Slip opinions decided 2020 — Ohio Public Domain Citations

Request for an extension to file answer Civ.R. 6(B)(2) excusable neglect Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings dismissal of a complaint legal malpractice. If a defendant moves for leave to answer after the date the answer is due, Civ.R. 6(B)(2) permits the trial court to grant the defendant's motion upon a showing of excusable neglect. A trial court's Civ.R. 6(B)(2) determination is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. The test for excusable neglect under Civ.R. 6(B)(2) is less stringent than that applied under Civ.R. 60(B). The determination must take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances, with the admonition that cases should be decided on their merits. In the instant case, Robey's counsel stated that he had been retained that afternoon, that he had just received the complaint, that he had reviewed the docket and noted that the answer had been due two days ago. In addition, Robey's counsel stated that he was unable to contact Johnson's counsel, as Johnson is pro se and appears to be in a correctional institution. Further, at the time of the request, Robey was out of rule by only two days and Johnson had yet to file a motion for default judgment. Considering all the surrounding facts and circumstances, as well as being mindful that cases should be decided on their merits, Johnson was not prejudiced by the trial court granting Robey a two-day extension to file his answer. We conclude there was no abuse of discretion in granting the two-day extension.

Conceded error no entry of guilty plea by defendant. Where defendant was exposed to a different range of potential penalties after he initially pled guilty, trial court erred in sentencing defendant without vacating defendant's prior guilty plea and having defendant enter a new plea in contemplation of the new range of potential penalties. The state conceded the error. Defendant's convictions and sentences vacated case remanded.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of two counts of rape and single counts of kidnapping, aggravated burglary (physical harm), aggravated burglary (deadly weapon), tampering with evidence, and obstructing official business. After merger of certain counts, he was sentenced to an aggregate 30-year prison term. The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress the victim's show-up identification. The trial court did not commit plain error by certifying a witness as an expert in the presence of the jury. The jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Any error resulting from conducting a juror interview outside the presence of appellant and counsel was harmless. The trial court's ultimate decision to dismiss the juror was not an abuse of discretion, and, further, appellant has not demonstrated prejudice as a result of the dismissal. Finally, it cannot be found by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

The trial court fully complied with its obligation under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) to advise appellant of the increased maximum penalty created by his post-release control status. Also, despite the slight variation between the indictment language and the State's factual statement in support of the guilty pleas, the record establishes that appellant subjectively understood the nature of the drug possession offenses to which he pleaded guilty. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurring in judgment only.)

The trial court did not err in revoking community control and imposing a consecutive sentence where appellant was convicted of a new felony offense while under community control supervision and had a lengthy criminal record and a poor supervision history. Although appellant contends that he did not understand the sentence, the trial court clearly stated it at the sentencing hearing and in the journal entry. We find no issues with arguable merit under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee was a final appealable order. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee on its foreclosure complaint. The action was brought within the applicable statute of limitations. Appellee's affiant had personal knowledge of its record-keeping system, and the business records at issue fell within the business records exception to the hearsay rule per Evid.R. 803(6). Appellee's Lost Note Affidavit established that it was entitled to enforce the note at issue, and the affiant established the amount due under the note. The equities favored the grant of foreclosure in favor of appellee. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court dismissed appellant's complaint without prejudice because it concluded that the complaint contained a "medical claim" and that appellant had failed to satisfy Civ.R. 10(D)(2), governing the pleading of such claims. The court correctly concluded that the complaint contained a "medical claim." But the dismissal order was not final and appealable, because appellant failed to show that the complaint could not be refiled. Appeal dismissed. (Froelich, J., dissenting.)

appointment of a visiting judge, Civ.R. 55, motion for default, Civ.R. 12(A), Civ.R. 6(B), motion for extension of time to answer, failure to serve subpoena, undisclosed witness, rebuttal testimony, abuse of discretion

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule untimely appeal.

OVI Sufficiency of the evidence under the influence strong odor of alcohol field sobriety testing refusal indicia of impairment glassy eyes, bloodshot eyes manifest weight of the evidence motion for mistrial abuse of discretion objection stricken curative instruction hearsay fleeting fair trial

political subdivision – immunity – R.C. 2744.02 – proprietary function – public grounds

motion for leave to file an amended complaint, arguments outside captioned assignment of error, certificate of assignment for visiting judge, due process, cumulative error, Civ.R. 15(A), abuse of discretion, Civ.R. 17, real party in interest, Civ.R. 25, substitution, enforcement of settlement agreement.

suppression, reasonable suspicion, premature

Manifest Weight/Sufficiency of Evidence/Credibility of Witness/Discovery Sanction/Proffer

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening untimely application good cause transfer of prisoner. Application for reopening was denied where applicant failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing. Lack of access to legal materials may not generally establish good cause. Even if a period of time the applicant spent in county jail as a result of a temporary transfer from prison constituted good cause, that does not excuse the delay in filing beyond that period. The application was still untimely when that period of time is subtracted from the total time.

App.R. 26(B) application to reopen ineffective assistance of appellate counsel R.C. 2929.14(C) maximum and consecutive sentences mitigating factors severity of harm multiple offenses and prejudice. Defendant argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that maximum and consecutive sentences were improper because the defendant's actions were provoked and because the record did not support maximum and consecutive sentences. The defendant's multiple crimes against multiple individuals and his extensive criminal history supported the maximum and consecutive sentences.

Foreclosure summary judgment magistrate's decision plain error sufficiency of service affidavit attached documents copies. - No plain error found in trial court's judgment that adopted the magistrate's decision granting summary judgment in a foreclosure action where appellant never objected to the magistrate's decision and thus waived all but plain error, appellant was properly served with the third amended complaint, and the affidavit attached to appellee's motion for summary judgment properly authenticated the copies of documents attached to the summary judgment motion.

Evid.R. 901(A) authentication admissibility hearsay Evid.R. 801(C) present sense impression Evid.R. 803(1) excited utterance Evid.R. 803(2) prior inconsistent statement Evid.R. 607. The trial court abused its discretion in admitting the victim's statements in the 911 tape and the body camera video because the statements were inadmissible hearsay. The victim's statements did not fall under the present sense impression or excited utterance hearsay exceptions, and were not properly admitted as prior inconsistent statements.

Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The record demonstrates that the defendant was represented by competent counsel during the change-of-plea hearing and that the trial court complied with all the requirements of Crim.R. 11 and gave full consideration to the motion to withdraw after a hearing.

Motion to suppress, Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry, implied consent. The trial court did not err when it adopted the magistrate's decision to deny the appellant's motion to suppress. The appellant's Fourth Amendment rights against an unlawful, warrantless entry were not violated. The appellant gave implied consent to officers to enter her hotel room by opening the door and going back to bed.

Foreclosure note mortgage bankruptcy assignment. - Trial court did not err in granting a decree of foreclosure to the bank. Debtor's bankruptcy discharge of his personal obligation under the note did not preclude the bank from seeking an equitable remedy of foreclosure to satisfy the debt. The bank was properly assigned the mortgage through a corrective assignment despite the fact that the original lender was no longer in existence.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Sections 4 and 6 municipality's purchase of electricity for resale outside municipal boundaries fifty percent limitation surplus product artificial surplus entire amount purchase solely for resale genuine issue of material fact. Based on the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of Sections 4 and 6 of Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution in Toledo Edison Co. v. Bryan, 90 Ohio St.3d 288, 288, 737 N.E.2d 529 (2000), a municipality violates the Ohio Constitution if it purposely purchases more electricity than it needs for its inhabitants solely so that it can resell electricity to customers outside its municipal boundaries regardless of whether the municipality's extraterritorial sales exceed fifty percent of the total service or product supplied within the municipality or the municipality purchased excess electricity in order to resell the entire amount of the purchased electricity outside its municipal boundaries. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of city on utility's claims against city premised on alleged violations of Sections 4 and 6. Genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether city purchased excess electricity solely for the purpose of selling it to others outside municipal limits. Judgment reversed and case remanded for further proceedings.

R.C. 149.43 public records request Ohio Rules of Superintendence court records mandamus summary judgment statutory damages proof of mailing certified mail moot. Relator's request for writ of mandamus was denied where relator was not entitled to court records through Ohio's Public Records Act when access to those records are governed by the Ohio Rules of Superintendence even if the Act applied, relator did not comply with the act by first seeking judicial order. Records sought that were not court records were delivered to relator during the pendency of the action, rendering that portion moot. Relator was not entitled to statutory damages where he failed to show that respondent was in receipt of his request he sent via certified mail.

Mandamus, enforcement of judgment, plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, motion for contempt, appeal. The relators, through a complaint for a writ of mandamus, seek to enforce a monetary judgment. The relators have failed to establish that they possess a clear legal right to the immediate enforcement of a monetary judgment. In addition, the relators possess or possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law through a motion for contempt. Finally, the monetary judgment in question is currently the subject of a pending appeal.

The trial court abused its discretion in issuing default judgment against a party as to whom the complaint stated no claim on which relief could be granted. Claims for negligent hiring and respondeat superior do not run against an individual who is not the alleged wrongdoer's employer, and the complaint failed to make factual allegations that support a recklessness theory on which to proceed against a father for the alleged actions of his adult son.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's public records request for documents pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Appellant failed to identify a pending proceeding to which the records would be material, and he did not indicate how the records would be material to any justiciable claim. Judgment affirmed.

The jury, not the trial court, made the factual determination resulting in appellant's death penalty eligibility. Thus, Hurst v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016) is not applicable. Further, Hurst v. Florida does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law, and it is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

The officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that appellant had been driving while impaired and was justified in administering the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) field sobriety test. The officer administered the HGN test in substantial compliance with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards. The totality of circumstances, including the HGN test result, established probable cause to arrest appellant for operating a vehicle while under the influence. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant filed a motion to vacate court costs imposed at his 2006 resentencing. The trial court overruled the motion on the basis of State v. Braden, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5079, __ N.E.3d __ (Braden I), which held that R.C. 2947.23(C), effective March 22, 2013, which granted jurisdiction to a trial court to waive or modify court costs at any time, was not retroactive to costs imposed before March 22, 2013. However, after the trial court's decision, on reconsideration, the Supreme Court decided State v. Braden, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4204, __ N.E.3d __ (Braden II), which held that R.C. 2947.23(C) does apply to court costs imposed prior to that section's enactment and that a trial court "retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution , at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter." The State concedes error. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court did not enter a final appealable order. Appeal dismissed for lack of a final appealable order case remanded for further proceedings.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees/cross-appellants on the issue of piercing the corporate veil of a limited liability company (LLC). In addition, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees/cross-appellants on two transfers the LLC made to one appellee/cross-appellant, as there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the transfers were fraudulent conveyances under R.C. 1336.04(A)(1). However, the court did not err in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether two other transfers to appellees/cross-appellants were fraudulent conveyances under R.C. 1336.05(A). Finally, the trial court did not err in awarding judgment against non-debtors after the bankruptcy court discharged the debtor LLC. The bankruptcy case had been closed, and the transferred property was no longer the property of the estate. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. (Hall, J., concurring.)

Anders appeal. No non-frivolous issues exist relating to the revocation of appellant's community control for domestic violence and the imposition of the maximum 18-month sentence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in the course of appellant's change of plea. Judgment affirmed.

Petition for writ of mandamus dismissed where it does not comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25.

sufficiency – manifest weight – expert testimony – consecutive sentences – cruel and unusual punishment

AB-CHMINACA, spice, synthetic marijuana, trafficking in drugs, possession of drugs, sufficiency of the evidence, knowingly, mistake of fact, manifest weight of the evidence

surety, R.C. 2937.36(C), bail forfeiture, R.C. 2937.39, remission, abuse of discretion, prejudice, reappearance of accused

App.R. 9(B)—transcript—record

Defendant was properly convicted of felonious assault for attacking a roommate with a machete where he failed to prove self-defense at trial.

The trial court's failure to hold a hearing prior to quashing several subpoenas was, at worst, harmless error where the subpoenas were plainly improper, requested materials that would be difficult or impossible to obtain, were issued for the wrong day, and referenced information that the trial court excluded. Furthermore, there was no plain error during trial and appellant's conviction for criminal damaging was supported by the manifest weight of the evidence.

Appellant's conviction for aggravated drug possession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where significant amounts of methamphetamine were discovered in appellant's motel room in close proximity to appellant. The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence where the search of appellant's motel room was lawful and the evidence was discovered in plain view. The trial court properly advised the jury that the testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with suspicion and weighed with caution, and therefore, substantially complied with R.C. 2923.03(D).

Habeas corpus—R.C. 2152.12(G)—Challenge based on juvenile court's alleged failure to fully comply with all procedural requirements for transferring petitioner's case from juvenile court to common pleas court—Common pleas court in petitioner's criminal case did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction—Court of appeals' denial of writ of habeas corpus affirmed—Gaskins v. Shiplevy, 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995), overruled.

Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel state department of transportation to commence appropriation proceedings for alleged taking of property when state closed intersection where county road and limited-access highway formerly met—State's closure of intersection that was shown as "point of access" on original project plans when limited-access highway was created deprived business near intersection of right of access—Writ granted.

CIVIL - summary judgment harmless error negligence duty breach landlord business tenant business invitee licensee possession and control common area lease ordinary care frequenter breach prior knowledge foreseeability notice qualified nuisance.

CRIMINAL LAW - rape child less than 13 years old gross sexual imposition sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence no scratches or marks does not weigh heavily against conviction no physical evidence delayed disclosure prosecutorial misconduct closing argument statements of child victim children's advocacy center nurse recorded interview hearsay for purposes of medical diagnosis non-testimonial merger.

CRIMINAL LAW - possession of cocaine other acts motion in limine to exclude reference to other acts motion granted Evid.R. 404(B) plain error allegation of offering drugs to a juvenile prosecutor elicited inadmissible testimony separate case not simply a narrative response inadmissible propensity evidence defendant was unfairly prejudiced tendency to inflame passions ineffective assistance of counsel authentication must be reversed remaining assigned errors moot.

CRIMINAL - speeding in a school zone R.C. 4511.21(B)(1)(a) expert reports Crim.R. 16(K) Daubert hearing presence of the defendant Crim.R. 43(A)

CRIMINAL LAW - OVI operating without reasonable control field sobriety tests motion in limine horizontal gaze nystagmus substantial compliance waiver expert testimony abuse of discretion relevancy of evidence sufficiency manifest weight affirmed.

APPELLATE REVIEW - writ of restitution stay pending appeal R.C. 1923.14(A) mootness

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) motion for delayed appeal App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeal no valid reason for delay.

CRIMINAL - Endangering Children Obstructing Justice statute of limitations guilty plea knowing and intelligent plea waiver ineffective assistance of counsel postconviction petition evidence outside of the record corpus delicti consecutive sentences judicial factfinding

Res judicata court costs and restitution

Denial of motion to suppress investigatory stop

Crim. R. 43(A) ineffective assistace, sufficiency

JUVENILE – BINDOVER – APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – SENTENCING – COUNSEL – JAIL-TIME CREDIT: Where the juvenile was charged with offenses that were subject to a mandatory bindover, and where the juvenile stipulated to the existence of probable cause and waived a probable-cause hearing, the juvenile court did not err in transferring jurisdiction of the case to adult court. Where the trial court imposed an agreed sentence that was authorized by law, the sentence was not subject to review on appeal pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the existence of probable cause and waiving a probable-cause hearing prior to the transfer of jurisdiction from juvenile court to adult court: defendant was not prejudiced where the record contains no indication that the state lacked sufficient evidence to prove his guilt or that the juvenile court would not have found probable cause that defendant had committed the offenses. The trial court committed plain error where it failed to award defendant jail-time credit for the time he spent confined in a juvenile facility prior to the transfer of jurisdiction of his case from juvenile court to adult court.

RESTITUTION – VICTIM – MARSY'S LAW: Where defendant used a stolen credit card to deceive a business into delivering a service and the true owner of the credit card had the charges reversed, the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to pay restitution to the business: under Marsy's Law, Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10a(D), the business was a victim for purposes of restitution because it suffered economic harm as a proximate result of defendant's criminal conduct.

Industrial commission did not abuse its discretion when it found relator violated several specific safety regulations by removing a guard on a hand held grinder and failing to provide claimant with a proper grinding/cutting mask, resulting in an injury to claimant's eye. Objections overruled writ of mandamus denied.

The judgment of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court denying Defendant-appellant's motion to suppress is affirmed. The encounter between McCall and the officers was consensual. Therefore, there was no seizure or detention that would implicate the Fourth Amendment.

On certification of default.

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11).

drugs—constructive possession—jury instruction

jail-time credit – community-based correctional facility – sufficiently restrictive – hearing – confinement

R.C. 5301.36 satisfaction of mortgage class action certification class definition arbitration agreement. Appellant class representative claims the arbitration agreements contained in the mortgage agreements are not valid and do not warrant exclusions of potential class members from the class unless signed arbitration agreements were produced by appellee bank. While a claim regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement could be raised by those individuals subject to an arbitration agreement in their own actions against appellee bank, the instant class action concerned the class of mortgagors who did not have an arbitration agreement in their mortgage agreements, as set forth in the class definition. Thus, whether appellee bank must prove the validity of an agreement to arbitrate by producing a separately signed arbitration agreement is not pertinent for this certified class. Conceivably, appellant could have proposed a class definition to incorporate the requirement that individuals with an arbitration agreement in their mortgage agreement can only be excluded from the class by a proof of a separately signed arbitration agreement. However, the class as defined does not incorporate this requirement. In addition, the trial court concluded appellee bank complied with prior discovery requests and previously made relevant mortgagor files available for inspection. Therefore, appellant's claim that appellee bank must produce evidence of a separately signed arbitration agreement in order to exclude the mortgagors whose mortgage agreements contained an arbitration agreement lacks merit.

Ineffective assistance of counsel, trial strategy, jury instruction, affirmative defense, parental discipline, plain error. Appellant has not demonstrated that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to assert the affirmative defense of parental discipline and request the corresponding jury instruction. We find the challenged actions are nothing more than the product of sound trial strategy that fall squarely within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Additionally, we cannot find that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a jury instruction that was inappropriate in regards to the evidence presented to the jury and an accurate statement of law. The trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give the jury instructions regarding the affirmative defense of parental discipline. A trial court does not err in failing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense where the evidence is insufficient to support the instruction.

Crim.R. 43(A) defendant's right to be present resentencing harmless error. The court's failure to hold a sentencing hearing that the defendant had a right to be present was harmless error. Defendant failed to argue any prejudice on appeal, and his prison sentence was, in fact, reduced on remand.

Motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial Crim.R. 33 newly discovered evidence unavoidably prevented unreasonable delay reasonable diligence res judicata and hearing on motion for leave. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant-appellant's motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial because the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the affidavit of Taylor was not timely brought to the court's attention, (2) there was no evidence that defendant-appellant was unavoidably delayed from obtaining Potts's and McCollum's affidavits, and (3) McCollum's affidavit was barred by res judicata. Further, it was within the trial court's discretion to not hold a hearing on defendant-appellant's motion for leave. Because the trial court denied defendant-appellant's motion for leave to file a delayed motion for new trial, the court could not rule on defendant-appellant's motion for new trial. The merits of a motion for new trial are decided after the trial court grants movant leave to file a delayed motion for new trial. Where this court determined in a prior appeal that defendant-appellant was not unavoidably prevented from filing his motion for new trial — based upon an alleged Brady violation — res judicata barred him from raising this issue in a subsequent appeal.

Jury instructions sufficiency of the evidence court costs itemization of costs. There is no error: (1) the conviction for robbery was based on sufficient evidence of the physical harm being inflicted during the commission of the theft offense or the attempted commission of a theft offense (2) the jury instructions properly set forth the law with respect to the elements of robbery and (3) the record does not contain the itemization of court costs nor has the trial court determined whether certain itemized costs were warranted in this particular case.

Findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) jail-time credit R.C. 2967.191 discretionary bindover R.C. 2152.10(B) R.C. 2152.12(B)(3). Imposition of consecutive sentences was contrary to law where (1) no findings were made at a sentencing hearing in support of trial court's decision to run three 36-month sentences consecutively (2) a trial judge who was not assigned to the case stated at a sentencing hearing that the three 36-month sentences would be served consecutively based upon the assigned judge's prior representations that consecutive sentences would be imposed and (3) the assigned judge issued sentencing journal entries setting forth findings in support of the imposition of consecutive sentences even though he did not make any of the requisite findings at the sentencing hearing. Consecutive sentences are not properly imposed where one trial judge attempts to memorialize consecutive sentencing findings made by another trial judge in a sentencing journal entry. State did not dispute that trial court failed to properly calculate defendant's jail-time credit. Juvenile court complied with its obligations under R.C. 2151.12(B)(3) in transferring case to the general division as a discretionary bindover. Trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences and calculation of jail-time credit vacated and cases remanded for the trial court to (1) consider whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and if so, to make all of the required findings on the record and incorporate those findings in its sentencing journal entries and (2) recalculate the amount of jail-time credit to which defendant is entitled under R.C. 2967.191.

Jointly recommended sentencing range agreed sentence R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Defendant's sentence was not reviewable on appeal under R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) because he agreed to a sentencing range as part of his plea and the trial court sentenced him within that range.

Foreclosure mortgage indorsement competent and credible evidence Civ.R. 12(B)(6) fraud Fair Debt Collections Practices Act counterclaim jury trial. The trial court's foreclosure judgment was supported by competent and credible evidence. The trial court properly dismissed defendants' FDCPA counterclaim pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because defendants failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were directed at them or that they justifiably relied on these misrepresentations to their detriment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding a bench trial.

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) Tier III sex offender classification substantial compliance complete failure to comply merger of allied offenses R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) imposition of consecutive sentences. In Cuyahoga C.P. 611863, defendant's guilty plea to rape count was invalid where trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) as it related to defendant's status as a Tier III sex offender. Considering the totality of the circumstances, trial court did not substantially comply, and completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), where prior to the entry of defendant's guilty plea, trial court failed to inform defendant that by pleading guilty to the rape count he would be classified as a Tier III sex offender and, based on that classification, would be subject to various requirements and restrictions. Trial court erred in sentencing defendant on felonious assault count that was found to have merged with a kidnapping count. Trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences without making the findings required for the imposition of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing. In Cuyahoga C.P. 611863, defendant's guilty plea to the rape count and the sentence imposed on the felonious assault count vacated and case remand for further proceedings on rape count. Trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences vacated and cases remanded for trial court to consider whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and if so, to (1) make all of the required findings on the record and (2) incorporate those findings in its sentencing journal entries.

Domestic-violence civil protection order expired collateral consequences competent, credible evidence menacing by stalking R.C. 3113.31 R.C. 2903.211. Affirmed the trial court's issuance of a domestic-violence civil protection order. Although the order had expired, the appeal was not moot because the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applied in this particular case. The trial court engaged in the appropriate analysis, and there was competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court's determination that appellant's actions constituted domestic violence as defined in R.C. 3113.31, specifically a violation of R.C. 2903.211, menacing by stalking.

postconviction petition ineffective assistance of counsel R.C. 2953.21

educational service center, treasurer, special audit, findings for recovery, breach of contract, duty to defend, severance pay, vacation leave, sick leave, summary judgment, performance incentives, motion to stay discovery, consideration, illusory, public policy, R.C. 3313.22, R.C. 3319.16, liquidated damages, unenforceable penalty, unconscionability, performance, R.C. 117.36, Civ.R. 59(A)(8), newly discovered evidence

motion to suppress, reasonable suspicion, traffic stop, credibility, pat-down search, consent, arrest, probable cause, plain feel

Original action mandamus procedural deficiencies R.C. 2731.04 improper caption verity affidavit moot trial court has ruled on all motions and no motions remain pending.

A detective did not conduct a search implicating the Fourth Amendment when he looked into appellant's vehicle located in a store's parking lot. The detective, while looking into the vehicle, observed what he immediately recognized as probable cocaine. This plain view discovery allowed the detective to conduct a warrantless seizure of the probable contraband which, upon testing, was confirmed to be cocaine. Additionally, the trial court reasonably concluded that the tow was necessary in order to avoid either theft or vandalism since the subject vehicle, which was parked in private business lot, could readily be placed in safekeeping in a police-controlled lot. The trial court properly overruled appellant's motion to suppress. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that awarding permanent custody of Mother's children to Montgomery County Children Services was in the children's best interest. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a third continuance of the dispositional hearing to allow a home study to be completed for a Florida relative. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for felony murder was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in awarding damages to appellee for temporary injury to real property caused by appellant. The trial court also did not err by overruling appellant's motion for a new damages trial. Judgments affirmed.

Finding Violation Not Supported by Evidence Sentencing Community Control Violation - Right to Confront

Forfeiture by Wrongdoing - Intimidation of Witness - Sufficiency - Evid. R. 804(B)(6)

Appellant was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of Evid.R. 404(B), other acts evidence. Appellant's domestic violence felony conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court erred in failing to hold requisite R.C. 2945.37(B) competency hearing after ordering an evaluation of appellant. Judgment reversed and remanded for competency hearing.

Trial court did not err in denying father's request for recording of trial proceedings where the requested materials were going to be used to support father's objections to the magistrate's decision that had not yet been filed and were already untimely as of the date of the request. Father failed to establish plain error in trial court's calculation of mother's income for child support purposes.

The trial court properly found that insured is not entitled to insurance coverage under commercial general liability policy because the claims asserted against the insured are either barred under the policy's contractual liability exclusion or are not cognizable pursuant to the economic-loss doctrine. However, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the insurance company, because the insured is entitled to coverage and a defense under the terms of an umbrella policy.

No speedy-trial violation where time was tolled, pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(E) and (H), by parties' tentative agreement that defendant would enter diversion program. Defendant was bound by trial counsel's representations that attorney "will see what [she] can get" by way of an agreement. Although no agreement was reached, the extension of time beyond the speedy-trial timetable was reasonable and necessary and therefore tolled the running of the clock.

The facts of this case indicated that the defendant had a separate animus for maintaining separate inventories of different strengths of oxycodone. A trial court must make an affirmative finding of an indigent defendant's present or future ability to pay court-appointed counsel's fees in order to impose such costs on the defendant.

A trial court may dismiss a petition for a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner does not state grounds for relief. Habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy. Habeas should not be used unless there are no alternative remedies in the ordinary course of law.

Trial court properly determined that there was no change of circumstances warranting a modification of custody or child support when all of the issues appellant raised occurred before the final judgment and appellant failed to file a direct appeal.

The trial court's sentence was not contrary to law where the court considered the proper statutory factors, sentenced appellant within the applicable range, and made the necessary findings. The trial court's findings were also supported by the record where appellant shot into a home where he knew children could be present over $900 in drug money.

The trial court properly overruled appellant's motion to suppress where the traffic stop was valid given the trooper's observation of appellant committing traffic violations. A canine sniff indicated the presence of narcotics, so that troopers had probable cause to search the car for drugs. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where his counsel did not challenge the canine's training or reliability where there is no indication in the record that any such challenge would have resulted in the trial court granting appellant's motion to suppress.

The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on constructive possession or flight as consciousness of guilt where the trial court's jury instructions were complete and proper statements of law that were necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the trier of fact based on the testimony and evidence presented at trial. The trial court also did not err by admitting a 9-1-1 call into evidence where the call was relevant and admissible as a present sense impression pursuant to Evid.R. 803(1) that explained the immediate background of the acts that formed the basis for the crime with which appellant was charged.

The trial court did not err in imposing a three-year prison sentence on appellant as R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b) imposes a definite sentence of "no less than three years" on an offender who fails to notify the sheriff of a change of address if he has previously been convicted of failing to provide notice of a change of address. Moreover, the sentence imposed under R.C. 2950.99(A)(2)(b) is not in conflict with R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), which provides that the maximum sentence for a third-degree felony is 36 months.

The trial court improperly granted appellee's motion for intervention of lieu of conviction where appellee was ineligible given that he pled guilty to third-degree felonies, which are rendered ineligible according to R.C. 2951.041(B)(2).

class action, Civ.R. 23, rigorous analysis, class membership, abuse of discretion

exculpatory evidence failure to preserve, burden, potentially useful, bad faith, operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol

Void Sentence Community Control Sanction imposed Consecutive to Prison Sentence

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JUVENILE - transfer amenability hearing amenable to transfer remorse impeachment of witness expert testimony R.C. 2152.12(D) R.C. 2015.12(E) factors. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - motion to suppress statements made without counsel seizure of evidence fingernail scrapings Miranda rights voluntary statement. CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCH & SEIZURE - Fourth Amendment Fourteenth Amendment statements made without counsel seizure of evidence fingernail scrapings specificity of search warrant reasonable expectation of privacy seizure from victim at a hospital. CRIMINAL LAW - ineffective assistance of counsel Strickland v. Washington, validity of search warrant Franks v. Delaware. SENTENCING - no contest plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary aggravated murder aggravated robbery attempted rape sex offender status strict compliance life without the possibility of parole consecutive sentence juvenile sentencing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) maximum sentence cruel and unusual punishment statutory factors consecutive sentences clearly and convincingly supported by the record affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion for resentencing hearing void res judicata failed to raise on direct appeal nunc pro tunc clerical error.

JUVENILE - CUSTODY - permanent custody termination of parental rights abandoned child motion to transport parent to hearing right to attend permanent custody hearing adoption of child due process prejudice motion for continuance abuse of discretion best interest of the child ineffective assistance of counsel affirmed.

PROBATE - declaratory judgment proceedings on remand affirmative defense counterclaim setoff Civ.R. 8(C) and 13 restitution equity

SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in considering defendant's failure to appear for sentencing when imposing maximum sentences. The trial court's improper consideration of defendant's failure to appear for sentencing when imposing consecutive sentences was harmless error where the trial court relied on other factors in addition to the failure to appear to justify the consecutive sentences.

The doctrines of equitable estoppel and promissory estoppel were inapplicable against the state because the state was engaged in a governmental function and no exception applied. Any erroneous attribution of evidence was harmless error because such evidence was not determinative of appellant's failure to comply with applicable Ohio Administrative Code requirements.

Where trial counsel did not object to the introduction of testimony by the guardian ad litem and the appellant essentially adopted that testimony, there was no plausible basis for excluding the GAL's testimony. On the evidence presented, the trial court's conclusions in weighing the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414 were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Public reprimand (Christensen)—Conditionally stayed one-year suspension (Kluesener).

Uninsured motorist insurance

Trial Court failed to hold hearing as requested under R.C. 3781.031

Possession/trafficking in khat

Relator's petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed where relator failed to name the respondent or provide addresses for the parties as required under Civ.R. 10(A).

Petitioner failed to show particularized need for grand-jury transcripts where transcripts would merely assist in his prosecution of administrative appeal and civil action and absence of transcripts would not deprive him of fair adjudication of his claims. An arguable appearance of impropriety was not sufficient to require disqualification of counsel where no actual prejudice was shown.

Motion to stay proceeding, arbitration, frivolous action. The trial court did not err when it denied the appellant's motion to stay proceeding pending arbitration, because the appellants were not parties to the arbitration agreement. Additionally, the appellees must first file a motion with the trial court to determine if the appellants engaged in frivolous conduct.

Arbitration agreement race discrimination retaliation motion to stay litigation pending arbitration non-class action claims procedurally unconscionable substantively unconscionable. - Trial court abused its discretion in granting employer's motion to stay litigation pending arbitration where the arbitration agreement was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.

Traffic stop motion to suppress motion to dismiss South Euclid Ordinance 337.27(d) home rule police power R.C. 4513.263 (B) and (D). The traffic stop, made solely for the purpose to issue a citation for failure to wear a seatbelt, was in violation of R.C. 4513.263(D). The authority to self-govern, permitted under the home-rule provision of the Ohio Constitution, does not apply to this case. The traffic stop was not for a primary offense. The trial court did not err where it converted appellee's motion to suppress to a motion to dismiss and granted the motion.

Guilty plea knowing voluntary intelligent prejudice consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C) R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 consideration. Defendant cannot demonstrate that he would not have entered the plea had the trial court's advisement regarding the sex offender registration requirements lacked substantial compliance because he was already subjected to the highest tier of reporting requirements. The consecutive sentence findings were supported by the record, and the record demonstrates that the trial court considered all the factors required by law.

R.C. 2929.11, R.C. 2929.12, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), consecutive sentences. The trial court did not err when it sentenced the appellant to consecutive sentences because the sentence was not contrary to law, and the trial court made the necessary statutory findings in accordance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. The trial court fully complied with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the appellant's consecutive sentences were not improperly imposed.

Crim.R. 11 (C)/guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1/motion to withdraw guilty plea plain error sex offender registration. The trial court strictly complied in informing appellant of his constitutional rights and substantially complied in informing appellant of his nonconstitutional rights. The trial court's advisement of the possibility of sex offender registration was stated out of caution. Appellant suffered no prejudice where at sentencing the sex offender registration requirement was not imposed. Appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently made.

Void sentence parole eligibility indefinite statutorily mandated terms authorized by law res judicata. The statute under which the defendant was sentenced does not specifically set forth parole eligibility and therefore the trial court's failure to include that language was proper. Furthermore, the trial court's failure to include the term "indefinite" in his sentence did not render his sentence void where the 15-year-to-life prison sentence was indefinite by its nature. The sentence was therefore authorized by law and is not void. Res judicata bars the defendant's claim on appeal.

R.C. 2935.09 R.C. 2935.10 mootness. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in referring citizen's R.C. 2935.09 "Affidavits of Criminal Complaint" to the prosecutor for investigation citizen's challenge to the trial court's refusal to issue arrest warrants, after the trial court referred the matter to the prosecutor's office was rendered moot once the prosecutor declined to bring charges.

Denial of motion to intervene is not a final appealable order where intervenor brought previous action and received relief in that action.

Regarding the trial court's granting of a motion to show cause why appellant should not be held in contempt of court, the court overrules appellant's assignment of error that the Agreed Entry was not in force once the court ordered the parties to participate in the arbitration process and the court stayed the case pending completion of the same. To the extent appellant alleges the trial court erred in not holding a hearing and in not providing an opportunity to rebut its initial finding that appellant violated the Agreed Entry when she filed a claim with the civil rights commission and a report with police, the court sustains the assignments of error in part. Furthermore, to the extent appellant alleges the trial court erred in not reconsidering its initial finding that appellant violated the Agreed Entry when she filed the insurance claims, the court sustains the assignments of error in part. To the extent appellant alleges different errors or abuse, the court dismisses the assignments of error as moot or as the decision pertaining thereto was not raised in the notice of appeal. Judgment reversed in part cause remanded with instructions.

The court vacates the BTA's property valuation decision. In setting property value at a recent purchase price, the BTA failed to consider evidence relating to the value of the property "as if unencumbered." The BTA erred by not considering uncontested evidence that the sale price was affected by the creditworthiness of the property's tenant and the terms of the long-term net lease that the purchasers assumed. Supreme Court precedent requires taxing authorities to consider "not just the sale price but also any other evidence the parties present that is relevant to the value of the unencumbered fee-simple estate." Property valuation should not reflect variation from value attributable, in either direction, to the effect of any specific encumbrance attached to the property. BTA decision vacated cases remanded.

The trial court erred in depriving a mother of her right to counsel during proceedings to terminate her parental rights. Such right to counsel cannot be denied absent careful inquiry into whether the parent has waived it knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and waiver cannot be inferred from an unexplained failure to appear at a hearing. Neither the trial court nor its magistrate considered factors affecting whether the claimed waiver was knowing or intelligent, and appointed counsel apparently did not either attempt to reach his client at the scheduled visitation with her daughter where service of notice of the termination hearing finally was effected, or then request a continuance of that hearing to attempt to communicate with her. Judgment reversed and case remanded.

The trial court failed to comply with Civ.R. 41(B) when it dismissed the complaint without providing the plaintiff with advance notice of the court's intention to dismiss the case. Judgment reversed.

Reconsideration denied for no obvious error unsupportable under the law for teacher denied continuing licensure for violation of school policy on changing grades.

The trial court did not err in entering default judgment against the appellant on the appellee's complaint for unpaid rent and repossession of a lofted barn. After being served with a summons, a copy of the complaint, and related documents, the appellant failed to plead or otherwise defend the action. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in entering summary judgment against the appellant on July 8, 2019 after explicitly giving him until July 22, 2019 to file a memorandum in opposition. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The indictment properly charged appellant with aggravated trafficking in drugs as a second-degree felony with mandatory imprisonment in Count 14, and counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue that the offense should have been classified as a fourth- or fifth-degree felony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motions for a continuance, filed on the day set for trial. Appellant was not entitled to findings of fact and conclusions of law on his motions for a continuance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's pro se motion to substitute counsel filed on the day set for trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the circumstances did not justify a deviation from the court's general rule that any plea taken after the final pretrial will only be accepted as charged in the indictment. Appellant's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary Crim.R. 11 permits a plea of no contest to a criminal charge and does not require an explanation of the circumstances. Appellant mischaracterizes the plea hearing as an "atmosphere of intimidation, pressure, and a lack of fundamental fairness." Finally, the trial court committed plain error in promising that it would not impose a prison sentence in Case No. 2019-CR-2 and then imposing 12 months on two counts in that case. Appellant's sentence in Case No. 2019-CR-2 is reversed, and that case is remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion in all other respects, the judgment in that case is affirmed. The judgment in Case No. 2018-CR-939 is also affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

The jury finding that appellant was guilty of solicitation was based on sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err in refusing to admit appellant's exhibit, which was a handwritten copy of words written in Arabic and translated into English. The exhibit was marginally relevant and was cumulative to testimony that appellant had just given. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

The trial court erred by sentencing appellant to pay a $25 fine without first considering his present and future ability to pay the fine. The trial court also erred by issuing a sentencing entry that incorrectly stated the manner of appellant's conviction. The judgment is reversed insofar as it ordered appellant to pay a $25 fine. The matter is remanded to the trial court for a determination of appellant's present and future ability to pay the fine, resentencing on that issue, and to reflect the correct manner of appellant's conviction in the new sentencing entry that is issued following remand. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant's pleas in two cases were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the trial court did not act unlawfully in disclosing, prior to the second plea colloquy, the sentence it intended to impose. The trial court's sentences were not contrary to law or clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not accurately advise appellant that a driver's license suspension was mandatory, and thus it only partially complied with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) maximum penalty advisement. However, the record does not support the conclusion the appellant would not have entered into the plea agreement if he had subjectively understood that the license suspension was mandatory. Also, since consecutive sentences were either mandatory or imposed as part of an agreed-upon prison term, the trial court did not err by failing to make consecutive sentence findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

The trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to 11 months in prison following his guilty plea to a felony theft offense. Appellant's extensive criminal history justified the trial court's denial of his request to be sentenced to STOP, and incarceration in state prison was permitted in light of appellant's prior aggravated burglary conviction and sentence. Any error in the trial court's failure to more fully articulate its reasons for disapproving shock incarceration or an intensive program prison was harmless. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant failed to file objections to the trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision denying appellant's petition for a civil stalking protection order. As a result, under Civ.R. 65.1(G), appellant may not challenge the trial court's decision on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant entered guilty pleas to failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, receiving stolen property, and assault on a peace officer. We have conducted an independent review, and pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed.

Summary judgment on outstanding credit card balance

Appellant's complaint for an injunction properly dismissed where appellant has not demonstrated any legal basis to require the defendant, a non-SEC regulated corporation, to include appellant's proxy proposals in defendant's proxy statement.

Guilty plea. Rapes. Trial court did not err by imposing maximum, consecutive sentences.

Appellant's plea is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made where trial court fully informed appellant of the potential consequences of his plea. Appellant's 18-month prison sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and appellant has five prior felony convictions.

Sufficient evidence supported the conviction for driving under suspension conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial court correctly denied Crim.R. 29 motion. Right to allocution.

Following a community control violation, appellant's prison sentence was not contrary to law.

guilty plea Crim.R. 11(A), Crim.R. 11(C), written plea

Loc.R. 6, transcripts, App.R. 9, presume regularity, operating a vehicle while under the influence, court reporter

Anders – wholly frivolous

Based on the evidence admitted at the hearing, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion assigning income to father and setting the support obligation. In deciding to assign income as it did, the trial court did not err in discounting the opinion of mother's expert because the opinion was speculative in nature. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to modify the support obligation to a date earlier than mother's modification motion because mother could not prove that special circumstances dictated otherwise. The juvenile court's decision on how to split the amount of extraordinary medical expenses between the parties and set the amount father must pay for his arrears was not unreasonable. Therefore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion on these matters.

CIVIL – oil and gas lease failure to join indispensable parties production covenant release termination condition precedent production in paying quantities statute of limitations, R.C. 2305.041.

CIVIL – application for reopening App.R. 26(A) second or successive.

procedendo motion for resentencing moot duty already performed

CIVIL LAW - summary judgment genuine issues of material fact standing quiet title action for land vested interest capable of divestment ambiugities in trust provision delivery of deed final distribution.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02(B) appeal from magistrate's order is not a final appealable order Only judges not magistrates may terminate claims or action by entering judgment the magistrate's order has not received judicial approval pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(a)(i).

ORIGINAL ACTION - mandamus failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted jurisdiction

Sexaul Predator Adjudication - Megan's Law

OVI ineffective assistance sufficiency of evidence

Aggravated Vehicular Homecide - Suppression

Motion to W/D Plea - Res Judicata

Trial court judgment affirmed denying post conviction relief and attempted amendment thereto and revoking bond and enforcing sentence on grounds of res judicata as to original motion and wrong remedy for relief sought by amendment.

Trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's complaint based on court's determination that PUCO had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.

Objections to magistrate's decision overruled in original action for writs of mandamus and prohibition brought by Relator against two common pleas court officials. The magistrate properly applied the relevant law to the facts at issue and appropriately found that Relator had failed to demonstrate he was entitled to a writ of prohibition as to Respondent trial court judge who had sentenced Relator in a criminal case, or to a writ of mandamus as to Respondent clerk of courts regarding Respondent trial court judge's oath of office. Magistrate's decision, modified to clarify a legal conclusion and to exclude and correct a scrivener error, adopted. Writs of mandamus and prohibition denied. Relator's request to vacate his criminal conviction and remand the matter to the trial court also denied.

Mandamus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss, denial of motion to resentence, appeal is adequate remedy

Procedendo, R.C. 2969.25, mandatory filing requirements

Procedendo, R.C. 2969.25, mandatory filing requirements, statement for immediately preceding six months

motion for summary judgment, breach of contract, declaratory judgment, contract interpretation, intent of the parties, business partnership termination agreement

Procedendo, R.C. 2969.25, mandatory filing requirements

Contract Dispute/Arbitration

Withdrawal plea post sentence

Other Acts Evid. - Habit Evidence - Jury Instruction on Flight - Manifest Weight - Evid. R. 404(B), 406

Appellate Rule 26(B), application to reopen, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, defective indictment, allied offenses, merger, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Applicant argues that the his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the indictments were defective in that they charged allied offenses because the named victim and the John Doe in a subsequent charge had to be the same person. Appellate counsel was not ineffective because he argued this point in an assignment of error and because the applicant's plea of guilty waived any defect in the indictment.

Postrelease control R.C. 2967.28 void sentence. The trial court did not err in correcting the postrelease control sanction. The trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control at the original sentencing hearing, rendering the postrelease control sanction void. Appellant had not completed his prison sentence, and as a result, the trial court was permitted to correct the postrelease control sanction.

R.C. 2945.71(C)(2)/speedy trial vindictive sentence sufficiency Crim.R. 29/motion for acquittal Crim.R. 8(A)/joinder manifest weight. A case overturned on appeal does not restart the time for calculating speedy trial time appellant's actions and filing of numerous motions is attributed to almost all of the continuances in this case. There was no constitutional violation of appellant's speedy trial rights. The trial court issued a comprehensive journal entry that detailed the sources the trial court used to determine an adequate and appropriate sentence, including material that was not available to the trial court that originally sentenced appellant. The totality of the trial court record does not reveal any vindictiveness to appellant by the sentencing judge. Witness testimony, physical evidence, possession of the victim's property, and appellant's apology to one of the victims outside of the courtroom was sufficient enough evidence to sustain appellant's convictions. Appellant failed to show that he was prejudiced by joining the offenses for trial. Appellant's trial counsel questioned the witness regarding inconsistencies about appellant's complexion and the type of vehicle driven by appellant. The jury was in the best position to determine the witness's credibility. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Guilty plea agreed-upon sentence ineffective assistance of counsel community control condition alcohol. - Trial court's sentence was not contrary to law and was supported by the record, even though the trial court imposed a longer sentence than the agreed-upon recommended sentence by the parties defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where he failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty condition of community control that defendant not work in any location where alcohol is served was not overbroad or unreasonable.

Moot collateral consequences collateral disability probation violation voluntary sentence real and significant consequences ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant challenged the effectiveness of counsel during his probation violation hearing where the trial court judge found he had indeed violated the terms of his community control. Before reaching that issue, his appeal was found to be moot because he had already served his sentence and appellant did not offer, nor did the record show, any collateral disability he had incurred as a result of his sentence.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1 res judicata R.C. 2945.06 Crim.R. 11(C)(3). Appellant pled guilty to an amended indictment that did not include a death penalty specification. R.C. 2945.06 was therefore not applicable, and the single judge had jurisdiction to accept appellant's guilty plea. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

R.C. 149.43 writ of mandamus public records request reasonableness timely production of records statutory damages. Relator's request for writ of mandamus was denied as moot where the public office had produced all records responsive to three public records requests, but relator was entitled to $200 in statutory damages because respondent failed to produce records responsive to one records request in a reasonable period of time.

Writ of prohibition moot adequate remedy at law motion to intervene Civ.R. 24 Civ.R. 7(A) prior adjudication. Relator's complaint for writ of prohibition was sua sponte dismissed because the action was moot where the same arguments were raised and decided in a contemporaneous appeal. If the action was not moot, the same claims were adjudicated in a prior action for writ of prohibition and in the contemporaneous appeal, precluding relief in prohibition in the present action.

Where the record contained competent, credible evidence to support the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's determination that an employee had been discharged for just cause, the commission's decision denying the discharged employee's claim for unemployment benefits is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court did not err in affirming the denial.

Where the trial court completely failed during the plea colloquy to advise the defendant that the sentence would include a mandatory term of post-release control, it failed to comply with Ohio Crim.R. 11, and on appellate review the plea is withdrawn and the cause remanded for resentencing.

Appellant's speculation that if his lawyer had behaved differently, appellant's speedy trial rights would have been violated (and his trial therefore obviated) is insufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee trampoline park's motion for judgment on the pleadings when it based its decision on an unauthenticated, and therefore inadmissible, document. One assignment of error sustained remaining assignments of error mooted. Judgment reversed matter remanded.

Guilty plea. Trafficking. Trial court did not err by imposing consecutive sentences.

Because the state did not act in bad faith, the trial court did not err in allowing photographic evidence to be used in lieu of the destroyed, potentially useful, physical evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the admission of other acts evidence. Evid.R. 404 no contest prejudice.

R.C. 2941.25 convictions of robbery and theft were not allied offenses because separate harm was caused to two victims Crim.R. 32(A) attorney given an opportunity to make a statement on behalf of the offender.

Trial court erred in denying postconviction petition as untimely filed where the petition was filed within 365 days of the filing of the trial transcript, which included a written transcript of a video deposition that was played at trial.

Trial court complied with all applicable sentencing requirements when it sentenced defendant to 12 months in jail following his guilty plea to aggravated drug trafficking. Also, prosecutor's failure to abide by promise not to speak at sentencing did not amount to plain error where defendant could not show that comments affected the trial judge's sentencing decision.

By failing to raise the issue in the small-claims court, appellant waived argument on appeal that the Home Solicitation Sales Act applied and that she timely complied with its three-day right to cancel contract for installation of air-conditioning unit.

After an administrative appeal was filed in the trial court, the appellant, who was a resident of a nursing home, died a Civ.R. 25 motion to substitute the executor of the estate for the deceased appellant was properly and timely filed, and the trial court erred by not granting the motion. The trial court also erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the administrative appeal from a decision of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS), because an amended notice of appeal which substituted the administrator of the estate for the original appellant/decedent was not filed. But the trial court did not err by concluding, in the alternative, that the ODJFS properly denied a state hearing on the appellant's application for Medicaid benefits. The decedent's health care power of attorney was for health care decisions, not financial decisions, and did not authorize her agent to designate a representative for the purpose of a Medicaid coverage appeal. Judgment reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of ODJFS for the reasons stated in the opinion.

The State did not properly invoke this court's jurisdiction to review its discretionary appeal under R.C. 2945.67 and App.R. 5(C), where it failed to file its notice of appeal and motion for leave to appeal concurrently. We therefore lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.

After appellant was shot in his own residence, police officers obtained a search warrant for his entire residence the warrant included authorization to search for drugs and currency. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his residence conducted pursuant to a search warrant. Although the judge who issued the warrant did not have a substantial basis to conclude that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that drugs and currency likely would be found in the residence or that evidence of the shooting likely would be found throughout the house, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. Judgment affirmed. (Hall, J., concurring.)

Defendant-appellant's counsel filed a brief under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). A thorough review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious appellate issues. Judgment affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of filing a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that incorporates the consecutive sentencing findings.

In a medical malpractice case, the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment and dismissing one cause of action for declaratory judgment was final and appealable where the court certified that there was no just reason for delay under Civ.R. 54(B). The order did not resolve a provisional remedy under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4), nor was it entered in a special proceeding under R.C. 25050.02(B)(2), but was final under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). This court therefore has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal and cross-appeals.

Appellants appeal from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee in this tax foreclosure action. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not striking a portion of an affidavit filed in support of appellee's summary judgment motion. The affiant had sufficient personal knowledge that appellee possessed the tax certificates at issue. The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of appellee because the Civ.R. 56 record established there was no genuine factual dispute that appellee was the holder of the tax certificates. Finally, appellants have not shown that R.C. 2329.192 is unconstitutional on its face or as applied in this case. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress as it related to the creation and administration of the photospreads used to identify him as the perpetrator of a bank robbery. The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant. The trial court did not err when it permitted a forensic scientist to testify as an expert in the field of materials composition/comparison. Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a limiting jury instruction pursuant to R.C. 2933.83(C)(3) because no evidence of noncompliance with the requirements of R.C. 2933.83 was adduced. Appellant's conviction for robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of driving a motor vehicle without a license and driving with a suspended license. Appellant has not made a transcript of the trial part of the appellate record. On this record, it appears that appellant was cited by a police officer employed by the village in which the conduct at issue occurred, and the trial court's jurisdiction includes this village. Thus, appellant's jurisdictional attack is without merit. Appellant did not file a motion to suppress asserting a Fourth Amendment violation thus, this issue is not before this court. The record does not support appellant's assertion that he was charged and convicted under out-of-date or otherwise invalid ordinances. The record also does not support appellant's contention he was not provided discovery. Appellant's remaining assignments of error relate to evidence excluded at trial and alleged judicial bias without a transcript, the regularity of the trial must be presumed, and these assignments of error must be overruled. Judgment affirmed.

Criminal law—Ineffective assistance of counsel—When defense counsel fails to request that the trial court waive court costs on behalf of a defendant who has previously been found to be indigent, a determination of prejudice in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis depends on whether the facts and circumstances presented by the defendant establish that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted the request to waive court costs had one been made—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Municipal income tax—Stock options employee received as compensation while working in Cleveland were not exercised until after employee retired and moved out of state—Exercise of stock options generated taxable qualifying wages under Cleveland Codified Ordinances—Cleveland properly imposed income tax on the stock-option income.

motion to suppress, Franks v. Delaware, search warrant, offer of proof, affidavit, ineffective assistance of counsel, prejudice, timeliness

guilty plea, Crim.R. 11(B), substantial compliance, sentencing, PSI, presume regularity, ineffective assistance, mitigation

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25, mandatory filing requirements

Habeas corpus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), writ available in specific extraordinary circumstances

defamation, invasion of privacy, closing argument

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for a continuance where the juvenile court properly determined that there was no just reason for delaying a dispositional hearing scheduled in a legal custody proceeding any further when considering such delay would not be in the child's best interest. The juvenile court's decision granting legal custody of a child to a nonrelative was also supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the child's best interests were served by placing the child in the nonrelative's legal custody.

The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress in a case involving av consensual encounter between the defendant and a police officer.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion to waive court costs without first considering appellant's future ability to pay because the statute permitting a trial court to waive the costs, R.C. 2947.23(C), does not require the trial court to make any findings or consider any factors.

Appellant's conviction for permitting drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.13(B) was supported by sufficient evidence where the state presented evidence that appellant permitted her juvenile son to engage in conduct that would constitute the commission of a felony drug abuse offense if that conduct was committed by an adult. The permitting drug abuse statute, R.C. 2925.13(B), does not require the state to prove the person using the offender's home for the commission of a felony drug abuse offense was convicted of that offense in order to secure a permitting drug abuse conviction. The trial court also did not err by finding computer printouts of purported text messages exchanged between appellant and her son were properly authenticated where the record contained sufficient evidence to support a finding that the text messages were text messages exchanged between appellant and her son that were recovered during a data extraction of appellant's and her son's cellphones. The trial court further did not err by finding appellant was not statutorily eligible for intervention in lieu of conviction where the record indicated appellant's alcohol usage was not a factor leading to the criminal charges being brought against her as required by R.C. 2951.041(B)(6).

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to suppress where the officer who initiated a traffic stop of appellant's vehicle had reasonable suspicion to believe appellant committed at least one, if not more, traffic violations.

The trial court did not err in determining that the client of a staffing agency was the plaintiff-appellant's employer for purposes of workers' compensation immunity as the client had the right to control the manner and means in which appellant performed his day-to-day tasks. Moreover, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the client-employer because it complied with the relevant workers' compensation statues, thereby entitling it to immunity under R.C. 4123.74.

To be convicted under R.C. 2917.11(A)(2) for uttering offensive statements, the defendant's profane language must be "fighting words." Context is important in determining whether obscene statements constitute fighting words. Courts will examine a defendant's accompanying conduct.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) motion for delayed appeal procedurally defective no notice of appeal filed.

APPELLATE REVIEW: App.R. 5(A) motion for delayed appeal procedurally defective no notice of appeal filed.

APPELLATE REVIEW: App.R. 5(A) motion for delayed appeal procedurally defective no notice of appeal filed.

Burden re. self-defense sufficiency manifest weight

Waiver of jury demand

Legal and permanent custody

Consecutive Sentences Child Endangering

Legal and permanent custody

Legal and permanent custody

Legal and permanent custody

Legal and permanent custody

Legal and permanent custody

Legal and permanent custody

Taxation—Real-property valuation—Contract price for sale of limited-liability company constituted best evidence of value of real estate owned by the company—Decision of Board of Tax Appeals affirmed.

Prohibition—Decision on whether trial court had authority to reinstate case that has been dismissed would result in purely advisory opinion—Appeal dismissed as moot.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Six-month suspension, fully stayed on condition (Rauzan)—Public reprimand (Wagner).

Reviewing de novo a trial court's decision to confirm a binding arbitration decision, the arbitrator's decision being reviewed must be reasonably derived from and not conflict with the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. Trial court judgment confirming arbitration award in favor of union local is affirmed.

Where an expert's proposed testimony was somewhat self-contradictory and based on undisclosed data, undisclosed assumptions, and an undisclosed method, the trial court did not err legally or abuse its discretion in excluding the confusing testimony.

Common pleas court erred by failing to conduct evidentiary hearing on whether corporate entities acquired contract containing forum selection clause under asset purchase agreement and thereby effectively consented to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.

The trial court did not err in granting multiple motions to dismiss certain counts of amended complaint filed by unsuccessful applicants for cultivator provisional licenses under Ohio's Medical Marijuana Control Program when they challenged award process. Trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and plaintiffs did not state claim on which relief could be granted, also involving failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court acting as administrative appellate court's judgment affirming State Medical Board's order permanently restricting appellant-physician's license to practice in Ohio under R.C. 4731.22(B)(19) affirmed based on no abuse of discretion by trial court in finding that the board's order was based on reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Because counsel for the appellant-minor conceded that the interview was non-custodial, we did not find minor's confession was a violation of Miranda or that it was otherwise involuntary. Because counsel for the appellant-minor also failed to raise any argument about the element of second-degree burglary requiring a finding that a person was "present or likely to be present" in the burglarized house, we did not address that issue and found that the appellant-minor's confession was otherwise sufficient evidence of guilt.

Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on breach of contract claim because proposed contract addendum did not constitute repudiation of contract or notice of termination, and breaching party was not entitled to unilaterally terminate contract. Trial court did not err by awarding damages in the amount of difference between contract price and subsequent sale price, because subsequent sale was proximate in time and made under similar conditions, thereby indicating that subsequent sale price represented fair market value of the property.

Amended complaint/default judgment

An administrative appeal becomes moot once the appellant gains every entitlement that he or she has claimed in that process. The common pleas court properly dismissed the appeal on that basis. Judgment affirmed.

CIVIL SERVICE – MUNICIPAL – WRITS – MANDAMUS: Where the city's civil service commission improperly awarded seniority credit to the score of a firefighter who had failed the promotional examination for fire captain, allowing him to post a passing score and receive the appointment, the remedy for the civil service commission's failure to properly award the seniority credit was not to order a new promotional examination, but rather to remand the cause to the civil service commission for the proper award of credit. A writ of mandamus compelling the appointment of a firefighter to the position of fire captain with back pay will not issue where the firefighter has not shown that he has a clear legal right to the appointment.

Mandamus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss, void sentence, appeal serves as adequate remedy

summary judgment – medical malpractice – statute of limitations – R.C. 2305.113(A) – foreign object – clamp – injury – reliance upon treating physician – cognizable event

dismissal because no final appealable order probate case special proceeding issues remain as to whether certain assets belong to estate order purports to be final appealable order can appeal after all claims are determined.

App.R. 26(B) application to reopen ineffective assistance of appellate counsel ineffective assistance of trial counsel counsel's decisions on strategy and tactics search warrant and motion to suppress. This court denied an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen because it would not second-guess appellate counsel's decision to argue an impropriety in a search warrant through the lens of ineffective assistance of trial counsel rather than directly on the grounds it contains a falsehood.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening ineffective assistance of appellate counsel search warrant affidavit issue adjudicated in other appeal probability of success Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. A timely application for reopening was denied where the proposed issue underpinning the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was fully addressed in a companion appeal and incorporated into the present appeal. The second prong of the analysis used to judge claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be met because there is no probability of a different result had appellate counsel raised the validity of a search warrant in the instant appeal.

App.R. 26(B) application to reopen timeliness good cause. An untimely application for reopening was denied where good cause for the untimeliness was not asserted within the application. Even if the arguments for good cause asserted in a separate attachment to the application were considered, good cause for the late filing was not shown.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, interstate agreement on detainers, R.C. 2963.30, Art. III(a), substantial compliance, written notice of disposition of pending charges, notice of availability, speedy trial, R.C. 2945.71, R.C. 2945.72, triple-count, res judicata. The appellant's App.R. 26(B) application for reopening is denied because he has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the conduct of his appellate counsel. The applicant's claim of lack of speedy trial, based upon R.C. 2963.30 (interstate agreement on detainers) and R.C. 2945.71 (speedy trial when charged with felony), is not well taken. The appellant failed to substantially comply with R.C. 2963.30, Art. III(a), because no evidence is contained within the trial court record to demonstrate that the prosecutor received notice of the notification of disposition of pending charges/notice of availability. Both the trial court and the prosecutor must be provided notice to trigger speedy trial under R.C. 2963.30. In addition, the appellant was brought to trial within 270 days of indictment. Finally, the appellant's claim of prejudice, based upon the trial court granting the state a continuance in the midst of the victim's testimony, was previously raised and addressed on direct appeal. Res judicata bars further review of the claimed error.

Motion to dismiss R.C. 2505.02/final, appealable order common-law qualified immunity. The trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss did not result in a final, appealable order.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 fraud sewer backups caveat emptor "as is" sale R.C. 5302.30 residential property disclosure form home inspection justifiable reliance. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of seller on buyers' fraud claim. Based on information buyers received from their home inspector during the pre-sale home inspection, there was no genuine issue of material fact that buyers were on notice that there was a history of sewer backups affecting both the property specifically and the neighborhood generally and that there was a risk of additional sewer backups affecting the property in the future such that buyers could not have justifiably relied on any alleged misrepresentations by seller in the residential property disclosure form.

Political subdivision immunity official capacity clerk of courts governmental function Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a civil complaint against the Cuyahoga County Clerk of Courts alleging improper handling of a criminal complaint. The trial court granted defendant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the motion to dismiss was properly granted because county-defendant is immune.

Postrelease control prison nunc pro tunc. - Any correction regarding postrelease control must occur prior to the offender being released from prison, and failure to do so renders that portion of a defendant's sentence void.

Not all of the records respondent-appellee Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC") withheld from requester-appellant were attorney-client privileged under R.C. 149.43, Ohio's public records law. ODRC was not required to establish the attorney-client exemption by clear and convincing evidence. Cause remanded to the Court of Claims with instructions to review this Court's redaction of the records and to provide requester-appellant access to those records which this Court has identified as not being privileged. Additionally, the Court of Claims' decision to assess court costs against requester-appellant will not be disturbed it was supported by the record.

The Court of Claims' adoption of magistrate's bench trial decision in prisoner's suit against Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction affirmed.

Where an offender was improperly classified as a tier III offender under the Adam Walsh Act, notwithstanding the fact that the offender had been released from prison, the trial court acted appropriately in vacating the improper punitive Adam Walsh Act classification and substituting an appropriate civil registration requirement under Megan's Law.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's petition for post-conviction relief on grounds of untimeliness and res judicata, because the untimeliness of appellant's petition and res judicata bar a challenge to a voidable sentence. Even though the trial court imposed a non-mandatory prison sentence for appellant's offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity when a mandatory prison sentence was required by law, that portion of appellant's sentence was voidable, not void. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring in judgment.)

The trial court misstated the post-release control sanctions in Case Nos. 2014-CR-2391 and 2014-CR-3312. In Case No. 2014-CR-2391, appellant has already served his sentence, and the proper remedy is for the trial court to issue an order vacating the portion of appellant's sentence imposing post-release control. In Case No. 2014-CR-3312, however, appellant has not yet served his full sentence, and the proper remedy is for the trial court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry in order to impose the correct term of post-release control of "up to three years" pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(C), to be served concurrently with the five-year term of post-release control in Case No. 2014-CR-1142. Post-release control was properly imposed in Case No. 2014-CR-1142. Notwithstanding the error in the imposition of sentence in Case Nos. 201-CR-2391 and 2014-CR-3312, the judgment entries of conviction constituted final appealable orders and were not void in their entirety. In Case Nos. 2014-CR-2391 and 2014-CR-3312, the matters are remanded for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment entries consistent with this opinion in all other respects, those judgments are affirmed. The judgment is also affirmed in Case No. 2014-CR-1142. (Hall, J., concurring.)

Appellant's conviction for abduction was supported by sufficient evidence, and it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Also, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's offenses of trafficking in cocaine and possession of criminal tools were committed with separate conduct, and therefore he was not entitled to their merger at sentencing. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not demonstrated in defense counsel's failure to request merger. The record supports the trial court's finding that, based on appellant's criminal history, consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future harm. The court found in its judgment entry of conviction that appellant had committed one or more offenses while awaiting trial or sentencing, while under a community control sanction, or while under post-release control, but it did not state this finding orally at the sentencing hearing any error in this respect was harmless. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant has completed his local jail sentence following community control revocation and raises potential issues in his Anders appeal related only to his sentence. Our review of the record reveals no potentially meritorious issues unrelated to the sentence. Appeal dismissed.

This court remanded this matter to the trial court to resolve a record dispute and then sustained the State's motion to supplement the record. The supplemented record reflects that appellant admitted to violating his community control sanctions. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community control. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in imposing a term of community control that included a 12-month jail sanction for the appellant's fifth-degree felony conviction. Under R.C. 2929.16(A)(2), only a term of up to six months in jail was authorized as a community control sanction. Judgment reversed, vacated in part, and remanded.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellee-student debt collector on appellant's claims that the debt collector could not collect on the debt because the promissory note had been sold and that the debt collector failed to validate the debt. Judgment affirmed.

Insufficient reason for closing jury trial courtroom.

Denial of Motion for Frivolous Conduct - No Error - R.C. 2323.51

Trial court orders denying applicant's motion to intervene and granting appellees' motion for partial summary judgment are affirmed. One-subject rule, severability, three-considerations rule, summary judgment, de novo review, intervention, abuse of discretion

Trial court failed to make all required findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences, requiring reversal and remand for new sentencing hearing.

Imposition of consecutive sentences must be reviewed only for whether the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record. In reviewing an individual prison term that is not contrary to law, a reviewing court may reverse only where the trial court's considerations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to submit statement of inmate account required by R.C. 2969.25(C)(1)—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint affirmed.

Prohibition—Subject-matter jurisdiction—Adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law—Res judicata—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25, R.C. 2725

Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where he failed to show any deficient performance and failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Trial court erred in retroactively applying the ten-year look-back period in newly-amended R.C. 4510.13(A)(3) in ruling upon the defendant's motion for limited driving privileges.

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from the trial court's judgment confirming an arbitration award against appellee where equity mandated, and justice required, granting appellee relief from its judgment.

The trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty of first-degree misdemeanor OVI following his no contest plea as appellant stipulated that the arresting officer's written narrative statement would serve as the explanation of circumstances and the record reveals the court considered the statement in finding appellant guilty. Moreover, as the officer's narrative statement set forth facts sufficient to support all elements of OVI, the trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty.

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law where the trial court sentenced appellant within the statutory range and considered the statutory requirements before imposing sentence. The trial court's findings were supported by the record where appellant shot two people and the victims suffered physical injury, and appellant had a long criminal history and was associated with violence while incarcerated. The trial court did not commit plain error by not continuing the trial or ordering a mistrial where a witness testified about a report that the defense was not given during discovery where the report did not prejudice appellant given that other evidence was presented specific to whether the victim fired his gun and because evidence related to the report would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel where there was no indication that the jury would have found appellant not guilty if defense counsel had used a different trial strategy, cross-examined the witnesses in any different way, or if appellant would have testified at trial. Nor would appellant's sentence have been different had defense counsel requested a presentence investigation or moved for more time before sentencing to find mitigation evidence.

Defendant-appellant's felonious-assault conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State did not violate defendant-appellant's right to remain silent by addressing defendant-appellant's refusal to speak with law enforcement officers during their investigation. The trial court did not err by providing an incomplete and inaccurate self-defense jury instruction and defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a self-defense jury instruction and verdict form that represent correct statements of law.

Defendant-appellant's trafficking-in-cocaine, trafficking-in-drugs, and complicity-to-trafficking-in-cocaine convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's motion for a mistrial. The trial court did not err in sentencing defendant-appellant because there is not clear and convincing evidence that defendant-appellant's sentence is unsupported by the record or otherwise contrary to law.

Trial court did not err in finding that the statute of limitations barred the claim for fraudulent transfer of real estate. The trial court erred in dismissing the claim for fraudulent conversion of money with prejudice. The claim was not pled with particularity, but that may be capable of remedy upon a new filing.

Defendant-appellant's menacing-by-stalking and telecommunications-harassment convictions are based on sufficient evidence. The trial court's jury instructions and the State's closing argument do not amount to structural error.

The appellant failed to demonstrated that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion when it overruled his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on attempted trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present.

Trial court did not err in denying suppression motion where defendant claimed that growing mushrooms and using marijuana was a protected religious act.

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Solicitation of professional employment by in-person contact when a primary motive is pecuniary gain—Public reprimand.

Habeas corpus—Inmate failed to comply with commitment-paper and verification requirements of R.C. 2725.04—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - Anders v. California felony sentence no error counsel withdraw.

CRIMINAL LAW - aggravated burglary aggravated robbery firearm specifications weapons under disability concealed weapon sentencing profanity-laced tirade sentence increased order not final until journalized judge possessed authority sufficient evidence not against manifest weight of the evidence impute firearm possession to accomplice no merger.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) clearly and convincingly contrary to law sentence packaging community control sanctions void sentence vacate conviction for violating community control remand for resentencing on underlying offenses R.C. 2929.11(A) purposes of felony sentencing rehabilitation R.C. 2929.12(C)(4) mitigation of conduct addiction consecutive sentences future sentence not yet imposed.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - sentence within applicable range evidence supports sentence and is not contrary to law R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule untimely appeal.

APPELLATE REVIEW - R.C. 2505.02(B) granting of preliminary injunction is generally not a final appealable order where a permanent injunction is sought meaningful and effective remedy following final judgment lack of final appealable order.

FORFEITURE: The trial court erred in ordering the forfeiture of $2,700 seized from defendant where the complaint charging defendant with obstructing official business did not contain a necessary forfeiture specification, and therefore, the forfeiture did not comply with R.C. Chapter 2981.

Whether plea knowing and intelligent/Appeal of sentence

Appeal of sentence/Sentence contrary to law/Argues sentences should have merged

Magistrate's decision adopted. The magistrate appropriately found that the Industrial Commission of Ohio did not abuse its discretion in awarding injured worker a percentage of permanent partial disability ("PPD") based on a number that fell between the numbers reported by two physicians who had examined injured worker. Writ of mandamus denied.

Defendant's convictions for murder and kidnapping were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where record evidence demonstrated defendant was complicit as an aider and abettor to the shooters. Defendant did not demonstrate plain error in regard to prosecutorial error or the alleged admission of hearsay and failed to demonstrated prejudice to support reversal based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgments affirmed.

Finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's decision, this court adopts the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we deny relator's requested writ of mandamus.

Whether the special purpose doctrine applied to the taxpayer's property involved factual questions and lay within the discretion of the BTA, to which we defer. Moreover, the requirement to value property for tax purposes as if unencumbered did not mean that the appraisers were to assume the subject property was vacant or distressed, but instead merely meant that an adjustment in value to simulate market rent and occupancy was appropriate.

Appellant's felonious assault conviction was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not unlawfully impose consecutive sentences or err in requiring appellant to prove self-defense. Additionally, appellant did not receive ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Judgment affirmed.

Summary judgment affirmed in case involving interpretation of multiple auto policies' coverage and where father's insurance, which specifically excluded son, denied coverage for automobile accident that occurred while son was driving his father's vehicle.

Where a defendant was found in possession of a credit card that was not in his name and that had been reported stolen a few days earlier, and where he failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for his possession of the stolen card, a conviction for receiving stolen property pursuant to R.C. 2913.51(A) was sufficiently supported against a motion for acquittal and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The common pleas court did not err in determining ODOT complied or substantially complied with the service requirements of R.C. 124.34 and the related administrative code provisions when it issued the September 23, 2011 removal order, and the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in determining reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports the board's removal order.

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's action where plaintiff sought to use declaratory judgment to collaterally attack his criminal conviction, defendants were absolutely immune from liability, and plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 had not yet accrued.

Mandamus, R.C. 2969.25, mandatory filing requirements

speedy trial—2941.401—strict compliance

motion to suppress, field sobriety tests, R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b), substantial compliance, probable cause, manifest weight

motion to withdraw plea, res judicata

Civ.R. 56 negligence vicarious liability agency relationship independent contractor inmate. Plaintiff, an inmate under the custody and control of the defendant, filed an action asserting that defendant was liable for the actions of CoreCivic America Corporation (CoreCivic) and Diamond Pharmacy Services one or both of which were allegedly negligent in the distribution of Plaintiff's prescription medication at Northeastern Ohio Correctional Center. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, to which Plaintiff did not reply, asserting that Defendant cannot be liable for any alleged negligence of CoreCivic or Diamond Pharmacy Services because they are independent contractors rather than agents of Defendant. After reviewing the Plaintiff's complaint with relevant attachments and the Defendant's motion and attached affidavit, the Court found that there is no dispute that CoreCivic is an independent contractor and not an agent of Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant cannot be held liable for the negligence of independent contractors and the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Damages liquidated damages clause liquidated damage cap recission. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant for breach of contract for failing to perform its contractual duty, which was consolidated with Case No. 2017-00746PR, Ohio Attorney General's Office v. Ventech Solutions, Inc. In its November 18, 2019 "Interim Decision," the Court found that plaintiff substantially breached the contractual agreement with defendant for failing to deliver a working system by the contracted date for which it is liable for damages. The Court requested the parties submit supplemental briefs on the issue of damages because it was not fully briefed in their initial briefings. After review of the parties' briefs and exhibits, the Court found that it is required to enforce the liquidated damages clause set forth in the contract because the clause was unambiguous and the evidence showed the parties knew the difficult nature of the future damages and, with negotiations, made a knowing effort to estimate and/or limit their exposure with a liquidated damage cap. Accordingly, the Court held that plaintiff is liable to defendant for damages in the amount of $4,973,403.88.

Damages liquidated damages clause liquidated damage cap recission. Plaintiff filed an action against defendant in Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which was thereafter transferred to this Court, for damages arising out of a contractual relationship by which defendant was contracted to develop a new working collections system for plaintiff. In its November 18, 2019 "Interim Decision," the Court found that defendant substantially breached the contractual agreement with plaintiff for failing to deliver a working system by the contracted date for which it is liable to plaintiff for damages. The Court requested the parties submit supplemental briefs on the issue of damages because it was not fully briefed in their initial briefings. After review of the parties' briefs and exhibits, the Court found that it is required to enforce the liquidated damages clause set forth in the contract because the clause was unambiguous and the evidence showed the parties knew the difficult nature of the future damages and, with negotiations, made a knowing effort to estimate and/or limit their exposure with a liquidated damage cap. Accordingly, the Court held that defendant is liable to plaintiff for damages in the amount of $4,973,403.88.

Civ.R. 56 defamation inmate. Plaintiff, an inmate under the custody and control of the defendant, filed an action asserting that defendant was liable to Plaintiff for defamation. Plaintiff's complaint asserts that Defendant's investigator knowingly wrote a false conduct report alleging Plaintiff was involved in a drug network at Noble Correctional Institution which resulted in his being discharged as a law clerk, placed in segregation, moved to a restricted facility, and losing privileges. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Defendant cannot be liable for these allegedly defamatory statements because they are protected by qualified privilege. The Court found that the Defendant presented sufficient evidence to establish the defense of qualified privilege. The Court further found that Plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence that the investigator made the alleged defamatory statements with actual malice because the Plaintiff's statements regarding the investigator's intent were not based on personal knowledge and not corroborated with evidence supporting the basis for how Plaintiff would know what the investigator knew and thought. Thus, Plaintiff's self-serving affidavit is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

concession of error, expungement, violation of protection order

App.R. 26(B)(1) and (2)(b) delayed application for reopening ineffective assistance of counsel good cause.

Foreclosure moot confirmation of sale order of confirmation. Appellant failed to obtain a stay of the trial court's judgment pending appeal. The subject property has been sold, the order of confirmation has been carried out, and the proceeds have been distributed. There is no relief that can be afforded to appellant. Accordingly, appellant's appeal is moot. Appeal dismissed.

Motion to suppress reasonable articulable suspicion totality of the circumstances Terry v. Ohio. The officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Thompson was engaged in criminal activity. The defendant's failure to comply with police instructions, attempt to flee, and throwing a loaded firearm into a home constituted probable cause for his arrest.

Motion for mistrial Fifth Amendment right to remain silent abuse of discretion bench trial fair trial sufficiency of the evidence circumstantial evidence discharging a firearm into a habitation R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) discharging a firearm upon or over a public roadway R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) manifest weight of the evidence self-defense force consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) supported by the record R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial in this bench trial where the witness's allegedly improper reference to the defendant's assertion of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent did not affect the trial court's decision-making and the defendant had not demonstrated the witness's statement deprived him of a fair trial. The state presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that the defendant was the shooter at the victims' residences where the evidence showed that the defendant was in possession of a .40 caliber firearm at two of the four crime scenes, all of the .40 caliber casings recovered from each of the four crime scenes were fired from the same .40 caliber firearm, and two of the crime scenes involved the same victim. The defendant's convictions for discharging a firearm into a habitation and discharging a firearm upon or over a public roadway in the May 14 incident are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The defendant's conviction for discharging a firearm upon or over a public roadway in the June 26 incident is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The factfinder could reasonably believe that the defendant was justified in firing his weapon against an initial attack but he did not act in self-defense where he continued to shoot at the attacker after the initial threat was gone. Defendant's consecutive sentence was supported by the record. However, because there is no evidence in the record that the trial court imposed a sentence in open court on Count 13, carrying a concealed weapon, a limited remand for sentencing on this count is required.

Civ.R. 56(C)/summary judgment R.C. Chapter 4171/operation of roller skating facilities/duties of roller skaters assumption of the risks. The trial court erred where it granted summary judgment to appellee. Affidavit and deposition testimony, when viewed favorably to appellant, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellee acted recklessly.

Motion to suppress registration sticker dashboard console probable cause. The trial court did not err in concluding that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion because the registration sticker was obstructed where officer smelled marijuana during traffic stop search of passenger compartment was proper the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress marijuana ammunition found in console the trial court erred in denying motion to suppress weapon (and related statements) found after officer took apart the dashboard during search.

Guilty plea Crim.R. 11 knowing, intelligent, and voluntary sentence nunc pro tunc. Defendant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court properly corrected a mathematical error through a nunc pro tunc entry.

Motion to withdraw dismissed Anders. Counsel's motion to withdraw granted and appeal dismissed pursuant to Anders where there were no meritorious grounds for appeal.

Ineffective assistance of counsel final appealable order res judicata Crim.R. 33 motion for a new trial motion for leave newly discovered evidence. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial and for revision of the judgment entry of conviction and sentence.

THEFT BY DECEPTION – EVIDENCE: Defendant's conviction for theft by deception pursuant to R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented evidence that defendant engaged in an act of deception to obtain possession of the victim's property and the trier of fact found defendant's testimony not credible.

CRIMINAL DAMAGING – RESTITUTION: Defendant's conviction for criminal damaging was not against the sufficiency or weight of the evidence: the evidence supported the inference that defendant knowingly damaged the victim's car mirror by slamming the mirror into the side of the car, causing the plastic casing to break apart. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution without conducting an evidentiary hearing where defendant failed to object to the amount of restitution ordered, and the court determined the amount awarded based on testimony presented at the sentencing hearing of a repair estimate obtained by the victim.

CRIMINAL-MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE - Appellant's conviction for theft was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to dismiss the racketeering charge and denied his motions for mistrial and acquittal on that charge. The trial court did not err when it denied the state's motion for joinder of parties and denied appellant's request for severance of parties and appellant's right to confrontation. The trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion for mistrial on the state's closing argument. The trial court did not err when it did not order a mistrial on all counts based on jury member pressure.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to state defendants with regard to execution protocol promulgated by the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The protocol was not a "rule" requiring filing with the Secretary of State and the Legislative Service Commission pursuant to R.C. 111.15 ODRC did not usurp the legislative authority of the General Assembly in enacting the protocol the General Assembly did not unconstitutionally delegate its legislative power to ODRC to enact the protocol.

The trial court made the necessary findings to impose consecutive sentences and those findings were sufficiently supported by the facts in the record.

The trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider A.A.'s application for expungement regarding her felony conviction because the mandatory waiting period after she made full restitution had not expired. Judgment reversed.

The trial court did not err by entering partial summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on the claims of four plaintiffs-appellants. The primary issue in these appellants' claims had been litigated and decided in a prior probate-court judgment, so collateral estoppel barred these claims. Whether the trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings on claims under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act is moot, because all those claims were reasserted in an amended complaint and subsequently dismissed by the plaintiffs or the trial court for other reasons. The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment for appellees on the claims of three appellants alleging violations of R.C. 1751.60appellants failed to show that they were damaged by the alleged violation. Judgment affirmed.

Following a bench trial, appellant was convicted of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and obstructing official business. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and, thus, were supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant's assertion that the judgment entry incorrectly stated that he pleaded guilty has been corrected through the filing of a nunc pro tunc judgment entry. Judgment affirmed.

After being informed of the trial court's intended sentence, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant was entitled to the requested withdrawal upon a showing of manifest injustice, which he failed to establish. Also, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that appellant entered the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress drug evidence discovered during a traffic stop. Although the trial court erroneously excluded certain testimony at the suppression hearing on hearsay grounds, the error was harmless because it did not prejudice appellant. In addition, the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by appellant lack merit because appellant failed to establish any resulting prejudice from trial counsel's alleged deficient performance. Appellant's claim that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress because the State failed to present evidence of proper venue at the suppression hearing also lacks merit. Proper venue was not at issue during the suppression hearing, as the purpose of such a hearing was to determine the admissibility of evidence. Moreover, even if venue had been at issue, appellant waived any challenge to venue by entering a no contest plea. Furthermore, contrary to appellant's claim otherwise, venue was sufficiently established by the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression hearing. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling the appellant's suppression motion. The record reflects that police discovered the appellant's identity during a consensual encounter and learned that he had been "trespassed" from the apartment complex where he was found. The trial court acted within its discretion in precluding suppression-hearing testimony about an alleged pattern of police conduct involving stopping people at apartment complexes "which trains citizens to believe that their encounters with police are not consensual." The trial court did not err in failing to consider that "the very presence of police" may cause citizens to feel detained or in failing to acknowledge that "a private citizen may put himself at risk of harm by attempting to walk away from a police officer." Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for aggravated burglary was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury reasonably concluded that appellant entered the home by force with the purpose to commit a criminal offense and that he caused physical harm. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling the appellant's motion to suppress. Police officers had probable cause to search a lawfully stopped vehicle for illegal drugs after a drug dog "hit" on the passenger door of the vehicle, which was where the appellant had been sitting. Appellant was told to leave her purse in the vehicle when she was asked to exit the vehicle for the deployment of the drug dog, but she did not, and the drugs were found in her purse since the purse was capable of concealing the object of the officers' search, they could search the purse. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., dissenting.)

In an appeal pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we find no potentially meritorious issues. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not unlawfully sentence appellant. Community control violation was criminal in nature, more than a technical violation, and not subject to the R.C. 2929.15(B) 180-day sentencing cap. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court properly advised appellant of his Crim.R. 11 right to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial court did not err in sentencing appellant. Judgment affirmed.

Criminal law—Affirmative defenses—Domestic violence and assault—Corporal punishment—Reasonable parental discipline is an affirmative defense to a charge of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A) or assault under R.C. 2903.13(A), with the burden of proof resting on the accused pursuant to R.C. 2901.05(A)—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Elections—Mandamus—Validation of signatures on nominating petition—Writ of mandamus sought to compel county board of elections to place candidate's name on ballot—Writ denied.

motion to reopen, R.C. 2945.10, Crim.R. 29(A), sufficiency, manifest weight, venue, judicial bias, jury trial

Manifest weight of the evidence, self-defense, defense of others

suppression—findings of fact

Appellant did not prove he acted in self-defense where he waited for the victim outside, shot 11 times at four people, the victim never fired or used a weapon, and appellant came to the location knowing the victim would be there.

The trial court's restitution order was supported by competent, credible evidence where the state presented receipts and medical bills incurred by the victim.

Appellant was convicted of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and trafficking in cocaine. Appellant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance when he did not move to suppress evidence from a traffic stop in violation of R.C. 2935.03. The traffic stop did not violate appellant's constitutional rights and a mere statutory violation does not warrant evidence exclusion therefore, the suppression motion would not have been successful. Further, it was not ineffective assistance for appellant's trial counsel to forego a pretrial motion to dismiss based on laboratory reports not compliant with state law because it was part of counsel's trial strategy to obtain an acquittal. Finally, Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

The record supports the trial court's finding that Appellant violated his community control sanctions.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – EVIDENCE: Where the evidence established that defendant received mail at the victim's home, kept his clothing at the victim's home, commuted to and from work from the victim's home, and was present both when the victim went to bed and when she woke, the state presented sufficient evidence that the victim was a "family or household member" of defendant's pursuant to R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(iii). Where the evidence established that defendant grabbed the victim's neck with his hand and pushed her head into a mirror, resulting in a cut to the victim's face that required stitches, the state presented sufficient evidence that defendant had acted knowingly, i.e., defendant had been aware that his acts were likely to cause the victim physical harm.

HEARSAY: Where, in reaching a guilty verdict, the trial court expressly considered statements of the prosecutor that were inadmissible hearsay, the court erred in relying on the hearsay, and defendant was prejudiced in that there is a reasonable possibility that it may have contributed to his conviction therefore, the error was not harmless.

SENTENCING – COUNSEL – COURT COSTS – JAIL-TIME CREDIT: Where no sentencing findings were required, and all sentences imposed fell within the applicable statutory ranges and were not contrary to law, and where the trial court stated on the record that it had considered the relevant sentencing factors, the trial court did not err in the imposition of sentence. Trial counsel could not be considered ineffective for failing to make a motion to waive the imposition of court costs at sentencing where defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial court would have granted such a motion had it been made. Where the judgment entry reflected that defendant had been awarded two days of jail-time credit, but at the sentencing hearing the trial court had actually awarded defendant 52 days of jail-time credit, the entry contained a clerical error that must be corrected nunc pro tunc.

APPELLATE REVIEW-CRIMINAL - judgment striking memorandum is not final appealable order when case has not concluded final order in criminal case is conviction and sentence.

In appeal pursuant to certification under Crim.R.12(K), trial court erred by granting motion to suppress statements and handwriting exemplars in prosecution for illegal voting under R.C. 3599.12. Handwriting exemplars were for identification only and were outside of the scope of Fifth Amendment privilege, and defendant's statements to BCI investigator during telephone conversation were voluntary, noncustodial, and noninculpatory. Defendant's statements to investigator for Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney's office were noncustodial and voluntary. Even though defendant's appearance was prompted by grand jury subpoena, her appearance on that date was voluntary and noncustodial and occurred several days prior to the date of her scheduled appearance, she was not placed under oath or before the grand jury.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claims for declaratory relief and injunctive relief. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that that the claims of appellants were premature, not ripe for review, and therefore not justiciable. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found that appellants' claims were subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Judgment affirmed.

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES-ATTORNEY FEES - Trial court's judgment denying compensatory damages is not against the manifest weight of the evidence where only evidence in record is testimony based on speculation and conjecture. Trial court did not err by ordering statutory attorney fees of $6,125.00, and competent credible evidence supported the trial court's judgment. Trial court has infinitely better opportunity to determine the value of services rendered by lawyers who have tried a case before him than does an appellate court.

Community control sanctions

Writ of habeaus corpus

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Personal jurisdiction long-arm statute

CRIMINAL LAW – felonious assault R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) jury trial the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and is supported by sufficient evidence. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – trial counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an instruction on an inferior degree offense or on a lesser included offense trial strategy Appellant sought an acquittal, not a conviction on a lesser offense.

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea Properly Denied

Replevin R.C. 2737.01 et seq. bond order of possession settlement agreement cognovit note 42 U.S. 1983 wrongful seizure due process jury instructions conversion directed verdict attorney fees new trial damages. Any error in the court's jury instructions on a party's Section 1983 claims is moot where the claims should not have been submitted to the jury as a matter of law. There is no actionable Section 1983 claim against an individual for executing a replevin order of possession pursuant to R.C. 2737.06. The court's grant of a directed verdict motion on appellant's conversion claim was proper where there was insufficient evidence of a demand and refusal. A party is not entitled to attorney fees where it did not prevail on its claim for breach of a settlement agreement. A party is not entitled to a new trial on damages where it did not prevail on any claim that would support an award of damages.

Resentencing mandate restitution nunc pro tunc waiver of jury trial res judicata allied offenses ineffective assistance of counsel. - Trial court exceeded the mandate for resentencing upon remand but its error was harmless because it did not alter the valid and final sentences imposed at the original sentencing trial court ordered to enter nunc pro tunc entry because although trial court did not order restitution at resentencing, the resentencing entry ordered defendant to pay restitution defendant's arguments regarding his waiver of a jury trial, allied offenses, lesser included offenses, and ineffective assistance of counsel were all barred by res judicata because they could have been raised on direct appeal.

Jury instructions abduction manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of an abduction. Defendant forced the victim into his car against her will and drove off. Abduction conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Jail phone call Evid.R. 801 admission by a party opponent sufficiency of evidence aggravated robbery R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) manifest weight of the evidence allied offenses merger. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting defendant's jail phone call into evidence because it was an admission by a party-opponent even though it was not a specific admission of the defendant's guilt defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery was supported by sufficient evidence where defendant brandished a gun, thereby threatening harm to the victim during the carjacking defendant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery were not allied offenses and did not merge for sentencing because there were two victims.

Guilty plea Crim.R. 11 knowing, intelligent, and voluntary right to testify judicial release. Defendant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11, properly informed the defendant that he would be ineligible for judicial release pursuant to his plea agreement, and was not required to inform him that he had the right to testify, or not, at his trial.

Crim.R. 34/motion for arrest of judgment Crim.R. 12(C)(2)/defenses and objections to the indictment res judicata ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's motion for arrest of judgment was untimely. Further, appellant filed a direct appeal and could have included the issue of an allegedly defective indictment at that time. Additionally, appellant included in his direct appeal his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and appellant was overruled. Appellant's claims are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Petition for postconviction relief ineffective assistance of counsel sexual offender void postrelease control nunc pro tunc. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ford's petition for postconviction relief because he has not shown that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering facts relating to his petition or that any new federal or state right applies. However, his argument regarding postrelease control has merit it part. Although the trial court properly advised Ford of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, it failed to include the proper advisements in the sentencing journal entry. Thus, the sentencing entry was not the "minimally compliant" as required under State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, which was decided after Ford was sentenced, but applies retroactively. The trial court's sentencing entry error, however, can be corrected through a nunc pro tunc entry.

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's post-conviction motion to vacate judgment.

WRITS – PROHIBITION: Under Marsy's Law, a crime victim is entitled to a writ of prohibition restraining the trial court judge from enforcing an order allowing the criminal defendant and his counsel to access the victim's residence: a trial court has no authority to issue an order to a nonparty in a criminal case requiring the nonparty to allow a criminal defendant to access the nonparty's private residence, and the victim has no other adequate remedy at law.

two appellants seek reconsideration of decision that any interests they had in minerals was extinguished under the Marketable Title Act while the interests of two other appellants were not extinguished as were in continuous possession for more than 40 years at the time they filed preservation notices reconsideration denied as the two movants did not satisfy continuous possession provision appellees' cross-application for reconsideration denied as two appellants satisfied continuous possession provision.

The magistrate did not err in determining that the record contains some evidence supporting the Industrial Commission's decision to deny relator's application for temporary total disability compensation. Objections overruled writ denied.

Trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte grant mistrial because brief references to appellant's criminal record were immediately objected to and corrected by curative instructions to jury. Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to request more specific curative instructions or move for mistrial because counsel could have concluded as a matter of strategy that this would only call more attention to appellant's criminal record. Evidence was sufficient to sustain kidnapping conviction where victim testified appellant put his body against door and held victim's arm, preventing him from leaving apartment. Verdicts were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where there was competing evidence as to whether appellant acted in self-defense jury was in the best position to judge credibility of victim and appellant regarding their different accounts of altercation.

Refusal to instruct jury in civil conversion trial on mitigation of damages was not error because conversion is an intentional tort for which contributory fault is not an affirmative defense. Motion for judgment notwithstanding the evidence or for new trial is not supported by alleged lack of credible evidence and cross-appeal on timeliness of motion is moot. Judgment affirmed.

The appeal initiated on behalf of appellant Red Foot Racing Stables is dismissed as it was not filed by a licensed attorney. However, appellant Eichenberger's appeal is properly before this court for disposition. Because appellant Eichenberger stated individual claims against appellee Polhamus, the trial court erred in dismissing those claims at the pleading stage. Appeal dismissed in part judgment reversed in part cause remanded.

Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by not requesting appointment of a foreign language interpreter at appellant's plea hearing because there is no indication in the transcript of the plea hearing that appellant was unable to understand and communicate in English and both the transcript of the sentencing hearing and the presentence investigation report showed that appellant was English proficient. Judgment affirmed.

Strict compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) is required by a prisoner when filing original action concerning public records and failure to even minimally describe the nature of each previously filed action beyond "civil action" requires dismissal.

The trial court revoked appellant's community control for having weapons while under disability (a third-degree felony) and for carrying a concealed weapon and improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle (both fourth-degree felonies). The trial court abused its discretion in concluding that appellant violated the term of community control requiring him to complete 120 hours of community service when the program director testified and provided certificates showing that appellant had complete the community service requirement to the director's satisfaction, even though the program apparently allowed appellant to satisfy the requirement with less than 120 hours on-site. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that appellant failed to meet with his probation officer as directed and did not comply with his electronic monitoring schedule. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community control and imposing the previously-stated 24-month sentence for having weapons while under disability. R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(ii) applied to the revocation of appellant's community control for his fourth-degree felonies and limited the prison term to 180 days. Accordingly, the trial court erred in imposing 18-month prison sentences for those offenses. The trial court's judgment with respect to appellant's conviction for having weapons while under disability is affirmed. The portion of the trial court's judgment imposing 18-month sentences for carrying a concealed weapon and improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle is reversed the sentences for those offenses will be modified to 180 days in prison, and the matter is remanded for the limited purposes of issuing a revised judgment entry consistent with our judgment herein and of notifying the appropriate prison officials of that revised judgment entry.

Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena two of the witnesses named on the defense's witness list. Appellant's conviction for felonious assault was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and his six-year sentence for felonious assault was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle and receiving stolen property (with a firearm specification). Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Two police officers did not provide expert testimony thus, the State had no obligation to provide expert reports under Crim.R. 16(K). Finally, the trial court made the consecutive sentence findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), and it cannot be concluded by clear and convincing evidence that the record did not support these findings. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-year suspension with second year stayed on conditions.

This pro se, accelerated appeal is barred by res judicata and R.C. 2953.08(D)(1). Judgment affirmed.

Trial court complied with all applicable sentencing requirements when it sentenced defendant to 17 months in jail following his guilty plea to assault. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a competency exam and/or to pursue a not guilty by reason of insanity defense where there was no evidence to support either.

Defendant's convictions for multiple sexual assaults against multiple victims affirmed. Trial court properly denied motion for mistrial where reference to other bad acts was brief and isolated, a curative instruction was given, and likelihood of prejudice was low. Other trial-related errors were not prejudicial or amounted to harmless error. Appellant failed to advance any argument in support of his assignment of error challenging sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence.

In a case involving a no contest plea to aggravated murder, appellant's plea was knowing and voluntary and counsel was not ineffective in failing to request independent competency and sanity evaluations. Crim. R. 11 R.C. 2945.371.

Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) Child Support. The magistrate determined that plaintiff did not establish that the information provided by defendant to the credit reporting agency was inaccurate or incomplete. Accordingly, defendant had no duty to remedy this information with the credit reporting agency. Magistrate recommended judgment in favor of the defendant.

Negligence. Plaintiff inmate brought claims against defendant after plaintiff was attacked by another inmate, asserting that defendant was negligent in preventing said attack. Plaintiff objected to magistrate's decision that recommended judgment in defendant's favor. Court agreed with magistrate's determination that defendant lacked notice of danger to plaintiff. The court supported the magistrate's rulings on the evidence and exhibits provided. The court overruled plaintiff's objections to the magistrate's decision and granted judgment for defendant.

sufficiency of the evidence, manifest weight of the evidence, contradictory testimony, credibility, indigent right to counsel, motion to substitute counsel, abuse of discretion

aggravated murder – self-defense – castle doctrine – duty to retreat – jury instruction – plain error – abuse of discretion – residence – attached porch – front stoop – neighbor

sufficiency – manifest weight – jury instruction – tampering with evidence – purpose to impair investigation – likelihood of investigation – improperly handling firearm in motor vehicle – duress

Sufficient evidence supports judgment of conviction trial court properly imposed consecutive sentences.

In the process of imposing restitution, the trial court must consider the defendant's ability to pay. In most situations, if the trial court considers a presentence investigation with the defendant's financial situation, employment history, age, physical condition, mental health, then the trial court has considered the defendant's ability to pay restitution.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to the carrier where the undisputed evidence showed that the carrier successfully delivered the goods and secured a signed bill of lading prior to damage occurring to the goods during the unloading process.

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel's decision not to object to statements made by the certain witnesses was part of reasonable trial strategy, therefore appellant cannot establish that his counsel's performance was deficient. Furthermore, there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the claimed errors.

CRIMINAL – jury instruction flight abuse of discretion prejudice manifest weight of the evidence credibility.

CIVIL - summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) political subdivision immunity R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b)

CIVIL - summary judgment Civ.R. 56 declaratory judgment workers' compensation right of reimbursement statutory lien against proceeds R.C. 2744.05(B)(1) public policy argument no longer moot remanded for the trial court to consider in the first instance.

JURISDICTION - lack of a final, appealable order R.C. 2505.02 contempt lack of jurisdiction dismissed.

CRIMINAL LAW - Felonious Assault R.C. 2903.11 Kidnapping R.C. 2905.01 Having Weapons While Under Disability R.C. 2923.13 Abduction R.C. 2905.02 consolidation of cases was appropriate where prior defense counsel stipulation to consolidation and where evidence presented was "simple and direct" Crim.R. 8(A), 13, and 14 evidence was sufficient to support conviction and conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R. 404(B) court did not err in denying defendant's request for self-representation where record shows defendant refused to participate in multiple attempts at a Faretta colloquy court did not err in requiring defendant to wear electronic restraint vest during trial where defendant had numerous outbursts, threatened corrections officers, destroyed property while in jail, violated terms of house arrest, remove ankle monitor and fled the state affirmed.

Adoption—R.C. 3107.07(A)—Whether a noncustodial parent has provided the financial support necessary to preserve his or her right to withhold consent to the adoption of his or her child is measured by the terms of the judicial decree—Appellant-father failed without justifiable cause to comply with the child-support obligations of the judicial decree for the one-year period preceding the filing of appellee-stepfather's adoption petition—Court of appeals' judgment affirming probate court's judgment affirmed.

Attorneys—Character and fitness—Applications to take bar exam and to register as candidate for admission to practice of law—Past criminal conduct—Lack of candor—Applicant permanently barred from reapplying for admission to practice of law.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43(A)(2) incident report uncharged suspect law enforcement investigatory work product expiration mitigation. Requester sought records from a police homicide investigation, arguing that the confidential law enforcement investigatory records exception had expired when the first of two suspects in the case was convicted. The prosecutor alleged that multiple parts of the confidential law enforcement investigatory records exception together protected all requested records. The special master found that the investigatory work product exception applied to all requested records other than the initial incident report, and continues to apply until the completion of every trial for which the information was gathered. The special master found that the uncharged suspect exception had terminated with respect to the second suspect, who had been charged before the court's decision was rendered. The special master further found that respondent had not met his burden to prove that release of any record would disclose specific confidential investigatory techniques or procedures or information that would endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel, a crime victim, a witness, or a confidential information source. The special master recommended the court order the prosecutor to disclose the initial incident report in his possession, but that the harm from this violation was mitigated by requester's prompt receipt of the same report from the investigating police agency.

Where genuine issues of material fact existed in the summary judgment record as to elements of the plaintiff's claims for vicarious liability, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on that claim is reversed. Where the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's petition for postconviction relief for lack of jurisdiction because petition was untimely filed and appellant failed to meet the requirements under R.C. 2953.23(A) for untimely filing.

On certification of default.

On certification of default.

AGGRAVATED MURDER – EVIDENCE – RELEVANCE – SELF-DEFENSE – JURIES – PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES – CRIM.R. 24 – SENTENCING – APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: The trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim's tattoos and t-shirt where the evidence was not relevant to the determination of the initial-aggressor element of defendant's self-defense claim. Under Crim.R. 24(E), a party's failure to exercise a peremptory challenge waives that party's right to that particular challenge. The trial court did not err in limiting defense counsel's questioning of a prospective juror where defense counsel had waived his fourth, and final, peremptory challenge. Defendant's conviction for aggravated murder was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant was complicit in the predicate offense of aggravated robbery. A sentence for aggravated murder is not subject to appellate review pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(D)(3). The trial court did not err by ordering that defendant serve his sentence for aggravated murder consecutively to his sentence for having a weapon while under a disability where the trial court made the appropriate R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing hearing and included those findings in the sentencing entry.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SEARCH AND SEIZURE – REASONABLE SUSPICION – PAT-DOWN: The trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to suppress evidence recovered after a pat-down, because the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous to permit the pat-down.

AGGRAVATED MENACING – WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – CONFRONTATION CLAUSE – WITNESSES – IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE: Defendant's conviction for aggravated menacing was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant ran toward the victim with a knife and threatened to kill her. Defendant failed to establish a Confrontation Clause violation where the trial court did not prohibit defense counsel from engaging in cross-examination. The trial court did not err in excluding impeachment evidence where the evidence had minimal relevancy to the allegations against defendant and other witnesses testified to the same effect.

maximum—consecutive—Crim.R. 32.1

traffic rules manifest weight, judicial notice

Conviction sentence jury instruction rule mandatory harmless error prejudice substantial right burden written audio copy. The trial court committed reversible error by failing to provide the jury with either a written or record copy of its final instructions for reference during deliberations pursuant to Crim.R. 30(A).

Heirs trusts split distributions fiduciary duty attorney fees counterclaims breached dividing declaratory judgment investment account breach of trust liquidation recombined damages summary judgment interest punitive law of the case mandate rule. The decision in a prior appeal of the case, that the trustee had divided the trust into two separate trusts for the separate benefit of the two beneficiaries pursuant to R.C. 5804.17, that plaintiff's counterclaims were perfunctory, and that the parties were to bear their own attorney fees was the law of the case and was binding on all of the parties. The mandate of the prior appeal left nothing for the trial court to consider further on remand.

Defect indictment statute void conduct plea waive knowing intelligent voluntary withdraw ineffective deficient counsel prejudice hearing abuse of discretion timeliness affidavit. Appellant's arguments concerning the sufficiency of his indictment rely on a misinterpretation of the criminal statute governing his conduct. Defendant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the existence of a manifest injustice that warrants the withdrawal of his guilty plea.

Motion to withdraw guilty plea presentence abuse of discretion. The trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant, after pleading guilty, immediately took steps to find new counsel and withdraw his plea.

Anders brief, motion to withdraw, presentence-investigation report, Crim.R. 32.2, R.C. 2947.06. Appellate counsel's motion to withdraw filed in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), is granted and the appeal is dismissed after a thorough review of the record fails to reveal any meritorious arguments for appeal. The trial court's failure to order a presentence-investigation report is not error. A presentence report is not required where the appellant is not eligible for probation or community control sanctions.

Felony sentences. Defendant's five-year prison sentence is not contrary to law, and the court considered the proper statutory factors.

Motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial unavoidable delay public records request. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial without a hearing. The documents submitted by appellant did not on their face support appellant's claim that he was unavoidably prevented from timely discovering the purported new evidence.

Jointly recommended sentence, jurisdiction, authorized by law, mandatory sentencing provisions. Appellant-defendant argued that his sentence was contrary to law. Defendant had agreed upon a sentencing recommendation because his sentence was within the recommended range and not contrary to law, we dismissed the appeal.

R.C. 2929.34(B)(3)(d) prison R.C. 2903.06 aggravated vehicular homicide R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) R.C. 2929.15 community control technical violation. The trial court erred in concluding that defendant who committed a fifth-degree felony was ineligible for confinement at a Targeted Community Alternative to Prison, under R.C. 2929.34, due to his prior aggravated vehicular homicide conviction, because aggravated vehicular homicide is not a disqualifying offense of violence under R.C. 2901.01(A)(9) where defendant was convicted of a fifth-degree felony and sentenced to community control, the trial court erred in imposing a one-year term for community control violation OVI was a "technical" violation of community control - it was a new offense that was not a felony, so under R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), it was subject to the 90-day limit on prison terms for community control violations.

Objection of respondent sustained and writ of mandamus denied. Relator has not shown that she has a clear legal right to the relief she requests, nor that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act requested. Therefore, relator is not entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Public Employees Retirement Board, to retroactively modify relator's retirement plan with the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System from the Combined Plan to the Traditional Pension Plan, effective to October 8, 1987, her original date of hire by the Franklin County Public Defender.

Mandamus denied. There is some evidence on which the commission could rely to conclude that relator was terminated from his employment for testing positive for marijuana. Therefore, the commission did not abuse its discretion.

The Board of Tax Appeals erred in failing to consider all the non-sale-price evidence, including the entirety of the appraisal, that the property owner offered to prove the true value of the subject property for tax purposes.

Construing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving plaintiff and conducting a de novo review, genuine issues of fact as to each of the disputed elements of retaliation claim exist, making it not suitable for resolution on summary judgment according to evidence in record.

The trial court did not err in resentencing Clemonts pursuant to the remand order, and the duration of Clemonts' sentences and the imposition of consecutive sentences are in accordance with law. However, the trial court made a clerical error in the judgment entries in Case Nos. 18CR-238 and 18CR-434.

In an action to collect on an R.C. 5747.13 tax assessment judgment, the trial court erred in denying the judgment creditor's Civ.R. 69 motion to compel discovery. Judgment reversed, cause remanded.

The magistrate properly determined that this matter should be sua sponte dismissed because relator failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(C). Thus, the magistrate's decision is adopted, and this action is sua sponte dismissed.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SEARCH AND SEIZURE – PROBABLE CAUSE – ARREST – SENTENCING – CRIM.R. 36: The trial court erred in considering defendant's post-arrest admissions when ruling on defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to his arrest, but the error was harmless where the remaining evidence before the court established probable cause that defendant had committed the crime for which he was arrested. Where the trial court announced a three-year driver's license suspension during the sentencing hearing, but the sentencing entry reflected a five-year driver's license suspension, the sentencing entry clearly contained a clerical error for which the proper remedy is to remand the cause to the trial court for a nunc pro tunc entry correcting the license-suspension portion of the sentencing entry pursuant to Crim.R. 36.

Appellant was sentenced to eight months in prison after pleading guilty to trespass in a habitation. Appellant was a first-time, nonviolent felony offender. The trial court imposed prison instead of community control because appellant admitted to smoking marijuana on the day of his PSI interview, a clear violation of the bond condition requiring him to obey all Ohio criminal laws. We do not find that the sentence was clearly and convincingly not supported by the record or that the sentence was contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of aggravated murder, attempted murder, and having weapons while under disability based on the shooting of two individuals. The trial court erred in denying appellant's request to call the surviving victim as a witness at the suppression hearing. Nevertheless, with the record before us, the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the surviving victim's photospread identification of appellant as the shooter even if the police's photospread or its administration were unduly suggestive, the surviving victim's identification was sufficiently reliable. Appellant's convictions were based on sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence the jury did not lose its way when it concluded that appellant was the shooter. Any error in the trial court's failure to admit text messages sent to the surviving victim from her ex-boyfriend was harmless, given that the jury was made aware of the threatening nature of the messages and that the ex-boyfriend sent those messages to the victim shortly before the shooting. Appellant did not demonstrate that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to offer the text messages properly since the appellant was not prejudiced by the lack of the admission of the messages. The detective's brief testimony that an attorney told him that the surviving victim was in fear and wanted protection by the police was harmless error, given that the statement was cumulative of the victim's extensive prior testimony at trial on those matters. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an FBI special agent to testify on redirect examination about whether appellant's cell phone could have been located at his residence at the time of the shooting. No cumulative error shown. Judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. The trial court erred in crediting appellee with jail time from his Logan County sentence toward his unrelated Montgomery County sentence. Appellee was entitled to three days of jail time credit following his Montgomery County arrest, plus the 14 days he was further held on the Montgomery County case in lieu of bond until sentencing, for a total of 17 days. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is modified to award appellee jail time credit of 17 days, rather than 183 days. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

Both parties to a commercial contract dispute appealed from the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of a protective equipment company and against the supplier that did not timely deliver goods ordered by the equipment company. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the equipment company on claims related to glove shells that the supplier failed to deliver, as the evidence compelled a conclusion that the equipment company's prepayment toward those items was a refundable deposit, not "investment risk" subject to forfeiture, and the supplier did not have a right to cure after repeatedly failing to deliver conforming goods despite multiple delivery date extensions. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding pre-judgment interest to the equipment company from the date of the supplier's final missed delivery instead of from the date that the equipment company filed its counterclaim against the supplier. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the equipment company had not proven with reasonable certainty its claim for lost profits stemming from the supplier's failure to deliver outwear items ordered under a separate contract between the parties. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. The affidavit in support of the search warrant contained sufficient facts to justify the issuance of a nighttime search warrant. The search warrant issued by the magistrate permitted the officers to search the apartment for illegal narcotics, weapons, and money. Since any of these items could have reasonably been located in the locked safe found in the apartment, the police were not required to obtain a second search warrant to search the locked safe. Judgment affirmed. (Tucker, J., concurring.) (Froelich, J., concurring in judgment only.)

Appellant served his jail sentence consequently, this appeal challenging the sentence for his conviction for failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer is moot. Appeal dismissed.

Motion to certify a conflict App.R. 25(A).

Appellant's convictions of receiving stolen property and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity affirmed. Circumstantial evidence was presented that appellant knew or should have known that trailers had been stolen and that appellant sold 45 stolen trailers to co-defendant for resale to third parties. Court properly imposed costs of prosecution and was not required to make a finding of ability to pay.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Appellee's offer of a package deal plea bargain was not improper. Judgment affirmed.

Summary judgment. Defamation/libel. Public official. Actual malice.

Appellant's premises liability claim was subject to dismissal on summary judgment where the hazards that allegedly caused appellant's injuries were open and obvious.

Trial court properly convicted appellant for two felonious assault offenses. Judgment affirmed. Felonious assault, sufficiency of evidence, Alford plea, felony sentencing

Judgment affirmed, in part and reversed in part, where trial court had jurisdiction to consider 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, and did not abuse its discretion in finding a timely motion demonstrating a meritorious defense and mutual mistake, but lacked authority to modify the property order by changing the source of the lump sum payment, with remand necessary to consider appropriate remedy under Civ.R. 60(B).

Trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to determine the action res judicata bars a second motion for an additional allowance for an injury based on a different theory of causation.

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision.

Workers' compensation—Voluntary abandonment is an affirmative defense—If evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a hearing officer's failure to address the issue constitutes a mistake of law—The employer has the burden to raise and produce evidence of voluntary abandonment—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

suppression—impairment—4511.19—reasonable suspicion

Trial court did not err in denying the petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds of res judicata when the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel was based upon a statute of limitations claim which was ruled upon in the direct appeal.

Service of permanent custody motions was not defective in this matter clear and convincing evidence was presented to support permanent custody awards of children to agency trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte grant a continuance appellant-father did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.

Trial court's sentence of maximum consecutive prison terms was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the defendant-appellant's motion to waive, suspend, or modify payment of costs.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's post-sentence motion to withdraw his no-contest plea.

The trial court did not err by granting the State's motion for summary judgment.

Defendant-appellant's rape conviction under R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) is based on sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause were not violated by admitting the testimony of a SANE nurse regarding statements made to her by the victim because the victim testified at trial. Defendant-appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the trial court designating the victim as its witness.

The trial court did not err by failing to merge defendant-appellant's kidnapping and robbery convictions for purposes of sentencing.

Jurisdiction was proper in the Fairfield Municipal Court where the work was performed in the City of Fairfield and the defendant was properly served with the summons and complaint and appeared on his own behalf at the trial

Trial court erred in calculating appellant's overall jail-time credit and in failing to apply jail-time credit to appellant's prison sentences for the time he was incarcerated exclusively for those cases.

Defendant mortgagors appeal from a decision granting summary judgment and a foreclosure in favor of plaintiff mortgagee. The court did not violate the mortgagors' due process rights by holding a hearing at which the mortgagee produced the original promissory note for inspection by the court and the mortgagors. The court reviewed the note and then found that the mortgagee had standing to enforce the note. There were no due process concerns because mortgagors had raised concerns about the note and had actual notice of what would occur at the hearing. The mortgagors did not deny that they were in default but challenged various aspects of the mortgagee's entitlement to summary judgment. The mortgagors lacked standing to challenge the validity of an assignment of the note. The mortgagors failed to produce evidence creating genuine issues of fact for trial as to the amount due on the note or whether the mortgagee complied with certain federal regulations before accelerating the note.

A defendant appeals his thirteen-year aggregate sentence after he was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide and found to have violated postrelease control and community control. The defendant, while under the influence of narcotics, crashed his motor vehicle into another vehicle, killing the other vehicle's driver. In determining the appropriate felony sentence, the court did not conflate the seriousness of the offense, generically, with the seriousness of the defendant's conduct. The maximum sentence imposed was not contrary to law and was supported by the record. The court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences where the record supported the court's findings that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crimes and to punish the defendant's conduct.

untimely motions for reconsideration App.R.26 App.R.14(B)

murder having weapons under disability convictions not against the manifest weight of the evidence no plain error in jury instructions appellant's testimony sounded in self-defense maximum, consecutive sentences not contrary to law

Declaratory judgment action regarding which party is to bear the cost of relocating utility line summary judgment in favor of city governmental versus proprietary function replacement of old sewer R.C. 4939.04 no evidence of discrimination.

CONSUMER PROTECTION - Application of Consumer Sales Protection Act unfair or deceptive practice used car dealer "supplier" defined engaged in the business of auto sales, not repairs lack of valid dealer license deceptive act for purposes of CSPA Ohio Adm-Code 109:4-3-16(B)(32) possible defense to breach of contract claim mitigation of damages waiver.

CRIMINAL LAW - Wrongful entrustment of motor vehicle permission to use vehicle direct evidence unnecessary inference based upon prior knowledge and prior warning by police officer admission of knowledge that user did not have valid license sufficiency of traffic citation no reference to subsection still adequate notice of nature of charged offense.

CRIMINAL - purposes and principles of felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 contrary to law consider rehabilitation Burglary

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 5(A) delayed appeal notice of appeal must be filed concurrently with motion for leave motion must set forth reasons for delay.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - aggravated possession of drugs R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) clearly and convincingly contrary to law R.C. 2929.12 sentencing factors silent record inference of consideration of sentencing factors R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(b) presumption of prison R.C. 2929.13(D)(2) interruption at sentencing hearing.

CRIMINAL - Operating a Vehicle while Under the Influence Crim.R. 32(C) single judgment containing fact of conviction and sentence final order remand

CRIMINAL - community control technical violation R.C. 2929.15(B)(1) felony sentencing consecutive sentences contrary to law

CRIMINAL - Obstructing Official Business sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence failure to act affirmative act interference with investigation lying constitutes interference delay in investigation

2 prior OVIs in 10 years

Attorneys at law—Resignation with disciplinary action pending—Gov.Bar R. VI(11)(C).

Appellant negotiated plea agreement complies with R.C. 2953.08(D)(1), making her sentence unreviewable.

CRIMINAL-JAIL TIME CREDIT-R.C. 2967.191 - The trial court's decision denying Appellant's motion for additional jail-time credit towards his prison sentence imposed as a result of a violation of community control was supported by competent, credible evidence where nothing in the record indicated the commission of a new offense in one county arose out of the underlying conviction for which Appellant was serving a term of community control in another county. Despite the fact that the commission of the new offense served as the basis for the community control violation and revocation, there was no relationship between the new offense and the underlying conviction requiring jail-time credit to be applied.

Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition

sentencing, community control, consecutive sentences

speedy trial, prior bad acts, evidence

Securities Fraud - Manifest Weight - Evid. R. 401, 402

Voluntary manslaughter

Consent to search car did not extend to searching passenger's backpack

Community control revocation/consecutive sentences

CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING – community control violation consecutive sentence R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) R.C. 2929.15(B)(3) truth-in-sentencing.

CRIMINAL LAW – ineffective assistance of counsel failure to object to testimony post-arrest silence other evidence in the record.

CRIMINAL LAW – community control terms and conditions R.C. 2929.25 abuse of discretion R.C. 951.02 animals running at large prohibition of keeping livestock on property R.C. 2921.33 resisting arrest sufficiency manifest weight.

Pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G) and C.F. v. T.H. R., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-536, 2019-Ohio-488, appellant's failure to file objections to the trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision on a civil stalking protection order within the 14-day period required dismissal of the appeal. Appeal dismissed.

The Court of Claims did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. Any cognizable claims arising from Plaintiff's 2006 dismissal from the University of Toledo College of Medicine are time barred, and the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over any constitutional claims that the complaint may have attempted to assert. A motion to dismiss may be decided before an answer is required, and the Court of Claims authorizes electronic filings made with electronic signatures. Assignments of error overruled judgment affirmed.

For purposes of R.C. 2933.53, an interception of a cell-phone call takes place both at the location of the cell phone and at the location of the government agent listening in on the call.

Mandamus—Inmate failed to failed to provide in affidavit listing prior civil actions information required by R.C. 2969.25(A)(4)—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Attorneys—Character and fitness—Pending application to take the bar exam approved—Applicant may sit for the July 2020 bar exam, provided she satisfies the remaining registration requirements.

ATTEMPTED MURDER – EVIDENCE – COUNSEL –CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT – SENTENCING – ALLIED OFFENSES: Defendant's convictions for two counts of attempted murder were not against the weight or the sufficiency of the evidence where the state presented evidence that defendant discharged a gun at police officers while they were in close proximity and within his line of fire. Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel elected to rely on cross-examination of the state's witness rather than call a defense expert. Defendant's attempted-murder convictions did not merge as allied offenses where they involved separate victims. Defendant's aggregate sentence of 43-and-a-half years did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment where it resulted from the imposition of consecutive sentences.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – RIGHT TO COUNSEL – COMPETENCY: The juvenile court did not deny the father in a permanent-custody proceeding the right to counsel where father's waiver of the right to counsel could be inferred at early hearings by his failure to appear and to communicate with counsel and at later hearings by his express waiver of counsel. The juvenile court did not err in failing to inquire into father's competency, even though it appointed him a guardian ad litem to help him understand the proceedings as he represented himself, where nothing in the record showed that father was incapable of understanding the proceedings.

double jeopardy, same act or transaction, police chase, traffic violation, speeding

sealing, R.C. 2953.52 standard, weighing

Suppression traffic stop

Pre-sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea

On certified entry of felony conviction.

partition R.C. 5307.25 attorney fees common benefit survey fee

On certified entry of felony conviction.

summary judgment prescriptive easement affidavit personal knowledge

Slip and fall summary judgment duty independent contractor primary assumption of risk gutter and downspout. Where a resident fell on an accumulation of ice allegedly caused by a gutter's downspout draining water directly onto a driveway, the trial court improperly applied the primary assumption of risk to grant summary judgment in favor of an independent contractor who installed the gutter.

Guilty plea ineffective assistance of counsel statute of limitations. A plea of guilty waives the right to claim that a defendant was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant's plea to be less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. A trial counsel's failure to advise a defendant of the statute of limitations defense can potentially avoid the application of waiver because it may impact the voluntary nature of the plea. In this case, however, appellant's trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss and asserted the defense of the statute of limitations on appellant's behalf but appellant chose to plead guilty to a reduced charge. Appellant fails to demonstrate his plea was less than knowing or voluntary due to any perceived deficient performance by his trial counsel.

Manifest weight of the evidence, sufficiency of the evidence, R.C. 2929.12. By entering a guilty plea, the appellant has waived his right to present manifest weight of the evidence or sufficiency of the evidence attacks against his convictions. Additionally, the trial court complied with the R.C. 2929.12 sentencing requirements.

Crim.R. 11 Fifth Amendment exact language. - During a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, the trial court is not required to advise the defendant that the state cannot comment on his right not to testify during trial. The trial court must advise the defendant that he cannot be compelled to testify against himself and by pleading guilty, he waives that right. Exact language of Crim.R. 11 is not necessary as long as the record demonstrates that right was explained or referred to in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant.

Postconviction relief hearing substantive grounds abuse of discretion due process Brady violation possession false testimony credibility res judicata. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. Appellant did not set forth credible operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief where the state was not in possession of the documents and there was nothing to suggest that the state knowingly used false testimony to obtain a conviction.

Journalize findings nunc pro tunc manifest weight of the evidence rape. The trial court failed to journalize the fact that it suspended Meadows's obligation to pay costs while he was incarcerated in its sentencing journal entry, which can be corrected through a nunc pro tunc entry. Meadows's conviction for rape was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) rape gross sexual imposition probation violation findings specific facts evidence support. Affirmed the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. The trial court engaged in the correct analysis and made the required findings the trial court was not required to set forth specific facts causing the requisite findings to be satisfied and the record contained evidence to support the statutory findings.

Anders, motion to withdraw and dismiss consecutive sentences findings. On review, the record shows that the trial court made the statutorily required findings and those findings were incorporated into the trial court's sentencing judgment entry. Appellant's counsel's motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal is well taken.

Crim.R. 11 effect of the plea. The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11, and the record shows that Harris knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty.

Allied Offenses - Restitution - 1AC - Court Costs

Sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence prior bad acts modus operandi evidence merger.

LAW OF THE CASE—JURISDICTION—POSTCONVICTION—CLERICAL MISTAKE: The common pleas court properly declined to grant postconviction relief based on an alleged violation of defendant's due-process/Crim.R. 43(A) right to be present at all critical stages of his trial: the court of appeals had held in defendant's prior appeal that a postconviction claim based on substantially the same facts and issues was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction therefore, under the doctrine of the law of the case, the common pleas court was constrained from entertaining that claim as presented in defendant's subsequent postconviction motion. The common pleas court erred in failing to exercise the authority conferred by Crim.R. 36 to correct a clerical mistake contained in defendant's judgment of conviction, misstating the name of his trial counsel.

The trial court did not err when it granted permanent custody of two children to Franklin County Children's Services.

The trial court's interlocutory rulings declining to provide additional state funding for a potential defense rebuttal witness present no final appealable order. The state's motion to dismiss defendant's appeal for want of jurisdiction is granted.

The trial court confirmed an award entered by an arbitrator following the arbitration of appellant's employment termination. Appellant's union, as required by a collective bargaining agreement, pursued the arbitration on appellant's behalf. Consequently, appellant lacks standing to appeal the trial court's judgment. Appeal dismissed.

Appellant was convicted of rape following a jury trial. The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress statements he made to the lead detective. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that appellant's direct testimony "opened the door" and allowed the State to impeach appellant's credibility based upon previous allegations of sexual misconduct. Further, the trial court's limiting instruction, to which appellant did not object, was appropriate to the situation. Appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant was not denied a fair trial based upon the lead detective's testimony, to which there was no objection, that he attempted to locate appellant's address through a law enforcement website. Finally, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that appellant did not satisfy the condition to receive a five-year stipulated sentence, and imposing seven years in prison. Counsel's potential assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress will not be considered, because Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), does not apply. Regardless, any error in the court's suppression ruling was waived by appellant's guilty plea. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for improper handling of firearms in a motor vehicle, discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises, and improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation were not allied offenses of similar import and therefore were not subject to merger. The State adduced sufficient evidence to support appellant's convictions for discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises and improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation. The verdict forms submitted to the jury were not defective. Appellant was found guilty of the three-year and five-year firearm specifications under R.C. 2941.145 and R.C. 2941.146, governed by R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) and (c), respectively, in connection with his conviction for improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation the trial court did not err when it failed to merge these specifications for the purposes of sentencing. Appellant waived his challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.16(B)(1) by failing to raise the issue in the trial court. The record establishes that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance at trial. The trial court should issue a nunc pro tunc order amending the judgment entry of conviction to reflect that Count IV was a felony of the third degree, and this matter is remanded for that limited purpose. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. (Hall, J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's "Motion to Void/Vacate Sentencing Judgment." Appellant's claim that his life sentence for aggravated murder was void because the trial court failed to specify that he would be eligible for parole after 20 years is barred by res judicata. Additionally, because appellant failed to raise an allied offenses argument in his direct appeal, the argument is barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

Appellees sought to recover possession of real estate sold to appellant under a land installment contract after appellant defaulted on monthly payments. The trial court found that appellant had not paid 20% toward the purchase price so as to avoid forfeiture and require foreclosure the court's calculation was based on payments allocable to principal only, excluding amounts submitted by appellant toward real estate taxes and property insurance premiums, pursuant to the court's interpretation of the contract. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. The trial court also did not err in finding that appellant breached the contract by failing to submit payments for the four months leading up to trial. Judgment affirmed.

Criminal law—Resentencing—When a portion of a defendant's sentence has been vacated on direct appeal, the trial court has the authority to resentence the defendant de novo on any of the vacated sentences—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Mandamus—R.C. 2947.23—Relator had adequate remedy at law by way of appeal of ruling on motion to waive, suspend, or modify court costs—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

Mandamus—Appellant exercised adequate remedy at law by filing in trial court motion seeking new trial—Res judicata bars appellant's claim, which could have been raised on direct appeal—Court of appeals' judgment denying complaint affirmed.

The trial court did not err in prohibiting the admission of a videotape where the narrator was not present in court.

Defendant lacked standing to challenge forfeiture statute on constitutional grounds where forfeiture was effectuated by guilty plea, not by statute. Also, because guilty plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, defendant waived claims that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated.

Postconviction relief barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Criminal-damaging conviction upheld where state presented evidence that appellant admitted spray-painting offensive messages on door without owner's consent and door needed to be replaced. No eyewitness testimony was required, and property need not have been rendered non-functional. Right to silence not violated by isolated statement by officer that appellant hung up on him. Trial court properly entered nunc pro tunc judgment to correct error in numerical designation and omission of degree of offense.

On requester's written objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the court overruled the objections and adopted the report and recommendation. The court did not find an error in the special master's application of State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 47. The court did not find well-taken requester's request for a stay of proceedings.

Because the court found an error of law or other defect was evident on the face of a report and recommendation, the court rejected in part and adopted in part the report and recommendation.

On requester's written objections to a special master's report and recommendation, the court overruled the objections and adopted the report and recommendation. The court did not find an error in the special master's application of State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 47. The court did not find well-taken requester's request for a stay of proceedings.

Zoning—Townships—Township trustees may regulate mining under R.C. 519.02(A) only in the interest of public health and safety—R.C. 519.141(A) does not provide board of zoning appeals with basis for denying an application to engage in mining when an application fails to meet a township's general conditions—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded to the board of zoning appeals.

The trial court did not err by granting defendant-appellee's motion to suppress evidence.

The trial court did not err by denying defendant-appellant's motion to suppress evidence.

A suit cannot be successfully commenced against a deceased defendant under Civ.R. 3(A) because a deceased defendant cannot be served and a trial court cannot, therefore, have personal jurisdiction over that defendant. A suit filed against a deceased defendant is not, however, a nullity as the plaintiff may later amend his or her complaint to name the proper party.

Trial court did not err by imposing court costs without first finding defendant had the ability to pay the costs.

summary judgment, tolling, savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, 28 U.S.C. 1367(d), App.R. 12(A)(2), App.R. 16(A)(7).

Ohio's newly enacted violent-offender enrollment statutes, R.C. 2903.41 through 2903.44, known as Sierah's Law, may be applied to offenders who committed their crimes and were convicted of violent offenses prior to the effective date of the law without violating the prohibition on retroactive legislation set forth in Article II, Section 28 of the Ohio constitution. The General Assembly expressly provided for retroactive application and such application does not burden any vested right or finality interest, thereby making the statutes remedial, rather than substantive, in nature. The trial court, therefore, did not err in advising appellant that he was required to register with the violent offender database upon his release from prison following his guilty plea to murder, a specified violent offense.

CRIMINAL LAW- assault conviction not against the manifest weight of the evidence trial court rejected self-defense argument to establish self-defense, one must prove three elements: "(1) the defendant was not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that [he] was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that [his] only means of escape was the use of force, and (3) that the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger." State v. Goff, 128 Ohio St.3d 169, 2010-Ohio-6317, 942 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 36.

CRIMINAL - speedy trial request for final disposition R.C. 2941.401 involuntary plea felony sentencing jail time credit consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.41 maximum sentence judicial release R.C. 2929.20

CRIMINAL - postsentence motion to withdraw guilty plea Crim.R. 32.1 res judicata manifest injustice

APPELLATE REVIEW - untimely appeal App.R. 4(A)(1) App.R. 5(A) thirty-day rule nunc pro tunc clerical error substantive rights

CRIMINAL LAW - domestic violence conviction not against the manifest weight of evidence State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to waive payment of court costs not barred by res judicata R.C. 2947.23(C) not required to consider offender's ability to pay not required to make findings.

CIVIL - concealment of assets R.C. 2109.50 motion in limine motion to suppress hearsay Evid.R. 801(C) Evid.R. 802 statement by decedent personal representative rebuttal Evid.R. 804(B)(5) statement of then existing state of mind Evid.R. 803(3) relevance Evid.R. 401 Evid.R. 402 sufficiency abuse of discretion material prejudice Civ.R. 12(B)(6) evidence or allegations outside the complaint notice of conversion into a motion for summary judgment harmless error Civ.R. 56 no objection to non-Rule 56(C) evidence weight of evidence title to assets upon death proximity possession.

CIVIL - DAMAGES - breach of residential real estate agreement subsequent offer to purchase residence established fair market value of home at the time of breach because it was an agreed upon price between a willing seller and a willing buyer in a voluntary sale on the open market within a reasonable time after the breach.

POSTCONVICTION RELIEF - R.C. 2953.21 ineffective assistance of counsel no substantive grounds for relief defense counsel's statement corrected prior to entering guilty plea petition denied without a hearing.

R.C. 2303.21 does not authorize a party to recover the cost of deposition transcripts used in support of a motion for summary judgment.

Habeas corpus—Res judicata—Alleged failure of state to file criminal complaint not cognizable in habeas corpus because defendant had been indicted—Res judicata bars successive habeas corpus petitions—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Parole—Habeas corpus appropriate only if petitioner entitled to immediate release from confinement—Court of appeals' judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing petition affirmed.

Mandamus—Mandamus may not be used to compel a court to order itself to act—Relator challenging factual inaccuracies in court of appeals' decision had adequate remedy at law by way of motion for reconsideration or appeal to higher court—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Suppression-Ineffective Assistance- Allied Offenses Methanmphetamine

easement, declaratory judgment

Criminal Rule 29 motion denied.

The trial court did not err in concluding the Village and the Harrisburg defendants were entitled to immunity as employees of a political subdivision, and the trial court did not err in rendering judgment in favor of appellees. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilkins' motion for new trial.

Trial court did not err by denying motion to vacate a void conviction and sentence. Defendant's 1992 conviction for aggravated murder was not void. Defendant's 1986 entry of conviction was not a valid, final judgment of sentence as to all counts. Trial court did not err by merging 1986 conviction for involuntary manslaughter into 1992 conviction for aggravated murder.

The trial court did not err in imposing the maximum sentence for appellant's attempted felonious assault conviction. Any error of the trial court in applying R.C. 2929.12(B)(8), which concerns gender prejudice motive, was harmless error. The trial court found the presence of other factors indicating appellant's conduct was more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense, and it also found he is likely to commit crimes in the future. Appellant does not challenge these additional findings that support the imposed sentence. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court erred by granting motion to suppress because trial court's discussion of the evidence and findings of fact and conclusions of law failed to adequately explain why granting the motion to suppress was warranted therefore, the record was insufficient to allow effective appellate review. Reversed and remanded for further findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining why the evidence warranted granting the motion to suppress.

It was error to deny appellant's motion for permissive intervention under Civ.R. 24(B) on the grounds that the existing parties to the receivership action would be unduly delayed and inconvenienced if appellant were permitted to intervene, given the Supreme Court of Ohio's dictate that Civ.R. 24 is to be construed liberally in favor of granting intervention. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further action.

The trial court did not err in overruling appellant's objections and adopting the magistrate's decision granting judgment in favor of ODRC. Appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that ODRC was negligent or that ODRC violated Title II of 42 U.S.C. § 12101, the Americans with Disabilities Act in connection with appellant's fall. Appellant failed to prove he has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities so as to be a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA, and appellant failed to prove ODRC breached its duty of reasonable care.

The magistrate's decision contained no error of law or other defect on its face therefore, we adopt the magistrate's decision as our own. Accordingly, the motion of respondents for summary judgment is granted and relator's request for a writ of mandamus is denied.

speedy trial, burglary, continuance, scheduling conflict, toll, R.C. 2945.71, R.C. 2945.72

construction—mootness—injunction

CRIM.R. 11 — GUILTY PLEA — VOLUNTARINESS: The trial court's denial of defendant's continuance request did not amount to coercion so as to render his guilty pleas involuntary where the court otherwise complied with Crim.R. 11 and offered defendant additional time to consider his guilty pleas.

AUTOMOBILES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – FOURTH AMENDMENT – SEARCH AND SEIZURE: Where defendant was indicted on weapons charges based on firearms found in his automobile during a traffic stop for having an obstructed temporary license placard, the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion to suppress the weapons evidence, because no credible evidence existed which would cause an objectively reasonable police officer to conclude that defendant's tinted license plate cover obstructed his temporary license placard in violation of R.C. 4503.21.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: Where the declaratory-judgment action involved a dispute between two private property owners and where the city of Cincinnati and plaintiff did not have adverse legal interests, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the city's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint after determining that no justiciable dispute existed between the city and plaintiff. Where genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Vandalia Avenue, which is a paved area that is owned by defendant and runs in front of plaintiff's residence, qualifies as a street under Cincinnati Municipal Code 1401-01-S12, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's claim for a declaratory judgment that Vandalia Avenue constitutes a street and that plaintiff is entitled to use it for any legal purpose.

Ineffective assistance manifest weight Crim. R. 29 sentencing

Prosecutorial Misconduct Restitution Order

Aggravated Robbery Juvenile Bindover In Court Identification

Joinder prejudicial Crim.R. 14 rape jury instruction sleep voluntary intoxication substantial impairment Crim.R. 7(D) amendment indictment. - Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's Crim.R. 14 relief from prejudicial joinder because the evidence of each rape and kidnapping charge was simple and direct. The evidence supported both a voluntary intoxication and sleep instruction for the purposes of substantial impairment. The trial court did not err in permitting the state to amend the indictment during trial by changing the method of rape because it did not change the name or identity of the offense.

Crim.R. 32.1 withdrawal of guilty plea abuse of discretion manifest injustice. The trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the defendant fails to show manifest injustice. A defendant does not establish manifest injustice by asserting claims not supported by evidence in the record.

Anders brief. This case is dismissed because a potential assigned error is not meritorious.

Competency to stand trial guilty plea ineffective assistance of counsel felony sentencing cumulative errors. There was no evidence in the record that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The defendant's guilty plea was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Counsel was not ineffective in failing to consider the defendant's competency, because no evidence supports the defendant's claim that he is incompetent. The defendant's sentence is not contrary.

Ineffective assistance of counsel competency rape gross sexual imposition kidnapping sufficiency R.C. 2907.02, penetration sexual conduct R.C. 2907.01 manifest weight. Appellant was not denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Text messages authentication sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence aggravated burglary aggravated menacing telecommunications harassment child endangering. - Defendant's convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated menacing, and telecommunications harassment were supported by sufficient evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the defendant trespassed into the home of his estranged wife, the victim, and assaulted her with a handgun he later sent threatening text messages to the victim. The text messages were properly authenticated by the victim because she was the recipient of the messages. The defendant's convictions for child endangering were not supported by sufficient evidence because although he was the children's stepfather, this relationship alone, without any evidence that he provided care, maintenance, or support for the children, does not establish the relationship or role needed to be found guilty of child endangering.

Summary judgment declaratory judgment quiet title slander of title breach of contract. Silberhorn entered a contract with A Christmas Story House Foundation, Inc. and Flemco, L.L.C. under which Flemco would perform construction work on Silberhorn's property, to be paid for by the Foundation. A dispute arose between Flemco and Silberhorn regarding the construction, and Flemco recorded a mechanic's lien against the property. Flemco did not properly serve Silberhorn with the mechanic's lien, rendering it invalid and a cloud upon Silberhorn's title. Silberhorn was entitled to damages for slander of title. Silberhorn was not liable for breach of contract because only the Foundation agreed to pay Flemco for work performed, not Silberhorn.

Failure to comply consecutive sentence R.C. 2921.331(D) void jurisdiction. Where the defendant's original sentence did not comply with the consecutive service mandate of R.C. 2921.331(D), the sentence was void. Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction to correct a void sentence when it ordered, upon resentencing, the defendant's Cuyahoga County sentence to be served consecutively to his Lake County sentence for failure to comply.

Guilty plea Alford plea protestations of innocence Crim.R. 11 knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily factual basis. Defendant-appellant's statement that he pleads guilty but he is not guilty is a protestation of innocence sufficient to invoke the trial court's duty to further inquire into the factual basis surrounding the charges to determine whether defendant-appellant is making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Where the trial court failed to so inquire, defendant-appellant's guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.

Mental health and developmental disabilities docket Loc.R. 30.1 ineffective assistance of counsel allied offenses of similar import aggravated robbery R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) aggravated burglary R.C. 2911.11(A)(2). The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not transfer defendant's case to the mental health and developmental disabilities docket because the court did not know of defendant's borderline IQ until after arraignment. Therefore, under Loc.R. 30.1, it was within the trial court's discretion to keep defendant's case after determining that defendant was competent, despite defendant's borderline IQ. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to emphasize defendant's mental health issues because counsel requested that defendant be evaluated by the court's psychiatric clinic and discussed the results of the report on the record. Howse's aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery offenses did not merge for purposes of sentencing because they were committed separately.

Denial of summary judgment on immunity

B&E, Rec. Stolen Prop., and Theft

CRIMINAL LAW – illegal conveyance of prohibited items onto grounds of a specified government facility guilty plea R.C. 2953.08(G) trial court did not err in considering criminal record R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 18-month prison sentence is within the statutory range R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b).

CIVIL – summary judgment oil and gas swabbing paying quantities Appellants' expert testimony was unreliable Appellee Condevco adopted the Christman Well and restored it to production before the expiration of the primary term of the Lease the evidence further reveals there has been continuous production of oil and/or gas from the Christman Well in the secondary term of the Lease.

WEAPONS – EVIDENCE – FIREARM – OPERABILITY: The record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence that a weapon used by the juvenile in a robbery offense was an operable firearm where the evidence demonstrated that the juvenile and his codefendant approached the victim with handguns held at their sides—a position one would hold an operable firearm the victim, who believed the guns were real, was instructed not to move the juvenile had been told that one of the guns was real the codefendant had treated his gun as real and operable prior to the robbery and the juvenile and the codefendant disposed of the guns so that they could not be found and used in a subsequent prosecution.

SENTENCING – AUTOMOBILES/CRIMINAL – FAILURE TO STOP AFTER AN ACCIDENT: The trial court's imposition of a prison term was contrary to law where R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) and (b) required the court to impose a community-control sanction because the defendant did not cause physical harm while committing the fourth-degree-felony offense of failure to stop after an accident: this court held in State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140299, 2015-Ohio-1189, that in order to impose a prison term, the record must establish that the physical harm was caused by the failure to stop and not the accident. [But see DISSENT: This court should overrule our opinion in State v. Jones, and hold that the crime of failure to stop after an accident, as a fourth-degree felony, cannot as a matter of law be completed without the offender causing serious physical harm and knowing about that harm prior to fleeing: under Ohio law there is no felony "failure to stop offense" that does not result in serious physical harm.]

SENTENCING – AUTOMOBILES/CRIMINAL – FAILURE TO STOP AFTER AN ACCIDENT: The trial court's imposition of a prison term was contrary to law where R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a) and (b) required the court to impose a community-control sanction because the defendant did not cause physical harm while committing the fourth-degree-felony offense of failure to stop after an accident: this court held in State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140299, 2015-Ohio-1189, that in order to impose a prison term, the record must establish that the physical harm was caused by the failure to stop and not the accident. [But see DISSENT: This court should overrule our opinion in State v. Jones, and hold that the crime of failure to stop after an accident, as a fourth-degree felony, cannot as a matter of law be completed without the offender causing serious physical harm and knowing about that harm prior to fleeing: under Ohio law there is no felony "failure to stop offense" that does not result in serious physical harm.]

CRIMINAL TRESPASS – PUBLIC INDECENCY – SENTENCING – ALLIED OFFENSES – R.C. 2941.25: Public indecency and criminal trespassing were not allied offenses of similar import because the offenses were committed separately where defendant entered a restaurant from which he had been banned and, when the employees refused to serve him, he exposed himself to the employees.

R.C. 2305.131 – STATUTE OF REPOSE – CIV.R. 12(B)(6): Where plaintiff's complaint alleging that defendant had negligently constructed her condominium was filed more than ten years after the improvements to the condominium had been substantially completed, the complaint was barred by the statute of repose in R.C. 2305.131(A)(1) and the trial court did not err in granting defendant's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint. Pursuant to R.C. 2305.131(G), an improvement to real property is deemed substantially completed upon the earlier of (1) "the date the improvement to real property is first used by the owner or tenant of the real property" or (2) "when the real property is first available for use after having the improvement completed in accordance with the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including any agreed changes to the contract or agreement."

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's motion to suppress. The Dayton Police Department's tow policy constitutes a reasonable standardized procedure, and there was no evidence in the record which established that the inventory search was a pretext for an investigative search. Appellant did not receive ineffective assistance when his trial counsel allowed him to plead no contest to one count of having a weapon while under disability. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in dismissing nursing home's complaint sua sponte, when the motion before the court was a motion for default judgment and no notice of potential dismissal based on inadequacies in the appellant's claims was given. In dismissing the action, the trial court also improperly treated the motion as one for summary judgment and made incorrect factual findings and legal conclusions based on taking judicial notice of a probate case for an individual with the same name as the deceased appellee, but who was not the deceased appellee. Nursing home's appeal from trial court's subsequent denial of nursing home's Civ.R. 60(B) motion is moot. Judgment of dismissal reversed case remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant pled guilty to burglary, and the other counts in her indictment (possessing criminal tools and petty theft) were dismissed. Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellate counsel has asserted that he has found no arguably meritorious issues for appellate review our independent review has likewise revealed no arguably meritorious issues. Judgment affirmed.

Following a jury trial, appellant and a co-defendant were convicted of aggravated robbery and misuse of a credit card. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the State's motion to consolidate the appellant's case and the co-defendant's case. Also, the appellant was not prejudiced by any statements made by the prosecutor at trial. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of kidnapping and gross sexual imposition. Appellant was not denied a fair trial by the appointment of an unqualified interpreter. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his failure to raise a speedy trial objection. The kidnapping conviction was supported by sufficient evidence, and it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the trial court erred by not merging the kidnapping and gross sexual imposition convictions. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Appellant's right to a speedy trial under R.C. 2945.71 was not violated. Also, appellant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter was supported by sufficient evidence. Judgment affirmed.

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted.

Appeal dismissed as moot.

On certified entry of felony conviction.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—One-year suspension, fully stayed on conditions.

motion to suppress – driving while under the influence – traffic stop – reasonable suspicion –

The 90 days limitation for violations of community control in accordance with R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i) is not applicable to those granted intervention in lieu of conviction as an offender is not actually "subject to a community control sanction" during intervention. Rather, the trial court could impose an appropriate sanction under the law.

Appellant's conviction for assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there was no corroborating evidence to support the victim's claim that appellant punched her one time in the back of the head since corroborating evidence is not necessary in order to support an assault conviction where the victim's testimony proves all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court did not err in denying motions filed by a nonparty. A private citizen is required to challenge a decision restricting access to certain court records by pursuing an original action in mandamus, not by filing an appeal.

Defendant's convictions for felonious assault and having weapons while under disability for shooting his girlfriend during an alleged sexual role play were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to stipulate to defendant's prior felony drug conviction as an element of the weapons-under-disability charge, and for not requesting a limiting jury instruction regarding defendant's prior conviction.

An individual appeals the trial court's issuance of a domestic violence civil protection order against her. The individual filed a letter objecting to the magistrate's decision but noticed her appeal before the trial court ruled on the objections. Because the trial court had not yet ruled on the objections, no final order existed to review on appeal.

The trial court did not err by dismissing appellant's successive petition for conviction relief or denying his motion for a new trial where he failed to offer newly discovered evidence or evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from obtaining.

Prison term imposed by the trial court was not contrary to law when it was within the statutory range, the trial court had considered the purposes and principles of sentencing, and the trial court considered the statutory factors.

CIVIL - remand from Ohio Supreme Court class certification cannot waive arbitration attack to certification class members were not parties prior to class certification challenge was not ripe at time of filing answer.

HABEAS CORPUS - Challenge to length of 1979 sentence alleged sentence enhancement prior conviction for burglary offense of violence statutory definition challenge to bindover procedure failure to attach copy of judgment to petition R.C. 2725.04(D).

LOANS - Foreclosure action summary judgment reviewed de novo affiant not required to state he or she viewed the original loan documents to meet the requirements of Civ.R. 56(E) R.C. 1301.201(B)(21)(a) R.C. 1303.25(B) holder of a note endorsed in blank has standing no evidence note and mortgage were severed HUD did not apply affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - R.C. 2925.11 Possession of Cocaine motion to suppress officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances to prolong traffic stop to conduct a canine drug sniff affirmed.

CIVIL - postconviction remedy civil in nature sealing of record of conviction R.C. 2953.32 eligible offender R.C. 2953.31 hearing not required when no factual issues related to eligibility law of the case ineligible as a matter of law.

CRIMINAL - administrative license suspension urine test refusal to submit to test hearing on ALS preponderance of the evidence due process violation de novo reversed and remanded.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - writ of procedendo pending motions mootness duty already performed.

Delayed application for reopening of appeal App.R. 26(B)(1) untimely App.R. 26(B)(2)(d) App.R. 26(B)(2)(e).

R.C. 2929.15(A)(3)(c) in misdemeanor cases, a trial court need not specify the definitive jail term a defendant will receive if the defendant violates a community control sanction.

Juvenile procedure—R.C. 2151.35(B)(1) mandates the dismissal of a case without prejudice if a juvenile court fails to conduct a dispositional hearing with 90 days of the filing of a complaint alleging that a child is abused, neglected, or dependent.

Speedy trial/Tolling event/2945.71/Ineffective assistance of counsel

Weight and sufficiency of the evidence/Assault and vandalism sentencing

Vehicular Assault Consecutive Sentences Properly Imposed

Appeal of denial of motion to suppress/Inventory search

Where the record does not contain evidence to support the filing of a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal trial, ineffective assistance of counsel is not present for not filing such a motion during the trial proceedings. Based on the evidence in the appellate record, obstructing justice and having a weapon under disability were sufficiently supported by the evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Defendant's convictions for R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2) were supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) was not raised at trial and thus need not be heard for first time on appeal.

Where the trial court construed a defendant's motion to correct a void sentence as a post-conviction petition and dismissed it as untimely and non-compliant with the post-conviction statutes, the trial court erred.

The trial court did not err in granting the defendant summary judgment on plaintiff's false imprisonment claim because plaintiff was confined pursuant to a facially valid sentencing entry.

The trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment where the plaintiff was confined pursuant to a facially valid sentencing entry.

PERMANENT CUSTODY-MANIFEST WEIGHT - Trial court's award of permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the biological parents failed to timely comply with the case plan and even though they had found a home and employment just prior to trial the trial court had no obligation to experiment with the children's welfare and test whether the parents would be able to maintain their current home and whether the mother had adequately resolved her substance abuse and mental health issues.

summary judgment, medical malpractice, negligence, expert medical testimony, informed consent, punitive damages

final appealable order, R.C. 2505.02, joint stipulation, Civ.R. 41(A), Civ.R. 54, stipulated dismissal

motion to vacate, complaint, warrant, defect, notarized, harmless, indictment

manifest weight, sufficiency, complicity, murder, consecutive sentences, presentence investigation report, failure to object, jury instruction, self-defense, obstructing of justice

Guilty plea medication constitutional rights right to jury trial nonconstitutional rights maximum penalty involved postrelease control. Defendant entered guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily even though he was on anxiety medication where court inquired into the effect of the medication on the defendant's understanding, and the court carefully questioned defendant to ensure he understood every aspect of the plea proceedings.

R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 sentence aggravated vehicular homicide driving while under the influence mitigating factors. McHugh's sentence was affirmed on appeal because the record indicates that the trial court properly considered mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing.

Allied offenses void sentence authorized by law res judicata. Postconviction motion to merge allied offenses was barred by res judicata where court never considered whether to merge allied offenses since the parties agreed the defendant's convictions were not allied offenses. Argument that consecutive sentences were contrary to law was not properly before the court where defendant failed to raise the argument in the trial court.

Directed verdict judgment notwithstanding the verdict workers' compensation repetitive motion injury discernible period of time. Trial court properly overruled motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove that her injury was proximately caused by her work activities and that it developed over a discernible period of time.

Default judgment foreclosure mortgage. We dismissed the appeal as moot. An appeal from a decree of foreclosure is moot where the debtor fails to obtain a stay. In this case, the appellant failed to take any affirmative action to halt the sale of his property.

Contempt R.C. 2705.03/procedural protections/indirect contempt conceded error. Appellant's actions would amount to a violation of indirect contempt. The trial court erred where it found appellant guilty of direct contempt.

Writ of mandamus R.C. 149.43 R.C. 313.10 autopsy photographs records of a coroner's office frivolous conduct Loc.App.R. 23 R.C. 2323.51 vexatious litigator.

Where the landlord did not know that a piece of exercise equipment provided for use of apartment residents was unsafe, the landlord could be excused from its statutory duties under the Landlord Tenant Act if it could not have discovered the hazard through the exercise of reasonable care. Without further testimony, and where the trial court found that the landlord's actions arguably might "rise to the level of a breach of ordinary care," whether it was "reasonable" for the landlord to have inspected the equipment two weeks before the mishap is a question for the finder of fact, and so summary judgment for the landlord was not appropriate on this record. Judgment reversed case remanded.

Court of Claims did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction ("DRC") as to inmate's defamation claim. Though the oral defamatory statements allegedly made by a DRC employee directly accused appellant of being a troublemaker, know-it-all, and poor dog handler, because those statements did not import an indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude or infamous punishment, impute some loathsome or contagious disease which would exclude appellant from society, or tend to injure appellant in his trade or occupation, appellant's failure to plead and produce evidence of special damages was fatal to his slander claim. Similarly, because the written statement made by a DRC employee disparaged appellant's reputation as a model inmate and accused him of being a poor dog handler only by inference, appellant's failure to either plead or produce evidence of special damages entitled DRC to judgment, as a matter of law. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in overruling the appellant's pretrial suppression motion. The record supports a finding that two police officers approached a small group of people gathered outside of an apartment and requested identifying information from everyone, including the appellant. Based on suppression-hearing testimony that the trial court credited, the officers did not draw weapons, touch the appellant, yell at him, or issue any commands to get him to identify himself. The trial court did not err in accepting the State's argument that the encounter was consensual and that the appellant voluntarily provided his identifying information. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., dissenting.)

The trial court was not required to order a presentence investigation prior to imposing sentence for illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto the grounds of a specified governmental facility. Appellant's sentence of one year was not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's Crim.R. 32.1 post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Appellant should have raised his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. The trial court also did not err by dismissing appellant's petition for post-conviction relief for lack of jurisdiction. The petition was untimely and did not satisfy the untimeliness exception. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant accompanied a detective to a police station for questioning as a potential witness to a double homicide, where he was interviewed in an unlocked conference room, without restraints. Appellant was only taken into custody after the interview because officers discovered an active warrant out of Greene County. A detective travelled to the Greene County Jail the next day to question appellant further in the homicide investigation. The trial court did not err in overruling, in part, appellant's motion to suppress his statements. Appellant was not in custody while questioned at the police station. Prior to the interview at the Greene County Jail, appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. The trial court also did not err in overruling appellant's motion to dismiss a firearm specification attached to a tampering with evidence charge. The plain language of the applicable statutes permits additional punishment by means of a specification where a firearm was the object of the tampering charge. Judgment affirmed. (Donovan, J., concurring in judgment only.)

The indictment charging appellant with aggravated robbery was sufficient to put him on notice that he could be convicted of complicity to commit aggravated robbery. Appellant's conviction was based upon sufficient evidence. The indictment did not need to inform appellant that, if convicted, a prison term was mandatory. Appellant's sentence is within the statutory range, and the record reflects the trial court's consideration of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Thus, the sentence is not contrary to law. Finally, appellant's proportionality argument is without merit. Judgment affirmed.

Mandamus—Procedendo—Relator had adequate remedy at law by way of appeal of ruling on motion for reimbursement of fine and court costs following vacated conviction—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law because the sentence was within the permissible statutory range and the trial court properly considered the purposes and principles of sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the applicable factors in R.C. 2929.12, and the sentence was not excessive.

Appellant's convictions for corrupting another with drugs are not supported by sufficient evidence where there is not evidence that appellant provided the heroin that was used by two individuals who subsequently overdosed.

The trial court's judgment sentencing appellant to "life in prison with the possibility of parole after twenty years" was not contrary to law. R.C. 2929.03 void res judicata.

Following his admission to a community control violation, appellant's 180-day jail sentence was not contrary to law.

Court of appeals has on authority to consider a case that was previously appealed and dismissed.

Relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to issue a final appealable order in his criminal case is denied where relator failed to attach the alleged faulty "putative judgment entry." Petition must also be dismissed for relator's failure to properly caption the complaint under R.C. 2731.04.

Prohibition—Res judicata—A valid, final judgment on the merits bars subsequent actions based on claims arising out of transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

negotiated plea – agreed sentence – waiver of appellate rights – benefit of bargain – conditional – ineffective assistance of counsel – jail-time credit – ability to pay

sentencing, R.C. 2929.22, mootness

Criminal Law—Crim.R. 16(K)—It is error to admit expert opinion testimony when the expert's opinion was not set forth in a written report prepared in compliance with Crim.R. 16(K)—The trial court's admission of testimony that went beyond the scope of the expert's written report was harmless error as the remaining evidence overwhelmingly established appellant's guilt beyond any reasonable doubt—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err by finding defendant guilty after she pled no contest where the indictment was sufficient on its face. Nevertheless, a statement of facts was recited, which was also sufficient, and the defendant actually stipulated in her written plea agreement to a finding of guilt.

The trial court must consider the overriding purposes and principles of felony sentencing as stated in R.C. 2929.11 in addition to the seriousness and recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to suppress where appellant was not subject to a custodial interrogation when asked by the lone police officer at the scene if the methamphetamine found hidden in a cigarette pack located on the nightstand next to appellant's bed belonged to him given the fact that appellant was not handcuffed, threatened, overpowered, tricked, or coerced when the officer questioned him about the methamphetamine while appellant sat unrestrained on the couch in the living room of the home where appellant was residing to "sober up" and "get clean."

Plaintiff sued for breach of contract against defendants, former business partner and limited liability company. The dispute involved whether plaintiff, who had withdrawn from limited liability company, was entitled to profits from defendants' operation of golf course. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on basis that plaintiff had not presented any evidence of oral agreement to share profits with defendants after withdrawal from limited liability company. Summary judgment record contained evidence to indicate an agreement where a third business partner corroborated the agreement. Agreement was further evidenced by a handwritten document, allegedly authored by the former business partner, which may have described ownership percentages and profit distributions.

The trial court properly denied appellant's petition for postconviction relief where the arguments were barred by res judicata because the arguments were or could have been raised on appellant's direct appeal.

Prohibition—Once judgment of sentence has been appealed, trial court loses jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal—Because defendant had filed notice of appeal from judgment of sentence, trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on defendant's postjudgment motions to modify judgment of sentence—Writ of prohibition granted.

Procedendo—Mootness—Trial court disposed of motions underlying appellant's complaint for writ of procedendo—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint as moot affirmed.

Mandamus—Res judicata—A valid, final judgment on the merits bars subsequent actions based on claims arising out of transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint affirmed.

Intervention in lieu of conviction

CRIMINAL - sentencing contrary to law R.C. 2929.11 and .12 purposes and principles of sentencing balancing sentencing factors court not required to make specific findings

CIVIL - breach of contract unfair and deceptive trade practices Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act excavation construction preparation regrade property level fill dirt overcharge unfinished work weight of the evidence hearsay no prejudice harmless error Civ.R. 61 attorneys fees no affirmative finding that appellant held himself out as different entitles.

CRIMINAL LAW - Sentencing R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) notice of duration of prison term for community control violation sentencing hearing strict compliance as to length of term substantial compliance permissible when prior notice given at change-of-plea hearing notice of imposition of community control inferred from statement of condition notice of effect of communiity control violation prison term.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule Civ.R. 58(B) untimely appeal.

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A)(1) untimely appeal App.R. 5(A).

Kidnapping–conviction not against the manifest weight of the evidence when witness testified that defendant zip tied six-year-old victim's hands and feet and sometimes used zip ties to secure victim to a mattress while she slept jury could have determined that defendant restrained victim with purpose of terrorizing her or with purpose of inflicting serious physical harm any error trial court made by allowing evidence surrounding later-occurring injuries did not warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to evidence surrounding later-occurring injuries.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – PARENTAL TERMINATION – CONTINUANCE – RIGHT TO COUNSEL – WAIVER – R.C. 2151.414 – BEST INTEREST: The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's motion to continue the permanent-custody hearing where mother gave no indication of when she would be ready to proceed, mother had engaged in previous dilatory tactics, and the state had witnesses present at the hearing. The juvenile court did not deprive mother of the right to counsel in a parental-termination case where the record reflects mother's valid express waiver of the right to counsel: mother stated her desire to proceed pro se, had been fully informed of the consequences of proceeding pro se, and had rejected appointed counsel. The juvenile court did not err in awarding permanent custody of the child to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services where the record demonstrated that the juvenile court considered the appropriate factors and the evidence supported the court's decision, including evidence of the absence of a significant bond between mother and the child, mother's lack of insight into the child's mental-health issues, and the child's need for a stable and secure placement.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL – TOWNSHIP – ZONING – DUE PROCESS: Where the plaintiffs appealed to the common pleas court the township's decision approving the 2012 planned unit development ("PUD") on the condition that plaintiffs remove a nonconforming billboard, the trial court did not err in considering the record from the 2008 PUD when ruling on the 2012 PUD, because the record from the 2008 PUD was made part of the record of the 2012 PUD appeal, and it was necessary for the court to understand the 2008 PUD in order to determine whether the 2012 PUD imposed a condition that was contrary to law. The trial court did not err in finding that defendant Township's zoning decision was contrary to law where the Township, as part of its approval of the 2012 PUD, required the plaintiffs to remove a legal nonconforming billboard located on the property, thereby modifying the written conditions of the 2008 PUD and violating Anderson Township Zoning Regulation 4.1.I. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the Township on the plaintiffs' constitutional causes of action where there was never a taking of the plaintiffs' property, the Township's zoning decision was not arbitrary or unreasonable, and without a violation of their constitutional rights, the plaintiffs could not sustain claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).

SEX OFFENSES—FAILURE TO NOTIFY—EVIDENCE: The evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for failing to provide notice of a change of address in violation of R.C. 2950.05 where the state failed to prove that the defendant no longer lived at his registered address.

LANDLORD-TENANT: The trial court erred by failing to award defendant tenant reasonable attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 5321.15(C) where plaintiff landlord threatened an unlawful act and wrongfully excluded the tenant from the premises in violation of R.C. 5321.15(A) an award of reasonable attorney fees was mandatory pursuant to R.C. 5321.15(C) where the landlord violated R.C. 5321.15(A). The trial court did not err by failing to give the tenant credit for a security deposit where the court could reasonably have concluded that the evidence did not support the tenant's claim that such a deposit had been paid.

CHILDREN – CUSTODY – PROCEDURE/RULES – JUV.R. 40(D)(4)(d) – PARENTAL TERMINATION: The juvenile court complied with the requirement, set forth in Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d), that it rule on objections to the magistrate's decision, because the court's decision on remand leaves no question that it properly considered mother's objections to the magistrate's decision granting HCJFS's motion for permanent custody, found the objections meritless, and overruled them. The juvenile court's determination that mother's children cannot be returned to her within a reasonable time or should not be returned to her was supported by clear and convincing evidence, including that mother had failed continuously and repeatedly to address domestic violence in her life, resulting in a threat of harm to the children that is not speculative but grounded in the facts and leaves the children unprotected in the future. The juvenile court's determination that the children's best interest is served by not returning them to mother is supported by clear and convincing evidence, including evidence of mother's pervasive dishonesty that aggravated her repeated failure to protect the children, her lack of insight into domestic violence and her own violent tendencies, the absence of a significant bond between mother and the children, who had lived the majority of their lives in agency custody, the children's proven ability to bond with substitute caregivers, and the very young children's need for a stable and secure placement.

return of seized property, jurisdiction, writ of replevin, direct appeal, guilty plea, Crim.R. 11(C), ineffective assistance of counsel

aggravated robbery – firearm specification – presentence motion to withdraw – guilty plea – reasonable and legitimate basis – change of heart – sentencing discretion – lack of remorse

trip and fall, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, negligence, proximate cause, speculation, harmless error, hearsay

Murder, motion to suppress, single photo, identification, suggestive, reliable, motion for a new trial, Crim.R. 33(A), irregularity in the proceedings, jury misconduct, accident or surprise, curative instruction

PROBATE - guardianship person financial R.C. 2111.121(B) abuse of discretion dementia Alzheimer's Disease Rule of Superintendence 66.09.

CIVIL – oil and gas Marketable Title Act Dormant Mineral Act mineral interest root of title extinguishment.

On motion for immediate interim remedial suspension.

App.R. 26(B) application for reopening untimely application good cause ignorance of the law diligence. An application for reopening filed almost 12 years after the appellate decision was issued was denied where the applicant failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing.

Obstructing official business R.C. 2921.31(A) fingerprinting sufficiency of evidence having a weapon under disability R.C. 2923.13(A) constructive possession self-representation. - Defendant's conviction for obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) was not supported by sufficient evidence where defendant's refusal to submit to fingerprinting was not an affirmative act that hindered the police investigation defendant's conviction for having a weapon under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A) was not supported by sufficient evidence where the state conceded defendant never touched or used the gun and failed to produce evidence that he constructively possessed the gun trial court erred in denying defendant's request to represent himself at trial even though the motion was made on the day of trial because the motion was made in response to the trial court's earlier inappropriate attempts to pressure defendant to plead guilty, leading defendant to conclude he could not get a fair trial, and trial counsel offered no objection to the trial court's comments.

Manifest weight cross-examination credibility bench trial. We found that the conviction in this case for robbery was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because we determined the witness was reliable. The trial court also did not err in limiting portions of the defendant's cross-examination because the court was an experienced trial judge who did not limit meaningful questioning.

Breaking and entering R.C. 2911.13(B) sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R. 404(B) other acts common scheme or plan. Defendant's conviction for breaking and entering was supported by sufficient evidence. The state presented circumstantial evidence that the defendant trespassed on the victim's property, and it was reasonable to infer from the evidence presented that defendant trespassed with the purpose to commit theft. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of other acts in order to show the defendant had a common scheme or plan. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give a limiting instruction.

Attempted rape gross sexual imposition importuning R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2929.14 consecutive sentences mitigating factors court costs nunc pro tunc. Defendant failed to show that consecutive sentences were clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Where the trial court waived court costs on the record at the sentencing hearing but imposed court costs in its journal entry, a limited remand is appropriate for the court to issue a nunc pro tunc entry correcting this clerical error.

R.C. 2929.11/felony sentencing/statutory range findings R.C. 2929.13(D)/second-degree felony presumption of prison term. The trial court considered the victim's compassion statement supporting the lower range for prison, appellant's efforts to resolve other pending cases in other courts, appellant's extensive drug addiction, appellant's previous failure to seek professional help for appellant's addiction, appellant's drug use while on probation, the presentence investigation report and sentencing laws for the record. The record supports the trial court's findings, and appellant's sentence is not contrary to law.

Sentence contrary to law/Manifest weight/Sufficiency of evidence/Ineffective assistance of counsel/Evidence Rule 403/Prejudicial photos

Child Endangering - Finding Serious Physical Harm Supported Not against Manifest Weight - Ineffective Assitance - Prosecutorial Misconduct

Violent offender database does not apply to offender whose offense accrued prior to effective date of act.

Forfeiture/waive court costs

Administrative appeal, fire code violations

Agg. Trafficking in Drugs

Rape, Abduction, D.V.

Rape, Abduction, D.V.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees based on immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 in appellant's claim for negligence.

The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motions for summary judgment.

The trial court did not err in denying Wilson's post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing.

The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motions for summary judgment on Jenkins' medical negligence claim.

In an inmate's negligence case against the Department of Administrative Services, Office of Risk Management and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("DRC"), summary judgment was appropriate where appellees demonstrated there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the transport officer did not operate the vehicle in a negligent manner. Further, appellees were entitled to discretionary immunity for removing seatbelts from the inmate seating area of the transport van consistent with DRC policy. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's conviction for escape was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Also, trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court fully considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 in sentencing appellant on one count of aggravated vehicular assault, a felony of the second degree, and appellant's sentence is not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. As conceded by the State, the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty on his pleas of no contest to two misdemeanor offenses without obtaining an explanation of circumstances. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with respect to the two misdemeanor offenses, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings as to those offenses. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with respect to the felony offense.

The stop of the vehicle was supported by probable cause that appellant had committed a traffic violation appellant was subject to detention for the duration of the stop. The search of the vehicle was supported by probable cause, and the search was also an appropriate inventory search. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress his statements. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's "motion to vacate a void judgment of conviction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." The trial court had jurisdiction over appellant's criminal case. The trial court did not err in construing appellant's motion as a petition for postconviction relief so construed, appellant's motion was untimely. Even if we were to address appellant's claim, he did not demonstrate that a discovery or Brady violation occurred. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a statutory maximum sentence on the appellant for his misdemeanor menacing conviction. The trial court was not required to make any findings or give reasons for its sentence. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred in failing to award the appellant jail-time credit for time he spent in pretrial confinement in lieu of bail in two cases simultaneously. The trial court also erred in computing the jail-time credit that it did award the appellant. Judgment reversed and remanded.

After pleading guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition, appellant was sentenced to maximum and consecutive sentences totaling ten years in prison. The trial court properly considered applicable sentencing factors and did not err in imposing maximum sentences for the individual offenses further, the court made the relevant findings supporting consecutive sentences, and such findings are not clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record. Judgment affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW – attempted murder with a firearm specification having weapons while under disability jury trial 17-year prison sentence. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL – failure to renew Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal no prejudice sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight self-defense claim not supported by a preponderance of the evidence domestic violence count merged with attempted murder no domestic violence conviction to vacate.

CRIMINAL LAW –PLEAS, MOTIONS & OTHER HEARINGS - Rule 32.1 post-sentence R.C. 2925.50 dual sovereign double jeopardy "same act" "same conduct" 21 U.S.C. 841, 846 R.C. 2925.03.

PROBATE – guardianship account two court orders, settlement entry and distribution entry both court orders permitted the guardian unrestricted access to the guardianship funds after-the-fact receipt of depositary does not trump the court orders matters of law reviewed de novo bank had no duty to flag and restrict the account.

Where rulings by a recused judge were voidable, appellant's six-year delay in challenging the error was waived. Subject-matter jurisdiction res judicata.

Trial court properly concluded that parties' dispute is governed by an arbitration provision that was incorporated by reference into the agreement executed by appellant's predecessor-in-interest.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's presentence motion to withdraw his no contest pleas. Exculpatory complete defense Fish.

A written claim for reimbursement of funeral expenses is presented in accordance with R.C. 2117.06 where it was delivered to the attorney for the estate, was reviewed by the executrix, and was denied by the executrix on its merits.

Judgment reversed where trial court attempted to substantively amend a final judgment, sua sponte, through nunc pro tunc entry, and erred in finding exercise of personal jurisdiction would deprive appellees of due process.

Appellant was not entitled to reinstatement of his driving privileges under R.C. 4510.54 after such privileges had been permanently revoked pursuant to his conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide, where appellant has been found guilty of multiple felonies in the past 15 years.

Eighteen-month consecutive prison terms for convictions of two counts of gross sexual of imposition was not contrary to law where trial court properly considered purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.12, properly applied post-release control, and imposed sentence within statutory range.

This pro se, accelerated appeal arises from a case previously affirmed by this court on direct appeal, with certiorari subsequently denied by the Ohio Supreme Court. It is barred by res judicata and law of the case doctrine. Judgment affirmed.

The common pleas court did not misinterpret Ohio Adm.Code 5123:2-9-03(D)(3)(a)(iii) when reaching the conclusion that the exception did not apply to appellant. Because appellant did not show that she "may be put at risk by having additional providers," the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the agency's decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Imposition of consecutive sentences is contrary to law where the trial court fails to make the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) on the record at the sentencing hearing or in its sentencing entry.

motion to suppress, App.R. 16(A)(7), ineffective assistance of counsel, no contest plea

criminal forfeiture of a vehicle, return to lienholder, innocent owner, R.C. 4511.19, R.C. 4503.234

judicial release, ineffective assistance, plea agreement, eligible offender

slip and fall, jury instruction, negligence per se, negligence, restaurant, stair, admission of evidence

lease, declaratory judgment, obligations, repair, replace, improvements, maintain, bridge, indemnify

sufficiency, sexual contact, R.C. 2907.01(B), touching, Evid. R. 103, exclusion of evidence, mootness

R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) – sexual battery – Evid.R. 404(B) – prior acts of violence – leading questions – judicial bias – actus reus – mens rea – insufficient evidence – manifest weight – ineffective assistance – forfeiture – plain error

OVI – R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) – R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) – prior conviction – essential element – material prejudice – hearsay – ineffective assistance of counsel – outcome determinative

Appellant's sentence was not contrary to law where the trial court sentenced appellant within the statutory range, made all relevant statutory findings, and also issued findings that were supported by the record including that appellant sold heroin laced with fentanyl to a woman who died after she ingested it, appellant had a long criminal history, and appellant was a known drug dealer who sold large quantities of drugs.

The plain and unambiguous language found in R.C. 109.78(D) makes clear that the Madison Local is prohibited from employing a person as a "special police officer, security guard, or other position in which such person goes armed while on duty" unless that person has either completed an approved basic peace officer training program or has twenty years of active duty as a peace officer. Though the school board may provide written authorization so that an individual is not subject to prosecution under R.C. 2923.122, the school board is still subject to the training requirements mandated by the General Assembly.

The decision by the small claims court awarding a monetary judgment to a special needs school against appellant was reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence where the record indicated appellant withdrew her special needs son from attending school at the school upon the advice of the owner and operator of the school, thereby triggering the clear application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar the school from recovering any unpaid fees allegedly owed to the school by appellant.

The trial court did not err by finding that appellant had not sustained his burden of proof with regard to his insanity defense that he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.

Defendant's convictions for receiving stolen property and having weapons while under a disability were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where evidence was presented to show that defendant lived on property, weapons were found in the home, and stolen items found on the property had been altered, painted, and identifying marks removed. Trial court's sentence of 14 months in prison on a third-degree felony charge was contrary to law because the possible sentences for a third-degree felony are 9, 12, 18, 24, 30 or 36 months.

Appellant voluntarily dismissed timely filed personal injury action after defendant died. Within one-year savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, but beyond statute of limitations, appellant refiled action against the administrator of the defendant's estate. The estate moved to dismiss complaint on statute of limitations grounds, which motion the court granted. Estate argued that the savings statute only applied where the dismissed lawsuit and refiled lawsuit were against the same parties and estate was different party than decedent. The plain language of savings statute indicated intention to apply notwithstanding death of a party and that the defendant and the administrator of his estate, while nominally different parties, represented the same legal existence.

administrative license suspension—ALS—jurisdiction—untimely—reasonable ground

Under R.C. 2151.419(A)(1), the children services agency carries the burden of establishing that it made reasonable efforts at family reunification.

Defendant-appellant's escape conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's escape conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

R.C. 2506.04 - zoning ordinance - beyond fair debate

motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), motion for judgment on the pleadings, Civ.R. 12(C), affirmative defense, political subdivision immunity, employee, R.C. 2744.09, defamation, libel per se, slander per se, privilege, falsity

motion to dismiss, discovery sanction, Civ.R. 37, default judgment, abuse of discretion

Guilty plea, voluntary, induced, promise, plea bargain, constitutional rights, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), strict compliance

Motion to vacate void judgment, res judicata, void, voidable, State v. Saxon, sentencing-package, lump sentence

R.C. 2953.08(D)(3), aggravated murder, life imprisonment without parole, R.C. 2929.03, juvenile, allied offenses, merger, plain error

summary judgment, statute of limitations, accrual, R.C. 2305.03, real party in interest, Civ.R. 17(A), word mark, FDCPA, OCSPA, R.C. 1345.01, national bank

compulsory counterclaims—Civ.R. 13(A)—res judicata—summary judgment

traffic stop – traffic violation – reasonable suspicion – OVI – probable cause – arrest – field sobriety tests –

R.C. 2929.191, hearing, post-release control, waiver of counsel, Crim.R. 44, colloquy, self-representation, physical presence, harmless error, already served, nunc pro tunc

speedy trial – re-indicted – initial indictment – second indictment – secret indictment – identity – alleged victim –

OVI – sufficiency – impaired driving – circumstantial evidence – medical records – exhibit – presume regularity – costs assessed – acquittal

Manifest weight, sufficiency

bond forfeiture, R.C. 2937.36(C)

challenge to 30 year old judgment entry nunc pro tunc on sentencing

Civil Stalking Protection Order failure to object to magistrate decision

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – SPEEDY TRIAL: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy-trial grounds: even though the 21½-month delay between defendant's indictment and arrest was caused by the state's negligence, defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because under the circumstances the state's negligence did not outweigh the absence of some particularized trial prejudice.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – EVIDENCE: Where the evidence established that defendant and the victim lived together and were in a relationship from which the domestic violence arose, the state presented sufficient evidence that defendant and the victim were "family or household members" under R.C. 2929.25(F)(1). Defendant's conviction for domestic violence under R.C. 2925.19(A) was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that defendant punched her in the ear, kneeled on her head, and choked her, and the responding officer's testimony supported the victim's version of events.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE – DURESS: The trial court erred by failing to apply the affirmative defense of duress to the facts of the case. [See LEAD OPINION: Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was under duress when he hit a vehicle with his truck and failed to stop after an automobile accident while he was fleeing from an individual who was banging on his window and trying to open his door, and using his vehicle to block his escape on a highway at night.] [See CONCURRENCE: This court should remand the cause to the trial court for a decision correctly applying the affirmative defense of duress to the facts of this case in the first instance.] [But see DISSENT: The trial court erred in failing to apply the defense of duress to the facts, but based on the facts of this case, defendant cannot prove the defense of duress by a preponderance of the evidence.]

WEAPONS – CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION – RIGHT TO COUNSEL – COMPETENCY: The state's evidence was sufficient to show that defendant constructively possessed an automatic weapon and a suppressor where defendant lived in the only habitable floor of a house in a small eight-by-ten room, where the house was the only place where police had ever interacted with him and they had never seen anyone else there, where he listed the address of the house as his residence, and where the weapon and suppressor were found in a safe in a closet that also contained a safe with the weapon and suppressor inside. Defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the defendant had previously knowingly, voluntarily, and knowingly waived his right to counsel and elected to represent himself and where, after the state rested its case, defendant said he wanted standby counsel to represent him and standby counsel could not, defendant said he did not want the court to appoint counsel for him. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding defendant competent to stand trial when even though the first evaluation found that defendant was not competent, two subsequent evaluations found that he was competent and the trial court relied on those two evaluations.

Trial court did not err in accepting appellant's waiver of right to counsel or his knowing and voluntary plea.

Judgment affirmed where nothing in record indicated basis for NGRI plea, and trial court complied with Crim.R.11(C) during plea colloquy.

Judgment affirmed where misgendering defendant did not constitute structural error and did not prevent a fair trial, with no prosecutorial misconduct or vouching demonstrated, and any error in naming prior offense insufficient to necessitate new trial.

Trial court's imposition of prison sentence following felony conviction was not contrary to law. Trial court considered all necessary factors prior to imposing sentence.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal and jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Municipal court collection judgment against appellants was not against manifest weight of the evidence or otherwise unlawful. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's challenge to the trial court's reinstatement of his suspended sentence following his violation of the terms of probation is not well-taken.

Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for continuance.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying post-sentencing motion to withdraw Alford plea, absent any evidence that a fundamental flaw in the proceedings occurred below. Defendant's professed innocence does not, without more, amount to a manifest injustice.

Adopting of magistrate's opinion constituted an abuse of discretion denial of a hearing on Civ.R. 53(D)(4) objections was not an abuse of discretion appellant waived right to challenge the trial court's denial of a motion for a stay of execution by failing to seek a stay in the appellate court.

The trial court properly sentenced the defendant for a firearm specification attached to a weapons under disability charge because he was previously convicted of at least a second-degree felony and less than five years had passed since he was released from prison or post-release control for the prior offense. The defendant was provided effective assistance of counsel.

Trial court erred in applying improper measure of damages, requiring remand for court to re-examine whether appellant suffered actual damages in action in which appellees sought return of security deposit and appellant brought counterclaim for breach of contract.

The Court of Claims did not err when it entered judgment in favor of ODRC on an inmate's negligence action relating to a fight between inmates.

Home repair dispute involving pro se plaintiff homeowner that trial court through Civ.R. 53 trial resolved in favor of contractor affirmed on appeal based on evidence in the record showing no abuse of discretion by trial court in adopting magistrate's decision.

The trial court did not err in affirming an order of the Ohio State Racing Commission suspending appellant's owner's license for one year and fining him $1,000 for his violation of commission rules. The commission's order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law. Judgment affirmed.

This appeal is dismissed as moot

Writ of prohibition sought to invalidate Secretary of State Directive 2020-06 and to establish procedures for completing the 2020 primary election—Subsequent actions by secretary of state and General Assembly rendered the cause moot—Cause dismissed.

Summary Judgment - Trust - Undue Influence - Lack of Testamentory Capacity - Forfeiture Clause

Insufficient evidence for conviction for failure to disclose personal information

Probable cause for search warrant

Ineffective assistance of counsel

Interpretation of Purchase Agreement

summary judgment in favor of defendant on claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and declaratory judgment was proper R.C. 1705.29(B) four-year statute of limitations on tort claims claim for indemnification ripe for review

R.C. 2929.14 consecutive sentences. The trial court's sentence was vacated and modified because the record did not clearly and convincingly support consecutive sentences.

Motion for a new trial, Civ.R. 59(A)(2), juror misconduct, Civ.R. 59(A)(4), inadequate or excessive damages due to jury passion or prejudice, Civ.R. 59(A)(6), manifest weight of the evidence. The original trial court's summary denial of appellant's motion for a new trial in this personal injury action constitutes an abuse of discretion where the trial was conducted by a visiting judge and: (1) the trial court did not consider whether juror misconduct occurred under Civ.R. 59(A)(2) and, if so, whether appellant's substantial rights were affected (2) the damages award was inadequate and may have resulted from passion or prejudice due to the alleged juror misconduct under Civ.R. 59(A)(4) (3) the award of medical expenses only in spite of evidence of pain and suffering was against the manifest weight of the evidence under Civ.R. 59(A)(6) and (4) the record does not reflect that the trial court reviewed the transcript and evidence prior to ruling on the motion.

Manifest weight of the evidence lack of physical evidence single eyewitness lack of corroboration effect of witness' drug use inconsistent or contradictory testimony. Defendant's convictions for attempted murder and felonious assault were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where victim was unwavering in his identification of defendant as his assailant, victim's statements and testimony were consistent in many material respects and existence of inconsistencies and omissions in defendant's testimony could have reasonably led the factfinder to disbelieve him. A conviction may rest on the testimony of a single witness, including the victim, if believed, and there is no requirement that a victim's testimony be corroborated to be believed. Physical evidence is not required to sustain a conviction against a manifest weight challenge. Fact that victim was "high" or that certain aspects of his testimony were inconsistent or contradictory did not mean that victim's testimony could not be relied upon to convict defendant.

Ineffective assistance of counsel exculpatory evidence. The appellant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when the appellant's trial counsel failed to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence. The appellant's counsel was so deficient such that the deficiency deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

Deed restriction parks restrictive covenant fence Marketable Title Act discovery in camera privilege log. Trial court properly concluded that Botanical Garden's use and operation of facility and underground parking structure did not violate park use restriction in 1882 deed court properly found that charging admission for some displays and for parking does not violate the portion of the deed requiring parcel to be open at all times to the public fence provision was a restrictive covenant but was enforceable by grantor's heirs trial court erred in concluding that heirs' claimed interests were extinguished by the Marketable Title Act trial court did not err in considering common interest and work product privilege claims in an in camera hearing.

Motion to vacate postsentence guilty plea Crim.R. 11(D). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's motion to withdraw and vacate his postsentence guilty plea. Appellant has not demonstrated that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

CRIMINAL LAW - Manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2921.31 obstructing official business overt act impede performance of duty R.C. 2921.13 falsification knowingly lie to prevent search of home R.C. 2919.22 child endangerment condition of home animal feces crack pipe bugs.

CIVIL - magistrate's decision adopted defendant enjoined from conducting commercial activities on real property tree service landscaping zoned residential R.C. 519.16 predecessor's use was in violation of code no variance no conditional use permit non-agricultural use.

EXTRAORDINARY WRITS - mandamus Civ.R. 12(B)(6) findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate remedy at law cannot use mandamus as a substitute for appeal dismissed.

On application for reinstatement.

Civ.R. 60(B)/Excusable neglect

Consecutive sentences/R.C.2929.14(c)(4)/Restitution/R.C.2929.18(E)/Ineffective assistance of counsel

Waiver of Right to Counsel Must be Unequivocal

Post conviction relief/Res judicata

Appellant was not eligible for intensive program prison (IPP) or transitional control because the trial court imposed a mandatory prison sentence. The trial court committed harmless error in disapproving appellant's placement into IPP without the requisite factual finding and in prematurely foreclosing the possibility of transitional control. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err when it overruled appellant's petition to vacate or set aside his judgment of conviction and his amended petition for the same relief, since the issues he raised in both petitions were barred by res judicata. Judgment affirmed.

In two orders, the trial court correctly overruled appellant's motions seeking a determination that his maximum prison term had expired. Further, the trial court did not err by overruling appellant's request for appointed counsel and his demand for public records. The trial court did not err by not conducting an evidentiary hearing. Finally, the trial court timely ruled upon appellant's motions. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not violate Evid.R. 404(B) by admitting evidence of other acts of violence in connection with appellant's domestic violence charge. Appellant raised the affirmative defense of reasonable parental discipline, and in assessing this defense, the fact-finder was permitted to consider the child's behavioral history and response to prior discipline. Even if this were otherwise, any error would be harmless because the evidence of appellant's violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) was overwhelming. Furthermore, treating reasonable parental discipline as an affirmative defense does not violate due process by unconstitutionally placing the burden of proof on the defendant. The Supreme Court of Ohio specifically rejected this contention in State v. Faggs, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-523, __ N.E.3d __. Finally, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the misdemeanor charge of child endangering under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) because R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) gives the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction over such charges. Appellant's conviction for child endangering, therefore, is void and is vacated. Because the domestic violence conviction, which is affirmed, was merged into the child endangering charge, this case will be remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the domestic violence conviction. Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

Sufficient evidence of unlawful conduct existed to justify the investigative stop of the car appellant was driving. A 911 caller and the information provided in the call contained sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a lawful stop. The officer also had sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the car matching the description given by the 911 caller without identifying the driver prior to the stop. Judgment affirmed.

claim for breach of contract alleging underpayment of oil and gas royalties summary judgment was proper royalties calculated and paid in accordance with leases

dog sniff, unlawful detention, State's burden, consent, motion to suppress

The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's untimely motion to determine lien priority with respect to the milk proceeds when it had already issued a final, appealable order adjudicating lien priority regarding all of the receivership assets.

Conviction for Tampering with Evidence supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Counterclaim for libel and perjury filed in a small claims court was properly dismissed. Small claims court erred in dismissing counterclaims for conversion, loss of income, and fraud for failure to file a motion to transfer, and in failing to certify the case to the common pleas court.

Appellant engaged in acts with his younger female cousin that would have constituted rape and gross sexual imposition if committed by an adult. Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to "other acts" evidence because it did not violate Evid. R. 404(B). Appellant's juvenile delinquency adjudication was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the trier of fact believed the testimony of the victim when resolving the conflict in the evidence.

The trial court did not err by finding the County's appraiser provided more competent and probative evidence than the property owner. Contrary to the property owner's suggestion, an appraiser is not required to value an occupied property, like the property in this case, as if it were vacant on the tax lien date to satisfy the requirement in R.C. 5713.03 that an auditor assess the "true value of the fee simple estate, as if unencumbered."

CRIMINAL LAW - Manifest weight of the evidence R.C. 2921.31 obstructing official business overt act impede performance of duty R.C. 2921.13 falsification knowingly lie to prevent search of home R.C. 2919.22 child endangerment condition of home animal feces crack pipe bugs.

CRIMINAL LAW - Having Weapons While Under Disability R.C. 2923.13(A)(1) felony sentencing R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12 sentence not contrary to law no error affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - res judicata sentencing entry was not void and was final and appealable despite clerical error regarding post-release control sanctions nunc pro tunc R.C. 2953.08.

CRIMINAL LAW - felony sentencing menacing by stalking duration of sentences consecutive nature seriousness and recidivism factors R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings.

CRIMINAL LAW - without jurisdiction to consider guilty plea appeal from revocation of community control abuse of discretion technical violation felonious drug use imposition of prison term consecutive sentence R.C. 2929.14(C) findings.

CRIMINAL – SENTENCING – consecutive sentencing contrary to law clearly and convincingly not supported by the record permissible range sexual assault purposes and principles of felony sentencing R.C. 2929.41 R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) judgment entry not subject to appeal not properly before the court affirmed.

CRIMINAL LAW - OVI refusal R.C. 4511.19(A)(2) motion in limine prior OVI conviction essential element danger of unfair prejudice Evid.R. 403(A) stipulation legal status limiting instruction jury instruction necessary matters of law R.C. 2945.11.

Trial court decisions motion for leave to file a motion for new trial and delayed, successive postconviction petition affirmed. Defendant did not show by clear and convincing evidence he was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of allegedly exculpatory document. Trial court did not err in concluding allegedly exculpatory document did not create a reasonable probability of a different result at trial. Defendant did not show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable jury would have found him guilty or eligible for a death sentence. Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice as a result of the State's failure to disclose allegedly exculpatory document.

The magistrate did not err in finding relator is not entitled to the requested writ because this matter is moot. Respondents have already credited relator with the appropriate number of days of jail-time credit. Thus, we overrule relator's objections and deny the requested writ.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's complaint pursuant to Civ.R.12(B)(6). Appellant failed to allege he was discriminated against therefore, his claim for violation of Title II of the ADA fails as a matter of law. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court did not err in holding appellants' claims for negligence, tortious interference with business relationships, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were disguised defamation claims. Having filed the complaint past the one-year statute of limitations for defamation, appellants were not prejudiced by the trial court's determination that the attorney general's office had absolute privilege to publish an allegedly defamatory press release. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's latest Civil Rule 60(B) motion. Assignments of error overruled judgment affirmed motion to dismiss appeal denied as moot.

Court of common pleas, sitting as appellate court in R.C. 119.12 appeal from administrative proceedings, denied appellant's request for stay of the administrative order pending review by the common pleas court. On further appeal to the court of appeals, appellant was not entitled to a stay of the administrative order pursuant to App.R. 7, because that rule only applies to orders issued by the court appealed from, in this case the court of common pleas, and the court of common pleas' denial of a stay was not itself an order that could usefully be stayed.

Writ of Mandamus - Prohibition

Whether court erred in allowing evidence regarding unrelated pending criminal indictment in drug case

Ineffective assistance of counsel/2947.23/Court cost/Abuse of discretion

Sentence, void, post-release control, jurisdiction, served

CIVIL-HABEAS CORPUS-R.C. 2969.25(A)-JURISDICTION-PROCEDURAL DEFECT - The failure to comply with the provisions of R.C. 2969.25 requires the dismissal of an action in habeas corpus. R.C. 2969.25's filing requirements apply to the filing of appeals as well as the filing of petitions at the trial court level and the failure to file an affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal the inmate has filed in the previous five years, in support of an appeal, creates a procedural defect that requires dismissal of the appeal. Although the appeal was procedurally defective, the trial court properly dismissed the petition on substantive grounds below, albeit for incorrect reasons, where 1) the petitioner had an adequate remedy at law by virtue of his filing of a delayed appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, and 2) the petitioner's substantive claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and challenges to the indictment were not cognizable in habeas corpus.

Trial counsel was not ineffective Plea was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently Postrelease control advisement at the sentencing hearing was inadequate New sentencing hearing on postrelease control is required.

The trial court was without jurisdiction to issue the July 18, 2019 judgment entry granting Appellees' motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment The July 12, 2019 order granting the motion to dismiss was an interlocutory order because it contained language that the order was subject to further order of the court The July 12, 2019 notice of voluntary dismissal filed by Appellant dissolved the July 12, 2019 order and rendered it a nullity.

AUTOS/CRIMINAL – MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL – AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE – EVIDENCE – R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a): Where a witness's testimony that defendant had previously been incarcerated was an isolated and vague statement, and where the jury heard no other testimony about defendant's prior record and was unaware of what prior offense defendant had committed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Under R.C. 4511.19(D)(1)(a), it was not necessary for the state to establish that tests of defendant's bodily substances were conducted in substantial compliance with Ohio Administrative Code regulations before evidence that drugs and alcohol had been found in defendant's system was admitted in a prosecution for the offenses of aggravated vehicular homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, where the evidence was accompanied by expert testimony. Defendant's conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the defendant admitted to multiple persons that he had been driving the vehicle at the time of the accident, the vehicle involved in the accident was registered to defendant, and defendant's DNA was found on the driver's airbag.

EVID.R. 404(B) – HARMLESS ERROR – OTHER ACTS: In a trial for rape and gross sexual imposition of minor victims, the court erred in violation of Evid.R. 404(B) by admitting evidence of 20-year-old sexual abuse allegation against defendant where the evidence was not admitted for any purpose allowable under the rule the admission of the evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the issue of guilt turned on the credibility of the defendant and the victims.

POSTCONVICTION — JURISDICTION — DUE PROCESS —INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL : The common pleas court properly denied relief without an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective-counsel and due-process claims presented in the petition under R.C. 2953.21 et seq. for postconviction relief, because the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claims: the postconviction statutes did not confer jurisdiction, because the petition was not timely filed, R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), because Ohio does not recognize a prison-mailbox rule that would operate to preclude dismissal of the petition as untimely, and because the petition did not satisfy the R.C. 2953.23 jurisdictional requirements for entertaining a late petition and the claims were not subject to correction under the jurisdiction to correct a void judgment, when the claims, even if demonstrated, would not have rendered the petitioner's convictions void. The common pleas court erred in overruling petitioner's motions for leave to amend his late postconviction petition, filed before the state filed its memorandum in opposition to the petition, R.C. 2953.21(G)(2) but the error did not compel reversal of the judgment denying postconviction relief, because the late postconviction petition was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

SENTENCING – ALLIED OFFENSES – R.C. 2941.25: Burglary and attempted arson offenses were not allied offenses of similar import because the offenses were of dissimilar import where the harm that resulted from the burglary was separate and identifiable from the harm caused by the attempted arson.

CRIM.R. 11: The trial court complied with Crim.R. 11 where the court reviewed the written jury waiver with defendant and confirmed that defendant understood the right he was waiving and wished to waive the right to a jury trial. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to withdraw a plea where the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

Denial of postconviction relief arguing ineffective counsel because of appellant's intellectual disability in rejecting a plea deal.

Minor misdemeanor detention

Vindictive sentence Crim.R. 11 group plea dual representation conflict of interest ineffective assistance of counsel indigency affidavit joint plea.

Anders brief. This court has examined and considered the arguments identified in counsel's Anders brief supporting the validity of the appellant's guilt and sentence. We conclude that there are no arguable legal points on the merits of this matter. This appeal is wholly frivolous pursuant to Anders. Counsel's request to withdraw is granted.

MHAS adult care facility revocation of license. The judgment of the common pleas court affirming the adjudication order revoking appellant's licenses of three adult care facilities is affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that MHAS's revocation of the licenses was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Evid.R. 803(6) hearsay exception opinion and diagnosis testimony of nontestifying doctors stipulation authenticity of medical records harmless error voir dire and plain error. The trial court did not err when it allowed defendant-appellee's expert witness to testify regarding the opinions of nontestifying doctors because the opinion testimony was contained in medical records that met the necessary authentication requirements and did not violate other evidentiary rules, and therefore, were subject to Evid.R. 803(6)'s hearsay exception. It was harmless error for the trial court to permit defendant-appellee's expert witness to testify regarding the opinion of a nontestifying doctor that constituted hearsay. The record shows the defendant-appellee's expert witness formed his medical opinion based upon his own observations and did not rely upon the nontestifying doctor's opinion to form his own conclusions. Thus, the testimony of the nontestifying doctor was cumulative to other admissible evidence and did not change the outcome of the trial. Where plaintiff-appellant fails to object during voir dire and fails to invoke the plain-error doctrine on appeal, an appeals court will not sua sponte undertake a plain-error analysis.

Guilty plea Crim.R. 11 knowing, intelligent, and voluntary postrelease control substantial compliance consecutive sentences R.C. 2929.14 court costs. The trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 where the prosecutor informed the defendant that he was subject to mandatory postrelease control and nothing in the record indicates that the defendant did not subjectively understand the maximum penalty he faced. The trial court made the required findings under R.C. 2929.14 before imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court was not required to consider defendant's ability to pay before imposing court costs.

Foreclosure R.C. 5721.18(A)/separation of lots or parcels for final decree motion to vacate Civ.R. 60(B) Civ.R. 12(B) void judgment standing. It was not an abuse of discretion where the trial court granted appellee's motion to vacate judgment. The decree listed both parcel numbers that is in violation of R.C. 5721.18(A). The judgment was void. Although intervenor-appellant had standing to file its counterclaim, there was no relief to be granted intervenor-appellant where the judgment had been declared void.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6), motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794. The trial court properly granted defendants-appellees' motion to dismiss the federal discrimination claims pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellant failed to advance a cause of action upon which relief may be granted.

Allied offenses animus R.C. 2929.11 R.C. 2929.12. – Defendant's sentence affirmed where the trial court did not err in not merging defendant's convictions for having weapons while under disability with aggravated robbery convictions because the animus for both offenses is separate, and the trial court considered the purposes and principle of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the statutory sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12 when it imposed sentence.

WBL did not satisfy its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 that there remained no genuine issues of material fact on its claim for breach of contract, and the trial court erred in granting WBL's motion for summary judgment.

Judgment affirmed. The Grandview Heights Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") had jurisdiction to review the Director of Building and Zoning's determination. Although appellants' proposed improvements to their garage would not create a dwelling unit, appellants were not entitled to make their proposed improvements because the improvements would turn their garage into a habitable structure in violation of the city's zoning code. The proceedings before the BZA did not violate appellants' due process rights. Appellants failed to carry their burden of proof to establish that their garage had a lawful non-conforming use. The record demonstrated that the common pleas court considered the whole record.

The court adopts the magistrate's decision denying relator's request for writ of mandamus to order the industrial commission to vacate its order which denied him a percentage of permanent partial disability ("PPD"). The doctor's report upon which the commission relied was not equivocal or internally inconsistent. The magistrate did not conduct a de novo review of the evidence. Relator's objections are overruled.

Trial court judgment entry denying appellant's motion to vacate and set aside judgment is affirmed. The motion was untimely, the arguments raised therein were barred by res judicata, and appellant did not meet the criteria to establish an exception to the timeliness requirement in R.C. 2953.23(A). Appellant's assignments of error are overruled.

Forcible Entry - Detainer

Waiver of fines and costs

States Appeal suppression pat down of passenger

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the record supports the conclusion that appellant entered the guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery with a firearm specification and misuse of credit cards after holding a homeless man who had just visited an ATM at gunpoint and demanding cash. The trial court did not err in refusing to order separate trials for appellant and his co-defendant both men were identically charged for a crime spree comprised of the same series of events. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Overwhelming credible evidence supported appellant's conviction. A mistrial was not warranted based on testimony elicited at trial from a woman who participated in the crime spree but was granted immunity. The defense did not object to the witness's statement that appellant was trying to sell drugs the day of the spree. The trial court quickly cured another statement the witness made about appellant saying he did not want to go back to prison. Furthermore, the prosecutor did not ask a question designed to induce this response. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. Trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by not moving for acquittal on four counts. The state offered sufficient evidence on all elements of these offenses to warrant submitting them to the jury. Trial counsel was not ineffective by not filing a motion to suppress based on the insufficiency of the search warrant the record shows little basis on which to question the warrant's sufficiency. The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal on a charge of endangering children based on illegal manufacture of drugs. There was sufficient evidence that appellant knew that methamphetamine was being manufactured in the residence. Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), there are no arguably meritorious issues to present on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

The State presented sufficient evidence to prove appellant's guilt on the single charge of aggravated possession of heroin for which he was indicted in Montgomery C.P. No. 2018-CR-1933/1, and the trial court did not disregard the weight of the evidence in finding appellant guilty as charged. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by overruling appellant's motion to suppress in Montgomery C.P. No. 2018-CR-2306/2. Police officers encountered appellant in a high crime area as he was emerging from a house known to be associated with illicit drug activity. The officers found a stolen car parked in the driveway next to the house, and appellant walked out of the house in the company of the suspected car thief. As part of their investigation into the theft, the officers were permitted to detain appellant, in addition to the suspect, under the "automatic companion rule," and appellant's refusal to comply with the officers' instructions permitted them to pursue and make an arrest. The search of appellant's person incident to that arrest was thus lawful, and the trial court accordingly did not err by declining to suppress the evidence obtained as a consequence of the search. Judgments affirmed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling two motions to compel filed by appellant or by limiting the scope of her depositions of personnel employed by appellee insurance company. Appellant sought to discover information in support of causes of action predicated partly on the allegation that a medical payments adjuster acted improperly by sharing information concerning appellant's claim for payment of medical expenses with a liability adjuster, but the alleged sharing of information was neither unlawful nor otherwise improper in this case. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by sustaining appellee's motion for summary judgment on appellant's causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith. The record supported the trial court's finding that appellant failed to prove appellee breached the express terms of her policy contract or that appellee acted in bad faith by refusing to perform without a reasonable justification for its refusal. Judgment affirmed.

Appellee's pick-up truck collided with appellant's tractor-trailer, which was backing into a driveway at night. Following a jury verdict in favor of appellant in this personal-injury action, the trial court erred in granting appellee a new trial based on appellant's use of demonstrative evidence that the court permitted the defense to use at trial. The demonstrative evidence consisted of computer-simulated partially-illuminated images depicting how the defense expert represented that appellant's tractor-trailer would have appeared to appellee from 600 feet, 400 feet, and 250 feet away before the collision. Although the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding after the trial that it should not have allowed appellant to use the demonstrative evidence, the images were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant granting a new trial, because the jury determined by interrogatory that appellant was not negligent, and the demonstrative images related to the issue of whether appellee was comparatively negligent for not seeing the tractor-trailer in time to stop. Consequently, exclusion of the demonstrative evidence would not have changed the result. Judgment reversed remanded for reinstatement of the jury verdict.

The trial court did not err by overruling appellant's post-conviction motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance merely because he had previously worked for the prosecutor's office. Res judicata barred appellant from arguing as grounds for withdrawal that he was incorrectly informed that he was subject to post-release control for a murder conviction. The judgment of conviction is not void the prison term imposed on appellant for murder was statutory, and a reference to an incorrect statute was merely a clerical error. Because the transcript of the sentencing hearing showed that the trial court did not impose a term of post-release control, that portion of the subsequent judgment entry of conviction imposing it is vacated. Judgment affirmed as modified.

The trial court did not err in imposing judgment. We find no issues with arguable merit under the authority of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Judgment affirmed.

Subject matter jurisdiction/Witness competency/Motion in limine/Guilty plea waives error

Trial court's denial of appellant's motion to vacate his conviction was a nullity where the case was on appeal when the trial court issued its order denying the motion. Appeal is consequently dismissed.

The trial court abused its discretion by failing to stay the proceedings until the parties' arbitration was completed.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's postsentence motion to withdraw his plea.

Trial courts must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c)—A trial court strictly complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) when it advises a defendant in a manner reasonably intelligible to the defendant that a guilty or no-contest plea waives the rights enumerated in the rule the trial court is not required to use the particular words stated in the rule.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Attorney's appeal from trial court's resentencing judgment is a direct appeal—Cause remanded for Board of Professional Conduct to stay proceedings until all direct appeals of attorney's convictions have concluded.

Judges—Misconduct—Driving while intoxicated—Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 1.3—Failure to act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary—Abuse of the prestige of judicial office to advance personal interests—Public reprimand.

On respondent's written objections to a special master's report and recommendation (R&R), the court (1) overruled the objections, (2) adopted the R&R, (3) rendered judgment in requester's favor, (4) ordered respondent to forthwith permit requester to inspect or receive copies of certain documents, and (5) ordered that requester was entitled to recover from respondent the amount of the filing fee of twenty-five dollars and any other costs associated with the action that were incurred by requester, but requester was not entitled to recover attorney fees.

On the recommendation of a special master, the court sua sponte dismissed requester's complaint without prejudice in accordance with R.C. 2743.75(D)(2).

Sufficiency of the evidence, illegal use or possession of drug paraphernalia, constructive possession, ownership, manifest weight of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, speculation

Appellant's conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

An appeal is moot where the underlying judgment is voluntarily satisfied. A limited receivership which appoints a receiver premised on limited authority cannot pay indemnification claims if the receiver is unauthorized to do so

Appellant's convictions for aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences, which led to an aggregate prison term of 60 months, was not error where the trial court made the necessary consecutive sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the record supported those findings.

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), if the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount. The refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing under such circumstances constitutes reversible error.

The trial court infringed on defendant-appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore his sentence is contrary to law.

CIVIL - attorney's fees fee agreement written agreement disqualification bias jurisdiction withdrawal from representation manifest weight of the evidence Prof. Conduct R. 1.16 excessive fees credibility

CRIMINAL LAW - violating a protection order sufficient evidence manifest weight of the evidence Evid.R. 701 testimony in the form of an inference assault self-defense jury instruction witness credibility province of the jury. APPELLATE REVIEW - mootness misdemeanor conviction voluntarily satisfied sentence unpaid fees and court costs.

CRIMINAL LAW - motion to suppress pretrial identification photo array guilty plea waived appellate review nonjurisdictional defect.

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely criminal appeal App.R. 5(A) motion procedurally defective notice of appeal shall be filed concurrently with court of appeals Loc.R. 3(D)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely criminal appeal App.R. 5(A) motion procedurally defective notice of appeal shall be filed concurrently with court of appeals Loc.R. 3(D)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely criminal appeal App.R. 5(A) motion procedurally defective noticce of appeal shall be filed concurrently with court of appeals Loc.R. 3(D)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely criminal appeal App.R. 5(A) motion procedurally defective notice of appeal shall be filed concurrently with court of appeals Loc.R. 3(D)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely criminal appeal App.R. 5(A) motion procedurally defective notice of appeal shall be filed concurrently with court of appeals Loc.R. 3(D)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - Untimely criminal appeal App.R. 5(A) motion procedurally defective notice of appeal shall be filed concurrently with court of appeals Loc.R. 3(D)(2).

APPELLATE REVIEW - App.R. 4(A) thirty-day rule Civ.R. 58(B) untimely appeal.

Criminal law—Remedy for conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence is a new trial—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.

Mandamus—Procedendo—Crim.R. 32(C)—Adequate remedy at law—Defendant in criminal case who claims judgment of conviction does not comply with Crim.R. 32(C) has adequate remedy at law by way of motion to trial court for revised judgment of conviction and appeal if trial court denies motion for revised judgment of conviction—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Habeas corpus—Evidence refuted petitioner's claim that trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over case involving offense committed by petitioner when petitioner was a juvenile—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing petition affirmed.

Appeal of denial of motion to continue sentencing hearing

Insufficient evidence

Permanent Custody Manifest Weight and Sufficiency Extension

Juvenile law—Subject-matter jurisdiction—Juvenile court loses subject-matter jurisdiction over child when the child attains 21 years of age—Juvenile court's order invoking adult portion of child's sentence that was not journalized until the day of child's 21st birthday is void—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and adult portion of child's serious-youthful-offender sentence vacated.

Domestic relations—Parental rights—R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)—A children-services agency may seek permanent custody of a child who has been in the temporary custody of the agency for 12 of the consecutive 22-month period preceding the filing of the motion.

Elections—Mandamus—Writ of mandamus granted against Ohio Ballot Board to compel it to certify that initiative petition contains only one proposed constitutional amendment and writ of mandamus granted against the secretary of state to compel him to convene a meeting of the board to facilitate such certification—Writ sought against the attorney general denied.

Mandamus—Nunc pro tunc sentencing entry—Judge patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to change defendant's sentence after defendant's sentence had been affirmed on appeal—Court of appeals' judgment dismissing complaint reversed and cause remanded.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Inmate's records request not moot—Court of appeals' dismissal of complaint reversed and cause remanded.

Where trial counsel substantially failed to present a defense despite considerable unanswered questions about the reliability of the evidence against her client and where a lifetime commitment was at stake, trial counsel was ineffective. Because appellate counsel was concomitantly ineffective in conceding his client's guilt and failing to raise trial counsel's inefficacy on appeal, we find on reopening that we must vacate our prior decision and reverse.

In condominium homeowner association dispute over rules infraction and fine for alleged parking violation, with dispute including lengthy litigation and eventually a finding against homeowner of frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51, failure to file transcript from hearing before magistrate and in the absence of plain error or legal infirmity, results in appellate court left with no recourse but to presume the regularity of the trial court's proceedings. Trial court decision awarding attorney fees for frivolous conduct affirmed.

Trial court did not err in finding appellant guilty on obstruction of official business and possession of a controlled substance.

The jury's determinations that defendant was guilty of two counts of aggravated menacing and one count of public indecency were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. And on the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in admitting recorded evidence of the defendant's pre-arrest discussions with the police about events and personalities in question.

CRIM.R. 11(C) – GUILTY PLEA – COMPETENCY – SENTENCING: The trial court did not err in accepting the defendant's guilty plea where the defendant was competent to stand trial, the trial court complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C), and there was nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant's guilty plea was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant where the sentence was supported by the record, was not contrary to law, and did not violate the Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

CONTRACT – MEETING OF THE MINDS – SALE OF GOODS – UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A valid contract existed for sale of airplane parts where the parties' email exchanges contained the requisite elements of offer, acceptance, and consideration sufficient to establish the parties' "meeting of the minds" for purposes of contract formation, and therefore, the trial court erred in determining that no contract existed. Where a valid contract existed the parties' recovery on the quasi-contract theory of unjust enrichment must be reversed, because unjust-enrichment damages are not available where a valid contract exists.

CONTRACTS — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — R.C. 2721.12: The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff employee on plaintiff's declaratory-judgment claim that tenure entitled plaintiff to continued employment absent just cause for his termination, because plaintiff met his initial burden demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact existed, presenting extrinsic evidence from plaintiff and a witness on the committee that recommended him for tenure, and defendant did not meet its reciprocal burden demonstrating a genuine issue of fact existed for trial, failing to combat plaintiff's extrinsic evidence that tenure included just cause protection. [But see DISSENT: The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's declaratory-judgment claim that tenure entitled plaintiff to continued employment absent just cause for his termination, because a genuine issue of fact existed for trial, both parties offering disputed evidence on whether plaintiff was an at-will employee at the time he was terminated]. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's declaratory-judgment claim that tenure entitled plaintiff to procedural-due-process protections because plaintiff did not meet his initial burden demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact existed, presenting only a vague statement in his affidavit that tenure entitled him to an opportunity to challenge the allegations against him. The trial court's order granting a declaratory judgment did not violate R.C. 2721.12(A), because defendant failed to establish how the declaratory judgment would affect the College of Medicine, and therefore, that the College of Medicine was a necessary party to the litigation, never asserting what "legally protectable interest" the College of Medicine maintained in the dispute.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL - INDICTMENT – PLEAS – SELF-REPRESENTATION – BAIL –JUDICIAL BIAS – PUBLIC TRIAL – JURY – JURY INSTRUCTIONS - ADVERSE POSSESSION: Defendants were given adequate notice of the charges against them where the indictments tracked the language of the applicable statutes, the defendants were supplied with bills of particulars to provide details of the charged offenses, and defendants were provided with discovery. Because the indictments were valid on their faces, defendants

LANDLORD-TENANT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court did not err by holding that a 60-month lease agreement that did not comply with the execution requirements of R.C. 5301.01 resulted in a month-to-month tenancy. The trial court properly entered partial summary judgment in favor of the landlord on its forcible-entry-and-detainer claim where the landlord discharged its initial burden to identify the absence of genuine issues of material fact on the elements of the claim and the tenant failed to discharge her reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts to counter the supported claim: an unsworn statement is not the type of evidence that can be considered under Civ.R. 56(C).

SENTENCING – THEFT – VICTIM – RESTITUTION –R.C. 2929.28(A)(1): The trial court did not err by ordering defendant, who was convicted of misdemeanor theft, to pay restitution to a bank because under R.C. 2929.28(A)(1), a bank that cashes a forged check and then recredits its depositor's account is a victim to which the forger can be required to pay restitution.

Mandamus—Elections—Action to compel board of elections to declare relator an eligible candidate for a primary election for the office of state representative and to include in its official canvass of the primary election the votes cast for relator—Residency—R.C. 3503.02—Great weight must be accorded to the person's claimed voting residence—Voting residence—Voter registration—R.C. 3503.01 and 3503.02—Writ granted.

Domestic violence, manifest weight of the evidence, credibility

ineffective assistance of counsel – deficient performance – prejudice – motion to continue – App.R. 12 – App.R. 16

CRIMINAL-NEGOTIATED PLEA AGREEMENT-RECOMMENDED SENTENCE-BREACH-CRIM.R. 11(F) - The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to enforce a verbal, negotiated plea agreement that was not stated upon the record in open court as required by Crim.R. 11(F). Even if the negotiated plea agreement had complied with Crim.R. 11(F), the defendant breached the agreement when he failed to appear for the scheduled sentencing hearing, thereby relieving the State of its obligations under the agreement. The terms of a plea agreement, including a recommended sentence, are not binding upon the trial court.

CIVIL-FORECLOSURE-FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER - Where judgment entry granting foreclosure is subject to modification, it is not final and appealable and appellate court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal

Guardian compensation

motion to suppress, traffic stop, duration of stop

Miranda rights involuntary confession gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) motion to suppress custodial interrogation police coercion manifest weight of the evidence sexual gratification

Community control sanctions violation hearing guilty plea App.R. 12(A)(2) exculpatory evidence forfeiture motion to dismiss jail-time credit.

Civ.R. 56(C)/summary judgment R.C. Chapter 4171/operation of roller skating facilities/duties of roller skaters assumption of the risks willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. The trial court erred where it granted summary judgment to appellee. Affidavit and deposition testimony, when viewed favorably to appellant, created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether appellee acted recklessly. The Revised Code does not provide that a roller rink owes a duty to protect skaters from the risks inherent to roller skating such as coming in contact with other skaters.

Ineffective assistance of Counsel medical records sufficiency of evidence possessing a dangerous drug R.C. 4729.51(C)(3). – Trial counsel was not ineffective for not attempting to introduce defendant's medical records during trial where the records did not have any exculpatory value the evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conviction for possessing a dangerous drug in violation of R.C. 4729.51(C)(3) where the city did not present any evidence that the drug was a dangerous drug that may be dispensed only upon a prescription.

R.C. 2929.41(E), consecutive sentences, parole eligibility, R.C. 2903.02, aggravated murder, Crim.R. 52, harmless error. In 1983, appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder (R.C. 2903.01) and murder (R.C. 2903.02) and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of 15 years to life in prison for murder and life in prison for the aggravated murder. The trial court incorrectly informed appellant that he was eligible for parole in 20 years instead of 35 years under R.C. 2929.41(E) which did not apply to convictions that involved aggravated murder. Appellant stated on the record that he understood that the terms were to be served consecutively. The parole board denied parole in 2015. This court determined in appellant's prior appeal that no manifest injustice occurred under Crim.R. 32.1. State v. Cooper, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104797, 2017-Ohio-541. We find that the sentences are not void, the error is harmless under Crim.R. 52(A), and appellant has not been prejudiced.

Gross sexual imposition R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) sexual contact chest erogenous zone sufficient evidence manifest weight corroborating testimony physical evidence inconsistent testimony. The state presented evidence of sexual contact, namely that the appellant touched the victim's erogenous zone, sufficient to support a conviction for gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) where the young victim testified that the appellantlicked her chest. The convictions are also not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the victim testified that the appellant licked her chest and he placed his hands under her pants and on her "private parts." The lack of corroboration or physicalevidence, and the alleged inconsistencies, did not require reversal. The factfinder did not lose his way and create a manifest miscarriage of justice such that a new trial should be ordered.

Rape R.C. 2907.02 expert witness expert testimony Evid.R. 702 scope plain error Crim.R. 52 victim-impact evidence sentence R.C. 2953.08 R.C. 2971.03 contrary to law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or err in permitting the state's expert witness to testify about the effects that trauma has on child victims of sexual abuse. Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law.

Consecutive sentence finding seriousness criminal history mitigation remorse trial court factors sentencing factor punish protect felony sentence purposes offender contrary to law principles recidivism. Defendant's sentence was not contrary to law. The trial court made the necessary findings for imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and the findings are not clearly and convincingly unsupported. There was no objective information in the record to suggest that the court failed to consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in formulating the sentence, or relied on demonstrably false or inaccurate information when making these considerations.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 unjust enrichment traffic camera class certification Civ.R. 23 typicality standing res judicata administrative remedies. The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant sufficiently demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the tickets were valid.

Failure to prosecute Civ.R. 41(B) motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) final appealable order abuse of discretion pretrial hearing notice. The trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's counterclaim for failure to prosecute.

Mandamus—Res judicata bars inmate's claim—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ affirmed.

Mandamus—Sentencing—Adequate remedy at law—Generally, sentencing errors may not be remedied through an extraordinary writ—Court of appeals' judgment of dismissal affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Indefinite suspension.

Revocation of Judicial Release-R.C. 2929.20-VIOLATION OF COMMUNITY CONTROL-R.C. 2929.15 - The trial court properly reserved the right to sentence Appellant to the balance of his reduced prison sentence at the time he was granted judicial release and then properly imposed the balance of the reduced prison term when Appellant's judicial release was revoked due to a violation of the terms and conditions of community control, R.C.2929.20, rather than R.C. 2929.15, governs the revocation of judicial release based upon a violation of community control.

Where a nude criminal defendant straddled a female healthcare worker and began choking her, indicating his intention to "rape" her, a conviction for attempted rape was sufficiently supported and not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

An identified 911 caller may provide police with reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, entitling police to stop the suspect and to frisk him or her for weapons. Where the suspect is slow to comply with orders to stop and raise his or her hands, the officer effecting the stop does not violate the Constitution when he or she draws and points a weapon at the suspect to attain compliance with an investigatory order to stop for detention based on that reasonable suspicion.

Appeal dismissed as not being from a final appealable order.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to correct a void judgment. The collateral challenge was barred by res judicata principles. Judgment affirmed.

The Court of Claims did not err in dismissing Jackson's complaint, though we reach our decision for different reasons than the Court of Claims.

Trial court did not err when it denied appellant's motion to vacate post-release control as moot. Judgment affirmed.

Where the record does not indicate that the trial court committed plain error, and appellant's brief did not provide legal errors for review nor a transcript that would support any conclusion otherwise, an appellate court must presume the regularity of the trial court's proceedings and affirm its decision. Judgment affirmed.

Where a prisoner's complaint consisted of allegations regarding the inconvenience and hardship caused by past and potential future transfers between prison institutions, the allegations were insufficient to allege a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, insufficient to show that the actions fell outside the scope of ODRC's general immunity from liability arising from decisions regarding inmate transfer and placement, and, insofar as the complaint sought to accuse ODRC of criminal acts or make constitutional claims, were brought in the first instance in the wrong forum, the Court of Claims.

The trial court erred in granting an application to seal the record of a felony conviction where the applicant did not show that he had received a "final discharge" and then waited the required three years before seeking expungement. Judgment reversed cause remanded to vacate sealing order.

Appellant was not denied due process when the State failed to preserve the car in which the victim was killed. The evidence in question was not materially exculpatory. Even if the evidence were potentially useful, there was no evidence that the State acted in bad faith. The trial court, therefore, properly overruled appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment. Appellant also failed to show prosecutorial misconduct concerning disclosure of the destruction of the car. Furthermore, while the State did fail to timely disclose DNA evidence concerning a bag of heroin unconnected to the murder, the trial court made proper orders to ensure that appellant's expert could evaluate the recently disclosed information and that appellant could properly prepare for cross-examination of the State's expert at trial. As to appellant's post-judgment appeal of a nunc pro tunc order regarding the court's reconsideration of the motion to dismiss the indictment, that order was not a final appealable order. Judgment affirmed in Case No. 27960 (the judgment of conviction). Appeal in Case No. 28080 (of the post-judgment nunc pro tunc order) dismissed for lack of a final appealable order.

The jury's guilty verdicts on charges of felonious assault and murder were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence supported a finding that the appellant was the only person who reasonably could have caused multiple injuries to his infant child and that those injuries were the result of child abuse, including multiple blunt-force blows to the head that resulted in hemorrhaging and caused the child's death. Judgment affirmed.

Having conducted a thorough, independent review of the trial court proceedings pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we conclude there are no potential assignments of error having arguable merit. The record establishes that appellant's guilty pleas were made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the 63-month sentence imposed by the trial court was supported by the record and therefore not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.

State's appeal. The trial court erred by dismissing the indictment against appellee pursuant to R.C. 2963.30, Ohio's statutory enactment of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, in the absence of a detainer against him. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The probate court did not err in authorizing appellee-estate to pay attorney's fees incurred by the executor. The court complied with the appellate court's remand instructions and reasonably determined that another hearing was unnecessary. Appellee's motion for sanctions is overruled. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant fails to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Counsel's conduct was not deficient, and appellant does not claim that it affected her guilty plea. The trial judge was not required to sua sponte offer to recuse herself. There is no evidence that the judge had a bias or prejudice against appellant, and the power to order disqualification of a judge rests solely with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of an insurance company that was a surety on a bond discharging a mechanic's lien. The lien at issue was invalid as a matter of law because appellant failed to comply with R.C. 1311.06(A), as strictly construed, when creating the lien. We decline appellant's invitation to adopt the Sixth District's substantial compliance analysis. Judgment affirmed.

Appellant's convictions for burglary and possession of criminal tools are not based upon insufficient evidence or against the manifest weight of the evidence where appellant's DNA was found on a pry bar at the scene of the crimes.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellees. Judgment affirmed. Summary judgment, R.C. 4301.69(B), common law social host liability, judicial notice

Ohio's rape-shield law—R.C. 2907.02(D) and R.C. 2907.05(E)—Both consensual and nonconsensual sexual activity are barred from admission into evidence by Ohio's rape-shield law, absent one of the specific exceptions listed in the law.

Mandamus—Procedendo—Mootness—Neither mandamus nor procedendo will compel the performance of a duty that has already been performed—Court of appeals' judgment of dismissal affirmed.

Mandamus—Inmate had adequate remedy at law by way of direct appeal to challenge his consecutive sentences—Court of appeals' dismissal of petition affirmed.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Indefinite suspension.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request to admit evidence that he agreed to take a polygraph examination where evidence regarding a polygraph examination is not admissible absent a signed agreement of the parties and approval from the trial court. Appellant's speedy trial rights were not violated where the first trial was reasonably continued because not enough potential jurors reported, and all parties agreed to the first available trial date. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence where there were applicable exceptions to the hearsay rule such as excited utterance and statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment.

Defendant motor vehicle dealership appeals $6,000 small claims judgment for breach of contract. Plaintiffs purchased used vehicle and "service contract" from dealership. Vehicle's engine seized four months after purchase. Warranty company that managed the service contract denied coverage because engine found severely neglected and vehicle had never been serviced by dealership.

Appellant was not denied effective representation at trial and his convictions for theft and misuse of a credit card were supported by sufficient evidence where the state demonstrated that appellant was the perpetrator of the offenses, that he broke into a locker at a fitness facility, stole the victim's wallet and credit card, and used the credit card to purchase gift cards and electronics at Target. The trial court did not err in permitting the state to introduce evidence of appellant's 2010 convictions for theft and possession of criminal tools where the evidence was relevant to show appellant's identity through his modus operandi.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for relief from judgment where company did not show excusable neglect in failing to respond to the complaint or other filings in the case. Reliance on another company to pay the amounts due under the contract did not amount to excusable neglect.

Appellant's bench convictions for criminal mischief and littering were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court erred in granting judgment to homeowners' association in a case involving the disapproval of a property owner's application to install solar panels. Trial court's ruling that the homeowners' association's disapproval of the application without a meeting complied with R.C. 1702.25 was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

CIVIL LAW - postconviction relief abuse of discretion R.C. 2953.21 res judicata evidence de hors the record newly discovered evidence ineffective assistance of counsel evidentiary hearing trial strategy possible conflict of interest is insufficient.

CRIMINAL LAW - Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) guilty plea knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea constitutional rights strict compliance reasonably intelligible manner privilege against self-incrimination right to remain silent compulsory testimony.

CRIMINAL - CONSTITUTIONAL - speedy trial rights R.C. 2945.71 tolling motion to dismiss failure to file motion unable to review issue on appeal ineffective assistance of counsel Strickland v. Washington legal strategy juror bias unauthorized juror communication untruthful juror speculation unsubstantiated allegations juror partiality affirmed.

ARBITRATION - lack of standing argument can be challenged at arbitration because the trial court was satisfied that the issues involved are referable to arbitration under a written agreement for arbitration, it was required to stay the case pending arbitration when a party opposing a motion to stay raised under R.C. 2711.02 challenges the arbitration clause as unconscionable, the trial court must determine whether the clause is unconscionable and cannot refer the issue for resolution by the arbitrator.

CRIMINAL LAW - Motion to withdraw guilty plea ineffective assistance alleged failure to investigate possible defenses no argument as what defenses could have raised no prejudice shown advice as to length of imposed sentence after guilty plea res judicata issue could have been raised in prior postconviction petition.

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - jail time credit clearly and convincingly contrary to law jail in lieu of bond R.C. 2967.191(A) consecutive sentences unrelated sentences affirmed.

CIVIL - class action certification Civ.R. 23(A) rigorous analysis overly-broad class definition readily-identifiable or ambiguously-defined class numerosity commonality typicality adequacy

CIVIL - class action Civ.R. 23(A) overly-broad class definition injury-in-fact exhaustion and waiver common questions of law

CIVIL - summary judgment conversion R.C. 2307.60 civil action R.C. 4505.101 certificate of title abandoned vehicle repair garage unclaimed motor vehicle affidavit clerk of courts "left unclaimed" wholesale value vehicle value cost of agreed upon repairs storage fees.

Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's decision to award permanent custody of the child to CPSU.

Trial court did not err in denying motion to suppress when the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for making the traffic stop and the evidence supported the officer's testimony.

A licensee has a limited right to appeal an administrative license suspension under R.C. 4511.197. The scope of this ALS appeal is, however, limited. The licensee subject to an ALS must establish that one of the four conditions listed in R.C. 4511.197(C) was not present in that case. The licensee bears the burden of establishing the absence of one of these conditions by a preponderance of the evidence.

Insuffiency assistant of counsel/manefest weight/sufficency/maximum sentence

Zoning - Abandoment of Nonconforming Use - R.C. 2506.03 - Right to Evid. Hrg.

motion to suppress, pat-down search, pockets, plain feel doctrine, folded piece of paper

Insurance—No allocation of liability across multiple insurers and policy periods when injury or damage for which liability coverage is sought occurred at a discernible time.

EVIDENCE - PROSECUTOR – OTHER-ACTS – MURDER -INTENT – COUNSEL – SENTENCING – CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES: The prosecutor's comment to the effect that she was not lying was not improper and did not deny defendant a fair trial where the comment was a direct response to defense counsel's comments implying that the police had done a slip-shod investigation and the state had fabricated facts because it had insufficient evidence. It was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on defendant's lack of remorse the prosecutor's comment about defendant crying in court did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, much less rise to the level of plain error. The trial court did not err in permitting the victim's family to testify as to other acts of domestic violence between defendant and the victim where defendant's entire defense was that the shooting of the victim was an accident, and evidence of threats and prior acts of domestic violence was admissible to show motive, intent and lack of accident. The state's evidence was sufficient to show that defendant purposely killed the victim where it showed that defendant had threatened and beaten the victim in the past, defendant's claim that the shooting was accidental did not match the scientific evidence, defendant did not report the shooting for almost three days, defendant tampered with the scene of the crime, defendant deleted his texts to the victim from his phone, and the details of defendant's story were inconsistent and changed over time. Defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to hire a crime scene reconstruction expert, because the decision whether to present expert testimony was tactical and counsel provided defendant with a diligent and thorough defense. The court engaged in the requisite analysis and made the findings necessary to justify the imposition of consecutive sentences.

EXCUSABLE NEGLECT – CIV.R. 6(B) – REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS – CIV.R. 36(A): The trial court did not err by finding that plaintiff did not demonstrate excusable neglect under Civ.R. 6(B) for failing to answer requests for admission within the 28 days prescribed by Civ.R. 36(A) where plaintiff's reasons were that the requests for admission were combined with interrogatories within the same document and that plaintiff had already answered similar questions for defendant's insurance representatives prior to her commencing the lawsuit.

WILLS/TRUSTS: The probate court did not abuse its discretion in removing the trustees of a family trust from their fiduciary positions under R.C. 5807.06(B)(3) where the trustees continued to administer the trust for nearly ten years after the established termination date of the trust and where the trustees did not provide any written communication to the beneficiaries regarding the administration of the trust for several years and then only sporadically. Due process was satisfied prior to the removal of the trustees where the trustees had notice that they may be removed from their fiduciary positions by the probate court's repeated warnings of that possibility and where the trustees were afforded an opportunity to defend themselves prior to their removal.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25

Domestic violence, manifest weight of the evidence, completed prison sentence, moot

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25, R.C. 2725

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25, R.C. 2725

application to reopen untimely App.R. 26(B)

Aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary R.C. 2911.11(A) trespass R.C. 2911.21 felonious assault kidnapping having weapons while under disability sufficiency manifest weight. Appellant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Probate administration of estate R.C. 2105.06 intestate estate res judicata. Filing a duplicative application for authority to administer the estate after the expiration of the time in which an appeal from previous denial of the same motion does not restart or toll the appellate clock, and any such appeal must be dismissed.

Forfeiture R.C. 2981.03 petition to adjudicate validity of interest in forfeited property amend final forfeiture R.C. 2945.67 state's appeal dismiss. The state failed to seek leave to appeal the trial court's judgment granting a petition to adjudicate the validity of a person's interest in forfeited property under R.C. 2981.03, and therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction under R.C. 2945.67 to consider the merits of the appeal.

Rape attempted rape kidnapping sexually violent predator sufficiency of the evidence manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Inconsistencies in the victim's testimony did not constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice in light of uncontroverted DNA evidence. The state presented sufficient evidence that defendant should be classified as a sexually violent predator.

R.C. 2901.05/self-defense sufficiency manifest weight R.C. 2929.14/sentencing/consecutive. Appellant was found to be the aggressor who escalated the encounter with the victim and the one who also failed to meet his duty to retreat. The state met its burden to show that appellant did not act in self-defense. Appellant's sufficiency argument under a self-defense claim is misapplied. A review of sufficiency is reserved for substantive elements of a crime reviewed under a manifest-weight standard. The jury, as the trier of facts, had the opportunity to view video, resolve any conflict between differing testimony, and assess appellant's motivation to be untruthful about his conduct. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the trial court established for the record its statutorily required findings and considered appellant's criminal history in determining that consecutive sentences were appropriate.

R.C. 2505.39 App.R. 27 remand special mandate continuing jurisdiction. A trial court lacks jurisdiction to "dismiss" an action after the final judgment was entered and affirmed in the direct appeal.

Voluntary satisfaction of judgment garnishment stay of execution age discrimination R.C. 4112.02(A) Age Discrimination in Employment Act 29 U.S.C. 623 motion for directed verdict Civ.R. 50(A)(4) failure to preserve issue for appeal plain error failure to object to jury instructions inconsistent jury verdicts back pay and front pay damages punitive damages Civ.R. 61. Appeal was not moot based on appellant's partial voluntary satisfaction of judgment through garnishment. Appellant failed to preserve the issue of trial court's denial of motion for directed verdict for appeal where it did not renew the motion at close of all evidence. Appellant forfeited all but plain error regarding improper jury instructions and inconsistent verdicts where it failed to raise issues below. Appellant failed to demonstrate plain error. Trial court did not improperly permit plaintiff to reference indictment of a third-party during cross-examination of a defendant. Trial court promptly sustained objection once defendants objected and gave appropriate instruction to the jury regarding the issue. Appellant did not demonstrate that trial court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiff to use Ohio Department of Job and Family Services document during his cross-examination of a defendant or that it was materially prejudiced thereby.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's postconviction petition without a hearing. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court's imposition of a ten-month jail term as an additional condition of community control pursuant to a community control revocation hearing violated the six-month maximum set forth in R.C. 2929.16(A)(2) and (6).

Probation revocation resentencing

Appeal of aggravated robbery and robbery convictions/Allied offenses/Appeal of sentence/Admission of evidence (letter)

The State appeals from the trial court's Crim.R. 29 judgment of acquittal at the end of defendant-appellee's trial for criminal trespass. The trial court erred when it found that a public transit bus is not a "premises" for the purposes of criminal trespass under R.C. 2911.21(A)(4). The bus where the defendant was located was a "place" as found in the definition of "premises" under R.C. 2911.21(F)(2). Therefore, a motor vehicle is a "premises" under the criminal trespass statute. The State's assignment of error is sustained, without affecting the trial court's judgment of acquittal in this case.

The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's false light invasion of privacy claim. A false light invasion of privacy claim involving allegations that would also support a defamation claim has the same statute of limitations applied to it as the defamation claim. This was the case here, and since appellant's false light claim was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations for defamation claims, the trial court properly concluded that it was barred. The trial court also did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees on appellant's statutory claim for use of an individual's persona under R.C. 2741.02. Appellees were exempt under R.C. 2741.09(A)(1)(b) and(A)(3). The material in question was newsworthy, and appellant's persona was also used "in connection with the reporting of an event or topic of general or public interest." R.C. 2741.02 also did not apply under an exception to the statute found in R.C. 2741.02(D)(1). Specifically, appellees were not required to obtain appellant's consent to use her persona because they used it "in connection with any news, public affairs, or account ." Finally, given the disposition of the first two issues, appellant's assignment of error concerning qualified privilege under R.C. 2317.05 is moot. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

The 18-month sentence imposed was within the permissible statutory range for a conviction for aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the third degree, and therefore was not contrary to law. The record establishes that the trial court properly considered and applied R.C. 2929.11, which addresses the purposes of felony sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which sets forth the seriousness and recidivism factors for the court to consider in imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed.

No trial court error denying motion to disqualify a prospective juror for good cause and denying motion to limit peremptory challenges. Judgment affirmed. Juror bias, peremptory challenge, abuse of discretion

Jointly recommended agreed sentence. Authorized by law. Not reviewable. Imposition of costs. Presentence investigation not required.

Trial court does not abuse its discretion in imposing a fine as part of the sentence in a misdemeanor conviction where there is some evidence in the record that the court considered appellant's present and future ability to pay, and where appellant has a degree in medical billing and coding and has stable employment.

Trial court erred in sentencing appellant to mandatory term of imprisonment under R.C. 2903.04(D)(2) when the underlying offense supporting appellant's involuntary manslaughter conviction was not an OVI-related offense or an offense that includes as an element the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or a drug of abuse.

Summary judgment reversed because reasonable persons could dispute whether the danger posed by an empty pallet next to a produce bin was an open and obvious danger to someone approaching it from a certain direction.

Trial court did not err in not merging appellant's felony drug convictions for sentencing purposes as the underlying offenses each involved a drug from a different drug schedule classification, and as such, they are not allied offenses of similar import.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the admissibility of evidence at trial. Judgment affirmed. FELA, negligence, causation, expert testimony, admissibility of evidence, abuse of discretion.

Pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor, allied offenses of similar import, plain error, R.C. 2941.25, State v. Ruff, separate offenses, separate animus, recidivism factors, ineffective assistance of counsel, motion to suppress, constitutional rights of third party, standing

double jeopardy, collateral estoppel, complete record, transcript, presume regularity, burden on appeal

Prohibition, sua sponte dismissal, R.C. 2947.14

Convictions for violation of 959.131(D)(1) and (D)(2) were supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court's order of forfeiture of companion animals and prohibition against having companion animals in the future was within its proper discretion pursuant to R.C. 959.99(E)(6)(a).

The trial court erred in determining that the ICCTA explicitly preempts R.C. 5589.21, Ohio's statute governing Obstruction of Roads by Railroads

The trial court's entry is not a final, appealable order because the trial court did not conform with its obligation to enter an independent judgment which determines the action.

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS - Termination of doctor's staff privileges at hospital hospital bylaws procedure for revoking privileges failure to provide notice of settlement of fraud case interpretation of bylaw specific provision applies over general provision governing procedure for corrective action against staff member no fight to full hearing prior to termination no separate state law right to due process bylaws, as a contract, control.

CIVIL - grant of summary judgment impermissible because defendant did not initially move for summary judgment on that claim Civ.R. 56(A) if moving party fails to discharge initial burden, burden does not shift under Civ.R. 56(E).

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25, R.C. 2725

Mandamus, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss, denial of motion to resentence

Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated where appellant was brought to trial well before the 90-day time limit expired due to several tolling events following appellant's arrest, which included a motion for a continuance, as well as a request for discovery, an application for a bill of particulars, a motion for change of venue, a motion to suppress, and a motion to dismiss, all of which were properly charged against appellant. Appellant's conviction for felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) was also supported by overwhelming, reliable, competent, and credible evidence where there was testimony from an eyewitness who identified appellant as the individual who shot the victim in the chest, as well as appellant's videotaped admission that he shot the victim.

Appellant's domestic violence convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state demonstrated appellant caused physical harm to his live-in girlfriend on two occasions by punching her in the face and by holding her down and choking her.

A Medicaid applicant appeals decision affirming administrative agency decision. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services denied applicant's request for long term care Medicaid. Attorney that represented applicant's nursing home requested a hearing to review the denial. Attorney forwarded agency documentation showing that applicant had granted written authorization to the nursing home to request a hearing on applicant's behalf. Agency denied the request on alleged basis that it had no documentation showing that the attorney had written authorization from the applicant. Common pleas court abused its discretion in affirming the agency denial. A licensed Ohio attorney informed agency that she represented the applicant's authorized representative for Medicaid purposes and was requesting a review hearing on behalf of the applicant. The letter was supported by documents establishing the client's status as an authorized representative, including a designation of authorization form signed by the applicant's power of attorney and a copy of the power of attorney.

Appellant appeals his conviction and sentence for vehicular assault. There was sufficient evidence to convict and it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because several eyewitnesses testified that appellant engaged in the passing maneuver in a no-passing zone while navigating a hill and curve in the road where the view of oncoming traffic was considerably obstructed. The trial court did not err ordering appellant to pay restitution because there was some evidence in the record that the trial court considered appellant's present and future ability to pay. The imposition of mandatory postrelease control was contrary to law because appellant was convicted of a third-degree vehicular assault offense and the offense is neither a sexual offense, nor an offense of violence, as required in R.C. 2967.28(B) for mandatory postrelease control.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial where the prosecutor's comments did not interfere with appellant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in admitting an exhibit which was properly authenticated through witness testimony. The trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress where the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent and the evidence was in plain view.

The trial court did not seat an unfair jury where potential jurors acknowledged that appellant had the right to not testify and that such decision could not be used against him in any way. Appellant's convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and were supported by sufficient evidence where the victim testified that appellant massaged her breasts, buttocks, and vagina for multiple years, starting when she was around five years old. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the state to use a drawing of an anatomically-correct child so that the victim could identify what she called certain body parts pointed to by the state where the chart was relevant, depicted a child's body accurately, and was not confusing to the jury. The trial court's consecutive sentence was properly imposed where the court's sentence was not contrary to law because the trial court considered all requisite statutory factors and sentenced appellant within the statutory range for a third degree fe

Appellant's conviction for felonious assault was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the state presented testimony and video footage demonstrating that appellant and a fellow prison inmate attacked a third inmate, causing the third inmate to suffer a broken jaw and head lacerations.

Appellant failed to show that the trial counsel's representation fell below the standards required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments under both the United States and Ohio Constitutions resulting in an unknowing and involuntary plea.

Guilty Pleas Final Appealable Order Missing Transcripts

Post Conviction Relief- Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Matters outside the Record

Immunity for Political Subdivision R.C. 2744.03(A)(5)

collateral, Security Agreement, oral contract, statute of frauds

Trial court did not err by joining multiple offenses of violating a civil protection order for trial because the evidence regarding each offense was simple and direct the fact that the jury convicted on one offense and could not reach a verdict on the other demonstrated it was capable of distinguishing between the evidence as to each offense. Claim of judicial bias was not raised before the proper court because appellant did not file an affidavit of disqualification of the trial judge. Evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and the conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where evidence at trial established there was a valid protection order requiring appellant to remain 500 feet away from the protected person or any place she was likely to be and there was testimony that appellant was seen at a stop sign on the street where the protected person's residence was located, less than 500 feet away. Copy of a grocery store receipt purporting to show appellant was not at the claimed location at the alleged time was not admissible under the business record exception to the hearsay rule when appellant could not present the custodian of records or other qualified witness to testify about creation of the receipt. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim relying on matters outside the record was not appropriate on direct appeal.

Magistrate's decision adopted. The magistrate appropriately found the Bureau of Sentence Computation did not abuse its discretion in how it applied relator's jail time credit. No objections filed. Writ of mandamus denied.

The court overrules relator's objections to the magistrate's decision to grant respondent's motion to dismiss relator's request for writ of mandamus and prohibition. A common criteria which must be met in order to grant a request for a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition is that there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Here, there exist adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law and therefore the criteria for mandamus and prohibition are not met. Accordingly, the court overrules relator's objections and adopts the decision of the magistrate as its own.

The defendant's conviction for felonious assault was sufficiently supported and not against the manifest weight of the evidence where, despite a dispute in the record about who struck the first blow in the altercation, he, a 46-year-old intoxicated carpenter, repeatedly stabbed an unarmed 15-year-old boy. The defendant's conviction for tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient evidence where, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it was reasonable to infer that his decision to wash his bloody clothing was made with purpose to impair its use as evidence.

Due to appellant's failure to adhere to the Ohio Appellate Rules, appellate court did not address appellant's arguments.

The trial court did not err when it granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

Relator's petition for writ of mandamus is sua sponte dismissed for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of R.C. 2969.25. Relator's motion for default judgment held moot, and relator ordered to pay costs.

On certfication of default.

competency, motion to withdraw, guilty plea, restoration, jail time credit, allied offenses, merger

motion to vacate, void judgment, Crim.R. 43, resentencing

statute of limitations, pro se, property damage, raised below

abduction – sexual battery – R.C. 2905.02(A)(1) – R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) – other acts evidence – relevant – substantially more prejudicial than probative – character evidence – manifest weight – consecutive sentences

Habeas Corpus, R.C. 2969.25, R.C. 2725

R.C. 2945.40–person mentally ill subject to court order under R.C. 5122.01(B)(4) trial court's finding that defendant is a mentally ill person subject to court order reversed and remanded when record unclear whether trial court first considered whether defendant has a mental illness as defined in R.C. 5122.01(A).

UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT – DEBTOR-CREDITOR – ATTORNEY FEES: The trial court erred in granting judgment against a transferee and awarding attorney fees to creditors under the Ohio Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act where there was no evidence in the record to demonstrate that the transferee was liable to the creditors for the debt on their underlying claim.

OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS – EVIDENCE: Defendant's conviction for obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31(A) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence showed that defendant repeatedly refused to comply with the police officer's orders, walked toward the officer with an uncapped syringe in his hand, and forced the response team to physically restrain him.

PROCEDURE/RULES – JUGDMENT: Once the defendants filed an answer in the action, the trial court erred in awarding plaintiffs' default judgment on the ground that defendants failed to appear at trial the court should have proceeded with an ex parte trial and required plaintiffs to provide proof on all the essential elements of their claims.

Misdemeanor sentence aggravated menacing criminal damaging restitution contempt criminal civil indirect direct due process hearing opportunity notice sentence moot served judicial bias. The record did not support defendant's claim of judicial bias. The trial court erred by imposing an order of restitution without holding an evidentiary hearing. The trial court abused its discretion by finding the defendant in indirect contempt of court without providing notice and the opportunity to be heard. Defendant's challenge to his sentence is moot because he has completed his jail term.

Administrative appeal R.C. Chapter 2506 standard of review. In an administrative appeal under R.C. Chapter 2506, a trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. In this case, the trial court instituted policy requirements contrary to the express provisions of the county's policies and procedures manual as applied by the hearing officer during the administrative action and the trial court discussed factual issues beyond what was considered by the Commission in reversing the Commission's decision, and accordingly, the court applied the incorrect standard of review.

Rape kidnapping importuning weight of evidence sufficiency of the evidence oral rape penetration force substantial impairment allied offenses merger Ruff analysis plain error. There is sufficient evidence in support of the convictions, and the trial court did not plainly err by failing to merge the substantial impairment and forcible rape convictions because although the crimes were committed in a limited time frame, the conduct constituting the commission of the offenses was separate and distinct as contemplated under State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892.

Third-party complaint, jury demand, motion for new trial, manifest weight of the evidence, wrongfully imprisoned individual, R.C. 2743.48. The trial court did not err when it dismissed the state's third-party complaint against the appellee's daughter, because she does not have a legally protected interest in rights that are the subject matter of the action. The trial court did not err when it denied the state's jury demand, because the Constitution does not entitle all civil litigants to a trial by jury. The trial court did not err when it denied the state's motion for a new trial. The trial court judgment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence when it certified the appellee as a wrongfully imprisoned individual as defined by R.C. 2743.48.

Involuntary administration of medications or treatment restore sanity R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) R.C. 2945.38 length of evaluation statutory limits mootness doctrine dismissal. In light of the fact that the trial court has concluded that appellant's competency cannot be restored within the statutory time frame during the pendency of this appeal, the sole issue advanced in this appeal is moot and the matter is dismissed.

Rape R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) weight of the evidence sufficiency penetration evidentiary objections mistrial. The victim's testimony demonstrating penetration for the purposes of the substantial impairment rape was sufficient, and the defendant has not demonstrated his conviction is against the weight of the evidence. Further, the trial court's decision to overrule a motion for a mistrial after the trial court sustained objections to three unsolicited statements by a witness was not in error.

Search and seizure 4th Amendment investigative stop Terry stop probable cause automobile exception. The automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment permitted the search of the vehicle. The police officers had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle based on the reliable information provided by the witness and the defendant's confession to being a convicted felon — the trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress the firearm and drugs seized through the search of the vehicle.

R.C. 2919.25(A) Cleveland Codified Ordinances 621.08(a). The city presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed domestic violence but it did not present sufficient evidence of unlawful restraint.

Summary judgment premises liability negligence. Baldwin Wallace is not liable for injuries sustained on public sidewalk abutting its campus.

Trial court improperly Ordered Community Control Sentence to Run Consecutive to Felony Prison Sentence Holding of State V Hitchcock Applied

Manifest Weight, Evid.R. 609 Prosecutorial Misconduct Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

res judicata, successive petition for post conviction relief

Trial court properly removed incorrect imposition of post-relief control via nunc pro tunc entry. Plain error analysis is only available on direct appeal.Merger argument is not a void sentencing issue. Merger argument not raised at trial level or on direct appeal is barred by res judicata

Trial court decisions denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion new trial affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by precluding plaintiff from admitting certain interrogatory responses in her case-in-chief. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting defendant's experts to testify. Assignment of error alleging error in grant of summary judgment to secondary defendant was moot where jury verdict which was affirmed on appeal had concluded that primary defendant was not the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's decedent.

The trial court did not err in accepting appellant's guilty plea as it was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made the trial court did not err in sentencing appellant to the mandatory maximum sentence and the mandatory maximum sentence is not cruel and unusual punishment. Having found no other nonfrivolous issues for appeal, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Trial court decision denying motion for new trial affirmed. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in its jury selection procedures, as those procedures were within the parameters established by Civ.R. 47. Defendant's motion for new trial did not demonstrate an irregularity in the proceedings, and because defendant fully participated in jury selection and was warned that it would be passing on its final peremptory challenge prior to actually passing on that challenge, trial court's decision to deny motion for new trial was not an abuse of its discretion.

State's appeal. The trial court erred when it granted appellee's motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The total number of days attributable to the State for speedy trial purposes was only 66 days. Because fewer than 90 days had passed pursuant to R.C. 2945.71(B)(2), appellee's statutory speedy trial rights were not violated. Furthermore, the record does not establish that the delay in prosecution was unreasonable or unjustified given appellee's pending competency evaluation and hospitalization outside of Montgomery County. Judgment reversed and remanded. (Hall, J., concurring.)

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's petition for postconviction relief in reliance on the doctrine of res judicata. Although the trial court arguably misconstrued the basis of the petition, the issues raised by appellant were adjudicated previously, or were forfeited because appellant could have, but did not, raise them in past appeals and petitions for postconviction relief. Judgment affirmed.

Husband and wife, who are now deceased, entered into an agreement with a retirement community pursuant to which they made an original deposit in the amount of $108,400. Wife predeceased husband. After husband's death, the value of his estate included $48,780 attributable to a refund paid by the retirement community from the couple's original deposit. Pursuant to the definition of "estate" in R.C. 5162.21(A)(1)(b) (non-probate assets), as well as the definition of "time of death" in R.C. 5162.21(A)(5), wife's ownership interest in her half of the refund was not extinguished by her death and endured post-mortem. Accordingly, it was a quantifiable non-probate asset which the Ohiio Department of Medicaid (ODM) was entitled to recover from husband's estate pursuant to a properly filed estate recovery claim for Medicaid medical assistance benefits previously paid on behalf of wife. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of ODM. Judgment affirmed.

Anders appeal. An argument regarding the trial court's compliance with Crim.R. 11 during the appellant's plea hearing is wholly frivolous. An independent review of the record reveals no non-frivolous issues for appellate review. Judgment affirmed.

Change of Plea-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Appeal of order granting motion for default judgment/Personal jurisdiction

Ineffective Asst. of Trial Counsel Speedy Trial Confrontation Clause Sixth Amend. Right to Jury of Peers

CRIMINAL-POST RELEASE CONTROL NOTIFICATION - The trial court's use of the phrase "up to" rather than "a period of" when imposing a mandatory five-year term of post-release control did not render the imposition of post-release control void where the totality of the circumstances indicate the appellant was placed on notice he was subject to a mandatory term of five years of post-release control. In considering the totality of the circumstances concerning a trial court's imposition of post-release control, reviewing courts may look to other documents, such as plea agreements, sentencing hearing transcripts, and judgment entries that alone may be insufficient to properly impost post-release control.

OVI-R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d)-MANIFEST WEIGHT - Where the record fails to indicate the jury lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice in weighing the evidence, considering the credibility of witnesses, and resolving conflicts in the evidence, the defendant's conviction for OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d) is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The weight to be given evidence is for the trier of the fact, and the jury - as the trier of fact - is free to accept or reject any and all evidence and to assess witness credibility.

Summary judgment in favor of appellees was improper because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether appellees breached their duty to maintain their store in a reasonably safe condition.

Trial court did not err in dismissing defendant's petition for postconviction relief. Counsel's failure to call an expert witness or seek a continuance of the trial date did not amount to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The trial court did not err in determining the scope and extent of the easement, and in determining that the appellees adversely possessed portions of the easement in dispute.

Criminal law—Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)—A trial court must explain to a defendant the "maximum penalty involved" when accepting a plea of guilty or no contest—When a trial court explained to a defendant sex offender who entered a plea of guilty or no contest that he is subject to the sex-offender-registration scheme of R.C. Chapter 2950 as part of his penalty, the defendant is entitled to have his conviction vacated for lack of a more complete explanation only if he demonstrates prejudice.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Court of appeals erred in denying complaint on grounds that it did not invoke Sup.R. 44 through 47 as basis for request for court records—Generally, it is not necessary to cite a particular rule or statute in support of a public-records request until requester attempts to satisfy more demanding standard applicable when seeking writ of mandamus to compel compliance with request—State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan overruled to extent it conflicts with this decision—Unlike case documents, administrative documents are subject to Sup.R. 44 through 47 regardless of when created—Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded for court of appeals to apply Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, to determine whether requester is entitled to writ of mandamus to compel clerk of courts to produce requested journal entries and whether requester is entitled to statutory damages and court costs.

The writ of mandamus to reopen sentencing is granted where the crime victim presented evidence that she had suffered economic loss in an underlying criminal matter, but no restitution was granted, and no hearing was held on the matter. The right to restitution under Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution does not conflict with R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) and therefore, since no restitution hearing was held, this court may grant the writ to reopen sentencing.

The trial court abused its discretion modifying reciprocal domestic violence civil protection orders after remand because one of the conditions in the orders, as amended, was unreasonable given the facts of the case.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to appellees, a roofing company and its principal owner, where appellant did not have a personal stake in the outcome of the action given the fact that appellant did not sign the contract subject to the litigation and did not have an ownership interest in the property upon which the contract dealt.

The trial court's sentence was not contrary to law where the court sentenced appellant within the statutory range, imposed postrelease control, and considered the statutory factors. The trial court's findings were supported by the record where appellant had an extensive criminal history and added to the drug epidemic by selling methamphetamine.

medical authorizations, privileged documents, motion to compel, final appealable order, R.C. 2505.02, in camera review

Insurance policies—Breach of warranty—Void ab initio—R.C. 2721.03—Declaratory judgment—Language in automobile-insurance policy stating policy could be rendered void ab initio if insured's warranty proved untrue was sufficient warning—Insurer may maintain action for declaratory judgment for purposes of establishing its rights and obligations under insurance policy—Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

Mandamus—Public-records law—When there is no evidence rebutting a public-records custodian's affidavit claiming that the requested records do not exist, the public-records custodian satisfies his obligations under R.C. 149.43—Writ denied.

In order to impose consecutive sentences, the trial court must find that one of the factors listed in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a-c) is applicable. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b) does not require the multiple offenses to have been committed in one course of conduct.

Counsel was not ineffective by advising client to admit to community control violations when the State had competent, credible evidence to show that the violation had occurred.

Defendant-appellant's guilty pleas were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Because defendant-appellant's sentence was recommended jointly and is authorized by law, defendant-appellant's sentence is not subject to review.

The defendant-appellant's sentence is not contrary to law.

Trial court's determination awarding summary judgment to Board on landowners' counterclaims of, inter alia, abuse of eminent domain authority is affirmed. Trial court properly dismissed counterclaims to appropriation petittion and properly overruled landowners' motion to dismiss the appropriation petition on grounds that the petition did not comply with Revised Code Chapter 163.

CRIMINAL LAW - trial court does not err upon overruling objection to hearsay testimony when evidence previously admitted without objection theft conviction supported by sufficient evidence and not against manifest weight of evidence.

CIVIL - breach of lease motion to dismiss App.R. 16(A) error abandoned summary judgment mootness or harmless error denial on legal grounds Civ.R. 56(C) evidence intestate R.C. 2105.06 vesting of title upon death R.C. 2113.61 certificate of transfer R.C. 2103.02 dower directed verdict Civ.R. 50(A)(4) failure to file a transcript or statement of the evidence App.R. 9 manifest weight harmless error Civ.R. 61 erroneous basis for correct judgment.

Appeal of consecutive prison sentences

Unemployment-contribution rate—The language in R.C. 4141.24(G)(1) requires concurrent ownership, management, or control of both employers at the time that the business or trade is transferred—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and trial court's judgment reinstated.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, i.e., committing an illegal act that adversely reflects on the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness—Two-year suspension.

Relator's mandamus request was properly resolved by a magistrate's grant of summary judgment in favor of parole authorities, as relator did not show a clear legal right to relief because he did not show his allegations were credible and supported by evidence, and that the material relied on during the parole hearing was substantively inaccurate.

Where the Industrial Commission had evidence to support its view that the employee was not fired for assaulting his employer, the court will not overturn that credibility assessment. The Commission did not abuse its discretion in awarding temporary total disability after finding that the employer did not prove that the injured worker voluntarily had abandoned his employment. Objections to Magistrate's decision overruled writ of mandamus denied.

The trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to defendant. Although contractual release language did not bar a contract claim that arose later, plaintiff knew that defendant calculated her production differently than she did when she agreed that defendant would have "sole discretion" over the basis for that calculation. And plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim for conversion as to files that she in consultation with counsel turned over to defendant. Objections overruled judgment affirmed.

CHILDREN — LEGAL CUSTODY — R.C. 2151.353 — BEST INTERESTS — JUV.R. 40: The juvenile court erred in sustaining father's objections to the magistrate's decision, rejecting the magistrate's decision, and granting legal custody of the child to father when the court applied the wrong legal standard and competent, credible evidence did not support the court's best interest determination because the court provided no contrary findings to those found by the magistrate and failed to explain in its decision that legal custody to father was in the child's best interest. The juvenile court did not err in finding father's objections to the magistrate's decision timely when the filing deadline fell on a legal holiday and father filed his objections the next day.

speedy trial, tolling, R.C. 2945.71, App.R. 16(A)

legal custody – best interest of the child – manifest weight of the evidence – plain error – failure to object – forfeit issue on appeal – six-month extension of temporary custody – continuance – abuse of discretion

small claims, municipal court, jurisdiction, R.C.1901.17, R.C. 1901.22, Civ. R. 13

motion to suppress – passenger – canine alert – marijuana – minor misdemeanor – probable cause to search – passenger search

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Presentence Investigation Maximum Sentence

Attorneys at law—Reciprocal discipline from the United States Tax Court—Indefinite suspension from the practice of law with reinstatement conditioned on reinstatement by the United States Tax Court—Gov.Bar R. V(11)(F)(4).

App.R. 26(B) application to reopen, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, timeliness, good cause, and misplaced reliance of appellate counsel. The court denied the App.R. 26(B) application to reopen as untimely. Reliance on appellate counsel does not state good cause for untimely filing.

En banc service by publication reasonable diligence internet search available steps circumstances default judgment motion to vacate affidavit counsel police report address insurance company inference rebut contradict R.C. 2703.14(L) Civ.R. 4.4(A) remand hearing damages. En banc decision held that an internet search is not a mandatory prerequisite to establishing reasonable diligence for service by publication but, instead, is just one of many available steps a party may endeavor to take in order to satisfy his burden under Civ.R. 4.4, and whether reasonable diligence has been exercised will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Panel decision affirmed trial court's denial of motion to vacate default judgment, except with regard damages. Service by publication was proper when the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, which stated that counsel had twice attempted service at the address provided in the police report and had tried to obtain a current address from defendant's insurance company, was sufficient to establish the exercise of reasonable diligence to locate defendant's address and to give rise to an inference of concealment, and the defendant failed to contradict the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence or to rebut the inference of concealment. Case was remanded for a hearing to determine the proper amount of damages.

Electronically monitored house arrest ("EMHA") jail sanction community control sanction jail-time credit R.C. 2949.08. Defendant-appellant's sentence to electronically monitored house arrest ("EMHA") was categorized as a jail sanction in the trial judge's journal entry. Defendant-appellant was therefore entitled to jail-time credit under R.C. 2949.08(C)(1) for his time served under the jail sanction. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied defendant-appellant's motion for jail-time credit based upon time served under EMHA.

Expert report Civ.R. 26 Loc.R. 21.1 separation of witnesses Evid.R. 615 office visit note hearsay medical records hospital records self-authenticating Evid.R. 902(10) R.C. 2317.422 business records exception Evid.R. 803(6) certification motion in limine failure to object leading questions. Trial court acted within its discretion in denying motion for separation of witnesses and allowing defense expert witness to read transcript of plaintiff's expert testimony where plaintiff failed to provide the defense with an expert report in advance of trial. Medical records of plaintiff's treating physician were admissible as self-authenticated business records because they were properly certified by the hospital. Trial court properly denied motion to exclude expert witness testimony where expert's testimony was consistent with opinions set forth in his expert report and addendum to the expert report.

Dismissal without prejudice for want for prosecution Civ.R. 41(B)(1) failure to appear for pretrial conference. Trial court abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's refiled complaint without prejudice for want for prosecution pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) after plaintiff's counsel failed to appear for a scheduled pretrial conference where dismissal had the effect of a dismissal with prejudice.

Crim.R. 32(B)/advisement of right to appeal voidable sentence resentencing hearing harmless error Crim.R. 52(B)/defects affecting substantial rights plain error Crim.R. 11 R.C. 2953.08(D)/appellate review/statutory range. The trial court's failure to advise appellant at appellant's sentencing hearing was harmless error. Appellant's sentence was not void, but rather voidable, and after appointment of counsel, appellant was able to file a timely appeal. The Crim.R. 11 colloquy does not require the trial court to inform a defendant that a guilty plea waives certain rights on appeal and thereby does not render the plea void.

Guilty plea, ineffective assistance of counsel mental health evaluation consecutive sentences. Appellant claims, for the first time on appeal and without offering any evidence from the record in support, that his trial counsel's performance was deficient in failing to request a psychiatric evaluation for sanity and failing to request evaluation for mental health docket eligibility. The claim is without merit because there is no indication in the record to show that such a mental health evaluation was warranted. Regarding appellant's consecutive sentences, our review shows the trial court made the requisite statutory findings and the findings are supported by the record.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)/appellate review R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)/consecutive sentences. The trial court made the required statutory findings at appellant's sentencing hearing and incorporated those findings into the trial court's sentencing entry. Appellant's sentence is not contrary to law, and appellant has failed to show that the record does not support the trial court's findings.

Crim.R. 32.1 presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea abuse of discretion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant's Crim.R. 32.1 presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court conducted a complete and impartial hearing on the motion and gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal request. Appellant was represented by highly competent counsel, he expressed his satisfaction with trial counsel at the time of his plea, and he voluntarily chose to accept a favorable plea deal.

Guilty plea negotiated plea agreement recommended sentence deviation withdraw. - Where a defendant has an expectation that the trial court will impose the recommended sentence that was the basis for the plea, and the trial court does not put the defendant on notice that it may deviate from the recommended sentence, the trial court errs in not giving the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea once the court determines that it will not be imposing the recommended sentence.

Murder with Firearm Specifications

legal and permanent custody

Court of appeals' judgment affirmed on the authority of State v. Dibble.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client—Two-year suspension.

The court found that plaintiff proved his vehicle received damages and those damages occurred because of plaintiff's vehicle coming into contact with a dangerous condition on a road maintained by ODOT, specifically wet tar on SR 104. The court determined that ODOT failed to property manage the contractor and ensure the safety of the public within the construction zone.

Defendant admitted liability for an accident involving plaintiff's vehicle being struck by unsecured debris from an ODOT dump truck on US 68. However, defendant alleged that plaintiff was contributorily negligent and thus defendant should only be liable for half the cost of the repairs. The court found plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Therefore, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for $4,914.63.

Plaintiff alleged violations of the ADA stemming from an incident where he was placed in a non-ADA complaint segregation cell. The court found that plaintiff's ADA claim failed because he did not provide evidence of a disability entitling him to the protections of the ADA. Further, the court determined that plaintiff was not denied a service, program, or activity under the ADA. Further, the court found that plaintiff was not entitled to his medical records because he did not submit a written request for them. Judgment was entered for the defendant.