[Cite as Williams v. McClain,
2019-Ohio-4802.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS :
:
Plaintiff-Appellant : Appellate Case No. 28475
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2019-CV-229
:
BRANDON C. McCLAIN : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Defendant-Appellee :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 22nd day of November, 2019.
...........
TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS, 1955 Kipling Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45406
Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro Se
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by COLLIN B. SHOWE, Atty. Reg. No. 0093805, 301 West
Third Street, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
.............
HALL, J.
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{¶ 1} Travis Lanier Williams appeals pro se from the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment against him on his complaint against Montgomery County Recorder Brandon
C. McClain for relief under R.C. 317.13(C).
{¶ 2} Although his two-page brief lacks assignments of error, Williams asserts that
McClain unlawfully recorded an affidavit he submitted to the Montgomery County
Recorder’s office as a miscellaneous document rather than “as a deed.”
{¶ 3} In an “Affidavit of Injunction” that formed part of Williams’ complaint, he
alleged that McClain had failed to perform a statutory duty to record an “affidavit of title”
as a deed. Williams sought to have the affidavit refiled. In an “Affidavit of Facts Relating
to Title” that also formed part of the complaint, Williams stated that his address was 1955
Kipling Drive in Dayton. He then stated: “I am claiming the home [by] Heirship to Eula W.
Carroll, my great-grandmother, due to the fact my brother is [in] jail I am claiming the
home as an heir to my great grandmother corresponding with [R]evised [C]ode 5301.252
to be transferred to my revocable trust[.]” Williams continued by stating that he wanted
the property transferred to him, as “landlord,” and to his brother and another person as
“tenants,” with “no other parties … allowed.” After providing the legal description for the
property, Williams stated:
4. I am the trustee of the TRAVIS LANIER WILLIAMS REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST AGREEMENT.
5. I am claiming the home as an Heir-ship the above described real
property to Williams, Travis Lanier Tr. u/d/t/ 3-1-17. As the Landlord-tenant.
6. No money has been exchanged as part of this transfer.
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7. This transfer is a gift from great grandmother.
8. FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
{¶ 4} The foregoing “Affidavit of Facts Relating to Title” is the document that
Williams sought to have recorded “as a deed.” In the top left corner, the document bears
a file number and indicates that it instead was recorded in the Montgomery County
Recorder’s office as a “miscellaneous” document.
{¶ 5} In response to Williams’ complaint, McClain moved for summary judgment
on May 17, 2019. (Doc. # 15.) McClain argued that he had discretion to refuse to record
Williams’ affidavit “as a deed” because he had reasonable cause to believe the document
was materially false or fraudulent. In support, McClain noted that Williams had submitted
no other documents or evidence to substantiate the claim in the affidavit that Williams
was Eula W. Carroll’s heir. Accompanying the motion were discovery responses from
Williams in the form of answers to interrogatories and requests for production of
documents. In those responses, Williams acknowledged that Eula Carroll had one other
living grandson besides him. He also acknowledged not knowing whether Carroll had a
will when she died. Based on these discovery responses, McClain argued that Williams
failed to establish being Carroll’s sole heir if she died testate and that Williams could not
be her sole her if she died intestate. Therefore, McClain argued that Williams’ affidavit
failed sufficiently to establish that he was Carroll’s sole heir who was entitled to have the
property transferred to his trust.
{¶ 6} Williams did not respond to the summary judgment motion, which a
magistrate addressed in a July 2, 2019 decision. (Doc. # 17.) The magistrate reasoned:
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, the Montgomery County Recorder,
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violated his statutory duties under R.C. 317.13 by refusing to record
Plaintiff’s affidavit. (Plaintiff’s Complaint). The duties of a county recorder
are set forth in R.C. 317.13, which states in relevant part:
(A) Except as otherwise provided in division (B) of this section, the
county recorder shall record in the official records, in legible
handwriting, typewriting, or printing, or by any authorized
photographic or electronic process, all deeds, mortgages, plats, or
other instruments of writing that are required or authorized by the
Revised Code to be recorded and that are presented to the county
recorder for that purpose. The county recorder shall record the
instruments in regular succession, according to the priority of
presentation, and shall enter the file number at the beginning of the
record. On the record of each instrument, the county recorder shall
record the date and precise time the instrument was presented for
record. All records made, prior to July 28, 1949, by means authorized
by this section or by section 9.01 of the Revised Code shall be
deemed properly made.
(B) The county recorder may refuse to record an instrument of
writing presented for recording if the instrument is not required or
authorized by the Revised Code to be recorded or the county
recorder has reasonable cause to believe the instrument is
materially false or fraudulent. This division does not create a duty
upon a recorder to inspect, evaluate, or investigate an instrument of
writing that is presented for recording.
(Emphasis added).
If the county recorder refuses to record an instrument, the person
presenting the instrument may file an action in the Court of Common Pleas.
Pursuant to R.C. 317.13(C):
If a person presents an instrument of writing to the county recorder
for recording and the county recorder, pursuant to division (B) of this
section, refuses to record the instrument, the person has a cause of
action for an order from the court of common pleas in the county
that the county recorder serves, to require the county recorder to
record the instrument. If the court determines that the instrument
is required or authorized by the Revised Code to be recorded and
is not materially false or fraudulent, it shall order the county
recorder to record the instrument.
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(Emphasis added).
Based upon the language of the affidavit and Plaintiff’s responses to
the Interrogatories propounded upon him by Defendant, this Court finds that
Defendant had reasonable cause to believe the instrument, Plaintiff’s
affidavit, was materially false or fraudulent. Plaintiff has not presented any
evidence to establish support for the clams made within the affidavit.
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered against Plaintiff and in
Defendant’s favor.
(Emphasis sic.) (Doc. # 17 at 2-3.)
{¶ 7} Although the magistrate’s decision referred the parties to Civ.R. 53 regarding
the filing of objections, Williams did not file any objections as contemplated by the rule.
Under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) “[a]n objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be specific and
state with particularity all grounds for objection.” On July 8, 2019 and July 12, 2019,
Williams filed documents captioned “Plaintiff’s Brief Statement with Affidavit.” (Doc. #18,
19.) Therein, he did not object specifically to anything in the magistrate’s decision. He
simply repeated his argument that McClain should be required to re-record his affidavit
as a deed rather than as a miscellaneous document.
{¶ 8} On July 19, 2019, the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision as its own
and entered summary judgment in favor of McClain. (Doc. # 20.) The trial court concluded
that Williams had not filed any objections pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). It also found no
error of law or defect on the face of the magistrate’s decision. (Id.)
{¶ 9} On appeal, Williams does not specifically address the magistrate’s legal
analysis, which the trial court adopted. Instead, he again claims his affidavit should be
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recorded “as a deed” rather than as a “miscellaneous” document based on R.C.
317.13(C) and R.C. 5301.252. He also argues that he should have a $1,000,000 claim
against McClain.
{¶ 10} Even if we overlook Williams’ failure to file proper objections under Civ.R.
53, we find his argument to be without merit. As set forth above, R.C. 317.13(C) provides
a potential cause of action if a county recorder refuses to record an instrument of writing.
Here McClain apparently did refuse to record Williams’ affidavit “as a deed.” But Williams
was not entitled to a court order directing McClain to record the affidavit that way. The
trial court declined to find under R.C. 317.13(C), and based on the evidence before it, that
the affidavit was not materially false or fraudulent. For the reasons set forth by the
magistrate and adopted by the trial court, we cannot say McClain erred in declining to
record Williams’ affidavit “as a deed.” See Kirk Excavating & Constr., Inc. v. RKJ Ents.,
LLC, 2018-Ohio-3735,
108 N.E.3d 1278, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.) (recognizing that a “county
recorder has discretion in rejecting an instrument”). Nor did the trial court err in upholding
McClain’s decision to record the deed as a “miscellaneous” document. Williams lacked
any evidence other than his own affidavit to support his claim about being his great-
grandmother’s lawful heir. As the magistrate noted, Williams did not even know whether
his great-grandmother had a will, and he acknowledged having a living brother who also
could be an heir if Eula Carroll died intestate.
{¶ 11} We are equally unpersuaded by Williams’ reliance on R.C. 5301.252, which
authorizes the recording of affidavits stating facts related to matters that may affect the
title to real estate. When recorded, such an affidavit is evidence of the facts set forth. The
statute further provides for the recording of such affidavits “as deeds are recorded.” R.C.
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5301.252(A)-(C). We do not believe, however, that an affidavit filed under the statute is a
deed or that it has the legal effect of a deed, which appears to be what Williams is arguing.
Based solely on his affidavit, he seeks to have legal ownership of Eula Carroll’s real estate
transferred to his trust. By providing for an R.C. 5301.252 affidavit to be recorded “as
deeds are recorded,” the statute appears to mean “in the same way” or “in the same
manner” that deeds are recorded. We note too that “Revised Code § 5301.252 provides
that the affidavit of facts is evidence of the facts asserted. It does not conclusively
establish such facts.” Guar. Title and Trust Co. v. Am. Mtge. Solutions, Inc., 5th Dist.
Delaware No. 00CAE12036, 2001 WL 958798, *3 (August 23, 2001). An affidavit filed
under R.C. 5301.252, “in and of itself, creates no interest in the subject real estate[.]”
Catawba West, Inc. v. Domo,
75 Ohio App.3d 80, 83,
598 N.E.2d 883, 885 (6th
Dist.1991). Rather, it is a statutory device for giving notice and for “recording facts which
may affect title to real estate in the State of Ohio.” (Emphasis sic.)
Id.
{¶ 12} In any event, as set forth above, R.C. 317.13(B) authorizes a county
recorder to refuse to record an instrument of writing presented for recording if the recorder
“has reasonable cause to believe the instrument is materially false or fraudulent.” Here
the trial court upheld McClain’s decision to refuse to record Williams’ affidavit “as a deed”
based on concerns about the affidavit containing false or fraudulent information. In our
analysis above, we held that the trial court did not err in reaching this determination.
Therefore, McClain was not required to record Williams’ affidavit “as a deed” regardless
of the precise meaning of the phrase “as deeds are recorded” in R.C. 5301.252. If
Williams believes he is the lawful heir to his great-grandmother’s real estate, he should
pursue an action in probate court and have it adjudicated to establish that fact.
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{¶ 13} Based on the reasoning set forth above, the judgment of the Montgomery
County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
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WELBAUM, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Travis L. Williams
Mathias H. Heck Jr.
Collin Showe
Hon. Michael W. Krumholtz
