[Cite as State v. Smith,
2020-Ohio-3074.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
WARREN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NOS. CA2019-10-113
CA2019-11-121
:
- vs - OPINION
: 5/26/2020
JIMMY RAY SMITH, JR., :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. 19CR35314
David P. Fornshell, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, Kathryn M. Horvath, 520 Justice
Drive, Lebanon, Ohio 45036, for appellee
Johnna M. Shia, P.O. Box 145, Springboro, Ohio 45066, for appellant
S. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Jimmy Ray Smith, Jr., appeals his conviction in the Warren County
Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of rape, two counts of gross sexual
imposition, two counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or performance,
one count of endangering children, and one count pandering sexual oriented material
involving a minor. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
Warren CA2019-10-113
CA2019-11-121
{¶ 2} On April 8, 2019, the Warren County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Smith with the seven above-named offenses. Five of those charges arose after
Smith raped an eight-year-old family member, caused her to masturbate him, and took lewd
photographs of her naked body exposing her genitalia and breast area. Smith then shared
those photographs with an undercover police officer over the Internet. The remaining two
charges arose after Smith took lewd photographs of another four-year-old family member
and forced her to touch and masturbate his penis. Although initially entering a not guilty
plea, Smith ultimately pled guilty to each of the seven offenses as alleged in the indictment.
Upon finding Smith's plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, the trial court
accepted Smith's guilty plea, ordered the completion of a presentence-investigative report
("PSI"), and scheduled the matter for sentencing.
{¶ 3} On October 10, 2019, the trial court held the previously scheduled sentencing
hearing. During this hearing, and without any objection from Smith, the state set forth the
underlying facts for each of the seven offenses to which Smith had pled guilty. Although in
slightly less detail, these facts were the same facts as provided to the trial court in the PSI.
Noting that it had considered the PSI, which included Smith's statements to police admitting
to the charged conduct, the trial court merged the two offenses relating to the four-year-old
victim as allied offenses of similar import. The trial court then sentenced Smith to a total
aggregate term of 25 years to life in prison, classified Smith as a Tier III sex offender, and
notified Smith that he would be subject to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term
should he ever be released from prison. Smith now appeals his conviction, raising three
assignments of error for review.
{¶ 4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 5} THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW THE MANDATES OF CRIM.R. 11
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RENDERING SMITH'S PLEA INVOLUNTARY.
{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Smith argues his guilty plea was involuntarily
entered since the trial court failed to properly advise him of the nature of the charges and
the maximum penalties involved for each offense prior to him entering his guilty plea as
required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). We disagree.
{¶ 7} When a defendant enters a guilty plea in a felony criminal case, the plea must
be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Mosley, 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA2014-12-142, 2015-Ohio-3108, ¶ 6. "Failure on any of those points 'renders
enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the
Ohio Constitution.'" State v. McQueeney,
148 Ohio App.3d 606,
2002-Ohio-3731, ¶ 18
(12th Dist.), quoting State v. Engle,
74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). To ensure that a
defendant's guilty plea is knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, the trial court must
engage the defendant in a plea colloquy pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Reynolds, 12th
Dist. Madison No. CA2018-02-005,
2018-Ohio-4942, ¶ 9. That is to say, Crim.R. 11(C)
"ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform the
defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is
understandingly and voluntarily made." State v. Stone,
43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975).
{¶ 8} To that end, pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court may not accept a
defendant's guilty plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.
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(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant's
favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.
{¶ 9} As recently explained by the Ohio Supreme Court, "[w]hen a criminal
defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on appeal, the traditional rule is that he
must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court proceedings and that he was
prejudiced by that error." State v. Dangler, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 13. There
are two limited exceptions, however, where no showing of prejudice is required in the
criminal-plea context. Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶ 10} The first exception to the prejudice requirement occurs "[w]hen a trial court
fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no
contest[.]" Id. When this occurs, "we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and
unknowingly, and no showing of prejudice is required." Id., citing State v. Clark, 119 Ohio
St.3d 239,
2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 31. The constitutional rights that the trial court must explain
to a defendant are set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c): the right to a jury trial, the right to confront
one's accusers, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to compulsory process to
obtain witnesses, and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., citing Clark at ¶ 19. "But when a trial court fails to fully cover other 'nonconstitutional'
aspects of the plea colloquy, a defendant must affirmatively show prejudice to invalidate a
plea." Id., citing Clark at ¶ 17.
{¶ 11} The second exception to the prejudice requirement occurs as a result of "a
trial court's complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C)[.]" Id. at ¶ 15, citing
State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86,
2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22. This, too, "eliminates the
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defendant's burden to show prejudice." Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765 at ¶ 15. For example, in
Sarkozy, the Ohio Supreme Court "held that the trial court had completely failed to comply
with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)'s requirement that it explain the maximum penalty when the court
made no mention of postrelease control in the plea colloquy, despite the fact the defendant
was subject to a mandatory five years of postrelease control."
Id.
{¶ 12} "Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule continues to apply: a
defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was
prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C)." Id.
at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). "The test for prejudice is
'whether the plea would have otherwise been made.'"
Id. citing Nero.
{¶ 13} Noting that its caselaw has "muddled" the analysis that should apply when
reviewing a defendant's plea of guilty or no contest "by suggesting different tiers of
compliance with the rule," the Ohio Supreme Court has set forth what it believes "should be
a fairly straightforward inquiry." Id. at ¶ 17. Therefore, rather than reviewing a defendant's
plea of guilty or no contest to determine whether the trial court substantially complied,
partially complied, or completely failed to comply with the requirements set forth in Crim.R.
11(C), "the questions to be answered are simply: (1) has the trial court complied with the
relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the
purported failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating
prejudice? and (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?"
Id.
{¶ 14} Answering the first question in the affirmative, the record firmly establishes
that the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), by
properly advising Smith of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalties involved
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for each offense prior to him entering his guilty plea. To begin Smith's plea hearing, the trial
court advised Smith that "this is an important matter, sir." The trial court then asked Smith
if he had enough time to speak with his attorney about the ramifications he faced by entering
a guilty plea. Smith responded, "Yes, sir." The trial court then notified Smith that he was
"facing a life sentence; do you understand that?" Smith again responded, "Yes, sir." The
trial court then went through each of the seven offenses set forth in the indictment. This
included the trial court accurately describing each of the seven offenses, as well as the
maximum penalty for each of those seven offenses. The trial court then notified Smith that
he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender if he pled guilty.
{¶ 15} At the trial court's request, the state then explained each of the registration
requirements Smith faced as a Tier III sex offender. Upon being notified of these
requirements, the trial court addressed Smith and stated:
THE COURT: All right. Did you hear everything that was said
on that, Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand it?
MR. SMITH: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. You heard what I said about the
potential penalties. Do you understand those, sir?
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
{¶ 16} The trial court then advised Smith of the constitutional rights that he would be
waving upon entering a guilty plea. After verifying that Smith understood the constitutional
rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty, the trial court engaged Smith in the following
exchange:
THE COURT: Do you feel that there's been any sense of
pressure from anyone on you to waive your constitutional rights
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and to plead guilty?
MR. SMITH: No, sir.
THE COURT: You're doing this of your own free will?
MR. SMITH: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to think about this,
sir?
MR. SMITH: I've had many months to think about this, sir.
{¶ 17} Smith claims that his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered since neither the
trial court nor the state provided "sufficient information" concerning the nature of the charges
and the maximum penalty involved for each offense. Smith also claims that his plea was
not voluntary because the state did not provide a recitation of the facts underlying each
offense prior to him entering his plea. We disagree.
{¶ 18} Contrary to Smith's claims, there is no requirement that the trial court "enter
into a discussion with a defendant or defendant's counsel to ensure there is an
understanding where no uncertainty is otherwise indicated." State v. Rivera, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2013-05-072, 2014-Ohio-3378, ¶ 28, citing State v. Dotson, 12th Dist. Preble
No. CA2007-11-025,
2008-Ohio-4965, ¶ 10. Such is the case here.
{¶ 19} There is also no requirement that the trial court determine whether a factual
basis exists to support a guilty plea prior to the accused entering his or her plea. State v.
Isbell, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-06-152, 2004-Ohio-2300, ¶ 16. This is because,
pursuant to Crim.R. 11(B)(1), a guilty plea is a complete admission of the defendant's guilt.
State v. McClellan, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2018-10-014,
2019-Ohio-5034, ¶ 9. Therefore,
by entering a guilty plea, Smith admitted that he was guilty of the substantive crimes
charged in the indictment, State v. Fuller, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2008-09-240, 2009-Ohio-
5068, ¶ 105, and "waived the right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
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doubt." Isbell. Accordingly, because the trial court properly advised Smith of the nature of
the charges and the maximum penalties involved prior to him entering his guilty plea as
required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), Smith's first assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled.
{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 21} SMITH'S SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE THE COURT
FAILED TO MERGE ALLIED OFFENSES.
{¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, Smith argues the trial court erred by
considering "additional evidence" when making its allied offenses determination at
sentencing. In support of this claim, Smith takes issue with the fact that "[i]t was not until
the issue of merger was raised at the time of sentencing that the [state] recited the specific
conduct that related to each alleged victim for each charged offense." This is because,
according to Smith, it was improper for the trial court to rely on "facts [he] did not plead to
when it decided not to merge certain offenses." We disagree.
{¶ 23} Despite Smith's claims, considering the underlying facts recited by the state
were the same facts detailed in the PSI, we find it was proper for the state to set forth the
salient facts necessary to assist the trial court in making its allied offenses determination.
It was also proper for the trial court to then consider those facts as part of its allied offenses
analysis. This is because it is well established that the trial court may consider the
information contained in the PSI when deciding whether offenses are allied offenses of
similar import. State v. Knight, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-02-028, 2016-Ohio-7991, ¶
13 (trial court can "look to the information contained in the record," including the PSI, when
making its allied offenses determination), citing State v. Cisco, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13
CAA 04 0026,
2013-Ohio-5412, ¶ 30 ("the trial court does not err in relying upon the [PSI]
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in deciding whether to merge offenses"). That is exactly what the trial court did here.
Therefore, because the trial court did not err by considering "additional evidence" when
making its allied offenses determination at sentencing, Smith's second assignment of error
lacks merit and is overruled.
{¶ 24} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 25} SMITH'S SENTENCE IS CONTRARY TO LAW BECAUSE THE FACTS TO
WHICH SMITH PLEAD FAILS TO SUPPORT CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES.
{¶ 26} In his third assignment of error, Smith argues the trial court erred by
considering "additional evidence" when deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences.
Similar to his argument in his second assignment of error, Smith argues that it was improper
for the trial court to rely on the state's "recitation of the specific conduct related to each
alleged victim constituting the offenses at the time of sentencing." We disagree.
{¶ 27} Contrary to Smith's claims, not only is the state permitted under R.C.
2929.19(A) to "present information relevant to the imposition of sentence" at sentencing, as
stated previously, the underlying facts recited by the state at sentencing were the same
facts detailed in the PSI. R.C. 2929.19(B)(1) "explicitly enables" the trial court to consider
the information contained in the PSI before imposing its sentence. State v. Milner, 6th Dist.
Erie No. E-14-113, 2015-Ohio-2446, ¶ 31. The trial court is in fact required to consider that
information before issuing its sentencing decision. State v. Mavrakis, 9th Dist. Summit No.
27457,
2015-Ohio-4902, ¶ 29 ("[t]he court is required to consider information presented by
the prosecutor, the offender, and the presentence investigation report, which contains the
defendant's criminal history"). That is, again, exactly what the trial court did here.
Therefore, because the trial court did not err by considering "additional evidence" when
deciding whether to impose consecutive sentences, Smith's third assignment of error lacks
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merit and is overruled.
{¶ 28} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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