The special master further found that respondent may redact photographs of any peace officers who hold a position or have an assignment that may include undercover or plain clothes positions or assignments.

Public records. On review of a special master's report and recommendation, the court found an error of law was evident on the face of the report and recommendation because the special master applied a clear-and-convincing standard of proof in determining that a respondent failed to prove certain exceptions. Since the special master concluded that the requester's requests were for either non-records, or for records that did not exist, the court adopted the report and recommendation, excepting the special master's application of a clear-and-convincing standard of proof. The court modified the report and recommendation, and adopted, as modified, the report and recommendation.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 moot filing fee damages. Overview: Requester sought records related to a job position within respondent agency. Respondent initially denied records pertaining to interview questions and responses, but provided the records during litigation. Requester sought recovery of his filing fee, lost wages, parking fees, mileage, and statutory damages. The special master found that the only claim in the complaint was moot and requester had not established eligibility for recovery of his filing fee, costs associated with the action, or other award. Neither party filed objections. Outcome: The court found no error of law or other defect on the face of the special master's decision and adopted the report and recommendation as its own.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 moot filing fee damages. Overview: Requester sought records related to a job position within respondent agency. Respondent initially denied records pertaining to interview questions and responses, but provided the records during litigation. Requester sought recovery of his filing fee, lost wages, parking fees, mileage, and statutory damages. The special master found that the only claim in the complaint was moot and requester had not established eligibility for recovery of his filing fee, costs associated with the action, or other award.

Traffic Stop Failure to Display Rear Plate

Speeding Citation Failure to Appear

Reallocation of Parental Rights Change of Circumstances

Search pursuant to consent fabrication of vehicle

Forcible entry detainer Res judicata

Manifest weight - Aggrevated possession of drugs

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – RIGHT TO COUNSEL: In a permanent-custody case, where a guardian ad litem had been appointed for mother, and where mother had informed the magistrate that she had retained new counsel, the magistrate erred in finding that mother had waived her right to counsel without engaging in an inquiry to determine whether mother was in fact competent to do so and whether mother was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving that right, either expressly or by inference.

The Board of Tax Appeals did not err in reinstating the county auditor's valuations for the subject properties because appellant failed to prove lower values and no other competent and probative evidence in the record enabled the BTA to independently determine the values of those properties. Decision affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting OSU's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for Alford's failure to file the required affidavit of merit.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to permit late filing or delayed appeal and in dismissing appellant's appeal. Appellant did not identify the appellee in its first submitted notice of appeal from the agency's order, and its second notice of appeal identifying the appellee was untimely. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's failure to file timely objections to the trial court's adoption of a magistrate's ruling on a civil stalking protection order required dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G) and K.R. v. T.B., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-302, 2017-Ohio-8647. Appeal dismissed.

R.C. 4510.11(A) pro se cross-examination is not testimonial in nature a certified LEADS report is a self-authenticating public record.

R.C. 5301.56 notice requirements due diligence for notice by publication claims to preserve Dormant Mineral Act Marketable Title Act exception within root of title denial of motion for summary judgment

Dormant Mineral Act Marketable Title Act root of title deed reservation or exception within the root of title conclusive presumption of abandonment

Right to confront witnesses plea entered knowingly rights explained in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant plea hearing colloquy

Merger by deed laches waiver by estoppel

R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) silent record rebuttible resumption

Application for reconsideration App.R. 26 summary judgment no obvious error.

R.C. 2947.59(A)(1)(a) R.C. 2947.39 (C) R.C. 2929.19 (B)(2)(f)

Habeas res judicata new evidence alternative legal remedy.

Marketable Title Act Dormant Mineral Act reservation within root of title due diligence for service by publication notice requirements of R.C. 5301.56 conclusive presumption of abandonment adverse possession of severed mineral interests

R.C. 2744.03, immunity, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, recklessness, Civ.R. 52

medical malpractice, Civ.R. 50(B), judgment notwithstanding the verdict, contributory negligence, standard of care, proximate cause, Civ.R. 59, jury instructions, jury interrogatories, Civ.R. 49(B)

permanent custody, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), reversible error, best interest

jurisdictional priority

motion to dismiss – personal jurisdiction – Civ.R. 12(B)(2) – long-arm statute – R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and (A)(6) – transacting business – Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) and (A)(9) – due process – purposeful availment – arising from – reasonableness – out-of-state attorney and law firm representing out-of-state party – negotiating loan transaction and drafting documents for a loan between a Nevada resident and an Ohio corporation – opinion letter – false statements – intentionally directed to Ohio resident

motion to suppress – protective search – armed and dangerous – reasonable suspicion – findings of fact – competent, credible evidence – incomplete findings

automobile accident – negligence – default judgment – damages hearing – insurer – subrogation rights – aggrieved party – right to appeal – standing

Workers' compensation—R.C. 4123.61—Calculation of average weekly wage—Industrial Commission did not abuse discretion in concluding res judicata barred claimant's motion to recalculate average weekly wage—court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

jail-time credit, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g), illegal sentence, res judicata

Legal custory to maternal Grandfather and Step-Grandmother

Postconviction relief

Manifest weight, sufficiency

Resentencing - contrary to law argument

Conspiracy to commit trafficking in persons R.C. 2950.01(A)(11)(a) Tier II sex offender plea colloquy Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) advisement of sex offender classification substantial compliance complete failure to comply. Defendant's guilty plea to conspiracy to commit trafficking in persons was void where trial court failed to advise defendant during the plea colloquy that he would be required to register as a sex offender as a consequence of his guilty plea. Trial court's omission of any reference to sexual offender classification at defendant's plea hearing constituted a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11.

Murder aggravated arson motion in limine other acts evidence due process fair trial abuse of discretion Evid.R. 404(B) identity modus operandi harmless error Crim.R. 52(A) sufficiency Crim.R. 29 circumstantial evidence serious physical harm manifest weight hearsay Evid.R. 801 Evid.R. 802 authentication Evid.R. 901 right to confrontation video testimony motion to dismiss speedy trial R.C. 2945.71 tolling R.C. 2945.72 preindictment delay motion for a mistrial Brady violation exculpatory evidence Crim.R. 16 consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2953.08. Appellant's convictions for murder and aggravated arson and the trial court's sentence are affirmed. The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion in limine, and appellant's rights to due process and a fair trial were not violated by the trial court's admission of other acts evidence. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err by admitting evidence that was not properly authenticated or inadmissable hearsay. The trial court did not err in permitting a state's witness to testify remotely, and appellant's constitutional right to confront the state's witness was not violated. The trial court did not err by denying defense counsel's motions to dismiss or motions for a mistrial. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences.

Aggravated murder prior calculation and design gruesome photographs prosecutorial misconduct bad acts. State presented sufficient evidence of purpose to kill with evidence that the suicidal defendant, driving the wrong way on an interstate highway while traveling at maximum speed, swerved into the victim's lane in order to kill himself, knowing that a collision with another vehicle that was severe enough to cause his death would surely cause the death of the driver of the other vehicle. Photographs of the victim in her car immediately after a collision were gruesome, but nevertheless relevant to prove the defendant's intent to kill in that they depicted the force of the collision, thus proving the defendant's intent to kill the victim.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2953.08 contrary to law R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2929.14. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences, and appellant's aggregate five-year prison sentence is not contrary to law.

Sentencing psychiatric report reversible error mental health record mitigation judicial release appointed counsel jurisdiction. The trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to directly reference the defendant's psychiatric report during the sentencing hearing. The trial court did not err in denying Reid's motion for the appointment of counsel to represent him during the judicial release proceedings.

Sufficiency manifest weight consecutive sentences penalty-enhancing specifications firearm specifications felonious assault knowingly credibility convicted felons. There is sufficient evidence to support felonious assault conviction where defendant knowingly caused serious physical harm to the victim by creating the circumstances that led to the victim's foreseeable injury. Defendant's convictions are not against manifest weight of the evidence where victims' testimony was credible even though they were both convicted felons and there was a minor inconsistency between their testimonies. Trial court was not required to make findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive sentences on firearm specifications because firearm specifications are penalty-enhancing provisions rather than criminal offenses and are governed by other sentencing provisions.

Res judicata R.C. 2705.03/contempt hearing. Appellants failed to present issues of the trial court granting appellees' motions for temporary restraining order, show cause hearing, and the award of sanctions in appellants' original appeal. Those issues are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. It was error, however, where the trial court granted appellees' latest motion to reduce sanctions to judgment without conducting a hearing.

Civ.R. 60(B) meritorious defense foreclosure forfeiture R.C. 5721.40 R.C. 5721.37 R.C. 5723.01 final appealable order R.C. 2505.02 tax certificate holder. Appellant failed to establish the existence of a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief was granted, and thus, appellant is not entitled to relief from judgment.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C). The trial court made the requisite findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C) before imposing consecutive sentences. The record contains evidence supporting these findings and is sufficient for this court to conclude that the sentencing court engaged in the required analysis before imposing consecutive sentences.

De novo review of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee municipal corporation affirmed when record shows that municipal corporation's employees exercised discretion for which R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) confers immunity.

Respondent's motion to dismiss relator's mandamus action granted.

Appellant's conviction for murder was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Where there were some clues of intoxication but the totality of the circumstances did not suggest that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while under the influence of marijuana.

Trial court did not err when it granted motion to dismiss.

Trial court's statement regarding rights of current owners of property was not necessary to its holding in judgment granting motion to declare prior foreclosure judgment void. Therefore, statement constituted dictum or an advisory opinion and was not subject to appeal.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for resentencing on the basis of merger. A complete reading of the sentence entry reveals the court merged counts one and two, and only sentence appellant on count one, not count two. Accordingly, appellant's assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.

No objections were filed to the magistrate's decision recommending that the court dismiss relator's complaint for mandamus for lack of compliance with R.C. 2969.25(C). No error of law or other defect is evident on the face of the magistrate's decision. Accordingly, the court adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate's decision and dismisses relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

There being no objection and no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Magistrate's decision, the court adopts the Magistrate's decision recommending this court grant respondent's motion to dismiss relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, to provide him "written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Post-Conviction Transcript of Proceeding of the Evidentiary Hearing relative to the dismissal of his Petition for Relief after Judgment filed in Respondent's Court rendered on June 29, 1994." Complaint for writ of mandamus is dismissed.

The trial court granted Appellant's motion seeking custody of the parties' minor child. The trial court's judgment did not, however, order Appellee to pay child support, with the judgment noting that Appellant could at any time file a motion to establish child support. Since the record includes no information concerning either parties' income, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering Appellee to pay child support, despite the R.C. 3119.06 mandate of at least a $50.00 per month child support order. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for burglary and receiving stolen property were not allied offenses of similar import and therefore not subject to merger. The record supports the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed.

In these permanent custody cases, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the father's motion for a continuance the day of the permanent custody hearing, and trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court also did not err in granting permanent custody of the children to the children services agency. Mother's counsel filed an Anders brief, and after conducting an independent review of the record, we found no issues that are not wholly frivolous. As a final matter, this appellate district will no longer accept Anders briefs in cases involving termination of parental rights. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant-appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated vehicular homicide, aggravated vehicular assault, and improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. Thus, Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to an examination of whether counsel's purported errors prevented him from entering the plea in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary fashion. Appellant has failed to establish that trial counsel's representation was ineffective or that counsel's asserted errors made the plea less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Further, Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law and we cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is not supported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

After conducting an independent review of the record as required by Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), this court finds no issues with arguable merit for appeal. Counsel's potential assignment of error arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert immunity under R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(b) lacks merit because: (1) Appellant is not qualified under the statute to receive said immunity and (2) Appellant's appeal is from the revocation of his community control—the only matter this court has jurisdiction to consider. Appellant cannot collaterally attack his un-appealed conviction through the instant appeal. Although it could be argued that the trial court erred by failing to give its reasons for recommending Appellant's placement in intensive program prison as required by R.C. 2929.19(D), such an error did not result in any prejudice to Appellant. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's judgment awarding permanent custody of the Appellant's child to a children services agency was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, the trial court's determinations that the child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, that an award of permanent custody to the agency was in the child's best interests, and that the agency had made reasonable efforts at reunification were supported by the record, and, thus, not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Absent a trial transcript, the appellant has failed to demonstrate error in his convictions for failure to display license plates in violation of R.C. 4503.21 and driving on a closed highway in violation of R.C. 4511.71. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in awarding Appellees title by adverse possession to a portion of land where the driveway to Appellees' residence is located. Since there is competent, credible evidence in the record establishing that the prior owners of Appellee's residence adversely used the driveway for a period of 22 years, the trial court properly tacked on that period of time for purposes of establishing the 21-year possession element of adverse possession. There is also competent, credible evidence in the record establishing that Appellees sufficiently proved all the other elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court's adverse possession ruling was therefore not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's guilty pleas to aggravated possession of drugs and attempted escape were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, and the trial court did not err in failing to "clear-up" any purported "confusion" on the part of Appellant regarding her pleas. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring in judgment only.)

Anders appeal. No non-frivolous issues for appellate review. There is no arguable merit in challenges to the trial court's denial of a continuance, defense counsel's failure to file a suppression motion and failure to object to evidence of an arrest warrant, or the trial court's imposition of a three-year prison sentence to be served consecutively to another sentence. The appellant's assignments of error related to the alleged admission of "tainted/adulterated evidence" also lack arguable merit. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court abused discretion in granting motion for relief from judgment. Motion should have been analyzed under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), not (B)(5), and denied as untimely because it was filed more than year after trial court's judgment. Trial court abused discretion by refusing to strike answer filed 15 months late, without leave of court or showing of excusable neglect. Summary-judgment decision reversed and remanded for consideration of application of res judicata or two-dismissal rule.

Appellant's convictions for importuning and rape were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where the victim testified in detail about the rapes and the state introduced messages that were sent by appellant to the victim that referenced the sexual conduct and solicited further sexual activity.

Appellant's aggravated burglary, rape, and kidnapping convictions were offenses of dissimilar import because each offense resulted in separate and identifiable harm. Thus, the trial court did not err by failing to merge appellant's convictions.

On petition for reinstatement.

guardianship, nonparty, motion to intervene

self-defense—sufficiency—manifest weight—domestic violence—physical harm

possession of drugs, tampering with evidence, R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), likely investigation, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence

summary judgment – reciprocal burden

summary judgment, right of first refusal, specific performance

summary judgment, R.C. 2307, products liability, R.C. 3715, food and drug act, seller, offer to sell, supplier

TERMINATION PARENTAL RIGHTS - best interest of the children R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors to consider manifest weight of the evidence standard of review trial court did not lose its way.

Conviction for rape was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where defendant engaged in sexual conduct with a person who was substantially impaired, and defendant knew or had reasonable cause to believe she was substantially impaired.

A defendant, convicted of complicity to murder, appeals the court's decision denying his petition for postconviction relief. A defendant did not demonstrate sufficient operative facts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel where the defendant had counsel present during a police interview, lied to the police during the interview, and counsel appropriately advised the defendant to not answer certain questions about his involvement with the offense.

The 90-day maximum prison sentence allowed under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) applies to a defendant serving a community control sanction for one or more felonies of the fifth degree. As a result, the trial court erred by finding that R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) was inapplicable based on the singular form of the term used in the statute.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's child to a children services agency where appellant was then incarcerated serving a four-year prison term and where the child's best interest was served by granting permanent custody to the children services agency due to the uncertainty regarding appellant's illicit drug use, employment, income, and housing following her release from prison.

Although the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment when it concluded that R.C. 5312.13 provided statutory authority for the award of attorney fees for a homeowner's violation of a covenant to pay monthly association fees to a homeowner's association, the trial court nonetheless erred in awarding attorney fees where there remained issues of fact as to whether the services performed by the association's attorneys were necessary to resolve the disputed claims and whether the Association or its attorneys failure to communicate with the homeowner caused additional and unnecessary legal expenses to be expended.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by staying the proceedings pending arbitration. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff-appellant's motion to compel. The trial court did not err by denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for an extension of time to respond to defendants-appellees' motion to stay.

Enforcibility of Arbitration Claues Stay of Proceedings

Because the amount of back pay recoverable has not been established with certainty, Stultz is not entitled to the requested writ of mandamus.

Relator's petition for writ of mandamus is sua sponte dismissed for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2969.25. Respondent's motion to dismiss held moot, and relator ordered to pay costs.

medical malpractice, laparoscopic cholecystectomy, manifest weight, Critical View of Safety, duct

aggravated robbery – waiver of counsel – sufficiency – manifest weight

motion to dismiss, subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, failure of service, insufficiency of service of process, Civ.R. 12

postconviction relief—untimely—irregular motion

Appeal fo restitution order/Whether error to admit testimony of prior conviction

Appeal of termination of visitation

Divorce property issues

Workers' Compensation

On order to show cause.

On certification of default.

Appellant appealed from judgment committing appellant to the Franklin County Alcohol, Drug Abuse , and Mental Health Board for a period not to exceed 90 days and on order authorizing the forced administration of psychotropic medication. This Court recognized the action was not moot. Further, this Court affirmed the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas judgment finding the record contained clear and convincing evidence to support the judgment.

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when it determined that defendants-appellants were not the prevailing parties because both parties were in breach of contract. Competent and credible evidence supported the trial court's determination of damages in favor of plaintiffs-cross appellants. The trial court's determination that defendants-appellants did not prove that they were entitled to advertising costs was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in dismissing or failing that plaintiffs-cross appellants failed to prove their claims of unjust enrichment, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. The damages calculation in favor of the independent contractor work was not in error. Plaintiffs-cross appellants' assertion of error in the trial court's damages award for independent contractor services was not presented to the trial court and may not be heard for the first time on appeal. All assignments of error and cross assignments of error are overruled and the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Material issue of fact existed as to whether appellant established a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. Decision on summary judgment reversed and cause remanded.

De novo review of summary judgment in favor of defendant appellee property owner and defendant appellee architect affirmed when record shows no genuine issues of material fact, including request for admissions deemed admitted, based on failure to timely response to discovery, and viewing admissible evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party.

Writ denied complaint dismissed. The magistrate noted that relator is not entitled to a writ of procedendo in this case for two reasons. First, his complaint seeks to compel the trial court to reach a desired outcome in the case, rather than merely proceed with the matter. Second, relator has subsequently obtained the desired outcome in trial court proceedings and a writ is unnecessary. In the absence of objections, and following our independent review of the matter, we find that the magistrate has properly determined the facts and applied the appropriate law.

Trial court applied incorrect legal standard in determining that contract was not ambiguous because it appeared to have relied on extrinsic evidence beyond the four corners of the contract in assessing whether the terms were ambiguous. Decision reversed and remanded for application of correct standard of law.

Pro se appellants' brief failed to comply substantially with the rules of this Court or the Ohio Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure and failed to set forth intelligible arguments explaining how the trial court may have erred. Appeal sua sponte dismissed.

Denial of motion for leave to file motion for new trial

Petition for writ of procedendo denied because relator failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25.

Sufficiency manifest weight ineffective assistance of counsel cumulative error right to self-representation. The record shows that sufficient evidence was presented to support the convictions for rape and kidnapping the trier of fact was in the best position to determine credibility. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant has failed to show that but for counsel not subpoenaing for translator testimony that the outcome of the trial would have had a different result. Appellant's counsel's representation did not fall below a reasonable standard performance. There were not multiple errors committed at the trial level thus appellant's cumulative error argument fails. Appellant's request to represent himself was untimely, and it was shown that appellant did not fully understand all of the questions asked of him by the trial court. Appellant's right to waive his right to counsel would not have been knowingly and intelligently made.

Ineffective assistance of counsel motion to suppress consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences because it complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and made the requisite consecutive sentence findings.

Plea agreement void lack of capacity. Because the appellant was deemed incompetent to stand trial, he lacked the capacity to enter into a plea agreement with the state, rendering the original agreement void.

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) right to counsel potential conflict of interest Crim.R. 11 guilty plea motion to withdraw guilty plea ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was not denied his right to counsel because the trial court obtained a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of the potential conflict of interest regarding appellant's trial counsel's representation. Appellant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's oral motion to withdraw his plea. Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.

Res judicata jail-time credit motion to withdraw no contest plea. The trial court's judgment reinstating defendant's original sentence was affirmed. Defendant's arguments regarding the voluntariness of his plea, his sentence, and jail-time credit were barred by res judicata. Defendant's argument regarding his motion to withdraw his plea was sustained because the trial court never considered this motion. Case remanded for the trial court to consider the merits of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.

Crim.R. 11(F) guilty plea plea agreements ineffective assistance of counsel. Crim.R. 11(F) was not violated because, at the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor and appellant's counsel both outlined their understanding of the plea agreement. Appellant's counsel was not ineffective because he successfully negotiated a plea agreement.

Real property personal property membership interest stock arm's length transaction sale of real property ad valorem taxation limited warranty deed sale and purchase agreement. Board of Tax Appeals properly determined that sale of the membership in a limited liability company coupled with simultaneous transfer of real property and nothing else was a sale and transfer of real property in an arm's length transaction for the purposes of ad valorem taxation. Since an actual, recent sale of real property in an arm's length transaction is the best evidence of the property's true value, an appraisal was not necessary to establish the property's value.

Motion to compel arbitration contract contractual capacity ratification R.C. 2711.02. The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The record reflects that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed because it had been ratified by appellant's guardian.

Administration appeal CMHA voucher program participant compliance. It was not error for the trial court to consider the entire record that included documentation that was not included in the administrative record. Sufficient facts supported the trial court's decision. The trial court did not abuse its discretion where it considered mitigating factors and overruled the hearing officer's decision.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's convictions affirmed because the court has no jurisdiction to vacate a guilty plea after direct appeal has been affirmed. Appellant failed to present any evidence that his counsel's performance was ineffective.

The State presented legally sufficient evidence to sustain the appellant's conviction for unauthorized entry upon a nuisance premises. The State presented evidence that the appellant entered a residence that had been posted with warning signs declaring it a nuisance and ordering people to stay out absent proper written permission to enter. The State's evidence established that the appellant entered the house with knowledge of the signs and without written permission. The trial court did not err in overruling the appellant's request for a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of "necessity." The trial court did not err in accepting a jury verdict rendered after approximately 28 minutes of deliberation. Judgment affirmed.

Appellants were prejudiced by the magistrate's failure to comply with the requirements of Civ.R. 53(D)(3) by providing notice of the time period for filing objections and notice that failure to file objections waived arguments on appeal. The judgment of the trial court adopting the magistrate's decision is reversed and remanded to the trial court so that the magistrate can prepare and file a decision that comports with the requirements of the rule and so that the appellants may have the opportunity to file objections.

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(D)(2) and (3), the trial court was permitted to consider defendant's extensive juvenile record and apparent lack of rehabilitation when it imposed the maximum sentence for a conviction for a felony of the second degree. The Ohio Supreme Court's holding in State v. Hand, 149 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-Ohio-5504, 73 N.E.3d 448, does not bar the trial court from considering a defendant's juvenile record when imposing a sentence within the applicable statutory range. The sentence imposed by the trial court is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a delayed motion for a new trial. Defendant's motion for a new trial was untimely, and defendant did not demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from timely filing the motion for a new trial or discovering new evidence within the time period provided by Crim.R. 33(B). Judgment affirmed.

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights and the grant of permanent custody of her nine-year-old son to the county children services agency. Juvenile court did not err in failing to deny the agency's motion for permanent custody as untimely. Juvenile court's grant of permanent custody to the agency was not contrary to R.C. 2151.414, the best interest of the child, or the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction over the issue of Appellant's child support obligation. Further, Appellant, by his substantive participation in the proceedings regarding child support, waived any challenge to the juvenile court's personal jurisdiction over him. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. The record reveals no non-frivolous issues for appellate review. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) before accepting the appellant's no-contest plea and finding him guilty. The appellant's 12-month prison sentence is not contrary to law, and the record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant obtained a judgment against the Appellee for unpaid sales taxes. Appellant thereafter initiated post-judgment discovery under Civ.R. 69 to aid in collection of the judgment. Appellee failed to respond to the discovery, prompting Appellant to file a motion to compel in the trial court. The trial court overruled the motion, concluding that Appellant, before engaging in Civ.R. 69-sanctioned discovery, had to obtain an order in aid of execution under R.C. 2333.09. R.C. 2333.09 allows, but does not require, a judgment creditor to obtain an order in aid of execution before engaging in Civ.R. 69 post-judgment discovery. Thus, the trial court erred when it overruled Appellant's motion to compel. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence of cocaine found in his car during a police search after a stop for a minor traffic violation. Safety concerns raised by factors including defendant's unexplained wearing of a mask that concealed most of his face justified a police officer's pat down and detention of defendant, and the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant voluntarily consented to the search of his car. Consent given after invocation of Miranda rights is valid if voluntary. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's actions in assaulting the victim, stopping the assault to compel her to shower, and then laying on top of her on the sofa and not letting her leave the residence were separate and identifiable acts committed with a separate animus. Thus, the trial court did not err when it refused to merge appellant's convictions for felonious assault and kidnapping. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court's adoption of magistrate's judgment regarding the modification of child support was not an abuse of discretion.

The trial court did not err when making an initial custody determination under R.C. 3109.04, as custody of three of the parties' four children to father was in their best interests. Manifest weight discretion.

Where the trial court failed to engage in a colloquy on the record into whether the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given, his OVI conviction must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.

Appellant was represented by competent counsel and his burglary conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. Identification corroboration.

Sufficient and competent, credible evidence supports verdict and conviction for burglary. R.C. 2911.12(A)(1) and (D). Crim.R. 29. Manifest weight of the evidence. Sufficiency. Appellant received effective assistance because no prejudice shown despite introduction, without notice, of 404(B) evidence.

Appellant's challenges to the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the manifest weight of the evidence could have been raised in the direct appeal of his 1994 aggravated-murder conviction. He is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from now raising these purported errors.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion or err in the handling of multiple post-decree petitions involving the parties' separation agreement.

Appeal challenging the trial court's decision awarding appellant with zero days of jail-time credit after he admitted to violating the conditions of his community control dismissed where appellant had completed his 90-day prison sentence, thereby rendering the appeal moot.

indictment – void – jointly-recommended sentence – roadmap – record – res judicata

CIVIL - declaratory action breach of contract motions for summary judgment judgment granting summary judgment on liability Civ.R. 54(B) declaratory action judgment appealed damages hearing pending breach claim is a mere restatement of declaratory action claim unnecessary fragmentation of litigation Civ.R. 54(B) certification was an abuse of discretion appeal dismissed.

The defendant-appellant was not denied the right to choose the objective of his defense. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant only to the parties' "Naphtha" agreement. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Trial court erred by not holding a new hearing pursuant to Juvenile Rule 40(D)(4)(d) when appellant alleged new evidence which the trial court found could not have been presented previously.

Trial courts have discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range provided that the trial court considers the purposes and principles of sentencing.

Maximum sentence supported by the record, but trial court failed to provide jail-time credit in this matter, as conceded by the State.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Judicial Conduct Rules—A judge is required to respect and comply with the law and act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary—Six-month suspension.

Motion for sanction and request for attorney fee/Frivolous conduct

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

The trial court dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and this court affirmed.

Effort by new construction condominium buyer to obtain 3% real estate commission in an action against real estate agent is barred by R.C. 4735.21. Trial court's grant in bench trial of real estate agent's Civ.R. 41(B)(2) motion to dismiss at close of plaintiff buyer's case is affirmed.

Because the trooper who arrested the defendant for OVI gave the advice required by statute under the circumstances, his failure to read the entire BMV form 2255 (which would have resulted in substantially the same advice being given twice) was not a violation of law.

Trial court properly considered indigent defendant's present and future ability to pay before imposing restitution as part of sentence. The amount of restitution ordered was supported by statements from prosecutor, which sufficed because defense counsel did not dispute that house destroyed by arson was a total loss.

Trial court's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal on motion of trustee of a spendthrift trust in action brought by creditor bank to collect future required distributions to beneficiary lacked analysis of exceptions under R.C. 5805.06. Decision reversed and remanded for trial court to apply R.C. 5805.06 in reaching a decision on parties' dispute.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's application to seal the record of his conviction. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated murder were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's appeals are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The entries he appeals from are not final appealable orders.

The trial court did not err in modifying the amount of the defendant's monthly child support obligation.

Speedy Trial Request for Disposition

Dismissal of Criminal Charges Abuse of Discretion

CHILDREN – CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision granting permanent custody of three children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the decision was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

bylaws – monthly assessments – condominium association – late fee – contract – magistrate decision – Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) – factual findings – lien – foreclosure – course of dealing – equitable remedy –

Competency-Manifest Weight-1AC-Allied Offenses

Court of Appeals Does Not Issue Advisory Opinions

Motion to Suppress/3rd Party Can Consent to Search

Manifest weight best interest of the children restrictive visitation abuse of discretion removal of guardian ad litem. Under the guidelines of R.C. 2151.281 and Juv.R. 4, Mother was not entitled to a GAL, and the outcome of the proceeding was not based solely on GAL representation for Mother. Mother participated during the hearing, competently testifying, presenting her concerns, and responding to the custodian's testimony. It was properly determined that it was not in the best interest of the children to change custody. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to limit Mother's visitation with one child so that she had no visitation at all. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to not allow the two children to visit and bond with one another.

Sufficiency of evidence resisting arrest R.C. 2921.33(A) lawful arrest. Because the evidence demonstrated that the defendant was not under arrest when he allegedly struck a highway patrol trooper in the chest, and that he did not engage in any physical activity to prevent or delay his arrest, the state failed to prove essential elements of the offense of resisting arrest, and the evidence was therefore insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for resisting arrest under R.C. 2921.33(A).

Crim.R. 29 theft manifest weight R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 allied offenses. State presented sufficient evidence establishing defendant as the suspect state presented sufficient evidence of theft as complaining witness was the manager of the service station whose funds were taken sufficient evidence supported conviction for theft of a dangerous drug under R.C. 4729.01 and 3719.01 theft and criminal damaging convictions were not against manifest weight of the evidence maximum and consecutive sentences were not unlawful theft of car, and thefts from trunk and glove box were not allied offenses of similar import.

Misdemeanor guilty plea voluntarily completed sentence moot. Where the defendant voluntarily completed her misdemeanor sentence, her appeal challenging the sentence is moot.

Appeal No. 107215 — State of Ohio v. Theodore Russell Crim.R. 11 appellate sentencing review guilty plea. The four-year sentence imposed on a second-degree felony is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record, and the trial court complied with the requirements set forth in Crim.R. 11.

Appeal moot. Where a defendant, convicted of a criminal offense, has voluntarily paid the fine or completed the sentence for that offense, an appeal is moot when no evidence is offered from which an inference can be drawn that the defendant will suffer some collateral disability or loss of civil rights from such judgment or conviction.

107233 Sufficiency of evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, restitution. The defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court's order for restitution was improper as it included amounts for the victim's new security system and locks.

Motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody termination of parental rights R.C. 2151.414, 2151.415(D)(1) motion to extend temporary custody Sup.R. 48 Juv.Loc.R. 18(G) guardian ad litem's investigation and report clear and convincing evidence medically fragile child best interest of the child. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's motion to strike guardian ad litem's report and recommendation where mother's counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine guardian ad litem regarding his investigation and report and guardian ad litem's report and recommendation was just one of the factors juvenile court considered in determining whether to grant permanent custody to agency. Juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting agency's motion for permanent custody and denying mother's motion to extend temporary custody. Competent, credible, clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that award of permanent custody to agency was in the best interest of the child where although mother made substantial progress on the elements of her case plan related to drug abuse, she made no significant progress towards meeting basic needs of her medically fragile child, including securing and maintaining appropriate housing for child, attending child's medical appointments and becoming knowledgeable about child's medical care and treatment.

107379 - S/O v. Tae Mon L. Rouse Sentencing purposes and principles of felony sentencing seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12. Defendant's sentence was affirmed where trial court made findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, and the findings were supported by the record.

107514 R.C. 2152.18(B) confinement hearing. Trial court's judgments denying delinquent's motions to recalculate confinement credit reversed and remanded for a hearing where the trial court took no evidence before denying the motions without evidence, trial court could not adequately determine whether the delinquent was confined at the facility and thus entitled to credit under R.C. 2152.18(B) for time served there, and the appellate court could not conduct a meaningful review.

Drug Abuse No Visitation Order

Divorce - Modify spousal support

Habeas corpus—Failure to properly file an affidavit of prior civil actions in compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A)—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Mandamus—Writ sought to compel city to pay township for lost tax revenue associated with township territory annexed to city—R.C. 709.19—Township has failed to establish amount city owes—Writ denied.

Habeas corpus—Habeas corpus is not the proper means to challenge claims that had adequate remedies at law—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Trial court did not commit plain error by not instructing the jury on the offense of physical control, which appellant asserted was a lesser included offense of operating a vehicle under the influence. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress based on alleged inconsistencies between testimony at the suppression hearing and trial. Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel related to the motion to suppress, motion for acquittal, failure to request jury instruction on lesser-included offense, failure to provide witness list prior to trial, voir dire, and the cumulative effect of the individual allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mandamus denied relator's refusal to subject himself to an examination by his employer's physician does not constitute good cause under R.C. 4123.65(C).

Where the evidence against the defendant was conflicting, and where jury foreperson admitted she viewed excluded prejudicial evidence and relayed what she saw to the other jurors at the outset of deliberations, and where officer witnesses offered hearsay testimony and improperly vouched for the credibility of the victim, defendant was deprived of a fair trial and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for new trial.

Trial court did not err when it granted wife's motion to liquidate spousal support arrearage.

No abuse of discretion for denying Civ. R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and without an evidentiary hearing. Judgment of the trial court affirmed.

Court of Claims magistrate's exclusion of expert testimony concerning how human factors affect standard of care and causation in accident alleged to be caused by ODOT road sign placement on state rural highway with multiple roads intersecting at a common point was prejudicial error. Cause reversed and remanded for new trial.

De novo review found no error in the Board of Tax Appeals affirming the tax commissioner's final determination that denied taxpayer's application for refund of commercial activity tax. Taxpayer's federal constitutional claims not supported by the record. Assignments of error overruled BTA decision affirmed.

Plain language of a business lease providing that if the corporate tenant changes ownership the lease is assignable with permission of the landlord and providing for assignability without permission of the landlord when new owners of the tenant have been known to principals of the landlord for more than three years, does not bar a transfer or assignment of rights under the lease. Trial court erred in concluding lease not to be assignable.

Probate court did not err in determining the best interests of the minor child when granting stepfather's petition for adoption. The court properly refused to consider appellant father's flawed affidavit and did not abuse its discretion when evaluating the evidence presented to establish that the child's best interest under the factors set forth in R.C. 3107.161(B). Proceedings in the adoption matter granted appellant the required notice and opportunity to be heard to comport with the constitutional due process requirements.

On certification of default.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Appellant's community control sanctions, since the State presented substantial evidence that Appellant was unsuccessfully discharged from the MonDay Program for requesting, via correspondence, that a female visitor smuggle illegal drugs into the facility for him. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in interpreting its Standard Order of Parenting, nor did the court abuse its discretion by holding Appellant in contempt. Appellant repeatedly violated court orders requiring him to transport the parties' minor children to extracurricular activities during his parenting time. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in summarily dismissing Upkins's complaint for malicious prosecution, where the defendants' motion to dismiss did not comply with Loc.R. 3.03 of the Miami County Common Pleas Court, and the court did not give Upkins an opportunity to respond to the motion. Judgment reversed remanded for further proceedings.

Trial court modification of child custody and child support obligations were not an abuse of discretion. Specific factual determinations were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. Divorce, parental rights and responsibilities, child custody modification, child support, modification, objections to magistrate's decision, abuse of discretion, manifest weight of evidence

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in equally dividing the retirement assets accumulated during a lengthy marriage when one party was retired and the other was close to retirement.

Trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress based on a purportedly unconstitutional seizure where the officer had probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed based on his observation of a hand-to-hand simultaneous transfer of a small, white object for U.S. currency, made through the window of a car door, in a gas station parking lot.

Appellant's claims were not barred by the parol evidence rule because appellees' allegedly-fraudulent misrepresentations were not directly contradicted by the written sale agreement.

sufficient evidence—manifest weight—mistrial—other acts

sexual battery, substantial impairment, knowledge, sufficiency, weight of the evidence

checkpoint, motion to suppress, State v. Orr, State v. Goines, constitutionality

Sentence to maximum consecutive prison terms was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

If a party violates R.C. 3105.171(E)(3) by failing to disclose assets, the trial court may use the remedy in R.C. 3105.171(E)(5) to compensate the other party. If a party to a divorce commits financial misconduct in violation of R.C. 3105.171(E)(4), the trial court may use the remedies in R.C. 3105.171(E)(4) to compensate the other party.

The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's motion for a mistrial. Appellant was not prejudiced by trial counsel's errors or by the improper religious statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Appellant's conviction for Aggravated Robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in finding that Appellant's convictions for Kidnapping and Aggravated Robbery did not merge for purposes of sentencing. The trial court erred in ordering Appellant to pay court-appointed counsel fees without first determining Appellant's ability to pay.

Sufficient evidence was presented by the State to sustain a conviction for failure to appear the defendant-appellant was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel and the trial court's imposition of maximum sentences is not contrary however, the trial court erred in its sentence of the merged-allied offenses. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Trial court complied with Criminal Rule 11 requiremens when he informed the defendant that he could summon witnesses during the change of plea hearing. Trial court did not err in considering the defendant's juvenile record when he determined that consecutive sentences were appropriate.

Appellant did not request to withdraw his guilty pleas and, in any event, his claims that he could not accept the consequences for his actions were not sufficient to justify a more thorough hearing to withdraw his plea.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - habeas corpus inmate's incarceration based on void conviction attempted felony murder not a cognizable crime in Ohio prior appellate decision failing to consider "void" issue on res judicata grounds not binding on habeas corpus court serious miscarrage of justice inmate not entitled to immediate release when additional prison term possible on merged offense.

CRIMINAL - speeding judicial notice uniform traffic citation illegal arrest suppression sufficiency of the evidence weight of the evidence transcript

Trial court's decision sentencing appellant to serve two concurrent six-year prison terms after she pled guilty to single counts of second-degree felony sale of an unregistered security and fraudulent acts or practices in the sale of securities was proper where appellant's conduct caused the financial ruin of numerous investors thereby supporting the trial court's sentencing decision.

Trial court erred in finding that former employee of a home care agency held a "position of trust" as the victim's caregiver pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(viii).

Appellant failed to provide a full transcript of the proceedings below and therefore this court must presume the regularity of proceedings and affirm

The trial court did not err when it imposed the maximum sentence for two fourth-degree felony convictions because the trial court found the seriousness and recidivism factors outweighed any factors in mitigation, thereby justifying the severity of the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Furthermore, the trial court did not err when it ran the felony sentences consecutively to one another because it made the proper findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

Trial court erred in failing to consider all current evidence of pending parenting action in domestic relations court at remand hearing. In addition, trial court's decision does not reflect consideration of the issue of justifiable cause for the father's failure to communicate with his child.

The drugs produced at trial were properly authenticated under Evid.R. 901 as the drugs recovered from the defendant. Defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the admission of the baggies of drugs into evidence where the drugs presented at trial were properly authenticated under Evid.R. 901 as the drugs recovered from the defendant. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's Crim.R. 16 motion which sought to dismiss the case based upon the state's failure to disclose the videotape of the drunk tank. Trial court did not impose an increased prison sentence in retaliation for the defendant pursuing a jury trial.

The trial court did not have jurisdiction to address appellant's motion to withdraw his no contest plea where this court affirmed appellant's convictions on a prior direct appeal

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant-attorney where plaintiff's malpractice claim was time barred and his remaining causes of action sounded in malpractice.

Probate court abused its discretion in denying parents' name change application regarding their transgender adolescent child.

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's child to a children services agency where the child's best interest was served by granting permanent custody to the children services agency due to appellant's continued illicit drug use before, during, and after the child was removed from her care, as well as the uncertainty regarding appellant's employment, income, and housing.

Mandamus—An inmate's failure to comply with R.C. 2969.26(A) warrants dismissal—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Mandamus and prohibition—Common pleas court had jurisdiction over habeas corpus petition—Writs denied and court of appeals' dismissal affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to act with reasonable diligence and failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter—Public reprimand.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension.

Trial court did not err when it granted motion to dismiss.

reasonable expectation, double jeopardy, municipal court jurisdiction, negotiated plea

adjudication of abuse and dependency, R.C. 251.031, R.C. 2151.04(C)

estate, removal of executor, App.R. 12(A)(2), App.R. 16(A)

motion to dismiss, employer intentional tort, particularity, R.C. 2745.01, summary judgment, statute of limitations, evidence, prior proceeding, judicial notice

manifest weight, ineffective assistance, DNA evidence, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, having weapons while under disability

Crim.R. 32.1, motion to vacate plea, post-sentence, manifest injustice, abuse of discretion, plea agreement, judicial release

foreclosure – Civ.R. 21 – personal knowledge – business records

60(B)—mistake—substitute for appeal

Murder psychological evaluation R.C. 2945.37 disqualify counsel mistrial Crim.R. 16 harmless error prosecutorial misconduct closing arguments isolated comments prejudicial error suppress pretrial identification photo array unnecessarily suggestive media confidence statements Evid.R. 613 impeachment jury instructions sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence circumstantial evidence. The defendant did not demonstrate sufficient indicia of incompetency to require a psychological evaluation and subsequent competency hearing. The trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to disqualify counsel was not unreasonable because the record supported that the day-of-trial request was made for the purpose of delay. The state's commission of a discovery violation for failing to timely disclose a witness did not warrant a mistrial because the testimony was cumulative. The prosecutor's isolated comments about credibility, when viewed in the context of the entire closing argument did not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights. Although the prosecutor's insinuation about misconduct by defense counsel was not appropriate, no demonstration of prejudice was shown. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress pretrial identifications because (1) the identifications were electronically recorded depicting the level of confidence (2) the witness made the identification based on who she remembered, not based on the media and (3) the photo array was not unnecessarily suggestive. The admission of the photo array was not admissible pursuant to Evid.R. 613, but its admission was harmless because the witness impeached his own credibility by his prior inconsistent testimony no limiting jury instruction regarding the exhibit was necessary. Defendant's convictions upheld where the direct and circumstantial evidence proved that the defendant was the shooter.

106150 - S/O v. Derielle Jones Speedy trial statutory speedy trial rights R.C. 2945.71 R.C. 2945.72 tolling discovery subsequent indictment ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated, and appellant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.

R.C. 4513.15 high-beam headlights suppression traffic stop oncoming approaching momentary flicker mistake of law objectively reasonable totality of the circumstances. The trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress where the record demonstrated that the officer had an objectively reasonable belief based on the totality of the circumstances that a traffic violation occurred when the defendant flashed his high-beam headlights on two separate occasions while stopped at a traffic light. Even if the officer's belief was mistaken, an objectively reasonable mistake of law can constitute reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop.

Caveat emptor, residential property, termites, fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, R.C. 5302.30, disclosure, inspection, "as is." Summary judgment was properly granted, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there were no genuine issues of material fact and the seller was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The record failed to establish the presence of fraud by the seller. The residential purchase agreement was clearly marked "as is." The purchaser claimed to have more than 20 years of experience in the commercial and residential construction trade but did not hire an inspector. R.C. 5302.30 requires that a seller disclose defects or issues that are within the seller's actual knowledge. In the absence of fraud, caveat emptor and the "as is" clause prevent recovery.

State v. Belle, App. Nos. 107046 and 107300. Rape joinder prejudice manifest weight of the evidence SANE nurse's testimony sexually violent predator specification. The trial court did not err in consolidating appellant's multiple rape cases for trial because the evidence for each case was simple and direct. Appellant's conviction of the sexually violent predator specification was supported by sufficient evidence because the record reflects compelling evidence to show appellant is likely to engage in a sexually violent offense in the future.

State v. Cruz, App. No.107174 Rape preindictment delay guilty plea. Appellant pleaded guilty and therefore waived his claim of preindictment delay. Even if he had not waived the issue as a result of his guilty plea, he has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice required for his claim to prevail.

107110 - L.T.C. v. G.A.C Civil protection order sufficient, credible evidence R.C. 3113.31 R.C. 2919.25 domestic violence risk of harm hearsay Evid.R. 801(C). The trial court did not err in granting the CPO because there existed sufficient, credible evidence to support a finding that appellant had engaged in acts or threats of domestic violence towards appellee and the parties' three children.

State v. Thomas, App. No. 107116 Rape postrelease control sentence. The record reflects the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and placed great weight on the seriousness of appellant's conduct. Just because the trial court did not agree with appellant's argument for a less severe sentence does not mean the trial court did not consider all the relevant factors. R.C. 2953.08 does not require more, and therefore, appellant's eight year prison sentence is not "contrary to law." Appellant argues the imposition of postrelease control violated Ex Post Facto Clause. At the time of appellant's offense in 1993, a defendant convicted of rape was subject to an indefinite term of a minimum of five to ten years and a maximum of 25 years and such a defendant was to be supervised by the parole board for up to 25 years after serving his prison term. Under the pre S.B. 2 law, Thomas was originally sentenced to a minimum of eight years and a maximum of 25 years. Appellant's Ex Post Facto Clause claim disregards the fact that under a pre S.B. 2 sentence, after his release from prison he would be under parole supervision for up to 25 years. With his new sentence under H.B. 86, after he serves 11 years, he will be subject to only five years of postrelease control. Therefore, appellant's Ex Post Facto argument lacks merit.

107172 Final appealable order, default judgment, Civ.R. 55(A), mitigation of damages. The trial court's default judgment is affirmed, but its damages award is reversed because the default clause obviated plaintiff-appellant of its duty to mitigate damages after defendants-appellees left the premises. As a result, plaintiff is entitled to the amount of rent that defendants-appellees owed and did not pay under the lease's term as well as attorney fees and expenses for enforcing the terms of the lease.

State v. Cruz, App. No.107174 Rape preindictment delay guilty plea. Appellant pleaded guilty and therefore waived his claim of preindictment delay. Even if he had not waived the issue as a result of his guilty plea, he has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice required for his claim to prevail.

107210 Manifest weight witness credibility. The credibility of witness testimony is for the trier of fact. Confusion as to what specific item was taken does not negate the facts that appellant trespassed, broke into the residence, and stole the homeowner's property. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

State v. Williams, App. No. 107221 Murder discharge of firearm on or near prohibited premises manifest weight complicity allied offenses of murder and discharge of firearm. Appellant's conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Sufficient evidence exists to support appellant's conviction of murder on an accomplice-liability theory. Murder and discharge of a firearm upon and over a public roadway are not allied offenses because different victims were involved.

Because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court's findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) and (11), the court's determination that the child could not, or should not, be placed with the mother within a reasonable time was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – RES JUDICATA – PLAIN ERROR: R.C. 2151.414(A)(1), which states that the adjudication that a child is an abused, neglected or dependent child shall not be adjudicated at the permanent-custody hearing, does not preclude the trial court from considering evidence elicited in the adjudicatory hearing at a permanent-custody hearing. Because the juvenile court is vested with continuing jurisdiction to review and, if necessary, modify its dispositional orders, the doctrine of res judicata does not prohibit the litigation of issues relative to a motion for permanent custody even though the same or similar issues may have been considered in a prior action under R.C. Chapter 2151. The trial court did not commit plain error in permitting excerpts from the child's voluminous medical records into evidence where father failed to specify which statements he alleged were inadmissible hearsay and the medical records were cumulative to the witnesses' testimony. Because the juvenile court was required to independently review the magistrate's decision and was free to disagree with the magistrate's conclusions, the juvenile court did not err in finding that the 12-of-22 condition in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) had been met even though the magistrate had found that the child could not or should not be placed with either of his parents within a reasonable amount of time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The parents' compliance with the case plan did not preclude the trial court from awarding permanent custody to a children services agency.

MANIFEST WEIGHT - CONTRIBUTING TO UNRULINESS OF A MINOR

OVI - refrigertion of urine sample

Trial court must advise defendant before accepting control that sentence for post-release control violation must be served consecutively.

Denial of petition for post conviction without a hearing properly granted

Appellant's conviction for obstructing official business was supported by sufficient evidence. Further, Appellant's conviction for resisting arrest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by concluding that Appellant was convicted of domestic violence as a first degree misdemeanor. The trial court, given this conclusion, was without authority to seal the record of Appellant's domestic violence conviction. Appellant's domestic violence conviction is not void. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurs in judgment only.)

Given the determination that the parties entered into an express contract, the trial court erred by awarding Plaintiff damages based on unjust enrichment. The trial court, however, did not err by denying Defendant's breach of contract, slander of title, and other counterclaims. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court did not err when it granted appellees' motion for summary judgment with respect to appellant's claim for legal malpractice and punitive damages stemming from a settlement agreement in his divorce case. Judgment affirmed.

On appeal from his conviction on one count of kidnapping and three counts of rape, defendant-appellant did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel in defense counsel's failure to pursue a ruling on a motion for a DNA test of the victim's oral swabs in counsel's failure to call an independent DNA expert to refute the State's DNA evidence in counsel's failure to introduce defendant's medical records in counsel's failure to call additional witnesses or in defense counsel's failure, when the jury initially indicated a deadlock, to request that the court instruct the jury that if it could not reach a verdict, it could ask to be returned to the court and report that fact. The trial court did not err in instructing the jury to reach a verdict, where its instruction was consistent with State v. Howard, 42 Ohio St.3d 18, 537 N.E.2d 188 (1989) and Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 429.09(2). Judgment affirmed.

Trial counsel was not ineffective where appellant received a sentence of 16 months in prison after pleading guilty to an amended charge of aggravated assault. Appellant faced a potential maximum prison sentence of over 80 years on the original charges, and counsel's statements during mitigation were appropriately brief in light of appellant's extensive criminal history and the lack of mitigating circumstances present in the record.

No ineffective assistance of counsel because trial strategy falls to the sound discretion of counsel.

Where minor child had been adjudicated dependent and a dispositional award of legal custody to non-relatives had been entered, trial court erred when it did not appoint counsel to indigent father on his motions for a communication order and to change parenting time, which were, in effect, motions to modify the trial court's dispositional order under R.C. 2151.353(F)(2).

No trial court abuse of discretion when it appointed standby counsel for appellant and when it determined appellant violated his community control sanction and revoked the same. Judgment affirmed. Community control sanction, revocation of community control sanction, appointed counsel, abuse of discretion

On certification of default.

On application for reinstatement.

obstructing justice – guilty plea – conviction – legal ascertainment of guilt – structural error – right to jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

juror bias, impartiality, R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), challenge for cause, peremptory challenge, motion in limine, admission of text messages, Evid.R. 901(B)(6), Evid.R. 803(6), Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a), Evid.R. 403(B)

Criminal Rule 33(A)(5) does not apply to changes in the law that occur subsequent to trial as they cannot have contributed to an error at law during the trial.

A businessowner does not have a duty to warn invitees of open and obvious conditions on the premises of their business.

APPEAL OF T/C's DECISION ON REMAND, ATTORNEY FEES/DIVISION OF PROPERTY NEED NOT BE EQUAL - MUST BE EQUITABLE

Murder Conviction Dependent Not Entittled to Resentencing

The juvenile court did not err by binding the case over to the common pleas court upon finding the factors in favor of the bindover outweighed the factors against a bindover most notably, the age of the victims and appellant's relationship with the victims. Nor did the common pleas court err by accepting appellant's guilty plea upon finding the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered where, contrary to appellant's claim, the common pleas court properly advised appellant of his appellate rights.

A defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated arson and felony murder, which arose from a scheme with a co-defendant to set an arson fire at the defendant's home for insurance money. A firefighter died while responding to the fire. The defendant failed to establish that his joint trial with his co-defendant was manifestly prejudicial. Sufficient circumstantial evidence established that the defendants conspired to commit aggravated arson. The court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses where the proposed offenses were not lesser included offense of the charged offenses and the facts at trial would not have supported a lesser included offense instruction. The defendant was not deprived of a fair trial based on alleged instances of misconduct by the prosecutor throughout the trial.

Appellant did not raise any arguments related to the trial court's judgment that it lacked venue, but instead, raised arguments related to jurisdiction. Thus, appellant failed to substantiate the trial court's alleged error and this court had nothing to review on appeal.

Appellant's conviction for rape and gross sexual imposition was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Criminal—Search/Seizure—Ineffective Assistance. The trial court did not err when it denied a motion to suppress evidence seized from a pat-down search for weapons. The officer had probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances to show it was immediately apparent the evidence was contraband. Further, appellant failed to prove that she received ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a waiver of court costs. Appellant could not demonstrate prejudice because R.C. 2947.23(C) allows a defendant to request the court waive or modify costs any time after sentencing.

The trial court did not err in granting permanent custody of appellant's children to a child services agency where appellant abandoned the children by not having contact with them for over 90 days, and granting permanent custody was in the children's best interests given appellant's ongoing drug problems and her unwillingness to complete case plan objectives that would have allowed for reunification with the children.

CRIMINAL - Nonsupport of Dependents probation violation community control res judicata allied offenses separate, identifiable harm multiple children plain error ineffective assistance of counsel consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c)

JUVENILE - motion for visitation incarcerated parent phone visitation presumption against visitation with incarcerated parent failure to make factual findings Civ.R. 52 abuse of discretion

CIVIL - foreclosure failure to prosecute Civ.R. 41(B)(1) default judgment Civ.R. 55(A) timeliness Civ.R. 6(B)(2) and 12(A)(1) excusable neglect interlocutory order

CRIMINAL - Alford plea benefit of plea reduced penalty factual basis brief description of the crimes voluntary plea assertion of innocence

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - felony sentence seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.12 findings supported by the record no-contact order community control sanction vacated sentence modified.

CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing post-Foster felony sentencing clear and convincing evidence contrary to law R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 consistency misdemeanor sentencing discretion of trial court R.C. 2929.22 factors.

CRIMINAL - postconviction relief R.C. 2953.21 timeliness R.C. 2953.23 irregular motions structural error

WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA - abuse of discretion ineffective assistance of counsel pro se Crim.R. 32.1 manifest injustice.

POST CONVICTION RELIEF - R.C. 2953.21 abuse of discretion jurisdiction successive petition R.C. 2953.23(A) guilty plea due process reply brief Crim.R. 52(A) harmless error speedy trial terminating the incident unindicted charges res judicata offense of inferior degree lesser included offense.

CRIMINAL LAW - maximum sentence restitution R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) clearly and convincingly contrary to law R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 burglary failure to object waiver plain error Crim.R. 52(B) R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) economic loss R.C. 2929.01(L) R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) present and future ability to pay.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - felony sentence appellate review seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.12 judgments findings supported by the record community control sanction.

GUILTY PLEA – CRIM.R. 11 – APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – COUNSEL – SENTENCING: Where the trial court conducted a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy prior to accepting defendant's guilty plea, which included informing defendant of the maximum sentence he faced, defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by the trial court's later imposition of the maximum sentence. The appellate court is unable to determine on appeal whether trial counsel was ineffective where the allegations of counsel's ineffectiveness are based on facts outside the record. The trial court's imposition of a maximum sentence was not contrary to law where the sentence fell within the available sentencing range and where the record reflected that the court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the factors in R.C. 2929.12.

Prohibition—Writ sought to prevent a board of elections from placing a referendum on a zoning resolution from the ballot—Mandamus—Writ sought to order board of elections to sustain property owner's protest of a referendum—Property owners failed to show that the board of elections abused its discretion or clearly disregarded applicable law—Claim that a petition for referendum was legally insufficient is a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, not for an extraordinary writ—Writs denied.

MOOT - SENTENCE SERVED

VOID SENTENCE - POST-RELEASE CONTROL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT - FORECLOSURE - DEED REFORMATION

Mandamus—Inmate failed to make credible claim of parole-record error that may prevent his parole request from receiving meaningful consideration and failed to prove clear legal right to review his parole record prior to a scheduled parole hearing—Court of appeals' denial of writ affirmed.

Mandamus—Relator's failure to show a clear legal right to the requested relief precludes issuance of a writ of mandamus—The inclusion of an incorrect date in a sentencing entry is a clerical error, not an error in sentencing—Inclusion of a clause improperly imposing postrelease control in a sentencing entry, which was deleted in a nunc pro tunc, entry, does not render sentencing entry void—Dismissal of petition for writ affirmed.

106753 - S/O v. Terrence Thomas Kilbane Domestic violence self-defense nondeadly force manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial court applied correct standard for establishing claim of self-defense where the defendant used nondeadly force. Defendant's domestic violence conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where evidence showed that the defendant created the situation that gave rise to the affray. Trial counsel was not ineffective even though he erroneously suggested that the defendant might have a duty to retreat where there was no evidence that the trial court applied the wrong standard for determining a claim of self-defense and the evidence showed that the defendant created the situation that gave rise to the fight.

Appeal No. 106578 - State of Ohio v. Michael T. Grayson R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive sentences void R.C. 2953.08. The imposition of consecutive or concurrent service is tied to the finality of the individual sentence, and the trial court does not have continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the consecutive or concurrent service upon a remand to address other sentencing matters.

106922 Involuntary manslaughter, drug trafficking, ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, consecutive sentence findings, R.C. 2929.14. Trial counsel was not ineffective for withdrawing a motion to suppress where counsel stated on the record that, through discovery and further investigation, the suppression issues challenging the warrant and search were meritless. Appellant's convictions including involuntary manslaughter and drug trafficking were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where cell phone records demonstrated direct contact between the victim and appellant several times during the day of the victim's death, the heroin envelope at the crime scene contained appellant's DNA and matched those used by appellant during controlled drug buys and found at appellant's apartment, and the victim died promptly after ingesting the heroin. The trial court complied with the consecutive sentencing factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.14 on the record and in the journal entry.

Delinquency adjudication by reason of kidnapping R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) twerking admissibility of statements by child victim regarding alleged sexual abuse competency of alleged child victim to testify Evid.R. 601 voir dire examination Evid.R. 807 abuse of discretion plain error. Juvenile court abused its discretion and committed plain error in determining that alleged child victim was incompetent to testify without conducting a proper voir dire examination of the child under Evid.R. 601(A).

106977 Crim.R. 29 sufficiency of evidence motion to suppress, Miranda warnings waiver. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal where there was sufficient evidence to prove penetration as an element of rape. The trial court did not err by not suppressing appellant's statement during his bench trial after a finding that the signed Miranda warning waiver was valid. Additionally, appellant did not file a motion to suppress. Therefore, he waives any objection to its admission.

Kidnapping evidence inconsistent verdicts severance preindictment delay maximum sentence. That jury acquitted defendant of 13 counts and found him guilty of only one count does not mean that the guilty verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consistency in the verdict is not necessary because each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. Sufficient evidence existed to prove that defendant terrorized the victim while he restrained her liberty by repeatedly assaulting her and smothering her into unconsciousness and humiliating her by denying her access to the bathroom and forcing her to remain in soiled clothing. Defendant failed to show actual prejudice resulting from preindictment delay because text messages showing why the argument occurred would not have justified the defendant's acts against the victim.

Guilty plea knowing, voluntary, and intelligent Crim.R. 11 totality of circumstances. A trial court does not violate Crim.R. 11, when under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant was aware he would be sentenced to a mandatory prison sentence. Where the trial court does not declare that the defendant will be sentenced to a mandatory prison term, but where it is nevertheless clear from the record and from the severity of the defendant's crimes that he or she is ineligible for community control sanctions, there is substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) proportionality finding clearly and convincingly not supported by the record nunc pro tunc. Although trial court did not state verbatim at the sentencing hearing that consecutive sentences would not be disproportionate to the seriousness of defendant's conduct and the danger defendant poses to the public, requisite proportionality finding could be discerned from the trial court's statements on the record when viewed in their entirety. Trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) were not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Sentences affirmed remanded in part for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc order incorporating the consecutive sentence findings made at the sentencing hearing into its sentencing journal entry.

State v. Williams, App. No. 107151. Improperly handling firearms in motor vehicle R.C. 2923.16 self-defense R.C. 2923.12 handgun principles and purposes of felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Self-defense is not available as an affirmative defense to improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) when the weapon involved is a handgun. The trial court considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and was not required to make findings under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The appellant's sentence was therefore not contrary to law.

107579 Permanent custody, manifest weight of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, R.C. 2151.414. The record clearly and convincingly supported the trial court's decision awarding permanent custody to CCDCFS because evidence showed that the children could not be placed with mother within a reasonable period of time and granting CCDCFS permanent custody was in the children's best interests.

guilty plea motion to withdraw sentence substantial compliance arson registration

negligence negligence per se construction site active participation critical variable duty summary judgment

step-parent adoption R.C.3107.07(A) no justifiable cause for lack of contact between biological father and child

guilty plea plea colloquy sustantial compliance strict compliance consecutive sentence felony.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – APPELLATE JURISDICTION – FINAL ORDER – EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE: Where plaintiff could not plead her claims any differently to state a claim for relief, the trial court's entry granting defendant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted was a final, appealable order. Where plaintiff's complaint failed to allege that defendant, the employer of her deceased husband, had deliberately intended to cause injury or death to her husband, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint because it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Animal Cruelty, R.C.959.13 (A)(1) - culpability is "recklessly" - not strict liability

Community control revocation

Ineffective assitance, jury unanimity, manifest weight/sufficiency

Appeal dismissed based on lack of standing.

In an R.C. Chapter 2129 land sale action, appellants did not demonstrate the trial court erred in removing one of the appellants as ancillary administrator, failing to remove the successor ancillary administrator, confirming the land sale, approving attorney fees for the work of the successor ancillary administrator, or imposing attorney fees and costs as sanctions for violations of Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in its interpretation of DYS's policies related to the use of force, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports SPBR's order.

The trial court erred by suppressing Appellant's incriminating statements and physical evidence on the basis that the statements were involuntary. The evidence does not support finding that the detective made false promises or that the statements were involuntary. Nothing the detective said overbore Appellant's will to resist and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination. The physical evidence was not obtained after custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings. Cottrell was not in custody, so Miranda warnings were not necessary. Reversed and remanded. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing grandmother's motion for legal custody and granting legal custody to a non-relative. Magistrate did not err in failing to continue the hearing, sua sponte, due to grandmother's absence. Record does not support grandmother's contention that her attorney, who attended the hearing, lacked authority to move to withdraw grandmother's motion for legal custody no written motion was required. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and, thus, the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence. As such, trial counsel's apparent failure to make a Crim.R. 29(A) motion for acquittal was of no consequence. Further, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court did not improperly refer to the charges against Appellant in the jury instructions so that Appellant's guilt was implied. With regard to the State's cross-assignment of error, we agree with the State that the trial court abused its discretion by giving the limits on human memory instruction delivered to the jury. However, this error does not entitle the State to any relief in this case. Judgment affirmed. (Welbaum, P.J., concurring.)

The trial court's jury instructions on fallacies of memory were based on legal authority supporting the instructions, rather than the trial court's opinion. However, no proper foundation was established. Specifically, neither side presented expert testimony, nor did the court call an expert witness using appropriate procedures under Evid.R. 614. At this stage of legal development in Ohio, the science of witness memory relating to identification is the proper subject of expert testimony rather than the use of the trial court's disputed jury instructions. Accordingly, Appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained. However, Appellee's acquittal is unaffected by our judgment, because he cannot be placed twice in jeopardy. (Froelich, J., concurring.) (Tucker, J., concurring in both the majority opinion and the concurrence.)

No proper foundation was established for the trial court's preliminary jury instructions regarding the fallibility of memory. The complainant's ability to identify the defendant was not at issue, and no expert testimony on the subject of memory was presented by either party or by the trial court. Accordingly, the State's sole assignment of error challenging the preliminary jury instructions is sustained, without affecting the defendant's judgment entry of acquittal. (Welbaum, P.J., concurring.)

Trial court did not err in appellant's change of plea colloquy. Appellant properly stipulated to sufficient facts in support of guilty finding. Judgment affirmed.

The record reflects no abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant's pro se, "Motion for Immediate Relief From a Fraud Upon the Court." Judgment affirmed.

Trial court properly allowed testimony about victim's hearsay statements. Appellant's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence the jury reasonably chose to believe statements victim made the day after the rape over her trial testimony. Appellant's conviction is not against the weight of the evidence the jury choosing to believe only parts of victim's testimony did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice. Trial counsel's actions were trial strategy, not ineffective assistance of counsel.

In appeal of small-claims court decision, court did not abuse discretion in granting judgment to defendant. Even if not required to present expert testimony in small claims court, plaintiff must present reliable evidence. Plaintiff failed to file transcript of proceedings or App.R. 9(C) statement of evidence and evidence as summarized by small-claims court is insufficient to show that appellant met burden of proving claim with reliable evidence.

CIVIL - Trial court did not err in granting permanent easement, ordering parties to equally share in expenses of same or that Appellant did not cause flooding.

CIVIL - Trial court did not err in the domestic case relating to non marital assists, valuation of the home, duration of the marriage, and on the contempt motion.

Habeas corpus—Violation of R.C. 2963.30, Interstate Agreement on Detainers, not jurisdictional and may be remedied by way of direct appeal—Court of appeals dismissal of petition affirmed.

Mandamus—Only an attorney may file pleadings on behalf of another party in court—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed as modified.

residential parent, magistrate bias, abuse of discretion, R.C. 3109.04, manifest weight, best interest

modification of child support, Civ.R. 53, appellate jurisdiction, standard of living, abuse of discretion, mootness, App.R. 12

assault, sentencing, transcript, Loc.R. 5(A), judicial bias, R.C. 2701.031

intervention in lieu of conviction – carrying a concealed weapon – improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle

An appellate court will not reverse an award of legal custody absent a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.

The trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Trial court's determination that defendant's confession was voluntary affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by designating plaintiff-appellee as the residential parent and legal custodian of the plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant's minor child.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for a modification of an existing custody decree in which plaintiff-appellant requested that he be designated as the residential parent of his minor son.

A defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated arson and felony murder, which arose from his participation in a scheme with a codefendant to set an arson fire at the codefendant's home for insurance money. A firefighter died while responding the fire. Substantial circumstantial evidence implicated the defendant as the arsonist and the greater weight of the evidence supported his convictions. The defendant failed to establish that his joint trial with his codefendant was manifestly prejudicial. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a videotape depicting the state's theory of how the defendant gained access to the locked basement of the home where the evidence was relevant and the method substantially similar to what may have occurred. The court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a lay witness' opinion testimony where the lay witness' testimony would be speculative. The state did not engage in misconduct where the prosecutor encouraged jurors to consider the passage of time during their deliberations. The passage of time is a constant and an everyday aspect of life, and does not call for the jurors to conduct improper experimentation.

Appellant's conviction for gross sexual imposition was supported by sufficient evidence, but the trial court erred by denying appellant leave to file his motion for new trial where appellant demonstrated, by clear and convincing proof, that he was unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for new trial based on an irregularity in the proceedings within the 14-day time period set forth in Crim.R. 33(B).

Conviction for domestic violence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when the jury believed evidence presented by the state that defendant caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the victim.

The juvenile court erred in finding that Civ.R. 52 did not apply to the court's exercise of its child custody jurisdiction. Father did not waive his right to challenge a shared parenting plan provision removing the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction over child custody and visitation when he acquiesced to the original shared parenting plan and failed to object to a magistrate's decision denying a motion for lack of jurisdiction where the provision is against public policy and unenforceable.

R.C. 2923.15, the using weapons while intoxicated statute, does not violate the right to keep and bear arms set forth in the Ohio or federal Constitutions either facially or as applied to defendant. R.C. 2923.15 is not in conflict with the public policy declaration in R.C. 9.68.

The trial court did not err when it did not sue sponte order a presentence-investigative report prior to issuing its sentencing decision because a presentence-investigative report is not required in misdemeanor cases and where appellant requested the trial court proceed immediately to sentencing. The trial court also did not err by sentencing appellant to a total aggregate 90-day jail term consisting of three consecutive 30-day sentences on each of the three offenses for which he pled guilty where the record supported the trial court's decision sentencing appellant to the maximum sentence available.

The state of Ohio appeals a decision granting intervention in lieu of conviction ("ILC") to a defendant who applied for ILC after a jury trial which resulted in a guilty verdict. The court erred in granting ILC where the ILC statute could not be reasonably interpreted to allow an offender to seek ILC after a jury trial, a verdict, and a finding of guilt by the court.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - petition for writ of mandamus summary judgment compel appropriations proceedings regulatory action allegedly eliminated economic viability of real property salt-injection wells seismic activity suspension order categorical taking all economically beneficial use order has not completely eliminated property's value partial regulatory taking character of suspension order is reasonable respondents have not acted in an unreasonably dilatory fashion differences between relators' operations and other operations justified different regulatory treatment distinct investment backed expectations subjective expectations highly regulated industry relators aware of regulations and potential for suspension of operations no objective expectation that relators would be free of regulatory oversight regarding seismic events no genuine issue of material fact not entitled to appropriations as a matter of law.

APPELLATE REVIEW - cross-appeal state appeal R.C. 2945.67(A) App.R. 5(C) motion for leave lack of jurisdiction dismissed.

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus failure to state a claim Civ.R. 12(B)(6) inmate account statement balance R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law direct appeal judicial notice

CRIMINAL LAW - post-conviction relief In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2016) habeas corpus federal court res judicata.

CRIMINAL LAW - felonious assault endangering children ineffective assistance of counsel plea negotiations sufficiency of the evidence recklessness culpability R.C. 2919.22(A) R.C. 2919.22(B)(3) R.C. 2901.22(C) R.C. 2901.22(E) manifest weight of the evidence.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal appellant not diligent reasons do not justify over 45-year delay in initiating direct appeal.

APPELLATE REVIEW - denial of motion for new trial is interlocutory until case is concluded final order in criminal case is conviction and sentence.

Habeas corpus—Habeas corpus is not the proper means to raise claims that could have been raised by way of direct appeal or a petition for postconviction relief—Trial court had jurisdiction over rape offenses regardless of appellant's allegation that bill of information failed to identify or misstated ages of victims—Court of appeals' dismissal affirmed.

Mandamus and prohibition—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

Mandamus—Procedendo—Inmate's sentences ran consecutively by operation of statute even though judgment entry is silent on issue—Writ of procedendo is appropriate when a court has refused to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment—Court of appeals' denial of petition affirmed.

oil and gas dormant mineral act marketable title act notice summary judgment

foreclosure eviction consolidated cases Civ.R. 54 (B) no final appealable order.

Habeas corpus—Allied-offense claims are nonjurisdictional and are not cognizable in habeas corpus—Alleged violation of Crim.R. 43(A) is not cognizable in habeas corpus—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Residential development

Residential development

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – EVIDENCE/WITNESS/TRIAL: When a parent is a party to a permanent-custody proceeding, his or her right to a reasonable opportunity to be present at trial must be balanced against the juvenile court's ability to manage its docket. While the juvenile court has a strong interest in the timely resolution of permanent-custody motions and in the speedy resolution of the issue of a child's custody, those interests must be balanced against a parent's constitutionally protected interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children. The parent-child bond is an extremely important one, and when the state attempts to permanently terminate the relationship between a parent and child, the parent must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection including a due-process right to be present at permanent-custody hearings. While there is no mechanical test for deciding when the juvenile's court's denial of a parent's request to testify violates due process, when, in light of the importance of the parent-child bond, the record reflects that only a short delay was occasioned by a parent's single request for a continuance, the parent's presence at trial was necessary, and the juvenile court could have easily remedied the harm by permitting the parent to testify at the objections hearing, the court erred in overruling the parent's objections without taking additional evidence.

The decision of the Ohio Court of Claims is affirmed. Appellant failed to submit any evidence that ODRC had actual or constructive knowledge that the inmate would attack appellant or any other person. Appellant's reliance on the use of an unsecured clothes iron and the tier level of the prison do not amount to constructive knowledge of an attack.

Case remanded so the trial court may issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry that includes all the information required by State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to comply with filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C)—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to provide competent representation to a client and withdrawing from representation in a proceeding without leave of court—Public reprimand.

restitution, community control, guilty plea

petition for post-conviction relief, abuse of discretion, right to testify, waiver, presumed, inferred from conduct, bias, incorporation by reference, App.R. 16(A)(7)

cell phone records – text messages – authentication – business records – insufficient evidence – identity – circumstantial evidence – jury instructions – plain error – ineffective assistance of counsel – aggravated burglary – aggravated robbery – kidnapping

summary judgment – negligence per se – R.C. 5321.04 – notice – proximate cause – expert affidavit/report – weighing the evidence – deposition testimony viewed in isolation of other testimony and taken out of context

civil sexually oriented offense protection order - insufficient evidence

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 ambiguous overly broad R.C. 187.04(C) JobsOhio trade secret. Overview: Requester sought all documentation related to respondent's bid to host the second headquarters of Amazon.com, Inc. (HQ2). Respondent asserted that the request was ambiguous and overly broad, and that that portions of the records were excepted from public records release under R.C. 187.04(C) and as trade secret information. The special master found that the request reasonably identified the formal bid document but was otherwise ambiguous and overly broad. The special master further found that R.C. 187.04(C) exempted only "records created by JobsOhio" from the Public Records Act, not information obtained from JobsOhio and then dispersed into other records of a public office. The special master found that one six-page document could be withheld as a record created by JobsOhio. The special master found that respondent failed to show that any withheld information constituted a trade secret of Cleveland. The special master recommended that the court order respondent to provide requester with the bid document, other than the exempt six pages.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 R.C. 149.433 infrastructure security video format investigatory undercover. Overview: Requester sought a copy of security camera video of a shooting incident outside the Jefferson County courthouse. Respondent asserted that the entire recording was both a security record and an infrastructure record, and that release of portions of the video would endanger the life or safety of law enforcement personnel and witnesses. The special master found that none of the video content met the definition of an infrastructure or security record, and that respondent failed to show that release of any portion of the video would endanger the life or safety of any law enforcement personnel or witness. The special master further found that the video must be exported, at requester's choice, in any video format available in the agency's software. The special master further found that respondent may redact photographs of any peace officers who hold a position or have an assignment that may include undercover or plain clothes positions or assignments. Respondent filed objections. Outcome: The court found no error of law or other defect on the face of the special master's decision and adopted the report and recommendation as its own.

On respondent's objections, the court adopted in part, rejected in part, and modified in part a special master's report and recommendation. The court sustained respondent's objections, concluding that the special master erred by ordering production of a letter without redactions and by ordering the production of an email after the special master determined that the request for the email was improperly ambiguous, overly broad, and failed to reasonably identify the records sought. The court ordered respondent to produce a copy of the letter with redactions.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 ambiguous overly broad email. Overview: Requester sought email between respondent and employees of a named company on specific dates and times. The special master found that the request as clarified prior to litigation reasonably identified the records sought. The special master further found that requester did not provide clear and convincing evidence to overcome respondent's attestation that if such emails had existed, they would have been deleted in accordance with the office records retention schedule and were no longer in her possession.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 R.C. 149.011(A) R.C. 121.22 R.C. Chapter 3517 political action committee functional equivalent case of first impression substantial public interest. Overview: Requester sought copies of invoices, meeting minutes, and bank statements from a political action committee, claiming that it was the functional equivalent of a public office. The special master found that the complaint constituted a case of first impression that involved an issue of substantial public interest. The special master recommended the court dismiss the case under R.C. 2743.75(C)(2) without prejudice to requester commencing an action in mandamus under R.C. 149.43(C)(1). Respondent filed objections. Outcome: The court found no error of law or other defect on the face of the special master's decision and adopted the report and recommendation as its own.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 R.C. 149.011(G) personal text message person responsible overly broad. Overview: Requester sought text messages between five members of city council over a period of four months. Respondent argued that a public official's text messages sent or received on a personal, privately-paid-for cell phone cannot meet the definition of "records" under RC. 149.011(G), are not "kept by" the office, and are thus not subject to the Public Records Act. The special master found that a text message stored on the personal device of a city official is a public record if its content meets the definition of "records" in R.C. 149.011(G) and "public record" in R.C. 149.43(A)(1). The special master found that the request in this case was overly broad in seeking all text messages sent or received between five officials over the substantial period of four months, and recommended the court grant the motion to dismiss on that ground.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Grandparent Visitation

CHILDREN – CUSTODY: The juvenile court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision granting permanent custody of two children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the decision was supported by ample competent and credible evidence, and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision granting permanent custody of two children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where mother continued an abusive relationship despite domestic-violence concerns, failed to adequately understand and manage her children's developmental delays and behavior issues, and failed to advance beyond the most restrictive level of supervised visitation with the children. The magistrate's decision allowing the children's In re Williams attorney to withdraw at the beginning of the permanent-custody hearing was not plain error because at the time of the withdrawal the children's wishes were aligned with the guardian ad litem's recommendation of a grant of permanent custody to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services, and the hearing did not develop evidence of a conflict between the children's wishes and the guardian ad litem's recommendation.

Crim.R. 16(B) — discovery Brady violation abuse of discretion polygraph examination DNA evidence motion for mistrial R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) — consecutive sentences manifest weight ineffective assistance of counsel cumulative error doctrine. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for mistrial or for failing to sanction appellee for alleged misconduct. There was no Brady violation where evidence of the polygraph test was disclosed during trial and appellant failed to show that the evidence was material to a finding of guilt or that it would have caused a different outcome. The information about the visit to the crime scene also failed to meet the criteria for a Brady violation. The failure to test appellant's DNA standard did not rise to the level of a Brady violation where there was no other DNA evidence recovered from the crime scene to compare to and appellant failed to provide support for his claims of police misconduct. The trial court made the necessary findings and incorporated those findings into the sentencing journal entry. Appellant provided no detailed argument or citations to support his contention that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, kidnapping, and one- and three-year firearm and criminal gang activity counts sufficient evidence was presented to support conviction on all other counts, and the evidence was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant failed to show that his trial counsel's representation fell below a reasonable standard of performance. The doctrine of cumulative error does not apply here where appellant's other assignments of error are meritless.

Separation agreement divorce decree contempt purge. Court that found a contemnor in violation of obligations contained in separation agreement incorporated into divorce decree did not err by altering the other party's rights in the separation agreement as condition for the contemnor to purge contempt.

Motion for mistrial Crim.R. 43(A) — ex parte communication transcript witness testimony. It was error where the trial court communicated with the jury outside the presence of appellant. It was an abuse of discretion where the trial court provided the trial transcript to the jury during deliberations.

Appeal No. 107001 — State of Ohio v. Cardell Doyle Unduly suggestive identification Evid.R. 901 authentication manifest weight of the evidence speedy trial void sentence. The trial court did not rely on what was deemed an unduly suggestive in-court identification during a bench trial. Further, the evidence admitted at trial was properly authenticated and identified in the record and the conviction is not against the weight of the evidence. The sentence imposed for a firearm specification attendant to a merged offense is void.

Modification of sentence R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) — consecutive sentences. There is no necessity for modification of appellant's sentence. Although the trial court made a verbal miscalculation of appellant's sentence during the sentencing hearing, the correct sentence was entered on the record and in the court's sentencing entry. There was no retaliation against appellant where he was resentenced on remand. The trial court complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) where it recited its findings at the sentencing hearing and incorporated those finding in the sentencing judgment entry. Additionally, appellant's sentence was less than the prior sentence.

Murder felonious assault, attempted murder discharge of a firearm on or near premises improperly handling firearms of a motor vehicle having a weapon while under disability firearm specifications sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence motion to strike. Convictions associated with drive by shooting supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence when defendant's action was caught on video surveillance cameras.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) failure to advise of postrelease control. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) provides in pertinent part that the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved. The requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) are nonconstitutional, and thus, this court reviews "to ensure substantial compliance" with this rule. Under this standard, a slight deviation from the text of the rule is permissible so long as the totality of the circumstances indicates that "the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving." When the trial court does not "substantially comply" with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), a reviewing court must then determine whether the trial court partially complied or failed to comply with this rule. If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect. As repeatedly recognized by the Ohio Supreme Court, a defendant must show prejudice before a plea will be vacated for a trial court's error involving Crim.R. 11(C) procedure when nonconstitutional aspects of the colloquy are at issue. The test for prejudicial effect is whether the plea would have otherwise been made. Whitfield was sentenced on offenses committed after the effective date of Senate Bill 2 he was subject to postrelease control. The trial court made no mention of postrelease control at the plea hearing. Because the trial court completely failed to comply, the plea must be vacated, and a showing of prejudice is not required. As a result of the trial court's complete failure to properly advise and impose upon Whitfield the requisite period of postrelease control, his pleas must be vacated.

107108 Class action, abuse of discretion, Civ.R. 23, mandate rule, law of the case doctrine, predominance, standing, injury, breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court was not "mandated" to only allow plaintiffs "to amend their class definition to include only those who overpaid their taxes[.]" The trial court erred in certifying plaintiffs' subclass because the issue of how the defendants' alleged misstatement affected each individual's tax liability predominates over questions common to the subclass members. The trial court erred in certifying plaintiffs' class because the class's alleged informational injury is not sufficient to confer standing and warrant class certification.

Motion to show cause separation agreement obligation to pay college expenses integration clause settlement agreement contract interpretation ambiguity integration contempt prejudgment interest R.C. 1343.03(A) due and payable attorney fees R.C. 3109.05(C) R.C. 3105.73(B). Trial court did not err in determining that subsequent settlement agreement was not intended to abrogate father's obligation to share in the costs of his daughter's college education set forth in separation agreement incorporated in divorce decree. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold father in contempt for failing to pay his share of his daughter's college expenses where although father was aware his daughter was attending college, there was no evidence he was informed of the amount of the expenses he was obligated to pay. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that father's obligation to pay his share of daughter's college expenses became "due and payable" upon her graduation for purposes of prejudgment interest award under R.C. 1343.03(A). Mother was not entitled to recover her attorney fees under R.C. 3109.05(C) and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the parties' mutual requests for attorney fees and legal expenses under R.C. 3105.73(B) where both parties were responsible for the voluminous, protracted litigation in the case.

Mandatory fine R.C. 2929.18(B) R.C. 2929.19 drug trafficking indigent motion to waive. The imposition of a mandatory fine was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the court considered the defendant's future ability to pay the fine and concluded that the defendant was not indigent and unable to pay the fine.

Pursuant to application of State v. Ireland, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2018-Ohio-4494, on remand from the Supreme Court of Ohio, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that appellant's defense of blackout resulting from PTSD (or insanity-related defense) was an affirmative defense that appellant had to prove by preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the remaining assignments of error, not previously considered prior to remand, were decided. The trial court did not err in permitting certain remarks by the prosecutor ,even if improper, as those remarks did not prejudicially affect the substantial rights of appellant. The trial court did not err in omitting from the verbal jury instructions the term "unconscious" as appellant did not argue that prejudice resulted therefrom and the term was included in the written instructions. The trial court did not commit plain error, when considering the context of the expert testimony, in permitting the expert to testify "the law requires." Finally, the trial court did not commit cumulative error. All assignments of error overruled. Judgment affirmed.

Relator's request for a writ of mandamus is denied as relator has not established a clear legal right to have her State Employment Relation's Board issue a probable cause finding on her unfair labor practice charge or a clear legal duty on the part of SERB to do so. Writ denied.

The trial court correctly held that under Ohio's Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, defendant, an underground coal mine operator, was liable for subsidence damages to surface structures of plaintiff, a pipeline operator, but the trial court improperly excluded from the measure of damages those pre-mining mitigation expenses incurred to protect the pipeline and avoid catastrophic failure. Preventive measures incurred to reduce damage from anticipated and inevitable tortious conduct are compensable as a matter of judicial and economic effiency.

Trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) with respect to appellant's guilty plea to the charge of rape because court did not inform appellant of the sex offender classification, registration, and notification requirements that would result from conviction on that charge and there was no other basis on which the court could determine that appellant understood those penalties. Trial court did not commit plain error by failing to make a formal finding on the record that appellant was competent to stand trial or enter a plea because a mental evaluation ordered at the request of counsel found appellant to be competent, appellant's counsel stipulated to the mental evaluation report on two separate occasions, and there were no other indicia of incompetence in the record.

Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in granting claimant's PTD application where the medical opinion relied on by the commission provided some evidence to support the commission's finding that claimant is incapable of sustained remunerative employment solely due to the allowed impairment. Because claimant was medically incapable of sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed impairment, the commission was not required to consider non-medical disability factors before granting PTD, including claimant's lack of participation in re-education and retraining. Writ denied.

There is insufficient evidence to support Groce's conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and the attendant firearm specification. However, there is sufficient evidence to support Groce's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, and illegal manufacture of drugs, and the attendant firearm specifications on these convictions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its evidentiary rulings, the prosecutor's statements in closing arguments did not deprive Groce of a fair trial, Groce did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court did not err in ruling on Groce's Batson challenge, and the trial court did not err in determining which of Groce's convictions merged with one another.

The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion when it found the Ohio School Board's order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Trial court did not plainly err in instructing the jury on the weight and credibility afforded to accomplice testimony because the jury instruction given by the trial court substantially complied with the language required by R.C. 2923.03(D). Appellant's convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated murder, and attempted murder were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's presentence motion for dismissal "pursuant to Crim.R. 29 and the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution" filed after this court decided his direct appeal, affirming in part and reversing in part, and remanding only for resentencing particular counts and to address sex-offender classification. Appellant's assignments of error are overruled on the grounds of res judicata, law of the case, and on the merits, seeing no course to revisit the issues raised and previously addressed by this court's decision in appellant's direct appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in finding granddaughter of a former nursing facility resident not liable for breach of a personal guaranty where the guaranty was based on an invalid residency agreement. Trial court also held the resident was not liable to the nursing facility however, the nursing facility did not appeal the trial court's judgment in favor of the resident or otherwise argue on appeal how the debt survived judgment to trigger the granddaughter's obligation as guarantor. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant-appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to provide evidence that a school facilities task force, formed to gather financial information and assist a public school board in making financial decisions, engaged in deliberations as opposed to information gathering when it participated in a private tour of a school. As a result, the alleged lack of an open meeting did not invalidate a resolution, rule, or formal action of the school board under R.C. 121.22(H). Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in convicting defendant of obstructing official business after guilty verdict based on evidence that defendant both reentered his residence after being told by police not to do so and verbally interfered with officers' attempts to investigate a report of a person calling for help inside defendant's residence. Trial court acted within its discretion in giving OJI jury instruction, in declining to give additional instructions proposed by defendant, and in its response to a jury question. Cumulative effect of other alleged mistakes did not amount to constitutional deprivation. Judgment affirmed, and matter remanded for corrective nunc pro tunc judgment entry.

The juvenile court's grant of permanent custody to MCCS was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father failed to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child's removal from the home, he was unable to provide an adequate and permanent home for the child, and Father's parental rights had been previously terminated and he failed to provide evidence that, notwithstanding the prior termination, he could provide a legally secure permanent placement for the child. Granting permanent custody to MCCS was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court erred in a few discrete respects as to the final judgment regarding the parties' divorce. The trial court erred by failing to explain why it did not treat husband's claimed inheritance from an aunt as his separate property rather than as marital property, and by failing to classify wife's 2016 tax refund as a marital asset and husband's 2016 tax debt as a marital liability. In addition, the trial court made a mathematical error in calculating husband's expected future income, and does not appear to have credited husband for a claimed prior payment toward wife's attorney fees. Judgment reversed and matter remanded as to those limited issues judgment affirmed in all other respects.

Appellant, following negotiations, pleaded guilty to several drug related offenses. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of twelve and one-half years in prison, with the sentence including the imposition of consecutive service. The trial court did not consider improper sentencing factors. Further, the consecutive sentences are not contrary to law, nor can we conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err by admitting a computerized criminal history (CCH) printout under the public-records hearsay exception in Evid.R. 803(8). Nor did the trial court err by overruling Appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal of the weapons under disability charge. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for having weapons under disability. The CCH printout was competent, credible evidence that Appellant had a prior felony conviction for drug trafficking. The evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for one count of aggravated possession of drugs where an expert testified that she had relied on the imprint and appearance of a particular set of pills, as well as testing to confirm the substances contained therein. However, the evidence was not sufficient with respect to a second set of pills, where the expert testified that the appearance and imprint of the pills suggested a particular drug, but the pills were not tested to confirm their content, and the expert testified that she "had no idea for sure" what was in those pills. Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new judgment entry.

Suppression urine test

On certified order of the Supreme Court of Nevada.

The trial court abused its discretion in applying post hoc review to the facts to find a willful violation of Civ.R. 11 and frivolous conduct, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51.

Prison sentence clearly and convincingly supported by the record, with challenge to consecutive sentences not before the court on appeal. Appellant failed to appeal the judgment in a separate case, imposing a sentence to run consecutively to the sentence on appeal.

Appellant's guilty plea waived alleged discovery errors the state did not breach the plea agreement.

Sentence imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a), not R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f)'s language now codified under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g). No prejudice demonstrated, and failure to notify as set forth in language of R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g) at sentencing does not constitute prejudicial error or automatic reversal.

Trial court properly found that appellant was not entitled to exclusive occupancy of certain trust real estate, where the clear and unambiguous language contained in the trust agreement granted appellant exclusive occupancy of another piece of trust real estate.

R.C. 2953.32 – motion to seal record of conviction – defendant's burden to present evidence or testimony – rehabilitation – weighing interests

Contempt, criminal, direct, constructive presence, due process

permanent custody, best interest, R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)(c) 2151.414(E)(11), cognitive impairment, prior termination, reasonable efforts, failure to preserve

waiver of counsel, Crim.R. 44, mootness, App.R. 12(A)(1)(c)

The defendant-appellant's assault convictions are based on sufficient evidence. The defendant-appellant's consecutive sentences are not contrary to law.

Because defendant-appellant voluntarily satisfied the portion of the trial court's judgment relevant to his appeal, defendant-appellant's appeal is dismissed as moot.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Criminal law—Sentencing. The trial court did not err when it sentenced appellant to an eight-year mandatory prison term for the second-degree felony offense because the sentence was supported by the record and was not contrary to law. Furthermore, there was no error in the trial court's decision to run the sentences consecutively to one another because the court made the necessary statutory findings.

Statements made by the trial court regarding the various requirements and restrictions appellant faced as a Tier III sex offender were such that the trial court, at worst, substantially complied with the nonconstitutional provisions of Crim.R. 11(C) despite the trial court's failure to explicitly notify appellant that he would be subject to a mandatory community notification requirement. There was also no error in the trial court's sentencing decision where the trial court's statement that appellant held a "position of trust" was not based on an impermissible finding under R.C. 2929.12(B)(3) but merely a reference to appellant's relationship to the victim as permissible under R.C. 2929.12(B)(6).

Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where filing a motion to suppress evidence and statements taken during the traffic stop during which appellant was a passenger would not have been successful.

Trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to show that he was entitled to any substantive grounds for relief.

JNOV - Motion for new trial

No standing to assign as error lack of service on non-party

CIVIL - complaint for declaratory judgment lacked standing dismissal with prejudice on merits preclusive effect of res judicata is hypothetical will not give advisory opinion.

CIV.R. 60(B) - permanent custody termination of parental rights motion to vacate disrupted placement unadopted child change of circumstances parents whose rights have been terminated may not obtain custody in the future upon their own initiative "opportunity interest" "reinstatement statute."

JUVENILE - custody paternal grandmother best interest factors R.C. 3109.04(F) factors adequately considered mother has done little to meet case plan goals mental health and alcohol issues living arrangements problematic denial not abuse of discretion.

Trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss based on alleged speedy trial violation because state did not act unreasonably or in bad faith by providing a more detailed supplemental bill of particulars on the morning of trial when it did not acquire the new information until the date of trial.

PROBATE - Trial court's finding that consent was required by biological father in adoption proceedings was supported by competent and credible evidence.

CRIMINAL - Appellant's conviction for theft was supported by sufficient evidence in the record and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Permanent custody - father

Permanent custody - father

Permanent custody - father

Permanent custody mother's appeal

Permanent custody mother's appeal

Trial court did not err in its determination that appellee's foreclosure action was timely filed within the applicable statute of limitations.

Appellant's failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirement set forth in R.C. 5717.04 regarding the inclusion of assignments of error in the notice of appeal deprived this court of jurisdiction over the appeal. Appellee's application for reconsideration and motion to dismiss are granted. We vacate our May 22, 2018 decision and dismiss this appeal.

The trial court did not err in resentencing Oller on his conviction of involuntary manslaughter and the RVO specification.

The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to vacate.

Court affirmed trial court's granting summary judgment in favor of note's holder.

Because appellants failed to file a brief that included discernable arguments and the brief did not conform with multiple rules of appellate procedure, the appeal is sua sponte dismissed under App.R. 18(C). Appeal dismissed.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to correct void judgment.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) on the basis of fraud, where the motion was filed more than three years after the judgment at issue and where the motion simply reiterated the arguments made on direct appeal, which had been denied.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the award of permanent custody to FCCS.

Appellant fails to demonstrate that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Judgment affirmed.

Pretrial motion, specific performance of plea agreement, plea offer, revised, guilty plea, waiver, knowing, voluntary, coercion, App.R. 16(A)(7), interference with plea negotiation

dependent – legal custody – manifest weight of the evidence – best interest of the children

2925.11(B)(2)—immunity—minor drug possession offense

allocation of parental rights, App.R. 12(A)(2), App.R. 16(A)(7)

defendant seeks vacation of Alford plea on grounds plea not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary as not strong evidence of actual guilt in the record maximum sentence.

sufficiency complicity to murder obstructing justice purpose of providing false information admissibility of photographs of the victim showing body cut in half ineffective assistance of counsel cumulative error remand for new sentencing entry incorporating consecutive sentence findings made at sentencing hearing.

Non-prosecution agreements voluntariness of statements sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence prior calculation and design.

Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) testimonial hearsay State v. Ricks, 136 Ohio St.3d 356, 2013-Ohio-3712, 995 N.E.2d 1181 harmless beyond a reasonable doubt prosecutorial misconduct plain error rebuttal witness cumulative error ineffective assistance of counsel speedy trial.

Sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence admission of text messages does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the messages are a party opponent admission and are authenticated sufficiency of indictment.

Sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence admission of text messages does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the messages are a party opponent admission and are authenticated.

R.C. 2929.13(B)(2) requires a sentencing court to consider the requisite sentencing factors when imposing a sentence sentencing courts are permitted to consider arrests that did not result in conviction before imposing sentence.

An advisement that a defendant is waiving his right to a "speedy and public trial" is insufficient to adequately inform a defendant of his right to a jury trial where the right to a jury trial is not otherwise mentioned at the plea hearing sentence argument is moot.

affirming trial court's denial of motion to correct the record which asked court to label rape sentences as mandatory 2006 sentencing entry did not say rape sentences were mandatory, but sentences were mandatory by operation of law.

Aggravated burglary, robbery, allied offenses of similar import, separate animus

WEAPONS UNDER DISABILITY - EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTION

DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT - MANIFEST WEIGHT

LEGAL CUSTODY - R.C. 2151.353(A) - MOTION FOR DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE

CRIMINAL - Trial court erred by not holding a hearing on Appellant's motion to withdraw guilty plea.

On application for reinstatement.

On application for reinstatement.

App.R. 26(B) untimely application for reopening timeliness almost 20-year delay good cause.

Collision involving patrol vehicle emergency call political subdivision liability R.C. 2744.02(B) individual liability R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) wanton misconduct willful misconduct reckless conduct R.C. 2315.21(B)(1) bifurcation punitive damages plain error voir dire prospective juror exclusion of expert testimony blood alcohol serum test results impairment Evid.R. 403(A) Evid.R. 702 evidence of prior convictions witness impeachment Evid. R. 609 juror misconduct mistrial providing tissues to crying witnesses R.C. 2744.05(B)(1) setoff for insurance benefits motion for new trial Civ.R. 59(A)(6) manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court did not err in failing to bifurcate punitive and compensatory damages issues where appellants did not file a motion requesting bifurcation of punitive and compensatory damages issues before trial. Trial court did not advocate for an eight-figure judgment when questioning potential jurors during voir dire and did not abuse its discretion in excusing a prospective juror for cause after the juror indicated that he did not think he could award plaintiffs an eight-figure judgment even if the evidence warranted it. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding appellants' expert from testifying that, based on the results of a blood serum alcohol test, plaintiff driver was impaired and was unable to operate a vehicle safely at the time of the accident. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit hard copies of prior convictions for felonious assault and a drug-related charge where witness freely admitted that he had pled guilty to the charges. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial after a juror provided tissues to two crying witnesses. Appellants were not entitled to introduce evidence of any insurance offsets to which they might entitled under R.C. 2744.05(B)(1) through the testimony of a witness during trial. Jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There was substantial competent, credible evidence in the record upon which the jury could have reasonably found that police officer acted wantonly, willfully and recklessly in causing accident.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, timely filed, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, consecutive terms of incarceration, multiple firearm specifications ordered to be served consecutively, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(g), defective indictment, subject matter jurisdiction of court of common pleas over criminal felony charges. The applicant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied. The applicant has raised three proposed assignments of error in support of his application for reopening. Our review of the applicant's proposed assignments of error fails to disclose the existence of any ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the applicant has also failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the failure of appellate counsel to raise any of the three proposed assignments or error on appeal. Appellate counsel is not required to argue on appeal assignments of error that are meritless.

Obstructing justice R.C. 2921.32(A)(6) Crim.R. 31(A) jury unanimity alternative means multiple acts maximum sentences consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Defendant's conviction for obstructing justice affirmed. He was not deprived of jury unanimity under Crim.R. 31(A) because the case involved alternative means rather than multiple acts. The case was an alternative means case because the indictment charging the criminal offense of obstructing justice alleged one single conceptual grouping thus jury, therefore, was not required to agree on the brute underlying facts because each set of facts would satisfy the elements of obstructing justice. The imposition of a maximum sentence for each offense was not contrary to law, but the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was contrary to law because the trial court did not consider the relevant statutory language.

Motion to dismiss for preindictment delay. In reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss for preindictment delay, this court applies a de novo standard of review to the legal issues, but we afford great deference to the findings of fact made by the trial judge. The statute of limitations for a criminal offense is the defendant's primary protection against overly stale criminal charges. However, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides additional protection in cases where the preindictment delay was unjustifiable and caused actual prejudice. The Ohio Supreme Court established a burden shifting framework for analyzing a due process claim based on preindictment delay. Under this framework, the defendant bears the initial burden of presenting evidence of actual prejudice. Once a defendant presents evidence of actual prejudice, the burden shifts to the state to produce evidence of a justifiable reason for the delay. Therefore, if the defendant fails to establish actual prejudice, the court is not required to consider the reasons for the delay. A court must 'consider the evidence as it exists when the indictment is filed and the prejudice the defendant will suffer at trial due to the delay. A claim of actual prejudice should be scrutinized "vis à vis the particular evidence that was lost or unavailable as a result of the delay" and "the relevance of the lost evidence and its purported effect on the defense." After independently considering the evidence as it existed when this indictment was filed, we find that Willingham has been prejudiced by the 17-year delay. It is clear from the record that Willingham could have been identified as early as 2004, if the rape kit had been tested. Whether through negligence or error in judgment, the police ceased to actively investigate the case, which is not a justifiable reason for delay.

Ethnic intimidation aggravated menacing R.C. 2903.21 insufficient evidence. Judgment modified and remanded. Insufficient evidence supported defendant's ethnic intimidation conviction where the record did not demonstrate that the defendant intentionally and specifically threatened the victim with a gun because of his race. Rather, the threats were prompted by their dispute over where the car was parked. There is sufficient evidence in the record, however, that the defendant knowingly caused the victim to believe that he would cause serious physical harm to him. Therefore, the defendant's conviction for ethnic intimidation is modified to aggravated menacing and remanded for sentencing.

107165 - S/O v. Louis Driscoll Guilty plea constitutional waive Fourth Amendment search seizure admission Crim.R. 11. A voluntary, knowing, and intelligent guilty plea waives any alleged constitutional violations unrelated to the entry of the guilty plea and nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.

Civ.R. 56, summary judgment, breach of contract, Business Opportunity Plan Act, R.C. 1334.11.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). The defendant's assignment of error is moot to the extent that it challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence because he completed his sentence during the pendency of the appeal. The trial court inadvertently failed to incorporate its statutory findings supporting consecutive sentences in its journal entry. Case is remanded for trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry incorporating the statutory findings and correcting the clerical errors concerning the defendant's felony conviction.

Community-based correctional facility probation violator R.C. 2929.15 State v. Paige.

Post-conviction relief

ineffective assistance of counsel, manifest weight, sufficiency, criminal damaging or endangering

motion to withdraw plea, timing, reasonable, prejudice, codefendant, sentencing

In forma pauperis motion abuse of discretion R.C. 2323.31 — court filing fees Civ.R. 55 — motion for default judgment Civ.R. 12(A)(1) — service of answer Civ.R. 33(A)(2) — discovery requests Civ.R. 56 — summary judgment res judicata. Appellant was shown to have filed numerous civil cases, motions, and notices in prior cases as well as in this current case. It was not an abuse of discretion where the trial court denied appellant's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Where the trial court granted leave to appellee to file her answer outside of the prescribed 28 days, denial of appellant's motion for default judgment was proper. Appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced where he was not transported to attend a scheduled final pretrial. The trial court granted appellee summary judgment prior to the scheduled final pretrial therefore no final pretrial was held. Appellant's motions for discovery filed prior to commencement of the action due to failure of service were properly denied there was no prejudice to appellant on his subsequent motions for discovery where summary judgment was granted on res judicata. Appellant was considered a creditor in appellee's bankruptcy case appellant's claims should have been presented in appellee's bankruptcy proceedings. Appellant's claims are therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment.

Crim.R. 44 — right to self-representation bias Evid.R. 611 — trial court's discretion to set procedure compulsory process reversible prejudice manifest weight jury instruction — complicity R.C. 2971.01(h)(1) — sexually violent predator merger of counts. The trial court engaged in extensive dialogue with appellant on trial procedures, questioned appellant on his understanding of those procedures, informed appellant that he would be held to the same standards as that of an attorney, referred appellant to a psychiatric evaluation and accepted appellant's timely written waiver. Appellant's request to represent himself was clearly and knowingly made. The trial court did not err in granting appellant's request to represent himself. Representing himself, a portion of appellant's questions were either inappropriate or inadmissible and properly objected to the trial court did not show bias against appellant. The trial court established the procedure that standby counsel would assist appellant. It was not error, for security reasons, that appellant was not allowed at sidebar, rather standby counsel communicated appellant's wishes to the trial court at sidebar. Appellant suffered no reversible prejudice where appellant failed to properly serve proposed witnesses with a subpoena. Appellant failed to provide any authority showing that a victim is required to testify in a rape case the trier of fact can determine guilt based on circumstantial and direct evidence and the credibility of other witnesses. Sufficient evidence was shown that a second offender was involved with the sexual assault of the victim and that appellant worked in concert with the other offender. The trial court's jury instruction on complicity was proper. Appellant's offenses occurred prior to the amendment of the statute and it was error to classify appellant a sexually violent predator based on the amended statute. Appellant's offenses involved different types of sexual activity and the trial court properly ruled that the offenses were not allied offenses.

Appellants waived argument on appeal that was not raised in their memorandum contra appellee's motion for summary judgment. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellee.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for a continuance of second trial date where appellant did not inform the court of the length of delay sought, appellant failed to appear on time for the first trial date, prosecutor and prosecutor's witnesses were ready to proceed, appellant was on notice of the date of trial, and appellant had the opportunity to view prosecutor's video evidence prior to trial. Appellant failed to support his argument that municipal ordiance regulating texting while driving was superseded by state statute.

Mandamus denied parole board records not inaccurate prior inaccuracy corrected.

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine found atop a tree stump next to where defendant experienced an overdose. The guilty verdict was based not merely on defendant's proximity to the cocaine, but on the totality of the circumstances. Conviction also was not against manifest weight of the evidence, as circumstantial evidence supported the inference that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine, and no compelling contrary evidence was presented. Defendant's trial attorney did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to make defendant aware of 911 Good Samaritan Law protections, as defendant was ineligible under R.C. 2925.11(B)(2)(a)(viii) because she was serving community control at the time of the new drug possession charge. Judgment affirmed.

Upon receipt of Burns' Affidavit by Accusation, which named the Prosecutor's Office as defendant, the reviewing official, namely the trial court, had only two options: either to issue an arrest warrant or to refer the matter to the prosecuting attorney or attorney charged by law with the prosecution of offenses in the court or before the magistrate. Since the trial court instead summarily dismissed the affidavit, the matter is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with R.C. 2935.10. (Froelich, J., concurring.) (Hall, J., dissenting.)

The record does not clearly and convincingly fail to support the appellant's 12-month prison sentence for aggravated drug possession. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

Anders appeal. Defendant pled guilty to possession of cocaine, a fifth-degree felony. Defendant waived a presentence investigation and acknowledged that he was would not receive community control absent a presentence investigation. The court had discretion to impose a prison sentence due to defendant's prior felonies and prison sentences. No non-frivolous issues exist related to pre-trial matters, defendant's plea, or defendant's maximum 12-month sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant used methamphetamine while on community control sanctions for a fourth-degree felony. Such conduct, though not charged, constituted felonious drug use, which allowed the trial court to impose a prison term in excess of 180 days upon revocation of community control, under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii). Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by issuing a sentencing entry that referred to an improper payment schedule for the collection of court costs. The sentencing entry at issue will be modified to excise the language referring to the improper payment schedule. Judgment affirmed as modified.

The trial court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the issue of whether Appellant WMCD, an ambulatory surgical facility, was entitled to a variance from the requirement to obtain a written transfer agreement with a local hospital the denial of the variance application by the Director of the Ohio Department of Health was final and not subject to judicial review in the court of common pleas. An abuse of discretion is not demonstrated since the order revoking and refusing to renew WMCD's ambulatory surgical facility license was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was not contrary to law. Pursuant to Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 153 Ohio St.3d 362, 2018-Ohio-440, 106 N.E.3d 1209, this Court will not address WMCD's argument that R.C. 3702.303, which requires ambulatory surgical facilities to obtain written transfer agreements, is unconstitutional. Judgment affirmed.

gender discrimination, at-will employee, similarly situated, union member, relevant similarity, burden-shifting, circumstantial evidence, comparator

DNA testing, R.C. 2953.74(B)(1)

defamation, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, whistleblower, R.C. 4113.52, statutory immunity, R.C. 2744.03, motion for summary judgment, genuine issue of material fact

motion to vacate default judgment – jurisdiction – perfect an appeal, timely file – App.R. 3 - App.R. 4 – Civ.R. 54(B) – final appealable order – motion to dismiss – failure to state a claim – Civ.R. 12(B)(6) - quiet title - slander of title – motion to amend complaint - Civ.R. 15(A)

adjudication – dependent – R.C. 2151.04(C) – physician-patient privilege – standing – manifest weight of the evidence – reasonable efforts – plain error

venue – residence of custodian – adjudication – neglected – dependent – clear and convincing evidence – manifest weight – disposition – temporary custody – best interest of the child

petition for post-conviction relief, R.C. 2953.21, untimely, R.C. 2953.23

burglary – aiding and abetting – mere presence – sufficiency – weight – jury instructions – accessory after the fact – abuse of discretion – resulting prejudice

penalty enhancement—actual weight—constructive possession

motion to compel arbitration – arbitration agreement - R.C. 2711.03

right to counsel in civil matters, summary judgment, certificate of service, affidavit, failure to serve, judicial bias

magistrate's decision – independent review – Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d)

Crim.R. 11—guilty plea

P.C. - MANIFEST WEIGHT

CIVIL - governmental immunity R.C. 2744.01 soverign immunity by political subdivision R.C. 2744.02 failure to keep roadway "in repair" R.C. 2744.03 affirmed denial of motion for summary judgment.

CIVIL - governmental immunity R.C. 2744.01 soverign immunity by political subdivision R.C. 2744.02 failure to keep roadway "in repair" R.C. 2744.03 affirmed denial of motion for summary judgment.

CIVIL - breach of contract justifiable reliance fraud unjust enrichment negligence breach of fiduciary duty accounting failure to establish damages failure to plead damages with specificity directed verdict appealed de novo lack of judicial bias.

CRIMINAL - Violating a Protection Order competency evaluation initial hearing R.C. 2947.37(B) presumed competent joinder of offenses prejudice Evid.R. 404(B) simple and distinct evidence manifest weight of the evidence sufficiency of the evidence credibility of witnesses

CRIMINAL LAW - Passing Bad Checks R.C. 2913.11 "not guilty" plea prospective jurors challenged for cause abuse of discretion fair and impartial jury peremptory challenge Crim.R. 29 manifest weight of the evidence presumption of purpose to defraud R.C. 2913.01 evidence sufficient to justify denial of motion for judgment of acquittal jury verdict not against the weight of the evidence.

CRIMINAL - felony sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

APPELLATE REVIEW - trial court judgment can only be reviewed on appeal if it constitutes a final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B) multiple claims remain pending interlocutory order no mandatory language that there is no just reason for delay lack of a final and appealable order.

APPELLATE REVIEW - trial court judgment can only be reviewed on appeal if it constitutes a final order pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B) multiple claims remain pending interlocutory order no mandatory language that there is no just reason for delay lack of a final and appealable order.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - writ of procedendo mootness duty already performed presumption of intent to deny motion

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and appellant's conviction for felony murder was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court entry denying defendant's motion to correct his original judgement of conviction and sentence was a final appealable order. Sentencing entry that lacks the judge's signature does not comply with Crim.R. 32(C) and should be corrected by means of a nunc pro tunc entry.

Adoption petition by stepfather. Zero dollar child support order. No contact order. Father's consent to adoption required.

Double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon, R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), following an acquittal as to a charge of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, R.C. 2923.16(B), and a mistrial as to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon.

Appellant's convictions for rape and abduction are supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, where the state introduced evidence establishing that appellant restrained the victim inside her residence, prevented her from answering the door when police officers arrived, and forced her to have sexual intercourse by grabbing her by the neck and penetrating her.

Appellant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel.

In a dispositional proceeding for a dependent child, trial court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem under R.C. 2151.281(B)(2)(b) does not amount to plain error in absence of any evidence that a conflict of interest existed between child and father and/or that appointment would have affected the outcome. No abuse of discretion found where record supported trial court's conclusion that child's best interests would be served by change of custody from Mother to Father.

No trial court abuse of discretion when it denied appellant's motion to vacate guilty pleas. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence became final when the sentencing entry was journalized. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify its final order and did not have authority under R.C. 2929.20 to modify appellant's sentence, so it did not err by denying appellant's motion to modify his sentence.

Trial court did not err in sentencing appellant. Judgment affirmed.

Although the trial court failed to inform appellant of the effect of his guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 11(E), appellant did not assert innocence at the plea hearing, so he was presumed to understand that his guilty plea was a complete admission of his guilt. Thus, to have his plea vacated, appellant was required to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(E), which he failed to do.

The trial court did not err in accepting appellant's guilty plea despite his inability to remember the incident precipitating the charges. Misstatement of sentence high or intoxicated memory knowing and voluntary.

forfeiture by wrongdoing, excited utterance, scope of re-cross examination, R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), Eight Amendment, life without parole, consecutive sentences, moot

Destruction of Exhibits Depositions and Transcripts

Sentence contrary to law

Declaratory judgment on the disbursement of settlement proceeds, summary judgment, exempted taxes recovered

juvenile lesser included offense aggravated murder involuntary manslaughter trial sentence vindictive sentence probation life imprisonment

Trial court did not err in denying motion to dismiss where defendant failed to provide notice of his request for final disposition upon the prosecutor's office.

The juvenile court did not err in denying father's motion to set aside administrative child support orders and juvenile court child support orders.

Appellant's due process rights were not violated and the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to terminate his commitment where the trial court properly considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2945.401(E) and found clear and convincing evidence that appellant remained a mentally ill person subject to court order.

Appellant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence supported the trial court's decision finding appellant had operated a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs after an officer found appellant "passed out" in the vehicle's driver's seat with an open can of beer in the center console cupholder while the vehicle was still running and in gear facing against traffic stopped halfway on pavement and halfway on grass with its brake lights illuminated.

Criminal Law—Community Control Violation—Sentencing. The trial court did not err when it imposed a ten-month prison sentence for a community control violation. The 90-day prison limitation provision of R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) did not apply because appellant committed a violation of law that constituted a felony criminal offense by testing positive for cocaine use, an F5 offense, on a probation ordered drug screen.

Trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) where there were no substantive grounds for relief that requires invocation of the civil rules.

A grandmother appeals the juvenile court's decision denying her complaint for custody of her grandchildren, who she alleged were abused by their mother. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the grandmother did not meet her burden of producing competent and credible evidence that the mother was an unsuitable parent and denying the grandmother's complaint for custody.

The trial court erred by granting appellee's motion to suppress where there was sufficient evidence to support the officer's decision to arrest appellee on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Despite the officer not witnessing appellee operating a vehicle, probable cause nevertheless existed where appellee was seen getting up from the ground next to a vehicle, exhibited a strong odor of alcoholic beverage on his person, had "very watery" eyes, "some degree" of "garbled" and slurred speech, and "balance issues" causing him to be unsteady on his feet both while walking and standing still.

Criminal Law—Sentencing: Restitution & Consecutive Sentence Findings. The trial court did not err when it imposed restitution, because the record showed the trial court considered appellant's present and future ability to pay. The trial court's consecutive sentence findings were harmless error, because the court is only required to give those findings when it actually imposes consecutive sentences at the original sentencing or at a later community control violation hearing.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to recuse from cases in which judge's impartiality could reasonably be questioned—Significant mitigating factors—Public reprimand.

Disclosure of confidential informant manifest weight motion to suppress consecutive sentences Evid.R. 410 plea negotiations indigent defendant right to counsel.

Juvenile court did not err in determining sufficient, credible evidence existed in support of finding probable cause to transfer jurisdiction to the general division of the common pleas court where police conduct surrounding out-of-court identification was not unnecessarily suggestive and the witness who made in court identification was subject to cross-examination. Counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to call an expert witness to testify about reliability of eyewitness testimony, or failing to file a motion to suppress or otherwise argue the reliability of eyewitness identification.

POST-RELEASE CONTROL - RETROACTIVITY

Criminal law—Final, appealable orders—A trial court's decision to exercise its discretion not to impose a monetary or community-service sentence must be clearly communicated in text of entry—Court of appeals' dismissal of appeal from judgment of conviction that was silent as to sentence affirmed.

Mandamus—Public-records law—Public office's responses to public-records requests were either incomplete or unreasonably delayed—Writ denied—Statutory damages awarded—Costs denied.

NEGLIGENCE – SLIP AND FALL – OPEN AND OBVIOUS: Where any danger posed by a mat that plaintiff tripped on was open and obvious, and where no attendant circumstances were present that would have distracted plaintiff and diverted her attention, defendants owed no duty of care to plaintiff, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's negligence claim.

LANDLORD AND TENANT – RES JUDICATA: The trial court erred in holding that the defendant landlord's previous suit against the plaintiff tenant for forcible entry and detainer and money damages barred the tenant's suit for personal injury where the record does not reflect that the landlord's previous claim for money damages reached a judgment.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – R.C. 3109.04(B)(1): The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying father's post-divorce decree motion for a change in custody, because the magistrate found there was no substance to father's assertion of a change in circumstances, a threshold factor for a change in custody, and father's objection to the finding was not supported by a transcript or other acceptable recording of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding, including the magistrate's in-camera interview of the parties' oldest child. The trial court did not violate R.C. 3109.04(B)(1) by denying father's motion for a second in-camera interview of the child in a change-of-custody proceeding that had been referred to a magistrate, because the magistrate's in-camera interview of the child satisfied the requirement of the statute.

negligence, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, open and obvious, attendant circumstances

frivolous conduct, R.C. 2323.51, preemption, res judicata, estoppel, Civ.R. 11

Guilty plea—evidence outside the record—ineffective assistance

motion to withdraw plea, abuse of discretion, hearing, Alford plea

supervised visitation – manifest weight of the evidence

On certified order of the Supreme Court of Florida.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

R.C. 2953.21 res judicata. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying petition to vacate conviction for aggravated murder and other offenses where the claims in support of the petition raised issues that were previously raised or could have been raised in petitioner's direct appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court or were otherwise without merit.

Trafficking in persons R.C. 2905.32(A)(1) multiple acts Crim.R. 31(A) multiple distinct conceptual groups plain error sex offender classification R.C. 2950.01(F)(1)(g) sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R. 404(B) discovery violation. R.C. 2905.32(A)(1) involves multiple acts because the offense involves multiple distinct conceptual groupings thus, to ensure juror unanimity under Crim.R. 31(A), the state should have elected or the jury should have been instructed which act the defendant committed. However, no objection was raised, and this court exercised its discretion to not recognize plain error. No manifest injustice was found where the defendant was labeled a Tier II sex offender because the evidence at trial demonstrated that defendant's conduct under R.C. 2905.32(A)(1) was sexual in nature and not just for involuntary servitude purposes. Defendant's conviction for trafficking in persons is supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record demonstrates that the defendant enticed, maintained, and provided for the prostitute-victim and her son. Despite the state committing a discovery violation by failing to timely disclose a witness, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a mistrial or strike the witness's testimony. The trial court abused its discretion in allowing other acts evidence, but the error was harmless when viewing the context of the entire trial.

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive trial court of subject matter jurisdiction or indicate claimant lacks standing because it is an affirmative defense Trial court did not abuse its discretion in certifying a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23(b)(2) and (3).

immunity employee police summary judgment malicious bad faith reckless conduct wanton misconduct.

Medicaid authorized representative R.C. 119.12 R.C. 5101.35 Ohio Adm.Code 5106:1-2-08(C) 42 C.F.R.435.923 jurisdiction standing. Common pleas court erred in dismissing appeal of administrative appeal decision, appealing denial of Medicaid benefits, for lack of jurisdiction. Nursing care facility, which had been designated as resident's Medicaid authorized representative, had standing to file an appeal on behalf of the resident in the common pleas court to challenge the denial of her Medicaid benefits.

Evid.R. 404(B) prior criminal history harmless error ineffective assistance of counsel manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant's convictions for attempted murder and associated offenses affirmed as being supported by the weight of the evidence in the record. Isolated references to defendant's prior criminal history were harmless as they were inadvertent and not introduced to show that defendant acted in conformity with his character. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a curative jury instruction as there was no reasonable possibility that the isolated testimony contributed to defendant's convictions.

107097 - S/O v. E.C. Sealing records of conviction expungement R.C. 2953.32 eligible offender offense of violence R.C. 2901.01 R.C. 2911.02. The trial court erred in granting appellee's application to seal the records of his criminal conviction. Appellee was convicted of robbery, an offense of violence, and thus was not eligible for expungement.

State v. Turner, App. No. 107102 Bestiality R.C. 959.21(B) extrajudicial statement corpus delicti sufficient evidence manifest weight of the evidence community control conditions home inspections.The state satisfied the minimal burden of providing some evidence tending to prove that the crime of bestiality was committed and, thus, the court's admission of the appellant's extrajudicial statement was proper. The state provided sufficient circumstantial evidence demonstrating the appellant engaged in sexual conduct with a dog where the appellant discussed sexual acts with a dog he identified the breed, age, and gender of the dog about which the dog's owner testified the dog's owner testified concerning the dog's uncharacteristically strange behavior exhibited immediately after staying with the appellant, in the appellant's bed, including excessively licking her genitals and her discomfort during veterinarian exams. The conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellant's explanation that his statements concerning the sexual act with the dog were designed to distract his boyfriend from desiring sex with children was not credible. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing conditions of community control, including allowing random home inspections by the APL.

R.C. 2953.08 felony sentences R.C. 2929.14 consecutive sentences Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw plea ineffective assistance of counsel. The record demonstrates that appellant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and that defense counsel's performance was not deficient. Appellant was advised by the trial court of the applicable sentencing ranges, the impact of the plea agreement to waive merger of the charges, and the possibility of consecutive sentence imposition. The consecutive sentence findings were properly journalized.

107282 - S/O v. Deonte King Ineffective assistance of counsel mandatory fine R.C. 2929.18 indigency inability to pay. Defense counsel's failure to file an affidavit of indigency did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because a reasonable probability does not exist that had counsel filed an affidavit of indigency, the trial court would have waived the mandatory fine.

Foreclosure/24 C.F.R. 203.604/Face to face meeting/Notice of default/Summary Judgment/Affidavit in support of foreclosure

In a slip-and-fall negligence action, the trial court did not err in granting the defendant-grocery store's motion for summary judgment where undisputed evidence showed the grocery store employees' actions in cleaning the area of a spill and warning customers of the spill with a caution sign fulfilled the duty of care the grocery store owed to its business invitees. Judgment affirmed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SPEEDY TRIAL: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment: defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial even though the state's inaction caused the post-accusation delay, because under the circumstances the state's mere negligence did not outweigh the absence of some particularized trial prejudice.

Defendant-appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in concluding that a police officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests, and in therefore granting Appellee's motion to suppress evidence. Further, the court declines at this time to overrule precedent in this district concerning reasonable, articulable suspicion to administer field sobriety tests. Judgment affirmed.

After knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a plea of guilty to breaking and entering, Hammond waived his right to a restitution hearing and agreed to pay restitution as reflected in the presentence investigation report. In Hammond's appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we see no meritorious issues for review. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte appoint counsel for an evidentiary hearing on appellant's Crim.R. 33 motion for a new trial. The constitutional right to appointed counsel extends only to trial and first appeal of right. Under R.C. 120.16 and State v. Crowder, 60 Ohio St.3d 151, 573 N.E.2d 652 (1991), only for a R.C 2953.21 petition for post-conviction relief and only when a merits hearing is to be conducted, the trial court is obligated to give the public defender notice and an opportunity to review the case for "arguable merit," which then results in public defender representation. Where an indigent party files a Crim.R. 33 motion for a new trial pro se that is not construed as an R.C. 2953.21 petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court is not obligated to provide the public defender notice of the Crim.R. 33 motion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial when appellant failed to prove his trial attorney had a conflict of interest or that such a conflict adversely impacted counsel's performance in the representation. The trial court did not err in denying the appellant's R.C. 2953.21 petition for post-conviction relief without a hearing. Although the appellant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on an actual conflict of interest, he presented insufficient evidence of the conflict and no evidence suggesting that the alleged conflict adversely affected his attorney's performance in that case, which resulted in a no-contest plea. Judgments affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

Appellant was found guilty of felonious assault (deadly weapon) and felonious assault (serious physical harm). The trial court ordered the merger of the two counts, and the State elected to proceed to sentencing on the count involving serious physical harm. The Appellant's felonious assault conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Because Appellant failed to challenge the part of the judgment granting legal custody of her son to a relative, that portion of the judgment is affirmed without discussion. Appellant also failed to object to a magistrate's decision which ordered a permanent planned living arraignment for her daughter. This part of the decision, therefore, is reviewed for plain error. Assuming that R.C. 2151.415 governs the agency's request for a permanent planned living arrangement, the trial court's failure to find that the daughter was in an independent living program was not an error that challenged the legitimacy of the judicial process. The error was also harmless, as the record indicates that the daughter had, in fact, completed an independent living program. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., dissenting.)

The trial court did not err by overruling Appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas without a hearing. Appellant failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that withdrawal of his pleas was necessary to correct a manifest injustice. The record does not show that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Appellant's sentence was not void. Appellant's claim that the trial court should have found that he had been convicted of allied offenses of similar import is barred by res judicata because Appellant did not raise it on direct appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant waived his right to a jury trial in open court, and the waiver otherwise complied with R.C. 2945.05's jury waiver requirements. Additionally, Appellant's conviction for discharge of a firearm upon or over a public road or highway was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurring.)

The record supports the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple counts of vehicular assault caused by operating a vehicle under the influence. Notably, appellant had juvenile and adult misdemeanor records, and the course of conduct finding and the gravity of the injuries sustained in the collision fully supported the sentence imposed. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to provide a transcript of the proceedings below pursuant to App. R. 9(B), a statement of the evidence under App. R. 9(C), or an agreed statement of the case under App. R. 9(D). These failures prevent us from effectively reviewing the evidentiary issues argued by appellant regarding the trial court's order granting his motion to return property. Accordingly, because the record before us is insufficient to allow us to examine appellant's asserted errors, we must presume the regularity of the proceedings in the trial court. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for disrupting public services was supported by sufficient evidence where identity is the only contested element and the state's witnesses testified that appellant's voice was heard over a loudspeaker threatening to shoot firefighters if they proceeded onto his property to extinguish an illegal fire.

Trial court failed to grant confinement credit for electronic monitoring and standard house arrest.

Trial court did not err in search warrant probable cause determination. Judgment affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-year suspension, with six months stayed on conditions.

Workers' compensation—Temporary total disability—Industrial Commission's conclusion that claimant was not in active workforce when she underwent knee surgery was supported by evidence in record—Court of appeals' judgment granting writ of mandamus and ordering commission to vacate decision reversed.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to comply with filing requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A)—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

modification of legal custody order, R.C. 2151.42(B), requisite change in circumstances of child or custodian, best interest of children

zoning—junk yard—salvage

summary judgment – movant cannot meet initial Dresher burden via a reply brief – breach of fiduciary duty – majority shareholder's duty to minority shareholders – director's duty to corporation and its shareholders – civil conspiracy

firearm specification—unloaded—operable

robbery, sufficiency, manifest weight of the evidence, witness competency, jury instructions, defense of others

Trial court's denial of suppression motion affirmed where driver crossed over the line into turn lane.

The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant-appellant because there is not clear and convincing evidence that defendant-appellant's sentence is unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law. The trial court did not err by not making findings under R.C. 2951.03(B)(5) where the statement at issue was not referenced in the PSI. The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant-appellant using the information provided in the PSI.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs-appellants' Civ.R. 56(F) motions.

When a trial court calculates annual gross income on the child support computation worksheet, the trial court should deduct any spousal support obligation from the obligor's annual gross income and add the value of the spousal support award to the gross annual income of the obligee.

The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant-appellant because there is not clear and convincing evidence that defendant-appellant's sentence is unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant-appellant because there is not clear and convincing evidence that defendant-appellant's sentences are unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

The State did not breach its plea agreement with the defendant-appellant. The trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant-appellant and by not merging allied offenses. The defendant-appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant-appellant because there is not clear and convincing evidence that defendant-appellant's sentence is unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

The trial court did nor err in reducing rather than terminating Appellant's spousal support obligation based upon an agreement between the parties incorporated into the divorce decree.

Jail sentence for contempt affirmed where appellant repeatedly failed to pay his arrearages.

The trial court did not err in dismissing an Ohio company's declaratory judgment action where the complaint, in part, did not set forth a live controversy and, where there was a live controversy between the Ohio company and the defendant-Illinois corporation, the resolution of the controversy depended greatly upon a determination of the facts of the case and the same facts were at issue in a pending action an Illinois court. The trial court also did not err in dismissing the complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens where the court, in balancing the private interests of the litigants and the public interest involving the courts and citizens of the forum state, noted the underlying contract involved in the dispute was an employment contract entered into between an Illinois citizen and an Illinois corporation, the dispute involved the application of Illinois law, resolution of the issues would likely require witnesses who reside in Illinois to be called at trial, and the same issues raised in the Ohio case were already pending in an Illinois court.

The trial court did not err by revoking defendant's community control and imposing a 36-month prison sentence where defendant committed a new felony criminal offense while under his fifth-degree felony community control sanction.

Where portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus has no choice but to presume the regularity or validity of the lower court's proceedings and affirm.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of rape, one count of sexual battery, two counts of gross sexual imposition, and one count of importuning where appellant failed to establish a manifest injustice. But, due to an error in trial court's sentencing entry regarding the mandatory nature of appellant's postrelease control, the matter must nevertheless be reversed in part and remanded to the trial court for the issuance of a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry to properly reflect that appellant is subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term should he ever be released from prison.

The trial court erred in finding appellants in contempt for failure to comply with discovery order where the alleged order was never journalized. The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellants' complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with discovery order where the alleged order was never journalized.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by naming appellee the child's residential parent for school purposes where remaining in the school system in which the child started was in the child's best interest because she had become comfortable there and was having success.

CRIMINAL - Aggravated Arson R.C. 2909.02(A)(1) sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence circumstantial evidence ineffective assistance of counsel

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - fifth-degree felony maximum sentence community control R.C. 2929.13(B) discretion.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Mandamus public records request by inmate R.C. 2969.25(A) list of prior civil actions and appeals affidavit attached to petition failure to include all required information lost of papers in prison invalid excuse.

ORIGINAL ACTION - procedendo failure to state a claim Civ.R. 12(B)(6) affidavit of prior civil actions affidavit of indigency R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C) clear legal right to relief transcript of proceedings App.R. 9(A)

CIVIL - civil conspiracy fraud negligence forgery on mortgage documents damages equitable division of property dower rights attorney's fees Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act R.C. 1345.02 "supplier" loan officer national bank

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Mandamus R.C. 149.43(B)(8) public records request by inmate failure to obtain preliminary finding by sentencing judge requested records needed to support justiciable claim no allegation in mandamus petition as to judicial finding failure to state viable mandamus claim.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - modification of child custody due process hearing notice custody exchange court interrogation of witnesses Evid.R. 614(B) child witnesses interference with visitation weight of the evidence

CIVIL - JUDGMENTS - summary judgment dismissal standing counterclaim contract account municipal court.

CRIMINAL LAW - CONSTITUTIONAL - post conviction relief vacation of judgment withdraw of guilty plea judgments, findings of fact conclusions of law interrogation of a minor Miranda rights intelligent and voluntary waiver of rights manifest injustice abuse of discretion.

APPELLATE REVIEW - an order for a competency evaluation is not a final appealable order R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) provisional remedy failed to show that evaluation would compromise attorney-client confidentiality.

Delay of 437 days violated appellant's right to a speedy trial on a first degree misdemeanor

Record does not contain sufficient evidence to prove violation

On application for reinstatement.

On application for reinstatement.

Breach of contract/Statute of conveyances/R.C. 5301.01/Illegal contracts/Gambling devices/Abuse of discretion

Habeas corpus—Petition fails to state a claim cognizable in habeas—Court of appeals' dismissal affirmed.

Twelve or More Months of a Consecutive 22 Month Perious Best Interest

Habeas corpus—criminal sentencing—R.C. 2929.61(A)—Adequate remedy at law existed to challenge sentence—Court of appeals' dismissal affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the former Code of Professional Responsibility—Public reprimand.

INSURANCE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court did not err in granting defendants-insurers' motion for summary judgment: no genuine issue of material fact existed on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim where, under the plain language of the insurance policy, the loss was not covered because neither the decedent nor her heirs qualified as an "insured" under the policy at the time the loss occurred where the insurers had not breached the policy, the denial of coverage could not have been in bad faith and plaintiff's dismissal of defendant insurance agency barred a claim based on vicarious liability against defendants-insurers.

GUILTY PLEA – CRIM.R. 11 – SENTENCING: Where the trial court thoroughly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) before accepting defendant's guilty plea to a felony offense, and where defendant entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial court did not err in failing to sua sponte vacate the plea after defendant claimed innocence at the sentencing hearing. Where the imposition of a five-year period of community control fell within the statutorily authorized period of community control under R.C. 2929.15(A)(1), the sentence was not contrary to law.

PROCEDURE/RULES – CIV.R. 41(B)(1) – CIV.R. 60(B): The trial court is required to provide notice to plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel before dismissing, on its own motion, plaintiff's case under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for failure to prosecute. Where the trial court did not notify plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel before dismissing, on its own motion, plaintiff's case under Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for failure to prosecute, the court erred in denying plaintiff's Civ.R. 60(B) motion to vacate the judgment of dismissal. (Svoboda v. City of Brunswick, 6 Ohio St.3d 348, 453 N.E.2d 648 (1983), followed.)

Trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain appellee's application to seal the record of his misdemeanor conviction because appellee failed to comply with the mandatory waiting period under R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)(c) which provides that "[a]pplication may be made [a]t the expiration of one year after the offender's final discharge if convicted of a misdemeanor." Our reversal of the trial court's judgment on the basis that the application was prematurely filed renders moot appellant's assignment of error pertaining to the payment of restitution. Judgment reversed.

Appellant, a non-attorney, attempts to proceed pro se in this appeal from the trial court's dismissal of wrongful death and survival claims he brought as the administrator of the estate of his mother. Because appellant is not authorized to appeal the dismissal of these claims pro se, we must dismiss this appeal.

Appellant, a non-attorney, attempts to proceed pro se in this appeal from the trial court's dismissal of wrongful death and survival claims he brought as the administrator of the estate of his mother. Because appellant is not authorized to appeal the dismissal of these claims pro se, we must dismiss this appeal.

The trial court did not err when it denied the defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds. Although a substantial delay occurred, defendant-appellant suffered no demonstrable prejudice as a result. The trial court did not err by failing to hold a hearing. It properly analyzed the speedy trial claim under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) and defendant-appellant has not pointed to any evidence that he was precluded from presenting to the trial court that would warrant remand. Assignments of error overruled judgment affirmed.

Mandamus denied some evidence supports the commission's finding that relator voluntarily abandoned the workforce for reasons unrelated to the allowed conditions in her claim.

Prohibition—Appellants failed to show that judge's exercise of judicial power over breach-of-contract case against appellants is unauthorized by law—Court of appeals' denial of writ affirmed.

allied offenses of similar import, State v. Ruff, committed separately, separate animus

dependency adjudication, history of unstable mental health, disposition, R.C. 2151.04(C)

statutory right to a speedy trial, tolling, burden on appeal, term of sentence, post-release control notification

legal custodian, mootness, motion to compel discovery, motion for continuance, motion to show cause, child support

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Mandamus—Appellant not entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus because he failed to allege any facts that, if true, would demonstrate a present injury—Court of appeals' dismissal affirmed.

ARBITRATION - PUBLIC POLICY

Closing argument comments, liquidated damages, attorney fees

Denial of motion for leave to file motion for new trial

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Public reprimand.

106493 - Kiara E. Torres, Et Al. v. Concrete Designs Inc., Et Al. Civ.R. 59(A) motion for new trial noneconomic damages passion and prejudice counsel remarks misconduct by the prevailing parties R.C. 2315.19 economic damages judgment notwithstanding the verdict permanent and substantial physical deformity stipulations R.C. 1343.03(C) prejudgment interest good faith effort. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial. Likewise, the trial court did not err in denying appellants' post-judgment motion pursuant to R.C. 2315.19. The awards of damages were not excessive given the severity of the injuries to Torres and Rojas. Moreover, there existed sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that the Torres's injuries amounted to a "permanent and substantial physical deformity," the parties clearly stipulated that the Torres's injuries amounted to a "permanent and substantial physical deformity," and Torres's and Rojas's damages awards were not capped at $350,000. The trial court's award of prejudgment interest was an abuse of discretion.

Parental rights permanent custody reasonable time custody best interest guardian ad litem report abuse of discretion continuance case plan visitation substance abuse housing secure. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that permanent custody of the children should be awarded to CCDCFS. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the permanent custody hearing just three days after the GAL report was filed in violation of Sup.R. 48 and Loc.R. 18 of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

Permanent custody R.C. 2151.419(A) reasonable efforts R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) R.C. 2151.414(E) reasonable time R.C. 2151.414(D) best interest manifest weight competent, credible evidence. The juvenile court's decisions awarding permanent custody of each child to the children services agency and terminating appellant's parental rights were affirmed. A reasonable efforts determination was made at a prior hearing, and the children services agency presented evidence at the permanent custody hearing of the case plan services that were provided and of mother's and father's failure to complete portions of their case plans. The juvenile court's determinations under R.C. 2151.414 were supported by competent, credible evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Indian child Indian Child Welfare Act 25 U.S.C. 1912(a) notice 25 C.F.R. 23.111(c) certified mail 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) serious emotional or physical damage qualified expert case plan R.C. 2151.412(E) The record was sufficient to establish compliance with the ICWA notice requirements, and the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of the child to the agency was supported by competent, credible evidence. The evidence in this matter, which included the testimony of a qualified expert witness and the social worker of record, constituted a sufficient basis for the court to find "beyond a reasonable doubt that the continued custody of the parents would likely result in serious physical or emotional damage to the child" as required by 25 U.S.C. 1912(f). The record also demonstrated that the court approved the case plan when committing the child to the temporary custody of the agency.

107450 Substitute counsel Sixth Amendment breakdown in attorney-client relationship abuse of discretion consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) affidavits. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing substitute counsel for defendant where the defendant did not demonstrate a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship that would prevent appointed counsel from representing him in keeping with his Sixth Amendment rights trial court made the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to impose consecutive sentences appellate court could not consider affidavits attached to appellant's brief that were not part of the trial court record

Civ.R. 59 new trial manifest weight abuse of discretion. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs' motion for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59 where the manifest weight of the evidence did not support the jury's verdict that the defendant acted within the standard of care. The trial court's determination that insufficient credible evidence existed supporting the verdict was within its discretion.

Appeal No. 107416 - State of Ohio v. Darryl W. Williams Affirmed sentencing review R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2953.08(A)(1) maximum sentence knowing and voluntary plea. The trial court, after accepting defendant's knowing and voluntarily entered guilty plea, expressly considered all that is required by law before imposing the sentence, and defendant agreed to serve the sentence consecutively thereby relieving the court of the burden to make the required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

Real property tax valuation total true value R.C. 5713.03 rebuttable presumption arm's-length transaction Board of Tax Appeals. Board of Tax Appeals acted unreasonably and unlawfully in concluding that taxpayer presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that its purchase of commercial property at sale where taxpayer's appraiser testified that the lease enhanced sale price and sale price did not reflect unencumbered fee-simple value.

Arbitration agreement motion to stay motion to compel arbitration R.C. 2711.02 R.C. 2711.03 hearing. Judgment reversed and remanded for a hearing. The trial court's grant of defendants' motion to compel arbitration without a hearing was improper. A party may choose to move for a stay, petition for an order to compel arbitration, or seek both. A motion to compel arbitration and a motion to stay proceedings are separate and distinct procedures that serve different purposes. In enforcing motions to compel arbitration under R.C. 2711.03, the trial court must engage in a two step process. First, the court is mandated to hold a hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration provision is in issue an the case at hand. Second, if the court finds this is an issue, "it shall proceed summarily to the trial." In the instant case, there was no discovery or evidence before the trial court for it to adequately determine if the arbitration clause applies, even though there is a separate disputes provision stating that claims and disagreements shall be subject to legal proceedings in any court having jurisdiction over the matter. Defendants acknowledged this inconsistency in the contract.

guilty plea sentence consecutive R.C. 2929.14 R.C. 2953.08 jointly recommended sentence. Judgment affirmed. Defendant's sentence was authorized by law as it was jointly recommended to range between 18 and 25 years. The court imposed a sentence of 19 years. Because defendant's sentence fits within the three criteria under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), his sentence is not subject to appellate review and his sentence is affirmed.

Appeal No. 107335 — State of Ohio v. Landra Shearer Sentence reversed allied offenses void R.C. 2941.25 sentencing package doctrine scope of remand. In a previous appeal, defendant's sentences were vacated as being allied offenses and the imposition of separate sentences on those counts violates R.C. 2941.25. The sentences are vacated and reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the single count upon which the state elects to proceed to sentencing under State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011 Ohio 2669, 951 N.E.2d 381.

Applying State v. Barry, 145 Ohio St.3d 354 (2015), appellant's conviction for tampering with evidence was based on sufficient evidence and was not premised on the "unmistakable crime" doctrine. Appellant's arguments regarding inconsistent evidence and witness credibility failed to support reversal of his convictions for possession of heroin and tampering with evidence on manifest weight of the evidence grounds. Judgment affirmed.

SENTENCING: The trial court's imposition of a 20-year aggregate sentence was not contrary to law where the court made the required consecutive sentencing findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and where the record demonstrated the court's consideration of the R.C. 2929.11 purposes and principles of sentencing and the R.C. 2929.12 factors.

The trial court did not err in denying Appellant's "motion to correct allied offenses" based on lack of jurisdiction. If the trial court had ruled on Appellant's motion, it would have been inconsistent with the appellate court's ability to reverse, affirm, or modify another ruling that Appellant had appealed, which was then pending on appeal. In addition, Appellant's motion seeking merger of offenses was barred by res judicata, as Appellant failed to raise this issue during his direct appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress. The record establishes that appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before being interviewed by the police. The record further establishes that appellant knowingly and voluntarily consented to having his DNA sample taken by the police. The State adduced sufficient evidence at trial to support appellant's convictions for kidnapping and rape, and his convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury regarding the lesser-included offense of gross sexual imposition. Appellant's convictions for kidnapping and rape were not subject to merger because they were committed with a separate animus. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was mailed the required Civ.R. 75(L) notice of the non-contested divorce hearing. Further, in the absence of a transcript of the hearing, the regularity of the proceedings is presumed. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in continuing shared parenting under a modified plan instead of designating the appellant the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the parties' children. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering fixed, alternating-week parenting time rather than allowing the appellant to continue creating monthly parenting-time schedules. The trial court did not erroneously reject the evaluations of two expert witnesses and the guardian ad litem. Judgment affirmed.

Defendant pled no contest to operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, a first-degree misdemeanor. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had driven left of center, in violation of R.C. 4511.25(A), which justified the stop of the defendant's vehicle. The trial court erred in accepting defendant's no contest plea when it completely failed to advise defendant of the effect of her no contest plea, as required by Traf.R. 10(D). Judgment reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant, who was placed on intensive supervision with the drug court, waived his argument that he was prejudiced when the drug court judge, and not the judge originally assigned to his case, imposed sentence after Appellant violated the conditions of his community control. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not demonstrated by defense counsel's failure to object to the absence of the originally assigned judge at sentencing. There is also no basis to conclude that defense counsel was unprepared or that the outcome of the hearing would have been different if counsel had advocated for the MonDay program instead of prison, since Appellant, who had been ordered to successfully complete the MonDay program, refused to comply. Judgment affirmed.

The 12-month sentence imposed upon the appellant was within the permissible statutory range and therefore not contrary to law. The record establishes that the trial court properly considered and applied R.C. 2929.11, which states the overriding purposes and principles of felony sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which sets forth seriousness and recidivism factors for the court to consider in imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by admitting the web history found on Appellant's cell phone during a forensic examination. Evid.R. 404(B) permitted admission of the web history searches specifically related to father/daughter sexual activity because it helped to prove Appellant's motive, intent, and plan. Because the trial court instructed the jury on the proper use of this evidence, its prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Appellant's rape and attempted-rape convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury reasonably could have believed the victim's testimony over Appellant's testimony. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in accepting defendant's plea to disorderly conduct as a fourth-degree misdemeanor, when the ordinance read by the prosecutor supported a conviction as a minor misdemeanor only and no explanation of the facts and circumstances was presented to the trial court. Although the plea agreement indicated that defendant would plead to a fourth-degree misdemeanor, the parties agree on appeal that the trial court should have sentenced defendant for a minor misdemeanor. The trial court's sentence of a suspended jail term, $250 fine, and intensive supervision was contrary to law for a minor misdemeanor. The trial court did not err in ordering defendant to pay jury fees pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(A)(2)(b), when he entered his plea less than 24 hours before his trial was to begin. Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings for disorderly conduct as a minor misdemeanor.

The trial court did not err in overruling the appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea to charges of felonious assault and felony OVI. The appellant failed to demonstrate a "manifest injustice" warranting withdrawal of the plea. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court correctly determined it had no jurisdiction to vacate a tax lien, as provided by R.C. 5703.38.

Maximum sentence for first felony domestic violence conviction was within guidelines, with nothing within the record demonstrating no support for trial court's findings, and no indication the trial court considered victim impact statement regarding other, unindicted conduct in sentencing determination.

Civ.R. 56, motion for summary judgment, tortious interference with a business relationship, movant's burden, genuine issue of material fact in dispute

domestic violence civil protection order, Civ.R. 65.1, objections

felonious assault, sufficiency, manifest weight, ineffective assistance, deadly weapon, billiard ball, App.R. 16(A)(7), R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), R.C. 2923.11(A)

R.C. 2744.02, R.C. 2744.03, political subdivision immunity, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56

Civ.R. 60(B) – directed verdict - conversion

marital property—equitable division—value

deadly weapon—knife—force—threat

plea agreement, R.C. 4511.19, transcript, vehicle forfeiture, excessive fine

Criminal Law—Manifest Weight. Appellant's conviction for robbery was not against the weight of the evidence, because appellant admitted to the vehicle theft while testifying on his own behalf and the prosecution presented photographic and testimonial evidence of the injury the victim received during the commission of the robbery.

Defendant's no contest plea waived any error associated with the trial court's decision granting the state's pretrial motion for a lesser included offense jury instruction. Trial court did not err in ruling that an OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) is a lesser included offense of an OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(h).

Motion to suppress was properly denied where the search warrant affidavit provided the necessary probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and where the warrant was a valid "all persons" warrant.

Property owner appeals the decision granting summary judgment to the defendants, a township and county. Property owner sought writ to compel defendants to enforce zoning resolution and state laws concerning alleged junkyard abutting the property owner's land. Zoning resolution defined "junkyard" as a site where inoperable vehicles would be stored for more than 30 days. Property owner established genuine issues of fact for trial concerning whether a junkyard existed, and entitlement to writ, through affidavits of witnesses who observed inoperable or wrecked vehicle stored on the neighboring land for years.

Trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief because his petition was untimely, and he was not unavoidably prevented from discovering facts necessary for relief. The decision not to keep a separate copy of his own evidence was petitioner's decision and did not constitute "missing evidence."

The trial court did not err by entertaining defendant-appellee's objections to the magistrate's decision despite defendant-appellee's failure to provide the trial court with transcripts of the hearings conducted by the magistrate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining defendant-appellee's objections to the magistrate's decision and modifying the magistrate's decision.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal no reasons for the delay are set forth in the motion.

APPELLATE REVIEW-CRIMINAL - judgment striking motion to appoint alternative counsel is not final appealable order when case has not concluded final order in criminal case is conviction and sentence premature appeal.

APPELLATE REVIEW- lack of a final appealable order R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) denial of motion to dismiss is not a final appealable order appeal can be sought after disposition of entire case.

CONTRACTS - magistrate's decision abuse of discretion breach of contract substantial performance essential purpose immaterial breach nominal damages.

CRIMINAL LAW - felony murder tampering with evidence bench trial voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial ineffective assistance of counsel disclosure of conversation with defendant on record allowing defendant to testify manifest weight of the evidence convictions supported by sufficient, credible evidence.

CONTRACT - vexatious litigator leave of court motion for 60(B) newly discovered evidence previous case res judicata privity of interest mutuality of claims pro se litigants.

MANDAMUS - R.C. 2911.12 R.C. 2903.11 R.C. 2731.04 lower court's judgment entries were sufficient without including findings of fact and conclusions of law.

CIVIL - motion to disqualify counsel Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 Telephone Consumer Protection Act Consumer Sales Practices Act Telephone Solicitation Sales Act abuse of discretion evidentiary hearing non-oral hearing admissible Evid.R. 402 Evid.R. 501 R.C. 2945.42 R.C. 2317.02(D) spousal privilege confidential spousal incompetency Evid.R. 601(B) necessary witness authentication Evid.R. 901(A) Evid.R. 901(B)(5) exceptions uncontested matter substantial hardship distinctive value scope of disqualification actual trial expansive all phases of litigation.

CRIMINAL LAW - guilty plea attempted failure to comply R.C. 2921.331 possession of cocaine R.C. 2925.11 R.C. 2953.08 consecutive sentences were supported by record and not contrary to law court considered statutory factors of R.C. 2929.12 R.C. 2929.14.

CRIMINAL LAW - gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05 R.C. 2953.08 review of sentencing court fairly considered the serious and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12 sentence was greater than joint recommendation sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS - divorce inheritance separate property improvements to marital home commingling receipts expenses itemized traceable bonuses deposited used for marital bills denial of motion for attorney fees was reasonable and equitable.

CRIMINAL LAW - victim's rights Marsy's law right to counsel standing compelling a witness to testify not coercive no violation of due process sufficiency of the evidence menancing by stalking robbery burglary manifest weight of the evidence ineffective assistance of counsel grand jury voluntarily testified.

CRIMINAL LAW - Crim.R. 32.1 Civ.R. 60(B) Ev.R. 201 OVI DUI R.C. 4511.19 R.C. 2941.1413 enhanced conviction motion to withdraw no contest plea plea was not uncounseled and without colloquy no invalid waiver of counsel no constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel in collateral attacks abuse of discretion manifest injustice barred by res judicata.

CIVIL - R.C. 2307.64 R.C. 1345.01 unsolicited email advertisements motion to stay was vacated rendering all assignments of error moot appeal dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - court costs R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2947.23 ability to pay R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) 2947.14 Eighth Amendment.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to seal record R.C. 2953.32 eligible offender weigh defendant's interest against state's legitimate needs nature and circumstances of underlying offense state failed to advance a legitimate interest insufficient evidence to conduct weighing exercise.

Service of an amended complaint prior to obtaining the required leave of court to file the amended complaint does not endow a trial court with personal jurisdiction over a newly added defendant.

While prisoner's suit against ODRS was of a decision made in special proceeding by the court of claims, the decision appealed—denial of motions to strike and for judgment on the pleadings—did not affect his substantial rights and were thus not final and appealable under R.C. 2505.02, requiring dismissal.

Relator's petition for a writ of mandamus is sua sponte dismissed for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2969.25. Relator is ordered to pay costs.

Appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. After an independent review of the case, the court found that the trial court failed to sentence the appellant on one count and imposed a different sentence at the hearing compared to the entry on another count. The trial court was also inconsistent in the sentencing entries regarding imposition of concurrent or consecutive sentences. The case is remanded to the trial court to resentence the appellant on those two counts and to decide whether the sentences in the four consolidated sentences should run consecutively or concurrently. Because these errors were plain and obvious, the court did not need to appoint new appellate counsel. Case remanded with instructions. Appointed counsel's motion to withdraw granted.

CHILDREN — CUSTODY: The juvenile court's decision to grant permanent custody of eight young children to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and was supported by sufficient evidence where the record showed that the children could not be placed with either parent, due to Mother's continual failure to understand the extraordinary needs of her children, and the best interests of the children would be served by placing them in the custody of the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services.

GUILTY PLEA – CRIM.R. 11: Defendant's guilty pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily where the trial court failed to inform defendant of the right to confront witnesses against him prior to accepting his pleas.

motion to modify child support, R.C. 3119.79, deviate, R.C. 3119.22, evidence, objection to magistrate's decision, Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d)

unemployment compensation—just cause—fault

106772 & 106773 - S/O v. Nathaniel Frazier Severance Crim.R. 13 joinder waiver probable cause determination R.C. 2152.12(A) bindover hearing subject-matter jurisdiction R.C. 2152.12(I) ineffective assistance of counsel guilty plea Crim.R. 11. Appellant waived any argument related to the joinder at the probable cause hearing because appellant did not object to the joinder. The state produced sufficient evidence to establish that probable cause existed to believe that appellant committed the acts charged. The adult court had jurisdiction over the entire case because the juvenile court had authority pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(I) to transfer all charges in the complaint. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Eviction nonpayment of rent motion for relief from judgment federally assisted public housing serious and repeated violations 24 C.F.R. 966.4(1). Public housing authority governed by federal regulations failed to make a prima facie showing for eviction under 24 C.F.R. 966.4(1) where the basis for the eviction was a single nonpayment of rent.

Law of the case Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a) notice of voluntary dismissal start of trial motion to strike. This court's issuance of writ of mandamus was law of the case this court previously held that notice of voluntary dismissal filed by a party to the underlying case was ineffective where it was filed after trial had commenced, and the trial court retained jurisdiction over the case trial court has jurisdiction to rule on motion to strike an invalid notice of dismissal filed during trial.

Breach of fiduciary duty breach of contract defamation jurisdiction exclusive jurisdiction collective bargaining rights State Employee Relations Board Unfair Labor Practices R.C. Chapter 4117 Civ.R. 12(B)(1) Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo statute of limitations R.C. 2305.11. Dismissal of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims by employees against their union was proper where the claims were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Employment Relations Board because they arose from, or depended on, the collective bargaining framework and rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117. Dismissal of defamation claim was proper where the claim was asserted outside of the one-year statute of limitations.

Domestic violence civil protection order protected person scope abuse of discretion term R.C. 3113.31. An appeal challenging the duration of a protection order is not moot when the order expires during the pendency of the appeal. The trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily limiting the duration of the protection order and failing to include the petitioner's infant daughter as a protected person where there was sufficient credible evidence that the respondent had engaged in domestic violence against petitioner and created a substantial risk to the health and safety of his infant daughter.

Plea effective assistance of counsel consecutive sentences timing.- Defendant's plea will not be set aside on the basis of receiving ineffective assistance of counsel unless the defendant can show that counsel's deficiencies render his plea involuntary. The consecutive sentence findings do not need to be articulated prior to the trial court orally stating it was imposing consecutive sentences.

Sentence felony sentence review under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Appellant's 15-month prison term for his conviction of domestic violence is affirmed because this court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support appellant's sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

107412 Final judgment R.C. 3929.06 vacated void summary judgment. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to insurers on appellant's R.C. 3929.06 supplemental petition because appellant did not have a final judgment as required by R.C. 3929.06 where the trial court's judgment rendered after jury trial was vacated after appeal.

Motion for revivor dormant judgment assignment of interest real party in interest right to trial by jury. Judgment to grant plaintiff-creditor's motion for revivor of a dormant judgment was not in error where the plaintiff was the real party in interest and defendant offered no evidence that the judgment had been paid, settled, or barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial in a revivor action.

Felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Appellant's 28-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter and several other felony offenses is supported by the record pursuant to the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.

R.C. 4112.02(A), same-sex sexual harassment, supervisor, wrongful discharge, IIED, negligent hiring

Ineffective assistance of counsel/References to the record

APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – SENTENCING – AGREED SENTENCE – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: When, as part of the entry of a guilty plea on two counts of aggravated assault, defendant and the state agreed to jointly recommend an aggregate prison term between five to 13 years, and the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term within that range, there was an agreed sentence within the meaning of R.C. 2929.08(D)(1), even though defendant did not expressly agree to the specific prison term for each count and the consecutive combination of those terms. State v. Gray, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-030132, 2003-Ohio-5837, overruled. Defendant's sentences for two felonious assaults were not reviewable on appeal where the sentences were authorized by law and jointly recommended. The consecutive sentencing findings the trial court made at the sentencing hearing in accordance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) to support the imposition of consecutive sentences for community-control violations were supported by the record the trial court's inadvertent failure to incorporate all of those statutory findings into the sentencing entries must be corrected on remand by nunc pro tunc orders.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – COMMUNITY CONTROL – SENTENCING: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked defendant's community control and imposed the suspended jail sentences where defendant not only failed to pay fines and court costs, but also failed to attend a corrective-thinking class, did not complete community service, and incurred new criminal charges. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences is moot where defendant challenges only his sentences, and not his convictions, and has completed his sentences.

PROCEDURE/RULES – CIV.R. 41(A) – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – NEGLIGENCE – CIVIL ASSAULT: Where the plaintiffs in a multi-defendant case voluntarily dismissed all defendants pursuant to Civ.R. 41(A), including those for whom the trial court had already granted summary judgment, the prior interlocutory summary judgment order was rendered a nullity. An action refiled under the saving statute is a new action and does not incorporate the documents filed in the dismissed action, so even if a refiled action is assigned to the same trial judge as the dismissed action, the necessary documents from the dismissed action must be filed in the new action. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of an operator of a haunted house attraction on plaintiffs' claims for negligence and civil assault where questions of fact remained as to whether the injured plaintiff had entered the confines of the haunted house attraction and whether she could be expected to foresee or accept the attendant risk of injury from being chased by a costumed haunted house worker.

There was insufficient evidence to support Walker's conviction for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. However, there was sufficient evidence to support Walker's convictions for trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, and illegal manufacture of drugs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its evidentiary rulings, the prosecutor's statements in closing arguments did not deprive Walker of a fair trial, Walker did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court did not err in ruling on Walker's Batson challenge, the trial court did not err in declining to merge Walker's fifth-degree felony trafficking convictions with his first-degree felony trafficking conviction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker's motion to compel the disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant.

The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's claim of negligence arising from a car accident involving a sheriff's deputy. Because the deputy's response to a radio dispatch concerning a residential alarm was a response to an emergency call under R.C.2744.02(B)(1)(a), the deputy's actions while on the emergency call did not arise to the willful or wanton conduct under R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a) that must be demonstrated to avoid immunity. Appellees were entitled to statutory immunity from any injury resulting from the accident under R.C. 2744.02 (B)(1). Judgment affirmed.

The magistrate did not err in finding that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in not requiring the claimant to comply with employer relator's request for a global medical release from the claimant based on her filing an application for permanent total disability compensation. Objections overruled writ of mandamus denied.

Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to vacate and set aside sentence. We found his arguments were barred by res judicata and rejected his argument that the trial court had not adjudicated him a sexual predator in 1997. Thus, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

dependent children temporary custody best interest factors reasonable efforts at reunification permanent custody manifest weight of the evidence clear and convincing evidence R.C. 2151.414(E) R.C. 2151.353

illegal conveyance of drugs on ground of detention facility R.C. 2921.36 sufficiency of evidence circumstantial evidence

parenting time R.C. 3109.051(D) R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) R.C. 2903.08(A)(1)(a) R.C. 2929.12 post-release control offense of violence