Cook v. Bentley

¶1Facts and Procedural Background

¶2Curtis J. Cook, Jr., and Joe Daniel Holt, Jr. (hereinafter sometimes referred to collectively as “the petitioners”), are inmates incarcerated by the Alabama Department of Corrections (“the DOC”). The petitioners each filed in the Elmore Circuit Court (“the trial court”) a “petition for release order” seeking their release from prison pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, § 14-15-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 (“the APLRA”). Holt filed his petition on or around June 20, 2014; Cook filed his petition on or around September 12, 2014.2 The petitioners also filed requests for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. On June 27, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting Holt’s request for IFP status. However, on August 25, 2014, the trial court entered an order revoking Holt’s IFP status. On September 17, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying Cook’s request for IFP status.

¶3The petitioners each filed with the Court of Criminal Appeals petitions for a writ of mandamus in which they sought an order from that court directing the trial court to set aside its orders denying the petitioners’ request's for IFP status. On March 12, 2015, the Court of Criminal Appéals entered separate orders in which it stated that it did not have jurisdiction over Cook’s and Holt’s petitions for a writ of mandamus and, consequently, transferred the petitions to the Court of Civil Appeals. On March 13, 2015, the Court of Civil Appeals likewise determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Cook’s and Holt’s petitions and entered separate orders transferring the petitions to this Court.3

¶4. This Court assigned Cook’s petition case no. 1140610, assigned Holt’s petition case no. 1140611, and entered an order consolidating the cases for the purpose of issuing one. opinion and to address the issue of which of Alabama’s appellate courts has jurisdiction to review proceedings arising from the APLRA. Accordingly, before addressing the merits of the petitioners’ ar*318guments, this Court must determine which of Alabama's appellate courts has jurisdiction over Cook’s and Holt’s petitions.

¶5Jurisdiction

¶6The APLRA, which became'effective on April 24, 2013, applies “to all pro se civil actions for money damages relating to terms and conditions of confinement brought under the laws of this state, or for injúnctivé, declaratory, or mandamus relief, brought by prisoners incarcerated in any state correctional facility.” § 14-15-2, Ala.Code 1975. The APLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a civil action under state law. § 14-15-4(b), Ala.Code 1975. Should a prisoner commence an action seeking relief in the form of a release order, he or she must file with the petition for release a request for a three-judge court and materials sufficient to indicate that certain prerequisites,- found in § 14-15-10(a), Ala. Code 1975, have been met.4 § 14—15—10(d), Ala.Code 1975. One limitation on relief prescribed by the APLRA is that a state court may order a prisoner’s release from incarceration only when a three-judge court finds from clear and convincing evidence that “[cjrowding is the primary cause of the violation of a right” and “[n]o other relief will remedy the violation of the right.” § 14—15—10(f)(1) and (2), Ala.Code 1975.

¶7The APLRA also provides that a pro se prisoner seeking relief as prescribed by the APLRA may seek IFP status by providing the court with a certified copy of his or her “prisoner money account” for the 12 months preceding the filing of the request for relief. § 14—15—5(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. If the prisoner’s “inmate trust account” shows no deposits in the 12 months preceding the filing of the request for relief, the court has no discretion regarding IFP status but, instead, “shall permit the prisoner to proceed without paying the filing fee and costs.” § 14-15-5(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The APLRA does not give courts guidance or provide factors for courts to consider in determining whether to grant IFP status in cases in which the prisoners’ inmate trust accounts indicate that deposits have been made into the accounts in the 12 months preceding the filing of the request for relief.

¶8Although no party argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over these matters, we briefly address, for thoroughness, that court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Criminal Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction “of all misdemeanors, including the violation of town and city ordinances, habeas corpus and all felonies, including all post conviction writs in criminal cases.” § 12-3-9, Ala.Code 1975. Because Cook’s and Holt’s mandamus petitions arise from actions seeking relief based on the conditions of their incarceration, rather than from actions giving rise to their incarceration, the proceedings underlying the petitions are civil, not criminal, in nature. That determination is supported by the fact that the APLRA consistently refers to actions seeking relief pursuant to the procedures set forth in the APLRA as civil in nature. See, e.g., § 14-15-2, § 14-15-3(1), § 14-*31915-4(b), and § 14-15-10(a) and (b). In addition, § 14-15-2 expressly provides that the APLRA does not apply to actions brought pursuant to § 15-21-1, Ala.Code 1975, which governs habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, although the APLRA provides that a prisoner may seek release from incarceration as a form of relief, our legislature clearly intended to make a distinction between a prisoner’s action seeking release from incarceration pursuant to the procedures set forth in the APLRA and a prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Because Cook’s and Holt’s petitions for release seek relief as prescribed by the APLRA, we conclude that their petitions are not in the nature of habeas corpus petitions. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals does not have jurisdiction over Cook’s and Holt’s mandamus petitions .arising from the proceedings initiated by the filing of their petitions seeking relief under the APLRA, Accordingly, appellate jurisdiction over an action seeking relief prescribed by the APLRA must lie either with the Court of Civil Appeals or with this Court.

¶9The petitioners argue that the Court of Civil Appeals has jurisdiction over their mandamus petitions because, they say, the Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all appeals and petitions for extraordinary writs arising from decisions of administrative agencies. The respondents,5 on the other hand, argue that this Court has jurisdiction over the mandamus petitions because, they say, the petitions do not fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Civil Appeals.

¶10Section 12-3-10, Ala.Code 1975, provides that the Court of Civil Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction

“of all civil cases where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $50,000, all appeals from administrative agencies other than the Alabama Public Service Commission, all appeals in workers’ compensation cases, all appeals in domestic relations cases, including annulment, divorce, adoption, and child custody cases and all extraordinary writs arising from appeals in said cases.”

¶11The only area of the Court of Civil Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction that could conceivably encompass Cook’s and Holt’s mandamus petitions is that court’s jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs “arising from appeals” from decisions of administrative agencies. However, Cook’s and Holt’s petitions for release filed in the trial court are not appeals from an administrative agency. These are not cases in which an administrative agency has denied a petitioner requested relief and that petitioner has appealed the agency’s decision either to a circuit court or to the Court of Civil Appeals. Although the basis for the relief sought by the petitioners concerns the DOC’s. alleged failure to address overcrowding in Alabama’s prisons, the DOC has no authority under the APLRA to grant the petitioners the relief they seek; the relief they seek can be granted only by a three-judge court. § 14-15-10(b). The mere fact that the DOC is the agency charged with overseeing Cook’s and Holt’s incarceration does not bring their mandamus petitions within the Court of Civil Appeals’ exclusive appellate jurisdiction of *320“all appeals from administrative agencies” and “all extraordinary writs arising from' appeals in said cases” as envisioned by § 12-3-10. Thus, we conclude that the Court of Civil Appeals does not have jurisdiction over Cook’s and Holt’s mandamus petitions. Because no other appellate court has jurisdiction over Cook’s and Holt’s mandamus petitions, jurisdiction lies with this Court. Ala. Const.1901, Art. IV, § 140(c); § 12-2-7(1), Ala.Code 1975. Thus, we turn now to the merits of the petitioners’- arguments.

¶12Standard of Review

¶13“In Ex parte Melton, 837 So.2d 819, 820-21 (Ala.2002), this Court discussed the standard of review applicable to a petition for the writ of mandamus:

“‘“A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will be ‘issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.’ Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993). A writ of mandamus will issue only in situations where other relief is unavailable or is inadequate, and it cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. Ex parte Drill Parts & Serv. Co., 590 So.2d 252 (Ala.1991).”

‘“Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 720 So.2d 893, 894 (Ala.1998).’

“Further, this Court has stated:

‘ “ ‘[M]andamus, and not appeal, is the proper method by which to compel the circuit court to proceed on an in forma pauperis petition.’ ” ’ 837 So.2d at 822 (quoting Ex parte Beavers, 779 So.2d 1223, 1224 (Ala.2000), quoting in turn Goldsmith v. State, 709 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Ala.Crim.App.1997)).”

¶14Ex parte Ward, 957 So.2d 449, 451 (Ala.2006).

¶15Case No. 1140610

¶16Based on the materials provided to this Court, it appears that Cook’s “average balance” in his inmate trust account as of August 31, 2014, was $11.76. Although Cook does not indicate what the filing fee for his action would have been, it appears as though he would have had to pay a filing fee of $297 to prosecute his action. § 12-19-71(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975.

¶17In its September 17, 2014, order denying Cook’s request for IFP status, the trial court noted that it had denied Cook’s request because it found that he “has had $853.00 deposited into his account within the last year; more than enough from which a filing fee might be paid.” Because Cook had deposits in his inmate trust account in the 12 months preceding the filing of his petition for release, the trial court was not required to grant Cook’s request for IFP status. § 14-15-5(a)(3). Rather, the trial court had the discretion more generally afforded trial courts in determining whether to grant IFP status in non-APLRA cases. Accordingly, we consider only whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Cook’s request for IFP status. See Wilson v. Southeast Alabama Med. Ctr., 187 So.3d 1165, 1167 (Ala.Civ.App.2015); Ex parte Holley, 883 So.2d 266, 269 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).

¶18In Ex parte Wyre, 74 So.3d 479 (Ala.Crim.App.2011), Wyre sought IFP status in connection with the filing of a postcon-viction petition in the Baldwin Circuit Court. Id. at 480. After the Baldwin Circuit Court denied Wyre’s IFP request, Wyre filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.In that petition, Wyre alleged that the *321Baldwin Circuit Court had erred in denying his IFP request because, he said, he had only 28 cents in his inmate trust account when he filed his IFP request and the average balance of his inmate trust account for the 12 months preceding the filing of his request was $30.74. Id.

¶19In denying Wyre’s mandamus petition, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that Wyre’s inmate trust account showed total deposits of $876.52 in the 12 months preceding the filing of his petition for postcon-viction relief. Wyre, 74 So.3d at 481. Given those deposits, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: “Wyre could have saved the money to pay the filing fee; thus, he is not indigent.” Id.

¶20Similarly, in Cook’s case, Cook’s inmate trust account indicates that Cook had total deposits of more than $800 in the 12 months preceding the filing of his petition for release, including deposits of $259 in 1 month alone. Those deposits, if saved, would have been more than sufficient to pay a filing fee. Although Cook argues that the trial court should not consider the assets of “friends and relatives” in determining whether to grant IFP status, there is no indication in the materials provided to this Court that the trial court considered any “assets” other than the deposits in Cook’s inmate trust account. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying Cook’s request for IFP status, and we deny Cook’s petition.

¶21Case No. 1140611

¶22Based on the materials provided to this Court, it appears that Holt’s “average balance” in his inmate trust account as of April 30, 2014, the most recent “average balance” provided on the “average inmate deposit balances” form submitted by Holt, was $2.24. Like Cook, Holt does not indicate what the filing fee for his action would have been, although, as noted above, it appears as though the required filing fee would have been $297. § 12-19-71(a)(4).

¶23Holt’s inmate trust account shows total deposits of $199.26 between May 31, 2013, and April 30, 2014. Thus, the trial court was not required to grant Holt’s request for IFP status. § 14-15-5(a)(3). As noted above, the trial court initially granted Holt’s request for IFP status but later revoked that status in an order that does not indicate the ground for the revocation. That order simply states, in pertinent part: “Reconsideration of indigent status filed by [the respondents] is hereby granted.” It is undisputed that the respondents filed with the trial court a motion to reconsider Holt’s IFP status and that Holt filed a response to that motion. Because the trial court initially granted Holt’s request for IFP status and then revoked that status, we infer that the trial court was persuaded by the respondents’ arguments. However, because neither the respondents’ motion nor Holt’s response to that motion are included in the materials provided to this Court,. we are unable to determine the grounds for the trial court’s revocation of Holt’s IFP status, and, thus, we are unable to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion.6

¶24*322As the petitioner, Holt carried the burden of providing this Court with the pertinent materials showing that he is entitled to mandamus relief. Ex parte Dangerfield, 49 So.3d 675, 680 (Ala.2010). Holt has failed to carry that burden, and this Court will not conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion when Holt failed to provide this Court with all the arguments and evidence the trial court considered in denying his request for IFP status. Thus, we deny Holt’s petition.

¶25Conclusion

¶26For the reasons set forth above, we deny Cook’s and Holt’s petitions for a writ of mandamus.

¶271140610—PETITION DENIED.

¶281140611—PETITION DENIED.

¶36(concurring in part and dissenting in part).

¶37I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it holds that appellate jurisdiction over actions filed by incarcerated inmates seeking release from prison pursuant to the Alabama Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, § 14-15-1 et seq., Ala.Code 1975 (“the APLRA”), lies with this Court, not with the Court of Civil Appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals. I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that predicates its denial of the requested mandamus relief—namely, the issuance of writs directing the Elmore Circuit Court to grant in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status to inmates Curtis J. Cook, Jr., and Joe Daniel Holt, Jr., the petitioners—on the rationale expressed in Ex parte Wyre, 74 So.3d 479 (Ala.Crim.App.2011).

¶38Today the Court adopts the Wyre “look back” or “could have saved” rule for the first time, even though the resolution of this case does not depend on Wyre. Under this rule, a court may deny an inmate IFP status if it surmises from recent deposits into the inmate’s trust account that the inmate could have saved enough money in the previous 12 months to pay his or her filing fee. The present case involves determinations of IFP status under § 14-15-5, Ala.Code 1975, not under Rules 32.6 and 32.7, Ala. R.Crim. P., which were the dis-positive rules in Wyre. Wyre is relevant to this case only by loose analogy. Under § 14-15-5(b), a court “shall deny in forma pauperis status to any prisoner who has had three or more pro se civil actions or appeals dismissed by any federal or state court for being frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim,” unless the prisoner makes certain showings specified in § 14-15-5(b). The respondents argue that the trial court properly denied Holt IFP status under § 14-15-5(b) because Holt had three or more pro se civil actions dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. Given that this case involves the application of § 14-15-5, and not the specific rules of criminal procedure addressed in Wyre, I do not believe *323that the rule espoused in Wyre should be discussed, let alone play a deciding role, in our decision in Holt’s case.

¶39Even in cases governed by Rules 32.6 and 32.7, Ala. R.Crim. P., however, the “look back” or “could have saved” rule articulated in Wyre raises troubling constitutional questions. The Wyre rule impedes a prisoner’s access to the courts in possible violation of the Due Process Clause by weighing the interests of rich and poor criminals unequally. The Wyre rule also may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See also Ala. Const.1901, Art. I, §§ 1, 6, 13, and 22, and Ex parte Johnson, 123 So.3d 953, 954 (Ala.2013) (Moore, C.J., dissenting)(“‘The Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale.’” (quoting Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 714, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961))).

¶40For the first decade after this Court adopted the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court of Criminal Appeals was responsive to prisoners’ complaints that a trial court was unfairly denying IFP status in postconviction proceedings even after a demonstration of indigence. In fact, the Court of Criminal Appeals “uniformly granted IFP status when the balance in an inmate’s prison account on the date the Rule 32[, Ala. R.Crim. P.,] petition was filed was less- than the filing fee and the prisoner’s account balance had never exceeded the filing fee in previous months.” Ex parte Robey, 160 So.3d 757, 761 (Ala.2014)(Moore, C.J., dissenting).7 This Court routinely affirmed the judg-*324merits of the Court of Criminal Appeals in these matters.

¶41In Ex parte Hurth, 764 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Ala.2000), we rejected the trial court’s finding that an inmate was not entitled to IFP status because he could have saved his usual monthly deposit to cover the costs of the filing fee. Instead, this Court ordered the trial court to permit the inmate to proceed with his petition for post-conviction relief based on the inmate’s financial . condition when he filed for IFP status. Hurth, 764 So.2d at 1274. In similar cases from this period this Court recognized that courts should look to the amount of an inmate’s funds at the time of filing to determine whether the inmate was indigent and, thus, entitled to IFP status. See Ex parte Beavers, 779 So.2d 1223, 1224-25 (Ala.2000); Ex parte Dozier, 827 So.2d 774, 776 (Ala.2002).

¶42Not until Wyre did an appellate court adopt the “look back” or “could have saved” rule. Robey, 160 So.3d at 762 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). Because I continue to. believe that “Wyre is inconsistent with our prior cases on determining indi-gency,” and, worse still, is “constitutionally questionable” and “unspecified in rule or statute,” Robey, 160 So.3d at 765 (Moore, C.J., dissenting), I object to the majority’s reliance on Wyre. Moreover, Wyre does not apply to an IFP determination under § 14-15-5. The facts and arguments before us do not justify ratifying a dubious decision by a lower appellate court on an issue ancillary to the' one presented. Therefore,' although I concur in the jurisdictional holding, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s approval of the unnecessarily harsh Wyre rule.